2019 SC CL January June HO CLC

NOTES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Excerpts from the January-June 2019 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ
Police Power
"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force without limits." "It has to be
exercised within bounds – lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly oppressive upon individuals." (Zabal v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be disputed.
Verily, the statutes from which the said measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions which serve as its
framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the people, the
promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and regulations. The
motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general.
(Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: The pressing need to implement urgent measures to rehabilitate Boracay is beyond cavil from the factual milieu
that precipitated the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 475. This necessity is even made more critical and insistent by what
the Court said in Oposa v. Hon. Factoran, Jr. in regard the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health, which rights
are likewise integral concerns in this case. Oposa warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are given continuing importance and the State assumes its solemn obligation to preserve and protect them, the time will come that
nothing will be left not only for this generation but for the generations to come as well. It further taught that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. (Zabal v. Duterte,
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
The only question now is whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Against the foregoing backdrop, we now pose this question: Was the temporary closure of Boracay as a
tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary under the circumstances? The answer is in the affirmative.
(Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: As earlier noted, one of the root causes of the problems that beset Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist arrivals in
the island were clearly far more than Boracay could handle. As early as 2007, the DENR had already determined this as the major
cause of the catastrophic depletion of the island's biodiversity. Also part of the equation is the lack of commitment to effectively
enforce pertinent environmental laws. Unfortunately, direct action on these matters has been so elusive that the situation reached
a critical level. Hence, by then, only bold and sweeping steps were required by the situation. Certainly, the closure of Boracay,
albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its
rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review, evaluation and amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation
activities involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily been done
with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple, superficial or mere cosmetic but rather quite
complicated, major, and permanent in character as they were intended to serve as long-term solutions to the problem. Also, time
is of the essence. Every precious moment lost is to the detriment of Boracay's environment and of the health and well-being of
the people thereat. Hence, any unnecessary distraction or disruption is most unwelcome. Moreover, as part of the rehabilitation
efforts, operations of establishments in Boracay had to be halted in the course thereof since majority, if not all of them, need to
comply with environmental and regulatory requirements in order to align themselves with the government's goal to restore
Boracay into normalcy and develop its sustainability. Allowing tourists into the island while it was undergoing necessary
rehabilitation would therefore be pointless as no establishment would cater to their accommodation and other needs. Besides, it
could not be said that Boracay, at the time of the issuance of the questioned proclamation, was in such a physical state that would
meet its purpose of being a tourist destination. For one, its beach waters could not be said to be totally safe for swimming. In any
case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To the
mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary
rehabilitation works to be done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it
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may seem, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical and realistic
means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most efficacious and expeditious way.
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb
the executive determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As earlier noted,
petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and justification for the challenged executive action. (Zabal v. Duterte,
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
Eminent Domain
Just compensation, in expropriation cases, is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the loss of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Its true measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The
word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. It has been consistently held, moreover,
that though the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial prerogative,
the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement nonetheless. Thus, while it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial
court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. As such,
"trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no
reason at all." Evidently, the recommendations of the BOC carry with it great weight and value insofar as the
determination of just compensation is concerned. (Republic v. Sps. Silvestre, G.R. No. 237324, February 6, 2019, J.
Peralta)
Indeed, the delay in the payment of just compensation is a forbearance of money and, as such, is
necessarily entitled to earn interest. Thus, the difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the
Court, which in this case is P15,225,000.00, and the initial payment made by the government, in the amount of
P3,654,000.00 — which is part and parcel of the just compensation due to the property owner — should earn legal
interest as a forbearance of money. Moreover, with respect to the amount of interest on this difference between the
initial payment and the final amount of just compensation, as adjudged by the Court, we have upheld, in recent
pronouncements, the imposition of 12% interest rate from the time of taking, when the property owner was deprived
of the property, until July 1, 2013, when the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money was reduced from 12%
to 6% per annum by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799. Accordingly, from July 1, 2013 onwards, the
legal interest on the difference between the final amount and initial payment is 6% per annum. (Republic v. Sps.
Silvestre, G.R. No. 237324, February 6, 2019, J. Peralta, see also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Navarro, G.R. No.
196264, June 6, 2019, J. Jardeleza)
This Court notes that for almost 20 years now, petitioner had been enjoying the use of respondent's property
without paying the full amount of just compensation under the Compromise Agreement. Respondent had been
deprived of his property for almost two (2) decades. In keeping with substantial justice, this Court imposes the
payment of legal interest on the remaining just compensation due to respondent. Consistent with this Court's ruling
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, this Court imposes interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time
of taking until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. Thus, respondent's
money claim under the Compromise Agreement should be adjusted to reflect the interest rates imposed by this
Court. (Republic v. Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008, February 4, 2019, J. Leonen)
The final determination of just compensation is vested in courts. In the recent case of Alfonso v. Land Bank,
this Court, through Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, ruled that courts may deviate from the basic formula
provided by administrative agencies if it finds, in its discretion, that other factors must be taken into account in the
determination of just compensation. Deviation, however, must be grounded on a reasoned explanation based on the
evidence on record. Absent this, the deviation will be considered as grave abuse of discretion. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)
Regional trial courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, as well as the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In contrast to the special agrarian courts, the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board only has preliminary administrative determination of just compensation.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J.
Leonen)
This Court has long held that settlement of the value of just compensation is judicial in nature.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, this Court categorically held that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function:

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The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
In Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad, this Court reaffirmed the judicial determination of just
compensation:
LBP's valuation of lands covered by the CARP Law is considered only as an initial determination, which is not
conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, that could make the final determination of just compensation, taking into
consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. LBP's valuation
has to be substantiated during an appropriate hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance with
Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR regulations.
Moreover, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Montalvan, this Court ruled on the finality of the Special
Agrarian Court's jurisdiction as provided for under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the
RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials (sic) original jurisdiction in compensation
cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules
speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco,
G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)
Special agrarian courts are not merely given appellate jurisdiction over the findings of administrative
agencies. The law has explicitly vested them with jurisdiction to make a final and binding determination of just
compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12,
2019, J. Leonen)
However, as this Court held in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals and Land Bank of the Philippines, and Export Processing Zone Authority, it is not adequate to merely use
the formula in an administrative order of the Department of Agrarian Reform or rely on the determination of a land
assessor to show a final determination of the amount of just compensation. Courts are still tasked with considering
all factors present, which may be stated in formulas provided by administrative agencies.
In Land Bank v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises this Court held that when acting within the bounds of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, special agrarian courts "are not strictly bound to apply the [Department of
Agrarian Reform] formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formula's strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the
factual situations before them."
In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank, this Court held that Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law merely provides for guideposts to ascertain the value of properties. Courts are not precluded from
considering other factors that may affect the value of property. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and
Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)
Thus, while the formula prescribed by the Department of Agrarian Reform requires due consideration, the
determination of just compensation shall still be subject to the final decision of the special agrarian court. (Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)
The special agrarian court sitting in a condemnation action may adopt the value computed using the
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In its exercise of original jurisdiction, the special
agrarian court may deviate from the formulas if it can show that the value is not equivalent to the fair market value
at the time of the taking. However, an allegation is not enough. The landowner must allege and prove why the
formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform does not suffice.
Nonetheless, having original and exclusive jurisdiction does not mean that our courts should be removed
from the realities that confront the entire government bureaucracy and, in so doing, become impervious to the
guidelines issued by our administrative agencies. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria
Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)
As this Court held in Alfonso v. Land Bank, any deviation to the basic formula made in the exercise of
judicial discretion must be "supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record." A
computation by a court made in "utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and by the
implementing rules" amounts to grave abuse of discretion. It must be struck down.
Here, the Special Agrarian Court's computation of just compensation resulted in a "double take up" of the
market value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already been considered in Palmares
as a departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative guidelines. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy
Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019, J. Leonen)

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Although ushered by the foregoing standards, courts are not confined to rigorously and faithfully comply
with the same. To do so would deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic
function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. The courts may relax the application of the DAR formula, if
warranted by the circumstances of the case and provided the RTC explains its deviation from the factors or formula
above-mentioned. Thus, the "justness" of the enumeration of valuation factors in Section 17, the "justness" of using
a basic DAR formula, and the "justness" of the components (and their weights) that flow into such formula, are all
matters for the courts to decide. xxx.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases emphasizing the duty of the RTC to explain the reasons for departing
from the formula created by DAR. In the case of Spouses Mercado v. Land Bank of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that if the RTC finds these guidelines inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating
therefrom and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the property
expropriated. So too is the case of Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines, wherein this Court reminded that a
reasoned explanation from the SAC to justify its deviation from the guidelines is indispensable and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), Inc., which deemed improper the complete disregard of the DAR
formula and Section 17 of RA 6657 without stating their inapplicability in the case.
While the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Courts, exercises judicial prerogative in determining and fixing
just compensation, the duty to abide by the rules, especially so when the same are enacted to comply with the
objectives of agrarian reform, cannot simply be disregarded. The case of Alfonso illuminates in this wise:
xxx The factors listed under Section 17of RA 6657 and its resulting formulas provide a uniform framework or structure
for the computation of just compensation which ensures that the amounts to be paid to affected landowners are not
arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives of agrarian reform. Until and unless declared invalid in a proper
case, the DAR formulas partake of the nature of statutes, which under the 2009 amendment became law itself, and thus
have in their favor the presumption of legality, such that courts shall consider, and not disregard, these formulas in the
determination of just compensation for properties covered by the CARP. When faced with situations which do not
warrant the formula's strict application, courts may, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, relax the formula's
application to fit the factual situations before them, subject only to the condition that they clearly explain in their
Decision their reasons (as borne by the evidence on record) for the deviation undertaken. xxx
As the RTC failed to comply with the foregoing pronouncement, the remand of the case is deemed proper.
More so, when both parties failed to present satisfactory evidence of the value of the property as of the time of its
taking; and that this Court, as we are not a trier of facts, cannot receive new evidence for prompt disposition of the
case. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Briones-Blanco, G.R. No. 213199, March 27, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
Thus, it is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a
public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land belonging to the
former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or
expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such
property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public
policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel. The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to
dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and
consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper
expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation and
consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has
jurisdiction over the value of the subject land. (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development
Corporation, G.R No. 214782, April 3, 2019, J. Caguioa)
[Note: Given that BDC filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against TransCo, which erected and
then energized a 230 KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the subject property, the MTC should have found or taken
judicial notice that TransCo is a public service corporation with the power to expropriate. Upon such finding, the MTC, pursuant
to the aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have then ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case without prejudice
to BDC's right to recover the value of the land actually taken, or ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and damages assessed therein. The MTC could not have proceeded
to determine just compensation given that the value of the subject property is clearly beyond its jurisdiction. (National
Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development Corporation, G.R No. 214782, April 3, 2019, J. Caguioa)]
[Note: Further, the award of rental in arrears by the MTC is improper because BDC is only entitled to the just
compensation of the subject land and consequential damages as determined pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. While the award of rental in arrears is proper in an unlawful detainer action, its award in the present case cannot be upheld
since an unlawful detainer action is not a sanctioned remedy in case a public service or utility corporation, endowed with the
power of eminent domain, like TransCo in this case, has occupied privately-owned property without first acquiring title thereto
by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings. (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development

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Corporation, G.R No. 214782, April 3, 2019, J. Caguioa)]
Taxation
A tax amnesty operates as a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to
impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law. It is an absolute
forgiveness or waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to
relent a chance to start with a clean slate. A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed
in law. The grant of a tax amnesty is akin to a tax exemption; thus, it must be construed strictly against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Transfield Philippines, Inc., G.R.
No. 211449, January 16, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
Petitioner Foundation has presented adequate legal and factual basis to prove that it remains as a tax
exempt entity under Article XIV, Section 4, Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on jurisprudence and tax rulings, a taxpayer shall be granted with this tax exemption after proving
that: (1) it falls under the classification of non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it
seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
Petitioner Foundation has fulfilled both of the abovementioned requirements. (La Sallian Educational
Innovators Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 202792, February 27, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
[Note: Considering the clear explanation of the nature of the money involved, it is evident that all of petitioner
Foundation's income is actually, directly and exclusively used or earmarked for promoting its educational purpose. To reiterate,
respondent never argued that the income of petitioner Foundation was used in any manner other than for promoting its purpose as
a non-stock, non-profit educational institution; in fact, there is not even a single argument or evidence presented to cast a doubt in
the proper usage of petitioner Foundation's income. (La Sallian Educational Innovators Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 202792, February 27, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
[Note: Furthermore, a simple reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require
that the revenues and income must have also been earned from educational activities or activities related to the purposes of an
educational institution. The phrase "all revenues" is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the
revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, then said revenues and income shall be
exempt from taxes and duties. (La Sallian Educational Innovators Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
202792, February 27, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
The tax exemption expressly granted by the 1987 Constitution, the supreme law of the land, cannot be set
aside by any statute, especially by a mere technicality in procedure. While payment of docket fee and other legal
fees within the thirty (30)-day reglementary period to appeal a tax assessment to the CTA is mandatory and
jurisdictional, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its equity jurisdiction and allow a liberal interpretation of the
rules of procedure if a rigid application will defeat substantial justice. (La Sallian Educational Innovators
Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 202792, February 27, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
Consistent with the BOT concept and as implemented, BPPC - the owner-manager-operator of the project -
is the actual user of its machineries and equipment. BPPC's ownership and use of the machineries and equipment are
actual, direct, and immediate, while NAPOCOR's is contingent and, at this stage of the BOT Agreement, not
sufficient to support its claim for tax exemption. Thus, the CTA committed no reversible error in denying
NAPOCOR's claim for tax exemption. (National Power Corporation v. The Province of Pangasinan, G.R. No.
210191, March 4, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
Thus, until the transfer of the project to NPC, it does not have anything to do with the use and operation of
the power plant. The direct, actual, exclusive, and beneficial owner and user of the power station, machineries, and
equipment certainly pertains to Mirant. NPC, therefore, has no legal personality to question on the assessment or
claim for exemption and privileges with regard to the tax liability attached to the subject properties. (National Power
Corporation v. The Province of Pangasinan, G.R. No. 210191, March 4, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
[Note: That NPC assumed the tax liabilities in the agreement is of no moment. Such undertaking does not justify the
exemption or entitlement to privileges. The privilege granted to NPC cannot be extended to Mirant. To rule otherwise would be
to allow the circumvention of our law on exemptions and grant of privileges. (National Power Corporation v. The Province of
Pangasinan, G.R. No. 210191, March 4, 2019, J. J. Reyes)]

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A tax refund or credit is in the nature of a tax exemption, construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Claimants of a tax refund must prove the factual basis of their claims
with sufficient evidence. (International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. The City of Manila, G.R. No. 185622,
October 17, 2018, J. Leonen)
Due Process
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (Bagaporo v.
People, G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
Although the petitioner cannot successfully invoke gross negligence of counsel to reinstate his lost appeal,
it cannot be said that he was deprived of due process. It is beyond question that the petitioner had his day in court.
His case was tried on the merits and he was ably represented during the trial stage. Furthermore, the merits of the
petitioner's case deserve scant consideration. (Bagaporo v. People, G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 impinges on their constitutional right to due process since they
were deprived of the corollary right to work and earn a living by reason of the issuance thereof.
Concededly, "[a] profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong."
Under this premise, petitioners claim that they were deprived of due process when their right to work and earn a
living was taken away from them when Boracay was ordered closed as a tourist destination. It must be stressed,
though, that "when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare."
Otherwise, police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, government measures implemented pursuant to
the said state power would be stymied or invalidated.
In any case, petitioners, particularly Zabal and Jacosalem, cannot be said to have already acquired vested
rights to their sources of income in Boracay. As heretofore mentioned, they are part of the informal sector of the
economy where earnings are not guaranteed. xxx. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del
Castillo)
[Note: Here, Zabal and Jacosalem's asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay is merely
an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere
expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. xxx. Certainly, they do not possess any vested right on their sources of
income, and under this context, their claim of lack of due process collapses. To stress, only rights which have completely and
definitely accrued and settled are entitled protection under the due process clause. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February
12, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
[Note: Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of their right to work and earn a living. They
are free to work and practice their trade elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay, at least for the duration of its
closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power measure to close and rehabilitate the island. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No.
238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
Also clearly untenable is petitioners' claim that they were being made to suffer the consequences of the
environmental transgressions of others. It must be stressed that the temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist
destination and the consequent ban of tourists into the island were not meant to serve as penalty to violators of
environmental laws. The temporary closure does not erase the environmental violations committed; hence, the
liabilities of the violators remain and only they alone shall suffer the same. The temporary inconvenience that
petitioners or other persons may have experienced or are experiencing is but the consequence of the police measure
intended to attain a much higher purpose, that is, to protect the environment, the health of the people, and the
general welfare. Indeed, any and all persons may be burdened by measures intended for the common good or to
serve some important governmental interest. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
As to the first issue, Miranda firmly believes that Duque should have motu propio inhibited himself from the
deliberation, evaluation and review by the CSC of the DOH Decision. Miranda pointed out that Duque was the
former Secretary of the DOH, which was her accuser in the instant administrative complaint. After Duque's stint
with the DOH, he was appointed as the chairman of the CSC, which rendered the now assailed Decision affirming

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that of the DOH.
Miranda has a point. True, CSC acts as a collegial body. And as such, the chairman alone cannot issue any
decisions or resolutions without consultation and deliberations with the other members of the commission. It is
equally true that mere allegation of bias and partiality is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence
to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
However, the circumstances in this case would readily show that Duque was the very person who issued the
assailed DOH Decision in his capacity as then Secretary of Health. Hence, it is just proper that he should have
inhibited himself from taking part on the appeal proceedings in the CSC, as Chairman of the CSC. Having
participated in the proceedings with the DOH and having ruled for the dismissal of Miranda, it was incumbent upon
Duque to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same case during the appeal with the CSC. While it
is true that he was not able to sign the Decision of the CSC as he was on official leave, records show that he
nonetheless signed the CSC resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision involving the
same case. This clearly shows that he still took active part in the appeal proceedings. The Court had ruled that the
officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. (Miranda v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
[Note: At the very start, he should have inhibited himself from the case and let the other Commissioners undertake the
review. Miranda was effectively denied due process when Duque reviewed his own Decision by participating in resolving the
motion for reconsideration of the case. (Miranda v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019, J. J. Reyes)]
Due process is comprised of two (2) components – substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal. (Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676, March 18, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. "Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to
be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein
and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties." (Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676,
March 18, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
[Note: The Court has punctiliously examined the available records of this case and found no showing that indeed,
petitioner had been duly notified of the charges filed against him by Ramirez or served with a subpoena relative to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the OCP-QC. The Court therefore takes exception to the CA's observation that petitioner
failed to prove that he was denied participation in the preliminary investigation, for it would have been impossible for him to
prove such negative allegation. Instead, under the circumstances, it was incumbent upon respondent to show that petitioner had
been duly notified of the proceedings and that, despite notice, he still failed to appear or participate thereat. In the absence of such
proof, the Court therefore finds that petitioner had not been given an opportunity to be heard. Case law states that "[w]hen service
of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence." (Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676, March 18, 2019, J. Perlas-
Bernabe)]
It bears to stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. As
such, to deny petitioner's motion for reinvestigation on the basis of the provisions of A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC would be
to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process on purely procedural grounds. Thus, the courts a quo
should allow petitioner to be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence in a preliminary
investigation for, after all, "the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not
mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.”
(Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676, March 18, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
In Serrano, this Court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" under Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection and substantive due process clauses. xxx.
Later, however, this clause was kept when the law was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of the new law mirrors the same clause. xxx.
In Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, this Court was confronted with the question of the
constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022. Reiterating our finding in Serrano, we ruled
that "limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a
violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution." xxx.

Page 7 of 25
This case should be no different from Serrano and Sameer.
A statute declared unconstitutional "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it

creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all." Incorporating a similarly worded provision in a
subsequent legislation does not cure its unconstitutionality. Without any discernible change in the circumstances
warranting a reversal, this Court will not hesitate to strike down the same provision.
As such, we reiterate our ruling in Sameer that the reinstated clause in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
has no force and effect of law. It is unconstitutional. (Aldovino v. Gold and Green Manpower Management and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 200811, June 19, 2019, J. Leonen)
Arrests, Searches and Seizures
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the
"plain view" doctrine is applicable. In People v. Lagman, this Court laid down the following parameters for its
application":
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure
even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues that the
second requisite is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent as it
was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court is inclined to agree.
The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint the picture that the
police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge that he was
also illegally planting marijuana… (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
[Note: It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the mauling
incident. In fact, it may be reasonably inferred that the mauling incident had something to do with Acosta's planting of marijuana.
It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he
reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact
that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants was
inadvertent. (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)]
In People v. Valdez, the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually
"searching" for evidence against the accused, to wit:
Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the
prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of
the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area,
they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants
were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew
that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be more
circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling
incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Thus, the second requisite
for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case,
the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
(People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
[Note: All told, since the marijuana plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 3
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated plants are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
Court finds Acosta's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him. (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28,

Page 8 of 25
2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)]
Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a "pot session." PO2 Villeran, respondent's
primary witness, testified that on the day of the incident, he and other police operatives were conducting a "stake-
out operation" in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. xxx. Petitioner was arrested and subjected to drug testing.
When he tested positive for shabu, he was subsequently charged with having violated Article II, Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 9165 xxx.
Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since PO2 Villeran had to peep through the window
to ascertain that something illegal was occurring. He posits that his case is similar to that of People v. Bolasa. In
Bolasa, the police were tipped off by an informant that people were packing drugs in a certain house. Upon reaching
it, the police officers peeked into a window, where they saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana. The officers
entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested the pair. This Court held that the arrests and
the subsequent searches and seizures were invalid as the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that the
people in the house were committing a crime. (Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, J. Leonen)
Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He
did not move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he
entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. xxx.
In Bolasa, the accused were charged with possession of illegal drugs. This Court not only contended with
the validity of the warrantless arrest, but also examined the validity of the subsequent search of the accused and the
seizure of items in their possession. As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a
warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the
evidence seized during the illegal arrest.
Petitioner does not deny that his drug test yielded positive for illegal drugs. What he questions is the
alleged illegality of his arrest.
Petitioner, however, has already waived the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized
from him during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs. Thus the trial court and the
Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 9165. (Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, J. Leonen)
However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the drugs
cases reveals that he was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule, but
also on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust operation, thereby
rendering Trinidad's in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the subsequent search on him
unreasonable. Thus, contrary to the courts a quo's opinions, Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs cases, more
particularly on the latter ground, is material to this case because the subject firearms and ammunition were
simultaneously recovered from him when he was searched subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust
operation. (Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 239957, February 18, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe)
Here, an examination of the ruling in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the RTC
admitted as part of his testimony) confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven and interdependent
of each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject firearms and ammunition, were illegally seized in
a singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances
attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases. To recall, in the drugs
cases, the finding of unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1
Sanoy's testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said testimony was found
to be highly doubtful and incredible. This circumstance similarly obtains here as in fact, the testimonies of both PO1
Nidoy and PO1 Sanoy in this case essentially just mirror on all material points the latter's implausible narration in
the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition are also
inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs cases.
Since the confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged in this case,
Trinidad's acquittal is in order. (Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 239957, February 18, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe)
[Note: The Court is aware that the findings on the illegality of Trinidad's warrantless arrest were made in the drugs
cases, which are separate and distinct from the present illegal possession of firearms and ammunition case. Nevertheless, the
Court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of such findings as evidence, and apply them altogether for the judicious
resolution of the same issue which was duly raised herein. To be sure, the general rule is that the courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the other case
has a close connection with the matter in controversy in the case at hand. (Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 239957, February 18,

Page 9 of 25
2019, Perlas-Bernabe)]
Thus, while it is true that the Ombudsman retains full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter gains full control as soon as the case has been filed before it. This
must necessarily be so considering that when an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
case and the concomitant authority to determine whether or not the case should be dismissed being the "best and
sole judge" thereof. Consequently, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with
st
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. (People v. Sandiganbayan [1
Division], G.R. Nos. 219824-25, February 12, 2019, J. J. Reyes)
As to the manner by which a court is expected to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused, the same is spelled under the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the
prosecutor's resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.
Specifically, under Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court has three options
upon the filing of a criminal complaint or information: a) immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause.
Thus, when the Sandiganbayan chose to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest over the other criminal
cases, ordered the prosecution to present the subject SARO which Relampagos, et al. denied having signed and
processed, and thereafter, upon examination of the subject SARO, dismissed the criminal cases for lack of probable
cause, the Sandiganbayan, in fact acted well-within its competence and jurisdiction. There is therefore no reason to
ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan for having reversed the Ombudsman's earlier
st
determination of probable cause. (People v. Sandiganbayan [1 Division], G.R. Nos. 219824-25, February 12, 2019,
J. J. Reyes)
[Note: It is also opportune to emphasize that the purpose of requiring the courts to determine probable cause is to
insulate from the very beginning those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
st
(People v. Sandiganbayan [1 Division], G.R. Nos. 219824-25, February 12, 2019, J. J. Reyes)]
In Sanchez v. People, a stop and frisk was defined and elucidated, thus:
xxx as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in other to check the latter's outer clothing
for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance
with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be
held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
In the case under review, sufficient facts engendered in the minds of the police officers that Jepez and
Ramos, Jr. were in the act of committing a crime. Consider the following instances: the police officers were on a
mission to entrap Cartina who was verified to be engaged in selling illegal drugs; Jepez and Ramos, Jr. were with
Cartina when the officers saw the latter at the target area; when the poseur-buyer introduced himself as a MAD AC
operative, the duo immediately fled from the scene; and when they were subdued, they were searched and each was
found in possession of a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. Indubitably, Jepez and Ramos, Jr. were then
illegally committing the crime of possession of dangerous drugs in the presence of the police officers. The seized
items were therefore admissible in evidence. (People v. Cartina, G.R. No. 226152, March 13, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: Appellants' next argument is centered on the arresting officers' failure to comply with the requirements for the
proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under RA 9165. They claim that the officers failed to make a physical inventory and
take photographs of the seized items in the presence of a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media thus
raising uncertainty about the identity of the seized items presented in evidence.
We find appellants' argument well-founded.
The procedural guidelines that the arresting officers must observe in the handling of seized illegal drugs to ensure the
preservation of the identity and integrity thereof is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 xxx. In the present
case, there was a clear non-observance of the above-mentioned procedure. MADAC operative Encarnacion categorically

Page 10 of 25
admitted during his cross-examination that, aside from Kagawad Parrucho, there was no representative from the media and the
DOJ present during the inventory of the seized items. xxx. "RA 9165 and its [IRR] both state that non-compliance with the
procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided
there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was
preserved." In the present case, the police officers did not bother to offer any excuses or sort of justification for their omission. It
is imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with the procedural requirements set by law. "
[W]hen there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (RA 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. xxx Accordingly, the prosecution is
deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of
the accused." (People v. Cartina, G.R. No. 226152, March 13, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. xxx.
However, it must be emphasized that a search warrant validly and lawfully issued by a competent authority
does not provide unbridled freedom to the peace officer in the manner of implementing the same. Section 8, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court cautions that:
Section. 8. Search of house, room or any other premises to be made in presence of two witnesses - No search of a
house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Thus, to be reasonable and valid, the search must be witnessed primarily by the lawful occupant of the
place or any member of his family. It is only in their absence, that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion and
who are residents of the place searched, may be witnesses to the search. The order of preference cannot be
disregarded, interchanged or intercalated. (People v. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, J. del Castillo)
In his final bid for reversal of his conviction, appellant contends that the search was illegally and
irregularly conducted and violative of his constitutional rights. Appellant argues that the members of the raiding
team were freely roaming around the house and the surrounding yard, unaccompanied by any of the required
witnesses, in violation of the spirit and letter of the law, as enunciated in Quintero v. National Bureau of
Investigation, Moreover, he asserts that the search was conducted without his presence since he was forced to stay
inside the receiving area.
Indeed, some members of the raiding team were roaming around the house and its surroundings. However,
appellant failed to present any evidence that, in so doing, they were searching for incriminating evidence. The
evidence showed that they were patrolling the area in order to secure the same against possible escape of the persons
earlier rounded up. It must be noted that the actual search did not commence until after the arrival of Barangay
Captain Baldemoro, the media representatives and Assistant City Prosecutor Joveliza P. Soriano.
That said, appellant's averment that the search was not made in his presence has no basis; besides, it cannot
prevail and overturn the positive, straightforward and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the
search was done in the presence of the appellant himself. In fact, appellant himself admitted that he accompanied the
search team throughout the conduct of the search. (People v. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, J. del
Castillo)
Next, appellant disclaims ownership of the place searched. He alleged that the seized illegal items were
found not in his actual possession but inside the bedroom of the rest house occupied by Boyet and Tabor Alejandria.
It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, appellant was the owner and possessor of the rest house
based on established facts and evidence. As owner of the cock farm and the rest house, appellant clearly had full
control and dominion over all the rooms located therein, including the bedroom where the thing seized were located.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it [was] found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary.
The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located is shared with another. (People v. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: "The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person
raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict." In the present case,

Page 11 of 25
appellant failed to rebut by sufficient evidence that he did not in fact exercise power and control over the place searched and the
items seized and that he did not intend to do so. Appellant also failed to adduce evidence that he was authorized by law to possess
the same. (People v. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
Our Constitution guarantees the inviolable right of every person to be secure in his or her persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose. Thus, there
should be a warrant duly issued on the basis of probable cause, in order to consider these searches and seizures as
valid. This notwithstanding, there are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant: (a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk; and (g) the
existence of exigent and emergency circumstances. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A.
Reyes)
In this case, the CA found that the discovery of the stolen motorcycle's OR and CR in the possession of
Marvin was the product of a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. For the search to become valid under this
exception, the inquiry of the Court should focus on the legality of the arrest. The arrest must not be used as a mere
pretext for conducting the search, and the arrest, to be lawful, must precede the search. Assuming that there was a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may only search the arrestee and the area within which he or she may reach for a
weapon, or for evidence to destroy. The arresting officer may also seize any money or property used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish
the arrestee the means of escaping or committing violence.
Since Marvin was arrested without a warrant, his apprehension may only be considered valid under the
three (3) instances provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) the arrest of a suspect where, based on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that the suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been committed, or a "hot pursuit" arrest;
and (c) the arrest of a prisoner, who has escaped from custody, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. For the case at bar, the last circumstance for a valid warrantless arrest obviously cannot
apply.
An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Meanwhile, for a
hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it.
Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that Marvin was not validly arrested
without a warrant. The prosecution failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in flagrante delicto
arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that
was just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March
20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
[Note: According to P/Insp. Villamer, the radio operator at the Ocanipo Police Station received a telephone call from a
concerned citizen regarding a suspicious person with something bulging in his body. This report constrained P/Insp. Villamer to
send a team to verify the report. One of the police officers, SPO4 Pequiras, verified the report, which resulted in the arrest of
Marvin. However, he did not specify the reason why Marvin was arrested, other than the fact that there was a report of a
suspicious person. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
[Note: From this testimony, the Court cannot determine Marvin's overt actions, which led SPO4 Pequiras to believe that
Marvin was illegally in possession of firearms. There is a dearth of evidence describing how Marvin committed a crime, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after
receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the report, and this eventually resulted in
the arrest of Marvin. It was not established that Marvin had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved in a manner
which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and the CA grievously erred in
agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothing more—prior to
the arrest of Marvin. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfill the requirements for a hot pursuit
arrest. The prosecution did not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious
person operate to vest personal knowledge on the police officers about the commission of an offense. (Porteria v.
People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on Marvin's body and belongings is likewise

Page 12 of 25
unjustified. The law requires that there should be a lawful arrest prior to the search. The process cannot be reversed.
"[W]here a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless
arrest xxx upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of
discovering if indeed a crime [was] committed by him, then the search xxx of such person as well as his arrest are
deemed illegal." The CA thus committed a reversible error in deeming the search valid without making a prior
determination of the legality of the arrest. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity of his arrest
before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Here, Marvin may no longer raise the issue
regarding the validity of his arrest, especially after participating in the proceedings before the trial court.
Nonetheless, this does not preclude Court from ruling against the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the
illegal warrantless arrest.
As such, the OR and CR allegedly found in the bag of Marvin after he was arrested for illegal possession of
firearms are inadmissible. The Court cannot consider the documents supposedly seized from Marvin's possession as
part of the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A.
Reyes)
One of the arresting officers, SPO4 Pequiras, further muddled his testimony when he stated that the search
on Marvin and his bag was due to the "information [they received] that a certain person was seen with a suspicious
thing tucked [in] his waist." Verily, the factual circumstances were ambiguous as to whether the arrest preceded the
search, or if Marvin was stopped and frisked pursuant to the anonymous report the police received regarding a
suspicious person. Regardless, the warrantless search is still unjustifiable as a stop-and-frisk search.
A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the protective search of
outer clothing for weapons. For purposes of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police officer
is required to introduce himself properly, make initial inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting
unusual and suspicious conduct.
In order to be considered valid, a stop and frisk search must be premised on the manifest overt acts of an
accused, which give law enforcers a "genuine reason" to conduct the search. Jurisprudence has refined the standard
to less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion. The search cannot be based on a suspicion or a hunch.
Their suspicion is formed on the basis of the law enforcers' prior experience with criminals and their behavior, as
well as the surrounding circumstances of the case. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A.
Reyes)
In some cases, the Court has also required the presence of more than one activity which, when taken
together, gives a reasonable inference of criminal activity. This is determined on a case-to-case basis, as when a
man with reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, avoided the police officers approaching him, or when a person
was seen placing a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white substance inside a cigarette case. For this particular
case, however, the Court cannot discern any circumstance that would give SPO4 Pequiras a genuine reason to stop-
and-frisk Marvin.
The prosecution stated that Marvin was arrested and searched because the police received a report
regarding a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist. But in his testimony, SPO4 Pequiras did not
specify the actions or behavior of Marvin, or the factual circumstances occurring prior to his arrest and
search. He simply stated that Marvin was arrested due to the anonymous tip. SPO4 Pequiras did not even
state how they were able to identify Marvin as the suspicious person referred to in the concerned citizen's
report. Evidently, these are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that Marvin was illegally searched. Following the exclusionary
principle, the items seized as a result of this unlawful search are inadmissible as evidence. Again, the OR and CR of
the subject motorcycle, allegedly discovered as a result of the invalid search of Marvin, cannot be used as evidence
against him. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
A petition for certiorari, pertaining to the regularity of a preliminary investigation, becomes moot after an
information is filed and a trial court issues an arrest warrant upon finding probable cause against the accused.
(Marantan v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019, J. Leonen)
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect

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against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in
People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject
sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of
the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at
the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as
it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and
integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating
witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-
bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA
9165.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when
they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and
photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the
purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be
secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the
intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and
confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." (People v. Claudel, G.R. No. 219852, April 3, 2019,
J. Caguioa)
A warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 is valid when these two elements are present: (1) the
person to be arrested must perform an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Here, both conditions concurred. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs by PO2
Aresta. In turn, PO2 Aresta effected the arrest since he had personal knowledge of facts indicating that appellant had
committed a criminal act. The fact that appellant was not the target person of the buy-bust operation was of no
moment. As long as an accused performs some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, the warrantless arrest is justified.
Appellant's contention that it was contrary to human experience for her to sell illegal drugs to total
strangers does not persuade. We have long observed that "[p]eddlers of illicit drugs have been known with ever
increasing casualness and recklessness to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers
or not. Moreover, drug-pushing when done on a small-scale xxx belongs to those types of crimes that may be
committed any time and at any place. (People v. Maneclang, G.R. No. 230337, June 17, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: Even as the sachets of shabu purportedly seized from appellant were admissible in evidence, we find that the
prosecution failed to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. The prosecution not only failed to prove the
corpus delicti of the crimes charged; it also failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody thereof, in violation of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165. (People v. Maneclang, G.R. No. 230337, June 17, 2019, J. del Castillo)]
Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-
bust team is accompanied by their informant at the crime scene. Similarly, the absence of marked money does not
create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided that the prosecution has adequately proved the sale.
Also, the use of dusted money is not indispensable to prove the illegal sale of drugs, as held in People v. Felipe.
Neither is it necessary to present the informant as his testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative.
(People v. Juguilon, G.R. No. 229828, June 26, 2019, J. del Castillo)
Freedom of Expression
The right to self-organization is not limited to private employees and encompasses all workers in both the
public and private sectors, as shown by the clear declaration in Article IX(B), Section 2(5) that "the right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees." Article III, Section 8 of the Bill of Rights likewise
states, "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,

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associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." While the right to self-organization
is absolute, the right of government employees to collective bargaining and negotiation is subject to limitations.
(GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019, J. Leonen)
The protection afforded by the Constitution to the press is not carte blanche that allows journalists to
abandon their responsibility for truth and transparency. It is incumbent upon them to exercise a high degree of
professionalism in their work, regardless of the subject of their stories. (Guy v. Tulfo, G.R. No. 213023, April 10,
2019, J. Leonen)
Right to Travel
In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what
petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely
corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary
incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant
to impair the right to travel. The questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay
and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its import. (Zabal v. Duterte,
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, J. del Castillo)
[Note: Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure. To repeat, police power constitutes an
implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater number. For the above reasons, petitioners' constitutional challenge on Proclamation
No. 475 anchored on their perceived impairment of the right to travel must fail. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12,
2019, J. del Castillo)]
Right of Association
"Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends 'closed shop,' 'union shop,'
'maintenance of membership' or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to
acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular
employees are required to join the union within a certain period for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the
agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A
closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and
his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the
enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing
of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part."
This is consistent with the State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with
management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately
bargain with the employer. Thus, the law has allowed stipulations for "union shop" and "closed shop" as means of
encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interest vis-a-
vis the employer. (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
[Note: While not explicitly mentioned in the Labor Code, case law recognizes that dismissal from employment due to
the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA is another just cause for termination of employment. Similar to the
enumerated just causes in the Labor Code, the violation of a union security clause amounts to a commission of a wrongful act or
omission out of one's own volition; hence, it can be said that the dismissal process was initiated not by the employer but by the
employee's indiscretion. Further, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees is of equal import as the
statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the union and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor; thus, there is parallel treatment between just
causes and violation of the union security clause. (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019,
J. Perlas-Bernabe)]
[Note: Pertinent is Article 259 (formerly 248), paragraph (e) of the Labor Code, which states that "[n]othing in this
Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a
condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement. xxx" The stipulation in a CBA based on this provision of the Labor Code is commonly known
as the "union security clause." (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)]
[Note: To validly terminate the employment of an employee through the enforcement of the union security clause, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the
union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the

Page 15 of 25
employee from the union. (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R. No. 232687, February 4, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)]
Notably, the Court has consistently upheld the validity of a closed shop agreement as a form of union
security clause. In BPI v. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, the Court
has explained that:
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in
the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor
organization because it is in favor of unionism. This Court, on occasion, has even held that a union security clause in a
CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only
members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the
most prized achievement of unionism." It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a
promise of employment in the closed shop, it wields group solidarity. (Slord Development Corporation v. Noya, G.R.
No. 232687, February 4, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
Custodial Investigation
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the commission
of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel. These rights may not be
waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.
This principle is further reiterated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438. Under this statute, extrajudicial
confessions made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation must fulfill the following
requirements:
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall
be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
These safeguards are intended to prevent the practice of extracting coerced confessions, no matter how
slight, which could lead the accused to make false admissions. They are meant to insulate the accused from
"coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of [a custodial] investigation."
The trial court, in convicting Marvin for the crime of carnapping, relied on several circumstantial pieces of
evidence. There include his supposed voluntary admission to P/Insp. Villamer that the motorcycle is in the
possession of a certain Felix. This admission, as shown in the xxx testimony of P/Insp. Villamer, was given after
Marvin was arrested and taken to the police station for further investigation xxx.
At that time, Marvin was already under custodial investigation, having been placed in the custody of the
police, or deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner. Thus, when the police officers asked Marvin
regarding the discovery of the motorcycle's registration documents in his possession, Marvin's right to counsel
automatically attached. Furthermore, his answer constitutes an implied admission of guilt, which should have been
done in writing, with the assistance of his counsel, or after a valid waiver of these rights. xxx.
At this point, it bears reiterating that when the police officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur began questioning
Marvin about the items found in his possession, there should have been a counsel present to assist Marvin. Without
the assistance of a counsel, and in the absence of a valid waiver of this right, Marvin's "voluntary" answer to P/Insp.
Villamer is inadmissible as evidence of his guilt. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
Another circumstantial evidence considered by the trial court is the alleged confession of Marvin to Virgie,
the mother of the complainant. Unlike Marvin's admission to P/Insp. Villamer, the confession to Virgie, a private
party, is not within the scope of the constitutional and statutory limitations on extrajudicial confessions. (Porteria v.
People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)

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[Note: This notwithstanding, the Court should still inquire upon the voluntariness of the confession. The prosecution
must establish that the accused spoke freely, without inducement of any kind, and fully aware of the consequences of the
confession. This may be inferred from the language of the confession, as when the accused provided details known only to him or
her. In the present case, the Court cannot determine the voluntariness of Marvin's supposed confession to Virgie because it was
not reduced into writing or recorded in another manner. The Court can only rely on the testimony of Virgie as to the substance of
Marvin's confession. Aside from her testimony, there is no independent evidence that establishes the voluntariness and substance
of Marvin's alleged extrajudicial confession. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
[Note: The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin may, nonetheless, be admitted as an
independently relevant statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was made. The admission of this testimony does
not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to the substance of what she heard—not
the truth thereof. Her testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20,
2019, J. A. Reyes)]
[Note: The Court emphasizes that an extrajudicial confession is not a sufficient ground for conviction, unless it is
corroborated by either direct or circumstantial evidence. If it is the latter, the accused may be convicted when: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived and proven; and (c) the combination of jail the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately for the prosecution, most of the
circumstantial pieces of evidence are inadmissible as evidence against Marvin. (Porteria v. People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20,
2019, J. A. Reyes)]
[Note: The only remaining circumstance is the recovery of the stolen motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Yet notably, the
police officers did not recover the motorcycle through the information Marvin allegedly provided to either P/Supt. Villamer or
Virgie. It was neither found in the possession of a certain Felix as Marvin supposedly told P/Supt. Villamer, or with "Insan Joy,"
in the address given to Vergie. Rather, the police officers of the Sta. Rosa City Police Station chanced upon the stolen
motorcycle when they set-up a checkpoint at the Barangay Road of Kaingin, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The driver of the stolen
motorcycle was Albert, not the petitioner in this case. Marvin was not even present at the time Albert was driving the
motorcycle. For these reasons, the totality of the evidence does not corroborate the extrajudicial confession of Marvin. His
conviction rests on tenuous grounds—the OR and CR were products of an illegal search, the admission to P/Supt. Villamer was
in violation of his right to counsel, and the Court cannot determine the voluntariness and veracity of Marvin's oral confession of
guilt to Virgie. The doubts as to the guilt of Marvin are, therefore, more than reasonable, which warrants his acquittal. (Porteria v.
People, G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019, J. A. Reyes)]
Right to Bail
Salcedo, in obvious anticipation of an adverse ruling on his Urgent Motion to Set Aside with Motion to
Reinstate Bail, filed the instant petition without waiting for the Sandiganbayan's resolution, hoping to obtain a
favorable ruling from this forum. Notably, Salcedo utilized our ruling in People v. Valdez to support his claim for
entitlement to bail in the present petition for certiorari as he did in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside with Motion to
Reinstate Bail. He, likewise, prayed for the same relief in both of these remedies, that is, to be allowed to post bail
for his provisional liberty. Clearly, the petitioner committed forum shopping by simultaneously raising the same
issue of the denial of his right to bail before the Sandiganbayan and this Court, relying on the same ground and
founded on the same facts. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019, J. Peralta)
[Note: Salcedo and his lawyer must be reminded that forum shopping constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends
to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts. Forum shopping is considered an anathema to the orderly administration of justice. Accordingly,
the instant petition must be dismissed outright as Salcedo and his counsel clearly committed the abhorrent practice of forum
shopping. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019, J. Peralta)]
Here, applying paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951 - in Criminal Case No.
7014, considering the amount allegedly defrauded by petitioners amounted to P2,600,000 which exceeded two
million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but not more than P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty will be
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. In Criminal Case Nos. 7012,
7013 and 7016, where the amounts allegedly defrauded all exceeded P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty shall be
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00). However, the law
also provides that the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Clearly, in the instant case, petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right as they have not been charged
with a capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of the RPC as amended by R.A. 10951, which petitioners have been
charged with, has an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still bailable. (Padua
and Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)
Indeed, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the
processes of that court. However, applying also the same pronouncement in Tuliao, the Court also held therein that,
"in adjudication of other reliefs sought by accused, it requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor

Page 17 of 25
custody of law over the body of the person." Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to
first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. (Padua and Pimentel
v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. Judicial
discretion in granting bail may indeed be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted to the court during
the bail hearing. It is precisely for this reason why an accused must be in the custody of the law during an
application for bail because where bail is a matter of discretion, judicial discretion may only be exercised during bail
hearing. However, where bail is not a matter of discretion, as in fact it is a matter of right, no exercise of discretion
is needed because the accused's right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. An accused must be granted
bail if it is a matter of right. (Padua and Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)
Clearly, bail is a constitutional demandable right which only ceases to be so recognized when the evidence
of guilt of the person charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death
is found to be strong. Stated differently, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or death. (Padua and Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4,
2019, J. Peralta)
Thus, an accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as in this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right. Here,
considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as they are entitled to bail,
by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no
bail is recommended. To do otherwise, if We deny bail albeit it is a matter of right, We will effectively render
nugatory the provisions of the law giving distinction where bail is a matter of right, or of discretion. (Padua and
Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)
[Note: It must be emphasized anew that bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a
criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed
innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to
punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a device
for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is
rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial, with all the safeguards, has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted
this conditional privilege, the individuals wrongly accused could be punished by the period or imprisonment they undergo while
awaiting trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense.
Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in
assuring his presence at trial. (Padua and Pimentel v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)]
Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the reason precisely why
the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or
denying bail, even in capital cases. However, where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not
excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the accused will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to
such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to
be subject, of course, to the constitutional provision that "excessive bail shall not be required." The recourse of the
judge is to fix a higher amount of bail and not to deny the fixing of bail. (Padua and Pimentel v. People, G.R. No.
220913, February 4, 2019, J. Peralta)
In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the
penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is
not strong.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is required
where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and
introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of
merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
The court's grant or denial of the bail application must contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence. On
this basis, the judge formulates his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused. (People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019, J. Caguioa)
In Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), the Court discussed the meaning of "a summary of the

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evidence for the prosecution" as follows:
xxx The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally
recognized as having been presented and most importantly, considered. The summary of the evidence is the basis
for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the
summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong
based on his discretion. Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by a finding of the facts relied
upon to form an opinion on the issue before the court.
Moreover, in People v. Cabral, which petitioner cites as basis, the Court ruled that the summary "should
necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing
proper. xxx An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order
cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by
the prosecution."
Thus, what jurisprudence requires is a reasonable recital of every piece of evidence of the prosecution -
which was done in this case. Contrary to petitioner assertions, the testimonies per se of the witnesses need not be
reproduced in the Order, as long as the same is recognized and considered by the trial court in its exercise of judicial
discretion over the bail application.
Clearly, the trial court followed the proper procedure in granting Tanes' bail application. (People v. Tanes,
G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Presumption of Innocence
In view of the failure of the arresting officers to comply with a mandatory requirement in Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 coupled with the obvious break in the chain of custody of the seized items as heretofore
discussed, a serious doubt arises as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs. There is no absolute certainty if the
seized items were the very same drugs object of the sale, transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually
presented in court as evidence.
Indeed, appellant's failure to present any evidence for her defense as she waived her right to do so was
inconsequential. The well-entrenched dictum in criminal law is that "the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." If the prosecution
cannot, to begin with, establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to
adduce evidence. (People v. Gumban, G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019, J. del Castillo)
At this juncture, it bears to stress that the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused
lies on the prosecution. It is in this context that we have consistently ruled that "the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense."
(People v. Molde, G.R. No. 228262, January 21, 2019, J. del Castillo)
This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, which the
Court of Appeals relied on in its Decision, "stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the
regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be
stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused." (People v. Ameril, G.R. No. 222192, March 13,
2019, J. Leonen, citing People v. Mendoza y Estrada, 736 Phil. 749, 770 [2014])
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a constitutionally protected right.
The burden lies with the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by establishing each and every
element of the crime charged in the information as to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.
Here, reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the
procedures undertaken by the buy-bust team is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves ire affirmative
proofs of irregularity. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally
enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

Page 19 of 25
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of
the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui that it will
not presume to set an a priori basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in
their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures and the fact that buy-bust is a
planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the required
witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and inventoried the seized item
according to the procedures in their own operations manual.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drugs due to the
multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of
the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Garry.
(People v. Briones, G.R. No. 239077, March 20, 2019, J. Caguioa)
In criminal cases, courts must evaluate the evidence in relation to the elements of the crime charged. Thus,
the finding of guilt is always a question of fact.
The Petition before this Court, however, is one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45 mandates
that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Thus, this Court generally gives great
respect to the factual findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor during
trial and assess their testimonies.
Considering that criminal cases involve the constitutional right to liberty and the constitutional guarantee of
the presumption of innocence, appeals of criminal cases before this Court are not necessarily treated in the same
manner as appeals in civil cases. In Ferrer v. People:
It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and that it becomes
the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned
as errors or not.
Appeals of criminal cases confer upon the reviewing court full jurisdiction and render it competent to
examine the records, revise the judgment from which an appeal arose, increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate
penal law provision.
Thus, this Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court "if it is not convinced that [such
findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses."
Significant facts and circumstances may have been overlooked, which, if properly considered, could affect the result
of the case. (Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019, J. Leonen)
This must be so as the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is convicted,
there should be moral certainty — a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon it. Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge
but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the
responsibility of the offender. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the
judge can rest at ease concerning its verdict. Again, these basic postulates assume that the court and others at the
trial are able to comprehend the testimony of witnesses, particularly of the victim herself if she is presented and
testified under oath. (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation
Finally, We, likewise, sustain the ruling of the CA in Criminal Case No. Q-11-170197 finding Adajar guilty
of acts of lasciviousness and not of sexual assault, due to the fact that the Information failed to allege that there was
an insertion of Adajar's finger into AAA's genitalia. A cursory perusal of said Information would reveal that Adajar
committed an act of sexual abuse by "holding complainant's private parts and kissing the latter on her lips while both
were at complainant's bedroom, all against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party." Nevertheless, as aptly ruled by the appellate court, Adajar may still be convicted of the lesser crime
of acts lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, pursuant to the Variance doctrine
embodied in embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Page 20 of 25
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged In the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (People v. Adajar, G.R. No.
231306, June 17, 2019, J. Peralta)
[Note: In view of the facts that were proven by the prosecution evidence, specifically that Adajar committed lascivious
acts against AAA when he inserted his finger inside her vagina, We find that the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC and of lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610 were established in the present case. Thus, applying the variance
doctrine, Adajar can be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which was the offense charged, because it is
included in the sexual assault, the offense proved. In effect, therefore, he is being held liable for the offense as precisely charged
in the Information. Hence, it cannot be claimed that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Caoili, however, Adajar must be convicted
of the offense designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610" since
AAA, the minor victim in this case, is below 12 years old. Moreover, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period. (People v. Adajar, G.R. No. 231306, June 17, 2019, J. Peralta)]
The Court observes that albeit the April 7, 2006 Information designated the offense charged as one of Rape
under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC, a perusal of the allegations therein would clearly show that Pendoy was
actually charged with two offenses. Petitioner was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA, employing force
or intimidation, under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A. The Information also charged Pendoy with committing
sexual assault by inserting his finger into the private part of AAA under the second paragraph of Article 266-A. It is
undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was sixteen (16) years old as duly proved by
her Certificate of Live Birth.
The Information, read as a whole, has sufficiently informed Pendoy that he is being charged with these two
offenses. It is true that Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that "a complaint
or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses." Failure to comply with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information and the
accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 120, as well as settled jurisprudence, states that "when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict
the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and law in each offense."
In the case at bench, the evidence bears out that what was proven by the People beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 1089 was the felonious coitus committed by Pendoy against AAA on January 24, 2006. Likewise
borne by records is the insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina. AAA testified that before Pendoy mounted
on her and inserted his penis into her private part, he first inserted his finger into her genital. Inasmuch as Pendoy
failed to object and file a motion to quash anchored on the ground that more than one offense is charged in April 7,
2006 Information before he pleads to the same, the effect is that he is deemed to have waived such defect and he can
be convicted of the crimes of rape and rape as an act of sexual assault. Jurisprudence elucidates that an offender may
be convicted for both rape and rape as an act of sexual assault for one incident provided that these crimes were
properly alleged in the information and proven during trial. (Posadas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 228223, June
10, 2019, J. Peralta)
Speedy Disposition of Cases
The right to speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the Constitution which
declares in no uncertain terms that "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The constitutional pledge mandates the swift resolution or
termination of a pending case or proceeding. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. What the Constitution prohibits
are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right to
speedy disposition of cases has been violated, to wit:

Page 21 of 25
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are
as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, and after a meticulous scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the
proceedings before the OMB-Visayas, the Court finds that Salcedo's right to speedy disposition of cases has not
been transgressed. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019, J. Peralta; see also
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
[Note: Concededly, the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time of four (4) years, two
(2) months and twenty (20) days to complete. However, the Court observes that Salcedo failed to seasonably assert his right to
speedy disposition of cases. In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the accused must invoke his or her constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases in a timely manner and failure to do so even when he or she has already suffered or will suffer
the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February
13, 2019, J. Peralta)]
[Note: Moreover, there is nothing on record that would demonstrate that the delay in the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation was deliberately availed of for an impermissible purpose. There is no showing that delay in the proceedings was
intentionally resorted to gain some tactical advantage over Salcedo and his co-accused or to harass or prejudice them. No impure
motive can be imputed to the OMB-Visayas other than the fact that it regularly performed its duty in its apparent desire to unravel
the mystery behind the alleged anomalous disbursements of public funds during the implementation of various projects in the
Municipality of Sara, Iloilo. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019, J. Peralta)]
[Note: Lastly, there is no allegation, much less proof, that Salcedo was persecuted, oppressed or was made to undergo
any vexatious process during the preliminary investigation. Admittedly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge.
However, not an iota of evidence was adduced to show that petitioner ever suffered anxiety of such nature and degree that it
became oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charges, and more importantly,
sufficient to justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960,
February 13, 2019, J. Peralta)]
[Unlike in the Tatad, Duterte, Coscolluela and Angchangco, Jr. cases where the delay were manifestly oppressive and
arbitrary, the facts of the cases subject of the present petition do not evince vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. Accordingly, We find no compelling reason to accord in the case at bench the same radical
relief of dismissal granted by the Court in those cases cited by petitioner Salcedo. (Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-
960, February 13, 2019, J. Peralta)]
Clearly, the period devoted for fact-finding investigations before the filing of the formal complaint is not
included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay. Hence, in this case, the period from the
receipt of the anonymous complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao, on August 23, 2010, until
December 7, 2014 should not be considered in the determination of the presence of inordinate delay. This is so
because during this period, respondents were not yet exposed to adversarial proceedings, but only for the purpose of
determining whether a formal complaint against them should be filed based on the result of the fact finding
th
investigation. (People v. Sandiganbayan [5 Division], G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019, J. Peralta)
[Note: Therefore, the reckoning point to determine if there had been inordinate delay should start to run from the filing
of the formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, on December 8, 2014, up to the filing of the Information
th
on November 23, 2016. (People v. Sandiganbayan [5 Division], G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019, J. Peralta)]
[Note: We find that the period from the filing of the formal complaint to the subsequent conduct of the preliminary
investigation was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays as would constitute a violation of respondents'
right to a speedy disposition of cases. We find the period of less than two years not to be unreasonable or arbitrary. In fact,
respondents did not raise any issue as to the violation of their right to a speedy disposition of cases until the Issuance of the
th
Ombudsman's Resolution finding probable cause. (People v. Sandiganbayan [5 Division], G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019,
J. Peralta)]
[Note: Our ruling in the cited case of People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., where we held that fact-finding investigations are
included in the period for determination of inordinate delay has already been abandoned. In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan. et al., we
made the following disquisition, thus:
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division must be re-examined.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding
investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this

Page 22 of 25
period cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office
of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay
proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the
prescription of the offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of
investigation will not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.
Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for
th
determination of inordinate delay is abandoned. (People v. Sandiganbayan [5 Division], G.R. No. 233063, February
11, 2019, J. Peralta)]

Consequently, in granting or denying motions for postponements, courts must exercise their discretion
constantly mindful of the Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. In other
words, while it is true that cases must be adjudicated in a manner that is in accordance with the established rules of
procedure, so is it crucial that cases be promptly disposed to better serve the ends of justice. After all, justice delayed
is justice denied. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders inutile the rights of the people guaranteed by the
constitution and by various legislations. xxx. There is no deprivation of due process when a party is given an
opportunity to be heard, not only through hearings, but even through pleadings, so that one may explain one's side or
arguments. Inasmuch as Choi had been given more than enough opportunity to present his case, the Court agrees
with the MeTC and the RTC that Choi had waived his right to present evidence. In this regard, Choi cannot claim
that he was "prevented from testifying" by the trial court, considering that all the postponements in the proceedings
were at the instance of Choi. (Park v. Choi, G.R. No. 220826, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, the Court clarified the mode of analysis in situations where the right to
speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked, thus:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both
rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is impmiant is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of
cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary
investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall
not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time
periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay
occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the
delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed
procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of
the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case,
from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
Here, it was only on September 21, 2011 when petitioner was required by the Office of the Ombudsman to
submit his counter-affidavit. While the complaint against petitioner's co-accused Isaias Ubana II was initiated on
March 16, 2009, petitioner became a party respondent only on September 12, 2011 when GIPO Allado requested his
inclusion in the preliminary investigation conducted against Ubana II. Prior to his inclusion as respondent in the
preliminary investigation, his right to speedy disposition of case cannot be invoked as he was not yet subjected to
any adverse proceeding. Thus, the reckoning point for purposes of computing inordinate delay should start on
September 21, 2011. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019, J. Peralta)

Page 23 of 25
[Note: Records show that Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie C. Cabras' Resolution dated August 18, 2014 was approved
by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales on August 20, 2014. Petitioner and his co-respondents filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's resolution, which was denied by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on January
12, 2015. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on July 1, 2015. Thus, the length of period from September 21,
2011, when petitioner was required to submit counter-affidavit, up to the time of the filing of information before the
Sandiganbayan cannot be construed as vexatious, capricious or oppressive to the petitioner. Due process considerations and other
factors not attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman factored in on the length of time consumed before the filing of the
information before the Sandiganbayan. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019, J. Peralta)]
[Note: It should, likewise, be noted that petitioner did not assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case at the
earliest possible time. In fact, petitioner took more than a year after the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan before he
invoked his right. Petitioner's failure to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his case during the preliminary investigation
amounted to a waiver of said right. In Magante, We categorically held that "it is the duty of the respondent to bring to the
attention of the investigating officer the perceived inordinate delay in the proceedings of the formal preliminary investigation.
Failure to do so may be considered a waiver of his/her right to speedy disposition of cases." This could also address the rumored
"parking fee" allegedly being paid by some respondents so that delay can be set up as a ground for the dismissal of their
respective cases. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019, J. Peralta)]
Added to this, the Court, in the recent en bane case of Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, Quezon City, Office of the Ombudsman, and People of the Philippines, laid down the following guidelines
in determining whether the delay in the disposition of the case constitutes a violation of the accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases, to wit:
(i) The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial;
(ii) A case shall deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. The doctrine in People v. Sandiganbayan which states that the fact-finding investigation should not be
deemed separate from the preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining whether there was a violation of
the right to speedy disposition of cases, has been abandoned.
Accordingly, the period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint
shall no longer be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Likewise, the OMB shall set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the
complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond the periods set by the OMB shall be taken against the
prosecution;
(iii) Courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the case was resolved within the time
periods contained in the law. Supreme Court resolutions, and circulars, then the burden falls on the defense to prove
that the accused's right to speedy disposition was indeed violated. Specifically, the defense must show that the case is
motivated by malice, or is politically motivated and attended by utter lack of evidence; and that it did not contribute to
the delay.
Otherwise, if the case drags beyond the reasonable periods, and the accused invokes his right to speedy disposition,
then the prosecution must justify the delay. The prosecution must prove that it followed the prescribed procedure
in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; the issues in the case were
complex, and that the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and that the accused did not suffer any
prejudice as a result of the delay;
(iv) "Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the
case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised." This rule
holds true unless it is shown that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, or if the accused
himself/herself waived his/her right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. In all cases of dismissals
due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court; and
(v) The right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or
the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Failure to do so,
constitutes a waiver of such right.
Applying the foregoing tenets to the case at bar, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the quashal of the Information against
Diaz based on the purported violation of his right to speedy disposition. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
233557-67, June 19, 2019, J. A. Reyes)
Non-Imprisonment for Debt

To repeat, case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made
punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. (Cabral v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 233174,
January 23, 2019, J. Peralta)

Page 24 of 25
Double Jeopardy
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. (People v. Acosta, G.R.
No. 238865, January 28, 2019, J. Perlas-Bernabe; Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 239957, February 18, 2019, Perlas-
Bernabe)
Ex Post Facto Laws

Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is
favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are
the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws. (Inmates of the New Bilibid
Prison v. de Lima, G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019, J. Peralta)
[Note: WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant
of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. The
Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to
RE-COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and,
thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being
confined thereat for any other lawful cause. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. de Lima, G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019, J.
Peralta)]
33

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NOTES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Excerpts from the January-June 2019 Decisions of the Supreme Court

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https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

A statute declared unconstitutional "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it

Arrests, Searches and Seizures

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

We find appellants' argument well-founded.

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

Speedy Disposition of Cases

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division must be re-examined.

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

11, 2019, J. Peralta)] ​

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

Non-Imprisonment for Debt

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

Ex Post Facto Laws

https://lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/2019-SC-CL-January-June-H…KHVU2iT-ZQx1lRqqtlAblH3kAbcBYuiskUEq8st3-jxirsl3nZjPZgB 20/01/2020, 9V28 PM

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11, 2019, J. Peralta)]