SERAPIO V.
SANDIGANBAYAN habeas corpus extends to instances where
Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed
two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A
petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions
of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan
denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2.
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
plunder together with Former President
Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada
among others. Petitioner was a member of
the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly
received, on behalf of the said foundation,
millions of pesos coming from illegal
activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of
a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was
issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he
voluntarily surrendered to the PNP.
Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion
for Bail but such motion is opposed by the
prosecution for the reason that petitioner
should be arraign first before he can avail of
Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed
a motion to quash.
The bail hearing was reset several times due
to various pleadings filed by petitioner and
the prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for
habeas corpus for the reason that the
prosecution have waived their right to
present evidence in opposition to his petition
for bail; the prosecution launched an endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to
prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and,
on the failure of the People to adduce strong
evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he
is still being deprived of his liberty.
Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile,
which in such case the Court held that
detention, while valid from its inception, has
later become arbitrary.
Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus
should be granted?
Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
General rule applies.
“Petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting ones right
to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused
is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but
on the discretion of the court and the latter
has not abused such discretion in refusing to
grant bail, or has not even exercised said
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.”
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this
case because petitioner’s restraint of liberty
did not become arbitrary. His application for
bail has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail
cannot be pinned solely to the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution
because he himself is partly to be blamed
(his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued
by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas
corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized
as the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action due to its
ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes.
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO V WARDEN
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the
Maguindanao massacre, had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in
People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When
Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan
S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his
name. Salibo presented to the police
pertinent portions of his passport, boarding
passes and other documents tending to
prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
happened. The authorities, however,
apprehended and detained him. He
questioned the legality of his detention via
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
CA, maintaining that he is not the accused
Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ,
making it returnable to the judge of RTC
Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial
court granted Salibo’s petition and ordered
his immediate release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed
the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S.
Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
orderly course of trial must be pursued and
the usual remedies exhausted before the writ
of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s
proper remedy, according to the CA, should
have been a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the
Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision
before the CA. Salibo argued that although
the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to
hear the Warden’s Return, the RTC’s ruling
should be deemed as the CA ruling, and
hence, it should have been appealed directly
before the SC.
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the
remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a
person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not
under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo,
who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan.
Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not
have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore,
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense, nor
restrained under a lawful process or an order
of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly
arrested without a warrant. When he was in
the presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an
offense, and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he
might have committed. Salibo was also not
an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his
liberty without due process of law. Therefore,
Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest is the proper remedy
in cases where a person with a mistaken
identity is detained
No, the CA’s contention is not correct.
Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to
Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to
Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the
defect he alleged could not have been cured
by mere amendment of the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the
name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from
“Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang
Salibo” will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion
for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of
lack of preliminary investigation.
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed
the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA

Yes. An application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be made through a petition filed
before CA or any of its members, the CA or
any of its members in instances authorized
by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and
requires the officer or person having custody
of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to
file a return of the writ. A hearing on the
return of the writ is then conducted.

The return of the writ may be heard by a court

apart from that which issued the writ. Should
the court issuing the writ designate a lower
court to which the writ is made returnable, the
lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court acquires the
power and authority to determine the merits
of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore,
the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017
Alexander A. Padilla, et al. vs. Congress
of the Philippines
G.R. No. 231694
Former Senator Wigberto E. Tanada, et al.
vs. Congress of the Philippines
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of
martial law and suspending the writ of
habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of
islands on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety.
Within 48 hours after the proclamation and
while the Congress was in session, President
Duterte transmitted his Report to the Senate
and House of Representatives.
After a briefing before the Senate (May 29)
and the House (May 31), the former adopted
Senate Resolution No. 49 and the latter
House Resolution No. 1050, which
expressed support for President Duterte’s
Proclamation No. 216 and both of the
Houses of the Congress voted against calling
for a joint session.
A petition for Mandamus was filed by Padilla
et al. (Padilla Petition) which seek to direct
the Congress to convene in joint session to
deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 and to
vote thereon.
The petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of
former Senator Tanada et al. (Tanada
Petition) seeks to (a) declare the refusal of
the Congress to convene in joint session to
be in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and (b) to direct
the Congress to convene in joint session.
Subsequently, the petitioners in the Padilla
Petition filed a Manifestation, due to the
imminent expiration of the 60-day period of
the validity of Proclamation No. 216, to still
resolve the instant cases for the guidance of
the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.
Consequently, the Congress convened in
joint session and approved by virtue of a
majority vote the extension of the
proclamation and suspension in Mindanao
until December 31, 2017.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Congress has the mandatory duty
to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
NO. The Congress is not constitutionally
mandated to convene in joint session
EXCEPT to vote jointly to revoke or extend
the President’s declaration or suspension.
(1) There is no constitutional
provision governing concurrence
by the Congress in the
President’s proclamation and/or
suspension, and absent a specific
mandate for the Congress to hold
a joint session in the event of
concurrence, then WON to hold a
joint session under such
circumstances is completely
within the discretion of the
Congress
Art. VII, Sec. 18: “The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
members in a regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President”
According to the SC, applying the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis, the use of the
word “may” in the provision is to be construed
as permissive and operating to confer
discretion on the Congress on WON to
revoke. Moreover, the Court stated that the
provision does not actually refer to a “joint
session.” The requirement that the Congress
“voting jointly” explicitly applies only to the
situation when the Congress revokes the
President’s proclamation and/or suspension.
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom
reveal the framer’s specific intentions to (a)
remove the requirement of prior concurrence
of the Congress for the effectivity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (b) to grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke
the President’s proclamation or suspension
by a vote of at least a majority of its
Members, voting jointly.
(2) The usual procedure for having a
joint session is for both Houses to
first adopt a Concurrent
Resolution to hold a joint session.
With neither Senate nor the House adopting
a concurrent resolution, no joint session by
the two Houses of the Congress can be had
in the present cases. The Court is bound to
respect the rules of the Congress as a co-
equal and independent branch of
government. Moreover, both Houses already
separately expressed support for P.RRD’s
proclamation, so revocation was not even a
possibility and the provision on revocation
under the Constitution requiring Congress to
vote jointly in a joint session never came into
operation.
the fundamental issue in the Fortun case was
whether there was factual basis for
Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it
was mandatory for the Congress to convene
in joint session. Furthermore, the word
“automatic” in the Fortun case referred to the
duty or power of the Congress to review the
proclamation and/or suspension, rather than
the joint session of Congress.
Therefore, the Court has no authority to
compel the Senate and the House to
convene in joint session absent a clear
ministerial duty on its part to do so under the
Constitution and in complete disregard of the
separate actions already undertaken by both
Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including
their respective decisions to no longer hold a
joint session, considering their respective
resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.

(3) Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

cannot be deemed a judicial
precedent for the present cases
In the Fortun case, the Senate expressed
through Resolution No. 217 its objection to
P.GMA’s Proclamation No. 1959 for being
unconstitutional, and both the Senate and
the House adopted concurrent resolutions to
convene in joint session for the purpose of
revoking said proclamation; while in the
cases at bar, the Senate and the House
adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and
House Resolution No. 1050, respectively,
which expressed support for P.RRD’s
Proclamation No. 216, and both Houses of
the Congress voted against calling for a joint
session. Moreover, the two Houses in 2009
also initially took separate actions on
P.GMA’s proclamation before the two
Houses adopted concurrent resolutions to
convene in joint session to vote on the
revocation of the proclamation. In addition,
4. Osorio vs. Navera
G.R. No. 223272, Feb. 26, 2018
FACTS:
Together with his superior officer, SSgt.
Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations
before Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping
University of the Philippines students Karen
E. Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan.
Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt.
Osorio which caused the arrest of the latter
by Colonel Yambing. SSgt. Osorio was
turned over to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame,
Quezon City and was detained in Bulacan
Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the
Philippine Army Custodial Center in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently
detained.
Contending that he was being illegally
deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court
of Appeals. He mainly argued that courts-
martial, not a civil court such as the Regional
Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal
case considering that he was a soldier on
active duty and that the offense charged was
allegedly "service-connected." In the
alternative, he argued that the Ombudsman
had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation and the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction to try the case because among
his co-accused was Major General Palparan,
a public officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is
SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy?
RULING:
No. The arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio
were issued by the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's
restraint has become legal; hence, the
remedy of habeas corpus is already moot
and academic. SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy
is to pursue the orderly course of trial and
exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which
would be a motion to quash, filed before
arraignment, on the following grounds: the
facts charged do not constitute an offense;
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do
so.
Kidnapping should never be part of the
functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a
soldier's official capacity. If a soldier
nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the
orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall
be tried before the civil courts. The remedy of
habeas corpus, on the argument that only
courts-martial have jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.
Note: The "great writ of liberty" of habeas
corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom."
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary,
summary, and equitable writ, consistent with
the law's "zealous regard for personal
liberty." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient."
The restraint of liberty need not be confined
to any offense so as to entitle a person to the
writ. Habeas corpus may be availed of as a
post-conviction remedy or when there is an
alleged violation of the liberty of abode.