FACTS:

The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from Japan pursuant to a
Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred to
the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the properties would be available to sale or disposition. One of
the first properties opened up for public auction was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from
different sectors.

HELD:

The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. They
were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the
agreement to house the Philippine embassy.

It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The
respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person
but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesn’t automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549

F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors,
to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment,
w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional.

HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read:

Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may
by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.

However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to delete the
phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase
"and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was intended to exempt the
appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that this position is low and
to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence. On the other hand, the 2nd
amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence, namely:

The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e.,

(1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]

(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)];

(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)];

(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)];

(5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)

The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers
of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized
by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone.
Matibag v Benipayo, GR No 149036, April 2, 2002

Facts:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was
appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad
interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during
the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed
an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment
violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

Issue:

WON the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of judicial
review in constitutional cases? In corollary, was the issue raised at the earliest possible time?

Ratio:

Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may exercise its
power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-
equal with this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These
are: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.

Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents
maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained
a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of
office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed
by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these
three respondents.

Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the
petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments.

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial,
and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal."

Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue
before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time
when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.

Alajar v alba

Political Law – Control Power – Removal of Appointed LGU officials

RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by the president.
Pursuant to the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication
to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor.
Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar
then complained. Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides: “ Appointment of City Officials. – The
President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of
the Philippines, the mayor, the vice- mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, has
been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant
and absolutely irreconcilable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure.

HELD: The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested
interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There
seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. “Admittedly, the act of
Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the “term” or the period during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress
enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-
Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President,
so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the pleasure of the resident and
can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.
Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc. v Pano (Constitution)

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.cralaw

FACTS:

1932 - Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated inTamlangon,
Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.

· January 9, 1953 -Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the abovepublic
land to plaintiff.

· April 13, 1954 - the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as
pastureland and declared agricultural land.

· January 26, 1955 - Jose Paño and nineteen other claimantsapplied for the purchase of ninety (90) hectares of
thereleased area.

· March 29, 1955 -Plaintiff Corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area.This
was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupantsof the
part thereof covered by their own sales application.

· July 31, 1956 - The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on giving
duecourse to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions.
Amove to reconsider failed.

· July 5, 1957 - the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself andhis
companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.

· June 25, 1958 -Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified
the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and

(1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and

(2)directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan,
Davao,with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to
actualoccupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this
portion.”

Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered
declaring:

(1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and

(2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the

Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources —yielded
an affirmative answer from the lower court

HELD:

Judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Executive Secretary’s act cannot be assailed and therefore has full force
and effect.

RATIO:
(1) The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.So, too, is his control of all executive
departments.Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too,
is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority
to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries.

In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary.

(2) Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of
control over the executive departments.

Control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former for that of the latter."

(3) The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who
acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even
reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may
issue.

(4) The action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief
Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of
this case.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 462 SCRA 622

July 11, 2009 at 10:32 am (1)

FACTS :

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdition
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000. Its
provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.

Hence this petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate
and it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to
allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Respondents, however argue that it has no
duty to transmit the copy of Rome Statute to Senate for concurrence.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the
copy of the Rome Statute.

RULING :

Petition is dismissed.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority
in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides for a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 votes of all the members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process
was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

Petitioners equate signing of the treaty with ratification, which are two different and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. Signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good
faith of the parties. Ratification, the other hand, is a formal act, executive by nature, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government.

The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence
of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence to the
ratification. Such power of the President cannot be encroached by the courts via mandamus and the courts has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. Therefore, the Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to Senate.