G.R. No.

L-34361 November 5, 1930

CANDIDO B. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
JOSE DE LOS REYES, in his capacity as Peace Officer and Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, respondent-
appellee.

This is an application for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from restraint of his liberty, by a ranking officer of
the Constabulary, under a warrant of arrest issued by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to resolutions
of the House finding the petitioner guilty and contempt. In addition to counsel for the petitioner and the Attorney-General for
the respondent, Honorable Ricardo Nepomuceno and Honorable Monico Mercado, members of the House of
Representatives, have appeared as amici curiae.

On September 16,1930, the House of Representatives adopted the following:

"Whereas, on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted, without any justification, the Honorable Jose D.
Dimayuga, who was then and is now a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands, while said
Representative was going to the hall of the House of Representative to attend to the sessions which were then about to begin,
as a result of which attack and assault said Representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the
two days next following, by reason of the threats which Mr. Candido Lopez made against said Representative, Honorable
Jose D. Dimayuga;

"Be it resolved, To declare, as it hereby declares, said Candido Lopez guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives for
having violated the privileges of one of the members of said House of Representatives;

"Be it further resolved, To order, as it hereby orders, that said Candido Lopez be punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison,
Manila, as any other transgressor of the law, for a period of twenty-four hours; and

"Finally be it resolved, That the corresponding order of arrest be issued in due form, signed by the Speaker, stamped with the
Seal of the House of Representatives, and addressed to the Sergeant-At-Arms, Mr. Alfredo Javier, requiring and ordering the
said Sergeant-At-Arms to comply with this order.

From the above, it will be observed that the alleged assault by Lopez on Representatives Dimayuga occurred on October 23,
1929. The House of Representatives adopted its original resolution, requiring the Speaker to order the arrest of Lopez, to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for twenty four hours on November 6, 1929. The House adjourned that session, the second, at
midnight on November 8, 1929, without the order of arrest having been served on Lopez. The confirmatory resolution
hereinbefore quoted was approved on September 16, 1930, during the third session of the Philippine Legislature.

It further appears that a new warrant of arrest was issued by the Speaker of the House of Representatives on September 17,
1930. Lopez was taken into custody by Colonel De los Reyes. Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, on September 19, 1930.
Immediately a writ of habeas corpus was obtained from Honorable Mariano Albert, Auxiliary Judge of First Instance sitting in
the City of Manila.

This leaves us then with the negation in the petition of the power of the House of Representatives to order the commitment
of persons guilty of contempt against it and with the affirmation of this power in the return. This leaves us further with the
denial in the petition of jurisdiction in the House of Representatives on account of the power being only coextensive with the
session of the body in which the alleged contempt occurred, not specially answered in the return. There are other points
mentioned in the assignment of errors and in the briefs, but the foregoing impress us as disclosing the two main issues
decisive of the case. We will take them under view in order.

The implied power to punish for contempt is coercive in nature. The power to punish crimes is punitive in nature. The first is
a vindication by the House of its own privileges. The second is a proceeding brought by the State before the courts to punish
offenders. The two are distinct, the one from the other.

The power of the State Legislatures in the United States to punish for contempt may be somewhat broader in theory than that
of the Congress of the United States. A number of State constitutions and statutes authorize each House of the Legislature
to punish for contempt. Even without express constitutional provisions, the view generally taken by the State courts is that the
power to punish for contempt is inherent in the bodies composing the legislative branch, and that the legislative bodies may
inflict punishment on those guilty of acts which tend directly to defeat, embarrass, or obstruct legislative proceedings.
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional authority, it would hardly be reasonable to suppose that the Houses of the Philippine
Legislature were intended to function in the restricted way in which an assembly like that of Newfoundland was intended to
function. A power essential to permit the Houses of the Philippine Legislature to perform their duties without impediment, as
contemplated by the Organic Act, must be assumed. There is as much necessity for the House in a territorial legislature to
possess the power to punish for contempt as there is for the Houses in the Congress of the United States and the Houses in
the State Legislatures to possess this power. Accordingly, we rule that a limited power to punish persons not members for
contempt resides in the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature.

Just as there is no good reason to suppose that the Houses of the Philippine Legislature would be left without the power of
self preservation to be realized through the power to punish for contempt, so is there no good reason to suppose that the
principle relative to the termination of the imprisonment, which is acceptable to the House of Commons, the upper House and
probably the lower House of the Congress of the United States, and the Houses of the State Legislatures, is not equally
applicable to a House of the Philippine Legislature.

Where a person, who is declared in contempt of the House of Representatives at one session of the Legislature, is not
committed to prison during that session, it is very doubtful if a new order of his commitment may be made at the next ensuing
session of the Legislature. This right has never been exercised by any legislative body deriving from the common law system.
On the contrary, the uniform practice of such bodies appears to have proceeded upon the assumption that the power to punish
an invasion of legislative privileges ends with the session during which the wrongful act was done. It is true that the rule
expressed by the authorities on this point was not formulated with reference to the power of a succeeding session to give
effect to the original resolution declaring the offender in contempt, but, as already stated, the practice of English and American
legislative bodies speaks loudly against the existence of the power for the House of Representatives in this case. An
innovation which experience has shown to be really unnecessary for the protection of the lawmaking body would be most
unwise. Occasional acts of personal violence against members of the Legislature will no doubt occur over long periods of
time, but their number will not be increased by the conclusion reached in this case, which is either that the offender must be
committed to prison by the offended body during its current session, or punishment must be left to the ordinary process of the
courts wherein the penalties inflicted will tend to be more severe in the main than those which would have been imposed by
the legislative body itself.

We recur again to the oft-repeated and all controlling thought that the legislative power to punish for contempt arises by
implication, is justified only by the right of self-preservation, and is the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.
We point out again that where imprisonment is imposed for contempt of a legislative body in the United States, it terminates
with the adjournment of the session of the body in which the contempt occurred. We emphasize again the absolute absence
of any judicial precedent which acknowledges the right of a legislative body to extend punishment for contempt beyond the
adjournment of the session, and that to go against the unanimous authority to the contrary, would be to sanction a power for
the Houses of the Philippine Legislature greater than that which any legislative body in the United States, including the Houses
of the Congress of the United States, is permitted to exercise. No legal cause for the restraint of the petitioner is shown.

It follows from what has been said that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus and its judgment
must be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the record remanded with directions to discharge the petitioner from custody. So
ordered, without costs.
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,

vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which
he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:

Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be
committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until
discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such
discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special
committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine Government, through
the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the
two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:

RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE

TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.

The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important
of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that
involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for
his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October
29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in
which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National
Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine
the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit information from
him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that
he did not remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities
dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which
questions the witness answered satisfactorily.

Our form of Government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely
from American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it
— is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly
gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be
punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House
has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).

Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the
United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider.
It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so
in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation
to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be
material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its
direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under consideration, we
find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the
matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a public official be (witness) might be accused
of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank,
sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation,
consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming
constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects those
rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain
while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that
the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of
others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which
awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and
applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his
duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.
G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.

The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to the government and is neither illegal
nor irregular is beside the point. To our minds, two questions are decisive of this case. The first is: Did the Senate Special
Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name
of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And the second is: If the Senate did not believe the
statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of
November 8, 1952, valid?

On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to
reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially charged
since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that
petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent
questions related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that
the person to whom he delivered the abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The court a
quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the "petitioner has satisfactorily shown that
the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate
Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate abused its discretion in making
its conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his
release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial department for investigation and prosecution as
the circumstances warrant.

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the
right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.

These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation
of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke
are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.

All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if
the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this
because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or property without due
process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to
be heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued
confinement.

The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine Senate have the power and authority to
pass its resolution ordering the continued confinement of the petitioner? In the supposition that such power and authority
exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name Jess D. Santos? Although the resolution
studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth,
the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may be inferred from
the confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront
to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way, therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is
justified by the language of the resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us in whether the Senate has the power to punish
the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us
for determination.

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and
policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate
said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other's authority and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for
the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to
exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to
the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively
within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of
the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course
of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme,
and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the
reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs.
Gordon, supra).

The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he says he has already
answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be
considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified truthfully, disclosing the
real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood;
this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery
of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person
whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the
original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as
insult to the intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and
contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt
may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power.
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA,
KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE
CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic
of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert
with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and
connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves
at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:

On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988,
conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan
newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition
of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise,
while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies"
were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the
President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations,
for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of
SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon
"the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry
has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez
corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire
into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making
it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies."
As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had
"taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a
telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and
that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate
to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act",
a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
G.R. No. 136760 July 29, 2003

THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, represented by its Chairman, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON, Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, and ATTY.
NILO J. FLAVIANO, Respondents.

On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing the Committee on National Defense and
Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group
of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d’etat to prevent the administration of then President Joseph
Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.1

During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (hereafter called the Committee), it appeared
that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter
from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.

The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify
before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, which was
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.

On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE and DESIST
from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila on
matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses
from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and injunction."3

We find for petitioner. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification.10 In
this case, the assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis.

The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and
settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others.11 When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee
from requiring respondent to appear and testify before it.
G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN
M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as
Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further,
Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by
this executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte
vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof
shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of
the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not
bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments,
all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security
Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed
as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the
requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however,
even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by
the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of
privilege.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor
and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of
kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
(Underscoring supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed
valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government,
but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.
G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, et. al., respondents.

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is "an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:

Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it."

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance
in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.18 Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI,
Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.19

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee."
This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the
mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.20

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court's high
regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry
is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.22 It
even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional
basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain
duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be
exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the
servants of the people, and not their rulers.24

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the
PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging
public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Peña,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the
majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG
and its Commissioners.
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN,
SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G.
REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND
TANSINGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its
Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent.

On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled
"Arrogance of Wealth"1 before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator
Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166,2 to wit:

RESOLUTION

DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN

INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING
PUBLIC

WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of
unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent
practices;

WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of
proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public;

WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate
penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures;

Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the Committee on Banks, Currencies, and
Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of unregistered and high-risk securities
by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February
28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.

Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper.
Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter3 dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly
stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby
posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.

Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject
matter of the following cases

Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,7 the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-
Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the
foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners’ case.

It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create
the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment
on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative
bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between
this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.

Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to
conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Court’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation.
The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any
contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.
Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.

Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the legislative investigation in that case.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the instant case. P.S.
Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent
Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on
matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed
that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo
and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be
specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.6

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and
testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.7

Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are presumptively
privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications
privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte
v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.

Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has
repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19 Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in
the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege
is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by
the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch.
This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be
exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the
President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and
in favor of disclosure.

In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific
matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case
markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita,21 to wit:

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used
in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive
branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction,
the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in
reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains
the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential communication," which was
recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for
Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive authorization" of an executive
official, to mean that the "presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and make the same engage in self-contradiction.

Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive Department and
the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke
executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as follows:

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a
matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given
preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in
favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications."23

It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN
Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between
officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations
are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It
could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s
dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily
inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court
can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with
increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense
and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve
her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.48 While
it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a
given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws,
not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter
role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in
respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons responsible for "anomalies" in government
contracts.

No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our
prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the
role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the
Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted
solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure.49

Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (1)
there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3)
they issued the contempt order in accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article
VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not
arbitrary or precipitate.

We reaffirm our earlier ruling.

The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see no reason to
discuss it once again.

Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations or
subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry" along with the "usual indication
of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is
merely an obiter dictum.

On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements.

An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently,
claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many
times.53 Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The
requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished
truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities. On motion of Senator Francis
Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by
Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7 In the Senate’s plenary
session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible
transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National
Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed
before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative
inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article
2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution. With the foregoing disquisition, the Court
finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ
of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting
any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
G.R. No. 184849 February 13, 2009

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA,
JR., Respondents.

On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow,
Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in
St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing
officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.

On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport departure area for
failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately ₱6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was
also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to ₱2,970,000.00).

Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed
to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros.

On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier
issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.

On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing, petitioners filed with
respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.2 Senator Santiago
emphatically defended respondent Committee’s jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter
does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
(Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of
arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very
same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the
basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.

The petition must inevitably fail. First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings." This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority
to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power
is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.4

The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in
effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature
of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco,5 was characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted
authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject
only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.

Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of the Senate’s action.

Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, we are convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its
authority. Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides: 12) Committee on Foreign Relations. – Fifteen
lawphil.net

(15) members. All matters relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular
services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral
organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident involving petitioners is well
within the respondent Committee’s jurisdiction.

The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow
in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a
huge amount of "public" money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply
with immigration and currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained him and
other members of the delegation in Moscow.

Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines is a
state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across
borders.6 The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under
these conventions. Thus, the respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and
purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippines’ commitments under these conventions.

Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the respondent Committee
and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).

Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations
on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government,
its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought
to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz,
a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him
millions which may have been sourced from public funds.
G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L.
ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.

his is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65,
assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment, and Human Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an
invitation,1 signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:

Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE,
IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR
THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA
OF P550.86 MILLION" and P.S. Resolution No. 543, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF P480
MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS, THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR
WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II," x x x the Committee on Labor, Employment and
Human Resources Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the
23rd day of August 2006 at the Sen. G.T. Pecson Room, 2nd floor, Senate of the Philippines, Pasay City.

The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter
and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.

Petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO6 alleging, among others, that: (1) he answered questions
concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWA’s original investment
had already been paid; (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of
the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,7 none of which were related to the
subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas
to return at the resumption of the investigation.

In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of
the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners’ criminal liability for plunder, it is not
in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination;
and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained,
and forced to give testimony against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G.R. No. 164527.

Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition. The sub judice
rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court,
or obstructing the administration of justice. Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent
Committee’s assailed investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration."13 For by an en banc
Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in
Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to
invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. Thus,
there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable––to the continuation of the Committee’s
investigation challenged in this proceeding.

At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance
would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. What we said in Sabio v. Gordon suggests as much:

The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any
inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.16

A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken
as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;17 and to determine
whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation,18 albeit the inquiry need not result in
any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: SEC.
123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending
matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present[ed] for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not
in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress)
should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. x x x (Emphasis added.)

Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, et al.,20 it can very well be stated that the termination of the assailed investigations has veritably
mooted the instant petition. This disposition becomes all the more impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present
Congress has not, per available records, opted to take up anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the investment of
OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. Suffice it to state that when
the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the
aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided
in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate
committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.21 Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear
before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked by the said directors and
officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing
in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them." That this right may possibly be violated or abused
is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative
action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 180308 June 19, 2012

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners,

vs.
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON.
SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.

This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and nullify Committee
Report No. 3121 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and on
Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate
of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines
holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.2 Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a private
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company whose main operation is collecting the
money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of
the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT.3 By virtue of its interests in both PHILCOMSAT
and POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC.

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC
sustained a ₱7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's operating expenses had ballooned
tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-owned
PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate accountability reports given to PHC
and PHILCOMSAT.4

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth
Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 5 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed
by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings6 on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited
to attend these hearings as "resource persons."

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the
need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the
respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in
the said corporations. In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of the
jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with which
the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No. 312.7 They also claim that respondent Senator Richard
Gordon acted with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to counsel,8 and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, despite having voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view of his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless
continued to participate actively in the hearings.9

Issues Before The Court

The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and (2) whether it should be nullified,
having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved by the respondent Senate.
The Court's Ruling

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,10 which cited Article VI, Section 21
of the Constitution, as follows:

"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.11

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct
legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution
was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.12 1âwphi1

Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as suggested13 by the parties in their respective pleadings,
the issues put forth in the petition14 have become academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation15 that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was violated during
the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a
person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation.16 Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource persons, they
cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 234608

ARVIN R. BALAG, Petitioner

vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND
REVISION OF CODES AND MGEN. JOSE V. BALAJADIA, JR. (RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-
ARMS, Respondents

On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill), 3 a first year law student of the University of Sto.
Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.

On September 19, 2017, SR No. 504,4 was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri (Senator Zubiri)5 condemning the death of
Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those
responsible accountable.

On September 20, 2017, SR No. 510, entitled: "A Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct An
Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Tomas Castillo III Allegedly Due to Hazing-Related Activities"
was filed by Senator Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.6

On the same day, the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator
Lacson) together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes,
invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and deliberate the
following: Senate Bill Nos. 27,7 199,8 223,9 1161,10 1591,11 and SR No. 504.

Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled on September 25, 2017. Nevertheless, John Paul Solano, a member
of AJ Fraternity, Atty. Nilo T. Divina, Dean of UST Institute of Civil Law and Arthur Capili, UST Faculty Secretary, attended
the hearing and were questioned by the senate committee members.

On the same date, Spouses Carmina T. Castillo and Horacio M. Castillo, Jr. (Spouses Castillo), parents of Horacio III, filed a
Criminal Complaint12 for Murder and violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, 13 before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) against several members of the AJ Fraternity, including petitioner. On October 9, 2017, Spouses Castillo filed
a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit 14 before the DOJ citing the relevant transcripts of stenographic notes during the
September 25, 2017 Senate Hearing.

On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as
approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad Testifzcandum 15 addressed to petitioner directing
him to appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry. 16 Another Subpoena Ad
Testifzcandum 17 was issued on October 17, 2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend
the legislative hearing on October 18, 2017.

On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. In the course of the proceedings, at around 11:29 in the morning, Senator
Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he was the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and
invoked his right against self-incrimination. Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson
then reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple question, otherwise, he could be cited in contempt.
Senator Poe retorted that petitioner might still be clinging to the supposed "Code of Silence" in his alleged text messages to
his fraternity. She manifested that petitioner's signature appeared on the application for recognition of the AJ Fraternity and
on the organizational sheet, indicating that he was the president. Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.
Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and
Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to
place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing. Allegedly, Senator Lacson threatened to order the detention of
petitioner in Pasay City Jail under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms and told him not to be evasive because he
would be merely affirming school records.

A few minutes later, at around 12:09 in the afternoon, Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner another chance to purge
himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was asked the same question twice and each time he refused to answer. 18

Thereafter, around 1: 19 in the afternoon, Senator Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he knew whose decision it was
to bring Horacio III to the Chinese General Hospital instead of the UST Hospital. Petitioner apologized for his earlier statement
and moved for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to
who its president was because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school.

Senator Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because he had already answered the question regarding his
membership in the AJ Fraternity. Senator Villanueva replied that petitioner's contempt would remain. Senator Lacson added
that he had numerous opportunities to answer the questions of the committee but he refused to do so. Thus, petitioner was
placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.

Petitioner chiefly argues that the legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not in aid of legislation; rather,
it was in aid of prosecution. He posits that the purpose of SR No. 504 was to hold accountable those responsible for the
senseless act of killing Horacio III, and not to aid legislation. Petitioner underscores that the transcripts during the September
25, 2017 committee hearing were used in the criminal complaint filed against him, which bolsters that the said hearings were
in aid of prosecution. He insists that the senate hearings would violate his right to due process and would pre-empt the findings
of the DOJ with respect to the criminal complaint filed against him.

Petitioner also asserts that he properly invoked his right against self-incrimination as the questions propounded by Senator
Poe regarding the officers, particularly the presidency of the AJ Fraternity, were incriminating because the answer thereto
involves an element of the crime of hazing. Despite the questions being incriminating, he, nonetheless, answered them by
admitting that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he did not know of its current president because he transferred to
another school. He adds that his right to equal protection of laws was violated because the other resource persons who
refused to answer the questions of the Senate committees were not cited in contempt.

The petition is moot and academic.

In this case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy. Petitioner essentially alleges that respondents
unlawfully exercised their power of contempt and that his detention was invalid. As discussed earlier, in its resolution dated
December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant
petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the Senate's authority.

Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice and Human Rights jointly
adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same to the Senate. Committee Report No. 232 referred to
the findings of respondent committees in the inquiry conducted in aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred
to the recommendation that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, 1591,
and 1609. On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on 3rd reading Senate Bill No. 1662.

Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of Committee Report Nos. 232
and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went further by approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill,
Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the inquiry in aid of legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
petitioner likewise ends.

Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of their constitutional power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the validity of petitioner's detention. Indeed, the petition has become
moot and academic. Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although supervening
events had rendered those petitions moot and academic.

In this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be addressed by Court: what is the duration of the
detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?

This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of
repetition. Moreover, the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. Thus,
paramount public interest requires the Court to determine such issue to ensure that the constitutional rights of the persons
appearing before a legislative inquiry of the Senate are protected.

The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated that he would be arrested and detained until such time that he
gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of the contempt. It does not provide any definite and concrete period of
detention. Neither does the Senate Rules specify a precise period of detention when a person is cited in contempt.

Thus, a review of the Constitution and relevant laws and jurisprudence must be conducted to determine whether there is a
limitation to the period of detention when the Senate exercises its power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation.
The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of contempt is not indefinite.

The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by
the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in
or affected therein. Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be detained
indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be detained for a day, a month, a year, or
even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate. Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons appearing
before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly
cannot be respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation and does not extend to
the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. 48 Even arguendo that detention under the
legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to
secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said
witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts
will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction
appears excessive in relation to that purpose. 49 An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries
in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of
investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that
subject. 52 Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to
begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made
by the members who do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The number
of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining
whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both
a concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for
the majority position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate,
who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules
for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of the legislative inquiry.
The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin
the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall
then be approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject
matter of the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is the
culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up
to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point, the
power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the
basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all
pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take
up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing
institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last session.
Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the refusal of
a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to wit:

Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional
Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred
to one thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly
summoned to attend as a witness before the National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and
subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission
or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons,
or being present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under
affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his possession,
when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person
who shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn
by any such body or official. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of contempt. The period of detention
provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of the legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or
the amendment of the existing law to augment its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the
sole discretion of Congress.

Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault - that the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings
during recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power
of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the
Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the
persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can
1âw phi1

continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act,
subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.

In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can
continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act,
subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.

In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond
the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to increase
the definite period of imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under the inherent
power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry.
G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines
Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides
that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.2 The Court has held that they may assail the
validity of a law appropriating public funds3 because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.4

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)

He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the
independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative
departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or
revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the
Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.

However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:

SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created,
composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws,
and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House
of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. – The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and
regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC)
is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation"
of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its
legislation.

However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to
"review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections
25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One
such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC shall be "independent."

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence
in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a
function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity.
Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1
which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections;
and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second
paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after
the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting
by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of
the COMELEC.

During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as
part of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the
creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;"

b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;"

c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall
be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;"
and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission,
such as COMELEC.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC
to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes
and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition
Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined
by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax
revenue.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for
such purpose.9
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

Separation Of Powers

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives.
The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing
the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Congress has
delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative agencies.
Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within
the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its
primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation
involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority,
and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions
when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right"
to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and
the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch
or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to
pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability
as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:

It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and
practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards,
leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative
aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or
 agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse
of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard,
of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means
of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine
whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives.
They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter
that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies
from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee
investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow
Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and
binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively
in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation
of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the
accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and
implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative
veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha
pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed
a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was
without constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine
on separation of powers.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue
of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It
held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures
set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x

Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the
bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35 (emphasis
supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature and
powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated
by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the
Commission on Elections.36

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes
two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation40 and

(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall
in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right"
or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.43 It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary
managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned
administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute50 and
are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion
to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid
and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13
of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)

If the investigation which the committee was directed to make was judicial in its character, and could only be properly and
successfully made by a court of justice, and if it related to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial
proceeding, we do not, after what has been said, deem it necessary to discuss the proposition that the power attempted to
be exercised was one confided by the Constitution to the judicial, and not to the legislative, department of the government.

The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the
subject. In all the argument of the case, no suggestion has been made of what the House of Representatives or the Congress
could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke & Co., or even the United States.
Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs of individuals? If so, the House of Representatives had no
power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country.
By "fruitless," we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred.

What was this committee charged to do? To inquire into the nature and history of the real estate pool. How indefinite! What
was the real estate pool? Is it charged with any crime or offence? If so, the courts alone can punish the members of it. Is it
charged with a fraud against the government? Here, again, the courts, and they alone, can afford a remedy. Was it a
corporation whose powers Congress could repeal? There is no suggestion of the kind. Can the rights of the pool, or of its
members, and the rights of the debtor, and of the creditor of the debtor, be determined by the report of a committee or by an
act of Congress? If they cannot, what authority has the House to enter upon this investigation into the private affairs of
individuals who hold no office under the government.

Such an enlargement of jurisdiction would not now be tolerated in England, and it is hoped not in this country of written
constitutions and laws, but it looks very like it when, upon the allegation that the United States is a creditor of a man who has
an interest in some other man's business, the affairs of the latter can be subjected to the unlimited scrutiny or investigation of
a congressional committee.

We are of opinion, for these reasons, that the resolution of the House of Representatives authorizing the investigation was in
excess of the power conferred on that body by the Constitution; that the committee, therefore, had no lawful authority to
require Kilbourn to testify a a witness beyond what he voluntarily chose to tell; that the orders and resolutions of the House,
and the warrant of the speaker, under which Kilbourn was imprisoned are, in like manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that
body, and that his imprisonment was without any lawful authority.

In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897)

Petitioner attached duly certified copies of the record and proceedings, judgment, and sentence, under the aforesaid
indictment against him and prayed that the same be considered in connection with the petition, and also referred to the record
in the matter of the application of petitioner for a writ of prohibition.

The indictment averred that the House of Representatives had passed a certain tariff bill, which was pending in the Senate,
with a very large number of proposed amendments thereto, during the months thereafter mentioned, and, among them, certain
amendments providing for duties on sugar different from the provisions of the bill as it had been sent to the Senate, the
adoption or rejection of which by the Senate would materially affect the market value of the stock of the American Sugar-
Refining Company; that the Senate adopted a preamble and resolutions raising a special committee, and clothing it with full
power of investigation into certain charges made in designated newspapers that members of the Senate were yielding to
corrupt influences in the consideration of said legislation; that the investigation was commenced, and, in the course of it,
petitioner, being a member of a firm of stockbrokers in the City of New York, dealing in the stock of the American Sugar-
Refining Company, appeared as a witness, and was asked whether the firm of which the witness was a member had brought
or sold what were known as "sugar stocks" during the month of February, 1894, and after the first day of that month, for or in
the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United States senator; had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold
any stocks or securities known as "sugar stocks" for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, or any United States senator; had
the said firm during the month of April done so; had the said firm during the month of May done so; was the said firm at that
time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United States senator. But
petitioner then and there willfully refused to answer each of the questions so propounded, all of which were pertinent to the
inquiry then and there being made by the said committee under the resolutions aforesaid.

It is insisted that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a criminal court, had no jurisdiction; that the questions
were not authorized under the Constitution, and that the act of Congress under which petitioner was indicted and tried is
unconstitutional.
Sections 102, 103, and 104 and section 859 of the Revised Statutes are as follows:

"SEC. 102. Every person who, having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress, to give
testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any committee of either House of
Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under
inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than
one hundred dollars, and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months."

"SEC. 103. No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be
examined by either House of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact
or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous."

"SEC. 104. Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section one hundred and two fails to testify, and the facts are
reported to either House, the President of the Senate or the speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall certify the fact
under the seal of the Senate or House to the District Attorney for the District of Columbia, whose duty it shall be to bring the
matter before the grand jury for their action. "

From the record of the proceedings on the trial, accompanying and made part of the petition, it appears that petitioner, in
declining to answer the questions propounded, expressly stated that he did not do so on the ground that to answer might
expose him, or tend to expose him, to criminal prosecution; nor did he object that his answers might tend to disgrace him.
Section 103 had in fact no bearing on the controversy in regard to this witness, and it is difficult to see how he can properly
raise the question as to its constitutionality, notwithstanding section 859. And we cannot concur in the view that sections 102
and 103 are so inseparably connected that it can be reasonably concluded that if section 103 were not sustainable, section
102 would therefore be invalid. In other words, we do not think that there is ground for the belief that Congress would not
have enacted section 102 if it had been supposed that a particular class of witnesses, to which petitioner did not belong, if
they refused to answer by reason of constitutional privilege, could not be deprived of that privilege by section 103.

Laying section 103 out of view, we are of opinion that sections 102 and 104 were intended, in the language of the title of the
original Act of January 24, 1857, "more effectually to enforce the attendance of witnesses on the summons of either House
of Congress, and to compel them to discover testimony." To secure this result, it was provided that when a person summoned
as a witness by either House to give testimony or produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House or any
committee of either House willfully fails to appear, or, appearing, refuses to answer "any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry," he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished accordingly. And it was also provided that when,
under such circumstances, the facts are reported to either House, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House,
as the case may be, shall certify the fact under the seal of the Senate or House to the District Attorney for the District of
Columbia, that the matter may be brought before the grand jury for their action.

It is true that the reference is to "any" matter under inquiry, and so on, and it is suggested that this is fatally defective because
too broad and unlimited in its extent; but nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction,
such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion, Lau Ow Bew
v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 144 U. S. 59, and we think that the word "any," as used in these sections, refers to matters
within the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Congress, before them for consideration and proper for their action, to questions
pertinent thereto, and to facts or papers bearing thereon.

Under the Constitution, the Senate of the United States has the power to try impeachments, to judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members, to determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, and it necessarily possesses the inherent power of self-protection.

According to the preamble and resolutions, the integrity and purity of members of the Senate had been questioned in a manner
calculated to destroy public confidence in the body, and in such respects as might subject members to censure or expulsion.
The Senate, by the action taken, signifying its judgment that it was called upon to vindicate itself from aspersion, and to deal
with such of its members as might have been guilty of misbehavior, and brought reproach upon it, obviously had jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the inquiry it directed, and power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to require them to answer
any question pertinent thereto. And the pursuit of such inquiry by the questions propounded in this instance was not, in our
judgment, in violation of the security against unreasonable searches and seizures protected by the fourth amendment.

In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 188, among other important rulings, it was held that there existed no general power in
Congress, or in either House, to make inquiry into the private affairs of a citizen; that neither House could, on the allegation
that an insolvent debtor of the United States was interested in a private business partnership, investigate the affairs of that
partnership, as a mere matter of private concern, and that consequently there was no authority in either House to compel a
witness to testify on the subject. The case at bar is wholly different. Specific charges publicly made against senators had been
brought to the attention of the Senate, and the Senate had determined that investigation was necessary. The subject matter
as affecting the Senate was within the jurisdiction of the Senate. The questions were not intrusions into the affairs of the
citizen. They did not seek to ascertain any facts as to the conduct, methods, extent, or details of the business of the firm in
question, but only whether that firm, confessedly engaged in buying and selling stocks, and the particular stock named, was
employed by any senator to buy or sell for him any of that stock, whose market price might be affected by the Senate's action.
We cannot regard these questions as amounting to an unreasonable search into the private affairs of the witness simply
because he may have been in some degree connected with the alleged transactions, and, as investigations of this sort are
within the power of either of the two Houses, they cannot be defeated on purely sentimental grounds.

The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry. The resolutions directed the committee to
inquire "whether any senator had been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks' during the consideration of the
tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained we cannot say; nor
are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument; but it is plain that
negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative
answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers.

Nor will it do to hold that the Senate had no jurisdiction to pursue the particular inquiry because the preamble and resolutions
did not specify that the proceedings were taken for the purpose of censure or expulsion if certain facts were disclosed by the
investigation. The matter was within the range of the constitutional powers of the Senate. The resolutions adequately indicated
that the transactions referred to were deemed by the Senate reprehensible and deserving of condemnation and punishment.
The right to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust
and duty of a member.

The refusal to answer pertinent questions in a matter of inquiry within the jurisdiction of the Senate, of course, constitutes a
contempt of that body, and by the statute this is also made an offense against the United States.

The history of congressional investigations demonstrates the difficulties under which the two Houses have labored,
respectively, in compelling unwilling witnesses to disclose facts deemed essential to taking definitive action, and we quite
agree with Chief Justice Alvey, delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, "that Congress possessed the constitutional
power to enact a statute to enforce the attendance of witnesses, and to compel them to make disclosure of evidence to enable
the respective bodies to discharge their legitimate functions," and that it was to effect this that the act of 1857 was passed. It
was an act necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in Congress and in each House thereof. We
grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt
in cases to which the power of either House properly extended; but because Congress, by the act of 1857, sought to aid each
of the Houses in the discharge of its constitutional functions, it does not follow that any delegation of the power in each to
punish for contempt was involved, and the statute is not open to objection on that account.

Nevertheless, although the power to punish for contempt still remains in each House, we must decline to decide that this law
is invalid because it provides that contumacy in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration by either
House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States,
who are interested that the authority of neither of their departments, nor of any branch thereof, shall be defied and set at
naught. It is improbable that in any case cumulative penalties would be imposed, whether by way of punishment merely or of
eliciting the answers desired; but it is quite clear that the contumacious witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same
offense, since the same act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also an offense against another, and indictable
statutory offenses may be punished as such, while the offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the same acts
as contempts, the two being diverso intuitu, and capable of standing together.

In our opinion, the law is not open to constitutional objection, and the record does not exhibit a case in which, on any ground,
it can be held that the Supreme Court of the District, sitting as a criminal court, had no jurisdiction to render judgment.

Writ denied.
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917)

No power was expressly conferred by the Constitution of the United States on the subject except that given to the House to
deal with contempt committed by its own members. Article I, § 5. As the rule concerning the Constitution of the United States
is that powers not delegated were reserved to the people or the states, it follows that no other express authority to deal with
contempt can be conceived of. It comes, then, to this: was such an authority implied from the powers granted? As it is
unthinkable that in any case from a power expressly granted there can be implied the authority to destroy the grant made,
and as the possession by Congress of the commingled legislative-judicial authority as to contempts which was exerted in the
House of Commons would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial authority
which is interwoven in the very fabric of the Constitution, and would disregard express limitations therein, it must follow that
there is no ground whatever for assuming that any implication as to such a power may be deduced from any grant of authority
made to Congress by the Constitution. This conclusion has long since been authoritatively settled, and is not open to be
disputed. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. Whether the right to deal with contempt in
the limited way provided in the state constitutions may be implied in Congress as the result of the legislative power granted
must depend upon how far such limited power is ancillary or incidental to the power granted to Congress -- a subject which
we shall hereafter approach.

The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, that that which was reasonably
appropriate and relevant to the exercise of a granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so
universally applied that it suffices merely to state it. And as there is nothing in the inherent nature of the power to deal with
contempt which causes it to be an exception to such rule, there can be no reason for refusing to apply it to that subject.

Thus, in Anderson v. Dunn, supra, which was an action for false imprisonment against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House for
having executed a warrant for arrest issued by that body in a contempt proceeding, after holding, as we have already said,
that the power possessed by the House of Commons was incompatible with the Constitution and could not be exerted by the
House, it was yet explicitly decided that from the power to legislate given by the Constitution to Congress there was to be
implied the right of Congress to preserve itself -- that is, to deal by way of contempt with direct obstructions to its legislative
duties. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, which was also a case of false imprisonment for arrest under a warrant issued by
order of the House in a contempt proceeding, although the want of right of the House of Representatives to exert the judicial-
legislative power possessed by the House of Commons was expressly reiterated, the question was reserved as to the right
to imply an authority in the House of Representatives to deal with contempt as to a subject matter within its jurisdiction, the
particular case having been decided on the ground that the subject with which the contempt proceedings were concerned
was totally beyond the jurisdiction of the House to investigate. But in In Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, the principle of the
existence of an implied legislative authority under certain conditions to deal with contempt was again considered and upheld.
The case was this: Chapman had refused to testify in a Senate proceeding, and was indicted under § 102 of the Revised
Statutes, making such refusal criminal. He sued out a habeas corpus on the ground that the subject of the refusal was
exclusively cognizable by the Senate, and that therefore the statute was unconstitutional as a wrongful delegation by the
Senate of its authority, and because to subject him to prosecution under the statute might submit him to double jeopardy --
that is, leave him after punishment under the statute to be dealt with by the Senate as for contempt. After demonstrating the
want of merit in the argument as to delegation of authority, the proposition was held to be unsound and the contention as to
double jeopardy was also adversely disposed of on the ground of the distinction between the implied right to punish for
contempt and the authority to provide by statute for punishment for wrongful acts and to prosecute under the same for a failure
to testify, the Court saying that, "the two being diverso intuito and capable of standing together," they were susceptible of
being separately exercised.

There can be no doubt that the ruling in the case just stated upheld the existence of the implied power to punish for contempt
as distinct from legislative authority and yet flowing from it. It thus becomes apparent that, from a doctrinal point of view, the
English rule concerning legislative bodies generally came to be in exact accord with that which was recognized in Anderson
v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, as belonging to Congress -- that is, that, in virtue of the grant of legislative authority, there would be
a power implied to deal with contempt insofar as that authority was necessary to preserve and carry out the legislative authority
given. While the doctrine of Kielley v. Carson was thus in substantive principle the same as that announced in Anderson v.
Dunn, we must not be understood as accepting the application which was made of the rule to the particular case there in
question, since, as we shall hereafter have occasion to show, we think that the application was not consistent with the rule
which the case announced, and would, if applied, unwarrantedly limit the implied power of Congress to deal with contempt.

What does this implied power embrace? is thus the question. In answering, it must be borne in mind that the power rests
simply upon the implication that the right has been given to do that which is essential to the execution of some other and
substantive authority expressly conferred. The power is therefore but a force implied to bring into existence the conditions to
which constitutional limitations apply. It is a means to an end, and not the end itself. Hence, it rests solely upon the right of
self-preservation to enable the public powers given to be exerted.
These principles are plainly the result of what was decided in Anderson v. Dunn, supra, since, in that case, in answering the
question what was the rule by which the extent of the implied power of legislative assemblies to deal with contempt was
controlled, it was declared to be "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed" ( 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 231), which
was but a form of stating that, as it resulted from implication, and not from legislative will, the legislative will was powerless to
extend it further than implication would justify. The concrete application of the definition and the principle upon which it rests
were aptly illustrated in In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, where, because of the distinction existing between the two which was
drawn, the implied power was decided not to come under the operation of a constitutional limitation applicable to a case
resting upon the exercise of substantive legislative power.

Without undertaking to inclusively mention the subjects embraced in the implied power, we think from the very nature of that
power it is clear that it does not embrace punishment for contempt as punishment, since it rests only upon the right of self-
preservation -- that is, the right to prevent acts which, in and of themselves, inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of
legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions
may be performed. And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations
which were expressly pointed out in Anderson v. Dunn, supra -- that is, that the power, even when applied to subjects which
justified its exercise, is limited to imprisonment, and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body
in which the contempt occurred. Not only the adjudged cases, but congressional action in enacting legislation as well as in
exerting the implied power, conclusively sustain the views just stated. Take, for instance, the statute referred to in In re
Chapman, where, not at all interfering with the implied congressional power to deal with the refusal to give testimony in a
matter where there was a right to exact it, the substantive power had been exerted to make such refusal a crime, the two
being distinct the one from the other. So also, when the difference between the judicial and legislative powers is considered
and the divergent elements which, in the nature of things, enter into the determination of what is self-preservation in the two
cases, the same result is established by the statutory provisions dealing with the judicial authority to summarily punish for
contempt -- that is, without resorting to the modes of trial required by constitutional limitations or otherwise for substantive
offenses under the criminal law. Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. The legislative history of the exertion of the implied power
to deal with contempt by the Senate or House of Representatives when viewed comprehensively from the beginning points
to the distinction upon which the power rests, and sustains the limitations inhering in it which we have stated. The principal
instances are mentioned in the margin, [Footnote 3] and they all, except two or three, deal with either physical obstruction of
the legislative body in the discharge of its duties, or physical assault upon its members for action taken or words spoken in
the body, or obstruction of its officers in the performance of their official duties, or the prevention of members from attending
so that their duties might be performed, or, finally, with contumacy in refusing to obey orders to produce documents or give
testimony which there was a right to compel. In the two or three instances not embraced in the classes, we think it plainly
appears that, for the moment, the distinction was overlooked which existed between the legislative power to make criminal
every form of act which can constitute a contempt, to be punished according to the orderly process of law, and the accessory
implied power to deal with particular acts as contempts outside of the ordinary process of law because of the effect such
particular acts may have in preventing the exercise of legislative authority.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)

The state courts quite generally have held that the power to legislate carries with it by necessary implication ample authority
to obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of that power, and to employ compulsory process for the purpose.

We have referred to the practice of the two houses of Congress, and we now shall notice some significant congressional
enactments. May 3, 1798, 1 Stat. 554, c. 36, Congress provided that oaths or affirmations might be administered to witnesses
by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of a committee of the whole, or
the chairman of a select committee, "in any case under their examination." February 8, 1817, 3 Stat. 345, c. 10, it enlarged
that provision so as to include the chairman of a standing committee. January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155, c.19, it passed "An act
more effectually to enforce the attendance of witnesses on the summons of either house of Congress, and to compel them to
discover testimony." This act provided, first, that any person summoned as a witness to give testimony or produce papers in
any matter under inquiry before either house of Congress, or any committee of either house, who should willfully make default
or, if appearing, should refuse to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry, should, in addition to the pains and penalties
then existing, [Footnote 16] be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be subject to indictment as there prescribed; and,
secondly, that no person should be excused from giving evidence in such an inquiry on the ground that it might tend to
incriminate or disgrace him, nor be held to answer criminally, or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture, for any fact or act
as to which he was required to testify excepting that he might be subjected to prosecution for perjury committed while so
testifying. January 24, 1862, c. 11, 12 Stat. 333, Congress modified the immunity provision in particulars not material here.
These enactments are now embodied in §§ 101-104 and 859 of Revised Statutes. They show very plainly that Congress
intended thereby (a) to recognize the power of either house to institute inquiries and exact evidence touching subjects within
its jurisdiction and on which it was disposed to act; [Footnote 17] (b) to recognize that such inquiries may be conducted
through committees; (c) to subject defaulting and contumacious witnesses to indictment and punishment in the courts, and
thereby to enable either house to exert the power of inquiry "more effectually;" [Footnote 18] and (d) to open the way for
obtaining evidence in such an inquiry, which otherwise could not be obtained, by exempting witnesses required to give
evidence therein from criminal and penal prosecutions in respect of matters disclosed by their evidence.

Four decisions of this Court are cited and more or less relied on, and we now turn to them.

The first decision was in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204. The question there was whether, under the Constitution, the House
of Representatives has power to attach and punish a person other than a member for contempt of its authority -- in fact, an
attempt to bribe one of its members. The Court regarded the power as essential to the effective exertion of other powers
expressly granted, and therefore as implied. The argument advanced to the contrary was that, as the Constitution expressly
grants to each house power to punish or expel its own members and says nothing about punishing others, the implication or
inference, if any, is that power to punish one who is not a member is neither given nor intended. The Court answered this by
saying:

"There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument, a grant of powers which does not draw after it others not expressed
but vital to their exercise, not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate."

"This argument proves too much, for its direct application would lead to the annihilation of almost every power of Congress.
To enforce its laws upon any subject without the sanction of punishments is obviously impossible. Yet there is an express
grant of power to punish in one class of cases, and one only, and all the punishing power exercised by Congress, in any
cases, except those which relate the piracy and offenses against the laws of nations, is derived from implication. Nor did the
idea ever occur to anyone that the express grant in one class of cases repelled the assumption of the punishing power in any
other. The truth is that the exercise of the powers given over their own members was of such a delicate nature that a
constitutional provision became necessary to assert or communicate it. Constituted, as that body is, of the delegates of
confederated states, some such provision was necessary to guard against their mutual jealousy, since every proceeding
against a representative would indirectly affect the honor or interests of the state which sent him. "

The next decision was in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. The question there was whether the House of Representatives
had exceeded its power in directing one of its committees to make a particular investigation. The decision was that it had. The
principles announced and applied in the case are that neither house of Congress possesses a "general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen;" that the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters of
which the particular house "has jurisdiction" and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that, if the inquiry relates
to "a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding," it is not within the range of this power, but
must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of governmental powers, and that, for the purpose of
determining the essential character of the inquiry, recourse may be had to the resolution or order under which it is made. The
Court examined the resolution which was the basis of the particular inquiry, and ascertained therefrom that the inquiry related
to a private real estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook & Co. had had an interest in the pool, but had
become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United
States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest
in the pool, and, of course, his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some
of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. In these circumstances, disclosed in the
preamble, the resolution directed the committee "to inquire into the matter and history of said real estate pool and the character
of said settlement, with the amount of property involved in which Jay Cooke & Co. were interests, and the amount paid or to
be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers and report to this house."

The Court pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in
respect to which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in
the bankruptcy court, and that the United States and other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And,
on these grounds, the Court held that, in undertaking the investigation,"the House of Representatives not only exceeded the
limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government,
because it was in its nature clearly judicial." The case has been cited at times, and is cited to us now, as strongly intimating,
if not holding, that neither house of Congress has power to make inquires and exact evidence in aid of contemplated
legislation. There are expressions in the opinion which, separately considered, might bear such an interpretation; but that this
was not intended is shown by the immediately succeeding statement (p. 103 U. S. 189) that: "This latter proposition is one
which we do not propose to decide in the present case, because we are able to decide it without passing upon the existence
or nonexistence of such a power in aid of the legislative function."

Next in order is In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661. The inquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate
and related to charges, published in the press, that Senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then
before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill.
Chapman appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena, but refused to answer questions pertinent to the inquiry,
and was indicted and convicted under the Act of 1857 for his refusal. The Court sustained the constitutional validity of the Act
of 1857, and, after referring to the constitutional provision empowering either house to punish its members for disorderly
behavior and by a vote of two-thirds to expel a member, held that the inquiry related to the integrity and fidelity of Senators in
the discharge of their duties, and therefore to a matter "within the range of the constitutional powers of the Senate" and in
respect to which it could compel witnesses to appear and testify. In overruling an objection that the inquiry was without any
defined or admissible purpose, in that the preamble and resolution made no reference to any contemplated expulsion,
censure, or other action by the Senate, the Court held that they adequately disclosed a subject matter of which the Senate
had jurisdiction, that it was not essential that the Senate declare in advance what it meditated doing, and that the assumption
could not be indulged that the Senate was making the inquiry without a legitimate object.

The case is relied on here as fully sustaining the power of either house to conduct investigations and exact testimony from
witnesses for legislative purposes. In the course of the opinion (p. 166 U. S. 671), it is said that disclosures by witnesses may
be compelled constitutionally "to enable the respective bodies to discharge their legitimate functions," and that "it was to effect
this that the Act of 1857 was passed," and also:

"We grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either of its houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for
contempt in cases to which the power of either house properly extended; but, because Congress, by the Act of 1857, sought
to aid each of the houses in the discharge of its constitutional functions, it does not follow that any delegation of the power in
each to punish for contempt was involved."

The terms "legitimate functions" and "constitutional functions" are broad, and might well be regarded as including the
legislative function; but, as the case in hand did not call for any expression respecting that function, it hardly can be be said
that these terms were purposely used as including it.

The latest case is Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521. The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded
its power in punishing, as for a contempt of its authority, a person -- not a member -- who had written, published, and sent to
the chairman of one of its committees an ill tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee.
Power to make inquiries and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The Court recognized distinctly that
the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, as was ruled in Anderson v.
Dunn, supra, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground
that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in
the exercise of any of its functions -- in short, that the act which was punished as a contempt was not of such a character as
to bring it within the rule that an express power draws after it others which are necessary and appropriate to give effect to it.
While these cases are not decisive of the question we are considering, they definitely settle two propositions which we
recognize as entirely sound and having a bearing on its solution: one, that the two houses of Congress, in their separate
relations, possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as
are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective, and the other that neither house is invested with
"general" power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, but only with such limited power of inquiry as is shown
to exist when the rule of constitutional interpretation just stated is rightly applied. The latter proposition has further support in
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 211 U. S. 417-419, and Federal Trade Commission v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 264 U. S. 305-306.

With this review of the legislative practice, congressional enactments, and court decisions, we proceed to a statement of our
conclusions on the question.

We are of opinion that the power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified.
Both houses of Congress took this view of it early in their history -- the House of Representatives with the approving votes of
Mr. Madison and other members whose service in the convention which framed the Constitution gives special significance to
their action -- and both houses have employed the power accordingly up to the present time. The Acts of 1798 and 1857,
judged by their comprehensive terms, were intended to recognize the existence of this power in both houses and to enable
them to employ it "more effectually" than before. So, when their practice in the matter is appraised according to the
circumstances in which it was begun and to those in which it has been continued, it falls nothing short of a practical
construction, long continued, of the constitutional provisions respecting their powers, and therefore should be taken as fixing
the meaning of those provisions, if otherwise doubtful.

We are further of opinion that the provisions are not of doubtful meaning, but, as was held by this Court in the cases we have
reviewed, are intended to be effectively exercised, and therefore to carry with them such auxiliary powers as are necessary
and appropriate to that end. While the power to exact information in aid of the legislative function was not involved in those
cases, the rule of interpretation applied there is applicable here. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change, and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information -- which not infrequently is true -- recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete, so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.
All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period, the power of inquiry, with enforcing
process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate -- indeed, was treated
as inhering in it. Thus, there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional provisions which commit the
legislative function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively
exercised.

The contention is earnestly made on behalf of the witness that this power of inquiry, if sustained, may be abusively and
oppressively exerted. If this be so, it affords no ground for denying the power. The same contention might be directed against
the power to legislate, and, of course, would be unavailing. We must assume for present purposes that neither houses will be
disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, or without due regard to the rights of witnesses. But if, contrary to this
assumption, controlling limitations or restrictions are disregarded, the decisions in Kilbourn v. Thompson and Marshall v.
Gordon point to admissible measures of relief. And it is a necessary deduction from the decisions in Kilbourn v. Thompson
and In re Chapman that a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds of the power are exceeded or the
questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

We come now to the question whether it sufficiently appears that the purpose for which the witness' testimony was sought
was to obtain information in aid of the legislative function. The court below answered the question in the negative and put its
decision largely on this ground, as is shown by the following excerpts from its opinion.

The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the
subject matter was such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real object. An express avowal of the object
would have been better; but, in view of the particular subject matter, was not indispensable. In the Chapman case, where the
resolution contained no avowal, this Court pointed out that it plainly related to a subject matter of which the Senate had
jurisdiction, and said: "We cannot assume on this record that the action of the Senate was without a legitimate object," and
also that "it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when
the investigation was concluded." 166 U.S. 166 U. S. 669, 166 U. S. 670. In People v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, where the Court
of Appeals of New York sustained an investigation ordered by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution
contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administration of a public office the duties of which were
subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487):
"Where public institutions under the control of the state are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some
legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in respect of public officers."

And again:

"We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object, if it is capable of being so
construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended.

Mr. Hinds, in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its committees through the
recess following the expiration of a Congress." [Footnote 23] And, after quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manuel,
he says: "The Senate, however, being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the recess after the
expiration of a Congress." [Footnote 24] So far as we are advised, the select committee having this investigation in charge
has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has it been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities
have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be
continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and, if continued or revived, will have all its original powers. [Footnote 25]

This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense.
The situation is measurably like that in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S. 514-516, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the commission and was a
matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect, and the investigation proceeded with from the point at
which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances, we think a judgment
should be rendered as was done in the case cited.

What has been said requires that the final order in the district court discharging the witness from custody be reversed.

Final order reversed.

Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929)

Appellant contends that his demurrer to the several counts of the indictment should have been sustained, and that a verdict
of not guilty should have been directed. To support that contention, he argues that the questions related to his private affairs
and to matters cognizable only in the courts wherein they were pending, and that the committee avowedly had departed from
any inquiry in aid of legislation.

By our opinion in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 273 U. S. 173, decided since the indictment now before us was found,
two propositions are definitely laid down:

"One, that the two houses of Congress, in their separate relations, possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to
them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective;
and, the other, that neither house is invested with 'general' power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, but
only with such limited power of inquiry as is shown to exist when the rule of constitutional interpretation just stated is rightly
applied."

And that case shows that, while the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, it must
be exerted with due regard for the rights of witnesses, and that a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds
of the power are exceeded or where the questions asked are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well to remember, that few if any of the rights of the people guarded
by fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness and safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized,
arbitrary or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their personal and private affairs.

But it is clear that neither the investigation authorized by the Senate resolutions above mentioned nor the question under
consideration related merely to appellant's private or personal affairs. Under the Constitution (Art. IV, § 3), Congress has
plenary power to dispose of and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the naval oil reserves, other public lands,
and property of the United States. And undoubtedly the Senate had power to delegate authority to its committee to investigate
and report what had been and was being done by executive departments under the Leasing Act, the Naval Oil Reserve Act,
and the President's order in respect of the reserves and to make any other inquiry concerning the public domain.
While appellant caused the Mammoth Oil Company to be organized and owned all its shares, the transaction purporting to
lease to it the lands within the reserve cannot be said to be merely or principally the personal or private affair of appellant. It
was a matter of concern to the United States. The title to valuable government lands was involved. The validity of the lease
and the means by which it had been obtained under existing law were subjects that properly might be investigated in order to
determine what if any legislation was necessary or desirable in order to recover the leased lands or to safeguard other parts
of the public domain.

Neither Senate Joint Resolution 54 nor the action taken under it operated to divest the Senate or the committee of power
further to investigate the actual administration of the land laws. It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to
compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through
its committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information
sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.

The record does not sustain appellant's contention that the investigation was avowedly not in aid of legislation. He relies on
the refusal of the committee to pass the motion directing that the inquiry should not relate to controversies pending in court
and the statement of one of the members that there was nothing else to examine appellant about. But these are not enough
to show that the committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether additional legislation might be advisable.
It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under Senate Joint Resolution 54
might directly aid in respect of legislative action.

Appellant earnestly maintains that the question was not shown to be pertinent to any inquiry the committee was authorized to
make. The United States suggests that the presumption of regularity is sufficient without proof. But, without determining
whether that presumption is applicable to such a matter, it is enough to say that the stronger presumption of innocence
attended the accused at the trial. It was therefore incumbent upon the United States to plead and show that the question
pertained to some matter under investigation. Appellant makes no claim that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the
innuendo alleged in respect of the question; the record discloses that the proof on that point was ample.

Congress, in addition to its general legislative power over the public domain, had all the powers of a proprietor, and was
authorized to deal with it as a private individual may deal with lands owned by him. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.
S. 459, 236 U. S. 474. The committee's authority to investigate extended to matters affecting the interest of the United States
as owner as well as to those having relation to the legislative function.

Before the hearing at which appellant refused to answer, the committee had discovered and reported facts tending to warrant
the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 54 and the institution of suits for the cancellation of the naval oil reserve leases.
Undoubtedly it had authority further to investigate concerning the validity of such leases, and to discover whether persons,
other than those who had been made defendants in the suit against the Mammoth Oil Company, had or might assert a right
or claim in respect of the lands covered by the lease to that company.

The contract and release made and given by Bonfils and Stack related directly to the title to the lands covered by the lease
which had been reported by the committee as unauthorized and fraudulent. The United States proposed to recover and hold
such lands as a source of supply of oil for the Navy. S.J.Res. 54. It is clear that the question so propounded to appellant was
pertinent to the committee's investigation touching the rights and equities of the United States as owner.

Moreover, it was pertinent for the Senate to ascertain the practical effect of recent changes that had been made in the laws
relating to oil and other mineral lands in the public domain. The leases and contracts charged to have been unauthorized and
fraudulent were made soon after the executive order of May 31, 1921. The title to the lands in the reserves could not be
cleared without ascertaining whether there were outstanding any claims or applications for permits, leases, or patents under
the Leasing Act or other laws. It was necessary for the government to take into account the rights, if any there were, of such
claimants. The reference in the testimony of Bonfils to the contract referred to in the question propounded was sufficient to
put the committee on inquiry concerning outstanding claims possibly adverse and superior to the Mammoth Oil Company's
lease. The question propounded was within the authorization of the committee and the legitimate scope of investigation to
enable the Senate to determine whether the powers granted to or assumed by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary
of the Navy should be withdrawn, limited, or allowed to remain unchanged.

Judgment affirmed.
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)

The respondent Rumely was Secretary of an organization known as the Committee for Constitutional Government, which,
among other things, engaged in the sale of books of a particular political tendentiousness. He refused to disclose to the House
Select Committee on Lobbying Activities the names of those who made bulk purchases of these books for further distribution,
and was convicted under R.S. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. § 192, which provides penalties for refusal to give
testimony or to produce relevant papers "upon any matter" under congressional inquiry. The Court of Appeals reversed, one
judge dissenting.

We are asked to recognize the penetrating and pervasive scope of the investigative power of Congress. The reach that may
be claimed for that power is indicated by Woodrow Wilson's characterization of it: "It is the proper duty of a representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the
voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn
how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country
must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and
direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function." Although the indispensable
"informing function of Congress" is not to be minimized, determination of the "rights" which this function implies illustrates the
common juristic situation thus defined for the Court by Mr. Justice Holmes: "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to
their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which
the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached."

Accommodation of these contending principles -- the one underlying the power of Congress to investigate, the other at the
basis of the limitation imposed by the First Amendment -- is not called for until after we have construed the scope of the
authority which the House of Representatives gave to the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities. The pertinent portion of
the resolution of August 12, 1949, reads:

"The Committee is authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to
influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to
influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation."

Surely it cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from it
the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however
remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality
in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.

Indeed, adjudication here, if it were necessary, would affect not an evanescent policy of Congress, but its power to inform
itself, which underlies its policymaking function. Whenever constitutional limits upon the investigative power of Congress have
to be drawn by this Court, it ought only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of what is at stake by
unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits.

If "lobbying" was to cover all activities of anyone intending to influence, encourage, promote or retard legislation, why did
Congress differentiate between "lobbying activities" and other "activities . . . intended to influence"? Had Congress wished to
authorize so extensive an investigation of the influences that form public opinion, would it not have used language at least as
explicit as it employed in the very resolution in question in authorizing investigation of government agencies? Certainly it does
not violence to the phrase "lobbying activities" to give it a more restricted scope. To give such meaning is not barred by
intellectual honesty. So to interpret is in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt.

Only a word need be said about the debate in Congress after the committee reported that Rumely had refused to produce the
information which he had a right to refuse under the restricted meaning of the phrase "lobbying activities." The view taken at
that time by the committee and by the Congress that the committee was authorized to ask Rumely for the information he
withheld is not legislative history defining the scope of a congressional measure. What was said in the debate on August 30,
1950, after the controversy had arisen regarding the scope of the resolution of August 12, 1949, had the usual infirmity of post
litem motam, self-serving declarations. * In any event, Rumely's duty to answer must be judged as of the time of his refusal.
The scope of the resolution defining that duty is therefore to be ascertained as of that time and cannot be enlarged by
subsequent action of Congress. Grave constitutional questions are matters properly to be decided by this Court but only when
they inescapably come before us for adjudication. Until then, it is our duty to abstain from marking the boundaries of
congressional power or delimiting the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment. Only by such self-restraint will we avoid
the mischief which has followed occasional departures from the principles which we profess. The judgment below should be
Affirmed.
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953)
Orman challenges the pertinency of the book and of the name of the person who loaned him $25,000. Acting consistently
with this view, the trial court had excluded all evidence of the actual contents of the book and of the name of the man who
loaned Orman $25,000. Orman contends that this exclusion was erroneous. Orman also argues that since the question of
pertinency was one of law, it was error for the trial court to submit this question to the jury. His view is that as a matter of
law, taking into consideration the contents of the book and the name of the lender, the requirement of pertinency was not
met.
Pertinency under Section 192 has been much discussed in the cases. "Pertinent," as used to describe a requisite for valid
congressional inquiry, means "pertinent to a subject matter properly under inquiry, not generally pertinent to the person
under interrogation." Because of the scope and purpose of congressional investigations, pertinency in this context is
necessarily broader than relevancy in the law of evidence. "A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as
exhaustive as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Congress. * * * A judicial inquiry relates to a case,
and the evidence to be admissible must be measured by the narrow limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates
all possible cases which may arise thereunder and the evidence admissible must be responsive to the scope of the inquiry,
which generally is very broad."

As indicated in these definitions, two separate elements must appear before pertinency is established: (1) that the material
sought or answers requested related to a legislative purpose which Congress could constitutionally entertain; and (2) that
such material or answers fell within the grant of authority actually made by Congress to the investigating committee.
This does not mean that a congressional committee possesses the power to examine private citizens indiscriminately in the
mere hope of stumbling upon valuable information and to cite them for contempt if they refuse to answer. Where, as in the
instant case, the questions asked and the documents requested, are not clearly pertinent on their faces to the committee's
authorized investigation, the United States in a contempt proceeding must prove by other evidence the relation of the
questions, the documents and the particular witness to the investigation. We think the United States introduced adequate
evidence to enable the jury to find that the inquiries made of Orman were pertinent.
We come now to Orman's contention that it was his right to refuse to respond to the inquiries made by the Committee unless
the Committee agreed not to publicize the information he would give them. As the Supreme Court in Sinclair v. United States,
supra, 279 U.S. at page 292, 49 S. Ct. at page 271, has so cogently said: "It has always been recognized in this country, and
it is well to remember, that few if any of the rights of the people guarded by fundamental law are of greater importance to their
happiness and safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures
in respect of their personal and private affairs." Moreover, to "compel an individual to produce evidence, under penalties if he
refuses, is in effect a search and seizure, and, unless confined to proper limits, violates his constitutional right to immunity in
that regard.

On the other hand, there can be no question of the power of Congress to undertake fact-finding inquiries in aid of legislation.
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra. This necessitates some curtailment of the individual's right to be let alone, just as the efficient
exercise of judicial power imposes upon private citizens a duty to submit their conduct to its scrutiny.
As shown above, the Committee had reason to investigate Orman as it did. Cf. Marshall v. United States, supra. There could
be no doubt in Orman's mind as to what information the Committee desired, or the general purpose for which the Committee
had been appointed. Therefore Orman is in error in claiming a violation of his right under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments8 and of his "right of privacy" vis a vis the Committee.
There is, however, another aspect to Orman's refusals to cooperate with the Committee. As we read his testimony, his refusals
were not absolute claims of right to conceal information from the Committee. He stated his willingness that the Committee
should have his information provided it was not given to the public. As he testified, he was in business in Atlantic City and
was therefore unwilling that the public should have access to his financial records particularly since, in his view, there was
nothing in these records which could help the Committee. The condition which he sought to impose upon his responses to
the Committee's inquiries seemed reasonable to him. This raises a problem quite unlike that raised by an outright refusal to
give information to the Committee under any circumstances.

In general a witness before a congressional committee must abide by the committee's procedures and has no right to vary
them or to impose conditions upon his willingness to testify. It has been held, however, that witnesses before the Senate
Crime Committee properly refused to testify in a hearing room filled with television and newsreel cameras, news
photographers with flashbulbs, radio microphones and a large crowd of spectators. Like Orman, the witnesses in Kleinman
objected that their constitutional rights would be violated by being compelled to testify under circumstances of such publicity.
But the court in Kleinman sustained their objection on the ground that the atmosphere of the hearing room was calculated
"necessarily so to disturb and distract any witness to the point that he might say today something that next week he will realize
was erroneous." The court further reasoned: "The only reason for having a witness on the stand, either before a committee
of Congress or before a court, is to get a thoughtful, calm, considered and, it is to be hoped, truthful disclosure of facts. That
is not always accomplished, even under the best of circumstances. But at least the atmosphere of the forum should lend itself
to that end." The court noted that its decision was without precedent.
We think the Kleinman case is not persuasive here. Orman's testimony was given at a closed session of the Committee.
There were no distracting circumstances alleged which might have jeopardized the accuracy and truthfulness of his answers.
Orman insists upon his right to make what was called a "closed" session of the Committee, a closed session in fact. He urges
the court to take judicial notice of the purpose of the Committee to obtain maximum publicity for all its hearings, regardless of
the nature of the information received. This brings before us the question of the extent to which a court can and should
regulate the procedures of a lawful congressional committee making pertinent inquiries. As we have said, the individual
motives of the members of such a committee cannot be impugned. On the other hand, there is much to be said for a
cooperating witness' right to demand that information which cannot aid the committee in its legislative purpose be withheld
from the public. We conclude, however, that this is a matter for legislative rather than judicial control.
The Senate Crime Committee was authorized to ascertain the identity of persons using the facilities of interstate commerce
in furtherance of criminal activities. Orman cannot be permitted to prevent the Committee from reporting its investigation of
him, and including his testimony in its report.
The Committee was entitled to refuse to accept Orman's condition before it knew what information Orman had to give. As we
have said, this is not a case where the inquiries themselves were not pertinent. Perhaps it would be desirable for Congress
to limit the newspaper and television publicity given to the testimony of witnesses — we believe that in some investigations
this has been the practice — but in accord with the Eisler and Costello cases, supra, we hold that a court will not enforce a
condition imposed upon committee procedure by a witness, at least where no circumstances appear which might affect the
ability of the witness to give clear and truthful testimony.
We conclude therefore that Orman's refusal to identify the source of the $25,000 loan was deliberate and intentional. 9 His
claim of a right of privacy was no justification under the circumstances at bar.
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955)
Petitioner and two others were summoned to testify before a congressional investigating committee. One of them refused to
say whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party, basing his refusal on "the First and Fifth Amendments,"
as well as "the First Amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment." Petitioner adopted the other's
statement as his own, and refused to answer the same question. The committee did not ask him to state more specifically the
ground for his refusal to answer, and did not specifically overrule his objection or direct him to answer.
There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions
relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted in American and English institutions, is indeed coextensive
with the power to legislate. Without the power to investigate -- including, of course, the authority to compel testimony, either
through its own processes or through judicial trial -- Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its
constitutional function wisely and effectively.
But the power to investigate, broad as it may be, is also subject to recognized limitations. It cannot be used to inquire into
private affairs unrelated to a valid legislative purpose. Nor does it extend to an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate.
Similarly, the power to investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement; those powers are assigned
under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary. Still further limitations on the power to investigate are found in the
specific individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination which is
in issue here.

The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the
Constitution -- and the necessities for its preservation -- are to be found in the lessons of history. [Footnote 26] As early as
1650, remembrance of the horror of Star Chamber proceedings a decade before had firmly established the privilege in the
common law of England. Transplanted to this country as part of our legal heritage, it soon made its way into various state
constitutions, and ultimately, in 1791, into the federal Bill of Rights. The privilege, this Court has stated, "was generally
regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard
against heedless, unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions.”
Coequally with our other constitutional guarantees, the Self-Incrimination Clause "must be accorded liberal construction in
favor of the right it was intended to secure." [Footnote 28] Such liberal construction is particularly warranted in a prosecution
of a witness for a refusal to answer, since the respect normally accorded the privilege is then buttressed by the presumption
of innocence accorded a defendant in a criminal trial. To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly -- to treat it as an
historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated -- is to ignore its development and purpose.
In the instant case, petitioner was convicted for refusing to answer the committee's question as to his alleged membership in
the Communist Party. Clearly an answer to the question might have tended to incriminate him. As a consequence, petitioner
was entitled to claim the privilege. The principal issue here is whether or not he did.
It is agreed by all that a claim of the privilege does not require any special combination of words. Plainly, a witness need not
have the skill of a lawyer to invoke the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause. If an objection to a question is made in any
language that a committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege, it must be
respected both by the committee and by a court in a prosecution under § 192.
Here petitioner, by adopting the grounds relied upon by Fitzpatrick, based his refusal to answer on "the First and Fifth
Amendments" and "the First Amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment." The Government
concedes -- as we think it must -- that a witness may invoke the privilege by stating "I refuse to testify on the ground of the
Fifth Amendment." Surely, in popular parlance and even in legal literature, the term "Fifth Amendment" in the context of our
time is commonly regarded as being synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination. The Government argues,
however, that the references to the Fifth Amendment in the instant case were inadequate to invoke the privilege because
Fitzpatrick's statements are more reasonably understood as invoking rights under the First Amendment. We find the
Government's argument untenable. The mere fact that Fitzpatrick and petitioner also relied on the First Amendment does not
preclude their reliance on the Fifth Amendment as well. [Footnote 31] If a witness urges two constitutional objections to a
committee's line of questioning, he is not bound at his peril to choose between them. By pressing both objections, he does
not lose a privilege which would have been valid if he had only relied on one.
The Government, moreover, apparently concedes that petitioner intended to invoke the privilege. In its brief the Government
points out
"the probability that petitioner's ambiguous references to the Fifth Amendment . . . were phrased deliberately in such vague
terms so as to enable petitioner . . . to obtain the benefit of the privilege without incurring the popular opprobrium which often
attaches to its exercise. [Footnote 32]"
But the fact that a witness expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so long as the claim is sufficiently definite to
apprise the committee of his intention. As everyone agrees, no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.
In the instant case, Quinn's references to the Fifth Amendment were clearly sufficient to put the committee on notice of an
apparent claim of the privilege. It then became incumbent on the committee either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner
whether he was in fact invoking the privilege. Particularly is this so if it is true, as the Government contends, that petitioner
feared the stigma that might result from a forthright claim of his constitutional right to refuse to testify. It is precisely at such
times -- when the privilege is under attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the guilty -- that
governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in protecting its exercise.

This ruling by no means leaves a congressional committee defenseless at the hands of a scheming witness intent on
deception. When a witness declines to answer a question because of constitutional objections and the language used is not
free from doubt, the way is always open for the committee to inquire into the nature of the claim before making a ruling. If the
witness unequivocally and intelligently waives any objection based on the Self-Incrimination Clause, or if the witness refuses
a committee request to state whether he relies on the Self-Incrimination Clause, he cannot later invoke its protection
in a prosecution for contempt for refusing to answer that question. Here, the committee made no attempt to have petitioner
particularize his objection. Under these circumstances, we must hold that petitioner's references to the Fifth Amendment were
sufficient to invoke the privilege, and that the court below erred in failing to direct a judgment of acquittal.

There is yet a second ground for our decision.

Section 192, like the ordinary federal criminal statute, requires a criminal intent -- in this instance, a deliberate, intentional
refusal to answer. [Footnote 33] This element of the offense, like any other, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner contends that such proof was not, and cannot be, made in this case.
Clearly not every refusal to answer a question propounded by a congressional committee subjects a witness to prosecution
under § 192. Thus, if he raises an objection to a certain question -- for example, lack of pertinency or the privilege against
self-incrimination -- the committee may sustain the objection and abandon the question, even though the objection might
actually be without merit. In such an instance, the witness' refusal to answer is not contumacious, for there is lacking the
requisite criminal intent. Or the committee may disallow the objection, and thus give the witness the choice of answering or
not. Given such a choice, the witness may recede from his position and answer the question. And if he does not then answer,
it may fairly be said that the foundation has been laid for a finding of criminal intent to violate § 192. In short, unless the witness
is clearly apprised that the committee demands his answer notwithstanding his objections, there can be no conviction under
§ 192 for refusal to answer that question.
He said: "I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature." Committee counsel thereupon stated that further
questioning "relating to those matters" was "not necessary," and proceeded upon a new line of inquiry. There is nothing in
this colloquy from which petitioner could have determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that the committee demanded
his answer despite his objection. Rather, the colloquy is wholly consistent with the hypothesis that the committee had, in fact,
acquiesced in his objection.
Our view that a clear disposition of the witness' objection is a prerequisite to prosecution for contempt is supported by
longstanding tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. [Footnote 36] In this country, the tradition has been
uniformly recognized in the procedure of both state and federal courts.
The judgment below is reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

Reversed.
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956)
This court now has for determination whether the Government has proved that the questions which the indictment charges
the defendant Icardi answered falsely were asked by "a competent tribunal" and whether his answers related to a "material
matter." These two facts are essential elements of the offense with which the defendant is here charged. Hence, although
matters of law for determination by the court, they must be proved by the Government like any other essential element of the
crime; and the court must grant defendant's motion to dismiss unless it finds the Government has proved them beyond a
reasonable doubt. At the outset, the court is faced with two basic principles of law: the presumption of the validity of
governmental proceedings, and the presumption that the accused is innocent. Since the second presumption outweighs the
first, the presumption of validity must be supported by proof of the validity of the legislative proceedings and materiality of the
specific answers which defendant is alleged to have falsely given.
The transcript of testimony indicates that, at the outset, the inquiry was directed primarily to the issue of the guilt or innocence
of Icardi and the other members or aides of the OSS team of the murder of Major Holohan and the robbery of his body, Icardi's
alleged embezzlement of government funds, and incidentally the investigation which had been made thereof.

Turning to the report of the special subcommittee, it states in terms: "The inquiry by the special subcommittee was concerned,
primarily with whether or not a crime had been committed; whether prosecution was possible; in what jurisdiction it would lie
whether military, civilian, or Italian authority; and whether the Federal statutes were inadequate in any respect or had been
improperly administered by the Army." There is a question as to the propriety of the report's Conclusions, which state there is
"probable cause" for charging Icardi and LoDolce with murder and embezzlement, but that they are not subject to prosecution
under existing civil law or under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The use of this language indicates the functioning of the
subcommittee as a committing magistrate.
This court does not hold that the mere fact that a committee has in its possession a prior statement of an individual is a bar
to the committee's compelling his testimony on the same subject, even though it be merely cumulative, provided such
testimony is obtained by the committee for a legislative purpose within its jurisdiction. The court does hold that if the committee
is not pursuing a bona fide legislative purpose when it secures the testimony of any witness, it is not acting as a "competent
tribunal", even though that very testimony be relevant to a matter which could be the subject of a valid legislative
investigation.While a committee or subcommittee of the Congress has the right to inquire whether there is a likelihood that a
crime has been committed touching upon a field within its general jurisdiction and also to ascertain whether an executive
department charged with the prosecution of such crime has acted properly, this authority cannot be extended to sanction a
legislative trial and conviction of the individual toward whom the evidence points the finger of suspicion. On the basis of all
the evidence before it, the court therefore finds, as a matter of law, that at the time the subcommittee questioned the defendant
Icardi it was not functioning as a competent tribunal.
Assuming, however, that the subcommittee was functioning as a competent tribunal when Icardi gave the testimony upon
which the indictment is based, the court holds, as a matter of law, that the false answers defendant is charged with having
given did not relate to a "material matter." When a committee of Congress is engaged in a legitimate legislative inquiry and
the questions propounded are relevant and material to that inquiry, the courts will not question the motives of the questioners.
And the fact that a crime may be disclosed by the answer does not make a question immaterial. There are, however, limitations
upon the investigative power of the legislature which must be considered in any determination of materiality. The investigation
must be to aid in legislation.
The facts sought to be elicited by the questions which are the subject of this indictment all dealt with the issue of Icardi's guilt
of the crimes with which he had been charged. The court has not overlooked the Government's argument that the matters
sought to be elicited by these six questions were material because, if Icardi had impressed the subcommittee with his
credibility and had produced substantial corroborative evidence, the subcommittee might have concluded that he was
innocent. In the face of the evidence that, as of the time he was questioned, Icardi's answers could have no effect upon the
subcommittee's conclusions in the field of legitimate congressional investigation, this slim conjecture cannot support a finding
by this court, as a matter of law, that Icardi's answers related to a material matter. Whether Icardi denied or confessed guilt
by his answers, his testimony could not have influenced the subcommittee's conclusion on subjects which might be
legitimately under investigation, namely, whether existing law adequately covered the prosecution of crimes committed under
the circumstances of the specific charge under investigation, and whether the Defense Department had functioned adequately
in its investigation of the Holohan disappearance. Therefore, under the test set forth in the Fraser case, the court holds as a
matter of law that the alleged false answers by Icardi were not material to the subcommittee's authorized investigation.
Counsel for the government has suggested that frequently individuals are adjudged guilty of an offense by a congressional
committee in the exercise of its functions. This court doubts the accuracy of such statement; but, if it be true, such practice
should not be condoned, as it denies to the accused the constitutional safeguards of judicial trial. Judgment of acquittal must
be granted.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
Petitioner was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a
witness by either House of Congress or any committee thereof to refuse to answer any question "pertinent to the question
under inquiry." Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American
Activities, petitioner testified freely about his own activities and associations, but he refused to answer questions as to whether
he had known certain other persons to have been members of the Communist Party. He based his refusal on the ground that
those questions were outside of the proper scope of the Committee's activities, and not relevant to its work. No clear
understanding of the "question under inquiry" could be gleaned from the resolution authorizing the full Committee, the
legislative history thereof, the Committee's practices thereunder, the action authorizing the Subcommittee, the statement of
the Chairman at the opening of the hearings or his statement in response to petitioner's protest.
Held: Petitioner was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and
his conviction was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 354 U. S. 181-216.
(a) The power of Congress to conduct investigations, inherent in the legislative process, is broad, but it is not unlimited. P.
354 U. S. 187.
(b) Congress has no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions
of Congress. P. 354 U. S. 187.

(c) No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress. P. 354 U. S. 187.
(d) The Bill of Rights is applicable to congressional investigations, as it is to all forms of governmental action. P. 354 U. S.
188.

(e) A congressional investigation is subject to the command that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or
press or assembly. Pp. 354 U. S. 196-197.
(f) When First Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation of power to a congressional committee must be clearly
revealed in its charter. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. P. 354 U. S. 198.
(g) A congressional investigation into individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any legislative purpose, because it is beyond
the powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. P. 354 U. S. 198.
(h) It cannot simply be assumed that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any
private rights affected, since to do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to
insure that Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right of privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly. Pp. 354 U. S. 198-199.
(i) There is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure where the predominant result can be only an invasion
of the private rights of individuals. P. 354 U. S. 200.
(j) In authorizing an investigation by a committee, it is essential that the Senate or House should spell out the committee's
jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity to insure that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of a legislative
purpose. P. 354 U. S. 201.
(k) The resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities Committee does not satisfy this requirement, especially when read
in the light of the practices of the Committee and subsequent actions of the House of Representatives extending the life of
the Committee. Pp. 354 U. S. 201-205.
(l) Every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to the actions of a coordinate branch of our Government, but
such deference cannot yield to an unnecessary and unreasonable dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms. P. 354 U.
S. 204.
(m) Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or Senate that
a particular inquiry is justified by specific legislative need. P. 354 U. S. 205.
(n) Congressional investigating committees are restricted to the missions delegated to them -- to acquire certain data to be
used by the House or Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere -- and no witness can be compelled
to make disclosures on matters outside that area. P. 354 U. S. 206.

(o) When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities
Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency. P. 354 U. S. 206.
(p) The courts must accord to a defendant indicted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all
other criminal cases, including the right to have available information revealing the standard of criminality before the
commission of the alleged offense. Pp. 354 U. S. 207-208.
(q) Since the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry," part of the
standard of criminality is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness. P. 354 U. S. 208.
(r) Due process requires that a witness before a congressional investigating committee should not be compelled to decide, at
peril of criminal prosecution, whether to answer questions propounded to him without first knowing the "question under inquiry"
with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a
criminal offense. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263. Pp. 354 U. S. 208-209.
(s) The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the
proceedings themselves, might make the "question under inquiry" sufficiently clear to avoid the "vice of vagueness"; but these
sources often leave the matter in grave doubt. P. 354 U. S. 209.

(t) In this case, it is not necessary to pass on the question whether the authorizing resolution defines the "question under
inquiry" with sufficient clarity, since the Government does not contend that it could serve that purpose. P. 354 U. S. 209.
(u) The opening statement of the Chairman at the outset of the hearings here involved is insufficient to serve that purpose,
since it merely paraphrased the authorizing resolution, and gave a very general sketch of the past efforts of the Committee.
Pp. 354 U. S. 209-210.
(v) Nor was that purpose served by the action of the full Committee in authorizing the creation of the Subcommittee before
which petitioner appeared, since it merely authorized the Chairman to appoint subcommittees "for the purpose of performing
any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do." Pp. 354 U. S. 211-212.
(w) On the record in this case, especially in view of the precise questions petitioner was charged with refusing to answer, it
cannot be said that the "question under inquiry" was Communist infiltration into labor unions. Pp. 354 U. S. 212-214.
(x) Unless the subject matter of the inquiry has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative
body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and
the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto. Pp. 354 U. S. 214-215.

(y) The Chairman's response, when petitioner objected to the questions on grounds of pertinency, was inadequate to convey
sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the "question under inquiry.
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
Syllabus
Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which
was investigating alleged Communist infiltration into the field of education, petitioner, formerly a graduate student and teaching
fellow at the University of Michigan, refused to answer questions as to whether he was then or had ever been a member of
the Communist Party. He disclaimed reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination, but objected generally to the right
of the Subcommittee to inquire into his "political" and "religious" beliefs or any "other personal or private affairs" or
"associational activities" upon grounds set forth in a previously prepared memorandum, which was based on the First, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments, the prohibition against bills of attainder and the doctrine of separation of powers. For such refusal,
he was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by
either House of Congress or a committee thereof to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry. He
was fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six months.
Held: Petitioner's conviction is sustained. Pp. 360 U. S. 111-134.
1. In the light of the Committee's history and the repeated extensions of its life, as well as the successive appropriations by
the House of Representatives for the conduct of its activities, its legislative authority and that of the Subcommittee to conduct
the inquiry under consideration here is unassailable, and House Rule XI, 83d Congress, which defines the Committee's
authority, cannot be said to be constitutionally infirm on the score of vagueness. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178,
distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S. 116-123.
(a) Rule XI has a "persuasive gloss of legislative history" which shows beyond doubt that, in pursuance of its legislative
concerns in the domain of "national security," the House of Representatives has clothed the Committee with pervasive
authority to investigate Communist activities in this country. Pp. 360 U. S. 117-121.
Page 360 U. S. 110
(b) In the light of the legislative history, Rule XI cannot be construed so as to exclude the field of education from the
Committee's compulsory authority. Pp. 360 U. S. 121-123.
2. The record in this case refutes petitioner's contention that he was not adequately apprised of the pertinency of the
Subcommittee's questions to the subject matter of the inquiry. Watkins v. United States, supra, distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S.
123-125.

3. On the record in this case, the balance between the individual and the governmental interests here at stake must be struck
in favor of the latter, and therefore the provisions of the First Amendment were not transgressed by the Subcommittee's inquiry
into petitioner's past or present membership in the Communist Party. Pp. 360 U. S. 125-134.
(a) Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown. Pp. 360
U. S. 126-127.

(b) The investigation here involved was related to a valid legislative purpose, since Congress has wide power to legislate in
the field of Communist activity in this Country and to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof. Pp. 360 U. S. 127-129.
(c) Investigatory power in this domain is not to be denied Congress solely because the field of education is involved, and the
record in this case does not indicate any attempt by the Committee to inquire into the content of academic lectures or
discussions, but only to investigate the extent to which the Communist Party had succeeded in infiltrating into our educational
institutions persons and groups committed to furthering the Party's alleged objective of violent overthrow of the Government.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, distinguished. Pp. 360 U. S. 129-132.
(d) On the record in this case, it cannot be said that the true objective of the Committee and of the Congress was purely
"exposure," rather than furtherance of a valid legislative purpose. Pp. 360 U. S. 132-133.
(e) The record is barren of other factors which, in themselves, might lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at
stake were not subordinate to those of the Government. P. 360 U. S. 134.
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
Syllabus
In a Florida State Court, petitioner, who was president of the Miami Branch of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, was adjudged in contempt and sentenced to fine and imprisonment for refusing to divulge contents of the
membership records of that Branch to a committee created by the Florida Legislature, which was investigating the infiltration
of Communists into various organizations. There was no suggestion that the Association or its Miami Branch was a subversive
organization, or that either was Communist dominated or influenced. The purpose of the questions asked petitioner was to
ascertain whether 14 persons previously identified as Communists or members of Communist front or affiliated organizations
were members of the Miami Branch of the Association. The principal evidence relied upon to show any relationship between
the Association and subversive or Communist activities was indirect, ambiguous, and mostly hearsay testimony by two
witnesses that, in years past, those 14 persons had attended occasional meetings of the Miami Branch of the Association
"and/or" were members of that Branch, which had about 1,000 members.

Held: on the record in this case, petitioner's conviction of contempt for refusal to divulge information contained in the
membership lists of the Association violated rights of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 372
U. S. 540-558.

1. When, as in this case, the claim is made that a legislative investigation intrudes upon First and Fourteenth Amendment
associational rights of individuals, the State must show convincingly a substantial relation between the information sought and
a subject of overriding and compelling state interest. Pp. 372 U. S. 543-546.
2. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S.
431; and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, distinguished. Pp. 372 U. S. 547-550.
3. An adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid before a legislative investigation proceeds in such a manner as will
substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected associational rights, and the record in this
case is not sufficient to show a substantial connection between the Miami Branch of the Association and Communist activities,
or to demonstrate a compelling and subordinating state interest necessary to sustain the State's right to inquire into the
membership lists of the Association. Pp. 372 U. S. 550-557.
4. Groups which themselves are neither engaged in subversive or other illegal or improper activities nor demonstrated to have
any substantial connections with such activities must be protected in their rights of free and private association guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 372 U. S. 557-558.
126 So.2d 129, reversed.