G.R. No.
L-10778 March 29, 1916 The record shows it to have been duly proven that the disputed lot 1
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS, ILOILO, applicant-
appellee,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, objector-
appellant.
J. M. Arroyo for appellant.
The provincial fiscal of Iloilo, F. Enaje, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This appeal by bill of exceptions was raised by counsel for the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro from the judgment of December 22,
1914, wherein the judge of the Court of First Instance ordered the
inscription in the registry of property in the name of the applicant
municipal corporation, of lot 3 of parcel 3, of lot 2 of parcel 5, and of
lot 1 of parcel 4, and therefore disallowed the objector's adverse
claim with respect to said lot 1 of parcel 4.
By a written application of November 1, 1913, counsel for the
municipality of Dumangas, Province of Iloilo, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of said province, in conformity with the law, for the
registration of six parcels of land of which said municipality claimed
to be the absolute owner. These lands are situated in the barrio of
Balabag of the pueblo of Dumangas, Iloilo; their description and
boundaries are given in detail in the plans and technical descriptions
which were made a part of the application, and they contain a total
area of 41,815 square meters. The applicant alleged that it had
acquired said lands by possession dating from time immemorial; that
it was occupying one of said parcels as a public market, the rest of
them being unoccupied, etc., etc.
The application for registration was opposed by the Director of
Lands, several private parties, and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro
who, in a writing of December 8, 1914, set forth that he objected to
the registration of lot 2, described in the technical plan Exhibit A, and
to that of lot 1 of parcel 4, specified in detail in the plan Exhibit B.
He stated that his objections were based on the ground that said lots
absolutely and exclusively belonged to the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, which had been in quiet and peaceable possession of same
since time immemorial, and therefore prayed that the petition for
registration be denied.
During the hearing of this case, the applicant municipality requested
that there should be stricken out of its application for registration
certain parcels of land mentioned in its verbal petition, found on page
152 of the record. For this reason all the oppositions that had been
filed with respect to those portions were considered withdrawn, save
that of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro with regard to lot 1 of
parcel 4. After the close of the trial the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which counsel for the objector excepted and from
which after taking the proper legal steps, he duly appealed.
In this case the only issue raised and submitted for our decision is
whether the applicant municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, is or is not
entitled to have inscribed in its name in the registry of property lot 1
of parcel 4, which lot, according to the application and technical plan,
Exhibit B, contains a total area of 2,183 square meters and is adjoined
on the northeast by lands of the Roman Catholic Church, on the
southeast, by lands of the same Church and by those of Crisostomo
Divinagracia, and on the southwest and northwest, by streets without
names.
of parcel 4, is adjacent to the same wall that forms the side of the
church of the pueblo of Dumangas; that in said wall or partition there
is a side door through which the faithful pass in order to enter the
church, and that in order to do so they are compelled to cross the land
in question. The applicant municipality claims to be the exclusive
owner of the said lot 1, while the objector, the Church, also alleges
itself to be the owner, inasmuch as it has been exercising acts of
ownership over the said property; that the applicant's contention is
unfounded, in that it maintains that said church of Dumangas was
constructed on the very edge of the land belonging to the church,
without t leaving a reasonable space for the use of the faithful, who
are accustomed to enter the building by means of said door; and that,
inasmuch as its own lands lie on the other side of the church, the
most logical thing would have been for it to have built the church in
the middle of its own land.
However, reasonable may be the contention of the objecting
corporation, the evidence does not justify its claim, inasmuch as the
record shows it to have been conclusively proven that the municipal
government of the pueblo of Dumangas has been in possession of the
lot in question for more than thirty years, and during this period of
time have performed thereon acts of indisputable ownership, such as
that of erecting a flag-staff for the use of the municipality and that of
using said land as a corral for branding cattle; as a public square, it
served as a place for posting the lists of persons called up as military
conscripts and also as a place for the rec ognition or
identification of malefactors killed by the guardia civil, and it was
here where on holidays small mortars were placed for firing salutes.
After the revolution, the applicant municipality constructed on said
land a building that served first as a theatre, then as a school, and
finally as a cockpit. On none of these occasions did the Church object
to or oppose such acts of the applicant municipality during the former
Spanish or the present American sovereignty. The record also shows
that the disputed land is now occupied by a billiard hall and by
several houses belonging to private parties who pay a rental to the
municipality of Dumangas; that the billiard hall was erected by a
concessionary who obtained the necessary permit from said
municipality of Dumangas itself, in 1912, without opposition on the
part of the objector to these acts of ownership. These facts are proven
by the testimony of Quintin Salas, 44 years of age, who says that
since he was 7 years old, he has known that the land is litigation
belonged to the municipality of Dumangas, and by that of Celestino
Dominado, 52 years of age, who stated that from the time of his
earliest recollection he has known that the applicant corporation was
the owner of the disputed property. The weight of this testimony was
not over-balanced by that of the witnesses presented by the adverse
claimant.
The circumstance that the priests in charge of the parish church of
Dumangas consented to the performance by the municipal council of
said pueblo of acts of possession and ownership over the lot of land
in dispute, without their having protested against and objected to the
same, clearly shows that the parish church did not then consider that
it has a right to the portion of land it now claims, and for this reason
we accept the conclusions of fact contained in the judgment appealed
from. Besides; it must be remembered that the trial judge had an
opportunity to see the witnesses, to observe their manner of testifying
and to determine their relative credibility; and the weight of evidence
does not always lie on the side of the party who presents the most
witnesses.
The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was
constructed in or about the year 1887; that its wall on the southeast
side adjoins the building lot in question; and that since the
construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall
through which the worshippers attending divine service enter and
leave, they having to pass over and cross the land in question. It is
therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also carries
with it the use by faithful Catholics of the municipal land over which
they have had to pass in order to gain access to said place of worship,
and, as this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the
Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of
the time that has elapsed since the church was built and dedicated to
religious worship, during which period the municipality has not
prohibited the passage over the land by the persons who attend
services customarily held in said church.
The record does not disclose the date when the Government ceded to
the Church the land on which the church building was afterwards
erected, nor the date of the laying out of the adjacent square that is
claimed by the municipality and on which the side door of the
church, which is used as an entrance by the people who frequent this
building, gives. There are good grounds for presuming that in
apportioning lands at the time of the establishment of the pueblo of
Dumangas and in designating the land adjacent to the church as a
public square, this latter was impliedly encumbered with the
easement of a right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the
church — a case provided for by article 567 of the Civil Code — for
the municipality has never erected any building or executed any work
which would have obstructed the passage and access to the side door
of the church, and the public has been enjoying the right of way over
the land in question for an almost immemorable length of time.
Therefore an easement of right of way over said land has been
acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the
public which, without objection or protest, has continually availed
itself of the easement in question.
For the foregoing reasons, by which the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, said judgment should be,
as it is hereby, affirmed. The land in litigation shall, however, be
understood to be burdened with an easement of right of way to allow
passage to and from the side door of the church of Dumangas, to such
extent as may be necessary for the transit of persons and four-
wheeled vehicles. No special finding is made as to costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-10619. February 28, 1958.]
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE ROCO Y
DOMINGUEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Moises B. Cruz for Appellants.
Vicente Roco, Jr. for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. EASEMENTS; CLASSIFIED AND HOW THEY ARE
ACQUIRED. — Under the Old as well as the New Civil Code,
easements may be continuous or discontinuous (intermittent),
apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or
less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532
and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous
and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription,
continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. Articles
537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes
respectively.)
2. ID.; EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY MAY NOT BE
ACQUIRED THROUGH PRESCRIPTION. — Under the provisions
of Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil
Codes, respectively, the easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Involving as it does only a question of law, the present appeal from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, dated
March 6, 1955, dismissing the amended and supplemental complaint
of plaintiffs on motion of defendants that it did not state a cause of
action, was taken directly to this Court.
The facts and the issue involved in the appeal are well and correctly
stated in the appealed order, the pertinent portion of which we are
reproducing and making our own:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The amended and supplemental complaint alleges that the plaintiffs
have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or
passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and their
predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market
place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more
than 20 years; that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco,
the predecessors in interest of the said defendants have long
recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of
way of said plaintiffs; that on May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose
Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with
malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs’
private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco,
started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way
construction actually impeded, obstructed and disturbed the
continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of
way; that on July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and
Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and
with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden
posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road
passage way and their right of way in question against their protests
and opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or coming
from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City
of Naga.
"It is very clear from the allegations of the plaintiffs in their amended
and supplemental complaint, that they claim to have acquired the
easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the
latter’s predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by
their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the
defendants as passage way or road in going to Igualdad Street and the
public market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and
return.
"The only question therefore to be determined in this case, is whether
an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of
way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or
intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription,
but only by virtue of a title. Under the Old as well as the New Civil
Code, easements may be Continuous or discontinuous (intermittent),
apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or
less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532
and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous
and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription,
continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles
537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes,
respectively).
Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the
easement of right of way is a discontinuous
one:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"En cambio, las servidumbres discontinuos se ejercitan por un hecho
del hombre, y precisamente por eso son y tienen que ser discontinuas,
porque es imposible fisicamente que su uso sea incesante. Asi, la
servidumbre de paso es discontinua, porque no es posible que el
hombre esté pasando continuamente por el camino, vereda o senda de
que se trate." (4 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, 5th ed., p. 529).
. . . "5° Por razon de los modos de disfrutar las servidumbres, en
continuas y discontinuas (1). Las continuas son aquellas cuyo uso es
o puede ser incesante, sin la intervencion de ningun hecno del
hombre, como son las de luces y otras de la misma especie; y las
discontinuas, las que se usan a intervalos, mas o menos largos, y
dependen de actos del hombre, como las de senda, carrera y otras de
esta clase." (3 Sanches Roman, Derecho Civil, p. 488).
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the
articles thereof aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement
of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Even
Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of
ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom
the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous
easements, such as, easement of right of way. (Bargayo v. Camumot,
40 Phil., 857, 867).
In the case of Cuayong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781 where the point in
issue was whether or not vested rights in a right of way can be
acquired through user from time immemorial, this Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time
immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil
Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) no discontinuous
easement could be acquired by prescription in any event."cralaw
virtua1aw library
However, in the case of Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro,
34 Phil., 545, this same Tribunal held that the continued use by the
public of a path over land adjoining the Catholic church in going to
and from said church through its side door, has given the church the
right to such use by prescription, and that because of said use by the
public, an easement of right of way over said land has been acquired
by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the public, which
without objection or protest on the part of the owner of said land, had
continually availed itself of the easement.
The minority of which the writer of this opinion is a part, believes
that the easement of right of way may now be acquired through
prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the
special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no
distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and
there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this
opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by
the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere
tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it,
Cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through
prescription.
"The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way
necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use
thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of
the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use.
(17 Am. Jur. 972)"
Even under the case of Cuaycong v. Benedicto (supra), this Tribunal
insinuated that the rule that no discontinuous easement, like an
easement of right of way, may, under Article 539 of the Old Civil
Code, be acquired, might possibly have been changed by the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to prescription.
. . . "Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by
the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating to
prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous easement
may be acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not avail
plaintiffs. The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1,
1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of rights in real
estate is fixed by the Code (section 41) at ten years. The evidence
shows that in February, 1911 before the expiration of the term of ten
years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the
defendants interrupted the use of the road by plaintiffs by
constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it and collecting toll from
persons making use of it with carts and continued to do so until they
were enjoined by the granting of the preliminary injunction by the
trial court in December 1912.." . . (Cuayong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil.,
781,796).
Professor Tolentino in his Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 340, would appear to be of the opinion that
under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to
prescription, even discontinuous easements, like the easement of right
of way, may be acquired through prescription:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
. . . "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous
servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown
that the servitude was ‘actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim
of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claimants’." However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it
is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the
Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or
clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through
prescription.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
No costs.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
Félix, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN
and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA
DE SAGUN,* respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Oscar Gozos for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Presented for resolution in the instant petition for review is the not-
so-usual question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. Both the
trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that petitioner is not so
entitled, hence the recourse to this Court. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the
late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent
estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the
dominant estate which has an area of 2,590 square meters and
bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino,
on the south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on the
West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own the 405-
square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the
National Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on the South by Tomas
Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by
Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands between
the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a
concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the
servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private
respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to
provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path was
taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion
was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No
compensation was asked and non was given for the portions
constituting the pathway.1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery
business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said
pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his
customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished
and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul
the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway
with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy
an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants.
However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he
approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and
Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one
and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the
existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter
consternation, his request was turned down by the two widows and
further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch 6 (Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of
easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2)
meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.2
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the
existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters
away from the dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower
court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint. It ruled:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff at present has two outlets
to the highway: one, through the defendants' land on a one
meter wide passageway, which is bounded on both sides by
concrete walls and second, through the dried river bed
eighty meters away. The plaintiff has an adequate outlet to
the highway through the dried river bed where his jeep
could pass.
The reasons given for his claim that the one-meter
passageway through defendants' land be widened to two
and one-half meters to allow the passage of his jeep,
destroying in the process one of the concrete fences and
decreasing defendants' already small parcel to only about
332.5 square meters, just because it is nearer to the
highway by 25 meters compared to the second access of 80
meters or a difference of only 65 meters and that passage
through defendants' land is more convenient for his
(plaintiffs) business and family use are not among the
conditions specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code to
entitle the plaintiff to a right of way for the passage of his
jeep through defendant's land.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court on January 28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's claim for an
additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined that the
necessity interposed by petitioner was not compelling enough to
justify interference with the property rights of private respondents.
The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried
river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate and
conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep
through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only
reason why he wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's
estate was that it was more convenient for his business and family
needs.
After evaluating the evidence presented in the case, the Court finds
that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional
easement of right of way, contrary to the conclusions of the courts a
quo.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly
inadequate.1âwphi1 Generally, the right of way may be demanded:
(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress
from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it
must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during
the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus,
it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the
right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.4
With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route
to the highway, we transfer our attention to the existing pathway
which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun heirs and
Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission
in open court that he needed a wider pathway for the convenience of
his business and family. (TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We
cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that which is convenient. But
certainly that should not detract from the more pressing consideration
that there is a real and compelling need for such servitude in his
favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the
easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the
needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from
time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs
of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When
petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family
could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the
national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the
use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of
plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely
cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of
theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and
can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters
in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate to only
about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed willingness
to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private
respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents
to take the offer of petitioner seriously.5 But unless and until that
option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify
the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from
whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original
path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor
of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the
Civil Code which states in part:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is
entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that
its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant
estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is
hereby declared entitled to an additional easement of right of way of
twenty-five (25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide
over the servient estate or a total area of 62.5 square meters after
payment of the proper indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127549 January 28, 1998
SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and
FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN
FAJARDO, Respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
decision 1 of 18 December 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 48473, which affirmed with modification the 30 June 1994
Decision 2 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Civil Case No. 77-M-92 granting the private respondents a right of
way through the property of the petitioners.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered
owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124 of the Obando Cadastre,
containing an area of 1,043 square meters, located at Paco, Obando,
Bulacan, and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCD No. T-
147729 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan
(Exhibit "B", p. 153 Orig. Rec.). They acquired said lot under a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 1992 executed by the vendors
Pedro M. Sanchez, et al. (Annex "A", Complaint; pp. 7-8 ibid.).
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1 (Psd 45412), a
fishpond (Exh. "C-5"; p. 154, ibid.), on the northeast portion thereof;
by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by
Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b (both Psd-297786) owned
respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida
Sta. Maria (Exhs. "C-2" and "C-3", ibid.), on the southwest; and by
Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.
On February 17, 1992, plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a complaint
against defendants Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta.
Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs
alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging
to other persons, including those of the defendants; that since
plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement
of a right of way passing through either of the alternative defendants'
properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be
plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the
provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been
passing through the properties of defendants in going to and from
their lot; that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs'
predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way
as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to
the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for
a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials,
refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an
easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in
their favor. They also prayed for damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss (pp.
41-45, ibid.) on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction to
hear the case since plaintiffs failed to refer the matter to the barangay
lupon in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1508. The lower
court, however, in its Order dated May 18, 1992, denied said motion
on the premise that there was substantial compliance with the law.
On May 25, 1992, defendants filed a "Notice of Appeal" to the
Supreme Court of the questioned order of the lower court denying
their motion to dismiss, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (p.
54, ibid.). On June 24, 1992, the lower court denied the notice of
appeal for lack of merit (p. 86, ibid).
In the meantime, defendants filed a petition for review
on certiorari of the lower court's Order dated May 18, 1992 (pp. 64-
84, ibid.). In an Order dated July 8, 1992, the Third Division of the
Supreme Court denied said petition for failure to comply with
Revised Circular Nos. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-01 (p. 97, ibid.).
Defendants' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with
finality on July 20, 1992 (p. 96, ibid.).
Consequently, defendants filed their answer to the court below where
they alleged that the granting of an easement in favor of plaintiffs
would cause them great damage and inconvenience; and that there is
another access route from plaintiffs' lot to the main road through the
property of Florentino Cruz which was likewise abutting the
provincial road and was being offered for sale. By way of
counterclaim, defendants prayed for damages and attorney's fees.
The parties not having settled their dispute during the pre-trial (p.120,
Orig. Record), the court directed that an ocular inspection be
conducted of the subject property, designating the branch clerk of
court as its commissioner. In time, an Ocular Inspection Report dated
December 3, 1992 (Exhs. "J" and "J- 1") was submitted. After trial on
the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed decision granting
plaintiffs' prayer for an easement of right of way on defendants'
properties. 3
The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there
was no other way through which the private respondents could
establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road except
by traversing directly the property of the petitioners. It further found
that (a) no significant structure, save for a wall or fence about three
feet high, would be adversely affected; (b) there was sufficient vacant
space of approximately 11 meters between petitioners' houses; and
(c) petitioners' property could provide the shortest route from the
provincial road to the private respondents' property. Consequently,
the trial court granted the easement prayed for by the private
respondents in a decision dated 30 June 1994, 4 whose decretal
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Court orders that a right-of-
way be constructed on the defendants' property covered by TCT No.
0-6244 of about 75 sq. meters, 25 sq. meters shall be taken from the
lot of Florcerfida Sta. Maria and 50 sq. meters from the property of
Cesar Sta. Maria to be established along lines 1-2 of lot 6-c and along
lines 3-4 of lot 6-b and to indemnify the owners thereof in the total
amount of P3,750.00 (P1,250.00 goes to Florcerfida Sta. Maria and
P2,500.00 to Cesar Sta. Maria) and to reconstruct the fence to be
destroyed in the manner it was at the time of the filing of this action.
The petitioners seasonably appealed from the aforementioned
decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 48473.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private
respondents had sufficiently established the existence of the four
requisites for compulsory easement of right of way on petitioners'
property, to wit: (1) private respondents' property was, as revealed by
the Ocular inspection Report, surrounded by other immovables
owned by different individuals and was without an adequate outlet to
a public highway; (2) the isolation of private respondents' property
was not due to their own acts, as it was already surrounded by other
immovables when they purchased it; (3) petitioners' property would
provide the shortest way from private respondents' property to the
provincial road, and this way would cause the least prejudice because
no significant structure would be injured thereby; and (4) the private
respondents were willing to pay the corresponding damages provided
for by law if the right of way would be granted.
Accordingly, in its decision 5 of 18 December 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, but modified the property
valuation by increasing it from P50 to P2,000 per square meter.
The petitioners forthwith filed this petition for review
on certiorari based on the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT
OF WAY CAN BE ESTABLISHED IN THE LIGHT OF THE
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT
IN COSTABELLA CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 193
SCRA 333, 341 WHICH HELD THAT [FOR] THE FAILURE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO SHOW THAT THE ISOLATION
OF THEIR PROPERTY WAS NOT DUE TO THEIR PERSONAL
OR THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST'S OWN ACTS,
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A COMPULSORY EASEMENT
OF RIGHT OF WAY.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY RIGHT OF WAY CAN
BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE TWO
OTHER EXISTING PASSAGE WAYS OTHER THAN THAT OF
PETITIONERS AND AN ALTERNATIVE VACANT LOT
FRONTING THE PROVINCIAL ROAD ALSO ADJACENT TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY, WHICH CAN BE USED
IN GOING TO AND FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
PROPERTY.
III.
RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN MAKING A PORTION OF ITS STATEMENT OF FACTS
FROM ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND NOT FROM
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
IV.
RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
NO ADEQUATE OUTLET TO A PUBLIC HIGHWAY WHICH
INFERENCE DRAWN FROM FACTS WAS MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN. 6
The first, second, and fourth assigned errors involve questions of fact.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are
conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record. 7
A perusal of the pleadings and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals, as well as of the decision of the trial court, yields no ground
for the application of any of the foregoing exceptions. All told, the
findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for
an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way
under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650). 8
As to such requisites, the Court of Appeals made the following
disquisitions:
Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs-
appellees' property is surrounded by other immovables owned by
different individuals. The ocular inspection report submitted to the
lower court reveals that:
The property of the plaintiffs, spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo,
is completely surrounded with adobe fence without any point of
egress and ingress to the national road. Said plaintiffs' property
containing an area of 1,043 square meters and covered by OCT No.
O-6244 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan was situated directly
behind defendants' property which abuts the national road.
Defendants, spouses Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria, are the absolute
owners of the parcel of land with an area of 537 square meters and
embraced under TCT No. T-37.762(M) situated on the left side
abutting the national road with their house thereon made of wood and
hollow blocks, while defendant Florcerfida Sta. Maria is the absolute
owner of a parcel of land with a similar area of 537 square meters and
covered by TCT No. T-37.762(M) situated on the right side and
likewise abutting the national road with an impressive house thereon
of modern vintage made of strong materials. As depicted in the rough
sketch hereto attached, plaintiffs have absolutely no means of ingress
and egress to their property as the same is completely isolated by
properties owned by other persons. On the left side is the property of
Florentino Cruz, on the right side is the property reportedly owned by
the Jacintos; and on the front portion are properties owned by
defendants. . . . .
(Ocular Inspection Report, p. 135, Orig. Rec.)
Plaintiffs-appellees' property is likewise without adequate outlet to a
public highway. The existing passage way for people ("daang tao") at
the back of plaintiffs-appellees property leading to the provincial
road (TSN, May 17, 1993, p. 12) cannot be considered an adequate
outlet for purposes of establishing an easement. Article 651 of the
Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall
be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and
may accordingly be changed from time to time." Thus in the case
of Larracas vs. Del Rio (37 Official Gazette 287), this Court had
occasion to rule that "it is not necessary for a person, like his
neighbors, to content himself with a footpath and deny himself the
use of an automobile. So in an age when motor cars are a vital
necessity, the dominant proprietor has a right to demand a driveway
for his automobile, and not a mere lane or pathway" (Cited in
Tolentino, ibid., p. 391).
The second requisite for the establishment of an easement of right
way, i.e., payment of indemnity, is likewise present in this case.
Plaintiff-appellee spouse Roslynn Fajardo testified on direct
examination that they are willing to pay the corresponding damages
provided for by law if granted the right of way (TSN, November 5,
1992, p. 11).
The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees'
property should not have been due to their own acts. In the case under
consideration, the isolation of their lot is not due to plaintiffs' acts.
The property they purchased was already surrounded by other
immovables leaving them no adequate ingress or egress to a public
highway.
Going now to the fourth requisite of "least prejudice" and "shortest
distance," We agree with the lower court that this twin elements have
been complied with in establishing the easement of right of way on
defendants-appellants' properties.
It has been commented upon that where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. And if the conditions of the various tenements are the same,
all the adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to
determine where the easement shall be established (Tolentino, ibid.,
pp. 108-109, citing Casals Colldecarrera).
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three
options open to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the
national road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly through defendants' property which is the
shortest route of approximately 20 to 25 meters away from the
national road;
(2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of
Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property; and
(3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their
property.
In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely affected.
There is sufficient vacant space between defendants' houses of
approximately 11 meters. The distance of defendant Florcerfida's
house with the adjoining adobe wall separating that of the property of
defendants Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the
space between the adobe wall and that of the latter's house is about 7
meters or a total of 11 meters vacant space for purposes of a right of
way. On the other hand, plaintiffs may negotiate with a right of way
with Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property although the
same is quite circuitous. Lastly, the option through the property of the
Jacinto on the right side is very circuitous and longer. The route
involves a total of about 50 yards as it has to go straight to the right
of about 35 yards and turn left of about another 15 yards before declare as established facts the allegations of the complaint referred
reaching the common right of way. to by the petitioner. It merely made a brief summary of what were
alleged in the complaint as part of its narration of the antecedents of
(Ocular Inspection report, pp. 135-136, ibid.) the case on appeal.

Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the
defendants-appellants' property would afford the shortest distance challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
from plaintiffs-appellees' property to the provincial road. Moreover,
it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t Costs against petitioners.
appears that there would be no significant structures to be injured in
the defendants' property and the right-of-way to be constructed SO ORDERED.
thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to
by the defendants" (p. 4, RTC, Decision; p. 223, ibid.).
Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Petitioners' reliance on Costabella Corporation v. Court of
Appeals 9 to support their first assigned error is misplaced. In said
case we reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals granting a
compulsory easement of a right of way to the private respondents G.R. No. L-23810 December 18, 1925
therein because of the absence of any showing that the "private
respondents had established the existence of the four requisites
CATALINO VALDERRAMA, plaintiff-appellee,
mandated by law." As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out;
vs.
thus: "Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the
THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their
predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals have found the existence of the requisites. The petitioners, --------------------------
however, insist that private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have, through their own acts of constructing concrete fences at the G.R. No. L-23811 December 18, 1925
back and on the right side of the property, isolated their property
from the public highway. The contention does not impress because
EMILIO RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
even without the fences private respondents' property remains
vs.
landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

Under the second and fourth assigned errors, the petitioners try to
--------------------------
convince us that there are two other existing passage ways over the
property of Cruz and over that of Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for
private respondents' use. Our examination of the records yields G.R. No. L-23812 December 18, 1925
otherwise. Said lots of Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing passage
ways for the private respondents to use. Moreover, the Ocular SANTOS URRA ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
Inspection Report 10 reveals that the suggested alternative ways vs.
through Cruz's or Jacinto's properties are longer and "circuitous" than THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
that through petitioners' property. This is also clear from the Sketch
Plan 11 submitted by the private respondents wherein it is readily seen
that the lots of Cruz and Jacinto are only adjacent to that of private Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for
respondents unlike that of petitioners which is directly in front of appellant.
private respondents' property in relation to the public highway. Camus & Delgado for appellees.

Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there
are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the
easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way
is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. 12 The
conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" are both
established in one tenement - petitioners' property.
As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it
must be stressed that under Article 651 the width of the easement of
right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.
Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of
the easement. 13 The needs of private respondents' property could
hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at the back and which is
bordered by a fishpond. 14
VILLAMOR, J.:
As appears from the record, on November 17, 1916,
several hacienda owners Manapla, Occidental Negros entered into a
contract with Miguel J. Osorio, known as milling contract, wherein
Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum
capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be
grown by the hacienda owners, who in turn bound themselves to
furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their
estates for thirty years from the execution of the contract, all in
accordance with the conditions specified therein.
Later on, the defendant North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the
rights and interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract
aforesaid.

The third assigned error is without basis and is nothing but a

misreading of the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals did not
Two years thereafter, that is to say, on January 29, 1919 Catalino
Valderrama (case No. 23810) and on February 1st of the same year,
Emilio Rodriguez (case No. 23811) and Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito
Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi (case No. 23812) made
with the appellant other milling contracts identical with the first one
of November 17, 1916, with some new conditions which are
specified in detail in the aforesaid documents Exhibit A and 1. Santos
Urra thereafter transferred to Pedro Auzmendi, and the latter to
Lorenzo Echarri, their interest in the milling contract executed by
them.
In view of the fact that the hacienda owners, who were up to that
time customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient cane for
milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant
made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners of Cadiz,
Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the
central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint,
alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has
established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation
through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while
the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central
upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not
only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of
the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The plaintiffs, in separate complaints, prayed the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros to pronounce judgment, holding that
the defendant had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to cause
its locomotives and wagons to run across the estates of the plaintiffs
for the purpose of transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of
Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The defendant answered the amended complaints, admitting some
allegations thereof and denying others. And as special defense, it
alleged that the plaintiffs respectively granted the defendant, for the
period of fifty years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an
easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs for the
construction and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar
cane; that said easement of way was established without any
restriction whatsoever, as regards the ownership of the cane to be
transported over the said railroad; that said contract was then in full
force and effect and had never been annulled or modified.
After hearing the three cases, the trial court entered one single
judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant had no right to
pass through the lands of the plaintiffs described in their amended
complaints for the transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of
the haciendas of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendant
appealed.
In view of the similarity of the facts and questions raised in the three
complaints, they will herein be considered jointly, as was done by the
trail court.
The parties agree that the only question herein involved is as to the
extent of the easement of way which the plaintiffs have established in
their respective haciendas in favor of the defendant, and therefore it
is important to know the terms in which such easement of way was
established.
In the contract executed by the plaintiff Valderrama with the
defendant on January 29, 1919, there appears: "6th. That in order to
have the obligations herein entered into by Mr. Valderrama duly
registered, in regard to the rural estates belonging to him and which
are described hereinafter, an easement of way 7 meter wide and for
the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby created in favor
of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., ' upon his property hereinafter
described, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad."
And in the contract of the plaintiff Rodriguez of February 1, 1919,
there also appears" "6th. That in order to have the obligations herein
entered into by Mr. Emilio Rodriguez duly registered, in regard to the
rural estates belongings to him which are herein described, an
easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period of 50 years from
the date hereof is hereby established by said Mr. Emilio Rodriguez in
favor of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon his estate
aforementioned, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad."
And lastly in the contract of Santos Urra and others of February 1,
1919, there likewise appears: "7th. That in order to have the
obligations herein entered into by Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito
Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi duly registered in regard
to their estate hereinafter described, an easement of way 7 meters
wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby
established in favor of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon their
estate hereinafter described, at such place as said corporation may
see fit for the construction of a railroad."lawphi1.net
As may be seen, the question raided depends upon the interpretation
to be given to the clause of the contracts of the plaintiffs above
quoted. The plaintiffs allege that the aforesaid clause is ambiguous,
and under the first exception of section 285 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, they have the right to introduce extraneous evidence to
explain the true intent of the parties. And it is ambiguous, according
to them, because it may applied to the transportation of the cane of
the plaintiffs or other producers, which is contrary to the intent of the
contracting parties. If the above quoted clause is ambiguous, the
plaintiffs have the right to introduce circumstantial evidence to
explain the true intent of the parties, but it our opinion said clause is
clear enough in its terms to express what the parties have intended to
agree upon. Had the clause mentioned only an "easement of way,"
there might be a doubt as to whether or not the easement of way is for
pedestrians, horsemen or carriages. But when the clause says:
"easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years for the
construction of the railroad," there can be no doubt about what the
contracting parties have agreed upon, to wit, that the plaintiffs have
created upon their respective haciendas at a suitable place an
easement of way 7 meters wide and for a period of fifty years, in
order to enable the defendant to build and maintain a railroad for the
transportation of sugar cane to the central. It is clear that the cane of
the plaintiffs was to be transported upon the railroad to the central;
but to limit the use of the road exclusively to the cane of the plaintiffs
and within their respective haciendas would make the contract in
question ineffective, except as to the hacienda which is contiguous or
nearest to the central.
The object of such a milling contract, from which arises the easement
in question, is undoubtedly to obtain mutual benefit to the procedures
of sugar cane and the corporation putting up the central. It is only by
taking this principal idea into account that it may be conceived why
the parties had come to an agreement to assume such obligation as
are set forth in the milling contract. But the contract could not
produce any benefit to the parties, if the explanation given by the
plaintiffs would be admitted, as to their intention in creating the
aforesaid easement of way upon their respective haciendas, that it
was only in favor of their respective haciendas. Such an explanation
is inadmissible because it is contrary to the object of the milling
contract.
It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was
established in favor of the servient estates, because it is a well settled
rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by
reason of easement.
This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation,
voluntarily created by the plaintiffs upon their respective estates for
the construction of a railroad connecting said estates with the central
of the defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is
apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails
which reveal the use and enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as
above stated, that the cane of the plaintiffs if to be transported to the
central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the
easement was created for the benefit of the corporation, owner of the
central, it may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times
as it may deem fit, according to the needs of the central. If the
plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the
central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation
the burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from
another source sufficient cane with which to maintain its business;
this is specially true here, because in the milling contract with the
plaintiffs, there is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making
milling contracts with other planters, and obtain in that way all cane
necessary to cover the capacity of the central.
Another reason advanced by the appellees in support of their theory
is that by transporting upon the road, through the servient estates, the
cane of the planters of Cadiz, it would alter the easement, making it
more burdensome. It is true that the owner of the dominant estate, in
making on the servient estate the necessary works for the use and
preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more
burdensome (art. 543 of the Civil Code); but this does not mean that
the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the
railroad other cane that of the plaintiffs. What is prohibited by the
legal provision above cited is that the defendant, in excavations or
building materials outside of the area of 7 meters, because in the first
case, the easement will be altered, and in the second it would become
more burdensome. But nothing of the kind happens when the
defendant transport on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the
cane of the planters of Cadiz; the railroad continues to occupy the
same area on the servient estates, and the incumbrance resulting from
the easement continues to be the same, whether the tractors traverse
the line 10, 20 or 30 times a day transporting cane for the
central.lawphi1.net
Furthermore, the record shows a circumstance indicating that at the
time of the execution of the milling contracts above referred to, there
was no intention of the part of the contracting parties to limit the use
of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by the plaintiffs in
their respective haciendas, and that is because, while the duration of
the milling contracts is fixed at thirty years, that of the easement is at
fifty. So that if at the end of thirty years the plaintiffs or their
successors should no longer desire to furnish canes for milling in the
central of the defendant, the latter shall still have the right to the
easement for the remaining period, but without transporting on the
railroad any cane for the central. An interpretation of the clause in
question leading to such a result is untenable.
For the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
finding that the appellant could not transport on its railroad passing
through the haciendas of the appellees, where it has an easement of
way established in its favor, the cane grown in the haciendas of the
procedures of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, to be milled in the central of
the appellant. And, therefore, the judgment appealed from must be
reversed and the appellant absolved, as it is hereby absolved, from
the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña. C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 75723. June 2, 1995.]
SIMEON FLORO, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO A. LLENADO
(Deceased), substituted by his wife WENIFREDA T. LLENADO,
in her own behalf as Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A.
Llenado and as Legal Guardian of Minors Ma. Bexina, Avelino
and Antonio, all surnamed Llenado, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for review on Certiorari presents two (2) issues
for resolution, namely: (1) whether or not a valid contract of
easement of right of way exists when the owner of one estate
voluntarily allows the owner of an adjacent estate passage through his
property for a limited time, without compensation; and, (2) whether
or not an owner/developer of a subdivision can demand a compulsory
easement of right of way over the existing roads of an adjacent
subdivision instead of a developing his subdivision's purposed access
road as provided in his duly approved subdivision
plan. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Simeon Floro is the owner of a piece of land known as the Floro Park
Subdivision situated in Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. 1
The subdivision has its own egress and ingress to and from the
MacArthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level
crossing.
Orlando A. Llenado, 2 on the other hand, was the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of land, with the total area of 34, 573 sq. meters, more
or less, 3 known as the Llenado Homes Subdivision ("Llenado
Homes," for brevity). Prior to its purchase by Llenado from the
owner Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing
subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. 4 Bounded on the South
by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the
Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to
Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and Guevarra, the Llenado Homes does not
have any existing road or passage to the MacArthur Highway.
However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of
Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan
of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the
defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board). 6
Sometime in February, 1983, the Llenados sought, and were granted,
permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park
Subdivision as the passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. On
April 7, 1983, however, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of
rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by
the Llenados.
Their request for the reopening of Road Lot 5 having been denied,
Orlando Llenado instituted on April 13, 1983, a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, against Simeon
Floro for Easement of Right of Way with the Prayer of the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages. The
complaint was docketed as the Civil Case No. 6834-M and raffled off
to Branch XIX, presided over by Hon. Judge Camilio Montesa.
After hearing and ocular inspection, the trial court, in an Order dated
July 15, 1983, 7 granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon the filing of a bond by
Llenado in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
Floro was ordered:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"1. To open the road by removing the rocks and wooden posts and/or
to remove the barricade on the subject road of the Floro Park
Subdivision and enjoining him and any person or persons under him
from doing or performing any acts which will prevent (LLENADO)
or his agents or any person acting under (LLENADO's) instruction
from passing through the subject subdivision road to get into and to
get out of the aforementioned properties of (LLENADO) until further
order from this Court."
Floro moved for reconsideration but was denied the relief sought. 8
He then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari and
prohibition with petition for a writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order, but later on, moved to withdraw his petition. His
motion for withdrawal was granted by the appellate court in its
Resolution dated March 30, 1984 which declared the case closed and
terminated. 9
In the meantime, Orlando Llenado died and was substituted by his
wife Wenifreda T. Llenado as administratrix of his estate and as legal
guardian of their four (4) minor children. 10 Trial on the merits of the
case which was suspended pending resolution of the petition before
the Court of Appeals, resumed.
On October 16, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
previously issued. The dispositive portion of the decision 11
reads:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant
complaint for lack of merit, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued in favor of the plaintiff is hereby ordered dissolved
and/or lifted. On the counterclaim posed by defendant, the plaintiff is
hereby ordered to pay defendant the following
amounts:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a. P30,000.00 as actual damages suffered by defendant;
b. P77,500.00 as a compensation for the use of defendant's property;
c. P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
d. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED."
On the appeal by Llenado, the appellate court set aside the decision
of the trial court in a decision 12 promulgated on February 11, 1986,
the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby SET ASIDE and another one
entered:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) Granting the establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of
right of way passing through Road Lots 4 and 5 of defendant's Floro
Park Subdivision in favor of plaintiff's Llenado Homes Subdivision;
(2) Ordering defendant to remove immediately all of the obstructions,
such as walls, rocks and posts with which he had barricaded Road
Lot 5 for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from using defendant's
subdivision as passage way to the MacArthur Highway;
(3) Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff, upon finality of this
decision, the following:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(a) P60,000.00 — temperate or moderate damages
(b) P100,000.00 — moral damages; and
(c) P30,000.00 — attorney's fees;
(4) Ordering plaintiff to pay to defendant the amount of P60,000.00
within ten (10) days from the date of finality of this decision as
indemnity for the right of way pursuant to the mandate of Article 649
of the Civil Code; and
(5) Ordering defendant to pay the costs.
The liability of the defendant under No. (3) (supra) shall be legally
compensated by the liability of the plaintiff under No. (4) (supra)
automatically to the extent that the amount of one is covered by the
amount of the other.
SO ORDERED."
On August 14, 1986, the appellate court in separate resolutions
denied Floro's motion for reconsideration and supplementary motion
13 and granted Llenado's motion for partial execution pending
appeal. 14 The latter resolution provided in its dispositive portion,
thus:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, upon the posting by plaintiff appellant of a bond in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
approved by this Court, let a writ of partial execution pending appeal
be issued ordering the defendant-appellee to remove immediately all
of the obstructions, including all walls, rocks, posts, and other
materials with which he barricaded Road Lot 5, for the purpose of
preventing plaintiff-appellant from using defendant's subdivision as
passage way to the MacArthur Highway. Said Order shall include
Road Lot 4 so that plaintiff-appellant will have free access to
MacArthur Highway.
SO ORDERED."
The writ of partial execution pending appeal was issued on October
2, 1986 after the instant Petition had been filed and after the Court
had resolved on September 15, 1986 to require Llenado to comment
thereon. On motion of Floro, the Court issued a restraining order on
October 29, 1986, 15 enjoining the appellate court from carrying out
its writ of partial execution pending appeal. Subsequently, the instant
petition was given due course. 16
In a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court is ordinarily
confined to reviewing errors of law committed by the court of
Appeals, its findings of fact being conclusive on the Court. 17 There
are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court
to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, summarized in
Remalante v. Tibe 18 and subsequent cases 19 as follows: (1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of a specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (10) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised in the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, being contrary
to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, the instant case falls
within the exception. Thus, the Court may scrutinize the evidence on
the record to bring to light the real facts of the case. 20
It is not disputed that sometime in February 1983, Floro granted the
Llenados verbal permission to pass through the Floro Park
Subdivision in going to and from the MacArthur Highway. Whether
such permission, as claimed by Floro, was the month of March only,
without compensation and as a neighborly gesture for the purpose
merely of enabling the Llenados to install stone monuments
(mojones) on their land, 21 or was in relation to the easement of right
of way granted in their favor, as insisted by the Llenados, 22 the fact
remains that no such contract of easement of right of way was
actually perfected between Floro and Llenado. Both Orlando 23 and
Wenifreda Llenado 24 testified the conditions of the easement of
right of way were still to be up by Floro's lawyer. Thus, no
compensation was agreed upon, and none was paid, for the passage
through Floro's property during the month of March. 25
However, when Wenifreda saw Floro in the evening of April 7, 1983
to negotiate for the reopening of Road Lot 5 and Floro laid down his
conditions 26 for the requested reopening and presumably for the
requested easement of right of way, Orlando rejected said conditions
for being onerous. 27
In Dionisio v. Ortiz, 28 where therein private respondents claimed to
have every right to use Howmart Road as passageway to EDSA by
reason of a standing oral contract of easement of right of way with
therein petitioner, so that the latter did not have the right to put a
barricade in front of private respondent's gate and to stop them from
using said gate as a passageway to Howmart Road, the Court
said:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the
private respondents over Howmart Road but the records disclose that
such right of way expired in December 1988. The continued use of
the easement enjoyed by QCIEA including the private respondents is
by the mere tolerance of the owner pending the renegotiation of the
terms and conditions of said right of way. . . . Absent an agreement of
the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of
easement of right of way has been validly entered into by the
petitioner and QCIEA. Thus the private respondent's claim of an
easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual
basis."
As in the Dionisio case, the use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados
during the month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending
the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. This is
evident from the testimony of Wenifreda that "they said to us to go
on while they are preparing for the papers" and that "We can use that
for a while, while they were making for the papers." 29 Although
such use was in anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way,
no such contract was validly entered into by reason of the failure of
the parties to agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, private
respondents Llenados cannot claim entitlement to a right of way
through the Floro Park Subdivision on the basis of a voluntary
easement.
Having ruled that no voluntary easement of right of way had been
established in favor of private respondents Llenados, we now
determine whether or not they are entitled to a compulsory easement
of right of way.
For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of
way under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles
649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are: (1)
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after
payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation
was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649,
last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest (Art. 650). 30
The burden of providing the existence of the prerequisites to validly
claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. 31 We find that private respondents have failed in this regard.
Significantly, when Orlando Llenado filed the complaint for legal
easement under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, he focused
his argument on the absence of any road, other than the closed road
of the Floro Park Subdivision, as his means of ingress and egress to
and from his property. However, he omitted to state that there is a
proposed access road through the Ipapo property.
Danilo Ravello, an engineer employed as Project Officer of the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) since 1981,
testified that his duties consisted in evaluating and processing
subdivision plans and making the proper recommendation for their
approval or disapproval. The application of Soledad Ortega for the
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, 32 appearing on page 120 of the
records of the HSRC, had the following attachments: (1) Sketch Plan
of the property containing an area of 34,973 sq. m.; 33 (2) Waterline
Layout Plan; 34 (3) Vicinity Plan; 35 (4) Road Plan Layout; 36 and
(5) Consolidation Subdivision Plan. 37 According to Ravello, as per
Plan Exhs. "10-A" and "10-C", Road Lot 3 of the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision starts and ends with adjacent properties; on one end, the
property owned by Mariano Monadero and the other, the property
owned by a certain Ventura Tan Mariano. As per Plans, the access
road to the subdivision should have come from the MacArthur
Highway through the Ipapo property. 38 Having found on ocular
inspection that the access road indicated in the Plan did not actually
exist, the HSRC required applicant Soledad Ortega to submit a
written right of way clearance from Ipapo, which she did and on the
basis of which her application on behalf of the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision was approved. 39
When Orlando Llenado acquired the subject property, he adopted the
subdivision plans of Emmanuel Homes and renamed it as the Llenado
Homes Subdivision. Accordingly, he applied for the issuance of a
new Development Permit and License to Sell in his name as the new
owner of the subdivision. Subsequently, the corresponding license to
sell and development permit were issued. As shown by the
Consolidation Subdivision Plan 40 submitted by Orlando Llenado,
the names Soledad Ortega/Emmanuel Homes Subdivision were
merely crossed out and, in lieu thereof, the names Orlando
Llenado/Llenado Homes Subdivision were written. In said
subdivision plan which was duly approved by the HSRC, the Ipapo
Access Road was retained.
On July 1, 1983, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6834-M,
Orlando Llenado filed with the HSRC an application for the
amendment of the original Consolidation Subdivision Plan of the
Llenado Homes Subdivision. 41 The proposed amendments, as
indicated in Exh. "11-A", 42 were: (1) the conversion of Lot 14 of
Block 6 into a road lot, designed to connect with Road Lot 5 of the
Floro Homes Subdivision; and, (2) the closing of both ends of Road
Lot 3, the portion leading to the Ventura Tan Mariano property and
the portion leading to the Ipapo right of way (Adriano Monadero
property), to be converted into salable residential lots. The first
proposed alteration, the conversion of Lot 14, Block 6 into a road lot
was approved on March 20, 1984. 43 The access road of Llenado
Homes Subdivision, however, remained in the Subdivision Plan to be
through the Ipapo property, as approved by the HSRC.
When asked by the court as to the policy of the HSRC regarding the
approval of a subdivision plan in connection with the right of way
issue, Engr. Ravello responded that as a prerequisite for approval, the
subdivision must have an access road. It was not necessary that the
access road be a paved road. A dirt road was a sufficient provided
that the owner of the lot used as access road gives his consent and the
owner/developer/applicant of the proposed subdivision develops the
proposed access road, 44 as approved by the HSRC in compliance
with Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
states:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"SEC. 29 Right of Way to Public Road — The owner or developer of
a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street
must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of
way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement
of the government authorities concerned."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents Llenado
submitted a letter of Marcial Ipapo dated July 3, 1985 addressed to
the HSRC, 45 informing the latter that he did not give a road right of
way over his property in favor of Soledad Ortega, the developer of
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This letter seems to be an aftermath
of the testimony of Engr. Ravello that the notarized affidavit of Ipapo
submitted by Soledad Ortega to the HSRC could not be located in the
records of the Commission. 46 This new matter, however, is
inadmissible in evidence, not having been authenticated in
accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of the Court. It
was, therefore, erroneous on the part of the Court of Appeals to
consider this piece of evidence in its Resolution For the Motion For
Reconsideration dated August 124, 1986. 47
There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo property, the first
requirement for a grant of a compulsory easement of right of way
over the Floro Park Subdivision has not been met.
In Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, 48 the Court explained what is meant by payment or
prepayment of the required indemnity under Article 649 of the Civil
Code, as follows:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . Prepayment, as we used the term means the delivery of the
proper indemnity required by law for the damage that might be
incurred by the servient estate in the event the legal easement upon
the extent of compensation cannot be reached by the parties involved,
is not an impediment to the establishment of such easement.
Precisely, the actin of the dominant estate against the servient estate
should include a prayer for the fixing of the amount which may be
due from the former to the latter."
In the case at bench, no proof was presented by private respondent
Llenado that he complied with this requirement. The complaint for
easement of right of way filed by him in the lower court did not
contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro
in the event that the easement of right of way be constituted. Thus,
the existence of the second requisite has likewise not been
established.
There can be no denying that the isolation of the Llenado Homes
Subdivision is the doing of its owner/developer/applicant. It appears
that the access road indicated in the Plan of the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision and the llenado Homes Subdivision for which a right of
way over the Ipapo property was procured, was merely for the sake
of securing an approval of the proposed development plan. There
were no proofs of actual work having been done to construct a road,
even just a dirty road, over the right of way that would connect road
Lot 3 of the Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur Highway.
Private respondents llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no
longer being cultivated and there was already a fence made of adobe
wall constructed on it. 49 Indication are that it has already been
abandoned as a ricefield. There was no reason for private
respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the
inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third
requisite has not been met.
If the servitude requested by private respondent Llenado is allowed,
other subdivision developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily
prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access roads
merely for registration purposes. Thereafter, said developers could
abandon their duly approved plans and, for whatever reason, open up
another way through another property under the pretext that they
have inadequate outlets to a public road or highway. Furthermore, if
such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential
Decree No. 957 was enacted, that is to protect subdivision buyers
from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege on
their duties to develop their subdivision plans, would be defeated.
The Court takes cognizance of the fact that, instead of developing the
proposed access road, private respondent Llenado applied for the
conversion of Lot 14 of Block 6 into a road lot to connect it with
Road Lot 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision, citing as reason therefor,
that the amendment sought would create a "more adequate and
practical passage" from Llenado Homes Subdivision to the
MacArthur National Highway and vise-versa. The "convenience" of
using Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision will not
suffice, however, to justify the easement in favor of private
respondent.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the
same should not be imposed. 50 This easement can also be
established for the benefit of a tenement with an inadequate outlet,
but nit when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person
had already established an easement of this nature in favor of his
tenement, he cannot demand another, even if those defects can be
eliminated by proper repairs. 51
In the case of Ramos v. Gatchalian, 52 the Court denied access to
Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in view of the fact that
petitioner had a road right of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez
Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision
plan for the buyers of its lots, notwithstanding that said lot was still
undeveloped and inconvenient to petitioner. Even if Ramos, the
petitioner therein, had "to pass through other lots belonging to other
owners, which are grassy and cogonal, as temporary ingress/egress
with great inconvenience particularly due to flood and mud," the
Court did not allow the easement because it would run counter to
existing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate
does not suffice to serve as basis for the servitude. This ruling was
reiterated in Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate Court 53 and
Constabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 54
As borne out by the records of this case, despite the closure of the
subject road, construction work at Llenado Homes Subdivision
continued. The alternative route taken by private respondent is
admittedly inconvenient because he has to transverse several
ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to
mention that said passage, as found by the trial court, is impassable
during the rainy season. However, private respondent has no one to
blame but himself for not developing the proposed access road
through the Ipapo property.
Worthy of mention is the trial court's reason 55 for the denial of the
easement of right of way, thus:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . While it is true that the conversion of said salable (sic) Lot 14,
Block 6 into a Road Lot has been approved by the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission, such approval, however, does not ipso facto
connect Road Lot 5 and 4 (Exh. C-1) of the Floro Park Subdivision in
the absence of consent and/or approval of the owner of said Floro
Park Subdivision. . . . It should be emphasized that the end of Road
Lot 3 of Llenado Homes Subdivision facing MacArthur Highway as
per approved subdivision plan, subject of the proposed amendment,
has been designated/specified as an access road directly leading to the
MacArthur Highway. It is the shortest route and the road alignment is
direct and in straight line perpendicular to the MacArthur Highway.
The disapproval, therefore, of the closure and consequent conversion
of both ends of Road Lot 3 into residential lots, in effect, maintains
Road Lot 3 as an access road of Llenado Homes Subdivision to the
main highway. There appears a semblance of deception if the
provision for (the) proposed access road in the approved subdivision
plan of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, now Llenado Homes
Subdivision, would not be implemented as it would appear that the
same was indicated in the plans merely for purposes of approval of
the subdivision but not actually to develop and avail of the same was
originally intended."
It is also worthwhile to observe that on November 29, 1985 the then
Minister of Public Works and Highways found the construction of the
concrete culvert across Palanas Creek illegal in contemplation of
Presidential Decree No. 296, Letters of Instructions No. 19 and
Presidential Decree No. 1067 and ordered private respondent herein
to remove or demolish the same, to be carried out by the Chief Civil
Engineer, Bulacan Engineering District, at the expense of private
respondent. 56
Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a
compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the
Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
It appears from the records that during the period from March 1983
until the closure of the subject roads on April 7, 1983, private
respondent was allowed to pass thru petitioner's subdivision without
any agreement or compensation. During the same period, the subject
roads (Road Lots 4 and 5) were damaged due to trucks and heavy
equipment passing thereon. Justice and equity demand that petitioner
be compensated for the said damage. Hence, the lower court's
decision awarding to petitioner Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as actual and compensatory damages should be affirmed.
Petitioner should likewise be indemnified for the use of his property
from July 15, 19983 (upon the reopening of the subject road pursuant
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) until
October 16, 1986 (when the writ was lifted). In the absence of a
specific provision applicable in the case at bench as to the amount of
proper indemnity, the award of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00)
as temperate or moderate damages pursuant to Articles 2224 and
2225 of the Civil Code 57 is considered proper and reasonable. 58
As regards the claim for attorney's fees, considering that the
petitioner was compelled to file a petition for review
on Certiorari before this Court, the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) is just reasonable. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, as herein modified, is
REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996.]
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, Respondents.
Benedicto L. Nanca for Petitioner.
Armando A. San Antonio for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, UPHELD ON APPEAL. — But we find no cogent
reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a
right of way to private respondent through petitioner’s property. In
fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their
agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the
determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary
easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies
but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal
easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law. The trial
court found that Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her
father’s property and held that there existed an available space of
about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as a
right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’s
father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Sotero’s store
which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda
requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one
(1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to
the public highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the
trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not
entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property since a detour
through it would not make the line straight and would not be the
route shortest to the public highway. In applying Art. 650 of the New
Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed
right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5)
meters long at the extreme right of petitioner’s property, will cause
the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean
destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials. Absent any
showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual
support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court
accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public
highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should
be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to
analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again where the
petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence
considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other, and the probabilities of the situation. In sum, this Court
finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly
backed up by law and the evidence.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND ITS
MODIFICATIONS; EASEMENT, DEFINED. — As defined, an
easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing
or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re
aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by
causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege
constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of
persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is
surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet
to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand
a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the
owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
3. ID.; ID.; EASEMENTS; RIGHT OF WAY; CONDITIONS FOR
GRANT THEREOF. — The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant
of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant
estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CRITERION OF LEAST PREJUDICE TO THE
SERVIENT ESTATE, CONSTRUED. — Petitioner finally insists
that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way
proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We
cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that
the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient
estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although
this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are
permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the
other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the
easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be
used, even if it will not be the shortest.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way
is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if
the two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest
route. 1 This is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest
distance. This means that the court is not bound to establish what is
the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to
the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls
which can be avoided by a round about way, or to secure the interest
of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would
place the way on a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia
Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan.
They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as
they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the
extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-1. It is bounded on
the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2.
Adjoining Sotero’s property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and
1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but
which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter
divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and
1448- B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-
6-A is located behind Anastacia’s Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No.
1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent
Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her
uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the
property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a
public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining
property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using
as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia’s
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. 2
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio
Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of
her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their
house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda
behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence.
The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage
of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long.
Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate
for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to
pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach
the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court
praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s property. An ocular
inspection upon instruction of the presiding judge was conducted by
the branch clerk of court. The report was that the proposed right of
way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property facing the
public highway, starting from the back of Sotero’s sari sari store and
extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for
about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the
municipal road 3 and the way was unobstructed except for an
avocado tree standing in the middle. 4
But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for
lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through
Sotero’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting
through Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path straight.
Hence the trial court concluded that it was more practical to extend
the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of
the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public
road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing
through Anastacia’s property. 5
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would
cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. 6 The
appellate court however did not award damages to private respondent
as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of
Appeals: (a) in disregarding the agreement of the parties; (b) in
considering petitioner’s property as a servient estate despite the fact
that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent; and,
(c) in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed
by private respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance
to the public road.

Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a
right of way. She claims that her agreement with private respondent
was to provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of
Antonio Quimen under her administration when it was not yet sold to
private Respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the
property of Yolanda’s parents is more accessible to the public road
than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree
standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-
B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way she provided her
(petitioner) was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so
that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private
respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots
suitable for the purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the
proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the
most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from
the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an
avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it. 7
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent
appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent through
petitioner’s property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and
respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot
insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein
presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent,
which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to
believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by
necessity constituted by law. 8
As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to
be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement. 9 It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and
perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of
way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by
law 10 to a person or class of persons to pass over another’s property
when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others
without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the
dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate
provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of
his property. 11
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right
of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the
dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the
right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. 12
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a
right of way 13 readily shows that —
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff
was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with
permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have
(sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance of the
defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and five
(5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter
to be taken from Anastacia’s lot at the side of a concrete store until
plaintiff reach(es) her father’s land, plaintiff was induced to buy the
aforesaid parcels of land . . . That the aforesaid right of way is the
shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading to the road
and being used by the plaintiff’s predecessors-in-interest from the
very inception . . .
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is
hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of
petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her
right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not
cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the
ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial
court itself declared that" [t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen
which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were
totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public
highway." 15
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded
that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least
onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil
Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The
criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest
distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may
be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two
(2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which
will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. 16 This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted —
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan,
kindly go over this and please point to us in what portion of this plan
is the house or store of the father of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the
proposed right of way).
x x x
Q. Now, you will agree with me . . . that this portion is the front
portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which was
(sic) occupied by a store made up of strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff
made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
x x x
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in
question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the public
road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching the
public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me . . . the main reason why your brother
is (sic) using this property is because there was a store located near
this portion?

A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way

than this, sir. 17

The trial court found that Yolanda’s property was situated at the back
of her father’s property and held that there existed an available space
of about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as
a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’s
father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Sotero’s store
which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda
requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one
(1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to
the public highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the
trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not
entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property since a detour
through it would not make the line straight and would not be the
route shortest to the public highway.

In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of

Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is
one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of
petitioner’s property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’s
father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong
materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are
devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous,
this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that
would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which although longer will
only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court
to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again where the
petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence
considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other, and the probabilities of the situation. 18 In sum, this
Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is
thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by

respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the
decision subject of review is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.