G.R. No.

133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license
may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source
of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under
oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground
for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse"
to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable.
Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF

VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

RESOLUTION

Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003

March 4, 2003

Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES

AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te
Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

 (a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially
allege te complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family
Code and within the period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising

substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five
years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or
wife; or the parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the
contracting party , at any time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by
any relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any
time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a
lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after
coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with
the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation,
or undue influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation,
or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force,
 intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party
has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability
continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage; and

(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable,
within five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the

parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the
custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiringurgent
action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to

file.-The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.
 If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the
parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support,
custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.

(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum

shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by me
petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-
fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification

against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of
the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or
consular agent in said country.

(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court
proof of such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground

for immediate dismissal of the petition.

Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the

Rules of Court and by the following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service
of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines and in such places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the
summons shall be served on the respondent at his last known address by
registered mail or any other means the court may deem sufficient.

(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with
the following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the
petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a
directive for the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of
publication.

Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed

except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case
may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of
service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her
in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
the parties.

Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion
and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court
shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion,
it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.

Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case
study and submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The
court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.

Section 11. Pre-trial. -

(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu

proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served
and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion
exists between the parties.

(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective
pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by
the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.
 (b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective
counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to
appear personally at the pre-trial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file
an answer. In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to
file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last
known address.

Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:

(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may
be allowed by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable
laws and authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed
factual and legal issues;

(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly
stating or describing the nature and purpose thereof;

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.

Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to
appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the
petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall
proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the
non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a
report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an
agreement on matters not prohibited by law.
 The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which,
for good reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed
with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability
of receiving expert testimony and such other makers as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition.

Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.
Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall
recite in detail the matters taken up In the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the ground of declaration of
nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the
matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed
upon by the parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the
following;

(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved
subject to Section 16 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked
and will be presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to
appear for the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any
stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the
trial on the merits.

(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and
evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial order.

The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose
corrections or modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on
prohibited matters, such as the following:

(a) The civil status of persons;

(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(c) Any ground for legal separation;

(d) Future support;

(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(f) Future legitime.

Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage

must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed.

(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons,
including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case.
Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record that requiring a
party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth;
would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively
communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of a
party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the
case or parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a
party, except by order of the court.

Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial
is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to
the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or
new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding decree if the parties have no properties.

If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of this Rule.

The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage
was recorded and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.

Section 20. Appeal. -

(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the
appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days
from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal
from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a
copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common

children and delivery of their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of

Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the Decree after;
 (1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where
the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the

properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real
properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property,

or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment
entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.

Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the
court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate
indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a)
The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is
situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court
compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the
Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause
the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third
persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the
properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.

Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. -
(a) In case a party dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the
court shall order the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of
the estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the
judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the
settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,
2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery
of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area
of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
 Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
(130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of
Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot
27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River;
and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an
area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda
por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la
parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado
1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda
por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la
parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado
1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said
two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion
of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of
said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the
second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining
10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on

August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that
the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary

damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased
Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked
that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be
granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the

testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil
Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In
her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child
with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial
court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the
parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for

Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
 1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum

of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date
of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of
Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and

defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and

defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant

Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant

Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his
claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees,
and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter
alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II
as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards.
The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to
recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no
genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case
cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88
and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment
of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to
these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of
dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that
appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the
very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the
estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always
be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender

an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the
serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in
the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at

Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for
the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as
well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a
trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of

marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof
that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection
of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on
the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements.
Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the
legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the
illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose
the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the
same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to
support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that,
during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use
of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able
 to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration
under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite
the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated
and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section
1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead
of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one
who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be

proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an

issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of
the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules
on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage

must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In

that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application
of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or

declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable
to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated
by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.
The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that
the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition
 cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how
to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their
marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-
to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be
the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition
to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause
of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of

marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and
the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00
 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a

real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir,
he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,

illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek
the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right
over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct
line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings
but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the
New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo,

then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although
the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an
adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action
if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent

Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the
trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the
remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent
couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the
declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo
II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the
guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of
a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the
very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated.
This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the
marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity
of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally

adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of
cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision

is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and
to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO
and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was
indicated as ‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano
married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
 11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by
deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted
the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting,
and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because
the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could
not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased
with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been
one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083,
since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual
desire to be thus covered by this law;7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the
court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on

February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s
disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions
and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with
this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we
referred the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since
there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while
her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance
until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s
temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision
dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to

present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita
again asked for a postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to
submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case.
Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits
the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one
of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the
RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over
such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of
his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the
very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will
not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of
terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required
her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen.
Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with
Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that
Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity
to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never
filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was
prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition
for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does
not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA,
had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the
injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e)
of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial
court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating
the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the
RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment
way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue
of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA
erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving
her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the
RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the
RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse
judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were
remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of
the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a
prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as
the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because
only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the
RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita
in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage
with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as
they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the
latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without
waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e.,
G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due
process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
 3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and
her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings
of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process.
She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to
defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file
an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been
decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file
her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court
with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on
the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the
‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in
Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on
her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to
the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial
court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is
filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence
ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of
procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to
file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the
pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require
Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued
any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her
numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file
an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the
trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she
should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her
side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603
to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to
it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and
not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the
prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after

receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion
and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court
shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
 (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit
the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant
City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30,
1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no
fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there
is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as
we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No.
126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this
Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing
herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or
operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general
rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in
respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in

accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section
2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may
directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to
the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers
to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be
a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does
not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it
has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot
be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be
the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking
down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued
on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of
the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently,
the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground
of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty
parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity
would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the
Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of
jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its
own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the
trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner,
in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v.
The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of
entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground"
to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x
x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases
of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be
a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in

assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she
had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear
that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would
be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have
a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the
spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A.
No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws
of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel
the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is

without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and
5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a
question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209,
as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial
on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon
the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant
of the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July
12, 1999 another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San
Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent
filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated January 21,
2000.

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF

HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN
EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF

NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND
MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES
JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is,
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier
case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain
either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner
claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection,
petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.

On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that
while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue
raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s
marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum
shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity
of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

The petition lacks merit.

The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity
of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the
Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on
the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the
present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of
action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.

The contention is untenable.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit."11

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and
is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12

In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
 of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and,

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to
it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of
a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res
judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule
of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment
obtains in the present case.

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4)
there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.15

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is
the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of
action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary
to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a
marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same
cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon
which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially
split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and
void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a
marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law.
Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license
which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.18

It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20

x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action,

provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply
because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings
in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the
loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery
opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff
is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be
permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to

the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds
upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to
split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a
portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave
the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There
would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to
obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the
parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time,
effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same
controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this
reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997
of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.