ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
Santiago vs Comelec

G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Constitutional provision on People's Initiative is not self-executory

Principle of Non-delegation of Powers, Exceptions

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution, specifically lifting the
limit of terms of elective officials, through people’s initiative. Santiago et al. opposed on the ground that
the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735, which provides for initiative
on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on Constitution

RULING:

Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executory

Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the Constitution...is not self-executory. xxx

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right?

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. xxx

We agree that RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution.
But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to “provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?”

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC, Sec. 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. – The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”

or use this link https://www.scribd.com/doc/33750093/Defensor-santiago-vs-Comelec-Case-Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the
Lambino petition. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People. The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must
be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative void. Petition is dismissed.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the
bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1.Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2.Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

3.Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

4.Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1.It is a self-executing provision.

1.Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

2.A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.1

Or use this link: https://www.scribd.com/doc/315572725/Manila-Prince-Hotel-vs-GSIS-Case-Digest

G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

Tondo Medical Center vs. CA, July 17,2007

Tondo Medical v. Court of Appeals

527 SCRA 746 2007

Facts:

The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the Department of Health (DOH) in 1999, which
provided five areas of general reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals that implements the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals. The petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reform had
resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantage
Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for violating the following constitutional provisions:
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII, and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV. On May 24, 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the functions and Operations of the Department of Health”, which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH.

Issues: . WON the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution

No. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
"declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archipelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of
the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner, vs.

HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, et al., Respondents

Facts

On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG),
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the
conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed
to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The
Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the
DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding
USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of
3% per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a
letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as
the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.

On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of
Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the
Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000
in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail
Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with
Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying
the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG,
the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17 March
2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006, CNMEG filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed
a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its
person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject
matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive agreement.

On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and setting
the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued.
CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Issue

Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.

Ruling

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions.

CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would
show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does
not automatically grant it immunity,... it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued
under Chinese law. Thus,... following this Court's ruling... in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original
charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive
agreement. CNMEG's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ ofPreliminary Injunction is DENIED
for being moot and academic. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145,
for further proceedings as regards the validity of the contracts subject of Civil Case No. 06-203.

No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ) v. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009

FACTS
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified and
agreement which lead to the Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment (SHINE)
program wherein the program seeks to provide health care to Filipino families, especially the poor.
The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program,
while the Philippines designated the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation. Private respondents, as employed by GTZ for the implementation of the SHINE, had
a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. This lead to an exchange of letters which
was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private respondents then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ contends that it is immune from suit as it
is the accredited agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.

ISSUE
Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.

HELD
A state may waive its immunity through a general or specific law. The special law can take
the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. In this case however, GTZ
presented any evidence to support their claim that they are immune from suit, and has failed to
obtain a certification of immunity from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs. If GTZ has
done so, then there would be no ambiguity in their claim that they are immune from suit.
Sanders vs. Veridiano II

No. L-46930 | 1988, June 10

Petitioner: Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, jr.

Respondent: Hon. Regino, Veridiano II (presiding Judge, CFI Zambales, Olongapo)

Facts:

Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes
the said station. Private respondents were American citizens with permanent address in the Phil and
were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA.

Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed from permanent full time
to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of Defense then was gave a recommendation
for their reinstatement. The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a letter to Moreau that he
disagrees with the recommendation. Because of the letters private respondents filed a case with CFI of
Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous content and has caused them the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.

The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion to lift the default
order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to dismiss which was subsequently
denied by the respondent court.

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts where they are sued for damages.

Decision/ Ruling:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are sued by are acts in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA
had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and employment. As for Moreau,
what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the
conversion of the private respondent’s type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had
even commenced.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977, and
September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O.
Our Temporary restraining order of September 26, 1977, I made PERMANENT. No costs SO ORDERED.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012

FACTS:

On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction of
extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3rd was not
paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So Stern
Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3,
2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002, RTC denied it and issued a writ of
execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise denied. On December 21,
2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files
for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC
directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of
check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied
on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced
Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files
petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.

ISSUE: W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be given retroactive application

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE UNIVERSITY INVOKES EQUITY AND THE REVIEW POWERS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT TO MODIFY, IF NOT TOTALLY DELETE THE AWARD OF P10 MILLION AS MORAL
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS.

HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of
retroactivity or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its
retroactivity is already given since by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its
application.

Period of appeal did not start without effective

service of decision upon counsel of record;

Fresh-period rule announced in

Bermoy vs PNC , May 18, 1956

Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twentyfour employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the
Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of
salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and
denies the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits, on the
ground that neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be
sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case
on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of
Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455
(Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued in any court.”

Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued.

Ruling: The state has already given the consent by investing the college with express power to be sued in
the court. The act Authorizes the College to be sued is also made clear in Section 6, where it is provided
that “all process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary thereof”.
The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No cost.
National Airports Corp vs Teodoro

waiver of sovereign immunity

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP VS TEODORO

G.R. No. L-5122 91 Phil 203 April 30, 1952

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

JOSE TEODORO, SR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

Facts:

The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was abolished by Executive
Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.

Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as
fees for landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have
been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports
Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.

The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports
Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the
fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and
its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the
third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the
reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.”

The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National
Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of
the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of
suing and being sued

Issues:

Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as engaged in private functions
and therefore subject to suit.
Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a
private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not
to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
traveling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state,
may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.

In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the parties who dealt
with the National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality in the enforcement of their mutual
commitments, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim for itself the
privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.
BOP v BPEA, 1 SCRA, 340

Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against
petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint
alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor
practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices
attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP
is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing
governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But
later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they receives outside
jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays,
therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.

Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot be
sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).

It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on
regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are
“exclusively proprietary in nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the
service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but
such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations,
so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in
character.

Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action
or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction.

Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and
the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against
respondents other than the respondent court.
SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, GR No. 179918, 2010-09-08

Facts:

This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor, whose
pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings
among fishermen.

On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the
Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in
northwestern Palawan. Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its
development... of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed the construction and
installation of a pipeline from Shell's production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. The
pipeline spanned 504... kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea. Respondents Efren Jalos,
Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages
against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),... Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. claimed
that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose
livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shell's natural gas pipeline. alos,
et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline. As a result, their
average net income per month fell

They said that "the pipeline greatly affected biogenically... hard-structured communities such as coral
reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea."

Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint.

It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a "pollution case" under Republic
Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control

Law.

Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution
cases and actions for related damages

Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the
State's consent.

Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not specify any
actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shell's part that could have caused the alleged injury
to Jalos, et al.

RTC dismissed the complaint.

t ruled that the action was actually pollution-related, although denominated as one for damages. The
complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB, the government agency vested with jurisdiction
over... pollution-related cases.

alos, et al assailed the RTC's order through a petition for certiorari[6] before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In due course, the latter court reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
action.
The CA also rejected Shell's assertion that the suit was actually against the State. It observed that the
government was not even impleaded as party defendant.

The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong

Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the correlative obligation
to respect.

Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA's decision but the same was denied

Issues:

Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.

Ruling:

Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the State's consent under the doctrine of state immunity
from suit. But, to begin with, Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service
contractor for the exploration and... development of one of the country's natural gas reserves.
Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology
and financing [31] for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006.
Respondent Efren Jalos, et al's complaint for damages against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil
Case P-1818-03 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro is ordered
DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.
Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, 31 August 1977

FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-
reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?

RULING: NO.

The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any
agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was
misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract
within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must
come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil.
Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on
the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
Amigable v. Cuenca

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for compensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give
its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the
time of the taking.
Santiago v Republic, 87 SCRA 294

Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed
of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the
Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary
to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build
an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy
on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was
exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos
case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the
respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional
mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is
consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be
emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a
Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.

Facts: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of
the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission.
For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to
the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his
original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be
issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he
be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed
for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said
vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason
that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the
vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said
property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

Issues: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the
plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the
right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms
of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state.
Caption: USA VS RUIZ

G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985

Facts:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by
Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972,
the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land
Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests.
The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the
United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive
an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that
the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by
him against the US.

Issues:

Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
able to invoke state immunity.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state
may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
VI.SCOPE OF CONSENT

REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR G.R. No. L-30671 54 SCRA 83 November 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents

Facts:

The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The Court of First
Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines. A
decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the
arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent
Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said decision. The
corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of
Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds
duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, filed prohibition
proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the
notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Rulings:

1. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that
the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA) vs. DANILO MORALES

FACTS:

Morales and 105 others, employees of NEA, filed a class suit with the RTC against NEA for payment of
rice allowance, meal allowance, etc. pursuant to RA 6758. RTC favored Morales and ordered a writ of
execution to settle employees’ claims. A notice of garnishment was issued against the funds of NEA.
Willing to comply, NEA however claimed to have no funds to cover the claim and needed to request for
supplemental budget from DBM. Because of this, NEA filed a Motion to Quash, which was denied by RTC
but was granted an extension. Meanwhile, COA advised NEA against making further payments because
the employees may not have been hired in the dates specifically mentioned in RA 6758 that awards
them of the benefits and that RTC had no jurisdiction to order for the settlement under PD 1445.
Morales appealed to the CA, who also ruled in his favor as NEA cannot take shelter in PD 1445, because
as a GOCC, it had the right to be sued.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed an error in ordering the write of execution against the funds of
NEA

RULING: CA did commit an error in ordering the execution against NEA’s funds.

First, garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of
money. RTC merely directs petitioners to "settle the claims of respondents." Therefore, garnishment
cannot be employed to implement such form of judgment. In addition, it is undeniable that NEA is a
GOCC — a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, with capacity to sue and be
sued. As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot evade execution. However, before execution may proceed
against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. Under PD 1445, it
explicitly mentioned that COA had the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries. While GOCCs are like corporations, which have
the right to sue or be sued, it is still part of the “agencies, subdivisions, etc” which is subject to the
governance of PD 1445. Therefore, execution of the settlement of employees’ claims could not have
been possible without impleading DBM.
Lockheed vs. UP G.R. No. 18591 AprIL 18, 2012 Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for
security services with respondent UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay
for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th
month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS),
unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be garnished?

RULING:

We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity
from suit as this was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated in
the proceedings below. What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its PNB account. This
Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it
cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
UP V. DIZON (G.R. NO. 171182; AUGUST 23, 2012)

CASE DIGEST: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.
ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ,
Respondents. (G.R. No. 171182; August 23, 2012)

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the
buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the
third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of
the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May
17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon
City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders,
the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory.
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having
already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC
granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the
writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the
UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?

RULING: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing
a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under
Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve
the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds
going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The
funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing
from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability
and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within
the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already
validated the claim against the UP.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00
which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed;
hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution.

Ruling:

Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to
satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing
that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an
amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be
validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.
People v Lagman

PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893

FACTS: Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60
of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants,
being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to
register in the mi litary service between the1st and 7th of April of said year, even though they h ad been
required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in
order to register for military service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the
information. Appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother
and a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one
month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE: WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutional by virtue
of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that: SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime
duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.

HELD: YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In
US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that a person may be compelled by force to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstances of the appellants do not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can
obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).
People v Zosa ; 38 OG 1676

Facts:

Appellants were charged with violation of the National Defense Law for refusing to register in the
military service despite being required to do so. They were sentenced to imprisonment for a month and
a day.

Issue(S):

Whether or not the National Defense Law violates the constitutional right against involuntary servitude.

Held:

No. The duty of the government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Assailed judgment is
affirmed.
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007 PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER
SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, &
DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J.
LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

FACTS :

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One
of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue:

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Ruling:

YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same
way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization

for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.
 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
MIJARES v. RANADA

FACTS:

Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention,
torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime, filed with the US
District Court, Hawaii, against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury
rendered a Final Judgment and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the
plaintiff class with an award of a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90) The present petitioners filed Complaint
with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. Respondent Judge Ranada of the
Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. He opined that the
subject matter of the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees
was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit
is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or
recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy
Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal
construction ordained by the Rules of Court, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

ISSUE:

What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign
judgment?

RULING:

Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be
computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim
against an estate based on judgment. A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a
foreign judgment in this jurisdiction. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. The conditions required by the Philippines for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment has remained unchanged. SEC. 48. Effect of foreign
judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in
rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the
title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the
party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Petition is GRANTED
BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO. G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011.

FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by
its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement
and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?

[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate?

Thursday, May 25, 2017

BAYAN MUNA V. ROMULO (G.R. NO. 159618; FEBRUARY 1, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO. G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011.

FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by
its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement
and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?

[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate?

HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far
from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of
the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the Rome
Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes
committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play
only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory
to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a
signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any
argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even
assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of
international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party
to the Rome Statute.

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we
have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields
vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it,
“executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements
has been confirmed by long practice. DISMISSED.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993

OPOSA et al, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-
profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails
and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

Ruling:

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
TANADA VS ANGARA

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations,

petitioners,

vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to
the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and
as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section
19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies,
which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent
seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs
to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a
matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles
underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to
“share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
CASE DIGEST: WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE
UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO.,
LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V.
PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents. PABLITO V. SANIDAD
and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioners-in-Intervention.

FACTS: In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), sold 26 percent of the
outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC).
In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the
111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding
capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital
stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine
Government through a public bidding sold the same shares to Parallax Venture who won with a bid of
P25.6 billion or US$510 million.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder
and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. On 14 February 2007, First
Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine
Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28
February 2007.

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC
shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common
shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent
to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47
percent. This, according to petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.

On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief,
and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares.
ISSUE: Does the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common
shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock of PLDT, a public utility?

HELD: Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens;
nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than
fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and restrictions on fully
nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in control of the
corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling upholding respondent's
arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure of a public utility
corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%)
preferred stocks. Following the Trial Court ruling adopting respondent's arguments, the common shares
can be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are
supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public utility corporation.

The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management
of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board
of directors that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as
common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived
of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. In
fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to
vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any
provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote
in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right
to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in
the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands
of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital"
assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation and thus in the present case, only
to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred
shares).
Emilio A. Gonzales III vs. Office of the PresidentG.R. Nos. 196231 & 196232 September 4, 2012Perlas-
Bernabe, J.

FACTS: Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCRagainst
Rolando Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Officeof the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. On February 16, 2009, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were
assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia,
who released a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director
Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April
27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the
Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in
whose office it remained pending for final review and action when Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated
in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of
public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused
to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body. The IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those
in whom culpability must lie. It recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be
referred to the Office of the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses
and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a
Formal Charge against petitioner. Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed
with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein,
necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President, acting through individual respondents, has
constitutional or valid statutory authority to subject petitioner to an administrative investigation and to
thereafter order his removal as Deputy Ombudsman.

HELD: Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section
8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of
the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case
petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it
infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance
to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued
and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than
Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for
“it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri

Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the
alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by the
Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which
involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed
that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200
million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether
or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter
dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the
ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China,” and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the
respondent Committees.

On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the
Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first
appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri
in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-
Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.

Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive
privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20
April 2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in
issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In
addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s
right to public information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means
to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive
privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

Held:

The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for
not answering such questions.

The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of the
Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.
LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

MARCH 28, 2013

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel,
CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA,
VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ
ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES,
EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA,
Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR.

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the Congress

G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for
in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together
with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not
empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving
and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude
into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to
legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based
on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

Issue:

whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Ruling:

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or
its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In
case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom
not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,
the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and
capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs
which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list
of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This
demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise
the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct
participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between
the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES
THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED

VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,

vs.

HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

 Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
 Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
 Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Rulings:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is
the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.

The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO

Facts:

Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral
free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate
grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general
and final provisions.

Issues:

a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.

b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of

the negotiation process.

c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege.

d. Whether the Respondents’ failed to claim executive privilege on time.

Decision:

Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:

1.To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy
of full public disclosure.

Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive
privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply
for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social,
political, and economic decision-making.

2.Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient
showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach
time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing
of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the relevance of the evidence," "the
availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the
"possibility of future timidity by government employees.

In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and “sufficient showing of need”. The
arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this
standard stated in the decided cases.

There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has
earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by
petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement.

Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that
they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the
initial offers are also published.

4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present
petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.

Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House
Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The House
Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of
then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold
the same in abeyance.

While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive
officials – out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such
requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of
executive privilege.
Southern Cross Cement Corp vs Philippine Cement Manufacturers’ Corporation

FACTS: Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Private
respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic
cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of
gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity
utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly,
Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to
the Safeguard Measures Act.

The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether
or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement

Tariff Commission’s report: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not
having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be
imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement

After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the
conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry caused
by the surge of imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretarys scope of options in acting on the Commissions
recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the
SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative finding, or finding that
a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed.

DTI then denied application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as
well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, Southern Cross filed its Comment arguing
that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in connection with
the imposition of a safeguard measure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the case which is concerned with imposition of
safeguard measures

RULING: CTA has jurisdiction. Under Section 29 of the SMA, there are three requisites to enable the CTA
to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by
the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling;
and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. The first two
requisites are clearly present. The third requisite deserves closer scrutiny.

Contrary to the stance of the public respondents and Philcemcor, in this case where the DTI Secretary
decides not to impose a safeguard measure, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction to review his decision.
The reasons are as follows:
First. Split jurisdiction is abhorred. The law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the
specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review without mention of any
other court that may exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction in relation to the SMA.

Second. The interpretation of the provisions of the SMA favors vesting untrammeled appellate
jurisdiction on the CTA.

A plain reading of Section 29 of the SMA reveals that Congress did not expressly bar the CTA from
reviewing a negative determination by the DTI Secretary nor conferred on the Court of Appeals such
review authority. Respondents note, on the other hand, that neither did the law expressly grant to the
CTA the power to review a negative determination. However, under the clear text of the law, the CTA is
vested with jurisdiction to review the ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of a
safeguard measure. Had the law been couched instead to incorporate the phrase the ruling imposing a
safeguard measure, then respondents claim would have indisputable merit. Undoubtedly, the phrase in
connection with not only qualifies but clarifies the succeeding phrase imposition of a safeguard
measure. As expounded later, the phrase also encompasses the opposite or converse ruling which is the
non-imposition of a safeguard measure.

Third. Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Semper Fienda Est, Ut Evitur Inconveniens Et Absurdum.

Even assuming arguendo that Section 29 has not expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to review a
negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the Court is precluded from favoring an interpretation that would
cause inconvenience and absurdity. Adopting the respondents position favoring the CTAs minimal
jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and onerous results.
Constitutional Law Case: RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No.
171396

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?

Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well
as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There
must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would
be observed.
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (G.R. No. 162272)

Facts:

Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS)
are radio networks both involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they
being the grantees of legislative franchises. Following the enactment of these franchise laws, NTC issued
Provisional Authorities allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast
stations in various locations throughout the nation. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that he
was a stockholder of respondent companies, filed two complaints with the NTC alleging that despite the
provisions of the law mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of
Respondents, both entities had failed to make such offering. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of all
the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of Respondents. The NTC dismissed both complaints, positing that
although it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional Authority or CPC for violations or
infractions of the terms and conditions, it refrained from exercising the same.

Issue:

Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress
has issued franchises to operate

Ruling:

NO. We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as established by E.O. No. 546. One can
readily notice that even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not
expressly vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast
stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio or television stations.

Petitioner relies on the power granted to the Public Service Commission to revoke CPCs or CPCNs under
Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act. That argument has been irrefragably refuted by Section 14 of
the Public Service Act, and by jurisprudence, most especially RCPI v. NTC. As earlier noted, at no time did
radio companies fall under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission as they were expressly
excluded from its mandate under Section 14. In addition, the Court ruled in RCPI that since radio
companies, including broadcast stations and telegraphic agencies, were never under the jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission except as to rate-fixing, that Commission’s authority to impose fines did
not carry over to the NTC even while the other regulatory agencies that emanated from the Commission
did retain the previous authority their predecessor had exercised. No provision in the Public Service Act
thus can be relied upon by the petitioner to claim that the NTC has the authority to cancel CPCs or
licenses.
CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court
said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
BOCEA vs. Teves Case Digest

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which
took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has
the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund;
(2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by
the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended
that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of
officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board
the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately
executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Held:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of
judicial trial.

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment
without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or
employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and
the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. (BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)
PUNDAODAYA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009 Residence, Domicile, Dwelling

NOVEMBER 23, 2017

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run for
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for
the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency
qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any
physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and
that he does not appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed
that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business
called OBERT Construction Supply.

ISSUE:

Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change
his domicile?

RULING:

No to both. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to
“domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).” In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that
domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.

The documentary evidence of Noble, however, failed to convince the Court that he successfully effected
a change of domicile. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place
but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In this
case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, 2013-04-16

Facts:

Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008.[4

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship

To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record[11] dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the

Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying
that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent... travel records:

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado's claim that
he is a Filipino citizen.[18]

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run
for office.

Issues:

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others,

Ruling:

Principles:

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession
of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted... by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,[35] it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required... for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA),
regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections.
Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.

ISSUE/S:

1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause?
HELD:

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g) are
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.