COMPUTATION OF TIME PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO G.R. No.

L-7234May 21,
1955

Facts: On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information was filed
on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made
directly to the court.

Issue: Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

Ruling: The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does not
provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code which
provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of the Civil Code
a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme Court held that the case
took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the new provisions should apply.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she,
used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the
City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when
after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which
he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in
the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June
17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the
paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by
way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a
month. The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the
said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every
month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00)
for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages;
and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against
defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is
not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY WASSMER vs. VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying
that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next
day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he
apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for
damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

Ruling: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Mariategui vs. CA 205 SCRA 106 GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He
acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife
Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and
Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand,
Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got
married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have
successional rights.

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.

Facts:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informedAncajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contractbetween him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner.
In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The trial court rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof
that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab
initio and without legal force and effect
Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the
second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover,
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriageon the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case,
all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 127406 TY Vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

November 27, 2000 FINAL JUDGMENT AND e PROCEEDINGS TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS In 1977, private
respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony. A church wedding
ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare their marriage null and void ab
initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for
lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna
Maria, Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony associated by a judge, then a church wedding
followed. In 1991, Edgardo reyes led a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage
with Ofelia be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got
married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The
Court of Appeals a irmed the decision

Issue: Whether or not the decree of nullity of the 1st marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly

Ruling: The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no need
for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may
contract a second marriage. The 1st marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s second marriage to
Ofelia Ty is valid. Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights. Petition
granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ G.R. No. 85140May 17, 1990
Facts: Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister, Vitaliana,
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein petitioner in his
residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims custody over Vitaliana’s body.

Issue: Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana’s body instead of the
immediate relatives.

Ruling: Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a community of
property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body must be
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008

Fact of the Case:

On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are legally capacitated and that they
cohabited for at least five years when in fact they only barely known each other since February 1986.On
1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that
their marriage was sham, as to no ceremony was celebrated between them; that he did not execute the
sworn statement that he and Felisa had cohabited for at least five years; and that his consent was
secured through fraud. His sister, however, testified as witness that Jose voluntarily gave his consent
during their marriage. The complaint was dismissed on Regional Trial Court stating that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribe. It cited Art 87 of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of fraud. Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision declaring
their marriage void ab initio for absence of marriage license. Felisa sought a petition for review praying
that the Court of Appeal’s Amended decision be reversed and set aside.

Issue:

(1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
short of the minimum five-year requirement., effectively renders the marriage void an initio for lack of
marriage.

(2) Whether or not the action for nullity prescribes as the case here where Jose

filed a complaint after seven years from contracting marriage.

Held:

(1)Yes. The intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage, will not salvage the parties’
marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The Court protects the fabric of
the institution of marriage and at the same time wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in the law. The case cannot fall under irregularity of the marriage license, what
happens here is an absence of marriage license which makes their marriage void for lack of one of the
essential requirement of a valid marriage.

(2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated san a marriage
license. The right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.

Republic vs Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August
1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed
a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Navarro vs. Domogtoy 259 SCRA 129

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of
gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. The first allegation of Navarro to
Domagtoy is that the latter solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated. It was told
that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home and has not returned and been heard for almost seven
years. The second allegation of the plaintiff was that the said Judge likewise solemnized marriage of
Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa
located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the defendant Judge Domagtoy were void;

2. Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law?

HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being
a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. With regard to the
marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage was solidified as valid, Albeit, Judge Domagtoy
was not authorized to solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the
Family Code with regard to irregularity of formal requisites of marriage. In addition, article 4 par 3 of the
Family Code of the Philippines states that formal requisites shall not affect the validity of marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Hence, Domagtoy was held administratively liable because of the latter’s failure to apply the legal
principles applicable in these cases, the Court find Domagtoy have acted in gross ignorance of the law
and because of this he was suspended for a period of six months.
PUGEDA Vs. Trias 4 SCRA 49

FACTS:

On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who
was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them, that accordingly to Ricafrente
celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of them was Santiago Salazar and
another Amadeo Prudente, and after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies
of a marriage contract and after the witness had signed the some, he delivered one copy to the
contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time
the keeper of the records of the civil register. It is also stated that after the marriage, Pugeda and Ferrer
lived together as husband and wife for 18 years. The defendants denied the existence of the marriage
and introduced a phtostatic copy of the marriages in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in the month of
January 1916 which showed that no records of the alleged marriage existed therein but the Justice of
the Peace explained perhaps the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage
in the registry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer exist.

HELD: Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the testimony of the justice
of the peace who solemnized the marriage and the living together of the parties as husband and wife for
18 years. The failure of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of the marriage certificate as well when
the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry are not a fatal defects.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant. G.R.
No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he and Susana Taborada (the deceased)
were legally and validly married because there was no marriage contact executed in their wedding,
hence he could be liable only for homicide, not parricide. Other than the stand of appellants counsel
against the existence of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client,
accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.

ISSUE: Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim?

RULING: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras). Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of the society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The presumption
in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The reason for this presumption is well
settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao
Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee
filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter
with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required
marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death
benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does
not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity
of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of
marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under
Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASTRO G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994 236 SCRA 257

FACTS

Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of
the former’s parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage which includes
procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four
(4) months after which they parted ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment
of her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted by
her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that
Castro and Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located
since it does not appear in their records. It was then that she found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her
petition. It ruled that “inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to
show that there was no marriage license issued.” Castro appealed to respondent appellate court
contending that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a
marriage license. The respondent appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the marriage contract. However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a
petition for review on certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony
of Castro are not sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

ISSUE; Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under he law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself,
not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not
discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. It was held that under the
circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. Therefore, the petition is
DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years
exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of
the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:

Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. The article should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing
in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. However, since Orbecido was not able to
prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all
of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration
of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now
being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground
of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court
found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus. The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

REPUBLIC VS. CA and CASTRO 236 SCRA 257 (SECRET MARRIAGE)

FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a
City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The
cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her
daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.

Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.

The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled
that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without
a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-
existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the former.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000] PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. D E C I S I O N PARDO, J.:

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was
naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife
to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo
returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25
years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled
in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever
properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled
to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that
they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s
will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by
our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.