VILLAMARIA vs. CA (G.R. No.
165881 April 19, control over the chattel leased but the lessee is still
2016)
FACTS:
Petitioner Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of
Villamaria Motors, a sole proprietorship engaged in
assembling passenger jeepneys with a public utility
franchise. By 1995, Villamaria stopped assembling
jeepneys and retained only nine, four of which he
operated by employing drivers on a "boundary basis."
One of those drivers was respondent Bustamante.
Bustamante remitted P450.00 a day to Villamaria as
boundary and kept the residue of his daily earnings as
compensation for driving the vehicle. . In August
1997, Villamaria verbally agreed to sell the jeepney to
Bustamante under a “boundary-hulog scheme”, where
Bustamante would remit to Villamaria P550 a day for
a period of 4 years; Bustamane would then become the
owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the same
under Villamaria’s franchise, but with Php 10,000 as
downpayment for the jeepney.
Villarama executed a contract entitled “Kasunduan ng
Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary-
Hulog”. In this contract, the parties agreed that if
Bustamante failed to pay the boundary-hulog,
Villamaria would hold on to the vehicles until
Bustamante paid such arrears to which it includes a
penalty of 50 pesos per day in case Bustamante failed
to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a period of one
(1) week, and which results to the kasunduan being
ceased and the return of the vehicle to the petitioner.
In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had
the same arrangement with Villamaria failed to pay
their respective boundary-hulog. This prompted
Villamaria to serve a “Paalala” but to no avail. On July
24, 2000. Villamaria took back the jeepney driven by
Bustamante and barred the latter from driving the
vehicle. Bustamante filed a complaint for Illegal
Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petition.
Bustamante appealed the decision to NLRC insisting
that the “Kasunduan” did not extinguish the employer-
employee relationship but the NLRC dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. The case was elevated to the
CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and awarded
Bustamante separation pay and backwages. Hence,
this petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the existence of a boundary-hulog
agreement negates the employer-employee
relationship between vendee and vendor.
HELD:
YES. Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual
juridical relationship is created; that of employer-
employee and vendor-vendee. The Kasanduan did not
extinguish the employer employee relationship of the
parties existing before the execution of said deed.
a. Under this system the owner/operator exercises
control and supervision over the driver. It is unlike in
lease of chattels where the lessor loses complete
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ultimately responsible for the consequences of its use.
The management of the business is still in the hands of
the owner/operator, who, being the holder of the
certificate of public convenience, must see to it that the
driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising
and regulatory authority, and the rules promulgated
with regard to the business operations.
b. The driver performs activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the owner/operator. Under the Kasunduan, respondent
was required to remit Php 550 daily to petitioner, an
amount which represented the boundary of petitioner
as well as respondent’s partial payment (hulog) of the
purchase price of the jeepney. Thus, the daily
remittances also had a dual purpose: that of petitioner’s
boundary
and respondent’s partial payment (hulog) for the
vehicle.
c. The obligation is not novated by an instrument that
expressly recognizes the old one,
changes only the terms of payment and adds other
obligations not incompatible with the old
provisions or where the contract merely supplements
the previous one.
d. The existence of an employment relation is not
dependent on how the worker is paid but on the
presence or absence of control over the means and
method of the work. The amount earned in excess of
the “boundary hulog” is equivalent to wages and the
fact that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in
the Kasunduan did not mean that private respondent
never exercised such power, or could not exercise such
power.
ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-
25984 Oct. 30, 1970)
FACTS:
The complaint for unfair labor practice for violation of
section 4 (a) subsections (4) and (6) of the Industrial
Peace Act, was filed by the acting prosecutor of
respondent court against petitioner, upon the charges
of respondent union that fifteen of the union members,
employed as drivers and helpers of petitioner, were
being discriminated against by petitioner's not
affording the benefits and privileges enjoyed by all the
other employees for no justifiable reason other than
their union membership; and that the union had asked
petitioner to negotiate with respect to said fifteen
drivers and helpers who were being excluded from the
benefits of their subsisting collective bargaining
agreement, but petitioner refused to do so. The union
prayed for a desistance order and that petitioner be
ordered to bargain collectively in good faith and to
grant the drivers and helpers the same benefits and
privileges extended to and enjoyed by all its other
employees.
In answer, petitioner denied the unfair labor practice
imputed to it and countered that the fifteen drivers and
helpers were not its employees, but separate and
independent employees of its salesmen and
propagandists who exercised discretion and control
over their selection, employment, compensation,
suspension and dismissal.
It is admitted that respondent union is sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative for all
the employees of petitioner and that collective
bargaining agreements had been successively signed
between the union and petitioner on March 14, 1962
and on February 18, 1964. Both the union and
petitioner exhausted steps 1 to 3 of the grievance
machinery provided in the collective bargaining
agreement with regard to the union's claim that the
benefits thereof should be extended to the fifteen
drivers and helpers and the petitioner's contrary stand
that they were not its "employees." Hence, as they
could not resolve by conferences this dispute, the
union invoked the final step in the grievance
machinery, after written notice thereof, and elevated
the issue of the true status of said drivers and helpers
to respondent court through its complaint for unfair
labor practice.
Respondent court in its decision: It is, therefore,
apparent that in truth and in fact, the respondent
corporation is the "employer" of the driver or helper
and not the salesman or propagandist who is merely
expressly authorized by the former to engage such
services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fifteen helpers and drivers are
employees of the petitioner?
HELD:
Petitioner's appeal must be dismissed. It is speciously
grounded on mere form rather than the realities of the
case. In form, respondent court gently treated
petitioner's scheme to deprive the fifteen drivers and
helpers of their rightful status as employees and did not
denounce it as a betrayal of the salutary purpose and
objective of the Industrial Peace Act, but instead
remarked that since the grant of employees' benefits
hinged on the court's decision on their status as such
employees, petitioner "could not have been guilty of
refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act." The
reality, however, is that respondent court expressly
found that "in truth and in fact, (petitioner) corporation
is the "employer" of the driver or helper and not the
salesman or propagandist who is merely expressly
authorized by the former to engage such services."
Petitioner's failure to comply with its duty under the
collective bargaining agreement to extend the
privileges, rights and benefits thereof to the drivers and
helpers as its actual employees clearly amounted to the
commission of an unfair labor practice. And
consequently respondent court properly ordered in, its
judgment that said drivers and helpers "should be
given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and
benefits that are given to all the other regular
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employees retroactive as of the effectivity of the first
agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present." In
ordering, respondent court but discharging its function
under section 5(c) of the Act, supra, to order the
cessation of an unfair labor practice and "take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this
Act."
Failure on petitioner's part to live up in good faith to
the terms of its collective bargaining agreement by
denying the privileges and benefits thereof to the
fifteen drivers and helpers through its device of trying
to pass them off as "employees" of its salesmen and
propagandists was a serious violation of petitioner's
duty to bargain collectively and constituted unfair
labor practice in any language.
ORLANDO FARM GROWERS vs NLRC (G.R.
No. 129076 –Nov. 25, 1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Farms Growers Association, with
co-petitioner Glicerio Añover as its President, is an
association of landowners engaged in the production
of export quality bananas located in Kinamayan, Sto.
Tomas, Davao del Norte, established for the sole
purpose of dealing collectively with Stanfilco on
matters concerning technical services, canal
maintenance, irrigation and pest control, among
others. Respondents, on the other hand, were hired as
farm workers by several member-landowners but were
made to perform functions as packers and harvesters
in the plantation of petitioner association.
On Jan. 8, 1993 to July 30, 1994, respondents were
dismissed and several complaints were filed against
petitioner for illegal dismissal and monetary benefits.
Based on similar grounds, the same were consolidated
in the office of Labor Arbiter which rendered that the
dismissal of 20 complainants is illegal and ordered
Orlando to reinstate them immediately to their former
or equivalent positions, and to PAY individual
complainants their respective back wages and other
benefits.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the same in toto in a decision dated
December 26, 1996. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied on February 25, 1997, petitioner
filed the instant petition for certiorari. Petitioner
alleged that the NLRC erred in finding that
respondents were its employees and not of the
individual landowners which fact can easily be
deduced from the payments made by the latter of
respondent's Social Security System (SSS)
contributions. Moreover, it could have never exercised
the power of control over them with regard to the
manner and method by which the work was to be
accomplished, which authority remain vested with the
landowners despite becoming members thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist an employer-employee
relationship.
HELD:
YES. The contention that petitioner, being an
unregistered association and having been formed
solely to serve as an effective medium for dealing
collectively with Stanfilco, does not exist in law and,
therefore, cannot be considered an employer, is
misleading. This assertion can easily be dismissed by
reference to Article 212 (e) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which defines an employer as any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. Following a careful scrutiny of the said
provision, the Court concludes that the law does not
require an employer to be registered before he may
come within the purview of the Labor Code, consistent
with the established rule in statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. To do otherwise would bring about a
situation whereby employees are denied, not only
redress of their grievances, but, more importantly, the
protection and benefits accorded to them by law if their
employer happens to be an unregistered association.
It is a settled doctrine that an employer-employee
relationship can be deduced from the existence of the
following elements: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employee's conduct.
CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS vs.
LAGUESMA (G.R. No. 113524 Feb. 24, 1998)
FACTS:
Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union members
(petitioners) worked as cargadors for Corfarms
Grains,Inc. (private respondent). They loaded,
unloaded and piled sacks of palay from the warehouses
to the cargo trucks and from the cargo trucks to the
buyers. They were paid by private respondent on a
piece rate basis. When Corfarm denied some benefits
to these cargadores, they organized a union. Upon
learning of its formation, Corfarm barred its members
from working with them and replaced them with non-
members of the union. Petitioner filed [a petition] for
certification election before the Department of Labor
and Employment and also filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Corfarm denies that it had the power of
control, rationalizing that petitioner's members were
'street-hired' workers engaged from time to time to do
loading and unloading work. There was no
superintendent-in-charge to give orders and there were
no gate passes issued, nor tools, equipment and
paraphernalia issued by Corfarm for
loading/unloading. Furthermore they contended that
employer-employee relationship is negated by the fact
that they offer and actually perform loading and
unloading work for various rice mills in Pangasinan.
Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito issued his decision
finding the dismissal of petitioner's members illegal.
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Public Respondent Laguesma premised the dismissal
of the petition for certification election on the absence
of an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner's members and private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship
between the CPWU members and Respondent
Corfarm exist.
HELD:
Yes. There is employer-employee relationship. To
determine the existence of an employer-employee
relation, this Court has consistently applied the "four-
fold" test which has the following elements: (1) the
power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power
to dismiss, and (4) the power to control - the last being
the most important element. Caurdanetaan Piece
Workers Union members (petitioners) performed work
which is directly related, necessary and vital to the
operations of Corfarm. Moreover, Corfarm did not
even allege, much less prove, that petitioner's members
have "substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, [and] work premises,
among others. To be considered as independent
contractors. Furthermore, said respondent did not
contradict petitioner's allegation that it paid wages
directly to these workers without the intervention of
any third-party independent contractor. It also wielded
the power of dismissal over petitioners; in fact, its
exercise of this power was the progenitor of the illegal
dismissal case. Clearly, the workers are not
independent contractors. Assuming arguendo that they
did work with other rice mills, this was required by the
imperative of meeting their basic needs.
MARAGUINOT vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 120969 Jan.
22, 1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr. maintains that he
was employed by private respondents on 18 July 1989
as part of the filming crew with a salary of P375.00 per
week. About four months later, he was designated
Assistant Electrician with a weekly salary of P400.00,
which was increased to P450.00 in May 1990. In June
1991, he was promoted to the rank of Electrician with
a weekly salary of P475.00, which was increased to
P539.00 in September 1991. Petitioner Paulino Enero,
on his part, claims that private respondents employed
him in June 1990 as a member of the shooting crew
with a weekly salary of P375.00, which was increased
to P425.00 in May 1991, then to P475.00 on 21
December 1991.
Petitioners' tasks consisted of loading, unloading and
arranging movie equipment in the shooting area as
instructed by the cameraman, returning the equipment
to Viva Films' warehouse, assisting in the "fixing" of
the lighting system, and performing other tasks that the
cameraman and/or director may assign. Sometime in
May 1992, petitioners sought the assistance of their
supervisors, Mrs. Alejandria Cesario, to facilitate their
request that private respondents adjust their salary in
accordance with the minimum wage law. In June 1992,
Mrs. Cesario informed petitioners that Mr. Vic del
Rosario would agree to increase their salary only if
they signed a blank employment contract. As
petitioners refused to sign, private respondents forced
Enero to go on leave in June 1992, then refused to take
him back when he reported for work on 20 July 1992.
Meanwhile, Maraguinot was dropped from the
company payroll from 8 to 21 June 1992, but was
returned on 22 June 1992. He was again asked to sign
a blank employment contract, and when he still
refused, private respondents terminated his services on
20 July 1992. Petitioners thus sued for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter.
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Viva
Films is the trade name of Viva Productions, Inc., and
that it is primarily engaged in the distribution and
exhibition of movies - but not in the business of
making movies; in the same vein, private respondent
Vic del Rosario is merely an executive producer, i.e.,
the financier who invests a certain sum of money for
the production of movies distributed and exhibited by
VIVA.
Private respondents assert that they contract persons
called "producers" - also referred to as "associate
producers" - to "produce" or make movies for private
respondents; and contend that petitioners are project
employees of the association producers who, in turn,
act as independent contractors. As such, there is no
employer-employee relationship between petitioners
and private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists in this case.
HELD:
YES. The employer-employee relationship between
petitioners and VIVA can further be established by the
"control test." While four elements are usually
considered in determining the existence of an
employment relationship, namely: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer's power to control of the employee's
conduct, the most important element is the employer's
control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the
result of the work to be done but also as to the means
and methods to accomplish the same. 27 These four
elements are present here.
VIVA's control is evident in its mandate that the end
result must be a "quality film acceptable to the
company." The means and methods to accomplish the
result are likewise controlled by VIVA, viz., the movie
project must be finished within schedule without
exceeding the budget, and additional expenses must be
justified; certain scenes are subject to change to suit
the taste of the company; and the Supervising
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Producer, the "eyes and ears" of VIVA and del
Rosario, intervenes in the movie-making process by
assisting the associate producer in solving problems
encountered in making the film.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE INSURANCE CORP. vs.
JUDICO (G.R. No. 73887 Dec. 29, 1989)
FACTS:
Honorato Judico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Grepalife, a duly organized insurance firm,
before the NLRC on August 27, 1982. Said complaint
prayed for award of money claims consisting of
separation pay, unpaid salary and 13th month pay,
refund of cash bond, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed to the NLRC
when a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
employer-employee relations did not exist between the
parties but ordered Grepalife to pay complainant the
sum of Pl,000.00 by reason of Christian Charity.
On appeal, said decision was reversed by the NLRC
ruling that complainant is a regular employee as
defined under Art. 281 of the Labor Code and
declaring the appeal of Grepalife questioning the
legality of the payment of Pl,000.00 to complainant
moot and academic. Petitioner company moved to
reconsider, which was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employer-employee relationship is
present in this case.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner admits that on June 9, 1976, private
respondent Judico entered into an agreement of agency
with petitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent
attached to the industrial life agency in Cebu City.
Petitioner defines a debit agent as "an insurance agent
selling/servicing industrial life plans and policy
holders. Such admission is in line with the findings of
public respondent that as such debit agent, private
respondent Judico had definite work assignments
including but not limited to collection of premiums
from policy holders and selling insurance to
prospective clients. Public respondent NLRC also
found out that complainant was initially paid P 200. 00
as allowance for thirteen (13) weeks regardless of
production and later a certain percentage denominated
as sales reserve of his total collections but not lesser
than P 200.00. One salient point in the determination
of employer-employee relationship which cannot be
easily ignored is the fact that the compensation that
these agents on commission received is not paid by the
insurance company but by the investor (or the person
insured). After determining the commission earned by
an agent on his sales the agent directly deducts it from
the amount he received from the investor or the person
insured and turns over to the insurance company the
amount invested after such deduction is made.
The test therefore is whether the "employer" controls
or has reserved the right to control the "employee" not
only as to the result of the work to be done but also as
to the means and methods by which the same is to be
accomplished. Applying the aforementioned test to the
case at bar, we can readily see that the element of
control by the petitioner on Judico was very much
present. The record shows that petitioner Judico
received a definite minimum amount per week as his
wage known as "sales reserve" wherein the failure to
maintain the same would bring him back to a
beginner's employment with a fixed weekly wage of P
200.00 for thirteen weeks regardless of production. He
was assigned a definite place in the office to work on
when he is not in the field; and in addition to his
canvassing work he was burdened with the job of
collection.
MAKATI HABERDASHERY vs. NLRC (G.R. No.
83380-81 Nov. 15, 1989)
FACTS:
Private respondents have been working for petitioner
Makati Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors, seamstress,
sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They
are paid on a piece-rate basis except Maria Angeles
and Leonila Serafina who are paid on a monthly basis.
In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily
allowance of three (P 3.00) pesos provided they report
for work before 9:30 a.m. everyday. Private
respondents are required to work from or before 9:30
a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. from Monday to Saturday
and during peak periods even on Sundays and
holidays.
On July 20, 1984, the Sandigan ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, a labor organization of the respondent
workers, filed a complaint for (a) underpayment of the
basic wage; (b) underpayment of living allowance; (c)
non-payment of overtime work; (d) non-payment of
holiday pay; (e) non-payment of service incentive pay;
(f) 13th month pay; and (g) benefits provided for under
Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
During the pendency of the case private respondent
Dioscoro Pelobello with Salvador Rivera, a salesman
of petitioner Haberdashery, left an open package
which contain a "jusi" barong tagalog. When
confronted, Pelobello replied that the same was
ordered by respondent Casimiro Zapata for his
customer. Zapata allegedly admitted that he copied the
design of petitioner Haberdashery. But in the
afternoon, when again questioned about said barong,
Pelobello and Zapata denied ownership of the same. A
memorandum was issued to each of them to explain
but both respondents allegedly did not submit their
explanation and did not report for work. Hence, they
were dismissed by petitioners on February 4, 1985.
They countered by filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
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The labor arbiter rendered judgment finding
respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering
them to reinstate Pelobello and Zapata.
The first case on underpayment was dismissed for lack
of merit. Petitioners appealed to NLRC the latter
affirmed said decision but limited the back wages.
Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition which raised that the subject decision
erroneously concluded that an employer-employee
relationship exists between Haberdashery and
workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists between petitioner and respondents.
HELD:
YES. The first issue which is the pivotal issue in this
case is resolved in favor of private respondents. We
have repeatedly held in countless decisions that the test
of employer-employee relationship is four-fold: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4)
the power to control the employee's conduct. It is the
so called "control test" that is the most important
element. This simply means the determination of
whether the employer controls or has reserved the right
to control the employee not only as to the result of the
work but also as to the means and method by which
the same is to be accomplished.
The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most
important requisite of control is present. As gleaned
from the operations of petitioner, when a customer
enters into a contract with the haberdashery or its
proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be
a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to take
the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants,
coat or shirt as specified by the customer. Supervision
is actively manifested in all these aspects — the
manner and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORP.
vs. PAGALILAUAN (G.R. No. L-62909 April 18,
1989)
FACTS:
On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the
private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant." He
received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an
initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually
increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban
received a letter from the corporation informing him
that he would be considered terminated effective
October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to
perform his duties well. On October 6, 1980, Aban
filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was
illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the
NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition.
The petitioner contends that its relationship with Aban
is that of a client with his lawyer. It is its position that
"(a) lawyer as long as he is acting as such, as long as
he is performing acts constituting practice of law, can
never be considered an employee. His relationship
with those to whom he renders services, as such
lawyer, can never be governed by the labor laws. For
a lawyer to so argue is not only demeaning to himself
(sic), but also his profession and to his brothers in the
profession."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an employer-employee
relationship between the petitioner corporation and
Aban.
HELD:
YES. A lawyer, like any other professional, may very
well be an employee of a private corporation or even
of the government. It is not unusual for a big
corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house
counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its
table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its
other officers and employees. At the same time, it may
also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel
on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often
work closely together but one group is made up of
employees while the other is not. A similar
arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists,
public relations practitioners, and other professionals.
This Court has consistently ruled that the
determination of whether or not there is an employer-
employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the
manner of selection and engagement of the putative
employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the
presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4)
the presence or absence of a power to control the
putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-
control test has been held to be the decisive factor.
Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only
with legal matters involving the said corporation and
its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer
in processing appointment papers of employees. This
latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of
his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the
corporation.
The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner
paid Aban's wages, exercised its power to hire and fire
the respondent employee and more important,
exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and
functions of his work.
CITIZNES LEAGUE OF FREE WORKERS vs.
ABBAS (G.R. No. L-21212 Sept. 23, 1966)
FACTS:
On March 11, 1963, respondents-spouses owners and
operators of auto-calesas in Davao City, filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Davao to
restrain the Union and its members, who were drivers
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of the spouses in said business, from interfering with
its operation, from committing certain acts complained
of in connection therewith, and to recover damages.
The complaint alleged that the defendants used to lease
the auto-calesas of the spouses on a daily rental basis;
that, unable to get the spouses to recognize said
defendants as employees instead of lessees and to
bargain with it on that basis, the Union declared a
strike on February 20, 1963 and since then had
paralyzed plaintiffs' business operations through
threats, intimidation and violence. The complaint also
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction ex-parte restraining defendants therein from
committing said acts of violence and intimidation
during the pendency of the case.
On March 11, 1963 the respondent judge granted the
writ prayed for, while deferring action on petitioners'
motion to dissolve said writ to March 20 of the same
year. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice against the respondents-
spouses with the Court of Industrial Relations on the
ground, among others, of the latter's refusal to bargain
with them. On March 18, 1963, petitioners filed a
motion to declare the writ of preliminary injunction
void on the ground that the same had expired by virtue
of Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875. On March 21,
1963, the respondent judge denied said motion on the
ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship between respondents-spouses and the
individual petitioners herein and that, consequently,
the Rules of Court and not Republic Act No. 875
applied to the matter of injunction. Thereupon the
petition under consideration was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship.
HELD:
YES. "The only features that would make the
relationship of lessor and lessee between the
respondent, owner of the jeeps, and the drivers,
members of the petitioner union, are the fact that he
does not pay them any fixed wage but their
compensation is the excess of the total amount of fares
earned or collected by them over and above the amount
of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent,
and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is for
the account of the drivers. These two features are not,
however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship,
between them from that of employer-employee,
because the estimated earnings for fares must be over
and above the amount they agreed to pay to the
respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day
operation of the jeeps. Not having any interest in the
business because they did not invest anything in the
acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the
management thereof, their service as drivers of the
jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the
relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained."