Irby C. Nichols Jr. (Auth.) - The European Pentarchy and The Congress of Verona, 1822-Springer Netherlands (1972) PDF

THE EUROPEAN PENTARCHY
AND THE
CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822
THE EUROPEANPENTARCHY
AND THE
CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822
by
IRBY C. NICHOLS, JR.

North Texas State University
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE I 1971

@ 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1110-9 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2725-0

DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2725-0
TO MY MOTHER
PAULINE WRIGHT NICHOLS
AND THE
MEMORY OF MY FATHER
IRBY COGHILL NICHOLS
WHO INSPIRED ME TO BECOME
A DISCIPLE
OF CLIO
CONTENTS
PREFACE XI
PART I
GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822 1
PROLOGUE
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE CoNGRESS 3

1. The Congress is called 3
2. The Eastern Question 5
3. The Hanoverian Rendezvous 8
4. The Shift from Castlereagh to Canning 13
CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO VIENNA 19

1. The Castlereagh Instructions 19
2. The Wellington Mission 23
3. The Ascendancy of Villele 25
4. Franco-Spanish Relations, 1820-1822 27
5. The Villele-Wellington Interview 34
CHAPTER II
THE VIENNA STALEMATE 40

1. The Conference Convenes 40
2. The Spanish Question 42
4. Italian Questions 54
5. A Retrospect 59
VIII CONTENTS
PARTn
THE CONGRESS AT WORK: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1822 63
CHAPTER ill
FROM VmNNA TO VERONA: PRELlMINARmS TO THE CoNGRESS 65

1. Exodus 65
2. The Canning Instructions 68
3. The Villcle Instructions 72
4. Reunion in Verona: The Congress at Play 75
5. Agenda and Procedure 81
CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH QUESTION 84

1. The Montmorency Mbnoire 84
2. The British Remonstrance and Allied Reaction 88
3. Dichotomy of the French Delegation 107
4. Triumph of the Franco-Russian Entente 112
5. International Finance and Intervention: The Brothers Rothschild and
Ouvrard 127
6. A Retrospect 133
CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH CoLONIAL QUESTION 137

1. Genesis 137
2. Wellington's Dissent 144
3. The Villcle-Montmorency Vendetta Revisited 145
4. The British Brief 147
5. The AngIo-Continental Impasse 148
6. The Gameiro Affair 151
7. The British Reservation 154
8. A Retrospect 159
CHAPTER VI
THE SLAVB TRADE QUESTION 161

1. Genesis 161
2. The Impossible Quest 165
3. The Black Tide 171
4. The Six Points 176
CONTENTS IX
5. The Implacable French and Diffident Allies 180

6. A Retrospect 186
7. Epilogue 189
CHAPTER VII
THE ITALIAN CONGRESS 191

1. The Charles Albert Affair 191
2. The Evacuation of Piedmont 195
3. The Evacuation of Naples 200
4. Metternich's Italian League (Lega Ita/ica) 205
5. The Sardinian Waldenses 211
6. The Swiss Confederation and Piedmontese Refugees 212
7. The Knights of Malta 215
8. The Aldobrandini Appeal 215
9. A Retrospect 216
CHAPTER VIII
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 218

1. The Austrian War Debt 218
2. The Russian Ukase 229
4. The Navigation of the Rhine 258
5. A Retrospect 262
CHAPTER IX
THE CURTAIN FALLS 264

1. The Verona Circular (December 14, 1822) 264
2. Exodus 266
3. The Second ViIlele-Wellington Interview 267
4. A Retrospect 272
PART III
PROBLEMS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND INTERPRETATION 275
CHAPTER X
WELLINGTON AND THE CoNGRESS 277

1. The Alleged Crime 277
2. The Prosecution 277
x CONTENTS
3. The Defense 280

4. The Verdict 284
CHAPTER XI
CHATEAUBRIAND AND THE CONGRESS 286

1. The Debate 286
2. Ambition and Intrigue 288
3. The Mission 292
4. Reception at Verona 295
5. A Retrospect 299
CHAPTER XU
CHATEAUBRIAND'S WAR 302

1. The French Ministerial Crisis (December 1822) 302
2. France Goes It Alone 307
3. Britain Adopts Neutrality 312
4. A Retrospect 315
EPILOGUE
FROM CoNGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE 317

1. The Secret Treaty of Verona 317
2. The Congress and the Alliance 320
3. Fall of the Alliance 321
4. The Legacy 324
BmuOGRAPHY 327
INDEX 349
PREFACE
For one reason or another. modem historians have neglected the Congress
of Verona. some because they thought the field already had been thoroughly
plowed. while others doubted that enough material could be found for more
than an article or two on the subject. Indeed. not a single book-length
monograph of this international assembly has ever been published in any
language. This study. therefore. attempts to fill the gap by (1) explaining the
genesis of the Congress. (2) furnishing a comprehensive account of its work.
(3) revising some of the interpretations of Sir Charles K. Webster. Harold
W. V. Tempedey. and others. and (4) analyzing the significance of the
Congress. with emphasis on its contribution to the fall of the Quintuple
Alliance. a consequence aided by the dissimilar and often contradictory
interests of the allies themselves.
This book is essentially a diplomatic history. but diplomats. of course.
do not live in a vacuum. Numerous political. social. commercial. financial.
and sometimes even religious factors. impinge upon their consciousness.
It soon became apparent. therefore. that the scope of this work would be
enormous and that its span would stretch from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century. if the alpha and omega of every issue discussed at Verona
were recounted. Yet anything less than a catholic approach would reduce
the claim of comprehensive coverage to an empty pretense. Included within
the purview of the study. perforce. are questions which range from Black
Sea commerce to the Atlantic slave trade. from the Greek insurrection to
Latin American independence. from the navigation of the Rhine to the
interdiction of foreign trade with Russian America. and from intervention
in the Iberian Peninsula to the persecution of Piedmontese Vaudois.
The present volume is an outgrowth of researches which began twenty-
three years ago in Professor James Logan Godfrey's seminar at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina. By 1949 the paper had grown into a master's
thesis which six years later at the University of Michigan envolved into a
doctoral dissertation: "Great Britain and the Congress of Verona." But
hardly more than the foundation for this work had been laid. for the greater
XII PREFACE
task of giving equal and adequate treatment to the diplomacy of the four
great continental powers remained. There were. moreover. other important
questions which required investigation: what impact. if any. did the negoti-
ations at Verona have upon the balance of power in Europe. the foreign
policy of the United States. or on Habsburg hegemony in Italy? Nonetheless.
the obvious need for a central theme in the midst of involved negotiations
on multitudinous issues led me to retain the focus on British diplomacy.
Of all the great powers. only Britain. by virtue of her empire. commerce.
and ambivalent position in Europe (at once insular and continental). had
interests which were truly global. Further research. writing. revision. and
the occasional pUblication of findings have occupied my attention for the
last decade and a half.
For the sake of clarity. I have modernized the spelling and punctuation
of most quotations - retaining some archaic forms for their dramatic effect -
and have translated foreign titles of nobility and office into English. Also
to avoid confusion. all Old Style dates have been converted to New Style.
During the nineteenth century. the Russian. Old Style calendar was twelve
days in arrears of the Gregorian. New Style calendar.
Both the organization of this book and my own historiographical creed
hang on five basic assumptions. First. the author should take the reader
into his confidence at frequent intervals. not just in the Preface and the
concluding chapter. Secondly. the essence of history is problems. not chroni-
cles. though no theory of historical interpretation or system of social
dialectics in definitive. because such factors as human courage. faith. and
ambition are indefinable and unpredictable. Thirdly. notwithstanding the
influence of complex material forces. accidents and men's free choice also
have produced dynamic results throughout the continuum of history. Does
not aio often seem capricious? Fourthly. symbols. such as the martyred
Joan of Arc or the modem propaganda image. are sometimes greater than
the reality. Fifthly. the interpretation of events is the proper function of the
historian and is as important as their narration. Since analyses are subjective
and cannot be guaranteed. however. each reader must judge for himself
whether a particular conclusion is astute or naive. proven or unwarrented.
germane or irrelevant. In conformity with these suppositions. at least one
section of each chapter analyzes problems of causation. relationships. and
significance. while all of Part III (three chapters and the Epilogue). focuses
on questions of historiography and interpretation.
Most of the published materials for this study and all of the manuscript
collections (except the Adams Papers). are deposited in London. at the
British Museum and the Public Record Office. and in Paris. at the Biblio-
PREFACE XIII
theque Nationale and the Quai d'Orsay. While I have not consulted the
governmental archives of Vienna, Berlin, and Leningrad (St. Petersburg),
this omission, in my opinion, does not present any serious difficulty in
understanding the policies of those cabinets. The British and French
archives, especially the embassy files, contain rich deposits of documents
pertaining to the diplomacy of the three eastern courts, and these holdings
are supplemented by many published collections of Austrian, Prussian, and
Russian diplomatic dispatches, memoirs, and diaries. Almost all of the
Austrian papers found in the Vienna Staatsarchiv, Kongressakten, Verona,
Fascs. 43, 45, and 50, moreover, have been printed in Wellington's new
Despatches. Vol. I. I have, of course, made use of the secondary accounts
of historians who have labored in foreign archives: Bertier de Sauvigny,
Cresson, Schroeder, Sweet, Temperley, and Webster, among others.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude all who have assisted me
in the preparation of this manuscript: the North Texas State University
Faculty Research Committee, which materially facilitated my work with
eight grants-in-aid, spanning the period 1956-1968; Professors Robert B.
Holtman of Louisiana State University and R. John Rath of Rice University,
who read and criticized sections of this book in their original (article) form;
Emeritus Professor Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky of the University of
Michigan, who gave me several insights into Russian policy during the reign
of Alexander I; Robert Lee Ellis, James Willard Hurst, and Richard Allen
Ward, three former graduate students who undertook theses on problems
tangent to this study; Mrs. Vinita B. Davis and Miss Ruth Gray of the
North Texas State University Library staff, who helped me locate and
obtain needed materials; Miss Patricia Fleischer, Miss Karen Temple, and
Miss Linda Cox, student assistants who deciphered my cryptography and
typed the first draft of the manuscript; and Mrs. Shirley W. Taylor, who
typed the final revision in its entirety.
Chapter V and sections of Chapters II, IV, VIII and XII have been re-
written from articles of mine which appeared in The Historian. Journal of
Central European Affairs. Pacific Historical Review, and the Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly. I am grateful to the editors of these periodicals for
permission to use these articles in revised form.
A special commendation is reserved for Margaret. my research assistant,
literary critic, egeria, and wife, who has contributed more to this book than
she knows and I can acknowledge.
Irby C. Nichols, Jr.
Denton, Texas
November, 1970
PART I
GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS:

FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822
PROLOGUE
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE CONGRESS
Himself his moldering monument survives,

And sees his labors perish while he lives;
His fame is more contracted than his span,
And the frail author dies before the man.
How would he wish the labor to forbear
And follow other arts with more successful care?
Vida. 1
1. The Congress Is Called
The origins of the Congress of Verona are as important as they are obscure,
stretching back, as they do, to the Laibach conference of 1821. There, on
February 25, while the Austrian expedition was marching through the Papal
States, the three eastern powers resolved to reunite at Florence in September
of the following year to discuss Italian affairs. In April, after the revolts in
Naples and Piedmont had been suppressed, the allies reaffirmed this decision
and announced that the Florentine congress specifically would determine
whether Austrian forces in these kingdoms should be continued, diminished,
or withdrawn. For more than a year, the great powers assumed that this
would be an Italian conference, since Austria had successfully opposed
placing the Spanish revolution on its agenda, and Russian objections had
effectively proscribed collective consideration of the Turko-Greek conflict. 2
Nonetheless, the statement is made repeatedly that the Congress of Verona
was summoned originally to debate the Spanish and Greek revolutions. To
make this assertion is simply to retroject later developments. 3
1 Marco Girolamo Vida, De Arte Poetica, Bk. iii, 11. 252-256, trans. Christopher
Pitt, in Albert S. Cook (ed.), The Art of Poetry: The Poetical Treatises of Horace,
Vida, and Boileau (Boston, 1892), p. 134.
2 Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte, "Resume historique des congres de:
Troppau, Laybach, et Verone," France, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (here-
after cited as Boislecomte, A.A.E.), 720, 185 (Boislecomte [1796-1863] was a secretary
of the French delegation at these conferences.); William Hill, British minister to
Sardinia, to Castlereagh, No.1, Turin, Apr. 29, 1821, Great Britain, Public Record
Office, London, Foreign Office (hereafter cited as F.O.), Sardinia, 67/63; "Journal
des conferences," Feb. 26, 1821, Austria, Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Kon-
gressakten, Laibach, fasc. 40, cited by Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy at
Its Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin, 1962), p. 110; Louis de Viel-Castel, Histoire de la
Restauration (Paris, 1860-1878), IX, 533; Adrien Maggiolo, Corse, France, et Russie:
Pozzo di Bargo, 1762-1842 (Paris, 1890), pp. 262-265.
3 Some recent works and monographs in which this misinformation appears are
4 GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS
Florence remained the site of the forthcoming congress until June 1822,
when Mettemich moved its location to Verona. The motive behind this
shift was that a city within Habsburg dominions would ensure greater
Austrian control of the congress. Count Karl Robert Nesselrode, Russian
foreign minister, opposed the change of sites, protesting that "Austria was
determined to exercise a monopoly on the Congresses," but Tsar Alexander
was won over by Metternich's arguments that the Venetian police were
superior to the Tuscan and that it was necessary to exclude "all strangers,
curiosity-seekers, and foreign agents from the scene of the Congress." 4 In
any case, geography favored Verona. Situated at the southern end of the
Brenner Pass astride the great Lombard highway running from Venice to
Milan and thence, by various passes, to France, its location facilitated com-
munications between the Congress and the capitals of the Pentarchy.
The road to Verona was a tortuous one for Britain, and, therefore, re-
quires clarification. Because the island kingdom had pursued a "hands off"
policy toward Italy since the Neapolitan revolution, had sternly protested
against the principle of armed intervention in the internal affairs of in-
dependent states, and had sent only an observer to the Troppau-Laibach
conference, her withdrawal from the Congress System appeared imminent
in the summer of 1821. This estrangement alarmed the Austrian chancellor,
because he needed British assistance in restraining the tsar in the west no less
than in the east. Having arranged a rendezvous with Castlereagh in Han-
over in October 1821, Metternich had persuaded the foreign secretary that
a conference on Russo-Turkish affairs should be held in Vienna on the eve
of the Italian congress scheduled for the next year. Castlereagh, however,
did not commit himself to attend because of recent Parliamentary opposition
to conserting with continental despots.5 In a further effort to obtain British
Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York, 1934), p. 165;
Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems
of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston, 1957), pp. 309-310; George M. Trevelyan, British History
in the Nineteenth Century and After, 1782-1919 (London, 1947), p. 208; Dexter
Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (new ed.; Boston, 1955), p. 34; Rene
Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New
York, 1958), p. 28; Panfilo Gentile, "Chateaubriand politico," Studi polWei, IV
(1956), 19; Andre Nicolle, "Ouvrard and the French Expedition in Spain in 1823,"
Journal of Modern History (hereafter cited as JMH), XVII (Sept. 1945), 193.
4 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 206; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,
423; Sir Adolphus W. Ward, Aix-La-Chapelle to Verona, Vol. III of Period of the
Congresses (London, 1919), p. 62.
5 Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Memoires, documents, et ecrits
divers laisses par Ie prince de Metternich, ed. Richard de Metternich (Paris, 1880-
1884), III, 559; Harold W. V. Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827
(London, 1925), p. 7.
PROLOGUE 5
participation, the chancellor on June 6, 1822, suggested that only issues of

interest to Britain be placed on the agenda for the Vienna conference and
that Italian questions be reserved for the later congress at Verona, which
Britain need not attend. Actually Metternich now did not want to raise the
Eastern Question at all, but he had to mention it to give the foreign secretary
a pretext to come. Castereagh endorsed this plan on June 22 but confessed
to Metternich that he did not know if the cabinet would permit him to
attend. "Everything would depend on how matters stood when Parliament
rose." The gambit, however, might yet succeed, if he received "a pressing
invitation ... with a programme designed to show the usefulness of his at-
tendance and excluding inconvenient items." 6 The chancellor obliged on
July 8, but he couched the agenda in extremely vague terms to avoid com-
mitting himself on the Eastern and Spanish questions. All that stood in the
way of British participation at the Vienna conference was the consent of
the cabinet which, still reluctant to send a plenipotentiary to any European
congress, delayed approval of the mission until July 25. Announcement
then was made to the London diplomatic corps that Lord Castlereagh, his
wife, and Richard, Earl of Clanwilliam, Parliamentary undersecretary for
foreign affairs, would leave for the continent on August 15. 7
2. The Eastern Question
Metternich's anxiety to have British assistance at the Vienna conference is

explained by the importance which the Eastern Question assumed during
the summer of 1821. The news of Alexander Ypsilanti's invasion of
Moldavia on March 6, 1821, reached the tsar at Laibach on the 19th. Al-
though condemning the Moldavian insurrection as a revolutionary move-
ment and disavowing its leader, he opposed collective action. A month later
Demetrios Ypsilanti, Alexander's younger brother, hurled the fire brand
of revolution into the Morea and several of the South Aegean islands, where
the minority Turkish population was slaughtered. The tsar learned of the
6 Metternich to Castlereagh, private letter, Vienna, June 6, 1822, cited by Sir

Charles K. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the
European Alliance (London, 1925), p. 480: Castlereagh to Metternich, Foreign Office,
June 22, 1822, ibid., pp. 480-481; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 205n.
7 Metternich to Castlereagh, Vienna, July 8, 1822, cited by Webster, Castlereagh,
p. 481; Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Aug. 6, 1822, Souvenirs et cor-
respondance tires des papiers de madame Recamier, ed. Amelie Lenormant (Paris,
1859), I, 428. The cabinet intended to keep Castlereagh's mission secret, but Lord
Francis Conyngham, second son of the royal mistress, informed "all the ladies at the
Opera-house." Richard Plantagenet Temple Grenville, Second Duke of Buckingham,
Memoirs of the Court of George IV (London, 1859), 1,355.
Greek revolt on May 13, just before he left Laibach. Both the anti-Ottoman
policy inherited from Catherine the Great and personal sympathy for his
Greek co-religionists made the emperor reluctant to accept Metternich's
suggestion that he condemn the Greek cause as inspired by J acobinism. On
the eve of his departure, Lord Charles Stewart, the British ambassador at
Vienna and an observer at Laibach, and Prince Metternich attempted to
discuss the Greek insurrection with Alexander, but the tsar refused to com-
ment on his intentions regarding the Balkans, since he considered the Turko-
Greek conflict as an issue to be decided solely between Russia and the
Porte and desired, moveover, to keep Austria out of the Balkans. s
By September 1821, the Eastern crisis had so deteriorated that the
cabinets of London and Vienna feared a Russo- Turkish war was imminent.
When the Morea rose in rebellion, Sultan Mabmud II immediately re-
sponded by closing the straits to Greek ships, which carried Russian wheat
from Odessa, and in retaliation for Greek atrocities, J anizaries on April 22,
murdered Gregory, the eighty-four-year-old Patriarch, as he celebrated the
Easter midnight Eucharist. With him perished two archbishops, ten mem-
bers of the Holy Synod, eight priests, and almost the entire congregation.
During May fanatical Turkish mobs massacred thousands of Greeks in
Constantinople, pillaged their churches, and decapitated bishops and priests.
Russian sailors, too, were murdered, their ships insulted, and Danesi, the
banker of the tsar's embassy was arrested. Since these acts of violence con-
stituted flagrant violations of the treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (July 21, 1774)
and Bucharest (May 28, 1812), the Eastern Question now became a Russo-
Ottoman dispute. Baron Gregory Alexandrovitch Stroganov, the Russian
8 The traditional date for the beginning of the Morean uprising is April 6; how-
ever, fighting did not actually commence until April 9. Schroeder, Metternich's
Diplomacy, pp. 165n, 168; Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-
1825 (Durham, N.C., 1947), pp. 388, 409; Cambridge History of British Foreign
Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York, 1922-1923), II (1815-1866), 41;
Maggiolo, Pozzo di Borgo, pp. 265-266. Before leaving Laibach, Alexander instructed
Pozzo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to work toward an alliance with France in
the event he declared war on Turkey. Again, in July 1821, he proposed a Russo-
French alliance to Count de La Ferronays, the French ambassador to Russia, but
Pasquier, the French foreign minister, quickly rejected these overtures. Ibid., p. 266;
La Ferronays to Pasquier, lettre particuliere, St. Petersburg, July 19, 1821, A.A.E.,
Russie: Correspondance, Vol. 161; La Restauration, 1820-1824, Vol. V of Histoire
de mon temps, memoires du chancelier Pasquier, ed. Ie duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier
(Paris, 1894), pp. 342-344; Maurice Bourquin, Histoire de la Sainte Alliance (Geneva,
1954), pp. 303-306. For a scholarly account of the Russian attempts to secure a
French alliance during the summer of 1821, see Albert Sorel, "L'Alliance russe et la
Restauration," Essais d'historie et de critique (2nd ed.; Paris, 1883), pp. 99-112. Pozzo
di Borgo exerted great influence on the tsar and was one of the chief Russian policy-
makers at Troppau, Laibach and Verona.
PROLOGUE 7
ambassador to the Porte, vigorously protested against these horrors and

provocations, and on June 5, after Mohammed Sadik, the Reis-Effendi
(Turkish foreign minister), had ignored his remonstrations, he suspended
diplomatic relations. His dispatches, describing the bloody May days in
Constantinople and Ottoman obstinacy, upon their arrival in st. Petersburg.
caused great resentment against the Turks. 9 On July 18. Stroganov trans-
mitted to the Porte a four-point ultimatum which must be met. if Turkey
were to co-exist with the other states of Europe: (1) The destroyed or pil-
laged Christian churches in Greece must be restored. (2) The Christian
religion must be protected in accordance with treaty provisions. (3) A dis-
tinction must be made between innocent and guilty Greeks in the suppres-
sion of the insurrection. (4) Turkish troops must be evacuated from the
Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), and the hospodars
(princes) re-established. The note also declared that, unless the Porte made
satisfactory reply in a week (huit jours), the tsar's ambassador would be
withdrawn. Failing to receive an answer on the 26th, Stroganov requested
his passports and boarded a Russian frigate in the harbor. Although the
Turkish reply was presented a day later, the ambassador refused to accept
it. After waiting two weeks for his passports, he sailed for Odessa on August
10 without them. That he was allowed to go unmolested was due largely to
the efforts of Percy Smythe, Viscount Strangford, the British ambassador.
and Count Rudolph Liitzow, the Austrian internuncio.1o
Britain and Austria wished to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish
empire at the hands of Russia, and this common interest demanded that
they work together to preserve peace. Their efforts infused new blood into
9 Count Joannes Capo d'Istria, "Apen;:u de rna carriere publique, depuis 1798
jusqu'a 1822," Sbornik Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obschestvo [Collection of the Russian
Historical Society] (hereafter cited as Sbornik), III (1868), 266-268 (This memoire was
addressed to Nicholas I and signed in Geneva, Dec. 24, 1826.); Count Anton von
Prokesch·Osten, Geschichte des Abtalls der Griechen vom Turkischen Reiche im
Jahre 1821 und der Grundung des Hellenischen Konigsreiches aus Diplomatischem
Standpuncte (Vienna, 1867), III, 84-86, 110-111, 113·114, 116; Nesselrode to Stro-
ganov, St. Petersburg, June 28,1821, ibid .• p. 91; ~douard Driault et Michel Lheritier,
Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 a nos jours (Paris, 1923-1925) I, 146·147;
M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London, 1966), p. 60. The last dispatches of
Stroganov from Constantinople are dated June 9, 182l.
10 For the French text of this document, see Prokesch-Osten, Abtall der Griechen.
III, 95-10l. This note, dated June 28, does not bear the name of its author, but ac-
cording to C. W. Crawley, Foreign Minister Capo d'Istria wrote it; see Crawley, The
Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-
1833 (Cambridge, England, 1930), p. 17; Capo d'lstria, "Ma carriere publique,"
Sbornik, III, 267. Driault and Lheritier, Hist. de la Grece, I, 150; Lobanov-Rostovs-
ky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 418; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 356·357.
the Quintuple Alliance, or the "European Pentarchy," to use Metternich's

phrase, because both powers recognized that it offered the best means of
thwarting isolated action by Russia. When Alexander returned to St. Peters-
burg from Laibach in the middle of June 1821, he assured Sir Charles Bagot,
the British ambassador, of his loyalty to the Alliance and his resolve not to
support the Greek insurgents, whom he suspected of being the tools of the
Paris liberals. Though encouraged by this assurance and also by the know-
ledge that the tsar was weary of military campaigns and did not want war,
Castlereagh and Metternich yet were disturbed by his vacillating character.
His loyalties were divided between Europe and Russia. To continue to
ignore the Greek cause or to denounce it as tainted with Jacobinism would
be to disregard traditional Russian interests and religious sentiment and to
offend national honor. The opinion of his court was almost unanimous that
Russia should put an end to the Ottoman Empire. His soldiers, moreover,
were growing impatient of inaction, and their morale was being "under-
mined by revolutionary intrigue." The pro-Greek memoire of Johann An-
cillon, Director of the Political Division of the Prussian Foreign Ministry,
also inspired in the tsar bellicose ideas. Despite his aversion to war, the
enigmatic emperor seemed to be yielding to the demands of the St. Peters-
burg "war party," led by that patriotic Greek, Count Joannes Capo d'Istria.
The moment appeared propitious, for Europe was unwilling to contest
Russia's military preponderance in the Near East. The question of the
tsar's policy in the Greco-Turkish affair, therefore, continued to cause
Austria and Britain grave concern. l1
3. The Hanoverian Rendezvous

As Alexander contemplated the possibility of war with Turkey, time became
an important factor. Realizing the necessity for speeding up the normal
11 Robert Gordon, secretary of the Vienna embassy, to Castlereagh, Laibach, May
13, 1821, Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh,
ed. Charles W. Vane (3rd ser.; London, 1848-1853), IV, 396; Bagot to Castlereagh,
St. Petersburg, June 20, 1821, quoted in Webster, Castlereagh, p. 358-359; Baron
Ludwig von Lebzeltern, Austrian ambassador to Russia, to Metternich, St. Petersburg,
July 3, 1821, Un collaborateur de Metternich: memoires et papiers de Lebzeltern, ed.
Emmanuel de Levis-Mirepoix (Paris, 1949), p. 412; Lebzeltern to Metternich, St.
Petersburg, July 15, 1821, Les rapports diplomatiques de Lebzeltern, ed. Grand Duke
Nicholas Mikhailovitch (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 76; Edouard Driault, La question
d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'{j la paix de Sevres (8th ed.; Paris, 1921), p. 106;
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954), p. 14;
Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 177-178; Camb. Hist. of Brit. For. Pol., II, 41;
Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 58-59. The Ancillon memoire had been published by
Count Bernstorff at the urging of Count David d'Alopeus, the Russian ambassador at
Berlin.
PROLOGUE 9
processes of diplomatic intercourse, which could be done only by a personal

exchange of views, Castlereagh and Metternich agreed to rendezvous in
Hanover during October 1821, when George IV visited his one continental
possession. 12 On October 8, the chancellor confided to Baron Ludwig von
Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambassador to Russia:
I am entirely of the conviction that by my interview with Lord Castlereagh
... I shall achieve more in a few days to settle the general question, to
strengthen the present and to save the future, than in six months of writing.
It is also necessary that I know a little about the English; their role is extremely
influential in the European-Russo-Turko-Greek affair. Only this conviction
could induce me to travel 500 leagues in the space of four weeks at the most. 13
Though invited, Count Christian Gunther von Bernstorff, the Prussian
foreign minister, either could not or would not come. His refusal probably
was due to bitterness against Austrian interference in Prussian affairs and
to a desire to follow an independent policy in the Eastern Question. He did,
however, send Baron von BUlow to Hanover as his personal representative,
but in the eight days of the conference, he took no part in the Castlereagh-
Metternich conversations. a
The tsar, too, was invited, but affairs of state required his constant at-
tention in St. Petersburg. To represent him, he directed to Hanover Count
Christophe de Lieven, his ambassador at London, with a personal message
for George IV.!5 If further inducement were needed to ensure Mettemich's
presence at Hanover, it was supplied by Castlereagh when he invited
Countess Dorothea Lieven. Castlereagh knew the secret of her heart and
thought she would put the chancellor in a more congenial mood. Both the
countess and the prince arrived in Hanover on October 20. Thus the stage
was set for the Hanoverian conference in October 1821, a reunion which
had about it a congress-like atmosphere of festivity, congeniality, and good
company, and an air of optimism that peace could be preserved. 16 Private
12 Entry for Wed., Oct. 3, 1821, Aus dem Nachlass Varnhagen's von Ense: Tage-
bucher von Friedrich von Gentz, ed. Ludmilla Assing (Leipzig, 1873-1874), II, 464;
Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, Oct. 3, 1821, Castlereagh, Corresp., IV, 439-440;
Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 364-365.
13 Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, Oct. 8, 1821, Lebzeltern, Rapports, p. 236.
Baron von Lebzeltem was created count in 1823.
14 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 350; Prokesch-Osten, Abtall der Griechen, III, 336-346,
351-355; Driault and Lh6ritier, Hist. de la Grece, I, 163-165; Webster, Castlereagh,
pp. 363-364.
15 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 349-350. Count Lieven was then in Russia on leave of
absence. The title of Prince was not conferred upon him unti11826.
16 Unpublished Diary and Political Sketches of Princess Lieven, together with
Some of Her Letters, ed. Harold Temperley (London, 1925), pp. 54-55. For an ac-
conversations between Castlereagh and Metternich got underway on Satur-

day, October 20, and their tenor set the mood of cordiality which prevailed
at subsequent conferences. At the first official interview, Monday, October
22, the chancellor outlined Austrian policy in the Eastern crisis in a memo-
randum endorsing "the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing
treaties." Russia must recognize, he asserted, that she is explicitly com-
mitted to the Alliance, and that Austria will continue to give her "moral"
support only so long as Russia does not separate herself from the Alliance.
Austria cannot consider armed intervention, but she will exert her influence
in Constantinople to obtain the acceptance of the tsar's demands. Finally,
any project for a rapprochement with the Porte should come from Russia
herself rather than from Russia's alliesP
Castlereagh unconditionally approved these tenets of Austrian policy, for
he already had expressed similar views in dispatches to Bagot and in a
private letter to the tsar on July] 6, 1821. The two ministers agreed, how-
ever, that a joint declaration would be unwise since such a demarche could
persuade the tsar that a conspiracy or combination against Russia had been
formed at Hanover. Nor must the Russian court think Britain and Austria
needed a conference to agree on fundamental aims. Castlereagh and Met-
ternich, therefore, sent separate dispatches to St. Petersburg and Constan-
tinople. Castlereagh transmitted the necessary instructions to Bagot and
Strangford on Sunday, October 28, and Metternich followed suit on the 31st.
While identical in purpose, these notes differed in emphasis, as required by
the special interests of each nation. Both governments were motivated by a
common fear that Russian intervention in behalf of the Greeks would lead
to the overthrow of Turkey and, thereby, to Russian hegemony in the
Balkans and the Near East. This ascendancy would upset the balance of
power in Europe, a contingency that must be avoided.1 8
count of Madame Lieven's first meeting with Metternich and their love affair, see
ibid., pp. 48-55, and H. Montgomery Hyde, Princess Lieven (Boston, 1938), pp. 101-
108.
17 Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, F. 0., Continent: Hanover,
92/47 (This dispatch is 139 pages in length; copies marked "Circular" also were
sent to Berlin, Paris, and Vienna.); Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 129; Metternich to
Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 24 and 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 553, 555, and
558; private letter, Hanover, Oct. 25, 1821, ibid., p. 509; Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol.,
II, 43. Metternich's note was based on his last dispatches to Constantinople and St.
Petersburg, copies of which had just been brought to Hanover by a special courier.
18 Castlereagh to the Emperor Alexander I, London, July 16, 1821, Castlereagh,
Corresp., IV, 404-408; Mettemich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 24 and 29, 1821, Metter-
nich, Memoires, III, 555, 557-558; Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, Oct. 28,
1821, F. 0., Continent: Hanover, 92/47; Sir Archibald Alison, Lives of Lord Castle-
reagh and Sir Charles Stewart (Edinburgh, 1861), III, 163; Webster, Castlereagh, pp.
PROLOGUE 11
The arrival of Count Lieven in Hanover on October 28 was a matter of

great import to Castlereagh and Metternich, for he brought from St. Peters-
burg the assurance that Alexander was not planning a declaration of war on
Turkey. These glad tidings prompted Metternich to boast: "Everything that
I have heard from Count Lieven shows me that the ... Tsar still remains in
the same mind as he was at Laibach." 19 The chancellor was convinced that
Alexander desired peace but did not know how to reconcile its preservation
with what he regarded as his honor.26
Anglo-Austrian efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East did
not end with sending instructions to St. Petersburg and Constantinople.
Austria and Britain also pressed Berlin and Paris to fall into line behind
them, and in this, their diplomacy was successful. To find a solution to the
Russo-Turkish impasse, Castlereagh and Metternich also agreed at Han-
over to hold a conference at Vienna in September 1822, just before the
Congress of Florence (the original site of the meeting later shifted to Ve-
rona). The presence of the tsar was urged, but it was not at all certain he
would attend. Britain and Austria, nonetheless, regarded a reunion of the
powers as imperative, not only to refuse intervention in the name of the
Alliance, but also to deny Russia the right of separate interference: the
attention of Russia must be turned from the Southeast. Consequently, the
two statesmen decided "to humour him by appealing to his idealism and
reminding him of his solemn engagements to Europe." 21
Confronted with the "alternative of offending the sentiment of his people
or bringing down in ruin the whole edifice of his international ideal," the
tsar chose the former. He deferred to his allies and agreed in June 1822 to
attend the Vienna conference. Thus the danger of separate intervention by
Russia was postponed.22
375-379. Capo d'Istria was perfectly aware of the real motives behind the Anglo-
Austrian mediation. Capo d'Istria, "Ma carriere publique," Sbornik, III, 275-277.
19 Quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 131.
20 Metternich to Liitzow, Vienna, Oct. 5, 1821, Prokesch-Osten, Abfall der
Griechen, III, 207; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Metternich,
Memoires, III, 558-559; Metternich to Lebzeltern, Hanover, Oct. 31, 1821, Lebzeltern,
Rapports, p. 238; Leon de Crousaz - Cretet, Le duc de Richelieu en Russie et en
France, 1766-1822 (Paris, 1897), p. 475.
21 Metternich to Count Stephan Zichy, Austrian ambassador to Prussia, Vienna,
Mar. 25, 1822, Prokesch-Osten, Abfall der Griechen, III, 355; Metternich to Strang-
ford, Vienna, July 31, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 600; Maggiolo, Pozzo di
Borgo, pp. 265-266; Myrna Boyce, Diplomatic Relations of England with the
Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830, University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences,
VII, 52; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 380.
22 W. A. Phillips, Confederation of Europe (London, 1920), p. 226; Lobanov-
Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 421. Metternich received word from
Castlereagh, however, did not commit himself at Hanover to attend

either the Vienna conference or the Florentine congress because Parliament
of late had displayed an increasing animosity to the "entangling Alliance"
with autocratic continental sovereigns. Despite the fact that he had no as-
surance of Britain's presence either at Vienna or Florence, Metternich
boasted to his master: "1 have the conviction that next year we shall have
Lord Londonderry at the congress which will meet in Italy." But the
London cabinet, it will be recalled, waited nine months before agreeing to
send a plenipotentiary only to Vienna. 28
The Hanover conference ended on the optimistic note which Lieven had
sounded on October 28. Assured by the Russian diplomat that the tsar had
no plans for a Turkish war in the spring, George N and Castlereagh de-
parted for England the next day, and Metternich left for Vienna on the 31st.
The king and his minister returned to London on November 8, and the
chancellor reentered the Austrian capital on the 15th, having spent four
day with the Lievens at Frankfurt.24
In retrospect, Anglo-Austrian diplomacy during September and October
1821 indicated that both Castlereagh and Metternich wanted an inter-
national conference on the Eastern Question, but, as a result of the Prussian
and Russian refusal to send plenipotentiaries to Hanover, they had to settle
for a bi-Iateral rendezvous. But this conference, though reduced to an inter-
view, had several significant results. It paved the way to Verona for both
Russia and Britain, and its decisions on the Eastern Question reversed the
Troppau Protocol (November 19, 1820), which sanctioned intervention in
the internal affairs of independent states. Far from being a universal re-
actionary, or even a European statesman (as Heinrich von Srbik, Hans
Rieben, and others have contended), Metternich appears in the role of a
Lebzeltern on June 14, 1822, that Alexander would come to the Vienna conference
early in September. On August 1, he learned that the tsar expected to arrive in Vienna
on September 7. Private letters, Metternich, Memoires, III, 580,597.
23 Temperley, Canning, p. 7; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821,
Metternich Memoires, III, 559. See Castlereagh's letters to Stewart on Feb. 24 and
Oct. 15, 1820; Jan. 5 and Mar. 13, 1821, published for the first time in Alison, Castle-
reagh and Stewart, III, 215n-217n, 223n. These dispatches, taken from the London-
derry MSS. still in the possession of the family, all emphasize Castlereagh's con-
viction that England could not act in concert with her allies for six months "unless
the mind of the nation was in the cause." "If they suppose we can," he confided to
his half-brother, "they deceive themselves." Castlereagh to Stewart, London, Feb. 24,
1820, in ibid., p. 215n.
24 Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, XCI (Nov. 1821), 460-461;
Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 553;
Lieven, Diary, p. 55; entry for Fri., Nov. 16, 1821, Gentz, Tagebiicher, II, 477.
PROLOGUE 13
good Austrian, motivated by concern for purely Habsburg interests. 25 His

diplomacy in the Russo-Turkish-Greek affair clearly reveals how Austria,
no less than Britain, pursued national interests at Constantinople. Even as
they tried to hide the collective character of the Alliance from the sultan,
they reminded the tsar of his solemn obligations to it. And their influence
in Berlin and Paris soon persuaded these courts to support Anglo-Austrian
policy. Finally, the Hanoverian rendezvous resulted in a renewal of the
cordial relations between Castlereagh and Metternich which had been
strained since the apparent break: with the Alliance at Troppau. The foreign
secretary, indeed, confided to Countess Lieven that he was anxious to attend
the Vienna conference, prologue to the Congress of Verona, in order to see
the chancellor. But to the average Englishman, perhaps its most important
achievement was the grouping of Britain once more with the autocratic
eastern powers. 26
4. The Shift from Castlereagh to Canning
During the summer of 1822, Castlereagh began failing in mind and body,
despite his appearance. Hard work, the long and hectic Parliamentary ses-
sion, the harassment of foreign affairs, constant quarreling with his wife
about her hostile attitude toward Elizabeth Denison, Marchioness Conyng-
ham, the new royal mistress, and blackmail, all took their tragic toll: shortly
after 7:30 A.M. on Monday, August 12, Castlereagh committed suicide by
severing one of his carotid arteries with a small penknife.27
25 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (Mu-
nich, 1925), I, 350-420, '456-463; II, 559-566; Srbik, "Der Ideengehalt des Metternich-
schen Systems," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXI (1925), 240-262; Arnold O. Meyer,
"Der Streit urn Metternich," ibid., CLVII (1938), 75-84; Schroeder, Metternich's
Diplomacy, pp. 240-241; Schroeder, "Metternich Studies since 1925," JMH, XXXIII,
No.3 (Sept. 1%1),237-239. The "others" include Algenon Cecil, Constatin de Grun-
wald, Hugo Hantsch, Arthur Herman, Henry A. Kissinger, and Werner NiH.
26 Sir John A. R. Marriott, Castlereagh: The Political Life of Robert, Second
Marquess of Londonderry (London, 1936), pp. 311-312; Alison, Castlereagh and
Stewart, III, 145-146; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 309; Mme Lieven to Metternich,
London, Nov. 30, 1821, Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich,
1820-1826, ed. and trans. Peter Quennell (London, 1937), p. 142.
27 Wellington to Dr. Charles Bankhead, London, Aug. 9, 1822 in "Obituary: Mar-
quis of Londonderry," Gentleman's Magazine, XCII (Sept. 1822), 179; "The British
Chronicle," Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany: A New Series of the Scots
Magazine, XI (Sept. 1822), 390; Hyde, Princess Lieven, pp. 136, 139-140; Alison,
Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 178; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 482-483. Hyde concludes
that there was, indeed, a conspiracy, as Castlereagh had claimed, that he was being
blackmailed by "some villains" who threatened to denounce him as a homosexual,
but that the charge was absolutely false. The secretary, who occasionally indulged
For three weeks following his death, the cabinet was deadlocked on the
issue of a successor. Thanks largely to the initiative of Wellington, it was
agreed finally that an offer to George Canning was necessary. Neither the
king nor the ministers liked Canning, distrusting both his motives and his
policies, but they loved power more than they disliked him. The government
needed his services and the support of his friends. 28 Wellington succeeded
in mollifying George IV, and on September 9, Prime Minister Robert Banks
Jenkinson, second Earl of Liverpool, proffered the post of Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs. But Canning refused this proposal with the comment
that he would have "the whole heritage" of Castlereagh or nothing at all;
i.e., he wanted also the leadership of the House. On the 11 th, he was offered
"the whole heritage"; the 15th he accepted it, and on the 16th, he received
from the king the portfolio of the Foreign Office. After entering the royal
service, Canning quipped that he felt as though he had been given a ticket
for Almack's, and then had found written on the back: "Admit the rogue." 29
Although Castlereagh was dead, the reasons which required his presence
in Vienna remained. With regret, he had witnessed the Alliance move away
from England. At Troppau and Laibach the Quasi.Quintuple Alliance had
himself in brothels, "had been deliberately entrapped" by a youth disguised as a

woman. As the boy undressed, his confederates rushed into the room and accused
Castlereagh "of being about to commit" a homosexual offense. The victim thus was
impaled on the horns of a cruel dilemna: on the one hand, he feared condemnation
for a crime he did not commit, and on the other, he dreaded going to the authorities
lest his real sin of adultery be disclosed to his wife. To the distraught Castlereagh,
suicide appeared the only recourse. Both Wellington and Clanwilliam knew the true
circumstances of the case. Hyde, Strange Death of Lord Castlereagh (London, 1959),
pp. 15, 182-190. For a recent criticism of Hyde's blackmail theory, see Christopher
John Bartlett, Castlereagh (New York, 1966), p. 263.
28 Temperley, "Canning, Wellington, and George IV," English Historical Review
(hereafter cited as EHR), XXXVIII (1923), 210; Wellington to Lady Emily London-
derry, London, Sept. 7, 1822, Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field
Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., ed. his son Arthur Richard Wellesley
(London, 1867-1880) (hereafter cited as Well. Desp.), 1,277-278.
29 Wellington to George IV, London, Sept. 7, 1822, ibid., p. 274; Marcellus, first
secretary of the French embassy in London, to Chateaubriand, London, Sept. 15 and
24, 1822, Count Andre Charles Demartin du Tyrac de Marcellus, Politique de la
Restauration en 1822 et 1823 (Paris, 1853), pp. 91-92; A. Aspinall, "The Canningite
Party," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser. (hereafter cited as
TRHS), XVII (1933-1934), 205; Temperley, Canning, p. 30; Hyde, Princess Lieven,
pp. 143-144. Philip Guedalla, Wellington (New York, 1931), p. 333; Richard Alding-
ton, The Duke: Being an Account of the Life and Achievements of Arthur Wellesley,
First Duke of Wellington (New York, 1943), p. 288. On September 16, Lord Henry
Bathurst, acting foreign secretary, sent a circular to the British diplomatic corps
throughout the world, announcing Canning's ascendancy. Bathurst circular, Foreign
Office, Sept. 16, 1822, F. 0., Austria, 120/54. This dispatch reached Lord Charles
Stewart in Vienna on September 25.
PROLOGUE 15
been formed. a rump alliance of the three eastern powers, based on prin-
ciples of despotism and intervention which conflicted with those of Parlia-
mentary government and non-intervention held by Britain. 3o As early as
April 1820. Metternich had admitted this shift in the political equilibrium
of Europe. confiding to Baron Karl von Vincent. the Austrian ambassador
at the Tuileries:
It is no longer in the form of the Quadruple Alliance that we can seek ...
remedies .... We must remake it today and the elements are no longer the
same. . . . It is impossible to count on the assent of England. Of all faults in
politics, those which bear the bitterest fruits are changes of system. 31
Castlereagh was the chief architect of the Alliance. and from its use he had
obtained advantages for England. Consequently he had been reluctant to
break entirely with the Confederation of Europe and had determined to
have one more try at bringing it back to its original purpose. This attempt
was scheduled for Vienna in September 1822. Britain's special interests in
the Near East demanded. moreover, that she cooperate with Austria in
mediating the Russo-Turkish dispute. So far as this issue was concerned, the
Vienna conference appeared to Canning, as it had to CastIereagh, a sequel
to that at Hanover. 32
The two statesmen, nonetheless, were poles apart in their attitude toward
the Alliance. Castlereagh had hoped to reform it, Canning to destroy it and
to reassert the diplomacy of isolation as Pitt had practiced it before the
Napoleonic wars to preserve the European balance of power. The govern-
ment. Canning argued. would only provoke further criticism from the public
if it attended another conference with foreign autocrats. Canning. in short.
differed from CastIereagh on several fundamentals of policy. Even after
Troppau and Laibach, CastIereagh had continued to urge close cooperation
30 Augustus Granville Stapleton. Political Life of the Right Honourable George

Canning (2nd ed.; London. 1831). II. 36 (Stapleton was Canning's private secretary.);
Harriet Martineau. A History of the Thirty Year's Peace: 1816-1846 (London, 1877).
I (1816-1824), 397; Temperley, Canning, pp. 47-48; Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 143;
William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and the 1ndependence of Latin America, 1804-
1828 (New Haven, Conn., 1951), pp. 133, 142; Marriott, Castlereagh, p. 342; Foun-
dations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or Documents,
Old and New, ed. H. W. V. Temperley and L. M. Penson (Cambridge, England.
1938), p. 54.
31 Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, April 7, 1820, quoted in Temperley, Canning,
p. 21. The italics are those of Metternich.
32 1bid., pp. 8-9; Webster. Castlereagh, pp. 480-481, 499-501; cf. Spencer Walpole,
History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815 (London, 1890),
II, 127.
with Europe, while Canning favored a policy of isolation. Castlereagh had

advocated neutrality and mediation in the Eastern Question, but Canning,
by March 1823, had established the novel policy of restraining Russia
through joining her as a co-champion of Greek independence. The tenets of
Canning's political philosophy were also less aristocratic, more liberal, than
those of Castlereagh. Canning's use of the press and public opinion revealed
another difference of principle, and at times he needed public support
against the king and his opponents in the cabinet. lI3
After 1816 most of Castlereagh's countrymen either opposed or ignored
his program for maintaining European peace. Beset by numerous domestic
economic and political troubles, they favored a policy of isolation from
European problems and dangers. Englishmen manifested, moreover, a uni-
versal contempt for foreigners, whether allied or enemy. An all embracing
arrogance permeated and characterized "British popular foreign policy."
All classes treated Russians, Spaniards, and Austrians as contemptuously
as they did the French. Castlereagh knew, of course, that most of his coun-
trymen did not support his policy of cooperation with the allies and de-
spaired of making it intelligible to them. Despite his prominent position in
the cabinet and the Commons, Castlereagh, throughout his career, "was
impatient of Parliamentary criticism and that of public opinion general-
ly." 34 William W. Kaufmann sums up the dilemma thus:
The reconciliation of such a general purpose as peace with the insistent and
often contrary demands of domestic politics is a task from which most states-
men shrink, and few emerge with credit or dignity.35
33 Temperley, Canning, p. 48; Webster and Temperley, "British Policy in the

Publication of Diplomatic Documents under Castlereagh and Canning," Cambridge
Historical Journal (hereafter cited as CHI), I (1923-1925), No.2 (1924), 165-168;
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XII (1822),651; Parliamentary Debates, new ser.,
ed. T. C. Hansard (hereafter cited as ParI. Debates), IV (1821), 722-773, 1368, 1370;
V (1821), 516; Temperley, Canning, pp. 32-34,48; Trevelyan, British History, pp. 207,
213; "Appendix: Selections from the Writings of Canning," Select Speeches of the
Right Honourable George Canning, ed. Robert Walsh (Philadelphia, 1835), pp.
541-542. Canning possessed a brilliant wit which enabled him to gain and keep public
support throughout his lifetime. Indeed, one of his political opponents, Sir James
Mackintosh, complained that he "had the orator's craving for popular applause."
Quoted in Col. E. M. Lloyd, "Canning and Spanish America," TRHS, new seT.,
XVIII (1903-1904), 80.
M Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHJ, I, 159; cf. Raymond
Postgate and Aylmer Vallance, England Goes to Press: The English People's Opinion
on Foreign Affairs as Reflected in Their Newspapers since Waterloo, 1815-1937
(Indianapolis, Ind., 1937), p. 14; Memoirs of George IV, ed. Robert Huish (London,
1830), II, 344, 357, 358.
35 Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 103.
PROLOGUE 17
The foreign secretary's eagerness to establish cordial relations with the
continental powers, especially Austria, led him occasionally to sanction acts
which he could not defend in the House. On such occasions he withheld
information, fearing that the ensuing debates would injure diplomatic re-
lations. To reveal too much of the policy of the allied courts could widen
the breach between them and Britain. By preference, he protested privately
in his dispatches to Britain's representatives on the continent. He did appeal
to public opinion, however, when the three eastern powers "deliberately
challenged his conception of the Alliance and threatened to wreck all his
schemes by ... using it ... as a wholly unnecessary instrument to put down
revolution in Naples." 36
In the case of the Circular of January 19, 1821, protesting the Troppau
Protocol, Castlereagh tried to carry Parliament with him, but after issuing
it, he did not exploit the situation. Again he resumed his normal relations
with the other great powers and thereby "his ceaseless and secret efforts to
use the Alliance to prevent Russia from invading Turkey." 37 He rarely
tried to convince Parliament with evidence or to appeal to public opinion.
Canning, who was quite sensitive to public opinion, differed from Castle-
reagh and Wellington in believing it absolutely necessary for foreign policy
to be both "intelligible and popular." He published state papers freely,
though he sometimes edited dispatches which he laid before the Commons.
He had a concept of the public and Parliament for which his predecessor
had no sympathy and little understanding. Even Sir Archibald Alison,
despite his high Toryism and partiality, admits that Castlereagh did not
correctly judge the trend of his times. He was a Parliamentary rather than a
popular statesman; Canning was both. Castlereagh's system of government
was becoming distasteful to the nation, and he probably would have fallen
from power had he lived even two years longer. 38
The keynote of Canning's policy was that "the public and private aspects
of diplomacy must be the same." He did not think Britain should attend
congresses at all and published a series of dispatches on the Congress of
Verona to discredit the Congress System, an action which prompted Wel-
lington to complain to Liverpool that Canning's publicity program made it
impossible for the cabinet to reach independent decisions as it should. From
across the channel, Metternich protested to the "Iron Duke" that the new
foreign secretary was a revolutionary who would sacrifice legitimate insti-
tutions to a "search after vain popularity." To such remonstrances, Canning
36 Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHI, 1,159-160.

37 Ibid., p. 160.
38 Temperley, Canning, p. 48; Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 187-188.
might have answered that the principle of ministerial responsibility did not
permit the cabinet to be independent of Parliament, nor commercial inter-
ests, nor the nation. 39
Now rehabilitated, Castlereagh the Statesman, like Marco Vida's poet,
has survived "his moldering monument," the Alliance, and has emerged
with credit from the obloquy which stigmatized him while he was yet alive.
But as George M. Trevelyan has observed: "The extreme eulogists of
Castlereagh, who would have it that he initiated all that was good in Can-
ning's policy, are doing a great injustice to Canning, who also has his
rights." 40
39 Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHJ, I, 166-168; Welling-

ton to Liverpool, London, Mar. 5,1824, Well. Desp., II, 229.
40 Trevelyan, British History, p. 208n.
CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO VIENNA
Let our object be our country, our whole country, and

nothing but our country. - Daniel Webster.1
1. The Castlereagh Instructions
The keynote of the memorandum which Castlereagh had drafted for his
own guidance at Vienna was non-intervention. This tenet had been the basis
of British policy since November 1818, when Castlereagh had declared at
Aix-Ia-Chapelle that the Alliance had no right to intervene in the internal
affairs of an independent state. In this case he was referring to the question
of Spain and her rebellious colonies, in which England was vitally interested.
In February 1820, he reaffirmed that the allies "must not. . . press us to
place ourselves on any ground John Bull will not maintain." Throughout
1820 and 1821, he intoned this same theme: No nation has the right to
intervene in the internal affairs of another; the Alliance was not established
for that purpose. 2 Castlereagh's instructions for the Vienna conference.
therefore. were but another application of a long established principle of
British foreign policy. Castlereagh. indeed. stated that "with respect to
1 Daniel Webster, "Address on Laying the Cornerstone of the Bunker Hill Monu-
ment, 1825," Familiar Quotations, ed. John. Bartlett, p. 530.
2 The exception is the Neapolitan revolution of July 1820; in this case, Castlereagh
secretly sanctioned Austrian intervention in the hope that he could dissuade Metter-
nich from making an appeal to the Alliance for support. Castlereagh to Stewart,
Foreign Office, July 29, 1820, F.O., Austria, 7/148. Castlereagh to Stewart, private,
London, July 30, 1820, F.O., Howard de Walden Papers, 360/2; Webster, Castle-
reagh, pp. 261-262; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 119; Castlereagh to
Stewart, London, Feb. 24, 1820, Londonderry MSS, published in Alison, Castlereagh
and Stewart, III, 215n; Lord Castlereagh's Confidential State Paper of May 5th,
1820, Temperley and Penson, Found. of Brit. Pol., pp. 51-63; cf. Marriott, Castle-
reagh, pp. 311-312. This paper is published also in Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol., II,
Appendix A, 622-633, which encloses in brackets the parts omitted by Canning in his
abridgment of this note for Parliament. "Additional Papers Relative to Spain," ParI.
Debates, new ser., VIII (1823), 1136-1139. The original document is in F.O., Austria,
7/148.
Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto
pursued." 3
The major issues which Castlereagh expected would be discussed at Vien-
na were: the Turkish Question, internal and external; the Spanish Question,
European and American; and the affairs of Italy.
British policy toward Turkey was a continuation of the course followed
in conjunction with Austria since April 1821. The tenets of this policy were
respect for treaty obligations, the prevention of war between Russia and
the Porte, amelioration of the hardships and horrors of the Greco-Turkish
war, and observance of strict neutrality. An attempt should be made to
reconcile differences arising from Russian protection of Orthodox Chris-
tians in Turkey and over navigation of the Straits. If this effort succeeded in
preventing a Russo-Turkish war, the problem of Greece might be discussed
but with great caution. Castlereagh warned that Greece had gained so much
in the last year that it would be difficult to avoid dealing with the provisional
government; Britain, however, should refrain either from recognizing
Greece or forcing Greek submission to the Porte, and not commit herself
beyond the limits of good offices. 4
Regarding Spain, Castlereagh observed that "solicitude for the safety
of the royal family, observance of ... engagements with Portugal, and a
rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country"
must form the basis of British policy. Spain should be permitted to settle
her own problems, free from foreign interference. Especially must this view
be urged on France. On his way to Vienna, the British representative should
reach an entente with the French government on the Spanish Question. 5
The brevity of Castlereagh's reference to Spain should not be interpreted
as an indication that he misjudged the importance of the Spanish Question.
During June and July 1822, conversations with Count Lieven and Viscount
Fran~ois Rene de Chateau briand, the French ambassador at London, and
dispatches from Metternich, all had made it obvious to Castlereagh that
the Spanish situation would be the great issue at Vienna. No amplification
of his instructions regarding Spain was necessary, because the position of
both the Austrian and French cabinets was uncertain, and because Castle-
reagh planned to attend the Vienna conference. He wished to reserve judg-
ment on this critical question until he had all the facts, and then, of course,
he meant to make the decision himself. Before the congresses of Vienna
and Aix-Ia-Chapelle, CastIereagh had followed the same practice in drafting
3 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 286.

4 Ibid., p. 285-286.
Ii Ibid., p.286.
instructions for his own use. Had those written at the end of July 1822 been
for anyone else, they certainly would have been more detailed and different-
ly worded. 6
On the subject of Spanish America, Castlereagh distinguished between
three classes of colonies: those struggling for their independence, those
negotiating with the mother country for recognition, and those which al-
ready had won their fight for freedom. Since Spain had lost control of the
greater part of her South American colonies, he believed that their re-
cognition as independent states was only a question of time. Already the
navigation laws had been modified to admit their merchant ships to British
ports. The British representative should propose
that every province which has actually established its independence should be
recognized; that with provinces in which the war still went on, no relations
should be established; and that where negotiations are in progress between a
revolted colony and the mother country, relations with the colony should be
suspended till the results of such negotiations are known. 7
There is no mistaking the commercial motivation behind British interest in

Latin America. If the occasion arose, the British plenipotentiary should
state that commercial intercourse had existed between Great Britain and
the Spanish American empire for a number of years. This trade could not
be obstructed or checked without arousing discontent in British manu~
facturing and commercial circles; in its last session, Parliament had deferred
to these vested interests by relaxing the provision of the Navigation Act
which excluded all South American produce, except in British ships.
Britain's duty toward the Spanish colonies was to bring the allied cabinets
to the adoption of a common policy, while leaving to the London cabinet
complete freedom of action. 8
6 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, London, July 16, 1822, Count Adhemar d'An-
tioche, Chateau briand, ambassadeur a Londres (1822), d'apres ses depeches inedites
(Paris, 1912), p. 315; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 476-478; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance,
p.324.
7 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., J, 286-287.
8 Ibid., p. 287. In 1815 the United States Congress gave the President power to
sign reciprocity treaties with those foreign governments which abolished discrimi-
natory regulations and duties on American vessels. On May 3, 1815, the Liverpool
Ship Owners Association, quoting the provisions of the American Act, petitioned the
Board of Trade to introduce a similar bill in Parliament; but for six years no action
was taken.
The United States, meanwhile, promoted British commercial reform by negotiating
reciprocal trade agreements with Britain's competitors on the continent of Europe
and by actively pursuing other tactics which reduced English trade and carriage. By
progressively increasing tariffs in 1816, 1818, 1819, and 1824, passing retaliatory
navigation laws in 1817, 1818, and 1820, competing successfully in the East Indies,
In July 1822, Castlereagh, while preparing his instructions, had informed

Wellington of his Latin American policy, emphasizing that it was exclusively
Anglo-Spanish, independent of the approval or disapproval of other nations.
Spain should be fully informed before any of her colonies were recognized,
but there should be no concert with France, Russia, or any other foreign
power.9
By contrast, Castlereagh considered the affairs of Italy of secondary im-
portance. He did not think the kings of Sardinia and Naples were ready to
dispense with Austrian forces, and Italian politics did not interest him.
Consequently, he dismissed Italy with the brief comment that, since Britain
had not been a party to the decisions reached at Troppau and Laibach
(which led to Austrian intervention in Naples and Piedmont), the British
plenipotentiary should merely observe, taking care that nothing was done
"inconsistent with the general system of Europe and the observance of
treaties." 1(1
In addition to these major problems, Castlereagh laid stress on the slave
trade, the Austrian debt, and the Russian Ukase of September 16 (N.S.),
1821, which interdicted foreign vessels from the waters bordering Russian
territory in the North Pacific. l l
and by smuggling into the West Indies, the United States assailed Britain's pre-
eminent commercial position. The American depression of 1818-1819 and the conse-
quent reduction of imports from England accounted for more than half of the British
export loss during those years. Britain herself, by attempting to saturate Europe with
manufactured goods and by maintaining, and even increasing in postwar years, her
own commercial restrictions, helped to create this situation. At last in 1821, Thomas
Wallace, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, took the first step toward initiating a
new free trade policy by introducing in the Commons five reforms of the mercantilist
navigation statutes. A year later (June 24, 1822), all of his proposals became law.
Thus United States policy was instrumental in causing Britain to adopt reciprocity,
but it was not the sole factor. Other fundamental causes were: (1) the international
depression and the pursuant British petitions for reform, (2) the competition and
retaliation of European powers which resorted to methods used successfully by the
United States, (3) the plight of the British West Indies which looked to America as a
source of needed agricultural products and as a major market, (4) the ambition of
British manufacturers to expand trade with Latin America, (5) the tradition of Pitt
apparent in the policies of liberal Toryism, (6) the philosophical influence of the
Enlightenment, and (7) the composition of Parliament which favored business inter-
ests. Vigneron Christophe, "The Reciprocity System," For. Qu. Rev., IX (May 1832),
267-268; Walpole, History of England, II, 154-155; Robert Lee Ellis, "The United
States and the British Reciprocity System, 1815-1825" (Unpublished Master's thesis,
North Texas State University, 1964), pp. 130-131,151.
9 Castlereagh to Wellington, London, July 6, 1822, quoted in Alison, Castlereagh
and Stewart, III, 171; Castlereagh'sInstructions, Well. Desp., I, 287.
10 Ibid., p. 285.
11 Ibid., p. 286.
The pacific character of Castlereagh's instructions - which stands in

contrast to the conspiracies and insurrections that convulsed Europe and the
New World in 1822 - indicates that he did not try to promote "universal
national independence," as Alison has contended. On the contrary, he
advocated non-intervention toward Latin America, Italy, and Greece. He
indeed favored the recognition of new states in South America, but only
when their governments were tully established. and he was no friend of
Greek independence. 12 British policy was motivated by national and com-
mercial interests, not by a crusading zeal for self-detennination. Both
Castlereagh and Canning by their pragmatic diplomacy incurred the enmity
and distrust of the continental powers. a factor which contributed to the
develpoment of British "splendid isolation" in the nineteenth century.
2. The Wellington Mission
After Castlereagh's death, Count Lieven called on Prime Minister Liverpool

to inquire who would be sent to the continent in his place: "The man is
dead, but the reasons which necessitated his presence at ... Vienna are
still there. Will someone be sent, and who?" 13 The Duke of Wellington
seemed the logical choice: he had been on familiar tenns with the allied
sovereigns and ministers since the congresses of Vienna and Aix-Ia-Chapelle
and had enonnous prestige throughout Europe. The duke was still in Eng-
land, due to an attack of influenza which had prevented his departure for
the Netherlands (August 9) on his annual inspection of the Dutch fortresses.
On August 17, he received the king's command to attend the Vienna con-
ference. He promptly accepted this mission, but continued illness delayed
his departure until September 17. Castlereagh's instructions, meanwhile,
received the approval of the cabinet and were transmitted to his Grace by
Lord Henry Bathurst, acting foreign secretary, on September 14,14
The news of Wellington's appointment delighted Mettemich, for he had
secretly requested tlle duke's presence as the "only man who can in a
12 Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 171-172.

13 Quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven. p. 143.
14 G. N. Wright, Life and Campaigns of Arthur. Duke of Wellington, K.G. (Lon-
don, 1841), IV, 127; Aldington, The Duke. pp. 288, 389; Guedalla, Wellington. p. 333;
Wellington to King George IV, London, Aug. 18, 1822, Well. Desp .• 1,258; Bathurst
to Wellington, Downing Street, Sept. 14, 1822, ibid., I, 284; Bathurst to Stewart, No.
12, Foreign Office, Sept. 5, 1822, P.O. Austria, 120/54; Temperley, Canning, p. 53.
Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834), held the official position of Secretary
of State for War and the Colonies in the Liverpool ministry. During the interim
between Castlereagh's death and Canning's appointment (August 12-September 16,
1822), he served as acting foreign secretary.
measure replace" Castlereagh. Realizing that the latter's death would cause
a delay in the sending of a British representative to Vienna, the Austrian
chancellor offered to delay this conference until the Congress of Verona
had ended, but the London cabinet declined this proposal, because it wanted
the negotiations completed prior to the opening of Parliament on February
4, 1823. With the results before the ministers, they could better defend their
policy before that body. They especially were anxious to settle the Austrian
debt in order to meet the criticism of the Opposition. The cabinet could not
take the chance of postponing the Vienna conference until after that of
Verona. 15
When Wellington left England for the continent, Canning had been in
office less than forty-eight hours. If the new foreign secretary had had any-
thing to do with the appointment, the duke probably would not have been
chosen. Relations between the two never had been cordial. Wellington could
not forget that Canning was only half noble and that his mother had been
an actress. The duke, moreover, was an ultra-Tory whose conservative prin-
ciples drew him toward Metternich's political system. The views of Wel-
lington and Canning on foreign policy differed in two important respects:
(1) The duke did not wish to break with the Alliance at the Vienna con-
ference, if he could help it, while such a rupture would have delighted the
foreign secretary; (2) Canning believed it absolutely necessary for foreign
policy to be understandable and popular, while Wellington was highly criti-
cal of his chief's publicity program which he believed prevented the cabinet
from reaching independent decisions. Finally, the "Iron Duke" was handi-
capped in performing the duties of a constitutional statesman. By nature
and training he found it difficult to compromise; he was a soldier, not a
diplomat, and since Waterloo, he had been practically immune to criticism.
Canning would hardly have chosen such a man to carry out his aim of
wrecking the Alliance.16
After crossing the channel, Wellington's first stop was Paris and an inter-
view with Villele, the new French premier.
15 Stewart to Bathurst, No.2, Vienna, Sept. 4, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Bathurst
to Stewart, No. 12, Foreign Office, Sept. 5, 1822, ibid.; private letter, Aug. 25, 1822,
Metternich, Memoires, III, 584; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 608.
16 Capt. J. E. S. Green, "Wellington, Boislecomte, and the Congress of Verona,
1822," TRHS, 4th ser., I (1918), 72-73; G. R. Stirling Taylor, "George Canning,"
English Political Portraits of the Nineteenth Century (Boston, 1929), pp. 56-57, 91;
Temperiey, Canning, pp. 31, 34, 48, 53, 486; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer.,
p. 140; Susan Buchan, The Sword of State: Wellington after Waterloo (New York,
1928), pp. 52-53.
3. The Ascendancy of Villele
On December 12, 1821, the moderate ministry of the Duke of Richelieu

had fallen to be replaced three days later by an ultra-Royalist cabinet whose
members were drawn from the party of Monsieur (Count of Artois), its
principal architectP Although Count Jean Baptiste Joseph de Villele,
minister of finance, and Count Jacques Joseph de Corbiere, minister of the
interior, were the two dominant members of the Royal Council, LouiS
XVIII did not designate a president until September 1822. Meanwhile,
confusion and discord, the inevitable results of lack of leadership, divided
the French cabinet and especially attended th.e ministerial meeting of August
26 at which Viscount Mathieu Jean de Montmorency, the foreign minister,
virtually chose himself to head the French delegation to the Vienna confer-
ence. Villele opposed sending an envoy of plenipotentiary status to Vienna,
but his influence was not sufficient to prevent it. Since the allied sovereigns
and their ministers would be there, nothing less than a representative of
cabinet rank would do.1 8
Neither Villele nor the king was pleased by Montmorency's nomination
for this mission, because of his belligerent attitude toward Spain. The
majority of the council, moreover, enjoined the foreign minister not to take
the initiative in any discussion of the Spanish situation and to reserve for
France independence of action, if that question were raised by others. On
August 29, 1822, Montmorency left Paris, refusing to be guided by any
17 Pasquier, Mernoires, V, 410-411; Rev. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, La

Restauration (Paris, 1955), pp. 238, 240-242; see "Le second ministere du duc de
Richelieu: fragment d'autobiographie, 1819-1821," Revue historique, XXXVII (mai-
aout, 1888), 100-137; "La chute du second ministere du duc de Richelieu et l'avene-
ment du ministere de droite en decembre 1821," Comte Jean Baptiste de Villele,
Mernoires et correspondance du cornte de Vi/We (2nd ed.; Paris, 1887-1889), II
(1816-1821), 487-488. Other members of the council were: Montmorency (Foreign
Affairs), Peyronnet (Justice), Duc de Bellune (War), Clermont-Tonnerre (Navy), and
Lauriston (Royal Household). Ironically, Villele himself had persuaded a reluctant
Louis XVIII to accept Montmorency in the cabinet rather than the old royal favorite,
the Duc de Blacas. In answer to the king's protests that the viscount was a member
of Monsieur's corterie, a Chevalier de la Foi, and a founder of the Congreration,
Villele successfully argued that Montmorency would draw the votes of the extreme-
right to the support of the ministry. Jean Fourcassie, Vi/me (Paris, 1954), pp. 194-195;
Bertier de Sauvigny, Un type d'ultra-royaliste: Ie cornte Ferdinand de Bertier (1782-
1864) et l'enigrne de la Congregation (Paris, 1948), p. 297.
18 Mernoires de M. de La Rochefoucauld, due de Doudeauville, ed. F. Claude
(Paris, 1861-1864), VII, 69, 71; Bertier, La Restauration, p. 252. Louis Fran~ois
Sosthene, vicomte de La Rochefoucauld (1785-1864) was Montmorency's son-in-law.
written memorandum or to promise to follow the oral instructions given

him. He arrived in Vienna on September 7. 19
During Montmorency's absence. Louis XVIII entrusted Villele with the
direction of foreign affairs. and on September 4. a royal decree proclaimed
him the permanent President of the Council. Montmorency regarded this
promotion as an "indecorus act." but he swallowed his pride with good
grace and congratulated Villele. Other members of the cabinet, except
Corbiere. received his ascendancy with jealous resentment. 20
Contemporary observers and modem historians generally agree that
Villele was an adroit parliamentary tactician. administrator, and financier,
and a man of courage and wit. Even Canning, though he distrusted Villele.
admitted that he was "the only man able to steer the boat." Sir Charles
Stuart, the British ambassador at Paris, received the news of Villele's
ascendancy with some enthusiasm. perceiving in it the crushing of the
"numerous intrigues .. , to effect a partial. if not a total. change in the
French Administration." 21
Villele had no love for fanaticism. clericalism. or reaction. No less than
Chateaubriand. he wanted "to emancipate France from the humiliating
control of foreigners, and to assert her independent action and influence."
19 La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 395; VII, 69, 71; Bdouard Herriot, Madame
Recamier, trans. Alys Hallard (London, 1926), II, 112, 116; Villele, Memoires, III,
33-34; Alfred F. Nettement, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris, 1860-1872), VI, 229:
Duvergier de Hauranne, Histoire de gouvernment parlementaire en France, 1814-
1848 (Paris, 1857-1872), VII, 139-140; Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Paris, Sept. 19,
1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Villele to Serre, Correspondance du comte de Serre,
1796-1824 (Paris, 1876-1877), IV (1820-1822), 484. The Comte de Serre was the French
ambassador at Naples.
20 Villele, Memoires, III, 38; Montmorency to Villele, Vienna, Sept. 14, 1822, ibid.,
pp. 51-52; Boulaye to Serre, Ay, Sept. 8, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 470n;
Montmorency to his wife, Vienna, Sept. 15, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, II, 3.
The charge made by Mme Recamier, and repeated by others, that Villele took ad-
vantage of Montmorency's absence to obtain the first rank in the council is not true.
ViIIele owed his elevation to the influence of Countess Zoe du Cayla, the royal
mistress, and Sosthene de La Rochefoucauld, her paramour. The premier did not
know of Mme du Cayla's overtures to Louis XVIII in his behalf. The king, moreover,
informed the foreign minister of his plans prior to the latter's departure from Paris
and before his Majesty sent for Villele. Louis XVIII still distrusted and disliked
Montmorency, and to counterbalance his influence, he made Villele President of the
Council. La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 396; VII. 71-72; VIII, 131, 150-151;
Recamier, Correspondance, II, 3-4; Villele, Memoires, III, 38, 50; Herriot, Madame
Recamier, II, 99; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 237-238, 241; Bourquin, Sainte
Alliance, pp. 328-329; Fourcassie, Villele, pp. 198-204,232.
21 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 293; Stuart to
Bathurst, Paris, Sept. 5, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; TemperIey, Canning, p. 59;
Andre Maurois, Chateau briand, trans. Vera Fraser (London, 1938), p. 247.
He disliked the Alliance, because, as Chateaubriand has observed, memories

of conferences and protocols, which had brought defeat and humiliation to
France in 1814 and 1815, still smoldered in many French hearts and burned
brightly in some. Villele, moreover, resented the intrigues of Tsar Alexander
and feared his ambition to send a Russian or an allied army through France
to Spain. Yet he could not afford to withdraw from the Alliance and leave
France isolated to face Great Britain. 22 The great problem facing both
France and the Alliance in 1822 was the Spanish revolution, which the tsar
regarded as a common menace to all the crowned heads of Europe.
4. Franco-Spanish Relations (1820-1822)
It is one of the ironies of history that rebellion in the Spanish American

colonies indirectly caused a revolution in the mother country. The insur-
rection began at Cadiz on January 1, 1820, in the ranks of the army being
mobilized there for an expedition to South America. The leaders of this
revolt were colonels Rafael del Riego y Nunez and Antonio Quiroga. Of
the former it has been remarked that he was "a greater but a more insane
hero than Don Quixote." 23 By March 1820, Riego's mutineers, unsupported
by the apathetic populace, had been dispersed in Andalusia by loyal troops
under General Manuel Freyre. This incident perhaps would have gone al-
most unnoticed by historians had it not lighted the fuse for a general ex-
plosion in the Peninsula.
There were many Spanish Liberals who desired to reestablish the Consti-
tution of 1812, which had been revoked by Ferdinand VII on May 4, 1814.
During February 1820, the provinces of Galicia, Ferrot and Murcia in the
north raised the standard of rebellion. Seeing his opportunity, General
Francisco Espoz y Mina crossed the border from France to lead the forces
of discontent in Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia. Everywhere the Consti-
tution of 1812 was proclaimed, and with it, the abolition of the Inquisition.
By March 3, the insurgents had achieved such success that Henry O'Donnell
(Count D'Abisbal) and General Freyre, who commanded the royal army,
cast their lots with the rebels. Ferdinand, realizing the tide had turned,
yielded as graciously as possible. On March 9, he took an oath to support
the Constitution; the following day he issued a proclamation restoring it and
all the decrees of the Cortes of 1812.24
22 See Temperley, Canning, pp. 57-58.

23 Quoted in ibid., p. 10; cf. Webster, "Castiereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1818-
1822," ERR, XXX (1915), 639.
24 For a French translation of Ferdinand's proclamation, see Nouveau recueil de
The immediate reaction of Spain's neighbors to these events was one of

disapproval. Only John Forsyth, the American minister at Madrid, offered
the congratulations of his government. 25 The new Cortes (which opened on
July 9, 1820), had hoped, in particular, for the approval of Russia, since the
tsar already had recognized and guaranteed the Constitution of 1812 by the
Treaty of Velikiye Luki, July 20, 1812. But in view of Alexander's stem
opposition to constitutions in 1820, this was indeed a forlorn hope.26
During the March days in Madrid, Baron Etienne-Denis Pasquier, the
French foreign minister, had considered replacing his ambassador, Adrien
de Montmorency, Duke of Laval, with Frederic Seraphin, marquis de La
Tour du Pin. The mission of the new ambassador would be to persuade the
Moderates (doceanistas) to establish a constitutional monarchy on the
French model. When Pasquier informed Stuart of La Tour du Pin's pro-
jected mission, the ambassador immediately protested against it and en-
joined Sir Henry Wellesly in Madrid to undermine French diplomacy. Wel-
lesley warned Evaristo Perez de Castro, the Spanish foreign minister, of
Pasquier's impending intrigue, and together they openly attacked France,
accusing her of diplomatic machinations and conspiracy against the consti-
tutional regime. The result of British diplomacy was to render a Royalist-
Moderate entente impossible and to convince Richelieu and Pasquier that
it now was useless to send La Tour du Pin to Madrid. Consequently, the
whole scheme was dropped. Enraged by Stuart's actions, Richelieu de-
nounced him to Wellington; Anglophobia in the French press increased
sharply, and in Paris the rumor spread that Britain was responsible for the
Spanish revolution. 27
Failing in its attempt to go it alone, the French cabinet sought to overawe
the Cortes by concerting with the great powers. Johann Aneillon, acting
Prussian foreign minister, at the prompting of Alopeus, the Russian ambas-
traites d'aUiance, de paix, de treve, ... des puissances et etats d'Europe, ed. George
Frederick and Ie baron Charles de Martens (Gottingen, 1817-1842) (hereafter cited as
Nouveau recueil), V (1808-1822), 455-456.
25 John Forsyth was the American minister to Spain from February 16, 1819, to
March 2, 1823.
26 Russian Circular, Saint Petersburg, May 1, 1820, Martens, Nouveau recueil,
V (supp.), 237-242.
27 The Marquis Joseph Paul Franyois de Gabriac, "Chateaubriand et la guerre
d'Espagne, d'apres des documents inedits, Part I: les conferences de Vienne et Ie
congres de Verone," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII (1897), 543-544 (The author's
father, the Marquis Joseph Alphonse de Gabriac [1792-1865] was La Ferronnays'
private secretary at Verona.); Pasquier, Memoires, IV, 492-494; Richelieu to Welling-
ton, Paris, Mar. 30, 1820, Well. Desp., 1,112; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 230 and 231.
Adrien and Mathieu de Montmorency were first cousins.
sador at Berlin, approved the La Tour du Pin mission and agreed that some
kind of allied action should be taken toward Spain. Mettemich did not
believe in acting where Austrian interests were not involved, and he had
no desire to enhance the tsar's influence at Paris or Berlin. He, therefore,
opposed an allied demarche against Spain and declared his readiness to
support British policy against French and Russian attacks. Toward Spain
Austria was willing to follow Britain's lead; throughout April 1820, Metter-
nich anxiously awaited news from Castlereagh, informing him what this
initiative would be. Castlereagh's answer to any form of allied intervention
in Spain was his State Paper of May 5, 1820. Austria promptly accepted its
principle of non-intervention, and Prussia and France finally endorsed its
reasoning. Richelieu even conceded that the La Tour du Pin project had
been a mistake. Consequently, when Count Charles Pozzo di Borgo, the
Russian ambassador to France, proposed a conference in Paris to discuss
the Spanish situation, he did not receive any encouragement from the French
premier nor from his colleagues in the diplomatic corps. Austria and Eng-
land had succeeded again in keeping France and Russia separate and alone.
Richelieu again resolved to follow exclusively the particular interests of
France. 28
From 1820 to 1822, conditions in Spain went from bad to worse. The
nation was in a state of anarchy which invited intervention. The government
was too weak to restore order. Neither Moderates nor Radicals (exaltados)
had the support of the country, for the great mass of people remained loyal
to their monarch and priests. Although the Moderates remained in power
until December 1821, Radicals and Royalists steadily increased in strength.
The king had no confidence in his ministers and continually intrigued
against them.
Until August 1821, Richelieu pursued a policy of strict neutrality toward
the Spanish situation. But he realized that France "was like a house full of
inflammable materials, threatened by a fire which had broken out next
door." Spanish Royalists openly used French territory as a sanctuary from,
and a base against, Spanish constitutional forces with the result that both
France and Spain committed numerous provocations and border violations.
Without breaking diplomatic relations with the Madrid government, Ri-
chelieu, in August 1821, established a cordon sanitaire on the frontier for
the alleged purpose of preventing a yellow fever epidemic, then raging at
28 Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIlI, 544-545;
Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 231-232, 235-236, 243-244. While Count Bernstorff was in
Vienna during the last two weeks of March 1820, Ancillon held the portfolio of
foreign affairs.
Barcelona, from spreading into France. In reality, however, the cordon was
a corps d' observation to bar revolutionary contagion from infiltrating across
the border. At the same time the French cabinet sent Count Augustin Pel-
letier de La Garde to Madrid to replace Laval as ambassador. The new
envoy's mission was to seek an entente with the Moderates and to forestall
any formal declaration by the Cortes which could lead to war.29
The number of insurrections in France in 1821 and 1822 is evidence that
the danger of a Leftist revolution was real. Inspired by the momentary
success of the Spanish revolution, the French Carbonari instigated military
uprisings at Belfort, Neuf-Brisach, Colmar, Saumur, and La Rochelle (De-
cember 30, 1821-February 24, 1822). All of these movements failed for
lack of adequate preparation and co-ordination and quick governmental
action, but they and the resulting trials made it clear that secret societies
also were undermining the army.30
At the end of February 1822, Francisco Martinez de la Rosa, the poet,
formed a Moderate ministry which sought to strengthen the government by
SUbstituting a more conservative constitution for the existing one. But in
May the outbreak of a Royalist counter-revolution in Catalonia and Na-
varre dashed these hopes. Joaquin Ibanez, Baron de Eroles, General Vicente
Jenaro de Quesada, and militant priests, including Antonio Maranon, the
famous Trappist, organized thousands of peasants into the "Army of the
Faith," and guerrilla warfare which resembled a crusade began. On June
21, the insurgents captured the city of La Seo de Urgel in Catalonia and
founded there a regency in the name of the king. This "Urgel Regency,"
led by the Archbishop of Tarragona and the Marquis of Mataflorida, sent
letters to Louis XVIII, appealing for help, and directed the movement
against the constitutional regime. In effect, it constituted a Royalist fifth
column in Spain. Further Royalist insurrections at Aranjuez and Valencia
on May 30, the king's festival-day, and especially the Royal Guard's
29 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, X, 305; XI, 407; Bertier, La Restauration, p. 251;

John R. Hall, The Bourbon Restoration (London, 1909), p. 321; Gabriac, "Chateau-
briand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 545-546. The royal ordinance
establishing the cordon sanitaire was issued on August 27, 1821.
30 Recamier, Correspondance, I, 372; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 244-247. In the
spring of 1821, Joubert and Dugied founded the French Carbonari society, and by
1822, its membership numbered approximately 40,000 drawn from students, junior
army officers, and the petite bourgeoisie. Generals La Fayette, Foy, Demarcay,
Berton, and Colonel Fabvier were among the leaders of the liberal insurrections of
1821-1822. For detailed accounts of secret societies and conspiracies under the French
Restoration, see Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 263-347; Edouard Guillon, Les
complots militaires sous la Restauration (Paris, 1895), and Pere Nicolas Deschamps,
Les societes secretes et la societe (4th cd.; Avignon, 1881).
abortive coup of July 7 at Madrid, which the ministry itself had helped to
plan, led to the captivity of Ferdinand. In the reaction and confusion that
followed these events, the influence of the Moderates in the Cortes waned
and that of the Radicals increased. In August Martinez de la Rosa and his
colleagues, realizing that a policy of moderation now had no chance of
success, resigned, whereupon Colonel Evaristo de San Miguel put together
a Radical ministry in which he held the post of foreign minister. Those who
had defended the king were removed from positions in the government and
army, and many were executed by the firing squad. The cabinet was caught
in an embarrassing position between the excesses of both the Spanish
Radicals and the Urgel Regency.31
The policy of the Villele ministry toward Spain was tortuous and often
vacillating, not because of timidity, but from disagreement between the
moderate and ultra-Royalist factions in the council. Villele himself desired
to continue Richelieu's policy of neutrality, fearing that Britain would
openly support the constitutional government and that French finances and
economic interests would suffer from war. The recent insurrections in
France had caused him to question the loyalty of the French army, if it
were sent against Spanish Liberals, and he could not forget the fate of
Napoleon's army in the Peninsula. These considerations persuaded the
premier that the best policy was one of restraint,32
By contrast, Montmorency, Pasquier's successor at the Foreign Ministry,
wanted to achieve more decisive results. During the spring of 1822, he had
instructed La Garde to support the king's efforts to regain his authority
and, through inexperience in foreign affairs, had even gone so far as to
present to the Spanish government a plan for a constitutional monarchy.
Coming from France, this proposal was resented as interference incom-
patible with Spanish sovereignty. But the Rosa ministry, in any case, would
not have implemented the scheme, because the ministers, with good reason,
distrusted Ferdinand VII. By the end of July 1822, Montmorency had come
to regard war with Spain as inevitable and had correctly perceived that the
Spanish Question would be the principal subject of discussion at the Vienna
31 Boislecomte, A. A. E., 720, 234-236; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 405, 408-

412, 415-420; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 315; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy,
pp. 195-196n; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII,
549-550. The precise title of the Royalist provisional government at Urgel was:
"Supreme Regency of Spain during the captivity of the King."
32 Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 251-252; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 330; Rene
Pinon, Histoire diplomatique, 1515-1928, Vol. IX of Histoire de la nation fran~aise,
ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (Paris, 1929), p. 458; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 407,
422-423; Fourcassie, Viliele, p. 228.
conference. But no foreign army, he assured La Garde, would cross France.

On September 5, the foreign minister again declared to his ambassador at
Madrid that war could not be avoided; the longer France waited, the greater
would be the dangers of a Spanish campaign. But this dispatch never was
sent, being vetoed by VilleIe as too belligerent. Villele, it will be recalled,
had become President of the Council the day before. In the interest of
moderation, the new premier assured La Garde on September 6 that France
would not take any hostile action against Spain, unless compelled by the
necessities of self-defense. Even when Radical mobs threatened French
consular agents at Cadiz, Santander, Bilbao, and Barcelona, Villele refused
to recall them, explaining that such a drastic response would be like "a
declaration of war which is by no means our intention." 33 The premier,
the king, and the majority of the council, in short, worked to maintain peace,
while Montmorency and Claude Victor-Perrin, Duke of Bellune (Marshal
Victor), the Minister for War, convinced that conciliation was a bankrupt
policy, advocated war as the only means of destroying the revolutionary
regime in Madrid. 34
But French policy toward Spain also was influenced by party conflict
on both sides of the Pyrenees, a confused situation intelligible only in tenus
of the Franco-Spanish dispute. French Radicals, like Spanish Royalists,
plotted to provoke war, but for opposite reasons. The former hoped the
Restoration monarchy would be defeated and themselves returned to power,
while the latter needed French aid to reestablish royal absolutism in Spain.
Ferdinand VII, meanwhile, played a double role in this affair. While secretly
exhorting the Court of the Tuileries to declare war on Spain, he posed as the
willing tool of the Liberal regime in Madrid. The French ultra-Royalists
and Clericals believed that a victorious Peninsular campaign fought under
the Fleur de Lis would revenge Baylen and Vittoria and give stability to
the none-too-finuly-restored monarchy. By the same stroke, they hoped to
make France once more a major military power. Strained Franco-Spanish
relations thus were brought about by several factions in both nations. As the
Marquis Joseph Paul de Gabriac observed: "The unleashing of the revo-
lutionary spirit in Spain" and "the progress of monarchial authority and the
ascendancy of a Royalist ministry" in France created a "moral hostility"
between the two countries. 35
33 Villele to La Garde, Paris, Sept. 16, 1822, quoted in Gabriac, "Chateaubriand,
Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 553. This phrase was written in capital
letters in Villele's handwriting.
34 Ibid., p. 546, 553-554; Montmorency to La Garde, Paris, July 29 and Sept. 5,
1822, quoted in ibid., pp. 550-552; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 422-423.
35 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 17 and Nov. 25, 1822, Villele, Memoires,
Despite mounting pressure within his party and the French press to adopt
a sterner attitude toward Spain, Villele refused to go further than to rein-
force the cordon sanitaire. When Montmorency and Franchet d'Esperey,
the director general of police, suggested to the French council in August,
1822, that the Spanish Royalists be aided secretly with arms, munitions,
and money, their proposal was rejected "as neither loyal nor effective."
Montmorency and Franchet, nonetheless, dispatched to the Urgel Regency
a shipment of munitions, but an alert frontier patrol intercepted it. An
investigation quickly revealed those responsible for this patent violation of
the embargo. The premier, however, discreetly dropped the affair upon the
foreign minister's promise that he would not repeat such impolitic conduct.
But other attempts to aid the partisans of Ferdinand VII were successful,
and the king himself received over two million francs through the French
ambassador.36
The yellow fever in Barcelona having subsided by the fall of 1822 and
all danger of an epidemic in southern France having manifestly passed, the
French cabinet on September 22 changed the official designation of the
frontier regiments from Ie cordon sanitaire to the more dignified and
realistic l' armee d' observation. The significance of this modification is its
indication of the strength of the French ultra-Royalists, who demanded a
more resolute attitude toward the Spanish government. Villele was certain
that the allied sovereigns would demand that Spain modify her constitution
in order to increase the king's personal power. By adopting a more deter-
III, 129,246; Pasquier to Serre, Paris, Feb. 23, 1823, Serre, Correspondance, V, 67-68;
Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, and Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 291,
345; Stuart to Canning, Paris, Oct. 21, 1822, ibid., I, 407; for extracts from the secret
correspondence between the kings of Spain and France, see ibid., pp. 393-400; Jean
Baptiste Honore Raymond Capefigue, Histoire de la Restauration et des causes qui
ont amene la chute de la branche a/nee des Bourbons (Paris, 1831-1833), VII, 23-25;
Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris, 1851-1852),
VII, 111-112; Viel-Castel, La Restauration. XI, 477; Alison, History of Europe from
the Fall of Napoleon to the Accession of Louis Napoleon (Edinburgh, 1853), II, 641-
642; Fourcassie, Viltele, p. 227; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux
mondes, CXLIII, 554.
36 Villele, Memoires, III, 33; Montmorency to La Garde, Paris, Aug. 14, 1822,
quoted in Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 551;
Agenor Bardoux, "Le congres de Verone, d'apres les papiers de mme la duchesse de
Duras," Seances et travaux de l'Academie des Sciences morales et politiques (Institut
de France) (hereafter cited as STAS), CXLVII (1897), 406; Nettement, La Restau-
ration, VI, 226-229. Even the Papacy sent money to the Spanish Royalists through
Marie Caroline, duchesse de Berry, granddaughter of Ferdinand I of Naples and
sister of Maria Christina, the fourth wife of Ferdinand VII of Spain. La Boulaye to
Serre, Ay, Jan. 5, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, V, '4. The Drapeau blanc and La
Foudre clamored for war with Spain.
mined policy, France might induce the Cortes to accept gracefully these
demands. But the threat of foreign interference only provoked the San
Miguel ministry to summon an Extraordinary Cortes to take counter-
actions. To the fearful La Garde, this step seemed a prelude to a formal
declaration of war on France. 37
Another important element of the Spanish Question was Anglo-French
relations. The foundation of British policy toward Spain, it will be recalled,
was Castlereagh's State Paper of May 5, 1820. Although the London cabinet
had immediately approved the actions of Stuart and Wellesley in the La
Tour du Pin affair (March 1820), the foreign secretary had instructed Wel-
lesley to refrain henceforth from interference in Spanish affairs, unless the
king's life was endangered, or Portugal was threatened with invasion. To
Castlereagh an understanding with France offered the best means of break-
ing the Franco-Spanish impasse. Thus he counseled moderation to Madrid
and mediation to Paris. On September 20, 1822, Wellington arrived in the
French capital to urge this policy on Villele in a private interview. 3s
5. The V illele-Wellington Interview
In an effort to achieve an entente with France on the Spanish Question be-

fore proceeding to Vienna, Wellington went immediately into conference
with Villele. He reached Paris at 1: 30 p.m. and an hour later called at the
premier's home. For the next two hours, the British and French ministers
debated the Spanish revolution and its possible consequences, the slave
trade, and the Eastern Question, but they emphasized the affairs of Spain
and the dangers of intervention. Not a word was spoken concerning Italy.39
As the interview opened, Wellington found Villele torn between the de-
mands of the ultra party and his own judgment of what was best for France.
When the duke asked if France would permit the passage of foreign troops
through her territory, the premier's reply was an emphatic no. His personal
opinion was that any expedition to rescue the Spanish king would probably
fail and result in the monarch's death. Spanish and French revolutionaries,
Villele complained, were in alliance; every day brought new threats to
37 Boislecomte, A. A. E., 720, 235-236; Stuart to Canning, No. 263, Paris, Sept. 26,
1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 447; Viel-Castel, La Restauration,
XI, 465. This session met on October 7, and one of its first acts increased the size of
the constitutional army by 30,000 men.
38 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 59; Bour-
quin, Sainte Alliance, p. 324; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 233.
3D Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 59; Wal-
pole, History of England, III, 44.
French forces along the Pyrenees and violations of French territory. The
government knew the true situation in Spain and wished only to protect the
rights and security of the royal family.40
Wellington estimated that it would take 100,000 men to subdue Spain; to
try such a venture with a smaller force would be folly. Villele rejoined that
the French army was strong enough to operate without fear of folly. He
then revealed that two plans regarding Spain were being circulated in
governmental circles. The one which he favored was to wait-and-see the
outcome of current developments. The other was to send two columns into
the Iberian Peninsula - one of 40,000 men via Perpignan into Catalonia,
and the other of 60,000 troops via Irun upon Madrid. The authors of the
latter scheme doubted it would be necessary to go beyond the capital city.
Whichever policy the French cabinet adopted, the object was the same; viz.,
to save his Most Catholic Majesty from "being deposed, and the royal
family from being murdered." But, Villele warned, if the Vienna conference
separated without coming to any decision on the affairs of France and
Spain, it was probable that the existing impasse would be aggravated, and
that the two countries could be forced into a war. He hoped, therefore, that
the conference would consider France's geographical position in relation to
Spain and that each ally would declare what line she would take in the event
of a Franco-Spanish war. 41
If war with Spain came, the French minister emphasized, it would be
through no fault of the French government, whose relations with Spain were
based on national interests, entirely separate from anything the Vienna
conference might determine. France would ask for no assistance from any
other power, for she could not receive it and would oppose any effort to
force it on her. In reply, Wellington affirmed that Great Britain could not
declare in advance what her policy would be in any hypothetical case.
The discussion of the Spanish Question ended with a statement by the
premier that he would not object to, but would regret, the formation of a
European army on the chance that hostilities might break out between
France and Spain. France, he reiterated, would not consent to the passage
of foreign troops across her soil; nor would she "wage war at the invitation,
still less at the injunction of others, but only if ... she were constrained to
do it" by either of two occurrences: (1) the deposition of Ferdinand VII
and/or the death of any member of the royal family, and (2) a declaration
40 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822; Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp.,
I, 290-292, 564; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, quoted in Nettement,
La Restauration, VI,237-238.
41 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 289-290.
of war by Spain and/or an attack on France. But Villele regarded the

British focus on Spanish affairs a dangerous mistake and urged a reorien-
tation in policy.42
Since his instructions emphasized the slave trade, Wellington broached
this subject, urging the premier to persuade his government to adopt ef-
fective measures for its suppression. France was the chief nation engaged
in this black traffic; if her cooperation were obtained, it could be arrested.
But Anglo-French cooperation, even on a issue both powers had condemned
as morally reprehensible, was difficult to achieve in 1822. The average
Frenchman still regarded England as his natural enemy just as his ancestors
had for the last five hundred years. Consequently, when the duke raised the
slave trade question, Villele protested that his Most Christian Majesty had
earnestly sought to put an end to it but had failed to persuade the Assembly
to adopt an effective measure. The Chambers refused to attach a degrading
punishment to this crime. The abolition of the slave trade, moreover, was
unpopular in France, because it was urged by Britain. The existing law for
its suppression was the only act which the legislature had ever passed in
complete silence, so humiliated were the deputies at having to yield to
British demands. France, Villele contended, had done, and would continue
to do, everything in her power to suppress this insidious traffic. For this
purpose, cruisers were maintained off the coasts of Africa and Madagascar.
He then ended the conversation on this subject by refusing to attempt the
passage of new laws against the slave trade or to enter into new engagements
for its suppression. 43
France's condemnation of the slave trade served the same function as
England's Foreign Enlistment Act: each permitted a nation to hide behind
the aegis of a legislative act that publicly proclaimed lofty sentiments which
were either privately repudiated, tacitly ignored, or flagrantly unenforced for
ulterior reasons.
The Eastern Question received only passing treatment at the Villele-
Wellington interview, because substantial agreement already existed between
their respective governments. When the duke requested the French minister
to adopt with England and Austria a common policy in the Russo-Turkish
dispute, he readily agreed to instruct the Marquis Florimond de Fay de
La Tour-Maubourg, the French ambassador at Constantinople, to convince
the Porte of the necessity of heeding the tsar's demands. In so doing, he
42 Ibid., pp. 292, 294; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, quoted in
Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 237-238.
43 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 295.
was only repeating the assurances which Richelieu had given Castlereagh
almost a year earlier.44
On September 21, the day following his conference with VilleIe, Welling-
ton conferred with Sir Charles Stuart and took his leave of Louis XVIII.
His Majesty assured the duke that he had no desire for war with Spain, but
wished only to protect his kinsman on the Spanish throne. Early on the
morning of the 22nd, Wellington left Paris and, traveling via Munich and
Salzburg, arrived in Vienna on the 29th. 45
The Villele-Wellington interview reveals that the importance of the
Spanish and Greek questions had been reversed by the deterioration of
Franco-Spanish relations. A second paramount fact brought out by this
conference was the premier's reluctance to use the corps d'observation.
While Villele was not above pretending more than he really thought, his
correspondence with Count Hercule de Serre, French ambassador to Naples,
and the reports of Sir Charles Stuart, contain further evidence that he
consistently opposed armed intervention in Spain, which he feared would
compromise French interests. 46
On the night of September 21, Wellington had sent several dispatches to
Canning covering his talks with VilleIe and requesting further instructions
on Spain. These reports reached the Foreign Office on the 24th but did not
alarm Canning, for he already had foreseen that the big issue at Vienna
would be Spain. Wellington's intelligence, however, gave him a new concept
of French policy toward Spain and suggested a means of breaking the
European Alliance by separating France from it. She appeared to agree
with Britain in opposing collective intervention in Spain. Canning preferred
dealing with one power rather than four. On September 27, he replied to
Wellington with his memorable "come what may" instruction. 47
The knowledge that Wellington would urge the allies to leave Spain to
herself apparently encouraged Villele to resist the growing demand of the
ultra-Royalists for intervention. A week after the duke left Paris Stuart had
44 La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 394.

45 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 63-64;
Duc de Blacas, French ambassador at Rome, to Serre, Rome, Oct. 13, 1822, Serre,
Correspondance, IV, 405; Walpole, History of England, III, 46; J. E. S. Green,
"Castlereagh's Instructions for the Conferences at Vienna, 1822," TRHS, 3rd ser.,
VII (1913), 123.
46 Stuart to Bathurst, No. 243, Paris, Sept. 2, 1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Villele
to Serre, Paris, Sept. 9 and 15, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 472, 485-486.
47 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 294; cf. British and
Foreign State Papers, ed. Lewis Hertslet (London, 1837) (hereafter cited as BFSP),
X (1822-1823), 90; Temperley, Canning, pp. 63-64; Green, "Castlereagh's Instruc-
tions," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII, 110, 113-114.
an interview with the premier about the Vienna conference. Villele stated
that every dispatch received from Vienna made him hope that Wellington's
arrival there was imminent. His Grace's knowledge of the opinions of the
British and French cabinets was necessary to counteract the tsar's views on
Spanish affairs, which "a variety of causes had rendered stronger than the
circumstances of the moment warrant." Confidential reports from Vienna,
moreover, had confirmed his suspicion that Montmorency was not re-
presenting the views of the council on Spain. 48
The French minister seemed genuinely alarmed that the Vienna confer-
ence would adopt measures so extreme that they would provoke Spain to
declare war on France. He blamed the advice of Count Dmitri Tatischev,
former Russian ambassador at Madrid, as the chief cause of Ferdinand's
embarrassment and declared that Mettemich did not dare contradict the
tsar for fear he would repudiate Anglo-Austrian mediation of the Russo-
Turkisch dispute. Villele, therefore, was uneasy over future developments
at Madrid. If the party in power in Spain really intended to follow a
moderate course, why had it summoned an Extraordinary Cortes, from
which only violent actions could be expected? 49
Although Villele counted heavily on Wellington's influence at Vienna to
restrain Alexander, he apparently hoped the duke would not be sent to
Verona. France had a special interest in Italy, where French security de-
manded that she contain and undermine Austrian hegemony. The premier
was uncertain of British policy in this area. Might not Britain stand by
Austria here as in the Near East? Under the circumstances it seemed best
that no British plenipotentiary attend the Congress of Verona. Villele,
therefore, inquired of Stuart whether his Grace would continue to the Italian
congress, in view of the previous determination of England not to interfere
in the affairs of Italy. He observed that Parliament's objections to partici-
pation at Verona could outweigh any benefits to be gained from attending.
The ambassador replied simply that he had no communication from his
government on this subject; but to ease Villele's fears, he added that there
should be no objection to a British delegation at Verona, since the avowed
purpose of the conference was to remove some of the burdens placed on the
Italian states at Laibach.50
This conversation is a sequel to the Villele-Wellington interview and is
significant for two reasons: (1) it reveals Villele's anxiety over the decisions
48 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30 and No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, F.O.,
France, 146/48; Villele, Memoires, ill, 59-68; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 445.
49 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48.
DO Stuart to Canning, No. 265, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, ibid.
of the Vienna conference, and (2) the premier admitted, for the first time
to a foreign diplomat, the division in the Paris cabinet between Montmoren-
cy and himself. It was this disagreement, moreover, that convinced Villele
he should send another delegate to Verona with written instructions to re-
strain Montmorency.51
Throughout 1822 the struggle between the apostles of war, led by the
Count of Artois and Montmorency, and the partisans of peace, headed by
the king and Villele, virtually paralyzed the French government in its search
for a viable Spanish policy. While the ascendancy of an ultra-Royalist
ministry in December 1821 had increased the possibility of war with Spain,
it did not make it inevitable, because of the schism in its ranks. The Villele-
Wellington interview strengthened the premier in his opposition to inter-
vention. On the eve of the Vienna conference, this controversy continued,
and French policy maintained its indecisive course. But for the moment,
Villele's position remained secure, and his pacific views prevailed.
51 Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Sept. 19, 1822, ibid. Stuart's informant was Viscount
Fran~ois-Rene de Chateaubriand, French ambassador at London and "the other
delegate."
CHAPTER II
THE VIENNA STALEMATE
At Vienna ... [Spain was] the great question, ... the

first, the gravest for ... the Alliance.
Montmorency, October 25, 1822.1
J. The Conference Convenes
Before Wellington left London, the allied sovereigns and their ministers
had begun their talks in Vienna. Already in the Austrian capital were Sir
Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry), the British ambassador, the Marquis
Victor-Louis Charles de Caraman, the French ambassador, Prince Franz
Ludwig von Hatzfeldt, the Prussian ambassador, and, of course, Prince
Metternich and Friedrich von Gentz, the Austrian publicist and the chancel-
lor's colleague and secretary. On September 7, both Montmorency and the
Prussian delegation arrived, the latter composed of Foreign Minister Bern-
storff and Baron Friedrich Alexander von Humboldt. Assisting the French
foreign minister and Caraman, was Count Pierre-Louis Ferron de La Fer-
ronnays, ambassador at S1. Petersburg, who arrived with the tsar. The
Austrian delegation was completed by the addition of Count Stephan Zichy.
ambassador at Berlin, who came with the Prussians, Baron Ludwig von
Lebzeltern, who traveled with the Russians, and Prince Paul Anton Ester-
hazy von Galantha, ambassador at London. Having departed from st.
Petersburg on August 15, Alexander reached Vienna on September 9. In
his entourage were Count Nesselrode, his foreign minister, Count Dmitri
Tatischev, Count Charles Andre Pozzo di Borgo, ambassador at Paris, and
numerous princes and generals. Conspicuous by his absence was Count
Capo d'Istria, who had resigned at the end of July on the issue of war with
Turkey. His departure delighted Metternich, for he detested the Greek's
liberal views. Lord Stewart and Sir Robert Gordon, secretary of the Vienna
embassy, looked after British interests until the arrival of Lord Strangford
on September 24 and Wellington on the 29th.2
1 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, Congres de Verone: correspon-

dance et protocoles, A.A.B., 721, 114.
2 Stewart to Bathurst, Nos. 2 and 11, Vienna, Sept. 4, and 24, 1822, F.O., Austria,
The original schedule for the Vienna conference called for the presence
of a British representative by September 7, so that the great questions could
be discussed before the 28th, the deadline for transferring deliberations to
Italy. On September 12, after weeks of frustrating delay, the three eastern
sovereigns adopted a new plan: they would wait several more days for
Wellington and then, if he had not arrived, proceed to Verona, and the
duke could follow them; the first two or three weeks of the Congress would
be set aside to discuss the agenda originally planned for Vienna. Since
Britain had not been a party to the Laibach resolution of February 25,
1821, the continental powers were particularly anxious for Wellington to
take part in discussions at Verona as a plenipotentiary. His attendance in
that capacity was needed to give the appearance of unity to the tottering
Alliance.3
As the days passed, Stewart's alarm increased that the sovereigns would
leave Vienna before Wellington's arrival. He consulted Mettemich, who
suggested that a courier be sent to intercept his Grace at Munich or else-
where and to direct him to Verona, thus saving many miles of travel. Stewart
concurred and sent Gordon on the mission, bearing with him a resume of
discussions up to September 24. For their part, the crowned heads of Europe
again postponed their departure. This maneuver reveals that the allied
delegations, lacking information, assumed that Wellington had authorization
to go to Verona. 4 His prolonged absence, meanwhile, virtually stalemated
120/54; Boislecomte, "Resume historique du congres de Verone," A.A.E., 722, 46-49,

67 (hereafter cited as Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722); Vicomte Fran~ois Rene de Chateau-
briand, Le congres de Verone, Vol. XII of Oeuvres completes de Chateaubriand.
ed. Charles A. Sainte-Beuve (nouvelle ed.; Paris. 1929-1938) (hereafter cited as
Congres de Verone). p. 34; Private letter, Verona. Oct. 22, 1822, Metternich, Me-
moires. III, 559; Nettement, La Restauration. VI, 236; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia
and Europe. 1789-1825. pp. 395-397, 420-421. Though once a revolutionist, Mont-
morency by 1822 had become "a devout, if somewhat pompous, clerical aristocrat."
Upon reaching the Austrian capital, his piety, indeed, cost him an interview with
Metternich. No sooner had the foreign minister arrived at his hotel, than he departed
on foot to attend mass and to talk to some nuns. He did not return for three hours.
The chancellor, meanwhile, informed of the viscount's arrival, had come to greet him,
but after a prolonged wait, he left. Temperley, Canning. p. 60; Pasquier, Memoires.
V,446.
3 Stewart to Bathurst, Nos. 7 and 8, Vienna, Sept. 12 and 15, 1822, F.O., Austria,
120/54.
4 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid.; Green, "Castlereagh's
Instructions," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII, 123. Wellington was at Munich when he learned
of the proposed removal of the conference to Verona. Because he was still in poor
health, he had taken the longer, but better, road to Vienna via Munich and Salzburg
and had traveled slowly and for shorter hours. Couriers also had been sent to Salz-
burg and Regensburg (Ratisbon) to invite him to Verona.
the Viennese negotiations, causing Montmorency to complain that the

resultant delay "has reduced everything here to simple conversations, which
may have their real utility, but which are less positive than conferences." 5
When Wellington finally reached the Austrian capital, he found the allied
monarchs and ministers ready to repair to Verona, where they intended to
transact all remaining business. He protested against their departure,
arguing that such a move would reveal to the world "a disunion among the
allied governments, manifested, as it would be, by four of the allied ministers
first waiting ... three weeks for the fifth, and then setting out for Italy the
day after his arrival." 6 It was quite possible, moreover, that he would not
be permitted to go to Verona, since the ministry was anxious to avoid
popular misunderstanding of its stand against entering any discussion of
Italian questions. Metternich assured him, however, that there was no
danger of embarrassing England, since Italian affairs would not be con-
sidered at Verona until after his Grace's departure. 7
Perceiving the futility of his protests, Wellington, on September 30, re-
quested clarification of his instructions: should he remain in Vienna, return
to London, or go to Verona? But Canning, forewarned of the intended
removal of the conference by Lord Stewart, already had drafted new in-
structions. On October 3, they arrived, directing Wellington and Stewart to
attend the Congress of Verona. 8
2. The Spanish Question
Although the conversations on the affairs of Spain were private, informal,

and indecisive, they, nonetheless, were important, for they portended the
course of negotiations at Verona. Despite the admonition of the majority of
the French council, Montmorency raised the issue during an interview with
Metternich on September 11. The foreign minister confided to the chancellor
that he wished France to act toward Spain as Austria had done toward
Naples; i.e., France desired the moral support of Europe just as Austria
had obtained it at Laibach. But Metternich was as anxious as ever to avoid
5 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Vienna, Sept. 25, 1822, in Edouard Herriot,

Madame Recamier, trans. Alys Hallard (London, 1926), II, 117; cf. Stewart to Bat-
hurst, No.8, Vienna, Sept. 15, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
6 Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,320.
7 Ibid., p. 319.
8 Ibid., pp. 319-321; Wellington to Metternich, Vienna, Oct. 3, 1822, ibid., p. 340;
Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid., 349-350; Stewart to
Canning, No.7, Vienna, Sept. 12, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Canning to Stewart,
No.1, Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid.
taking a stand on this delicate question which would involve him in a

controversy with Britain and Russia, whose opposing views on intervention
were well-known. He remained noncommittal, suggesting merely that Mont-
morency should draft a memoire of his proposals for improving the situ-
ation. 9 Although the French minister concurred in this recommendation, he
later reported to Villele:
At Vienna they wished to concert with me on the great question; Spain was the
first, the gravest for us and for the Alliance. It was natural that they should
look to me for information. They asked me what were our views, our manner of
regarding the course of events, and my idea on the conduct to follow toward
a government which menaced us. 10
This statement, of course, is misleading, for it was not the allies who sought
to concert with France, but Montmorency who took the initiative in seeking
their aid. He misrepresented the facts, when he told his chief: "I have not
had to denounce Spain as Austria denounced Naples at Laibach." 11 To
Alexander and Bernstorft. he asserted that the Spanish Royalists, if left to
themselves, could not triumph over the constitutional government. The
existing situation was very dangerous to France. He protested that he did not
want war, but thought it inevitable; consequently, prudence required France
to prepare for war. The allies must assure France of their eventual support
but leave it to France to choose the right moment to strike. 12
But the Vienna diplomatic corps knew that Montmorency's views did not
represent the consensus of the French cabinet. Villele had revealed to the
allied ambassadors in Paris his determination to avoid war and even had
admitted that Montmorency held views stronger than most of the council
was disposed to entertain. The French minister's maneuvers, however,
placed Metternich in a embarrassing situation. 13
Austria, no less than Britain, opposed a French invasion of Spain, being
apprehensive of a renewed family compacU4 It is a popular misconception
that the chancellor's policy was universally reactionary; on the contrary,
9 Stewart to Bathurst, No.5, Vienna, Sept. 12,1822, ibid.

10 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, Congres de Verone, A.A.E.,
721, 114.
11 Ibid.
12 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,440-441.
13 See above, pp. 37-38.
14 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 431-432; Maurice de La Fuye and t;:mile Albert
Babeau, La Sainte-Alliance, 1815-1848 (Paris, 1948), p. 167; cf. Robert A. Kann,
"Mettemich: A Reappraisal of His Impact on International Relations," 1MH, XXXII
(Dec. 1960),337-339.
his "whole doctrine of intervention was conceived realistically and was

tempered by consideration of Austrian interests." 15 But since Austria had
intervened in Naples and Piedmont, he could not now openly resist Mont-
morency's project. He did not want war, but he wanted even less a rupture
with Russia, whose views on the Spanish constitutional regime had been set
forth in the tsar's denunciatory circular of May 1,1820. 16
As early as July 1822, Metternich had accused the French Royalists of
having provoked the revolt in the Spanish army, but the tsar had rejected
this imputation and had contended as staunchly as ever that intervention
was absolutely necessary. Having failed to drive a wedge between the courts
of Paris and st. Petersburg, the chancellor had looked to the Vienna confer-
ence to soften the tsar's attitude toward events taking place in the Balkan
and Iberian peninsulas, and to inspire in him a distrust of France. To ac-
complish this dual objective he had counted heavily on Castlereagh's in-
fluence with Alexander. With it he was sure that he could achieve a solution
of the Spanish Question before the Congress of Verona. 17
At Vienna Mettemich, left to his own devices by Castlereagh's death and
Wellington's long absence, varied his language to Alexander, Montmorency,
and Stewart, to suit Austrian interests. To the tsar, he pretended to approve
intervention and to regard the Spanish revolution as no different from those
of Naples and Piedmont. Only France, however, should intervene, but could
not because of her untrustworthy army. "How can France talk of war," he
asked, "when her army is infected by a revolutionary spirit? The order to
fight would be, perhaps, for her troops the signal for desertion." 18 War is
not popular in France; her finances are scarcely restored, and Premier
Villele is all for peace.
But let us suppose, [the chancellor continued], all difficulties are surmounted,
the army marching obediently and with discipline, the Spanish Revolution
16 Paul R. Sweet, Friedrich von Gentz: Defender of the Old Order (Madison,
Wis., 1941), p. 236.
16 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 431-432, 443; for the text of this circular, see
Martens, Nouveau recueil, V (supp.) 237-242. The raison d'etre of the Russian me-
moire was a note which Zea de Bermudes, the Spanish charge d'affaires, at St.
Petersburg, delivered to Capo d'Istria in April 1820, describing the change in the
Spanish government which had resulted from Ferdinand's proclamation of March 10,
restoring the Constitution of 1812. Bermudes requested approval of this change on
grounds that Russia already had recognized and guaranteed this constitution by the
Treaty of Velikiye-Luki (July 20, 1820). Ibid., pp. 237,242.
17 Metternich to Lebzeltem, Vienna, July 31, 1822, quoted in Viel-Castel, La Res-
tauration, XI, 432-433; Gabriac "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes,
CXLIII (1897), 555-556.
18 Ibid., p. 557; cf. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,3.
vanquished, and Ferdinand reestablished on his throne, then would not France,
intoxicated by her recent victories, regain a taste for the old ideas of conquests
and, after having fought for a good cause, undertake unjust wars? 19
Metternich obviously hoped to prevent war by narrowing the field of
potential belligerents to one possibility - Fran~ and then eliminating her.
To the French delegation, the chancellor described the dire consequences
of a Russian army marching across France and advised them to defy the
tsar, who regarded Frenchmen as the first revolutionists of Europe.
If he desires to undertake himself a Spanish Expedition, [Metternich confided],

it is not for the reason he represents to you. Without doubt, he wishes to crush
the revolution in the Peninsula and to restore the Spanish monarchy, but, above
all, he wants to cross France to take away on his return your Charter and to
confiscate your liberties ..2o
But armed intervention in Spain, the chancellor concluded, was unnecessary,

since the constitutional government could be overthrown merely by supply-
ing the Urgel Regency with arms and money. Although France, of course,
must do what she thought most expedient, she should not separate from her
allies, but concert her actions with them, as Austria had done at Troppau
and Laibach.21
To Lord Stewart, Metternich condemned the tsar's martial spirit and
characterized as foolish his vision of personally leading from 200,000 to
300,000 Russians across Europe into Spain. Thus the Austrian chancellor,
"by continual contradictions and the sterile abundance of his words, at-
tempted to confound those who tried to penetrate his true thoughts." 22
Prussia followed Austria's lead, but Bernstorff was more forceful in his
efforts to preserve peace.
Gordon has given an astute analysis of the diplomatic chess game played
before his eyes. He saw clearly the paradox between Montmorency's re-
quest for the cooperation of the Alliance in intervening in Spain and his
protest that nothing could induce France to permit the passage of foreign
troops across her territory. Gordon perceived, too, that the French minister
combined his own with his government's views, for when Montmorency
realized that Austria and Prussia really did not want a Spanish war, he
showed a willingness to soften his tone and to ask the allies for advice. The
British diplomat also doubted that Metternich favored the reestablishment
19 Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 557.
20 Ibid., p. 558.
21 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 443-444.
22 I bid., p. 444.
of absolute monarchy in Spain, wishing instead that Spain might be "gov-

erned according to the forms which were her own in former times." But the
one great determination of Austria, Prussia, and Russia was to stand to-
gether in their actions. Above all, they were resolved not to have Britain
ranged in an opposing camp. The tsar, of course, urged intervention, and
his hostility to France's national, anti-Alliance policy grew steadily. Pozzo
di Borgo, according to Gordon, held the French ministry "extremely cheap,"
with the exception of Villele. Pozzo had eminent talents, but unfortunately,
he had belonged to the Capo d'Istria faction and now was trying to regain
favor with the aid of Nesselrode, who remained his warm friend. 23
Despite the protests of Metternich, Montmorency, and Stewart, Alexander
continued to advocate the use of a Russian army to overthrow the Cortes
and the constitution he once had recognized and guaranteed. In support of
this proposal, Tatischev argued that the "Spanish population would receive
the Russians with enthusiasm." 24 But Montmorency put up "an insur-
mountable resistance" to this scheme, and in answering the tsar, he followed
closely VilleIe's conversation with Wellington on September 20. Chagrined,
the emperor replied:
What do you think of me and my army? Think of the great distance which
separates us, and do not forget that you may have need of us to overawe your
demagogues, conspiring with those of Europe.'25
Metternich watched this debate with interest. He realized that by going

across Austria and Italy and taking ship to Spain, France could be by-
passed, but being as little inclined as Villele to permit foreign troops to
cross Austria or Italy, he held his peace, preferring that opposition should
come from Britain and France.26
The ministers of Russia and Prussia endorsed Mettemich's suggestion of
September 11 that Montmorency should draw up a memoire on the views
and aims of France to serve as the basis for official deliberations. In drafting
the desired note, he studied closely Villele's account of his talks with Wel-
lington and concluded that the premier's views had shifted toward a more
aggressive policy.27 Thus Montmorency drafted the memorandum on the
Spanish Question along his own lines, encouraged by the rationalization that
Villele's opposition to war had weakened. But before he finished it, the
23 Gordon memorandum to Canning: "State of Affairs and the Subjects Likely to
Come under Discussion," Vienna, Sept. 22,1822, Well. Desp., I, 297-299.
24 Quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 447.
26 Ibid., p. 448.
26 Ibid., p. '449.
27 See Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 236-238, for the text of this dispatch.
Eastern Question disrupted the conference and decided its adjournment to
Verona.28
On reaching Vienna, Wellington went immediately into conference with
the allied sovereigns and ministers, trying to persuade them to leave Spain
to herself. He especially opposed intervention by France. To Nesselrode
he declared that "England would not suffer the French to wage war on
Spain." Intervention in the affairs of any country, moreover, was not a
proper subject for a congress. 29
On the morning of October 1, Wellington had his first audience with Tsar
Alexander since the Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle. As the duke had antici-
pated, the Russian emperor denounced Spain and portrayed it as "the
headquarters of revolution and lacobinism."
The King and the Royal Family, [he insisted], were in the utmost danger; ... so
long as the revolution in that country should be allowed to continue, every
country in Europe, and France in particular, was unsafe.30
The British minister replied that the objections of his government to inter-
ference in the internal affairs of any nation were insuperable. Britain, in-
deed, had considered that Austria and the Italian states had reason to fear
the revolution in Naples and the secret societies which had fomented it.
But the ministry never had heard of any apprehension of danger from the
Spanish revolution, nor did he believe France complained of it on the score
of danger. However urgent the demand of the King of Spain, it could not
justify an invasion of that nation to overthrow its existing institutions. Both
the Liberals and ultra-Royalists in France and Spain, and Ferdinand VII,
were all trying to provoke a war between the two kingdoms.
In rebuttal, the tsar, undoubtedly influenced by Metternich and Pozzo
di Borgo, maintained that France could not be trusted to invade Spain; the
loyalty and military quality of the French army were too questionable. He
refused to depart one iota from his insistence on armed intervention, which
should be a joint project of the Alliance. When Wellington informed him
that France had 100,000 men on the Spanish border, his Majesty showed
great dismay, because his secret agents had reported that France "had not
half that number of men disposable for service in Spain." His audience
with the tsar convinced Wellington that the deliberations at Verona would
center almost entirely on the affairs of Spain. But the clashing views of
28 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 3.

29 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 460-46l.
30 Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 343.
France and Russia, he thought, would cancel each other, thus resulting in
the decision to leave Spain alone. 31
Since the outbreak of the Greek insurrection in April 1821, Anglo-Austrian

policy in the Eastern Question had remained unchanged. This policy, it
will be recalled, advocated the observance of existing treaties, prevention
of a Russo-Turkish war, termination of the atrocities which attended the
Greco-Turkish war, and maintenance of strict neutrality. Differences be-
tween the tsar and the sultan arising from the Russian claim to protector-
ship of Orthodox Christians in Turkey and over navigation of the Straits
should be reconciled through mediation. If this effort succeeded in avoiding
hostilities, the question of Greece might be cautiously discussed. As Castle-
reagh had observed in his instructions for the conference, it would be diffi-
cult not to deal with the Greek provisional government, but the London
cabinet should not recognize it nor force the Greeks to submit to the Porte.
Above all, England should not become involved in either dispute - Russo-
Turkish or Tuko-Greek - beyond the limits of good offices. 32
During the interval between the Hanoverian rendezvous and the Vienna
conference, the Russo-Ottoman crisis had abated, though no solution had
been found. In February 1822, Tatischev had been sent to Vienna for
negotiations on the Eastern Question (March 8-April 12) which resulted
in the tsar's complete acceptance in May of Metternich's proposals and the
announcement that he would renew diplomatic relations with the Porte
when the Principalities were completely evacuated. 33 Evacuation had begun
on May 13, and on July 19, 1822, Sultan Mahmud II had appointed two
Rumanians as hospodars: Gregory Ghica for Moldavia and Jonitza
Stourdza for Wallachia. Pleased with these results, the tsar had proposed
a conference between Russia and Turkey at Podolsk, where the Porte could
announce officially the evacuation of the Principalities and the return of the
31 Ibid., pp. 345-346.

32 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 285-286.
33 Lebzeltern to Mettemich, st. Petersburg, May 22, 1822, Mettemich, Memoires,
III, 443. For Mettemich's notes on his talks with Tatischev, and the official protocols,
see ibid., pp. 431-450. Despite Capo d'Istria's recommendation that Count Pierre
Tolstoy be given this mission, Alexander, much to the embarrassment of the foreign
minister, chose Tatischev, whom Nesselrode had nominated. Capo d'Istria, "Ma
carriere publique," Sbornik, III, 279. Tatichev returned to Vienna at the end of June
to renew the conversations on the Eastern Question. Jubilant over this diplomatic
triumph, Mettemich boasted that it was "the greatest victory ever won by one cabinet
over another." Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 191.
hospodars, and so make possible the renewal of direct relations. 34 Finally,
on August 10, Mohammed Sadik, the Turkish foreign minister, had de-
clared to Lord Strangford and Count Llitzow that the Ottoman Empire had
complied with every demand to which Russia was entitled under existing
treaties; therefore, he considered the mediation of Austria and England at
an end. Any further intervention by the allied powers could delay the
restoration of relations between Russia and Turkey.3s
But with characteristic indifference, the Turks blandly delayed the exe-
cution of their promise to evacuate the Principalities until a Russian
minister had returned to Constantinople. This rebuff, coupled with Turkish
accusations that Russian agents had fomented the Greek insurrection and
the renewal in August of the decree closing the Straits to commerce in grain
(a measure that severely hurt the Russian wheat export trade of which
Odessa was the emporium), so exasperated the tsar that his conciliatory
mood of May gave way to severity during August. But though his attitude
toward the Turks changed, his opinion of the Greeks did not. He arrived
in Vienna on September 9, complaining that "All or most of my servants
are either Greeks or Liberals. With such men, how can one avoid
trouble?" 36
On September 19, 1822, Mettemich received from Strangford the protocol
of a conference which he had had on August 27, with the Reis-Effendi and
the Salih-Effendi (Grand Marshal of the Empire), Gianib Tschaousch-
Bachi. The chancellor gave a copy of this precis, together with other letters
from Strangford, to Nesselrode, but the Russian foreign minister was afraid
to show the tsar one dispatch in which the British ambassador to the Porte
had complained of the activities of the Russian agent Andre Dashkoff;
34 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822,
F.O., Austria, 120/54; Depeches inedites du chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars de
Valachie, ed. Count Anton von Prokesch-Osten (Paris, 1877), II, 150; Lobanov-
Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 411. The last Turko-Persian war (1821-
1823), by diverting men and material from Greece and by convincing the sultan that
he should avoid hostilities with Russia at the same time, assisted Strangford in
obtaining these concessions from the Porte.
35 Stuart to Bathurst, No. 246, Paris, Sept. 5, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48, quoting
dispatches from Constantinople of August 10 and Vienna of August 24, 1822. On
November 1, 1821, Mohammed Sadik had replaced the more moderate Hamid Bey
as Reis-Effendi. Strangford to Castlereagh, No. 143, Constantinople, Nov. 10, 1821,
F.O., Russia, 181/46.
F.O., Austria, 120/54; Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 152; Gordon memorandum to
Canning, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 299; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia
and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 395; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 170-171, 192.
consequently, he suppressed it, thereby creating an incident which embar-

rassed the allies. 37
During his August 27 conference with the Reis-Effendi and Grand
Marshal, Strangford had announced his mission to Vienna and had offered
to inform the allied sovereigns of the Porte's views. The proces-verbal of
his conversation with the Ottoman ministers, which the Russians regarded
as "a romance from beginning to end," enraged the tsar by revealing
Strangford's Turkophile bias. Why had a minister charged with representing
Russian interests not contradicted the Turkish accusations against Russian
agents? Why had Strangford seemed to accept the allegation that the Porte
had remained faithful to its treaties while Russia had broken them?38
Tatischev declared impatiently: "These affairs shall be ended only by
cannon fire. "39
Perceiving this hostile attitude, Mettemich feared that Tatischev and
other members of the Russian delegation would destroy Strangford's repu-
tation before his arrival in Vienna. He was alarmed, too, that unless some-
thing was done quickly to mend the damage caused by Strangford's blunder,
Anglo-Austrian mediation in the East would be seriously compromised.
Mettemich, therefore, came to the defense of the British diplomat and dis-
covered Nesselrode's suppression of Strangford's report on the activities
of Dashkoff. He then revealed to the tsar the entire contents of Strangford's
letters and succeeded in correcting Alexander's impressions of the ambas-
sador. As a result of this affair, the tsar condemned all his ministers who
espoused the Greek cause, denouncing them for supporting a movement
the success of which would prove his own ruin.4-0
Friedrich von Gentz, secretary of the conference, also was astonished at
the contrast between the sentiments of the tsar and the conduct of his agents
and generals on the frontiers of the Principalities. Their intrigues, as well
as those of Greek emigres, Gentz and Mettemich were convinced, had
caused no end of inconveniences which had resulted in the present attitude
of the Porte. But Alexander was sincere in disavowing every agent who
P.O., Austria, 120/54; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 3; Gentz, Depeches inidites, II, 441.
38 Ibid., pp. 144-145; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vien-
na, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18,
1822, Well. Desp., I, 540; Vie1 Castel, La Restauration, XI, 450-455.
39 Ibid., p. 457.
40 Gordon memorandum to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 298-
299; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822,
F.O., Austria, 120/54; Viel-Caste1, La Restauration, XI, 457; Gentz, Depeches inedites,
II, 146.
obstructed his policy of restoring order in the Principalities. Indeed, he dis-

missed Pini, the Russian consul general at Bucharest, capital of Wallachia,
and Pisani at Jassy, capital of Moldavia. Pini was replaced by Minciaky,
while the Jassy post was discontinued; thus Minciaky became in 1822 consul
general for both Principalities. Gentz, who read the instructions sent to
Minciaky, certified that they conformed to the avowed principles of the
tsar.41 One accomplishment of the Vienna conference was, therefore, the
purging of the Russian diplomatic and consular staff in the Balkans in the
interest of peace.
On September 26, two days after Strangford's arrival in Vienna, Nessel-
rode submitted to the conference a memoire on the Eastern Question in
which the tsar expressed deep regret that so little progress had been made
in the last eighteen months in bringing the Porte "to satisfy the just demands
of Russia." Turkey, moreover, had adopted measures which paralyzed the
commerce and prosperity of Russia's southern provinces. The note con-
cluded with a list of new conditions which must be met before diplomatic
relations with the sultan were restored. 42
Concerning Greece, the Porte was given a choice of action: either enter
into direct negotiations with Russia and her allies for granting toleration
and amnesty to those Greeks who returned to their former allegiance, as
called for by the Austrian memorandum of April 19, 1822; or prove "by a
series of deeds" that the Greek religion would be respected and peace
re-established in Greece on a just and durable basis.43
Nesselrode insisted that the Porte must completely evacuate Wallachia
and Moldavia and permit Russian agents to verify that the measures taken
conformed to existing treaties. 44
Relative to commerce and navigation, Russia exhorted the Porte to
revoke "all measures taken to restrict the commerce and free navigation
of the Black Sea." Turkey again was offered two alternatives:
41 Ibid., pp. 153-155; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 407.

Both Pini and Pisani were Greeks, as, indeed, were nearly all of the Russian consuls
in various cities of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to his appointment, Minciaky had
gained experience in dealing with the Porte as the Russian Chancellor of Commercial
Affairs in Constantinople. Stephen P. H. Duggan, The Eastern Question: A Study of
Diplomacy, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law,
XIV, No.3 (1902),623.
42 Nesselrode to Montmorency: Copy of Note, Vienna, Sept. 26, 1822, France et
les etats divers de l'Europe, 1822: Le congres de Verone, A.A.E., Vol. 723.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. The Principalities had been occupied in March 1821 and were not com-
pletely evacuated until 1826.
(1) Either accept the Passage [through the Straits] of Sicilian, Portuguese,
Spanish, and other vessels [sailing under their own flags],
(2) or else respect the [Russian] flag which has protected these ships, this
custom being sanctioned by long practice.4l'I
This memoire was not received calmly by the conference. It annoyed France
and Prussia, because they had thought the Russo-Turkish dispute indefinite-
ly adjourned and had regarded the Greek Question as nearly ended. Lord
Strangford protested to Mettemich that:
A victim was necessary for offended Russian pride, and they wanted to offer
me up as the holocaust! But the sacrifice shall not be killed without resistance,
and the calf, while struggling, shall shake the temple. They have thrown down
the gauntlet! Well, I shall take it up, and since they have made me the champion
of the Turks, I shall play the role! 46
True to his word, Strangford, in conversations with the allied ministers,

insinuated that the Turks were completely right and the Russians wrong,
and that Baron Stroganov was the real culprit responsible for the Greek
revolt.
Astonished by his tactlessness, and fearful that it would undermine the
Anglo-Austrian entente in the East, Mettemich, for the second time during
the Vienna deliberations, undertook to repair damage caused by Strang-
ford's blunders. To achieve this end he resorted to duplicity, that subtle and
effective weapon of a skillful diplomat. He assured Nesselrode that he had
answered, as circumstances required, the unjust slanders of the Porte. No
one would believe Russia guilty of fostering "revolutionary insurrection."
To Strangford, on the other hand, the chancellor deplored the temper of
the Russian note, severely criticized Tatischev, and attributed to him the
unexpected change in the tsar's attitude. 47
Believing tension too high for serious negotiations, Metternich began to
press for an adjournment to Verona. But first, Nesselrode's note had to be
answered. The Austrian reply, delivered on September 30, praised the tsar's
conduct and the moderation of his memoire, promising support for its
proposals. Metternich regretted that the Porte was not "intelligent enough
to distinguish the policy of the powers from the activity of a sect whose great
objective was to disunite the allied courts and especially the two imperial
courts." 48 Prussia and France also replied on September 30. The Prussian
45 Ibid.
46 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722.
47 Ibid.
48 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 458.
note was similar to the Austrian, while the French paper was vague and
general. Montmorency promised only that France would cooperate "to
inspire in the Porte dispositions capable of assuring the re-establishment of
good understanding and diplomatic relations." 49
Wellington received the Russian note upon his arrival in Vienna on
September 29. His reply, transmitted two days later, was an apology for
Lord Strangford which was not likely to please the Russian. court. The
Iron Duke declared that the ambassador deserved the tsar's commendation
for past concessions obtained from the Porte. Strangford regretfully could
not deny the Turkish accusations against Russian agents in the Balkans,
since he had no proof that they were false. The tsar, Wellington affinned,
was not shown the dispatch which accompanied Strangford's precis of the
August 27th conference, because it named the Russian agents. If his
Majesty had known the facts, surely his sense of justice "would have pre-
vented his passing a censure on this minister." If Metternich were annoyed
that Strangford had come to Vienna without bearing good news, Wellington,
notwithstanding his defense of the ambassador, thought he had made a
"false movement" in coming at all.5()
But Wellington, convinced that Russia had a case regarding Turkish
restrictions on Black Sea commerce, desired Strangford to be more forceful
in pressing for a settlement of this issue. Consequently, he requested Can-
ning to urge the sultan to grant the petition of those powers which were
seeking permission to pass the Straits under their own flags. If these negoti-
ations were successful, the just rights of the Porte would be preserved and
Russian commerce would be placed upon "a better footing than it was
before, inasmuch as a legal commerce is more secure than one under a false
flag." The London cabinet, of course, preferred this alternative to the
former Turkish policy of permitting ships to sail the Straits under false flags.
a practice which had hurt the British carrying trade. 51
After the Russian note had been answered, the allied sovereigns and
ministers were ready to leave for Verona. All of Wellington's efforts to
49 Ibid., pp. 458-459.

50 Boislecomte, AA.E., 722; Wellington to Nesselrode, Vienna, Oct. 2, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 337-339; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 540; Wel-
lington's note paralleled closely the arguments used by Metternich in defending
Strangford, as Stewart had recorded them on September 24, 1822. It is probable that
Gordon conveyed this information to the duke at Munich. Stewart to Bathurst, No.
11, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions," TRHS,
3rd ser., VII, 123.
51 Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 353; Canning to
Wellington, London, Oct. 25, 1822, ibid., pp. 431-433; Strangford to Wellington,
Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., pp. 469-470.
delay their departure failed, and on October 2, the mass exodus from Vienna
began.
4. Italian Questions
Since the affairs of Italy had been reserved for the Congress of Verona, they
received little consideration at Vienna. It will be recalled that the "avowed
and known" purpose of this congress was to discuss the situation in Naples
and Sardinia-Piedmont. 52 Metternich continued to pretend that Italian ques-
tions would be the first to occupy the attention of its sessions, a deception
which apparently achieved some success. 53 But at Vienna France raised
two Italian issues: the evacuation of Naples and Sardinia and the complex
and delicate Charles Albert affair, which stemmed from the ambivalent
role that prince had played in the Piedmontese insurrection.
Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, was a scion of the cadet line of the
House of Savoy and heir-apparent to the Sardinian throne. A youth of
twenty-two at the time of the revolt, he was French educated and a veteran
of Napoleon's army. His political views were liberal and anti-Austrian, but
by nature he was a waverer. When a delegation of conspirators, led by
Santorre di Santarosa, invited Charles Albert on March 6,1821, to lead the
struggle for a united Italy, free from Austrian domination, he had vacillated
between approval of the plan, rejection, and conditional espousal of it. On
the morning of March 7, he had consented to join the movement, but with
night came sober reflection and disenchantment. The next day, the prince
had withdrawn his support of the conspiracy and had demonstrated his
fidelity to the House of Savoy by warning King Victor Emmanual I of the
impending crisis. Disturbed by this volte-face. Santarosa on the 9th had
countermanded the revolt, but too late to prevent the garrison at Alessandria
from launching the insurrection that very night, March 9-10. Two day later,
the soldiers and university students of Turin had followed suit, and on
March 12 Victor Emmanuel had abdicated in favor of his brother Charles
Felix, Duke of Genevois, rather than accept the Spanish Constitution of
1812 and war against Austria, as Santarosa demanded. But Charles Felix
was in Modena at the time. Until his return to Turin, Victor Emmanuel
had entrusted the regency to his cousin Charles Albert who, immediately
yielding to the demands of the rebels, had proclaimed on the 13th the
Spanish constitution, though subject to the approval of Charles Felix. There
seems little doubt that the regent sincerely believed this action necessary
to save the throne for the new king and thereby to protect his own inherit-
52 See above, pp. 3-5.
68 Blacas to Serre, Rome, Oct. 13, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 505.
ance. But four days later (March 17) an envoy of Charles Felix had arrived
from Modena with a manifesto rejecting the constitution and ordering
Charles Albert to repair to Novara where General Count Victor Amadeus
Della Torre (or de La Tour) had mobilized about half the Piedmontese
army which remained loyal to the king. On the 21st. the prince had obeyed.
riding at the head of his cavalry regiment. Upon his arrival in Novara. how-
ever. he had received another order from Charles Felix. exiling him to
Florence where his father-in-law Ferdinand III (who was Emperor Francis
I's brother), ruled as Grand Duke of Tuscany.54
Soon it was rumored in Turin that the king was determined to dispossess
the Prince of Carignan. The general feeling at the Sardinian court was that
the prince's infant son should be educated by the king and designated as his
successor. These troubled waters were made even more turbulent by the
intrigues of Mettemich, who since 1814 had wanted to exclude Charles
Albert in favor of the reactionary Archduke Francis N of Modena. the
Austrian emperor's first cousin. That the chancellor had not completely
abandoned this project is indicated by the violent attacks which Count
Heinrich von Bombelles, the new Austrian minister at Florence. aimed at
the heir-apparent on the eve of the Vienna conference. 55
By September 1822. the Charles Albert affair had long received the
serious attention of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. The Paris cabinet,
alarmed over the possibility of an agreement which would increase Austrian
influence in Italy, supported the prince, alleging that the doctrine of legiti-
macy required the recognition of his claim. But this appeal to principle not-
withstanding, France's Italian policy was conceived realistically with due
regard for the traditional Bourbon interest in the House of Savoy. French
54 The best discussion in English of Charles Albert's conduct in March 1821 is

that of Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, Being a Political History of Italy from
1814 to 1871 (London, 1899), I, 31-34, and II, App. A., pp. 384-385; two excellent
accounts in Italian are: Cesare Spellanzon, Storia del Risorgimento e deU'Unita
d'ltalia (Milan, 1933-1951), I, 848-854, 857-860, and Nicomede Bianchi, Storia docu-
mentata della diplomazia europea in ltalia daU'anno 1814 all'anno 1861 (Turin, 1865-
1872), II, 339-340; cf. Pietro Vayra, La leggenda di una corona: Carlo Alberto e Ie
perfidie austriache (Turin, 1896), pp. 135, 141, 259; for a contemporary report, see
Rodolgo de Maistre, "Simple recit des evenements arrives en Piemont dans les mois
de mars et d'avril 1821, par un officier piemontais," in Gli Scritti di Carlo Alberto
suI moto piemontese del 1821, ed. Vittorio Fiorini (Rome, 1900), pp. 61-157. Schroe-
der, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 117-118, gives a good, brief analysis based largely
on Austrian sources deposited in the Staatsarchiv in Vienna.
55 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; William Hill to Castlereagh, No. 15, Genoa, Aug.
18, 1821, F.O., Sardinia, 67/63; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 227n-228n.
On March 14, 1820, a son named Victor Emmanuel had been born to Charles Albert
and Maria Theresa of Tuscany.
agents, moveover, in their zeal to combat the Austrian preponderance in

Italy (especially in a kingdom situated on France's southeastern doorstep),
sometimes committed acts which, to say the least, violated diplomatic eti-
quette. Duke Emeric-Joseph de Dalberg, the French minister at Turin, in-
deed had assisted the Piedmontese conspirators by permitting them to hold
secret meetings in the French embassy; and the attitude of the Marquis de
La Tour du Pin, the French charge, became so obnoxious that Baron
Friedrich Binder von Kriegelstein, the Austrian minister, even accused him
of having incited the insurrection. When news of the revolt reached Paris,
Pasquier dreamed of substituting the French charte for the Spanish consti-
tution in Sardinia and Naples. Toward this end, he suggested Anglo-French
mediation in both kingdoms, but Castlereagh's rejection of the proposal and
the collapse of the Neapolitan revolution quickly foiled this scheme. France,
of course, did not instigate the Piedmontese revolt, but her policy in general
and the compromising activities of Dalberg in particular raised again the
spectre of French interference in the Apennine Peninsula. 56
Russia, no less than France, sought to undermine Habsburg hegemony
in Italy. The Russian legation at Turin especially was active in trying to
increase its influence in Sardinia, while thwarting the schemes of Metternich.
It was Count Georges de Mocenigo, the tsar's minister, who had obtained
the reduction of Austria's occupation force in Piedmont from 15,000 to
12,000 men. 57 Thus when the news of Charles Albert's fate reached st.
Petersburg, Nesselrode immediately directed this able diplomat to secure
the speedy return of the prince by pressing Charles Felix to grant him a full
pardon. But much to Mocenigo's indignation, his remonstrances were
ignored. Even George Frederick Petitpierre, the Prussian minister at Turin,
joined the ranks of the prince's defenders, despite the fact that the Berlin
cabinet in 1822 could not afford openly to gainsay Austria. Petitpierre,
therefore, covertly assured William Hill, his British colleague, of his govern-
ment's sympathy for Charles Albert and requested him to exert his influence
in behalf of the prince.58
Charles Albert, in his own defense, stoutly maintained that he never had
56 Hill to Castlereagh, No. 20, Genoa, Sept. 8, 1821, EO., Sardinia, 67/63; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 461; Spellanzon, Storia del Risorgimento, I, 843; Schroe-
der, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 119n and 162; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 335-336.
57 Hill to Castlereagh, Nos. 26 and 27, Turin, Nov. 13 and 25, 1821, F.O., Sardinia.
67/63. In 1816 the tsar, acting on the appeal of Sardinia, had forced Austria to
abandon her claims to Alessandria, the region of Novara, and the Simplon road.
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 359.
58 Hill to Castlereagh, Nos. 6, 24, and 26, Turin, May 28, Oct. 24, and Nov. 13,
1821, F.O., Sardinia, 67/63. Mocenigo, a native of Zante, one of the Ionian Islands,
was a Greek in Russian service.
consented to join the Piedmontese rebels and wrote an historical memoire

to that effect which he showed first to Duke Pierre Louis de Blacas, the
ultra-Royalist French ambassador at Rome, and then to Mocenigo. Both
were impressed with the justice of his cause as was ex-king Victor Em-
manuel, who pardoned his cousin for his actions during the interval of a
few days. But Charles Felix remained adamant. A judicious appraisal of the
Sardinian king's position, however, should take into account the fact that
his realm was occupied by 12,000 Austrians. Had he done anything inimical
to Habsburg interests, retribution would have been swift. There is no doubt
that his first loyalty was to Sardinia, for on more than one occasion he
declared to the allied sovereigns his determination to resist any interference
with the internal affairs of his government.59
At Vienna, France alone was free to raise the question of the Prince of
Carignan and to support him openly. Russia pretended disinterest in this
affair. For the sake of the solidarity of the three eastern powers, the tsar
could not display the dirty linen of the Alliance by quarreling with Austria
over Italy. Metternich found this affair quite disconcerting, for he did not
dare avow his design of substituting an Austrian archduke for Charles
Albert in order to extend Austrian control over the strongest of the Italian
states.
Although this policy did not change at Vienna, it appears that the chan-
cellor's opinion of the Prince of Carignan did. Metternich at first believed
in Charles Albert's guilt but later came to the conclusion that the evidence
was insufficient to prove his complicity. In short, he was no longer certain,
but still suspicious. GO In reply to the French foreign minister, therefore, he
circulated a confidential memoire, asserting that
to dispossess the Prince de Carignan would be an offensive and false policy,
but the King [Charles Felix] seems to be decided on it; he is very tenacious in
his ideas; this question is highlyembarrassing. 61
On this point, Bemstorff confided to Montmorency that
the duty of King Charles-Felix was to tell the Congress that his heir-presumptive
threatened to overthrow one day all that had been done for the happiness of his
people; it was necessary that he be judicially deposed, or that he renounce for
himself the right of succession.6:2
59 Hill to Castlerea.gh, No. 15, Genoa, Aug. 18, and No. 24, Turin, Oct. 24, 1821,
ibid.; Vayra, Carlo Alberto, p. 259. The evidence indicates that the prince was lying,
but in any case, his adherence to the conspiracy was only momentary. King, Italian
Unity, II, 384-385.
60 Vayra, Carlo Alberto, pp. 135 and 141; Metternich, Memoires, III, 526-257.
82 Ibid.; d. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,461-462.
In September 1822, Metternich apparently hoped that Charles Albert could

be persuaded to renounce his right of succession voluntarily, but because of
the strong protests of France and the milder opposition of Britain and
Russia, he was willing to postpone a decision on this compromising question
until the Congress of Verona. His views and those of Bernstorff, however,
convinced Montmorency that Austria and Prussia were using Charles Felix
to further their own ends. 63 But how can the apparent contradiction between
the actions of the Prussian foreign minister at Vienna and those of his
minister at Turin be explained? Had Austria forced Prussia to reverse her
policy, or was Prussia attempting to conceal her support of Charles Albert
from Austria? Subsequent developments at Verona indicate that Prussia
was following an independent policy in behalf of the House of Savoy-
Carignan.
The Charles Albert affair was closely associated with the evacuation of
Piedmont, for once Sardinian soil was cleared of Austrian troops, Charles
Felix would have a freer hand in dealing with the succession rights of his
cousin. To obtain this end he needed the support of one of the great powers
of Europe; consequently, he appealed to London and Paris to support the
complete evacuation of his realm at the Congress of Verona. At Vienna,
however, Metternich showed little disposition to reduce the occupying army
in Piedmont or Naples, much less to withdraw it from either kingdom, an
attitude for which the impecunious condition of Habsburg finances was
partly responsible. So long as these troops remained on foreign soil, the
Vienna treasury was relieved of the considerable burden of supporting
them. 64
The evacuation of Naples presented a different problem, for Ferdinand
I considered Austrian bayonets necessary to prop up his insecure throne,
despite the fact that the cost of maintaining 52,000 soldiers was ruining the
economy and thus undermining the absolute government they were suppose
to protect. On the eve of the Vienna talks, Prince Alvaro Ruffo, the
Neapolitan premier (President of the Council of State), had tried in vain
63 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 161.

64 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; Stuart to Canning, No. 257, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822,
F.O., France, 146/48; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 462; Schroeder, Metternich's
Diplomacy, pp. 120-121. When Count Johann Philipp Stadion, the Austrian finance
minister, learned of the Piedmontese revolt, he advised Metternich to withdraw the
Austrian army from Naples for home defense and to forswear an invasion of
Sardinia. His reaction was one of "outraged despair." He remonstrated with the
chancellor "to tell him 'for the love of God' just how this was to be paid for. A
repetition of the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand ... would be required
to do it." Ibid., p. 120.
to float a loan from Great Britain to finance his government through 1822
and 1823. He admitted that the cost of the Austrian army alone took two-
thirds of the kingdom's annual income, while the interest on the national
debt accounted for another one-fourth of the government's revenues. The
occupation costs amounted to 11,450,000 ducats (c. $ 24,761,000), and the
yearly deficit by the end of 1822 had reached 1,550,000 ducats (c.
$ 3,375,000). Taxation was so heavy that it could not be increased. Despite
this serious financial crisis, Ruffo still thought the continued presence of
the expensive Austrian guard was necessary. With Metternich, Ferdinand,
and Ruffo, all opposing the evacuation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
this subject would not have become a problem for allied negotiation, had it
not been for the interest which France and, later, England took in reducing
the size of the Austrian army of occupation.65
Nothing was decided at Vienna on Italian questions, which were carried
over to the Congress of Verona for their final disposition. The Vienna talks,
however, did underscore the strong opposition of France and the weaker
resistance of Russia and Britain to Metternich's Italian policy.
5. A Retrospect
Recent historians of European diplomacy either have ignored completely

the Vienna conference of September 1822 or have relied upon the traditional
interpretation of Sirs Adolphus W. Ward and Charles K. Webster that this
reunion was a mere preliminary to the more brilliant Congress of Verona. 66
But that which appears obvious is not always true. An analysis of the Vienna
conference leaves some doubt that the conventional conclusion is altogether
justified. While Castlereagh's suicide, the late arrival of Wellington in Vien-
na, and fundamental disunity among the allies, all combined to stalemate
the discussion of Spanish and Italian problems, a signal and significant
achievement was scored in the negotiations concerning the Eastern Question
which contributed to the preservation of peace between Russia and Turkey
for six more years. Metternich at last had realized his dream of making the
Austrian capital a "center [foyer] of deliberation" on this issue.
115 William Hamilton to the Foreign Office, No. 57, Naples, Sept. 1, 1822, F.O.,
Austria, 120/54; Serre to Villele, Naples, Sept. 26, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV,
491; Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 307-308; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 462.
68 For example, neither Renouvin, Le XIXe siecle: 1815-1871, nor Albrecht-Carrie,
Diplomatic History of Europe, even mentions the Vienna conference; nor does Sweet,
Gentz, despite the fact that Gentz was secretary of the conference and exercised
great influence on Austrian policy in the Near East.
Castlereagh's death had deprived the chancellor of a close personal friend

and staunch ally, whose influence on the tsar was great, but so complete
was the Anglo-Austrian entente that his absence neither stalemated nor
seriously impaired joint efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East.
The decisions reached on the Eastern Question at the Hanover rendezvous
and its sequel, the Vienna conference, reversed the Troppau Protocol, which
had sanctioned armed intervention in the internal affairs of independent
states. In the name of the Alliance, Alexander, once more "grouped" at
Vienna as he had been at Laibach, was restrained from declaring war on
the Porte for the sake either of the sultan's Greek subjects, or the Danubian
Principalities, or Black Sea commerce. The purging of the Russian diplo-
matic and consular staff in the Balkans and the restoration of Strangford
to the tsar's confidence were other accomplishments which promoted the
cause of peace. Since the Congress of Verona subsequently contributed
nothing to alter decisions which had previously been taken, its role in the
Russo-Turkish dispute was distinctly secondary to the Vienna conference.
The special interests of Britain in the Near East had required a return
to active participation in the councils of the Alliance. George Canning was,
of course, aware of this fact and mindful, too, of the unexpected circum-
stances which had resulted in his own ascendancy and the long delay of the
duke's mission. England would be embarrassed if four of the allied ministers
waited three weeks for the fifth and then set out for Italy without him. It
was essential to British prestige, Canning thought, that Wellington not
return ignored and empty-handed from a conference which his predecessor
had helped to plan and of which, albeit reluctantly, the cabinet had ap-
proved. 67
Augustus G. Stapleton's opinion that "no British minister would have
attended the Italian congress, if Canning had been in office three months
earlier" is often quoted. 68 Several recent historians, including the late
Harold Temperley, have repeated this conclusion, and in so doing have
ignored important facts. Not till the end of July had the London cabinet
endorsed participation at the Vienna conference, and no plenipotentiary
had been accredited to the proposed congress at Verona until the end of
67 Lieven-Liverpool interview, London, n.d., quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven,

p. 143 (Lieven's conversation with the British prime minister took place in August
1822 soon after Castlereagh's death.); Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 30, 1822,
Well. Desp., I, 320; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 48l.
68 Stapleton, Life of Canning, II, 36; Temperley, Canning, p. 48n; Bourquin,
Sainte Alliance, p. 321; Kaufman, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 138-140; Marriott,
Castlereagh, p. 342.
THE VIENNA ST ALEMA TE 61
September. The original plan had called for a British representative to be

in the Austrian capital by September 7 and to return home immediately
after the conclusion of deliberations which were expected to last about
three weeks. 69 When Wellington left London, neither he nor Canning nor
any other member of the cabinet foresaw that he subsequently would pro-
ceed from Vienna to Verona, thereby enabling Britain to take part in a
congress for the first time since Aix-Ia-Chapelle. It appears, therefore, that
the unforeseen accidents of Castlereagh's suicide and Wellington's long
illness were largely responsible for the duke's presence at the Italian
congress.
That national rivalry had weakened the Alliance was apparent from the
conversations at Vienna, Austria (secretly), Prussia, and Britain, all opposed
armed intervention in Spain, while the London cabinet objected even to the
exertion of moral or diplomatic pressure. Tsar Alexander wanted to lead a
Russian or, at least, an allied army across the Pyrenees, but Villele and
Montmorency strongly resisted any such project. The premier, however,
desired to reserve to France complete independence of action, while the
foreign minister wanted to cooperate with the Alliance. Faced with the
equally repugnant alternatives of a French army in Spain or the transit of
Russian troops through Austrian territory, Mettemich was on the horns of
a dilemma. He did not want war, being apprehensive that a victorious
France could upset the balance of power established at Vienna in 1815,
but he wanted even less a rupture with Russia. The chancellor, therefore,
resorted to duplicity: to the French, he decried the tsar's bellicose attitude;
to the Russians, he questioned the loyalty of the French army. Spinxlike,
he watched while France and Britain dashed the tsar's dream of Cossacks
in Andalusia. By such oblique means he hoped to allay all threat of war,
whether by France or Russia.
Despite the failure of Wellington's efforts to dissuade the tsar from
interfering in Spain and to prevent the removal of the deliberations to Italy,
his optimism did not dim. He predicted that no action would be taken
against Spain and looked forward to the new opportunity offered by the
Congress of Verona for winning acceptance of British policy. Even Villele
admitted that reports from Vienna had not justified his expectations; he
now doubted that the allies would use force to settle the Spanish Question.
Still the premier viewed the approaching congress with foreboding, for he
69 Castlereagh to Metternich, London, June 22 and July 29, 1822, in Webster,

Castlereagh, App. D, pp. 546, 548-549; ibid., p. 488.
feared the eastern powers would deny France freedom of action in dealing
with Spain. 70
Such disharmony of interests, clashing personalities, and conflicting
policies made it impossible to achieve concerted action at Vienna on any
major issue, except the Eastern Question. This impasse was a portend of
events to come, for the agenda at Verona was determined largely by
deliberations in the Austrian capital. Just as the Troppau conference had
adjourned to Laibach to continue its debates, so the Vienna conference
repaired to Verona to complete its work.
70 Stuart to Canning, Nos. 269 and 271, Paris, Oct. 3 and 7, 1822, F.O., France,
146/48.
PART II
THE CONGRESS AT WORK:

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1822
CHAPTER III
FROM VIENNA TO VERONA:

PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONGRESS
The plenipotentiones of ... [France] must, above all,

avoid presenting themselves at the Congress as re-
porters of the affairs of Spain.... This role might have
been suitable to Austria at.. . Laybach, because she
was determined to invade Naples .... But we are not
determined to declare war on Spain . .. , [and] we are
not under the necessity of declaring war ....
Villele. 1
1. Exodus
The exodus from Vienna began on October 2, with the departure of Francis
I, accompanied by the Austrian delegation and two distinguished Russian
diplomats: Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo. Arriving at Salzburg that night,
they found Count and Madame Lieven waiting to join their party. As they
passed through southern Bavaria on the road to Innsbruck, Metternich
stopped at Tegernsee on the 6th for a conference with King Max Joseph.
He and the rulers of Baden and Saxe-Weimar, having granted their subjects
constitutions under Article XIII of the German Federal Act (June 8, 1815).
feared that the Congress of Verona would be a sequel to that of Carlsbad
(August-September 1819). As spokesman for the liberal German princes.
Max Joseph had been delegated to obtain Mettemich's promise that their
political institutions would not be disturbed. Confident of the support of
France and Russia. the Bavarian king ably carried out his mission. The
Austrian chancellor. in a show of moderation. assured him that the Congress
would not deliberate on the general state of Germany nor on any particular
state of the Confederation. But he denounced the Bavarian constitution and
the revolutionary sect whose influence in the Munich cabinet was incom-
patible with the peace of monarchial Europe.2 As Paul W. Schroeder has
observed:
1Instructions de M. de Villele, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 50-5l.

2Private letter, Innsbruck, Oct. 9, 1822, Metternich, Memoires III, No. 604; 421;
Metternich to Wellington, Salzburg, Oct. 3, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 340; Alphonse de
Beauchamp, "Preliminaires du congres de Verone et de la guerre d'Espagne," La
Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822. VII, 99; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 462-463.
66 THE CONGRESS AT WORK
Metternich objected to all such constitutions not merely because they were
representative, and hence incompatible with absolutism, but also because they
were national, and thus incompatible with the structure of the Austrian Empire.
A national constitution, Metternich believed, would be the death of Austria ....
But if it was in the best interest of Austria not to have a unified constitution,
other German states should not set a bad example by having one .... 3
The next delegation to leave Vienna was the Russian. On October 3, the
tsar took the road to Verona with the rest of his suite which included
generals Prince Alexander Sergeievich Menshikov and Prince Nikita Vol-
konsky, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Emperor's aide-de-
camp. Because Alexander had shown leanings toward Catholicism, his
mother, Empress Marie, had made him promise that while in Italy he would
not visit Rome. Before leaving the Austrian capital, he had had several
meetings with the abbot Prince Hohenlohe, who declared that the tsar was
the annointed of God "to give peace and quietude to the peoples of Europe."
Nonetheless, he did not hesitate to spend a whole evening talking with
William Allen, the famous Quaker abolitionist, who had come to Vienna
expressly for the purpose. 4 Thus Alexander, as he approached Verona, was
again in a mystical and religious mood similar to that which had inspired
the Holy Alliance in 1815.5
Montmorency, like Wellington, lacked instructions to go to Verona. Not
having received an answer to his request for positive orders by October 4,
the foreign minister repaired to Innsbruck to await them. Finally on the
9th, the premier's command arrived, directing him to follow the same course
as the British plenipotentiary. Again France paid England the compliment
of imitating her.6
3 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 16-17,
4 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 395-397.
5 Professor E. J. Knapton convincingly demonstrates that the Holy Alliance did
not result from Baroness Julie von Kriidener's mystical influence on Alexander. In
a well-documented article, he contends that: "The Treaty of Holy Alliance must in
the broadest sense find some place in the long category of proposals to secure the
peace of Europe by means other than the sword." The document was written by
Alexander and shown to Baroness von Kriidener only after he had completed it. It
stemmed from the tsar's reaction to contemporary social and political forces, to
recollections of Sully's Great Design, Saint Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace, and
the writings of many mystics with which Alexander was familiar. Finally, Knapton
maintains that the Treaty of Holy Alliance was the sequel to the "negotiations under-
taken between Russia and England in the autumn of 1804 which led eventually to
the forming of the Third Coalition." E. J. Knapton, "Origins of the Treaty of Holy
Alliance," History, new ser., XXVI (1942), 132-135.
8 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restaura-
lion, XI, 463; Villele to Mme Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 14, 1822, Recamier, Cor-
respondance, I, 443.
FROM VIENNA TO VERONA 67
Wellington and Lord Stewart, it will be recalled, had received their orders
to attend the Congress on October 3, the day of the tsar's departure.
Stewart's instructions were the same as those he had carried to Troppau
and Laibach: observe only. Before leaving Vienna, he had resigned his
ambassadorship and was going to Verona to await his Majesty's orders.
It is not true that his resignation was caused by Canning's ascendancy.
Bathurst's Circular of September 16, telling of his appointment, did not
reach Vienna until the 25th, but Stewart (or Lord Londonderry as he be-
came upon the death of Castlereagh, his half-brother), had tried to resign
before this date. On September 20, he had written George IV, stating that
after eleven years in the diplomatic corps and eight years at Vienna, he
wished to return home to claim his brother's inheritance. On October 15,
Canning consented to his retirement from the Vienna embassy. Stewart
received this dispatch at Verona on the 29th and returned to England in
January 1823.7
While Wellington was in the midst of preparations for the journey to
Verona, William Allen entered his apartment and requested the duke's
assistance in getting to the Congress. He must go, Allen declared, to crusade
for the abolition of the slave trade throughout the world. For this cause,
he carried an appeal from Wilberforce to Tsar Alexander, but because
Austria had blocked entry into Verona to all except official delegates, he
could not continue his quest. Wellington, to assist Allen's mission, made him
an official courier, and in that capacity, he rode all the way to Verona in
the stage just in front of the duke. The departure of Wellington at 1:00
P.M., October 5, completed the Vienna exodus of major plenipotentiaries,
although Stewart, accompanied by Strangford and Gordon, joined his Grace
in Verona at the end of October.s
7 Stewart to George IV, Vienna, Sept. 20, 1822, in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart,
III, 225n; Stewart to Liverpool, Vienna, Sept. 25, 1822, ibid., pp. 225n-226n; Stewart
to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., 226n; ibid., 224, 263-265; Stewart to Canning,
No.1, Vienna, Sept. 26, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54. Although Stewart later seized
upon Canning as a scapegoat, the fact remains that he was tired of public service and
wanted to retire to the estate left him by Castlereagh, valued at £80,000. He had
ample opportunity to return to public life thereafter, but did not. In 1835 he was
appointed ambassador to Russia, but resigned before leaving England as a conse-
quence of criticism of his appointment in Parliament.
S Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, and Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, Well. Desp.,
I, 354, 539, and 542; British Diplomatic Representatives, 1789-1852, Camden 3rd Ser.,
Vol. L, ed. S. T. Bindoff, E. F. Malcolm Smith, and C. K. Webster (London, 1934),
pp. 14-15, 168; Buchan, Sword of State, pp. 54-55, erroneously reports that William
Wilberforce accompanied Wellington to Verona; G. R. Gleig, Life of Arthur, Duke
of Wellington (London, 1903), p. 300. Before his Grace left Vienna, Camereiro, the
Spanish charge d'affaires, called on him to discuss British policy toward Spain and to
2. The Canning Instructions
While the allied monarchs and ministers deliberated in the Austrian capital,
developments were taking place in London and Paris which profoundly
influenced not only the forthcoming Congress but also the fate of the
European Pentarchy itself.
Convinced by reports from Vienna and Paris that the instructions carried
by the British plenipotentiary were inadequate, Canning drafted a series of
notes in September and October which modified British policy toward Italy,
the Near East, Spain, and South America, and contributed to England's
break with the Alliance Stewart's dispatch of September 12, as aforesaid,
prompted the foreign secretary to direct Wellington to Verona. The duke's
dispatches, and especially Gordon's memoire of September 22, 1822, con-
siderably influenced Canning's thinking, but the immediate cause of his
directive of the 27th to Wellington was the A'Court Affair.
Early in September 1822, Sir William A'Court was sent to Madrid to
replace Lionel C. Hervey as British ambassador. During 1820 and 1821,
A'Court, while minister at Naples, had recognized the Neapolitan consti-
tutional government and had criticized Austrian intervention. As a result
of Metternich's protests, Castlereagh in February 1822 had replaced him
with William R. Hamilton. 9 When the news reached Vienna that A'Court
now was going to Madrid, the continental powers were shocked. On the
morning of September 12, Metternich, Nesselrode, and even Montmorency
remonstrated with Stewart, demanding that A'Court be stopped. His mis-
sion, they declared, could be construed as hostile to the Alliance. Surprised
assure Wellington that the Madrid government was anxious to maintain cordial
relations with England. As the two had known each other since 1815, when the duke
was British ambassador at Paris and Camereiro, secretary to the Spanish embassy,
Wellington spoke frankly, declaring that if that was the object of Spain, she must
refrain from provoking 'revolutionary disturbances in France, and must not interfere
in the affairs of other countries." For his part, the charge complained that France
was assisting rebels in Spain and that the allied ministers were encouraging the
Urgel Regency. This was the whole of the conversation. But Austrian spies reported
this visit to Metternich, and later at Verona, the rumor spread throughout the
diplomatic corps that the Cortes had sent Camereiro to the Congress to offer England
commercial concessions in return for support against France. Not only was the report
totally false, but Camereiro never was in Verona. Wellington to Canning, Verona,
Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 546-547; cf. Gleig, Wellington, pp. 301-302, which,
however, spells the Spaniard's name, Carnacero, and does not give his position.
9 A'Court's letter of recall is dated Jan. 16, 1822, but it was not presented until
February 11. Hamilton, who was appointed as his successor on February 12, arrived
in Naples on April 1, 1822, F.O., King's Letter Bks., 90/45; P.O., Miscellanea, Ser. I,
95/453; ibid., 95/680.
at the commotion A'Court's appointment had caused, Stewart requested
Stuart, the British ambassador at Paris, to detain him there until London
had been informed of allied reaction. But A'Court had passed through the
French capital on the 11 th, twelve days before the arrival of Stewart's
dispatch. 10
On the morning of September 26, Baron Philipp von Neumann, the
Austrian charge d'affaires, and Baron Heinrich Wilhelm von Werther, the
Prussian minister, called on Canning to protest the appoinment of A'Court
to the Madrid embassy, alleging that his mission could create the impression
of disunion among the allies.
Although absent in person, Baron Paul Andreiivitch Nicolay, the Russian
first secretary, sent through his colleagues a similar note of protest and thus
joined them in this remonstrance. They requested Canning to recall him
before he reached his destination. At this point in the interview, Viscount
Charles Demartin de Marcellus, first secretary of the French embassy,
arrived and seemed disappointed at finding the others there; however, he
supported the representations of his colleagues. The foreign secretary
countered their arguments be asserting that he did not see why so much
importance was assigned to a new ambassador to Spain. Hervey had been
relieved only because of poor health. Canning treated the matter as lightly
as possible, since he intended to do nothing about it. But the A'Court Affair
aroused his suspicions, and he correctly perceived in it evidence that the
allied sovereigns were contemplating a public declaration on Spain. The
attempt of the French charge to make a separate communication indicated,
Canning thought, "some shade of difference between the views of France
and those of the other Allied powers." 11
The new foreign secretary's insight into the motives behind this allied
demarche led him to send additional instructions to Wellington. On Sep-
tember 27, in the first of a series of notes, Canning modified British policy
toward Italy, the Near East, and Spain. He relaxed Castlereagh's "keep
silent" admonition about Italy and left the duke free to offer suggestions
on the evacuation of Piedmont and to request a reduction of the Austrian
garrison in Naples. If he thought Austrian troops still necessary, he should
revert to his original instructions to keep silent on Italian questions, so long
10 Stewart to Bathurst, No.6, Vienna, Sept. 12, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Stuart
to Canning, No. 260, Paris, Sept. 23, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Montmorency to
Chateaubriand, Vienna, Sept. 11, 1822, Antioche, Chateaubriand. pp. 373-374.
11 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 301-302. A'Court
arrived in Madrid on Sept. 25 and presented his credentials three days later. F.O ..
King's Letter Bks., 90/64.
as they do not affect treaty obligations, the rights of independent powers,

or "the political balance and general tranquility of Europe." 12
A fortnight later (October 15), Canning, in imitation of Oliver Cromwell,
directed Wellington to caution the King of Sardinia to respect the privileges
of the Protestant community of Waldenses or Vaudois residing in his realm;
Britain was concerned about their welfare, future good treatment, and
religious toleration. This was a clear case of Canning contradicting his own
policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of an independent state,
though he did so without menace and through diplomatic channels.13
Concerning the Eastern Question, the foreign secretary declared tersely
that Britain would not go to war to help Russia or Greece against Turkey,
or Turkey angainst Greece, since war would be ruinous to British interests.
Thus he adopted Castlereagh's official posture of neutrality in the Russo-
Turkish dispute, but privately he was a philhellene. Notwithstanding the
assertion of Golo Mann that Canning did not want to help the Greeks,
regarding them as a "rascally set," unofficially he was, in fact, quite sympa-
thetic with their cause. He recognized hem as belligerents (March 1823) and
permitted a consortium of bankers to lend them £ 3,800,000 (1824). As
Stanley Lane-Poole explains, Canning could not openly support the Greeks
in 1822-1823 for fear .he "would be accused of joining the Holy Alliance."
He was, moreover, anxious to avoid entanglement in a continental issue.14
Turning to the New World, Canning united the Spanish American and
slave trade questions: Britain, he affirmed, would recognize only those
states which had completely abolished the slave trade and would not take
part in any declaration on the "rights and dominion of Spain over her
revolted colonies." 15 France, of course, would obstruct any measure for the
effective suppression of the slave trade. Every new British overture to the
Paris cabinet on this subject, Canning complained on September 30, only
served to arouse and strengthen French resistance and to convert a question
of moral duty and political obligation into one of national pride. Through-
out the continent, indeed, there seemed to be a growing conviction that
England desired to abolish the traffic in Negroes as much for reasons of
self-interest as for the sake of humanity.1 6
Canning had qualms about permitting the allies to condemn the slave
12 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 307-308.

13 Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 15, 1822, ibid. p. 358.
14 Ibid. p. 372; Mann, Gentz, p. 270; Stanley Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe, K. G. (London, 1890), p. 116; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe,
1789-1825, p. 419; Temperley, Canning, p. 326.
15 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 304-305.
1e Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 30, 1822, ibid., I, 323.
trade as piracy. Such liberty, he thought, would give them "an authority,
which they might tum to worse purposes; and which, other powers - but
certainly America - would laugh at." 17 But despite these misgivings, he
directed the duke on October 1 to recommend that the maritime powers
should "negotiate slavetrading into piracy." Confident that the French
government would reject it, he wished to embarrass France by making it
appear that she was the enemy of humanitarian reform. Not possessing
Canning's diplomatic adroitness, Wellington did not understand this
maneuver; nonetheless, he carried out his chief's order.1S
There were two proposals, however, which Canning thought the Congress
could accept: (1) a convention by the allies to refuse "admission into their
Dominions of the produce of ... Colonies belonging to Powers who have
not abolished, or who notoriously continue the Slave Trade"; (2) a covenant
renewing the denunciation of the Congress of Vienna in the name of the
whole Alliance, or in the name of the three remaining powers, if France
declined.1 9 But Canning, realistically, did not expect the Congress to do
much about this iniquitous commerce.
Concerning the European Spanish question, the British foreign secretary
on September 27 made his famous "come what may" statement:
But if ... there is entertained by the Allies a determined project of interference
by force, or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his
Majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, -
so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impractical
in execution, - that, if the necessity should arise, ... I am to instruct your Grace
[Wellington] at once frankly and peremtorily to declare, that to no such inter-
ference, come what may, his Majesty shall be a party.20
Canning made it clear, however, that the London cabinet's decision "to
abstain from all interference in the internal struggles of Spain" did not mean
that Britain had abandoned her right to self-defense against the "external
violences" of Spain ish subjects. The royal navy, in short, would continue to
protect British shipping from the ravages of Spanish corsairs. Spain's
inability to prevent piracy in the West Indies., indeed, caused Canning on
October 15 to complain to Wellington that "in the present situation of Spain
with respect to her colonies, we suffer equally from the maintenance of her
17 Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 1, 1822, F.O., Continent: Congress of

Verona, 92/48.
18 Ibid.; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 28, 1822, ibid., 92/49; Boyce,
Diplomatic Relations, p. 68; Petrie, Wellington, p. 224.
19 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 324·325.
20 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, ibid., p. 304.
claim of sovereignty by herself, and from the violation of it by her lawless

subjects." .21
Canning's note of October 15, the last transmitted to Wellington before
the opening of the Congress, concluded a series of dispatches by which he
amended Castlereagh's instructions. Canning, in resume, relaxed his prede-
cessor's laissez-faire policy toward Italian affairs, united the Latin American
and slave trade issues, and questioned the wisdom of authorizing the Al-
liance to declare the slave trade piracy, but - certain of a French veto -
made this request in a move to embarrass the Paris cabinet.
3. The VilleLe Instructions
On August 26, the French council had directed Viscount Fran~ois Rene de
Chateau briand, ambassador at London, to join La Ferronnays and Caraman
at Verona. Three days later Montmorency had left Paris for the Vienna
conference, refusing to be guided by any written memorandum or to
promise to follow the oral instructions given him. Reports from Vienna soon
convinced Villele, who had been appointed president of the council on
September 4, that the foreign minister was not representing the views of the
council and that his diplomacy would forfeit France's freedom of action in
dealing with the Spanish Question. Villele knew, of course, that Montmo-
rency was jealous of him, being resentful of his elevation to the premier-
ship, which the foreign minister had coveted for himself. For these reasons
Villele hoped that Montmorency would return to Paris at the conclusion of
the Vienna conference, whereupon Chateaubriand would leave for Verona
with general instructions for the Congress. 22
While the foreign minister awaited the premier's command at Innsbruck,
the council deliberated over Chateaubriand's instructions, which Villele,
who was charged with the direction of foreign affairs during Montmorency's
absence, had drafted on August 30. These circumstances and lack of infor-
mation about the Vienna exodus kept Chateaubriand in Paris for three
weeks. At the time of his departure for Verona on the night of October 5,
21 Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 15, 1822, ibid., p. 357.

22 Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, and No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3,
1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug. 27, 1822, Antioche,
Chateau briand, p. 359; Villele, Memoires, III, 33-34; La Rochefoucauld, Memoires,
VI, 395-396; VII, 69-71; VIII, 131, 150-151; Villele to Serre, Sept. 15, 1822, Serre,
Correspondance, IV, 484; Marcellus, Chateaubriand et son temps (Paris, 1859), pp. 282-
284; Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 229; Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," STAS
CXLVII, 407; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII,
561; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 252-253.
he still did not know whether Montmorency or Wellington would attend the
Congress, and Villele did not definitely learn their destination until the 14th.
Chateaubriand's mission. therefore. was to counterbalance the influence of
Montmorency (whom he disliked personally as a rival for the affections of
Julie Recamier), and to serve as the special envoy of Villele. Disagreement
between the premier and his foreign minister and the ambition of the
romantic litterateur, Chateaubriand, were to produce a tortuous, vague,
and vacillating diplomacy at Verona. afterward leading to the resignation of
Montmorency and his replacement by Chateaubriand.23
The French instructions to the Verona delegates covered the situation in
Italy, Spain, and Latin America. In Villele's view, the action of the Congress
should be focused on Italy in order to distract the tsar's attention from the
east. To put an end to Austrian intrigues, Naples and Piedmont must be
evacuated and Charles Albert. whom France recognized as the hereditary
prince of Sardinia. reconciled with Charles Felix. The object of French
policy was to defend the small states of Italy and Germany from the ex-
panding hegemony of Austria. Negotiations on these issues were placed in
the hands of Caraman and La Ferronnays.24
Turning to Spain, Villele ordered the French delegation to leave France
a free hand in dealing with the Spanish Question and not to permit any
interference by the Congress. No aid should be sent to the Urgel Regency,
whose cause was hopeless, and especially must the tsar be prevented from
sending troops into Spain. To emphasize his views, the French premier
declared: "We are taking charge of Spain ourselves." Villele speculated
that Austria could be forced to endorse Russian demands for armed inter-
vention in order not to offend the emperor. who had supported the Austrian
invasion of Naples, and that Prussia would follow suit. Britain, he correctly
assumed, would object to any form of intervention and try to stop it. While
France did not need, and would not accept, material aid against Britain,
she would welcome moral support from her allies to prevent British inter-
ference in Spain. 25 But Villele, realizing that any discussion of the Spanish
23 Stuart to Canning. No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Chateau-
briand to Marcelius, Paris, Sept. 16, 1822, Antioche, Chateau briand, p. 380; Chateau-
briand to Villele, Paris, Oct. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance generaie, ed.
Louis Thomas (Paris, 1912-1924), III, 265; Villele to Marcellus, Chateau briand, p.
282; Villele to Mme Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 14, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance,
1,443; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 444-445, 455; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue
des deux mondes, CXLIII, 560-561; cf. Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 249.
1/4 "Instructions pour les plenipotentiaires fram;:aises au congres de Verone du 30
Aout 1822," A.A.E., Le congres de Verone: correspondance et protocoles, Vol. 721.
25 Ibid., cf. Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 231-234.
Question could cause great embarrassment to France, preferred that this

controversial issue not be raised at Verona. In subsequent dispatches to
Montmorency as well as in talks with Stuart, he reaffirmed and expanded
his pacific, wait-and-see policy.26
Concerning Latin America, France strongly supported the recognition of
Brazil and the Spanish American colonies, in order not to leave to Britain
the advantageous position of being the most favored nation. As a further
blow at British commerce, VilleIe proposed an international convention
allowing "no particular power special advantages" in South America. 27
The Villele instructions reveal that the Paris cabinet "did not want to be
the executor of a European policy in Spain" but intended to follow one of
its own. 28 It is equally clear that French policy was motivated by: (1) rivalry
with Austria in Italy, (2) fear of Russia, and (3) jealousy of Great Britain's
commercial position. Despite his independent attitude, VilleIe had no
desire to withdraw from the Alliance, for such a move would leave France
to face Britain without support. The basic design of his policy, therefore,
was to persuade the allies to support France against Britain, while leaving
the former a free hand in Spain. 29 But Villele was badly served at Verona
by Montmorency and Chateaubriand.
21; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 23, Oct. 12 and 15, 1822, Villele, Memoires,
III, 70-71, 115-116, 122-123; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, quoted in
Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 261; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 17, 1822,
A.A.E., Congres de Verone, Vol. 721; Stuart to Canning, No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822,
and No. 271, Paris, Oct. 7, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48. Tarnawski contends that
Villele was as much an apostle of war as Montmorency, but was more nationalistic.
Schroeder argues that the premier was "neither pro-nor antiwar, but - unwilling to
be committed to any step which might prove embarrassing later.... " These views
are contradicted, however, by evidence in the Quai d'Orsay, the Villele family archives,
and by the published statements of the premier's colleagues. Fourcassie's investigation,
which parallels my own, also indicates that Villele resolutely championed a policy of
peaceful coexistence with Spain, fearing that war would ruin French finances which
were still in a precarious condition. Notwithstanding Schroeder's opinion that Villele
gave Montmorency an impossible task at Verona, what actually ensued was quite
close to what the premier wanted and expected to happen. Ferdinand Franz Tar-
nawski, "Der Kongress von Verona" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Vienna, 1925), pp. 198-200, cited by Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 209n;
ibid., pp. 208-209; Journal du marechal de Castellane, 1804-1862, ed. comtesse de
Beaulaincourt and P. Le Brethon, (Paris, 1895-1897), I (1804-1823), 451; Chateau-
briand, Congres de Verone, p. 36; Jean Fourcassie, Viltete, pp. 229-231, 235-236;
Irby C. Nichols, Jr., "The Congress of Verona, 1822: A Reappraisal," Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly (hereafter cited as SWSS Qu.), XLVI (March 1966), 385-
399.
27 Instructions pour Ie congres de Verone, Aug. 30, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de
Verone, Vol. 721.
28 Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 233.
29 Temperley, Canning, pp. 57-58.
4. Reunion in Verona: The Congress at Play
While Canning and VilleIe revised their instructions for the Congress in the
light of recent developments at Vienna, the crowned heads of Europe and
their ministers converged on Verona. On October 7, the day after the
Tegemsee rendezvous with the King of Bavaria and oth.er German notables,
Mettemich proceeded to Innsbruck, where he joined his son Victor, Lebzel-
tern, Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and the Lievens. Two days later this
company entered the Brenner Pass. 3{) So impressed was the chancellor by the
majesty of the Tyrolean Alps in autumn, that for a moment he forgot about
affairs of state and exclaimed:
We are traveling through the most beautiful country, in the most glorious
weather, and as there is no hurry, we can make excursions to the right and
lefL31
On the afternoon of Sunday, October 13, they reached Verona. On the 15th
Wellington and Francis I entered the city, preceding by a day the tsar and
his entourage. Their majesties had journeyed at a more leisurely pace in
order to enjoy the festivities in their honor. When the two emperors reached
Tegemsee on October 8, its citizens had put on an extraordinary illumi-
nation for them. As Alexander and Francis passed through the Tyrol, they
had been greeted by mountaineers in their colorful, native dress, singing
folksongs and waving ancient tribal flags. On the 10th, these loyal subjects
had marched into Innsbruck to welcome their sovereign and his august
guest, making the mountains "resound with their acclamations and crys of
joy." 32
With the arrival in Verona of Alexander, Montmorency, and La Ferron-
nays on October 16, the transferal of the Congress from Austria to Italy at
last was complete. 33 All were present who had attended the Vienna confer-
ence, but this select group was greatly augmented by numerous Italian,
German, and Swedish potentates, princes, and notables, British and French
30 Beauchamp, "Preliminaires du congres," La Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822, VII, 100;

Private letter, Innsbruck, Oct. 9, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, No. 604, 421; entries
for Mon., Oct. 7, and Wed., Oct. 9, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 792-93.
31 Metternich, Memoires, III, 422.
32 Entry for Sun., Oct. 13, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 95; Kasirnierz Waliszewski,
La Russie it y a cent ans: Ie regne d'Alexandre ler (Paris, 1925), 111,99; Beauchamp,
"Preliminaires du congres," La Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822, VII, 100.
33 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Verona, Recarnier, Correspondance, I, 444;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 471.
newspaper correspondents, hundreds of attendants, and scores of singers and

actors "come - to amuse the other actors, the kings." 34 On October 14,
Chateaubriand entered the city to join the French delegation, and later in
the month, Lord Richard Clanwillian, who had recently resigned as British
undersecretary of foreign affairs, Lord John Burghersh, minister at Flo-
rence, and Sir Frederick James Lamb, minister at Frankfurt, arrived sepa-
rately to assist Wellington, Stewart, and Strangford. King Frederick William
III, his two sons, Prince William and Prince Charles, and Prince Karl
Augustus Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor, reached Verona on October
15. But the king and the royal princes stayed only overnight in the city, for
the presence of two emperors relegated Frederick William to secondary im-
portance. He had confidence, moreover, in their imperial majesties and in
his ministers (Harden berg, Bernstorff, and Hatzfeldt), to take care of Prus-
sian interests. On the 16th, they left for Venice, not returning to the Congress
until the end of October, only to depart again on November 5 for Rome. 35
Nor did Chancellor Hardenberg remain long in Verona. At the beginning
of November, he went to Rome where he concluded a concordat with the
Holy See. Returning through northern Italy on his way back to Berlin, the
aged prince, then in his 73rd year, was stricken in Genoa with violent cramps
in the chest. After resting in the home of Karl Theodors, the Prussian
consul, he showed some improvement, but at 2 P.M., November 26, he suf-
fered an "apoplectic stroke," causing him to fall into a coma. At 11 P.M.
he died. 36
Of the numerous Italian princes and ministers present at Verona, the most
important were: Ferdinand I of Naples and premier Prince Alvaro Ruffo;
Charles Felix of Sardinia and foreign minister Count Victor-Amedee Sallier
de La Tour (or Della Torre); Grand Duke Ferdinand III of Tuscany and
Minister of the Interior Prince Neri Corsini, the Senior; Archduchess Marie
Louise of Parma (widow of Napoleon) and Count Adam Adelbert von
Neipperg, her premier and consort; Duke Francis IV of Modena and the
Marquis Filippo de Molza, the Modenese foreign minister; Archduke
34 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 33-34; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-

tombe, ed. Maurice Levaillant (cent. ed.; Paris, 1950), III, 133 n; cf. Boislecomte,
A.A.E., 722, 5, 46-49.
35 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Oct. 15 and 29, Nov. 5, 1822, in Gabriel
Pailhes, La duchesse de Duras et Chateaubriand d'apres des documents inedits (Paris,
1910), pp. 218,221, 222-223; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 13, 1822, Chateau-
briand, Correspondance, III, 267; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 4, 69; La Foudre, Oct.
25, Nov. 20 and 30, 1822, VII, 98-99, 242, 309; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 469,
471.
36 Gentleman's Magazine, XCII (Dec. 1822), 643; Georg Heinrich Pertz, Das Leben
des Ministers Freiherrn Vom Stein, (Berlin, 1849-1855), V, 759, 762.
Rainer of Austria, the Viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia and the youngest
brother of Emperor Francis I; and Giuseppe Cardinal Spina, papal legate
to Bologna, representing the Holy See.37
Among the great powers, France had by far the most elavorate official
delegation at the Congress, while Britain, the wealthiest nation in Europe,
sent the smallest. Naples, despite her poverty and endebtedness, also main-
tained one of the largest diplomatic suites.
Other notables who attended the Congress for private or business reasons
were William Allen; Gioacchino Rossini; Manoel Gameiro, the Brazilian
envoy; Gabriel Ouvrard, the French financier and army contractor; the
brothers Solomon, James, and Carl Rothschild, and Prince Oscar of Sweden,
whom the allied sovereigns received coolly, since they regarded him, the
son of Bernadotte, as tainted by the French Revolution.lIs
During their stay in Verona, most of the allied delegations lived at the
Casa Lorenzi. Two exceptions, however, were the tsar and his entourage,
who resided in the beautiful castle of the Marchese di Canossa, and the
Austrian chancellery, which remained at the Palazzo Cappellari. The city
of Verona, with a normal population of 60,000 was so crowded that hotel
rooms could not be had; very modest apartments rented for 4,000 francs
($ 800) a month, and house rentals were more exorbitant. Even a garret
room cost twenty-five German ducats (c. $ 45.00) a month. 39
The deliberations of the Congress were conducted with uncommon
secrecy. Strict censorship, which Gentz called "the supreme law of the
Confederation [of Europe]," 40 was enforced, and passports were required
of everyone entering or leaving the city. Austrian police were everywhere
in evidence. As the Annual Register reported:
Every precaution was taken to baffle prying curiosity; no stranger was allowed
to remain in Verona, without a most satisfactory explanation to the Austrian
37 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 46-49; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 33-34.

General Della Torre and Count de La Tour are, of course, the same person, but
after he became foreign minister, he usually was addressed by the French form of
his title, since French was the universal language of diplomacy.
38 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 411; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 90-91;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 468, 470; Count Egon Caesar Corti, The Rise of
the House of Rothschild, trans. Brian and Beatrix Lunn (New York, 1928), pp. 278,
282.
39 La Foudre, Nov. 20 and 30, 1822, VII, 242, 309; Chateaubriand, Congres de
Verone, p. 33; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 397; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 470; A. M. Allen, A History of Verona (London, 1910),
pp. 341-342.
40 Quoted in Sweet, Gentz, p. 271.
authorities of the business which kept him there; nor was permission even to
pass through that town easy to be obtained. 41
The Congress of Verona was attended by a continuous social whirl of balls,

operas, concerts, banquets, little suppers and soirees, and finally a horse
race, as befitted this last brilliant reunion of the crowned heads and ministers
who had ruled Europe since 1815. At the invitation of Mettemich himself,
Gioacchino Rossini provided the music for the Congress. Lacking time to
create anything new, the famous composer extracted pieces from several
of his operas and adapted them to fit contata form. For one of these, La
Santa Alleanza, Rossini employed a local poet, Rossi, to compose the lyrics.
Working rapidly under the pressure of a tight time limit, the poor poet com-
pleted his commission only to be driven to distraction by the obstinate
Austrian censors who forced him to revise his verses three times to remove
every allusion to politics, war, or peace. But that was not all; when the lyrics
had been cast in their final form to everyone's satisfaction, the Podesta of
Verona, "to make assurance doubly sure, forbade the printing of them on the
only too solid ground that in that case nobody would be able to understand
anything, anyhow!" 42
On the night of November 21, Rossini staged and directed in the well-
preserved Roman theatre a performance of his opera, La Donna del Lago.
which starred Madame Angelica Catalani, one of the greatest sopranos of
her day. The following evening La Santa Alleanza was performed by a ballet
company supported by a choir of twenty-four voices and an orchestra of
125 members. This contata was the highlight of a festival held before a
capacity audience of 23,000 in the great Roman arena, in size second only
to the Flavian amphitheatre (Colosseum) in Rome, but far better preserved.
The program also featured a lottery, to help defray the cost of the Congress,
and a concert of a work by Renaud d'Ast entitled Avec Ie Temps. il y
viendra. But the evening's performance, though a brilliant success, had been
a terrifying experience for the corpulent Rossini. While conducting the
music, he glanced upward and saw to his horror that a large statue of
Concord, under the impact of sound vibrations, was teetering precariously
on its pedestal. Until the concert had ended, it threatened at any moment to
come crashing down on his head. For his next cantata, II Vero Omiiggio.
41Annual Register, LXIV (1822), 218.

42Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone. p. 36; Francis Toye, Rossini: A Study in
Tragi-Comedy (New York, 1947), p. 88.
presented two days later (December 2), he returned to the safer confines of
the smaller theatre beside the Adige. 43
It was not in operas, concerts, and spectacles, however, that the beau
monde of the Congress took their greatest pleasure, but in salons and
soirees. Although Rossini, the god of harmony, sang at these private parties,
so dear to diplomats, he was no competition for the feminine element. In
the cosmopolitan and secular atmosphere of this august assembly, grandes
dames played an influential role in backstairs intrigues and amours. Like
the gods and goddesses of ancient Olympus, this new race of sublime
potentates was delightfully amoral. Tsar Alexander devoted much of his
time to having an affaire with the charming and sensual Frances Anne,
Marchioness of Londonderry and wife of Lord Stewart. The beautiful and
talented Countess Lieven came to Verona to renew intimate relations with
Metternich who had become her lover in 1818. The chancellor under-
standably considered her salon the "only social resource" of the Congress,
and he was not alone in this view. The influence of Dorothea Lieven, none-
theless, was not as great at Verona as it had been at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, for
her affaire with Metternich was no secret. The tsar certainly knew of it and
approved, since this liaison, he thought, promoted cordial relations between
Russia and Austria, but other members of the Russian delegation believed
her to be pro-Austrian. 44
Also prominent in the social life of the Congress were Princess Zenaide
Volkonsky, Countess Tolstoy, the widow of the Grand Marshal of the
Court, and the Archducess Marie Louise. Countess Tolstoy'S parties were
frequented by ultra-Royalists, and her influence with the French delegation
was great by virtue of her recent marriage to M. de Vernegues, a French
monarchist and former agent in Russia. Now a resident of Paris, she was
the intermediary of Chateaubriand and the Empress Elizabeth, dispatching
observations on French politics which the tsar himself studied closely. To
the famous author-turned-diplomat, she was "la bonne comtesse" who gave
him "un grand secours" at the Congress which he did not find elsewhere.
Countess Lieven, he thought, was "a wretched (mechante) creature," and
43 Ibid., pp. 88-89; La Foudre, Nov. 30, 1822, VII, 309-310; Viel-Castel, La Res-
tauration, XI, 470.
44 Private letter, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 560; Toye,
Rossini, p. 89; Herman, Metternich, p. 166; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe,
1789-1825, p. 398; Hyde, Princess Lieven, pp. 1'44-145. It was generally believed at
the time that Metternich was the father of Dorothea's fourth son, George, whom the
wits called "['enfant du congres," supposing that he had been conceived at Aix-la-
Chapelle, but, as Hyde observes, "the jest was ill-timed," for the boy arrived on
October 16, 1819, almost eleven months after the lovers had parted on November 27,
1818. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
the Archduchess Marie Louise, indifferent and antiquated, an unkind view

which Wellington, who took tea and played cards with her, certainly did not
share. At thirty the archduchess was still beautiful, warm, and gay. Her
frequent fetes were quite popular and were well attended by monarchs and
ministers alike. While trying to forget that she once had been Empress of
France, she retained in Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, some of Napoleon's
laws and institutions. It is not generally recognized that her rule in these
duchies was marked by moderation and amnesty, a policy for which Count
Neipperg shared equal responsibility. But this former general, who wore a
black eyepatch, was also "a man of elegant manners." He had so diverted
Marie Louise from thoughts of the past that she "fruitfully cuckolded" the
modern Prometheus. On May 1, 1817, and again on August 8,1819, she bore
her paramour sons, Albertine and William Albert. For two years their
existence was carefully concealed behind castle walls, because Napoleon did
not die until May 5, 1821, and Marie Louise meanwhile did not dare admit
this adulterous union even to her father. But the following September, the
count, in a secret marriage, became the archduchess's morganatic husband,
and by the time the Congress opened in Verona she was again pregnant. 45
It appears, therefore, that Marie Louise was far from being an indifferent
or antiquated person, Chateaubriand notwithstanding.
Among the illustrious ladies who attended the Congress from the various
courts of Italy were Queen Christina of Sardinia, the Vicereine Marie
Elisabeth of Lombardy-Venetia, the Grand Duchess Marie Louise of Tus-
cany, the Duchess Beatrice of Modena, and Lucia Migliaccio, the Duchess
of Floridia, morganatic wife (and former mistress), of Ferdinand I of
Naples. 46
Reflecting upon the grandeur of the Congress sixteen years later, Cha-
teaubriand commented: "Thus all the magnificence of the modern age was
assembled in Verona amidst the ruins of ancient greatness left by the
Romans." 47 The days of petticoat politics, though numbered, had not
passed.
45 Chateaubriand to Mme Duras, Verona, Oct. 25 and Nov. 12, 1822, in Pailhes,
Duras et Chateau briand, pp. 220, 224 (Countess Tolstoy arrived in Verona on October
24 and returned to Paris on November 16.); Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 35;
La Foudre, Nov. 30, 1822; VII, 309; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-
1825, p. 398; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 141; Frederic Morton, The
Rothschilds: A Family Portrait, (New York, 1963), p. 75.
46 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 46-49.
47 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 35.
5. Agenda and Procedure
While the gentlemen of Verona danced. many vexatious problems awaited

their serious attention. The harmony of Rossini's concerts. unfortunately,
had no counterpart in the world of Realpolitik. The discordant notes struck
in Vienna. upon being repeated at Verona, increased in volume. The
members of the European Pentarchy followed their own interests, and no
two powers could be found whose aims were united. Personal jealousies,
too, abounded in cabinets and around the diplomatic green table. If Cha-
teaubriand were disliked and ridiculed at Verona, Pozzo di Borgo was
ardently detested by Canning, Wellington, Villele, Chateaubriand, and Met-
temich alike. While the Austrian prince regarded Canning as a "malevolent
meteor," he cared nothing for Alexander's chimerical schemes, so long as
they did not lead to any practical action. And none of the allied courts
trusted Mettemich. Chateaubriand considered him mediocre and weak;
Canning had no faith in him; Baron Heinrich vom Stein, the Prussian states-
man and historian, thought him lazy and petty, and Baron Peter Meyen-
dorff, a Russian diplomat, observed that duplicity had become second
nature with him.48
At first the continental statesmen and sovereigns did not believe the
substitution of Wellington for Castlereagh would make any difference in
British policy. They recalled that the foreign secretary had publicly
protested against armed intervention in Naples but had privately expressed
sympathy with Austria. 49 But Canning's attitude toward congresses and
the alliance system in general was as yet an unknown factor which caused
anxiety in allied councils. On September 23, Count Achille Fran90is de
Jouffroy, editor of the Gazette de France and a member of the French
delegation, complained to Montmorency:
It is impossible to anticipate exactly the resolutions which the Duke of Welling-
ton shall bring to the Congress. The death of Lord Londonderry has created
a fear of some unfavorable alteration in the dispositions of the London
Cabinet.5~
48 Baron Louis Pierre Edouard Bignon, Les cabinets et les peuples, depuis 1815
jusqu'a la fin de 1822 (2nd ed.; Paris, 1823), pp. 370-371; Boyce, Diplomatic Relations,
p. 53; Temperley, Canning, pp. 61-62, 342; Constantin de Grunwald, Metternich,
trans. Dorothy Toll (London, 1953), pp. 153-154; Chateaubriand to Mme Duras,
Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, in Pailhes, Duras and Chateau briand, p. 224.
49 Martineau, Hist. of the Peace, I, 394; Walpole, History of England, Ill, 49;
Temperley, Canning, pp. 23-24, 47.
50 Memorandum of Jouffroy to Montmorency, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, BFSP, X
(1822-1823), 957.
The Congress did not have long to wait before learning what these dis-
positions were.
The original purpose of the Congress of Verona, as aforesaid, was to
determine whether Austrian forces in Naples and Piedmont should be
continued, diminished, or withdrawn. But with the Congress at hand, Met-
ternich saw that this reason was of no value. He did not wish to give the
tsar another opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Italy and, of course,
of Austria. Nor was the chancellor much interested in events beyond the
Pyrenees, for they were far removed from Austria's frontiers. He had
counted heavily on Castlereagh to calm Alexander's bellicose temperament.
Now the death of the foreign secretary had reduced the influence of Britain
at Verona, leaving the burden of placating Russia almost entirely on the
chancellor's shoulders. While Prussia concurred in these opinions, her in-
fluence also was weak at Verona. 51
The agenda for the Congress was determined primarily by the circum-
stances which had attended the Vienna conference. The late arrival of
Wellington had prevented a British plenipotentiary from participating in
these negotiations and thus had virtually stalemated them. Many questions
raised there could not be answered, while others could not be raised at all.
Montmorency had not finished the memoire on Franco-Spanish relations
requested by Metternich. Discussions of the Russo-Turkish dispute and the
affairs of Italy had been adjourned. Latin American independence and
the slave trade, two questions of international importance. still waited off-
stage, as did a host of other issues which ranged round-the-world from the
tsar's interdiction of trade along the coast of Russian America (Ukase of
September 16. 1821) to Dutch restrictions on the navigation of the Rhine,
from the pretentions of the Order of Malta to the petition of the Senate of
Argos, and from the right of Switzerland to grant asylum to Piedmontese
political refugees to the demands of Britain for repayment of the long-
standing Austrian war debt. 52
The procedure of the Congress was secretive and irregular, for its meet-
ings were not governed by a rigid agenda or schedule. As one court com-
pleted a note it wished to present. a confidential session met to hear it read.
Later, copies were transmitted to the allied delegations who. after the lapse
of a day or two, replied with written memorandums. These in tum were
usually annexed to the minutes of the conference at which the responses
were delivered. Some questions, to be sure, never came before a formal
51Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 41; Pasquier, Memoires, v, 442-443.

52 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 5-10; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 37; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 611-612.
session of the Congress, but were handled entirely behind the scenes either
in private interviews, as in the Charles Albert affair, or through the ex-
change of notes, as in the cases of the Russian ukase and the Austrian
loan.53 But of all issues discussed, that of Spain "loomed largest on the
canvas." 54 It was the first question to be raised when the Congress of
Verona began its work in mid-October, 1822.

04 Temperley, Canning, p. 324.
CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH QUESTION
Congresses had hitherto been a meeting of almost super-

natural beings, whose secret and solemn decisions car-
ried with them a sense of awe and mystery. It was at
Verona that the 'archangels' were 'damaged.'
Temperley.l
1. The Montmorency Memoire
At the opening of the Congress, a spirit of self-confidence and optimism

animated Wellington, for he thought Metternich agreed completely with the
cardinal points of Britain's policy toward Spain: the observance of strict
neutrality and the maintenance of diplomatic relations. The duke's health
improved and likewise his humor, as a host of adoring young ladies im-
mediately surrounded him. To his Grace, "the political sky seemed bright
and the war clouds rolled away." 2 He assured Canning that "all notion of
what is called a European army, or any offensive operation against Spain,
is at an end." a His optimism soon was shattered, however, as much by the
clash of personalities as by conflict of policy. Metternich, he learned, had
deliberately deceived him in order to retain his support in restraining the
tsar.
On October 15, the day of Wellington's arrival in Verona, the chancellor
had secretly proposed to Nesselrode and Bernstorff that the three eastern
courts should take the initiative in a demarche to destroy the Spanish
constitutional regime through moral action. Toward this end the two consti-
tutional powers, Britain and France, should be persuaded to join them in
breaking diplomatic relations with Madrid. A French invasion of Spain
would be so dangerous to France herself, he argued, that such a course
should be discouraged. Only in the event of a Spanish attack on France,
should the Alliance even consider the question of material action. Metter-
nich, in short, maintained that if Europe presented a united front to Spain,
her revolutionaries would be cowed and the problem solved. To have a

2 Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I (1918), 65; cf. Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and
Lat. Amer., p. 141; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 211-212.
3 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 18, 1822, Well. Desp. I, 384.
proper setting for this purpose, the stage had been carefully arranged at
Verona. Clearly the chancellor hoped that moral action in the Iberian
Peninsula would appease the tsar.4
On Sunday night, October 20, Nesselrode, Bernstodf, Montmorency and
Wellington met at Metternich's apartment in the Cappellari Palace for the
first working session of the Congress. Metternich, who was President of
the Congress, served as chairman of this and subsequent formal conferences,
and Gentz, as secretary. The purpose of this meeting was to hear two papers
which concerned the affairs of Spain. The first was the long awaited
memoire on Franco-Spanish relations, which the chancellor .had asked the
French foreign minister to prepare on September 11, and the second was
an appeal from the Urgel Regency.5
Reading from his note, Montmorency declared that despite France's
sincere desire to avoid a rupture with Spain, she suffered from numerous
provocations and attacks along the Pyrenees. France's patience was not
inexhaustible, nor was she "blind to the danger which must inevitably
attend such a state of affairs." The "revolutionary fire" in Spain threatened
not only France but all of Europe. The Paris cabinet, moreover, feared that
at any moment the Spanish government might resort to "formal aggression,"
describing it, however, as "a glorious effort by liberty against tyranny."
Montmorency foresaw that circumstances might occur which would force
the king to recall his ambassador from Madrid, an action which, in tum,
might provoke the Cortes "to make an immediate declaration of war on
France." War, he contended, was possible, even probable, though for France
it would be a defensive war. But guided by principles of moderation and
loyalty to her allies, France wished to submit this great question to the
grand alliance for consideration. 6
She is above all convinced, [Montmorency affirmed], that ... the concurrence
of the great powers is necessary in order to preserve that unanimity of views
which is the fundamental character of the alliance, and which it is of the utmost
importance to maintain and emphasize as a guarantee for the repose of Europe. 7
4 "Memoire confidentiel sur les affaires d'Espagne et de Portugal," Oct. 15, 1822,
Austria, Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Kongressakten, Verona, Fasc. 43, cited
by Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 211-212 (Gentz was the author of this
memoire.); entry for Tues., Oct. 15, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 96; cf. Temperley,
Canning, pp. 66, 73.
5 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 409; Boislecomte,
A.A.E., 722, 75; entry for Sun., Oct. 20, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 97-98.
6 Communications verbales de M. Ie vicomte de Montmorency, Ie 20 octobre 1822,
Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 52-53.
7 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
To ascertain the policy of each of the allied courts in the event of a Franco-
Spanish war, the French foreign minister, in concluding his note, put three
questions to the Congress:
(1) If France were forced to break diplomatic relations with Spain, would
the great powers "be disposed to take a similar step and recall their re-
spective legations [from Madrid]?"
(2) If hostilities occurred between France and Spain, what "moral sup-
port" would the allied powers extend to France?
(3) If France requested the active intervention of her allies, what "ma-
terial aid" would they be disposed to give? 8
When Montmorency had finished his aide-memoire, he distributed copies
of it to his colleagues. At Metternich's suggestion, another conference on
the Spanish Question was scheduled for October 30 to answer the French
note and to consider what posture should be adopted toward Spain. 9
Having postponed a discussion of the questions posed by Montmorency,
Metternich turned to the next item on the agenda: an appeal from the Urgel
Regency brought to Verona by Count Charles of Spain.1o In this long and
verbose address, the Regency painted in somber colors the adversities which
had convulsed Spain for more than two years. With the captivity of the
king, the ancient liberties of the realm had been lost. Spain could expect no
help from her neighbors, for the King of Portugal was himself held captive,
and France was the source of agents who subverted Europe. The cause of
the Spanish Royalists was the cause of all legitimate thrones. The Regency
requested, therefore, the aid of the allied sovereigns "to restore the King to
his throne and to reestablish all things as they had been before March 9,
1820." 11
No action was taken on this appeal at the meeting of October 20, since
the question it raised could not be separated from those of Montmorency's
note. Four-fifths of the Alliance, moreover, disagreed with the Regency's
views. Only Russia wanted to march an army into Spain but could not with-
out the permission of France and Austria. Under the circumstances, the
petition of the Spanish Royalists was politely shelved, and Count Charles
of Spain was denied a seat at the Congress as the envoy of the Urgel
8 Ibid., p. 54.
9 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29,1822, Well. Desp. I, 457.
10 Boislecomte, A.A.B., 722, 75; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 201; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 481. Don Carlos de Bspagna, a general, was not related
to Don Carlos de Bourbon, the brother of Ferdinand VII.
11 Boislecomte, AA.B., 722, 75; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 481. The
address of the Urgel Regency was dated Septemb~r 12, 1822, and was signed by the
Marquis de Mataflorida and the Archbishop of Tarragona.
Regency, though he was allowed to remain in Verona as an unofficial

observer.12 The fate of Spain had to await the outcome of future delibera-
tions.
In the language of diplomacy, Montmorency's memoire of October 20
meant war, if it meant anything at all. Despite the note's assurances that
France would fight only if Spain attacked her, its defensive character was
only a stalking-horse and was so regarded by the Congress. 13 The purposely
vague, general, and hypothetical language of the paper and the frequent
use of "if" and "may" clauses also stamp its mood as subjunctive. Not once
did the foreign minister mention a specific act of provocation or border
violation.
Since Austria and Prussia wanted to prevent a rupture between France
and Spain, they were careful to take the French paper at its face value. The
tsar, too, understood the true meaning of Montmorency's memoire, though
he wisely chose to play the game according to the rules and pretended to
regard France's posture as defensive. Nor was Wellington deceived, despite
his later avowal in Parliament that he saw in this note "no appearance of
force or menace." 14
By taking the initiative at Verona on the question of hostilities, and by
asking the allied powers, in writing, what they intended to do, if a Franco-
Spanish war should break out, Montmorency had made this issue a congress
affair, which was precisely what Villele wanted to avoid. Not only did the
minister deliberately violate his instructions, but he also misrepresented the
views of the Paris cabinet when he alleged that it feared Spanish aggression.
The premier, indeed, held just the opposite opinion. Montmorency alone
must bear the responsibility for placing his country in such an awkward
position at Verona, for in drafting his memoire, he did not consult any of
his colleagues. He soon discovered, however, that he had rashly opened a
Pandora's box. 15
As the allied ministers left Metternich's apartment on the night of October
20, the uppermost thought in the mind of each was the probability of a
12 Boislecomte, AAE., 722, 75; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. parl., VII, 201.
13 Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 66-67.
14 Ibid., pp. 67-68; Boislecomte, AA.E., 722, 78-79; Wellington to Canning,
Verona, Oct. 22 and 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 409, 457; Pari. Debates, new ser., VIII
(1823), 1225. Wellington's remarks were made on April 24, 1823, in opposition to
Lord Ellenborough's motion to reprimand the ministry for its conduct of negotia-
tions relative to Spain. The Lords rejected the motion by a vote of 142 to 48. Ibid.,
cols. 1l93-1253.
15 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, and No. 271, Oct. 7, 1822,
F.O., France, 146/48; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 78-79; Chateaubriand, Congres de
Verone, pp. 55, 84-85; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 67.
France-Spanish war. And from their private, informal discussions during

the next two days, there emerged a hypothetical plan for a Spanish cam-
paign: If a French army advanced only to the Ebro, it could live easily in
the northern provinces while giving powerful encouragement to the Royal-
ists. If circumstances called the French to Madrid, the march there also
would be easy, and reinforcements could be assured by occupying the line
of frontier fortresses along the Pyrenees.1 6 Wellington, the old soldier,
could not remain a silent witness to these conversations. Recalling the
Peninsula War, he offered the opinion:
If Bonaparte had remained on the Ebro, I would never have thought of at-
tacking him there; but he scattered his armies all over Spain. Having thus given
me the population, I ... was able to oppose him at every point with superior
forces.1 7
It was now too late, the duke thought, for the Cortes to raise an effective
resistance; nothing could prevent even so small a force as 25,000 troops
from reaching Madrid. If Spain were the aggressor, moreover, Britain
"would wish France good luck and do nothing to interfere with her." High
Tory that he was, Wellington revealed clearly his personal anti-revolutionary
bias. But soon thereafter, he resumed his official role, declaring that 100,000
men could not accomplish such an enterprise, so certain and terrible would
be the dangers to which they exposed themselves. 1s
2. The British Remonstrance and Allied Reaction
Between the 20th and 31st of October, the general confusion on the Spanish
Question was so great that several ministers regarded the adoption of a
concerted policy toward Spain as impossible. Only the British delegation
appeared to be free from uncertainty, but all of the great powers were
embarrassed that the apple of discord had been flung into their midst.1 9
The Emperor of Austria washed his hands of the whole question. "The
Russians, if you need them, will help you ... ," he informed Chateaubriand
on October 23; "as for myself, I have more than I can do with Italy....
It is necessary to end this affair and to end it well." Although Metternich
16 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 75-76; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 481-482. On

November 20, Chateaubriand suggested a similar plan to Villele. Chateaubriand,
Correspondance, III, 282-284.
18 Ibid.; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 67; Green, "Wellington and the
Congress of Verona, 1822," EHR, XXXV (1920), 200-201.
19 Entry for Sun., Oct. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 101.
disapproved of France's undertaking a counter-revolution in Spain either
alone or with Russia, he was equally convinced that since Montmorency
had thrown the affair into the midst of the Congress, it would be less
dangerous "even to do badly, than to do nothing at all." He added, how-
ever, that "it is only by continued friction that roughness and resistance are
worn down and smoothed; ... give me time to link the will of Russia, who
wants to rush forward, and that of England, who wants to do nothing." 20
The Prussian cabinet maintained that France was not at all menaced,
that if she attacked Spain, she would be beaten, for she had only "youthful
and inexperienced soldiers and officers in whom no confidence could be
placed." Consequently, there would be no war. Wellington, who shared
these views, knew from his conversations with Alexander, Villele, and
Montmorency, that the foreign minister was a member of the French war
party and that his attitude toward the tsar's projected army of observation
directly contradicted that of his chief. But the duke committed an indiscretion
in revealing to the Congress his conviction that a personal bias motivated
Montmorency's diplomacy.21
By October 22, Wellington was persuaded that the tsar had given up the
idea of attacking Spain, at least for the moment, and would follow the lead
of France. Both Wellington and Metternich had tried to deter Alexander
from pursuing a policy so dangerous to the French government and so op-
posed by the rest of Europe. The Austrian chancellor succeeded, too, in
persuading Montmorency to oppose "the movement of any troops by any of
the Allies, till they shall be positively called for by France." 22 No pressure,
indeed, should have been required, since Villele's instructions had placed
this obligation squarely on Montmorency's shoulders.
In order to clarify this confusion, Tatischev, Metternich, and Bernstorff
agreed among themselves that "France must consider herself an agent of
the Grand Alliance, and that the question of Spain was entirely European."
As Bernstorff put it: France must not "go to war with the Spaniards unless
Europe consents to it; nor must she withdraw her legation from Madrid
unless the other Powers recall theirs." This position was, of course, exactly
what Villele had cautioned his plenipotentiaries to avoid. Consequently,
the French delegation declared to the Congress that "in as much as they had

21 Ibid., pp. 77-78; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, A.A.E., Congres
de Vthone, Vol. 721, 115; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, Well. Desp.,
I, 457; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 474-475, 480.
22 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 22 and 29, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 408-409,
457.
no ambition to dictate to anyone, they certainly would not permit anyone

to dictate to them." 23
In a further attempt to discourage armed intervention, Metternich on
October 24 read to a private conference of Montmorency, Nesselrode, Wel-
lington, and Bernstorff, a dispatch from Count Brunetti, Austrian charge
d'affaires in Madrid, who argued that it would be difficult to determine the
effectiveness of an invasion. Such a policy was so repugnant to Spanish
pride that it would have little chance of success, unless the life of the king
were threatened or a reign of terror ravaged the country. Even some Royal-
ists were cautious about intervention. If war were declared, moreover, the
allied powers would have to state clearly their views regarding the insti-
tutions best suited to Spain and determine the point at which all interests
coincided. If military intervention were decided on, Brunetti concluded, the
last country that should intervene was France; French troops in the Penin-
sula would rouse all the memories left by Napoleon's invasion. 24
The other allied ministers regarded this last opinion as coming from the
chancellor himself, since it was the habitual argument of the Austrian
government to dissuade the Congress from armed intervention. 25 If they
are right, Metternich, realizing that France would never permit foreign
troops to cross her soil, thought that the Congress could prevent war merely
by disapproving French intervention. In any case, the chancellor, by October
26, had become quite distressed at the failure of his diplomacy. He protested
that:
For days and nights, I have had no rest. My head is under a hammer; every-
thing seems, at the moment, to slip between my hands. Three times have I seen
the Emperor of Russia without persuading him to adopt a more moderate
course. If I do not press him toward war, I upset him; if I show myself less
ardent and zealous than he, he ignores me. 26
The complaints of Bernstorff were no less vociferous. As for Wellington,

he sought to restrict discussion on the question to Britain, France, and
Spain. On October 26, he suggested to Montmorency: "All means have not
yet been exhausted .... There remains to us only one way by which we can
extract ourselves from such a complication. Accept our mediation in order
to end your differences with Spain." 27 Montmorency, of course, rejected
this offer.
24 Ibid., p. 80; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 484-485.
25 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,81.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 82.
While Austria, Britain, and Prussia were trying to dissuade France from
war, Pozzo di Borgo and Tatischev were overlooking no argument which
might determine France to favor hostilities. With more finesse than his
ministers, Alexander on October 24 assured Montmorency that he was
aware of France's dilemma, but considered her position as "less delicate"
than his own.
While I might be suspected of nourishing ambitious views with respect to
Turkey, [the tsar confided], no one would think that you seek to conquer Spain.
Your position is all the more excellent because you are on the defensive. It is
for you to decide what you want to do; it is a question that must be treated by
you. As for myself, I shall act only according to your request . ... After having
been condemned for making war against France, ... I shall be happy to wage
it with her .28
It appears that the tsar wanted France to ask for his aid in the west so that
he would have an excuse for not using his army in the east. Still emphasizing
this theme, Alexander, three days later (October 27), pledged to La Fer-
ronnays that not a single Russian soldier would set foot on French soil
without the consent of the Paris cabinet. He remarked, however, that the
French ministry seemed to be showing hesitation and uncertainty in its
decisions, for Montmorency had spoken more strongly at Vienna than he
had since arriving in Verona. Villele, he correctly assumed, was responsible
for this more moderate tone. But France, he argued, was more seriously
threatened by the Spanish revolution than Austria had been by that of
Naples and must adopt the same stand that Austria had taken in 1820. 'I
will not leave Verona,' the tsar declared, 'until this affair is ended. It is
too dangerous to do nothing about it. If the Congress separates without
adopting a common policy, revolutionaries everywhere will be convinced
that we cannot agree on one and that our union is broken. The only aim of
the Alliance is that for which it was formed: to combat revolution.' La
Ferronnays replied that France stood on her note of October 20, of which
his Majesty had approved. France did not want war, but, far from being
guilty of hesitation, she was ready to wage it alone, if she were attacked. The
Paris cabinet, however, must delay a decision on the Spanish Question
until it has received the answers to the French note. Austria, Britain, and
Prussia did not even admit the existence of a menace which might force
28 Ibid., p. 79; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 487 (The italics are mine).
Since the pious Montmorency was almost as visionary and mystical as Alexander
himself, he fell victim to the tsar's charm and persuasion. W.P. Cresson, The Holy
Alliance: the European Background of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1922), p.
113.
France to fight the main army of the Spanish revolution. Consequently, his
Majesty must not press the Court of the Tuileries to adopt any policy until
the reconciliation of these conflicting opinions. The ambassador further
warned that Europe would regard any movement of Russian troops as a
measure intended to coerce France to war, a view which would compromise
her. Unimpressed by these arguments, Alexander reiterated his political
creed: "I believe the formation of an army of observation useful; but it will
remain as distant from you as all the space which separates Russia from
France." After speaking of the satisfaction he would feel at seeing Russian
and French soldiers fighting side by side, the tsar terminated the audience. 29
Metternich, too, suspected dissention within the French ministry regard-
ing its Spanish policy. On the morning of October 28, he explained to Lord
Charles Stewart (now the third Marquess of Londonderry), his request for
a French policy statement:
I wished. . . France to be committed to state what she wanted and what she
aimed at. Whether I had a good or a bad France! I wished to be certain that
there was no disunion among the French Ministers here, and that M. de Mont-
morency and M. de Villele were fairly of the same line, which Chateaubriand's
arrival rendered doubtful, as it was rumored he came to play a great game, as
the avowed confidant of the ... first minister of France.30
The chancellor concluded the interview with a condemnation of the "mad
notions" of the tsar.
By October 28, Metternich had prepared another piece of diplomatic
strategy which he hoped would draw Montmorency from the position he
had assumed in his note of October 20. One of the questions raised by this
memoire was: would the other powers withdraw their legations from Madrid,
if France recalled hers? The Austrian prince wanted to avoid the obligation
of following the lead of France, yet Russia's attitude toward Spain made
it almost mandatory for him to give an affirmative answer to this question.
Metternich knew, too, that Alexander wanted to wash his hands of the
Turkish affair, but to do so, he needed the aid of the Spanish Question. 31
Such was the embarrassing position of the Austrian chancellor.
Metternich began the maneuver by assuring Montmorency that the allies
were ready to give France all the support that she desired. He then sug-
gested that, to save time while their replies were being drafted, the Congress
29 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 83-84; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 489.

30 Londonderry to Wellington, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 475.
31 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., p. 567; cf. Green, "Wel-
lington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 69. Both Montmorency and La Ferronnays support this
view. Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 28, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 160.
should consider the means of communicating their disapproval to the

Spanish government. For this purpose, he listed four alternatives from which
the Congress could choose the one it thought best.
(1) The powers could draw up a collective declaration, announcing to the
Cortes their resolution to recall their legations.
(2) A special declaration condemning the Spanish constitution could be
sent separately by each power.
(3) France alone could recall her minister from Madrid and adopt a
posture toward Spain like that which Russia now assumed toward the Porte.
(4) Britain alone could be charged with speaking to Spain in the name
of Europe. 32
It should be noted that proposal one would obviate the necessity of fol-
lowing France's lead. Proposals two and three would free the allies from
the obligation of withdrawing their ambassadors, if France did. Number
three, moreover, is almost the antithesis of Montmorency's question.
Number four was made to conciliate Wellington by supporting his offer of
mediation and ignoring the issues raised by the French note. Thus Metter-
nich hoped to undermine Montmorency's diplomacy.
These propositions were made to Montmorency as though on behalf of
all the allies, but in fact neither Russia nor Britain knew of them before
they were presented formally on Monday, October 28. The ensuing dis-
cussion, though inconclusive, revealed the moderation of Austria. Metter-
nich favored the sending of a collective declaration as the best means of
frightening the Spaniards. He adamantly refused to recognize that France
had a legitimate cause for declaring war and, therefore, a valid reason for
withdrawing her minister from Spain. Caraman, the French ambassador in
Vienna, proposed that Spain be given two months in which to set the king
at liberty before the allied ministers were withdrawn. This suggestion was
too vague, however, for the allied powers to rest their future relations with
Madrid on it. Seeing the opposition which favored the recall of ambas-
sadors, Metternich adjourned the reunion confidentielle until the next day.33
When the allied ministers met again on the 29th, the chancellor urged
that a collective declaration be adopted as the best means of announcing
to Spain the condemnation of Europe. Again conflicting views postponed
a decision on this question until after the conference of October 30, at
which the French memoire of October 20 would be answered. This Met-
ternichian maneuver served, however, to soften the attitude held by Mont-
morency at the beginning of the Congress, for he now seemed more inclined
33 Ibid., pp. 85-86; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 490-491.
to collaborate with the Alliance. But neither the entreaties of Metternich

nor of Wellington carried any weight with the tsar, who, on October 29,
declared himself ready to conclude a treaty with France, stipulating the
assistance he would give. He announced further his intention of dispatching
an army of 150,000 men through Germany into Piedmont in order to be in
a position to fall upon France, if the Liberal party in that country attempted
a revolution in the absence of the French army, or upon Spain, if the French
army needed assistance. 34
Like all previous meetings, the conference of Wednesday, October 30,
was a secret reunion of the chief ministers of the five allied courts. Its
purpose was to reply to the Montmorency note. In conformity with the
tsar's declaration of the previous day, the Russian answer promised support
to France in all three cases: Russia would recall her minister from Madrid,
if France withdrew hers, and would give France both "moral support" and
"material assistance" in the event of a Franco-Spanish war. Austria and
Prussia, though not wishing to break diplomatic relations with Spain, could
not withstand the combined pressure of France and Russia. Consequently,
they promised to recall their ministers from Spain, "if France were forced
to withdraw" hers. To the second question, Austria and Prussia promised
moral support, but Austria reserved the right to decide for herself the most
propitious means of making this aid "useful and effective." As for the third
question, both Austria and Prussia dodged the responsibility of giving
material support, while giving different reasons for their veiled refusal. Both
courts affirmed that they were ready to grant material assistance, if requested
by France. But Prussia doubted that her geographical position and internal
situation would permit her to give it, and Austria contended that she could
not give armed support unless her allies recognized its necessity. To deter-
mine its "extent, quality, and direction," there must be "a new, common
deliberation of the allied courts." 35 Thus Austria pretended to want another
full congress, while Prussia was even vaguer. Both replies, indeed, were so
fraught with conditions and loopholes that, as guarantees to France, they
were worthless.
Wellington's note, which was the first official statement of British policy
at Verona, contrasted Anglo-Spanish to Franco-Spanish relations since
April 1820. Britain had consistently maintained toward Spain a policy of
non-intervention as set forth in Castlereagh's famous state paper of May 5,
34 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 86-87; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822,
Well. Desp., I, 457.
85 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 91; Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822,
Well. Desp., I, 519; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 58-59; cf. Temperley,
Canning, p. 66.
1820, and had advised her allies to exercise similar restraint. At Troppau
and Laibach, British representatives had opposed the principle of foreign
interference with the internal affairs of an independent and friendly state.
Thus the tenets of British policy were well-known to the allies.36
Conditions in Spain, the duke observed, could best be improved by
Spain herself rather than by foreign powers, whose attempts to assist
Ferdinand VII to overturn what he had guaranteed would only put him in
a false position. Such interference would be an unnecessary assumption of
responsibility which might expose the Spanish king to danger and the
power (or powers) involved to obloquy, possible disasters, enormous ex-
penses, and final failure to achieve the desired result. A general rupture
of diplomatic relations, in short, was more likely to produce greater dis-
turbances in Spain than to allay them. The great object of England was
to preserve peace.
Wellington declined to commit either himself or his government on the
three hypothetical cases of the French note, stating that he could give no
answer until he had complete and accurate knowledge of Franco-Spanish
relations since 1820. Specifically, he had to know "the exact ground of
complaint and the exact cause of war" before he could support the other
members of the Alliance. But because of civil war and other internal diffi-
culties, it seemed improbable that Spain desired to break relations with
France. Regardless of the tone of the Cortes, Spain was in no condition
to endanger France. It appeared unlikely, therefore, that Spain would
provoke war with her neighbor to the north.
While admitting that France had a right to maintain a corps d' observation
along the Pyrenees in view of the civil war in Spain, Wellington denied that
the Spanish revolution threatened other nations with a "moral contagion."
On her part, France should explain the purpose of her frontier army to the
Madrid cabinet in such terms as to satisfy the Cortes. A candid explanation,
the duke thought, could remove some of the Spanish enmity against France.
The British note concluded with the assertion that the French king would
suffer humiliation if he had to call on his allies for assistance. His Britannic
Majesty, Wellington declared, regrets that his allies do not concur in his
opinions. The concurrence of England is so important to this issue that,
without her, you can do nothing, and your efforts to maintain peace - peace
being your object - shall fail entirely.37
36 Wellington's note, Verona, Oct. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 499.

37 Ibid., pp. 499-501; minutes of the conference of Oct. 30, 1822, ibid., p. 504; cf.
Temperley, Canning, p. 67. In the interest of clarity, I have paraphrased Wellington's
concluding statement.
The effect produced by the British memorandum was immediate and

serious. Gentz described it as "an acid work," and Metternich denounced
it as "wholly detestable and a singular example of inexperience." The
probable meaning of the chancellor's remark is that Wellington blundered
in finding in Montmorency's paper "what it did not actually contain, and
what, moreover, it explicitly denied," viz., a French threat to Spain. The
duke broke the rules of the diplomatic game by not accepting the French
note at face value. Indeed, he demolished its thinly veiled hypocrisy and
pretenses by pointing out how absurd it was for France to expect or fear
a declaration of war by Spain. Only Britain and Russia, for entirely different
reasons, found this memoire aggressive in spirit.3 8
Hardly had Wellington finished his reply than an exasperated Mont-
morency hotly denied the allegations that France was in no danger of
Spanish aggression, that Louis XVIII would be humiliated by asking for
aid against Spain, and that Great Britain's approval was necessary for a
successful solution of the question. So long as there existed in Spain a
revolutionary party connected with that in France, the French minister
declared, Spain would be hostile to France. 39 Following this outburst, the
talks were adjourned to the following evening.
It is difficult, nonetheless, to accept Temperley's description of Welling-
ton's note of October 30 as a "bombshell" which prevented the Alliance
from using force against Spain. 40 The duke's memoir came as no surprise,
for Britain had intoned the same refrain throughout 1820 and 1821. British
policy had been clearly presented in Castlereagh's state paper of May 5,
1820, which he reaffirmed on January 19,1821. Wellington, even before he
received Canning's "come what may" dispatch of September 27, had on
October 1 informed the tsar at Vienna that "the objections of his govern-
ment to interference in the internal affairs of any nation were insuperable,
and that such intervention was not a proper subject for a congress." Thus,
when the negotiations on the Spanish Question were resumed at Verona,
the position of each of the allied powers was well-known to all. But so
divided were the continental allies on Spain, that even had Britain connived
at intervention, concerted action would not thereby have been assured.
Gentz makes it quite clear that "persistent great confusion" had character-
ized the talks on Spain long before the meeting of October 30. 41 The sin-
38 Entry for Thurs., Oct. 31, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 103; Boislecomte,
A.A.E., 722, 100; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 68-70.
39 Minutes of the conference of Oct. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 504.
41 Entry for Sun., Oct. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 101; cf. Montmorency to
Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 177-182.
THE SP ANISH QUESTION 97
cerety of Mettemich's denunciation of Wellington's memorandum also may

be questioned. Despite his denial that he had seen the British note before it
was read, there is evidence that the duke had showed it to him and that the
chancellor had even suggested some changes in its phraseology, hoping to
produce a declaration so violent that it would stop the negotiations, force
the withdrawal of all that had been done, and bring about a rapprochement
to the question on an entirely new basis.42 It appears, therefore, that Tem-
perley placed too much reliance on Canning's own explanation of his
Verona policy in the House of Commons and on John E. S. Green, who
seven years earlier (1918) had asserted that Wellington's note had had the
effect of a "storm" on the Congress.4:I
On Thursday evening, October 31, the first general conference of the
Congress was held at the tsar's request. Attended by all thirteen pleni-
potentiaries of the allied powers, its purpose was to obtain formal endorse-
ment of the decisions reached in numerous private and confidential conver-
sations and to receive officially the answers to Montmorency's memoire.
At 8:00 P.M., Mettemich, as President of the Congress, opened the pro-
ceedings with an address on the state of Europe in which he voiced the
hope that "there might be some intervention to check or correct the progress
of the revolution [in Spain]." The four responses to the French memoire of
October 20 then were read. The Austrian chancellor significantly prefaced
his note with the statement that he was replying to a France who was "ready
to defend herself and not to attack." 44 Thus he laid the foundation for
Austrian neutrality if France began hostilities.
After Wellington had finished reading his note, discussion shifted to the
first protocol of the Congress. Montmorency requested that only the three
questions with which his memoire closed be entered in the protocol. Welling-
ton immediately announced to the assembled ministers that Britain "could
never stipulate to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain in any manner"
and demanded that his answer be inserted. When objection was made be-
cause of its length, he asked that it be annexed to the protocol. This request
accepted, Austria, Prussia, and Russia demanded that their replies also be
attached. But these countermoves served only to checkmate each other, for
rather than reveal to the world the disunity within the Alliance, the allied
42 Boislecomte, AAE., 722, 100; cf. Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 68.
43 Canning to the House of Commons, Apr. 30, 1823, Pari. Debates, new ser.,
VIII, 1482-1483; Green, "Wellington," THRS, 4th ser., I, 68.
44 Boislecomte, A.AE., 722, 91; entry for Thurs., Oct. 31, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher,
III, 103; minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 505; Chateau-
briand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 168: Chateaubriand
to Mme Duras, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 374.
ministers decided not to issue a protocol on the conversations held thus far
on the Spanish Question.45
In a further effort to establish a consensus, while taking some moral
action which might satisfy Alexander, Mettemich submitted a revision of
his proposals of the 28th for informing Spain of the Congress's condem-
nation. This time, however, he condensed the four modes of procedure to
three: first, the allied powers could send a collective declaration or separate
instructions to their ambassadors in Madrid; secondly, four of the allies
could intercede with Spain for France, the injured party; or, thirdly, one
power could be chosen to speak for the rest. 46
An analysis of this new Austrian memoire reveals that the first two
propositions of the original note have been consolidated into one. Its second
suggestion would take the Franco-Spanish dispute completely out of the
hands of France, and the third proposal was another attempt, however
veiled, to prevent the separation of Britain from the Alliance. Although
the chancellor did not now suggest England for the role of spokesman or
mediator, as he had on the 28th, his colleagues understood his intent.
Significantly, Mettemich's earlier suggestion that France could emulate
Russia's Turkish policy was missing from his note of the 31st, apparently
because he had come to believe that if France alone broke diplomatic
relations with Spain, war would ensue. 47 Austria was just as anxious to
group France in the west as she was Russia in the east and thus restrain
both.
Because of the acrimonious mood of the session, the discussion of Metter-
nich's memoire was brief and indecisive. Montmorency, anxious to seize
any means which offered an opportunity to escape from the difficult position
in which he had placed himself, welcomed a debate of the alternatives sug-
gested by Metternich. He apparently did not realize that by accepting this
discussion, he was casting France in the role of executrix of the Congress's
will. But La Ferronnays, more astute than his chief, suggested that sending
separate instructions would be the most convenient mode of procedure,
since it allowed each power to draft a note which reflected the circumstances
peculiar to her. Pozzo di Borgo concurred and pronounced it the only
method to which Russia could subscribe. At this point, however, Nessel-
rode raised a new issue which forced an adjournment of the conference.
45 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,96; minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 505.
46 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 96-97; minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822,
Well. Desp., I, 506; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 216.
47 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 85 and 96; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 491.
THE SP ANISH QUESTION 99
The tsar expected, he declared, that when the Congress had agreed on the
type of communication to make to Spain, it would consider what to do if the
allied protest had no effect. Specifically, his Majesty desired that
a treaty or treaties should be signed, stipulating, as far as possible, the Casus

Foederis, the number and description of troops to be furnished by each power,
the line of march and place of assembly of each corps, etc. 48
Nesselrode's demand served notice to Austria and Britain that Russia would
send a hostile note to Spain. Wellington responded by requesting another
five-power conference for the next evening, November I, in order to explain
his position and to cooperate with the continental allies, "if possible, con-
sistently with the principles on which his government acted, or ... at least
not do them any injury." Since the assembled ministers were not prepared
to discuss at this time the question posed by Nesselrode, they approved the
duke's petition and thereupon adjourned the first plenary session of the
Congress. 49
In the wake of this conference, and partly because of the animosity which
it engendered, a long period of angry debate and intrigue ensued during
which the British and Russian delegations vied with each other for control
of French policy. On one occasion, Strangford remonstrated with La Fer-
ronnays:
Consider what encouragement you give to the [Spanish] revolutionaries, if you

show them England separated from the general action of the powers. The great
name of Wellington can produce a prodigious effect in Spain; he is a God to
that country.
When the diplomatic La Ferronnays replied that his court was "too con-
vinced of the purity of the intentions of the English cabinet to believe it
would ever consider giving support to revolutionaries," Strangford, far from
promising neutrality, boasted that Britain "would prevent France from
waging war against Spain as she had restrained Russia in the East." The
tsar, he asserted, "has 800,000 men with which he knows how to do only
one thing; he wants to use 100,000 of them, and that is the whole
question." 00
Wellington, who was less imperious than Strangford, tried a different
48 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 96-97; minutes of conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 505; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 490-491, 498.
49 Minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 506; Viel-Castel,
La Restauration, XI, 498.
00 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 97-98.
tack with La Ferronnays. "Let us suppose," he asked, "that you are already
in Madrid and that only two battles have been required to take you there,
what would you do then? Would you overthrow the constitution, or would
you let it stand?" But the French diplomat adroitly avoided the question
by replying: "If France found herself in such a position and had the good
fortune to set the king at liberty, she would leave it to him, as an inde-
pendent sovereign,. . . to do what he thought best for the welfare of his
people." 51
With no less zeal than the partisans of peace, the trio of Nesselrode,
Pozzo, and Tatischev pushed France toward the abyss of war. Reproaching
the French plenipotentiaries for being intimidated by Britain and deceived
by Austria, they all declared that Russia would support France, if Britain
took the side of Spain. Nesselrode assured La Ferronnays: "If you still
harbor any doubt on this subject and this fear stops you, I can return in
fifteen minutes with the signed engagement." Pozzo urged Montmorency
to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Wellington and to reply with vigor
to the British note, lest it be brought to the attention of Parliament, and
France should suffer a loss of dignity for having "permitted it to pass un-
challenged." 52 As Chateaubriand had observed: "Count Pozzo, quick to
seize his master's ideas, hoisted all sails for the ultras." 53
Meanwhile, the tsar's ardor for war, rekindled by Montmorency's request
for material aid, was kept ablaze by British remonstrances and the dire
prediction of the Italian princes that unless revolution were crushed in
Spain, it would be reborn in Italy. Although Alexander refrained from
making an avowal of his intentions, the tenor of his conversations revealed
a strong desire to set his troops in motion. 54
Wellington, on the other hand, seemed to be obeying to the letter Can-
ning's instructions to break the unity of the Congress, if necessary. But
Metternich was just as determined to preserve it, since Austria's national
interests demanded the maintenance of the Alliance. On Friday morning,
November 1, the day after the first plenary session, he and Wellington to-
gether had warned Montmorency not to bring before the Congress
"dangerous contestations which served no purpose." During the rest of the
week, Metternich called upon the tsar several times to persuade him of the
necessity to preserve peace. Alexander received him graciously, but, ex-
asperated by the arrogant tone of England, he remained adamant in his
51 Ibid., p. 97.
52 Ibid., p. 98; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 492, 498-499.
54 Boislecomte, A.A.B., 722, 99.
desire for war. Pozzo and Tatischev claimed that they had undermined the
chancellor's credit with the tsar. While admitting that Metternich had, in-
deed, influenced the emperor in the Eastern Question, Pozzo explained that
in the Russo-Turkish dispute, the prince's views had coincided with those
of his Majesty. But he who thinks the chancellor must play the same role
in the Spanish Question, the count declared, deceives himself. "Today the
sentiments of the Emperor are entirely opposed to his." 55
At the conference of ministers held on the evening of November I, Wel-
lington again protested against "the objects, views, and considerations set
forth in Prince Metternich's paper, delivered to the Conference of the night
before.... " Metternich immediately denied that his memoire
bore the meaning. .. affixed to it, viz., a determination to interfere in the
internal affairs of Spain, but [expressed] only the ... wish that the intervention
of the Allies to prevent a rupture between France and Spain might lead to a
better order of things in Spain. 56
A discussion ensued as to the best means of preventing such a rupture.

While objecting to a treaty or "anything like menace," Wellington urged
his colleagues to adopt Metternich's suggestion of the previous evening that
"France ... apply to one of the Allies to communicate to Spain for her."
Going along with the duke, the chancellor again proposed Britain for the
task. Montmorency protested against the use of mediation, since there was
no definite area of dispute; furthermore, the "many reserves" and "peculiar
position" of England prevented her from saying for France what France
wished to have said. Wellington replied that Britain was not at all anxious
to be charged with such a responsibility and could not undertake the task
of mediation without the complete confidence of France.57 The true cause
of Montmorency's opposition to mediation was, of course, that he wanted
war.
At this point, Metternich again suggested that the allies might "hold a
common language by separate notes but uniform in their principles and
purpose." 58 This proposal was essentially the same as that made by Met-
ternich to the plenary conference of October 31. Montmorency, Bernstorff,
and Nesselrode accepted this compromise, but Wellington pleaded his in-
ability "to form a judgment upon a hypothetical case." 59 First, he would
55 Ibid., pp. 98-99; Green, "Wellington," TRRS, 4th ser., I, 70; Green, "Congress
of Verona," ERR, XXXV, 201-202; Temperley, Canning, p. 66.
56 Minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 506.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 519.
have to know whether the allies signed a treaty against Spain, and then the
language held by each in its note. As an alternative course, he strongly re-
commended that all powers wanting to interfere in the Iberian Peninsula
should confine themselves to the "external quarrel between France and
Spain." They should take care not to approach Spain as "enemies bound in
a treaty of defensive alliance against her." He emphasized that while
Britain could not join in a "general declaration" against the Cortes, she
would always regard the "peace and honour of France," rather than
"counter-revolutionary projects, ... as the great object of any negotiation
with Spain." Finally, Wellington protested against holding any more general
conferences on the Spanish Question. 60
Having lasted more than three hours, the meeting ended with its members
once again indignant. As the ministers were leaving the conference room,
Wellington asked Montmorency if he would insist on a treaty. The French
minister replied that he considered the Declaration of Aix-Ia-Chapelle (No-
vember 15, 1818) as sufficient. Overhearing the remark, Metternich inter-
posed the observation that "the Protocols of Aix-Ia-Chapelle stipulated
nothing but union." Montmorency answered that he still would be satisfied
without a treaty, but he did not forget Metternich's words as the next
ministerial meeting revealed. 61
The Congress's second plenary session was scheduled for Saturday after-
noon, November 2, to hear the French reply to the allied notes of October
30, and especially to that of Britain. Pozzo di Borgo, it will be recalled, was
responsible for persuading Montmorency to answer the British memoire.
Shortly before 3 P.M., the allied plenipotentiaries began to arrive at Met-
ternich's apartment in the Palazzo Cappellari, the usual scene of such
conferences. 62 Separating into small groups, they engaged in animated
conversation while awaiting the official opening of the meeting. Seeking out
Wellington, who was talking to Nesselrode and other members of the Rus-
sian delegation, Montmorency read to them his reply to the allied notes in
which he thanked the "three Courts of the North" for their sympathetic
understanding and promised assistance. Then speaking directly to the duke,
he confessed his regret that Britain had not seen fit to concert with the other
powers. He saw with pain that the London cabinet's opinions were founded,
60 Ibid., p. 520; minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822, ibid., pp. 506-507;
Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 178-179; cf.
Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 217.
61 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 5 and 99.
62 Ibid., p. 99; entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 104; Mont-
morency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 178-179.
in part, on ignorance of what had passed between France and Spain since
1820. But the facts on this point, he had assumed, were of public knowledge.
France, faithful to the principles of the Union sanctified by the protocols of
Aix-Ia-Chapelle, [he declared], has never kept secret ... her relations with the
Spanish Government .... Moreover, the ... [causes of] the present state of af-
fairs have been revealed so clearly to the ... Four Courts, that no doubt re-
mains of the solicitude of his Majesty's government for preserving peace and
avoiding, on its part, every ... [cause] for rupture. 63
Wellington made no reply to Montmorency's bold declaration, but during
its course, he remarked from time to time: HC'est bien, tres bien." Upon
its conclusion, the British note became the sole topic of heated discussions
among the plenipotentiaries who were still dispersed into groups. At length,
the duke offered to withdraw his memoire, if the other ministers would do
the same. Montmorency, who did not want to separate England completely
from common action, suggested that they could just consider the British
note as "null and void" (non avenue). Nesselrode, however, protested that
a document which had been presented officially to the Congress could not
be withdrawn. In the ensuring debates within the several groups, differences
of opinion became so great that the assembled delegates resolved to adjourn
without having convened the conference. 64
The unofficial meeting of November 2 proved to be the watershed of
the tortuous negotiations on the Spanish Question. It was not Wellington's
protest of October 30 alone which caused a change of procedure, but, as
Gentz complained, Britain's "whole obscurantist system" on this issue. 65
Realizing that nothing could be done with the duke. the continental powers,
from November 2 until the 20th, concerted their policy in secret conver-
sations without him, inviting him only to formal sessions. Thus they side-
stepped the critical impasse with Britain. Wellington was relieved that he
no longer had to attend these confidential meetings where he would be em-
barrassed to object continually to the actions of the allies. But if absent in
person, the influence of his remonstrances certainly was present; moreover,
63 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 100; cf. Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR, XXXV,
201-202. The italics are mine, used to emphasize how Montmorency turned Metter-
nich's own words against him.
64 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 100-101; entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, Gentz, Tage-
bucher, III, 104; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires,
III, 179; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 501-502. Green contends that Wellington's
offer resulted in the practical withdrawal of his famous protest of October 30. He
attributes the duke's proposal to the influence of Metternich. On November 21,
Wellington received a copy of Montmorency's reply, and on the 26th, he transmitted
it to Canning.
65 Entry for Wed., Oct. 30, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 102.
he continued to have private talks with Mettemich, Montmorency, and Tsar

Alexander. The duke admitted that jealousy of Britain by French ministers,
the presence of ultra principles in Paris and at Verona, and fear of offending
Russia, all conspired to impede a Franco-Spanish reconciliation, but he still
believed that allied disunity and the doubts of the French delegation con-
cerning the outcome of war would forestall intervention. Thus, as late as
November 5, he hoped to achieve complete inaction at Verona, though Lord
Stewart did not share his optimism, and Canning foresaw that France might
be driven to intervene in Spain. 66
At Russia's suggestion, the other members of the Alliance, meanwhile,
decided on November 4 to send separate instructions to their ambassadors
in Madrid, since that "mode of proceeding. " [afforded] greater latitude
for discussion and explanation than official notes." 67 These dispatches,
however, "should be such as would lead unfailingly to a break in relations
with Spain." 68 While Montmorency had agreed to send instructions of this
tenor to Count de La Garde, French ambassador at Madrid, he interposed
the reservation that they were subject to the approval of the king-in-council.
Drafts of these dispatches should be shown to Wellington in the hope that
the London cabinet would "go along with" (marcher it cote') the allies, or
at least, not oppose them. The eastern courts, nonetheless, were determined
to act with, or without, the concurrence of England or France. On Novem-
ber 6, Nesselrode announced that Russia would suspend diplomatic re-
lations with Spain, if her note had no effect on the Cortes. Two days later,
the tsar declared this same determination to Montmorency.69
Metternich, the editor of all the notes, received drafts of the French and
66 Entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, ibid., p. 104; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Welling-
ton to Canning, Verona, Nov. 5, 12, and 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 494, 532-533, 555-
556; Londonderry (i.e., Lord Stewart) to Canning, memoranda, Nos. 2-5; Nov. 2, 3,8,
and 14, 1822, ibid., 484-486, 486-489, 510-511, 534-535; Montmorancy to Villele.
Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223, 226; Green, "Congress of Verona,"
EI-IR, XXXV, 202-203, 205; Temperley, Canning, p. 67. On November 5, the tsar
seemed more anxious than ever for a crusade of kings against Spain.
67 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 519; Boislecomte.
A.A.E., 722, 101.
68 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 217. On November 5, the three eastern
powers returned to the idea of a common declaration but abandoned it again the
same day in favor of separate instructions. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 102; Viel-Castel,
La Restauration, XI 502.
69 Boislecomte A.A.E., 722, 102; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, and
19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 180, 223, 226; Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR,
XXXV, 205; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand et la guerre d'Espagne, Part II: Chateau-
briand: ministre des affaires etrangeres," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV (1897),
62.
Prussian dispatches on Friday, November 8. He approved their content and

even considered them moderate, though he made some alterations. Nessel-
rode remitted the Russian instructions on November 9, and Gentz finished
the Austrian draft late the night of the 12th. Wellington was not consulted
on the preparation of any of these dispatches, though Montmorency on
November 8 read the French draft to him. The duke objected to its in-
temporate language so strongly that the foreign minister agreed to moderate
its tone. 70
The two German courts were determined to avoid war, but they were
equally obliged to do something. If they did not assist the tsar, he might
have to yield to the demand at home for a war on the Ottoman Empire.
His sacrifices in the east imperatively demanded an effort in the west.
Alexander acted as though war already had been declared. He wanted to
wash his hands of the Turkish affair, but to do so, he needed the aid of the
Spanish Question. The reward which he now claimed for his forbearance
in the east was the right to send his legions into Spain. The Russian army
had to be put to some use before its morale and efficiency were undermined
by inertia and revolutionary conspiracy. Austria and Prussia were com-
pelled, therefore, to adopt a language consistent with that held at Troppau-
Laibach toward Naples. Though reluctant to express the same principles
on this occasion, they could not risk offending the powerful tsar. 71 Austrian
and Prussian friends of Lord Stewart declared that if a Franco-Spanish war
broke out, which occurrence they thought improbable,
no consideration should induce ... [Austria and Prussia] to take part in ...
[it], as neither their finances nor their position, considering all other abundant
circumstances belonging to it, would allow them. 72
Having done all that was expected of them, Austria and Prussia prayed that
Providence would be kind.
In an effort to gain the secret connivance of Britain, Nesselrode, Tatischev,
70 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510; Wellington
to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 531; Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov.
12, 1822, ibid., 519-520; entries for Sat. and Tues., Nov. 9 and 12, 1822, Gentz,
Tagebiicher, III, 107-108; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4 and 6, 1822, Villele,
Memoires, III, 174-177, 182-190; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11, 1822,
ibid., 200-201; Temperely, Canning, pp. 67-68. Montmorency not only permitted
Mettemich to edit the French instructions, despite Villele's admonition not to trust
the chancellor but also showed his dispatch to Alexander, N esselrode, and Bemstorff.
71 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 457-460; London-
derry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, ibid., pp. 510-511; Wellington to Stuart,
Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., pp. 520-521; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11,
1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 201-202.
72 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 511.
and Lieven called on Lord Stewart on Thursday, November 7. They in-

quired whether Wellington - failing to approve of the course adopted by the
allies in separate notes to their legations in Spain - would, nonetheless,
induce Sir William A'Court, British ambassador at Madrid, "in an indirect,
if not in an open manner, to sustain the object set forth in representations
to the Spanish government?" Stewart professed "perfect ignorance." The
next day he confessed to Canning that the eastern powers seemed to be
pursuing a course similar to that employed at Laibach.
It is singular, [Stewart observed], that Sir William A'Court should stand at
Madrid much in the same position as he formerly did at Naples. The Allies at
Laybach ... addressed separate dispatches, conveying the same sentiments on
the Neapolitan revolution, to their ministers at Naples, and these were to make
a united declaration on the receipt of them, while at the same time, I was
solicited to encourage A'Court in every way, to support secretly the common
effort.7 3
It is perhaps significant that the Russian diplomats called on the half-
brother of the late Lord Castlereagh. If they had been certain of the duke's
attitude, as Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte has observed, there
would have been no need to ask anyone what action he would take. 74 Would
England act toward Spain as she had toward Naples and secretly support
intervention? But if there were doubt in Nesselrode's mind about Britain's
stand on the Spanish Question, there was none in Montmorency's. By the
time the latter left Verona, he was so exasperated by Wellington's tactics
that he complained to ViIlele: "The English plenipotentiary... always
raises difficulties of principle, ... renewing from time to time his efforts to
disunite the Four, or to obtain complete inaction.... " 75 Finally, Metter-
nich himself admitted that Wellington had not been consulted in the matter
of the Spanish dispatches, because of the known "wide difference" between
the course followed by England and that which the continental powers
intended to pursue. 76 The Alliance now excluded Britain, one of the charter
members of the system.
73 Ibid., p. 510.
74 Boislecomte reports that Wellington "desired to separate as little as possible
from the action of the Allies and was not opposed to sending, himself, analogous
instructions to M. A'Court." (Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 103). Green accepts and
repeats this charge. (Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR, XXXV, 205). No credence
should be placed in this report, except possibly, as an indiscretion caused by in-
experience in diplomacy. The correspondence of Montmorency with VilU:le, more-
over, describes the duke's role as one of consistent protest and objection. Cf. Mont-
morency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 202.
75 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., pp. 226-227.
76 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510; cf. Alison,
Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 233n.
3. Dichotomy of the French Delegation
At the beginning of November, Metternich, too, flattered himself that he

had dissuaded Montmorency from taking any belligerent action. France's
allies, the chancellor concluded, had effectively restrained her. But despite
his great diplomatic talents, the prince's optimism was premature. Not only
had he not reckoned with Chateaubriand, whose views on Spain still were
unknown, but he also had underestimated Russian influence on Montmo-
rency, who, since July 1822, had regarded war with Spain as inevitable. 77
Both throne and altar, the foreign minister thought, would benefit from the
"destruction of the anticlerical and revolutionary regime at Madrid." 78
Notwithstanding the opposition of Villele, Mettemich, and Wellington to
war, the arguments of Alexander, Pozzo di Borgo, and Tatischev had
confirmed Montmorency in this view. But if war were his object, he still
wanted the support of the Alliance. Unfortunately, he did not take his
colleagues - La Ferronnays, Caraman, and Chateaubriand - into his confi-
dence, thus placing them in the embarrassing position of being ignorant of
his policy. They knew, of course, that powerful forces were working to
convert Villele to the cause of war, and his language, they thought, oc-
casionally indicated a certain hesitation. Finally, La Ferronnays asked
Montmorency to state clearly his position on the Spanish Question so that
the other members of the French delegation could follow a uniform policy
in accordance with the views of their government. 79
In response to this demand, Montmorency requested Baron Boislecomte
to prepare a list of arguments for and against war. The foreign minister
received this memorandum on November 5, and three days later, he called
a secret meeting of the four French plenipotentiaries at which he submitted
two questions: "Is war with Spain desirable? If so, should we work to bring
it about?" 80 Chateaubriand and La Ferronnays declared in favor of war;
Caraman voted for peace; but the position of Montmorency remained am-
biguous. While refusing to commit himself, the foreign minister appeared
77 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 106-108; Stewart memoranda, Nos 1. and 2, Verona,

Oct. 29 and Nov. 2, 1822, Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 229n, 231n; Fourcas-
sie, Vi/We, p. 231.
78 Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 327.
79 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 98-99, 106-107; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458; Cresson,
Holy Alliance, p. 113; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 507; Gabriac, "Chateau-
briand, Pt. II," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV, 68; Gentile, "Chateaubriand,"
Studi politici, IV, 19.
80 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458.
to favor the maintenance of peace. But he did not deceive Chateaubriand,

who reported in his history of the Congress that Montmorency desired war
so ardently that he represented "all the princes as seized with a warlike
mania," though he visited hardly anyone but the tsar. S1
The one satisfactory explanation of Montmorency's circumspection is
that he realized the danger of compromising himself, if he revealed his true
sentiments to the French delegation. Thus the premier was badly served,
indeed, at Verona, with three of his four plenipotentiaries following a policy
opposed to his own. The reason also becomes clear why Montmorency
wanted to keep this meeting a secret from Villele, and in this, he succeeded.
Nonetheless, the disagreement between the two on what to do about Spain
eventually caused the foreign minister's resignation. For the present, how-
ever, the disunity of the French delegation and the timidity of Montmorency
continued to thwart their efforts to support a positive and consistent
policy.s2
If there were confusion in the ranks of the French delegation as to the
true policy of their chief, there was none in the mind of Wellington, who
knew that Montmorency had demonstrated at Verona an utter disregard
for the views of ViIlele and Louis XVIII on the Spanish Question. Neither
king nor premier thought that France had anything to fear from the Spanish
civil war. But the foreign minister, the duke suspected, hoped that, with the
support of French ultra-Royalists, he could persuade the Paris cabinet to
adopt his policy. Despite his assurances to ViIlele that in everything he had
reserved complete freedom to the king and council, he had agreed to act
in concert with the three eastern courts in withdrawing the French ambas-
sador from Madrid when they recalled theirs.83 In this respect, he had acted
"in a sense more purely European than French." 84 In effect, he had created
a policy of his own in opposition to that of the premier. To break this im-
passe, one of them had to leave the cabinet; on November 22, Montmorency
left for Paris and the showdown with Villele. For the remaining duration of
the Congress, Chateaubriand was in complete charge of French diplomacy.85
81 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 85; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 107-108;

see ibid., pp. 108-114, for Boislecomte's essay on war or peace.
82 Ibid., p. 108; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458-459; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th
ser., I, 61; Pinon, Histoire diplomatique, IX, 458.
83 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 531-532; Mont-
morency to Villele, Verona, No. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223.
84 Temperley, Canning, p. 69. See also Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 68.
85 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12 and 22,1822, Well .Desp., I, 531,536;
Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 566-567; Net-
tement, La Restauration, VI, 265; Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 328.
Though chosen to counterbalance Montmorency's legitimist obsession,

Chateaubriand had become the slave of his own vanity. As early as July
1822, while ambassador at London, he, too, had come to regard a Franco-
Spanish war as both desirable and inevitable, but he carefully veiled this
opinion. At Verona Alexander fed the famous author's ego with personal
attention and compliments. Pretending to take the ambassador into his
confidence, the tsar declared that an invasion of Spain would certainly
restore French prestige.86 Flattered by the thought that the emperor agreed
with him, Chateaubriand adopted this theme and repeatedly urged Villele
to seize this occasion to restore France to the first rank of European military
powers. There was no danger, since all Europe, excepting Britain, would
support France. Success would be easy, and an occupation of Spain would
be unnecessary.87
If England became angry, [he argued], she would not even have time to throw
herself on a colony. As for the Chambers, success covered everything. To
destroy a source (foyer) of Jacobinism, to reestablish a Bourbon on the throne
by the arms of a Bourbon, these are results which outweigh considerations of
a secondary nature. 88
Always ready to suspect Britain of selfishness and ulterior motives, Cha-

teaubriand assured Villele on November 28, that he now saw clearly the
reasons for the violent protests of Wellington against either French or allied
intervention in Spain. Britain, he declared, had concluded a commercial
treaty with the Cortes which gave her liberal trading privileges in the
Spanish colonies. She feared her interests would be jeopardized by the over-
86 Actually Alexander doubted the statesmanship and strength of the French

government to invade Spain. He thought it likely that such an expedition would be
unsuccessful and that the consequence of its failure would be disorders in France.
A victorious campaign, on the other hand, might inspire France to adopt once more
a policy of aggrandizement. What he really wanted, therefore, was intervention by
a Russian or European army. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 613-614; Georges Grosjean, La politique exterieure de La Restauration et
l'Allemagne (Paris, 1930), p. 63.
87 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, Nos. 40 and 41, July 16 and 19, 1822, in
Antioche, Chateau briand, pp. 316-317, 320; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct.
31, Nov. 19, 20, 28, and 30, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 271, 280,
285, 291-292, 296-297; Fourcassie, Ville/e, pp. 233-234; Bardoux, "Congres de Ve-
rone," ST AS, CXLVII, 407; Temperley, Canning, pp. 60-61; Cresson, Holy Alliance,
p. 113. The value of Cresson's views is enhanced by the fact that he used unpublished
Russian materials on the Congress of Verona while secretary of the American
embassy in Petrograd immediately following the March Revolution, 1917. He had
access to both the Imperial Archives and the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives.
88 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance,
III, 271.
throw of the constitutional government of Spain. A reliable source reported,

moreover, that Britain had given Spain "two hundred million francs to use
as she saw fit, and had promised her four hundred thousand more," if it
were needed. 89
With great imagination, the ambitious ambassador formulated a plan for
Spain which he was sure "would arrange everything if it were adopted." 90
He conceived a national policy between the extremes of VilleIe and Mont-
morency: France alone should interfere in Spain, with equal disregard for
the threats of Britain and the wishes of the other allies, "who wanted to
make ... [France] the agent of their resolutions." 91 While recognizing the
value of opposing to Britain a union of the continental powers, so that it
would appear that a war with France meant a war with Europe, Chateau-
briand did not like the wording of Montmorency's note of October 20. He,
like Villele, would not have asked Europe's categorical opinion on the
Franca-Spanish dispute, nor would he have requested material support. He
would have asked merely: "Should we be obliged to go to war, will you, if
England intervenes, embrace our alliance?" 92 Chateaubriand was equally
contemptuous of the notes which the three eastern powers proposed to
send their representatives in Madrid. He thought them insignificant, ob-
serving later in his memoirs: "To this inoffensive procedure, that could not
lead to anything, was reduced that famous intervention of the Congress of
Verona, about which so much noise has been made." 93 Incurable romanti-
89 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid., pp. 291-292. Gabriel
Ouvrard was the source of Chateaubriand's information about a British loan to
Spain; in this case the report was false. On October 18, 1822, Canning sent a strong
remonstrance to the Spanish government, protesting the seizure of British merchant
ships by Spanish privateers and announcing his intention to land troops on the
coast of Cuba to destroy the pirates who used the island as a base of operations.
Mter many complaints and demands for redress of grievances, Spain, not wishing to
lose her only friend in Europe, yielded. She acknowledged Britain's right to trade
with the insurgent colonies and paid 40,000,000 reals (c. £ 500,000) for the liquidation
of British claims. On February 4, 1823, George IV announced in his speech convoking
Parliament, that the complaints of the British government to the Court of Madrid
"respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of His Majesty's subjects in
the West Indian seas" have been redressed and reparation granted. Canning to
Stuart, Nos. 12 and 15, London, Nov. 29 and Dec. 1, 1822, F.O., France, 146/50;
Canning to Bagot, No.3, London, Dec. 10, 1822, F.O., Russia, 181/48; King's Speech,
Feb. 4, 1823, Pari. Debates, new ser., VIII, 2; Canning to the House of Commons,
Apr. 14, 1823, ibid., col. 879; Walpole, History of England, III, 59-60.
00 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, Verona, Dec. 12, 1822, Recamier, Correspond-
ance, I, 454.
91 I bid., II, 4-5.
93 Ibid., p. 63; cf. Paquier, Memoires, V, 449-450.
cist that he was, Chateaubriand dreamed, too, of scrapping the Vienna

settlement and reversing the decision of Waterloo. From Richelieu and
Pasquier, he had inherited the idea of a Russian alliance but developed it
further: perhaps Russia could be persuaded to' take Constantinople in ex-
change for agreeing to the return to France of the left bank of the Rhine. 94
Confident that the premier would triumph over the foreign minister,
Chateaubriand took pains to assure Villele of his loyalty to whatever course
of action the council decided upon. As the ambitious author explained in
his Congres de Verone: "We had no wish to render ourselves impracticable;
we feared lest, if we unveiled ourselves too much, the president of the
council would no longer listen to us." 95 Repeatedly Chateaubriand de-
clared to Villele: "I shall not separate my political destiny from yours....
I am your man .... My stand is taken; you may do with me whatever you
like. I am determined to follow you in bad as in good fortune. If you stay,
I stay; if you leave, I leave." 96 Even in his private correspondence with
Claire de Duras, he consistently maintained:
Despite the faults and enormous stubbornness of VilleJe, I shall not part compa-
ny with him. After all, he is the only capable man in the ministry, and I like
him a hundred times better than the hypocritical, jealous folly and low intrigue
of Mathieu [de Montmorency].97
By such protestations of fealty, however insincere, and by falsely repre-

senting the views of the allies, Chateaubriand deceived the premier and
fostered his own ambition to enter the foreign ministry, which he had long
coveted in order to realize his cherished desire for war.98
In sum, Villele wanted peace with independence of action; Montmorency
favored war in close collaboration with the Alliance; and Chateaubriand
desired war with independence of action.
94 Grosjean, La Restauration et I'Aliemagne, p. 59; Marcellus, Chateau briand,

p. 246; Maurois, Chateaubriand, p. 259.
96 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 20, 30, 1822, Chateaubriand, Cor-
respondance, III, 280, 285, 296-297.
97 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 30, 1822, ibid., p. 297. The
fact that the Duchess of Duras was also a close friend and confidante of Villele may
explain Chateaubriand's discretion in this letter, but on other occasions, he did
confide to her his great desire for war. Her response was to chide him for his great
ambition which "overshadowed every other feeling." cf. Chateaubriand to Mme de
Duras, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., p. 281; Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 255.
98 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 85-86; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 459,
463-'464; Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," STAS, CXLVII, 407; Maurois, Chateau-
briand, pp. 258-260.
4. Triumph of the Franco-Russian Entente
Aware that Montmorency was not following his instructions, Wellington,

on November 12, sent the French premier through Stuart a lengthy memo~
randum on the Spanish Question and Britain's stand on it. When shown a
copy of this document, Mettemich pretended to agree with every opinion
in it, but he declared, nonetheless, that if France followed the "proposed
course of procedure, he must go with ... [her]," and that as he went, so
went Prussia. 99
Two days later (Thursday, November 14), Stewart called on Mettemich
to discuss the Franco-Spanish dispute. The chancellor, in a subdued tone
which sounded strange to one accustomed to his usual arrogance, admitted
the difficulty of getting France to state explicitly her complaints and aims
against Spain, but he still expressed confidence in the "moderation of
France and in her positive decision against an offensive war," though she
"did not see very clearly how to proceed." As for the Spanish revolution,
it was drawing to its close, "even by its own acts, and the terror ... inspired
by the meeting of the Congress."
Suppose we should arrive at doing nothing ... , [Metternich argued]; in the
nation itself, there is no popular feeling that rallies round the constitutional
government. One must not judge Spain by Madrid alone. From the reports from
all sides, we know the country is very sick of its revolutionary position, and
where a revolution does not advance, it is near its death. The work may pos-
sibly be effected, therefore, without our agency, and merely by the aid of our
attitude. 100
Although Stewart made no reply to these views, he did not share Metter-
nich's optimism, for he did not believe that the tsar would give up all his
"diplomatic territory." Nor did he think Russia would consent to delay
action until Montmorency retumed to Paris and the French cabinet reached
a decision. Austria and Prussia, in short, were committed to Russia, who,
in tum, was pledged to support the French initiative. It seemed probable,
therefore, that some positive demarche against Spain would be adopted by
the continental powers before the Congress adjoumed. 101 Within the week,
the astuteness of Stewart's conclusions was demonstrated.
99 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 519; Wellington
to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., pp. 532-533.
100 Stewart to Canning, Verona, Nov. 14, 1822, Londonderry MSS, pub. in Alison,
Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 234n.
1111 Ibid., p. 235n.
The chancellor, of course, continued to warn the tsar of French un-

realiability and British separatism and to insist that the three aims of the
eastern courts should be the forestalling of armed intervention, the re-
establishment of order in Spain, and the maintenance of the Alliance. But
despite these admonitions, Wellington, on the morning of November 14,
found Alexander just as determined as ever to intervene in Spain. For the
tsar, counter-revolution was the goal to be achieved, and war, the only
means of obtaining it. He preferred using a Russian army, but rather than
no army at all, he would have Spain invaded by a French army, supported
by the allies. Spain, he declared, must be occupied by an army of the
Alliance.1 02
On Sunday evening, November 17, Montmorency presented to a confer-
ence composed of Metternich, Nesselrode, Bernstorff, and himself, a "projet
de protocole" which contained the casus foederis requested by Nesselrode
on October 31. This second French memoire was the corollary to that of
October 20. Since the allies already had promised support, if hostilities
occurred between France and Spain, the only question which remained was:
what events would force France to declare war on Spain? Montmorency's
note answered this question. Any of the following cases would cause war:
(1) An attack by Spain on French territory, or an official act of the Spanish
government inciting to rebellion French subjects; (2) the deposition, trial,
or death of the king or any member of his family; (3) a "formal act of the
Spanish government, subversive to the rights of legitimate succession of the
royal family." 103 The foreign minister added that other circumstances could
also lead to war. As casus belli, he cited attacks on, or threats to, the Spanish
dynasty, insults to France or her minister in Madrid, and threats to French
citizens in Spain. 104
After the French "projet de protocole" had been submitted to the confer-
ence, two amendments were proposed. Metternich, always ready with a
diplomatic formula to impede independent action by someone else, sug-
gested that all unforeseen cases should be referred to a conference of the
allied ambassadors at Paris and the French premier for consideration.
Nesselrode insisted that there should be perfect reciprocity between France
and her allies concerning the three hypotheses of Montmorency's note. All
102 Wellington to Stewart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 520; Wellington
to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., 555-556; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplo-
macy, p. 218.
lOS Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 54-55; Wellington to Canning, Verona,
Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 556. Montmorency's note was dated November 14.
104 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 518; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy,
p.218.
of the allied powers, not just France, he contended, should have the right to
request a joint consultation on situations which could become casus belli.
In the ensuing discussion, it was agreed to revise the French "projet de
protocole" to include the Austrian and Russian proposals and to meet the
next day to study the new draft.1 05
Following the conference of November 17, Montmorency sought the
advice of the French delegation on the question of reciprocity. La Ferron-
nays and Chateau briand, both ardent nationalists, opposed reciprocity of
the casus foederis on the grounds that it assumed a parity of juxtaposition
to Spain among the allies which did not exist. While the civil war in Spain
posed a real danger to France, it produced no effect at all in Russia. The
issue, moreover, had been raised in an arbitrary manner. They urged their
chief to exclude, at least, the case of a provocation by Spain. But to Mont-
morency and Caraman, the Russian demand seemed a "genuine exigency."
This debate gives further evidence of the lack of accord among the French
plenipotentiaries at Verona, and it is singular that none of them had anti-
cipated a request for reciprocity.1 06
At the four-power conference of November 18, the amended draft
protocol, which consisted of two articles, received serious examination.
After long discussion, Montmorency, disregarding the advice of La Ferron-
nays and Chateau briand, accepted reciprocity of the casus foederis as "the
most sacred of obligations." The first case was revised to read: "An attack
with military force by Spain on French territory or an official act of the
Spanish government directly inciting to rebellion the subjects of anyone
of the powers." Finally, the casus belli enumerated in the original French
note were deleted, and the document entitled a "proces-verbal." 107
Consistent with their practice of confronting Wellington (who no longer
attended their private conferences), with a fait accompli, Metternich, Mont-
morency, Nesselrode, and Bernstodf called on the duke Tuesday morning,
November 19. The purpose of their mission was twofold: to give him a copy
of the revised proces-verbal and to read to him the final drafts of the dis-
patches which Austria, France, and Prussia proposed to send to Madrid.
They promised to wait for his views before signing the proces-verbal and
urged him to sign it with them. Metternich explained that Austria must act
100 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 556; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 518-519; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 217-
218; Tempedey, Canning, p. 68.
107 Ibid., pp. 519, 521; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Chateaubriand, Congres de
Verone, pp. 54-55; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 218.
with her allies in condemning the Spanish revolution and in recalling her
minister from Spain. lOS The chancellor apparently wanted to convince the
duke that he was acting in an official capacity, and then only under duress.
Anxious to learn Wellington's reaction to the amended proces-verbal of
November 17, the allied ministers waited while he read it. No sooner had
he finished, than he refused to sign the document, describing it as both a
treaty and a protocol which would prevent Britain from taking any useful
part in the discussions between France and Spain. 109 Nor could his Britannic
Majesty admit the probability of the events specified by the casus foederis.
Concerted intervention by foreign powers, moreover, could endanger the
very party it was intended to help. Finally, the duke observed, cases two
and three of Article I of the proces-verbal pertained to points which were
"properly the subject of municipal law."
But the laws which declare the ... sovereign inviolate, [Wellington asserted],
do not equally protect the persons of their august families, and this proces-
verbal may tend to hold out a protection to the Royal Family of Spain which
the laws of Spain do not afford them, and which is not afforded to the Royal
Families of other countries in Europe by the laws of those countries. 110
After the duke's refusal to endorse the proces-verbal of November 17, the
four allied ministers withdrew. That night, in an "informal and tumultuous"
conference, they made some minute changes in the wording of this docu-
ment and apparently relabeled it a "protocole" before signing it. In any
case, what Wellington in the morning had called a proces-verbal," Gentz
that night described as "the Protocol in which the Four Powers set forth
their defensive treaty." 111
All five courts were again represented at the conference of Wednesday,
108 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 544; Wellington
to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., 556. Though Nesselrode had finished the
Russian note by this date, he did not read it to Wellington on this occasion. The
manuscript copy of the proces-verbal found in the Wellington Papers is undated.
Ibid., pp. 648-649.
109 Ibid.; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III,
223; entry for Tues., Nov. 19, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 111; Viel-Castel, La
Restauration, XI. 523-524.
110 Note of Lord Wellington, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone,
723, 128.
111 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Verona Protocol, Nov. 19, 1822, Mettemich,
Memoires, 1111, 609-610, entry for Tues., Nov. 19, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 111;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 523; Temperley, Canning, p. 68; Nichols, "Congress
of Verona," SWSS Qu., XI.VI, 396. This document is also called the proces-verbal
of November 19, since it was signed on that date. TemJlerley incorrectly gives the
15th as the date of its signing.
November 20, Wellington having returned to the diplomatic green table

(from which he had been absent since November 2), to receive officially
the allied instructions to their ministers in Madrid. 112 In a stormy session,
the Iron Duke not only refused once more to sign the proces-verbaux of
October 20 and November 17, but also delivered a Philippic against the
dispatches which the allied courts intended to communicate in extenso to
Spain. While asserting that Britain surely had more cause than France for
quarreling with Spain, he accused the continental powers of deviating from
the policy they had professed to follow but three weeks before, viz., "to
allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible
rupture .... " The apparent object now was to make an insulting declaration
against the state of affairs in Spain which "cannot assist the cause of
France." He requested the allies to withdraw their dispatches or, at least,
to delay their transmission to Madrid, since they would vex the Cortes,
embarrass France and Britain, and result in the severance of diplomatic
relations between the allied courts and Spain. Being apprehensive of these
consequences, his Britannic Majesty could not send a note to the Spanish
government "on the subject of its relations with France"; nor could he "hold
a common language with his allies upon this occasion." Instead, his Majesty
must limit his exertions to allaying "the ferment which these communi-
cations must occasion ... ," although he had failed at the Congress to
prevent the use of provocative language. 113
Following this outburst, the allied ministers agreed, as a meaningless
concession to Wellington, to relabel the protocol of November 17 (not signed
until the 19th), a "prod$-verbal," and Bernstorff accepted two minor
amendments to the Prussian "Instruction ostensible" proposed by the duke.
In the first paragraph, HIes Puissances de ['Europe" was amended to read
HIes Souverains reunis a Verone," and in the second, "les Puissances
Alliees" was changed to "les Souverains reunis." Wellington obviously
wished to avoid any inference that Britain was a party to the allied demarche
against Spain. 114
112 Entry for Wed., Nov. 20, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, Ill; Wellington to
Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 563.
113 Note of Lord Wellington, Verona, Nov. 20, 1822, A.A.E., Congn!s de Verone,
723, 134; cf. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 20 and 26, 1822, Well. Desp., J,
556, 592; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 59.
114 Bois1ecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Verona Protocol, Nov. 19, 1822, Metternich,
Memoires, III, 609-610; Bernstorff to Wellington, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 598; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres
de Verone, p. 75; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 219; Temperley, Canning,
p. 68. Bois1ecomte, Gentz, Metternich, and Villele, all refer to this document as a
protocol.
When this furious meeting had ended, the illusion no longer remained
in Montmorency's mind that Britain might 'go along with" the allies. That
night a weary Gentz confided to his diary the terse comment: "What a
day!" 115 And Chateaubriand, in angry retrospect, declared:
It would have been impossible to use worse arguments than those given by the
Duke of Wellington, and to conceal less adroitly the animosity of the Cabinet
of St. James towards France. The English plenipotentiary imagined he was still
commanding at Waterloo.1 Hi
The final five-power conference on Spain met on the afternoon of Thursday,

November 21, to receive officially Wellington's reply to the entire course of
action taken by the continental allies in the Spanish Question. Reiterating
Britain's opposition to any form of intervention in Spain, the duke read to
the conference the minutes of his verbal answers to the allied ministers on
the 19th (in declining to sign the proces-verbal), and the 20th (upon the
official communication of the Spanish dispatches).117
In the debate which followed Wellington's recital, he learned that the
policy of the three eastern courts would not depend, come what may, upon
that pursued by France, but that they wanted French cooperation, none-
theless, is indicated by their decision to send their dispatches first to Paris
and not to forward them thence to Madrid until the French cabinet had
decided what policy it would adopt. The duke, in response to Metternich's
previous urging, then inquired whether, in the event of a successful invasion
of Spain, that country would be occupied, and if so, would the occupying
force be composed of French troops alone or those of other nations? Speak-
ing first, Nesselrode declared that "this was a matter which must remain
undetermined till the King of Spain should be at liberty, and enabled to
decide for himself whether he would require such [a] force or not." Care-
fully choosing his words, Metternich replied that the occupation of Naples
and Piedmont had been such a burden to Austria that his Imperial Majesty
was unwilling "to saddle any Sovereign with an occupation by foreign troops
unless at his own desire." That the Paris cabinet "could wish to occupy
Spain with French troops," he did not think possible. Disappointed in Met-
ternich's answer, Wellington described it as "a flourish" and avowed to
116 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223;
entry for Wed., Nov. 20,1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, 111,111.
117 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22 and 26, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 563,
591; Wellington to Mettemich, Verona, Nov. 25, 1822, ibid., p. 585. On November
25, Wellington transmitted to each of the allied delegations copies of these minutes
with a covering official note.
Canning that he would not have raised this issue had not the chancellor
assured him on the preceding night that Austria "would not hear of" a
French occupation of Spain. After Bernstorff had seconded the views of his
Austrian colleague, Montmorency declared that the French government
certainly wished to avoid occupying Spain, but that the question depended,
of course, on the ultimate solution of the Franco-Spanish dispute. liS
Following this exchange of views, the discussion shifted to Portugal, which
in August 1820 had followed Spain along the revolutionary path and, on
June 27,1821, had adopted a constitution similar to the Spanish Constitution
of 1812. Then on the eve of the Congress, Brazil had declared her inde-
pendence of the mother country (September 7, 1822). Montmorency asked
Wellington about Canning's assurance of October 1 to De Moraes Sar-
mento, the Portuguese charge at London, that Britain would continue "the
existing guarantee in favour of Portugal," when Castlereagh had declined
to give such an assurance. The duke explained that the late Lord London-
derry had refused only to guarantee that kingdom's political institutions,
but that England's ancient treaty of defensive alliance with Portugal (the
Methuen treaty, 1703), was still in effect. Britain was obligated to protect
her ally's independence and territorial integrity only if she were invaded,
but not if she were the aggressor. But Montmorency pressed the question:
would Britain aid Portugal, if the latter signed an offensive engagement with
Spain and that nation declared war on a third power? Wellington replied
categorically that in such a case, Portugal would have no right to call upon
England for help. All present expressed their satisfaction with this ex-
planation. 119
The last question discussed was what documents should be drafted to
publicize the measures taken by the Congress against Spain. After a brief
118 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., pp. 563-564.
119 Ibid., pp. 560-562; for Sarmento's note verbale (Sept. 25, 1822) and Canning's
answer (Oct. 1), see ibid., pp. 305-307 and 335-336; cf. Temperley, Canning, pp. 194-
197. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Allianoe, February 19, 1810, which bound
England to a "perpetual guarantee of the House of Braganza," had been abrogated
by the Treaty of Vienna, January 22, 1815. It is clear that Canning did not include
Portugal's colonies in the guarantee of territorial integrity. Because of the foreign
secretary's unequivocal declaration of October 1, 1822, Portugal dropped her project
for an offensive alliance with Spain, and the Hispanic-Portuguese "treaty of defensive
alliance and mutual guarantee of the constitutional system of the two kingdoms"
came to nought, because the Spanish Cortes would not ratify it. But Villele took
Canning at his word and warned Angouleme on May 6, 1823, to leave Portugal
alone, for, if he provoked that country, Britain would intervene. Canning to Stuart,
No.5, London, Jan. 24, and No. 25, London, Mar. 11, 1823, F.O., France, 146/55;
Canning to A'Court, London, Feb. 4, 1823, F.O., Spain, 185/91; Villele to duc
d'Angouleme, Paris, May 6, 1823, Villele, Memoires. III, 418-419.
debate, it was agreed that there should be no protocol and that all diplomatic
pieces exchanged among the powers should be regarded as "confidential
communications from one cabinet to another." In short, everything should
be kept secret, and nothing published. By such circumspection, the conti-
nental courts hoped to hide from Europe the disunion of the Congress and
especially the great divorce of England from the autocratic powers. Welling-
ton, however, protested that the transmission of the Spanish dispatches to
the Madrid cabinet would be followed immediately by their appearance "in
every newspaper in Europe," in which case his government would be com-
pelled to communicate something to Parliament. Since the allied courts
could not prevent the London ministry from publishing whatever papers it
wanted to, they made a virtue of necessity and agreed to permit the British
government to produce the duke's observations on the dispatches as well as
his answer to the proces-verbal, if either "instrument should ever come
before the public in an official form." These decisions reached, the confer-
ence adjourned; the congressional debates on the Spanish Question at last
had ended. 120
The following morning, Montmorency left for Paris to report to Villele
on his diplomacy at Verona and to persuade the council to act in concert
with the autocratic powers in the affair of the Spanish dispatches.
To recap the important developments of the week, Montmorency's
"projet de protocole," completed on November 14, was presented to the
eastern courts on the 17th, revised on the 18th, and entitled a "prods-
verbal" before being shown to Wellington. On the 19th, the continental
powers relabeled this document a "protocole" and signed it, only to change
it again the next day to a "proces-verbal," as an insignificant response to
Wellington's bitter condemnation. But the autocratic courts, refusing to
budge on the question of the Spanish dispatches, agreed on the 21st to
transmit them to Paris to await the decision of the French king-in-council.
Although the continental allies protested that the proces-verbal of No-
vember 17 was neither a treaty nor a protocol, both Metternich and Villele
privately called it a "protocole," and Gentz, indeed, referred to it as both
a protocol and a treaty. Despite its name, it was a treaty, the significance
of which was threefold: (1) it contained the casus foederis desired by Rus-
sia; (2) it permitted the tsar, through Pozzo di Borgo in Paris, to take the
initiative in the Spanish Question; and (3) it made it more difficult for
France to go it alone, because of her dependence on the three eastern courts.
120 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 564; entry for
Thurs., Nov. 21, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 112; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,
523-524.
The need for further revision had delayed the completion of the Spanish
Jispatches until November 17, and the confidential four-power conference
of the 18th had approved their final drafts. Significantly, Montmorency had
entitled his note a "plan for instructions" (cadre d'instruction) and had
submitted it in his own name, not that of his government. The remarkable
similarity of these instructions gives mute testimony to the long hours spent
on their editing. Each consisted of three distinct documents: (1) a trenchant
indictment of the Spanish government which demanded the immediate
restoration of the king to absolute power; (2) a secret dispatch ordering the
minister to request his passport and leave the country, if, within a certain
time, the Madrid cabinet had not instituted "a decisive change in the state
of affairs" in Spain; and (3) a project for a note to be delivered to the
Spanish government at the moment of departure. Russia sent a fourth piece,
a supplementary note which was not communicated to the Congress, ex-
plaining that her original endorsement of the Constitution of 1812, of course,
had been contingent upon the subsequent approval of Ferdinand VII, then
held prisoner in France. The Prussian instructions were the most severe of
the four, and the French, most moderate, but none was intended to be ac-
ceptable to Spain. Couched as they were in provocative language, they were
well-calculated to produce the desired break in diplomatic relations. l2l
On November 27, the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian dispatches were
sent to Paris so that they could be transmitted to Madrid in conjunction
with the French note. Dated November 26, Nesselrode's instructions to
Count BuIgary, Russian minister to Spain, paints in sanguine colors the
calamities which had befallen that unhappy land since 1820: revolution
followed by anarchy, the loss of colonies, the destruction of property,
blood spilled on scaffolds and in the royal palace, the captivity of the king,
and daily threats of death to the royal family. Not content to stay at home,
Spanish conspirators now strive "to excite disturbance and rebellion" in
France, to gain accomplices in more distant states (i.e., Naples and Pied-
mont), and to extend their "proselytism" everywhere. France, Nesselrode
predicted, would be compelled to use her army to put an end to "the provo-
cations of which she is the object." At length the note demanded that his
Catholic Majesty be set at liberty to form a new government founded on
absolutist principles. In justification of this policy, the Russian foreign
minister declared that:
121 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; entries for Thurs, and Mon., Nov. 14 and 18,
1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 109-110; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 517-518;
Schroeder, Mettemich's Diplomacy, p. 220n.
To express the desire to see a protracted misery terminate, to snatch from the
same yoke an unhappy monarch and one of the first among European nations,
to stop the effusion of blood, and to facilitate the reestablishment of an ad-
ministration at once wise and national, is certainly not attacking the inde-
pendence of a country, nor insisting upon a right of intervention against which
any power whatever would have reason to protest. 122
M~tternich's dispatch to Count Brunetti in Madrid, also dated November

26, was actually Gentz's work. 123 The text, though more moderate in tone
than either the Russian or Prussian notes, was in principle just as objection-
able to Britain. It contained frequent references to the ancient bonds of
friendship and common tradition existing between Austria and Spain. His
Imperial Majesty, the instructions declared, viewed "the situation in which
the Spanish monarchy found itself as a ... grave question." The anarchy
and civil war, produced by the revolution now rampant in Spain, are destroy-
ing the resources, prosperity, and prestige of the nation. But, after all, "a
military revolt can never form the basis of a happy and durable govern-
ment." His Majesty, nonetheless, feels such "repugnance at meddling in the
internal affairs of an independent state" that he would not make a pro-
nouncement on this occasion, were the evils of revolution confined to Spain
itself. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. The Spanish revolution, "by
the contagion of its principles and its example, and by the intrigues of its
principal partisans," caused the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont. These
principles, the emperor disavows as "false, pernicious, and condemnable."
But these harsh words do not apply to "Spain - either as a nation or as a
power -" but only "to those who have ruined and disfigured Spain, and
who persist in prolonging her sufferings."
The note emphasized the emperor's desire for peace and conceded that
there was no "direct danger" to Austrian subjects. It did not even mention
the possibility of a war with Spain, and made only one vague allusion to
Franco-Spanish relations. They "have assumed a character so problematic,"
Metternich contended, "that one can surrender himself to serious distress
over the complications which may result." The only consideration which
compels his Imperial Majesty to suggest a change in the present government
of Spain is his sincere desire to restore to the Spanish people the prosperity,
happiness, and peace which they enjoyed before the conquest of their land
122 Depeche de Ia Russie au cornte Bulgary, Verone, Ie 26 novembre 1822, Cha-

teaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 64-65; cf. Annual Register, LXIV (1822), 568.
123 Entries for Tues. and Thurs., Nov. 12 and 14, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 108-109;
depeche de l'Autriche, Verone, Ie 26 novembre 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de
Verone, p. 65.
by the Corsican orge. To achieve this goal, the dispatch concluded, the
King of Spain must be free.
[His Catholic Majesty] ... will be free the moment that he has the power to
terminate the evils which afflict his people, to restore order and peace in his
kingdom, to surround himself with men equally worthy of his confidence by
their principles and their intelligence; and finally, to substitute for a regime
acknowledged as impracticable even by those whose egotism or pride still holds
them to it, an order of things in which the rights of the monarch would be
happily combined with the true interests and legitimate desires of all classes
of the nation. 124
Count Bernstorff's instructions of November 22 to Bartholomaus Schepeler,

Prussian charge d'affaires in Madrid, was, by far, the most violently worded
of the four, perhaps as a means of compensating for the weakness of her
position at Verona and the nullity of her policy, which was dominated by
Austria. She was, moreover, linked by geography to Russia.1 25 After survey-
ing the origins, progress, and results of the Spanish revolution, the note
vehemently attacked Spain's existing governmental institutions. Bernstorff
deplored the fact that
a revolution, issuing from military revolt, has suddenly tom asunder all the
bonds of duty, upset all legitimate order, and broken down the elements of the
social structure, which in falling has covered the entire country with its ruins.
The Constitution of 1812, the dispatch continues, confuses "every principle

and every power, leaving only the principle of a permanent and legal op-
position to the government," which perforce is powerless and paralyzed and
no longer has the means "either of doing good, or of preventing ... evil."
The Cortes is an assembly which
has presented only a conflict of opinions and views and a collision of interests
and passions in the midst of which the most dissimilar propositions and reso-
lutions are constantly crossing, disputing, or neutralizing one another.
The "sectarians in Spain," Bernstorff declared, have abandoned every

notion of sound policy for "pernicious doctrines" and have sacrificed "every
sentiment of justice and moderation ... to dreams of sham liberty." The
established institutions of the country are "instruments of injustice and
violence" which thinly veil a "tyrannical system with a legal appearance."
124 Ibid., pp. 65-67; cf. Annual Register, LXIV, 571.

125 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 101, 248; Walpole, History of England, III, 49. On
November 5, Metternich had remarked that the Prussian instructions displayed a
violence which must be moderated.
The rule of this lunatic faction of idealistic liberals would have ended long
ago, had not
deceitful invectives from the tribune, ferocious outcries from the clubs, and the
freedom of the press, ... compromised the opinion and stifled the voice of the
healthy and sane party of the Spanish nation, which. .. forms an immense
majority.
But for all its Sturm und Drang. the Prussian note did not go as far as th~
Russian in threatening war. Bernstodf contented himself with the sweeping
charge that the "frightful sickness" which afflicts Spain disturbs her re-
lations with foreign powers and "can compromise the tranquillity of
Europe." Like Metternich, he alluded to Franco-Spanish relations only
once, asserting that their troubled state "is of a nature to give just fears for
peace between the two monarchies." Only the unequivocal liberation of
Ferdinand VII and the restoration of the ancien regime, the dispatch con-
cludes, can remedy the evils which engulf his realm and "dispel the causes
of our grief and of our well-founded worry concerning his safety." 126
Notwithstanding that the Berlin cabinet followed Vienna's lead at Ve-
rona, it would have preferred to avoid the Spanish Question altogether.
Bernstodf, indeed, thought that Metternich should have strongly opposed
the tsar's views on Spain from the beginning, instead of waiting for a con-
gress at which he hoped to have the assistance of Castlereagh. Had the
chancellor done so, he might have prevented the issue from getting out of
hand before the Vienna conference met. The Prussian foreign minister, who
desired peace and distrusted the Paris government, was convinced that "it
was better to do nothing than to cooperate with France in taking a step
which could lead to a war." But by November 1822, it was too late; the
affair had come to the point where it was impossible to get out of it without
some kind of declaration to which Britain could not be a party. Bernstodf's
dispatch, despite its violence, was not inconsistent with this moderation.
Not only was Prussia's hand forced by Austria and Russia, but also Fre-
derick William TIl, because of traditional Hohenzollern militarism, was
the most extreme of the three eastern autocrats on the subject of military
mutiny. If called upon to communicate with Spain at all, he was determined
to make manifest this personal abhorrence. 127
Reflecting on the proceedings of the Congress, Wellington ruefully
observed on November 22 that the scene had changed since the Congress of
126 De¢che de la Prusse Ii M. de Schepeler, Verone, Ie 22 novernbre 1822, Cha-

teaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 63-64; cf. Annual Register, LXN, 572-573.
127 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22,1822, Well. Desp., I, 566.
Aix-Ia-Chapelle. The eastern powers had closed their eyes to French in-
trigues in Spain, of which there were "the most undoubted proofs," and to
the dangers of a French army in Spain. He realized at last that the Austrian
chancellor had used him and Montmorency to oppose Alexander's ambition
to lead a European army into Spain. Once the tsar had abandoned this idea,
Metternich had supported Russian policy regarding the casus foederis, the
Spanish dispatches, and the deliberate provocation of Spain. Having ac-
complished the dismissal of Capo d'lstria, Metternich, the duke contended,
had become the tsar's "principal adviser," but to maintain his influence, the
chancellor now was obliged "to bend his own opinions" to bring them closer
to those of Alexander. Wellington still hoped that Villele could preserve
peace with Spain, but he was no longer optimistic, having learned that the
autocratic powers would transmit their dispatches to Madrid regardless of
what the Paris cabinet did. Wellington's only recourse, therefore, was to
withdraw from the Congress. 128
During his last audience with Alexander on Wednesday morning, No-
vember 27, Wellington declared that what had passed at Verona would
disturb the peace of the world. The tsar replied that he neither believed nor
wished that peace between France and Spain would last. War, he affirmed,
was the only measure which could overturn the Spanish revolution. The
duke reminded the emperor that he had not availed himself of an old ally:
Time, which could remedy many of the evils alleged to have been spawned
by the Spanish revolution. Why not let Time try its perspective and apply
its healing process? The Russian autocrat answered that he feared, while
Europe waited for the remedy of time, "much mischief would be done,"
and the cause of the Spanish Royalists would be lost. He apparently let his
arriere-pensee slip when he confessed his hope that a French invasion of
Spain would provoke insurrections at home, thus furnishing the eastern
courts with a pretext for intervening in France with their European army.
In response to this undiplomatic avowal, Wellington inquired if his Majesty
thought the Paris government could survive a war with Spain. "No," the
tsar exclaimed, "but if it should not, we have the means of setting all to
rights!" 129
Wellington took his leave of Francis I on the evening of the 27th. His
Apostolic Majesty declared his fervent hope that peace could be preserved
and seemed surprised, even alarmed, by the tsar's bellicose views. On No-
vember 29, Wellington informed Metternich that the Marquis of London-
128 Ibid., pp. 563, 568-569; cf. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 219.
129 Wellington to Canning: Memorandum on Conversation with Emperor of Rus-
sia, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 613-614.
derry (Charles Stewart) had been appointed to attend the conferences on

Italian affairs. Early the next morning, the duke left Verona for Paris and
thence to London. 130
From the beginning to the end of the Congress of Verona, the Spanish
Question remained unchanged. Without exception, the policies of the major
European powers were motivated by national interests. Chateaubriand
described the situation thus:
Whatever is done here pleases no one. France is obliged to act against her will;
Russia thinks that nobody goes far enough; Austria has stirred only to avoid
breaking with Russia; Prussia dreads the least movement; and England opposes
everything.1 31
VilleIe was delighted with the proces-verbal of November 17, which stipu-
lated the casus-foederis. Praising it as a "genuine success," he declared:
[N ow] we are assured of the moral support that we desired on the part of the
three great powers in order to confine the ill will of the fourth.132
But the premier was far from pleased with the determination of the eastern
courts to send notes to Madrid, and he was frankly skeptical of their con-
tents. To Chateaubriand, his man in Verona, he confessed on November 28,
that he had no objection if the "whole weight of the determination relative
to Spain" were shifted "upon our shoulders," so long as
they leave us two bowls; but if they give me but one, I cannot be seduced by
the appearance of so much honor: everything depends on the notes which are
to be delivered ... to Spain.1 33
Villele, moreover, was absolutely opposed to sending the dispatch which

Montmorency had drafted in Verona, regarding it as well-designed to break
diplomatic relations with Spain. The security and reputation of France, the
premier believed, would be compromised if France
associated with the other three powers in sending simultaneously a note to the
Spanish government, and in recalling the French ambassador at the moment
those of the other powers left Madrid. 134
130 Ibid., p. 611; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 619;
Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Corre-
spondance, Ill, 291. Pozzo di Borgo left Verona for Paris on November 28 two days
before Wellington.
131 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Villele, Memaires, III,
247-248.
132 "Suites du congres de Verone," ibid., p. 276; cf. Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris,
Nov. 28, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone, 721, 243.
133 Ibid.
134 "Suites du congres de Verone," Villele, Memoires, III, 273-274.
Finally, VilleIe was convinced the severance of relations would lead im-
mediately to war, or to a "state which will be so like it that we shall not in
reality have any choice.... Why, [he lamented], must these unfortunate
foreign affairs come to disturb ... [our] prosperity!" 135
Determined at all costs to avoid a war on the southwest frontier of France,
the premier made one more attempt before the close of the Congress to
prevent the withdrawal of the allied ministers from Madrid. On December
1, he, with the king's support, secured the council's approval of his policy,
and Montmorency, who had returned to Paris just the day before, acquiesced
for the moment. Four days later (December 5), Villele requested the auto-
cratic powers to withdraw their notes or, at least, to refer the recall of
ministers to the conference of ambassadors in Paris. The situation in Spain,
he declared, had completely changed since they were written. Their trans-
mission now would be inopportune and would only promote England's
interests. The defeat and dispersal of the Army of the Faith, the fall of the
Urgel Regency, and the mobilization of Mina's army along the Pyrenees
meant that the sending of notes, the withdrawal of ministers from Madrid,
and the beginning of hostilities, "form but one and the same fact, accom-
plished in a week." There were, moreover, other important factors to be
considered: the danger of British intervention on the side of Spain, the
"disastrous effect" war would surely have on French commerce, industry,
and finances, and the opposition to war of "the soundest and most general
portion of public opinion." Because of these circumstances, it was "no
longer appropriate" for France even to send a note. In a rare display of
rhetoric, ViIleIe concluded his entreaty to the eastern courts with an appeal
to heaven:
God grant, for my country and for Europe, that they may not persist in a
determination which, I declare beforehand and with complete conviction, must
compromise the welfare of France herself,136
Upon the arrival of the premier's plea in Verona, December 11 (only three
days before the Congress ended), Chateaubriand hastened to implement it.
Despite his arguments, Alexander and Mettemich rejected the French re-
quest, fearing that agreement would appear to be a surrender to the Spanish
revolution. The absolute monarchs, nonetheless, did grant the Paris cabinet
1M Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28, 1822, AAE., Congres de Verone,

721, 243. Villele had estimated a treasury surplus of 25 million francs by the end of
1822.
136 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de
Verone, pp. 80-81; cf. Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 259.
"several days to act with them ... [or] if the moment were not opportune ... ,
to act a little later after them." But the Spanish government must receive
the dispatches in time to know they were the work of the Congress. 137
Metternich consistently opposed war throughout the Congress, though
the realities of the situation demanded he be circuitous in his methods, lest
Austria be compromised and his influence with the tsar undermined. As
late as December 12, he declared his opposition to war to Chateaubriand,
urging him "to support Villele and to restrain the ardor of Montmoren-
cy." 138 But two days later, the chancellor, who distrusted the French
author-diplomat and had no confidence in his ability as a statesman, "im-
plored Montmorency not to let France act alone and to induce his govern-
ment to content itself with a moral remonstrance alone." 139 While sharing
the desire of Wellington and Villele for peace, Metternich did not share the
latter's alarm at the possible consequences of breaking diplomatic relations
with Spain. In his opinion, "the recall of their ministers was the extreme of
what could or would be done, especially by Austria and Prussia." 140
5. International Finance and Intervention:

the Brothers Rothschild
and Ouvrard
Not all the notables at Verona were plenipotentiaries and potentates, or

even members of the official delegations. The parts played by several
famous ladies and by the composer, Rossini, already have been noted, but
their influence was almost entirely social and, therefore, irrelevant to the
political results of the Congress. By contrast, the Brothers Rothschild -
Solomon, James, and Carl - and Gabriel Julien Ouvrard, a French army
contractor and financier, were deeply involved in the Spanish Question, and
their similar, though separate, cases furnish important evidence of the role
of moneyed power in international politics.
Mindful of Solomon Rothschild's timely assistance in financing the
Austrian expedition to Naples in 1821, Metternich and Gentz brought him
to the Congress. Upon arriving in Verona, Solomon learned that a rumor
137 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona., Dec. 12, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de

Verone, p. 83; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 17, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,656-567;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 604.
139 Metternich to Montmorency, Verona, Dec. 14, 1822, quoted in Camb. Hist. of
Brit. For. Pol., II, 60; cf. Temperley, Canning, p.60.
140 Stewart to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510, quoting a
conversation with Metternich on Nov. 7.
was being circulated that the House of Rothschild had offered a loan to the
Spanish consitutional government. He hastened to spike this baseless al-
legation, assuring Metternich on October 22 that his family "was lending
its support only to the legitimists and the conservative regime." 141
Throughout the Congress, Solomon and Gentz were inseparable. The
two had enjoyed an intimate and mutually profitable rapport since Aix-la-
Chapelle. In exchange for gifts of money and investments in his behalf, the
publicist had given the banker political information, served as a confidential
connection between him and the chancellor, assisted him in negotiating a
loan to Austria in 1820, and the following year had successfully defended
the House of Rothschild from the attacks of Baron Johann Friedrich Cot-
ta's influential Allgemeine Zeitung of Augsburg. To assure himself of
Gentz's continued support, Solomon offered him the prospect of future
lucrative transactions. 142 The chevalier was not ungrateful; he introduced
the Vienna Rothschild to Nesselrode, Lieven, and Tatischev, who soon
secured a state loan of £ 6,000,000. This business deal brought Solomon
and his Paris brother, James, not only a handsome profit but also increased
prestige. In recognition of their services, the tsar conferred upon them the
Order of S1. Vladimir. 143
Notwithstanding that Gentz was, indeed, a mercenary of the pen, his
venality was more apparent than real. He made no secret of the gifts he
received from the Rothschilds, the Danubian hospodars, and others. Met-
ternich knew and approved of these arrangements and never thought that
they would compromise the secretary's sincerety or cause him to write any-
thing contrary to his political convictions. Remarkably candid, the scribe
did not hesitate to criticize his employers' policies when he disagreed with
them. Despite an ultra-Royalist point of view, Gentz's writings reveal an
impartiality and objectivity rare for this age of reaction and revolution.
His total immersion in the society of princes, statesmen, and financiers, his
influential work as Metternich's henchman and alter ego, a realistic attitude
toward the rapidly changing world of the early nineteenth century, and
a political insight, which at moments was profound, all make Gentz's cor-
respondence, diary, and essays valuable historical documents. 144
141 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 233-236,278.

142 Entry for Tues., Oct. 22, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 97; Sweet, Gentz, 218-
219, 273-274. Stegemann, the editor of the Zeitung, promised Cotta that he would
refrain from printing any further criticism of Rothschild's relations with Austria.
143 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 279-280. When this news was published in the
6sterreichischer Beobachter, the word "saint" was deleted, because of the impro-
priety of a Jew being made a member of a Christian order.
144 Sweet, Gentz, pp. 219, 229, 275, 285-287, 296-297, 299.
While at Verona, Solomon established a private courier service with
Vienna and Paris. So swift was this service that it was used by both the
Austrian and French delegations to the Congress as well as by their home
governments. By exploiting news from Verona, which he got before anyone
else, James Rothschild, reaped huge profits on the Paris Bourse. Since no
one expected war at the beginning of the Congress, French bonds and bank
notes rose steadily in value.1% Suddenly, James sold five million francs
worth of French securities. The next day it was learned in Paris that armed
intervention in Spain was expected. As the rumor spread that the Crowned
Heads of Europe were holding warlike councils in Verona, the price of
government bonds fell in all continental nations, and to some extent in
Britain as well. Alarmed by this decline, Villele warned Chateaubriand
that war would ruin France's financial structure.146 But this admonition
failed to impress either the Congress or the ambitious ambassador who
observed sardonically: "Surrounded by gentlemen of the Bourse, whose
stock-jobbing was deranged by the sound of cannon, he [Villele] was
frightened by the cries of the ruined speculator. ... " 147
As the ultra journals in Paris continued to preach war and to embarrass
the government, the slump became more acute, until Stuart received word
that no decisions had been reached and that Wellington was still opposing
intervention. Once more the price of government bonds began to rise. 148 On
November 18, Villele informed Montmorency that:
The Rothschild courier is causing our bonds to rise again .... He is propagating
the news that there will be no intervention. I fear these deceptive booms, which
pave the way for new variations [in stock values] and great losses, if later war is
again feared. 149
145 Three types of official French capital notes were sold on the Paris stock ex-
change: securities of the Bank of France and the Mortgage Bank (La Caisse hypo-
thlkaire), bonds of the national government (rentes sur l'Btat), and municipal bonds,
especially those of Paris and Bordeaux. Frederick B. Artz, France under the Bourbon
Restoration, 1814-1830 (New York, 1963), p. 215.
146 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28 and Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand,
Congres de Verone, pp. 75, 80-81; Annual Register, LXIV, 218, Corti, House of
Rothschild, pp. 280-281.
148 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid., p. 83; Corti, House of
Rothschild, p. 281.
149 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 18, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 219.
In November 1822, Cortes bonds sold in London for 75 per cent of par, but by
January 1823, they had fallen to only 35 per cent of par, a drop of 40 per cent in
two months. During the same period, French government bonds, by contrast, fell only
12 points, from 90 to 78. Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 195.
Thus the House of Rothschild turned the political situation to its own
purpose. When Solomon suggested to James that his presence in Verona
could be useful in view of the great decisions pending there, the latter
needed no further urging. Already he had become alarmed by the contra-
dictory reports from the Congress. He arrived in Verona on November 22.
Six days later they were joined by a third brother, Carl, who was in charge
of the Naples branch of the banking house. Only brothers Nathan and
Amschel were absent from Verona; Nathan's political sympathies and close
connections with the British government kept him in London, and Amschel's
business would not permit him to leave Frankfurt-on-Main.1 50
To strengthen relations between Austria and his House, Solomon paid
all of Metternich's personal expenses at the Congress, a sum of 16,370 lira
($ 3,274). The Rothschilds, indeed, provided all the cash spent in Verona by
the various delegations. 151
After discussing Italian and Spanish problems with Carl, Solomon and
James returned to their respective homes on or about December 1. James
was as reluctant as Villele to send a French expedition into Spain, fearing
it would hurt his financial system; nonetheless, when war became inevitable,
he raised the money for the campaign by underwriting the sale of 6 per cent
French Royal Bonds and "negotiating a Spanish loan payable to France."
The premier, remembering the precedent of Austria and Naples, had sug-
gested the "Spanish loan" to James Rothschild. By "Spanish" was meant,
of course, Ferdinand VII and the Royalist Regency.152
The association of the Rothschilds with the Congress of Verona was, in
short, of great advantage to all concerned, with the exception, of course,
of the Spanish constitutional government. The Rothschild tactics will be
familiar to anyone who has studied the methods of a modern lobbyist.
While Ouvrard could not match the Rothschilds' great fortune and inter-
national prestige, he compensated for these deficiencies with incredible
audacity and imagination. Born near Nantes in 1770, he was the son of a
paper manufacturer. During the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, he
made a fortune and attained prestige as an army supply contractor. He was
an unscrupulous, greedy, but "genial war profiteer," financier, and specu-
lator. He earned an estimated fifteen million francs in Paris and London
150 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 282, 284. Solomon introduced James to Rossini,
while the three were in Verona. The friendship of the French Rothschild and the
composer dates from this meeting.
151 Ibid., p. 283. The specie was drawn from France and the money exchanges of
Lombardy-Venetia.
152 Ibid., pp. 282, 285; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 8.
through speculation in government bonds whose value had fallen as a result

of the war scare of 1822. 153
While the chiefs of the Alliance were meeting in Verona, Ouvrard agreed
to grant the Urgel Regency a loan of five million francs to recruit, equip,
and train an army, but only on condition that either the Alliance or France
officially recognize the Regency. When Ouvrard approached Villele on this
issue, the premier for a moment considered endorsing the scheme, since it
seemed to offer a chance of averting war. But he soon recovered. He rejected
the proposal, realizing that he could not recognize the Regency without
declaring war on the Spanish constitutional government. He refused even to
give Ouvrard a letter of introduction to any member of the French dele-
gation at Verona,154
Rebuffed by Villele, Ouvrard struck out for Italy on his own. In Milan,
he met Montmorency, easily secured that minister's support for his plan,
and obtained from him a letter of introduction to Chateaubriand. Ouvrard's
mission was brief; he arrived in Verona on November 25 and left on De-
cember 1. The Alliance vetoed his petition because recognition of the rebel
regency would have required war with Spain anyway, though Chateaubriand
favored the use of Ouvrard's scheme in the event of a Franco-Spanish
war.155 That zealous diplomat was, of course, doing everything in his power
to bring about such a war.
Metternich was amused by this "audacious adventurer" who aspired to
kill the Cortes by "dint of money and the Urgel Regency," without any
military assistance from France. As much as he wished such a plan could
succeed, he considered it "chimerical" and gave it no support. Though
Ouvrard declared he would be satisfied if only Russia recognized the
Regency, Nesselrode refused lest such recognition embroil Russia in a
Spanish war against the wishes of her allies. The Russian minister regarded
Ouvrard's plan as more an aid to foreign intervention than a substitute for
it, since his loan would provide money for an invasion. 156
On Gentz's advice, Ouvrard did not call on Wellington, despite the fact
153 George Weill, "Le financier Ouvrard," Revue historique. CXXVII (1918),31-47,
51; Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 194.
154 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4, 6, and 14, 1822, VillilIe, Memoires, III,
175, 182-183, 214; "Suites du congres de Verone," ibid., 277; Weill, "Ouvrard,"
Revue historique, CXXVII, 50; Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 194.
155 Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Milan, Nov. 24, 1822, Chateaubriand, Con-
gres de Verone, p. 88; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28 and 30, 1822, Cha-
teaubriand, Correspondance, III, 293, 296; Weill, "Ouvrard," Revue historique.
CXXVII,51.
IIH1 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspon-
dance, III, 294-295.
the two were well-acquainted, his Grace having lived in the financier's Paris
home for three years. The duke, therefore, was deliberately kept in the dark
and was not sure what was going on.1S7 To Canning, he complained:
I cannot say that I know exactly what brought him [Ouvrard] here .... The
secrecy, however, in which this transaction has been kept will show you how we
stand here. 1SS
Determined to talk to Ouvrard, Wellington on November 29, finally suc-

ceeded in meeting him, but the wily speculator hid the real purpose of his
mission. He misled the duke by declaring that he had come to Verona "to
obtain some kind of guarantee" for a twenty million franc loan to the
Spanish RoyalistS. 1S9
Rejected by Villele and the Congress, Ouvrard returned to Paris, where
he soon came forward with another project. He was prepared for the POSSI-
bility of war and ready to bank heavily on the Royalists, not that he was a
conservative crusader, but only because he wanted to make money. Toward
this end, he had served first the French Revolution and then Napoleon;
now he would serve the Restoration - for a price. This time his efforts were
crowned with success; he acquired the contract for supplying the French
expedition which invaded Spain in April 1823. He had, indeed, a virtual
monopoly of the food supply and transportation for the Bourbon army.
His prices were twice the prevailing level. He received the privilege of
establishing the cost of forage at a later date, and on this item, he also was
given a "blank check." He received a 2 per cent commission on all pur-
chases made with government funds. A charge of 7Yz centimes per day per
horse was levied, and there were 25,000 of them. All accidental losses were
to be borne by the Royal Treasury. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that
Ouvrard made 30,000,000 francs ($ 6,000,000) as the supply contractor of
the French army in 1823. 160
Concerning the "apparition" of Ouvrard, Metternich astutely observed:
"It is not Ouvrard who is fabulous, but the times in which we live." 161
157 Ibid., pp. 293, 295; Weill, "Ouvrard," Revue historique, CXXVII, 51.
158 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 612.
159 Ibid., The original amount offered by Ouvrard was, indeed, twenty million
francs, but only five million was to be in cash; the rest was to be paid in "worthless
securities" (mauvais titres) of the prerevolutionary Spanish government. The Regency
wisely refused the offer of claims they probably could never collect. The final sum
agreed on was five million francs in silver. Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4
and 6,1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 175, 182.
160 Nicole, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 195; Fourcassie, Viltele, pp. 246-247.
161 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspon-
dance, III, 295.
6. A Retrospect
Permeating the negotiations on the Spanish Question were four significant

forces: (1) the predominance of the Franco-Russian entente, (2) the influence
of the tsar on Austria and Prussia, (3) the disunity of the French delegation
caused by the determination of Montmorency and Chateaubriand for war,
despite Villele's desire for peace, and (4) the subtle diplomatic maneuvering
of Mettemich to preserve, at least, a rump alliance which could restrain
France and Russia.
After returning to London, Wellington explained to Canning that with
Russian assistance, French policy, not Austrian, had gained ascendancy at
the Congress:
From the commencement to the end of the proceedings at Verona, [the duke
declared], the case of Spain under consideration was a French case, and nothing
else. It was brought forward as a French case; the answers given were ... to
a French case; the replies were from French ministers; and the proces-verbal
is founded upon French cases. 162
Not to overlook the obvious, it should be noted, too, that the conversations,
cabinet pieces, protocols, and precis of the Congress were all in French,
the international language of diplomacy.
As much as Austria and Prussia wanted peace in Western Europe, they
wanted even more to prevent a Russo-Turkish war; they agreed, therefore,
to the proces-verbal of November 17, containing the casus foederis desired
by the tsar, and drafted dispatches to Madrid in the language held at
Laibach.
Before coming to the Congress, both Montmorency and Chateaubriand
had become converts to the "war party." Once in Verona, the influence of
Alexander and his agents, Pozzo and Tatischev, confirmed this conviction
by counteracting the arguments of Metternich and Wellington in favor of
peace. The views of the foreign minister not only split the French delegation,
but also led him to violate his instructions by committing France to an
action opposed by the premier: the sending of simultaneous notes to Spain.
Villele had watched with mounting anxiety and disapproval Montmorency's
conduct at Vienna and Verona. His impolitic diplomacy, the premier be-
lieved, made it appear that France had appealed to the eastern courts for
help and had accepted from them a mandate to act as their agent. Thus he
had seriously compromised the dignity and independence of France and
162 Wellington to Canning, London, Dec. 31, 1822, Well. Desp .• 1.672.
had forfeited to the Alliance the initiative in the Spanish Question. Mont-
morency, moreover, had permitted Metternich to edit the ostensible La
Garde dispatch, despite Villele's specific admonition not to trust the chan-
cellor. Under these circumstances, the premier's disavowal of his minister's
policy became more probable.
Austrian diplomacy was, of course, contingent upon Russian policy. From
the moment the Spanish Question occupied the tsar's attention, Metternich
displayed great anxiety about it. Not wishing to oppose Alexander's views
directly, he solicited Wellington and Montmorency to object to his first plan
of marching Russian troops through Germany and France to attack Spain,
and to protest against his second scheme of stationing a European-Russian
army in Piedmont to watch the French campaign in Spain. By November 6,
they had succeeded in pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Austria.
While they were remonstrating with the tsar, no one was more convinced
than the chancellor that nothing should be done about the internal affairs
of Spain. But no sooner had the pressing danger of the march of a Russian
army across Habsburg dominions been removed, than Metternich did an
about-face, supporting the Russian proposal that the continental courts
should conclude a treaty in response to the French demands. Failing to
control the congressional debates on Spain, he was perforce obliged to adopt
the tsar's view in this matter.
On November 1, the chancellor had proposed that Britain be given the
responsibility of mediating between France and Spain and had even pro-
fessed the belief that such was the only means of solving the Franco-Spanish
crisis without war and, by the same stroke, preventing the separation of
Britain from the Alliance. Metternich repeatedly assured Wellington of his
concurrence in all the duke's views and especially with respect to "the in-
convenience which must result from anything in the shape of a treaty, and
from the establishment of a conference at Paris," which would be dominated
by Pozzo di Borgo. 163 Yet, when Alexander insisted on a treaty of some
sort, and Montmorency endorsed the idea, Metternich offered no objection,
notwithstanding that he knew a treaty would render it impossible for
Britain to cooperate with the Alliance, even in the work of preserving peace.
As a final artifice, the chancellor discovered that the Emperor of Austria
had no alternative but "to pronounce his opinion upon the Spanish revo~
lution and against what was passing in Spain." 164 There can be no doubt,
however, that Russian influence, which manifested itself despite the opinions
183 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., p. 565-566.

1~4 Ibid.
and prejudices of Austria and Prussia, was primarily responsible for these
Metternichian maneuvers.
A reappraisal of the long and complex negotiations on the Spanish
Question reveals that the allies were so divided on Spain, even before the
Congress began, that concerted action was impossible. When the Vienna
conference convened, it was already too late, as Bernstorff observed, to
adopt any demarche that the London cabinet could support. It appears,
therefore, that Temperley has exaggerated the importance of Wellington's
note of October 30, since the duke's reply to Montmorency added nothing
new to the well-known British policy of non-intervention in the internal af-
fairs of independent states. Under these circumstances, the intervention of
the Congress was confined to three "insignificant dispatches," as Chateau-
briand has called them,lM and France, far from being the instrument of the
Alliance, actually pursued a separate, national policy against the wishes of
Britain, Austria, and Prussia. The two German courts wanted to go no
further than a moral remonstrance to the Spanish government and then to
sever diplomatic relations. They feared a Franco-Spanish war for two
reasons: (1) If it resulted in a French victory, France might become too
strong, since a renewal of the Bourbon Family Compact seemed almost
certain; (2) if France were defeated, they might be compelled to go to war
to save her from being overrun by Liberals and Revolutionaries. The tsar,
of course, did not share these fears, for he believed and hoped that a French
invasion force would be routed, that this defeat would produce disturbances
at home and thereby create a pretext for allied intervention in France as well
as Spain. Britain, Austria, and Prussia tried to prevent war up to the very
end. For all practical purposes, the European Pentarchy died at Verona.
Against the wishes of three-fifths of the Alliance, the Paris cabinet, for the
first time in seven years, manifested a will of its own. Thus the conventional
interpretation that the Alliance commissioned France to attack Spain is
untenable. 166
British policy had little chance of gaining ascendancy at Verona in the
face of the solid opposition of the continental powers, all of whom favored
some kind of intervention in Spain, although each followed its own interests.
The time had passed when the continent was financially dependent on
British subsidies (as during the common struggle against Napoleon), and
could ill afford to gainsay the court of Saint James. British motives, too,
were suspect, for it was no secret to the allies that "those shopkeeping

168 Bignon, Les cabinets et les peuples, pp. 440, 469, 494.
islanders" were more interested in trade with Spanish America than in the
political institutions of the mother country. VilU:le certainly associated the
two questions and thought the Congress had made a mistake not to connect
them as a means of restraining England in the New World. 167 Thus Britain's
cry for non-intervention was viewed as an attempt to protect her lucrative
commerce with Latin America. In sum, continental, and especially French,
statesmen believed that "John Bull" was more interested in the welfare of
his pocket-book than in helping Spanish Liberals maintain their hopelessly
unstable government.
The prospect of a French invasion of Spain did not alarm Canning, for
he had anticipated this possibility and had seen it as a means of detaching
France from the Alliance, which he wanted to destroy. This objective he
hoped to accomplish by withdrawing Britain and separating France from the
Congress System. So long as intervention was restricted to one country -
France - and the arena of conflict was confined to Spain proper, British
interests were only remotely involved. Where Canning did not propose to
act, he did not threaten. But where British interests were concerned - as in
the case of Portugal and Latin America - Canning was as good as his word.
The question of Spanish America and of Europe's attitude toward this area
must now be discussed.
167 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28 and Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand,

Congres de Vb-one, pp. 75, 80.
CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH COLONIAL QUESTION!
H France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to

avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we
should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way. I
sought materials for compensation in another hemi-
sphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had
known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it
should not be Spain 'With the Indies.' I CALLED
TIlE NEW WORLD INTO EXIS'IENCE, TO RE-
DRESS TIlE BALANCE OF TIlE OLD. - Canning,
1826.2
1. Genesis
The Napoleonic Wars had virtually assured the emancipation of Spanish

America, but European recognition of this newly won independence re-
mained as important diplomatic question for a decade thereafter (1815-
1825). By the fall of 1822, this question, like the slave trade, had become an
issue to be decided primarily between Britain and France, since the interests
of the other continental powers were only remotely involved. The role of
the Congress of Verona, appears to have been that of a watershed in the
colonial quest for European recognition.
But during Latin America's long struggle for independence, British policy
toward this area, inspired largely by economic and political expediency
rather than by any libertarian principles, was characterized by frequent
shifts and reversals. As early as May 9, 1790, General Francisco Miranda of
Venezuela had presented to Prime Minister William Pitt a scheme for Latin
American Emancipation. This plan would have been executed at the time
had not the Nootka Sound Incident been amicably settled. Early in 1801,
Henry Addington, Pitt's friend and successor, revived the project and began
military preparations, but the Peace of Amiens (March 25, 1802) again
1 An abridged version of this chapter appeared in the Southwestern Social Science
Quarterly, XL (June 1959), 28-39. My views today, however, are not identical to those
held then. In 1959, I believed that Chateaubriand's policy statement at Verona on the
Spanish Colonial Question could not "be reconciled with French attempts to establish
Bourbon monarchies in the New World, nor with Villele's repeatedly affirmed policy
of recognition." (ibid., p. 34). But under the impact of additional research and more
reflection, this opinion gradually gave way to the conviction that the two, indeed, can
be reconciled.
2 Canning to the Commons (corrected version), December 12, 1826, in Temperley,
Canning, App. VI, p. 584.
postponed its execution. When war with France was renewed on May 16,
1803, the liberation of Spanish America once more became a major aim of
British policy, despite the dissent of Captain Sir Home Popham, who advised
Pitt on October 14, 1804, that, while the conquest of South America was
out of the question, it was quite possible for England to capture its com-
merce and open for British manufacturers and shippers boundless riches.
The plan, however, was suspended again "by the affairs of Europe, and by
the hopes and exertions of the Third Coalition." 3 After July 1808, when
Britain became Spain's ally against Napoleon, the London cabinet dismissed
all idea of using force to detach the Spanish American colonies from the
motherland.
In 1810 the Spanish navigation laws, restricting trade in the West Indies
and along the coast of South America, were suspended by an unwritten
Anglo-Spanish entente. 4 When Castlereagh returned to the Foreign Office
two years later, he laid down the tenets of England's Latin American policy.
Britain would undertake mediation, he declared, but only if Spain agreed:
(1) to sign a satisfactory treaty with England on the slave trade, (2) to
proclaim "a general amnesty and armistice" to the insurgents, (3) to place
the South Americans on a "footing of legal equality" with European
Spaniards, (4) to grant her colonies "free commercial intercourse with all
nations," Spain enjoying, as the mother country, "a fair preference," and
(5) British mediation shall not "under any circumstances assume an armed
character. ... " 5
On October 17, 1816, and again on January 10, 1817, Carlos Jose Fran-
cisco Gutierrez de los Rios, Count of Fernan-Nunez, the Spanish ambas-
sador at London, inquired if this policy remained unchanged. In return for
armed assistance, Spain, he asserted, would grant Britain a liberal com-
mercial treaty. In rejecting this bribe, Castlereagh repeated his earlier
demand for the abolition of the colonial system and absolutely refused to
use force against the colonies. On August 28, 1817, he issued a Cabinet
Memorandum to inform the allied powers of these views. Since no Spanish
3 Don Juan Gusman, "Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains," Edinburgh Review, XIII

(1809), 278, 285, 292, 297; "Documents: Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804-
1806," ARR, VI (1900-1901), 513; Kaufman, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 104; J. H.
Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (London, 1911), p. 569 (Addington, who suc-
ce-ooed Pitt on March 14, 1801, was created Viscount Sidmouth in January 1805). An
army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley actually was raised in 1808 to aid
General Miranda in emancipating Colombia, but it was sent instead to Portugal, when
the Spanish revolted against the French.
4 Canning to the Commons, Mar. 5, 1824, ParI. Debates, new ser., X (1824), 753.
5 Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 408-409,413; cf. Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish
Colonies, 1815-1818," ERR, XXVII (1912), 87.
THE SPANISH COLONIAL QUESTION 139
government would accept the British terms, and Britain would not mediate
unless they were accepted, a stalemate ensued which lasted for the duration
of the negotiations on this issue. 6
Meanwhile in Madrid, Tatischev, the Russian ambassador, tried "to stir
up Spanish jealousy against the British South American policy," and en-
couraged Ferdinand VII in his hope of recovering the revolted colonies with
the promise of aid from the Quadruple Alliance. And in the French capital,
Pozzo di Borgo, who warmly seconded this plan, not only succeeded in
gaining the support of Premier Richelieu, but also proposed to the Paris
Ambassadors' Conference that Britain should employ a commercial boycott
to break the resistance of the insurgent Spanish colonies. But when Tsar
Alexander learned of these intrigues, he reprimanded his ambassadors for
fostering "the Spanish dream of re-subjugation." He even complained of
Tatischev's actions to Castlereagh, when the two met at Aix-Ia-Chapelle in
the fall of 1818. Far from advocating the use of force to regain the colonies,
Alexander, still inspired by a spirit of moderation, suggested that Welling-
ton be given the task of mediation and even expressed a willingness to
permit the United States to have a voice in the negotiations. The tsar hoped,
as did Castlereagh and Wellington, to see the colonies reconciled with the
mother country, but he also wished to replace Spain's absolute rule in the
colonies with a more liberal system of government. 7
In private conferences with Alexander, Castlereagh emphasized "the
absurdity of expecting British ministers to acquiesce in the idea of a com-
mercial boycott [of the Spanish American colonies]." Since Austria and
Prussia remained unwavering in their support of Britain, the conferences
at Aix-Ia-Chapelle resulted in the withdrawal of Russian support from
Richelieu's proposal that the Alliance aid Spain in reconquering her colo-
nies. It should be understood, however, that it was the tsar's ambassadors,
6 Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 409-411, 415.

7 Ibid., pp. 412-414; "Documents: Protocols of Conferences of Representatives of
the Allied Powers Respecting Spanish America, 1824-1825," AHR, XXII (1916-1917),
595; Dexter Perkins, "Russia and the Spanish Colonies, 1817-1818," ibid., XXVIII
(1922-1923), 668-670,671; Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. I," EHR, XXVII, 84, 93-95. Cast-
lereagh had several conversations with Richard Rush, the American minister, on Latin
America and even gave him copies of official correspondence which persuaded the
Washington government to postpone recognition of the Spanish colonies until the
completion of Britain's mediation in behalf of Spain to restore them to their former
allegiance. John Quincy Adams, however, never doubted for a moment that this me-
diation would fail.
Alexander's efforts to include the United States in the inner sanctum of the Alliance,
his willingness to see her participate in discussions on the colonial question, and his
disapproval of reestablishing absolute rule in Spanish America, all indicate a latent
liberalism.
Tatischev and especially Pozzo, who had urged this measure, not the tsar
himself. Alexander not only rebuked his ministers, but even tried to secure
Spanish approval of the British conditions for mediation. All of the conti-
nental powers (excepting Spain) now accepted the principles which had been
the basis of Britain's South American policy since 1812.8
The next attempt to defeat British policy came from France in 1819, when
Richelieu and his successor, Jean Joseph Dessolle, tried to establish a Bour-
bon monarchy in La Plata. 9 The whole affair was revealed in July 1820 as
a plot to undermine British diplomacy.1o
That such was the definite aim of France has now been definitely established.
The idea occurs again and again in the correspondence of the French
ministers .... It is favored in 1822 by Montmorency. It was the favorite dream
of Chateaubriand. It was the hope of Villele. l l
The recognition of the independence of Argentina (La Plata), Colombia,

Chile, and Mexico by the United States in 1822 compelled Britain to take
some action, and British public opinion favored following the American
example. 12 Castlereagh and Wellington, however, opposed immediate re-
cognition, since they shared the objection of the continental courts to re-
8 Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1818-1822," EHR, XXX (1915),
635-636; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 119-120.
9 The Spanish viceroyalty of La Plata was later divided into the modern states of
Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. In 1819 and 1820, France showed definite signs of
wishing to interfere in the newly established states of South America. Temperley,
"French Designs on Spanish America in 1820-1825," EHR, XL (1925), 37; Kaufmann,
Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 124-125.
10 "Paper Relative to a Secret Project for Erecting the Provinces of South America
into a Kingdom, and Placing the Prince of Lucca on the Throne - 1819," BFSP, VI
(1818-1819), 1085-1100; Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doc-
trine," AHR, XXVII (1921-1922), 210; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 125;
Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. II," EHR, XXX, 637-638. The Prince of Lucca was a Bour-
bon, though not closely related to the King of Spain. The whole plot was revealed by
a memorandum of Count Fran~ois-Gerard de Rayneval to Valentin Gomez, the Se-
cretary of State of Buenos Aires. In 1819 Rayneval was a member of the French Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, but in January 1821 he succeeded Chateaubriand as minister
to Berlin. He attended the Congress of Verona.
11 In July 1823, the French cabinet again sanctioned the project of founding Bour-
bon monarchies in the New World and notified the French ambassador at Madrid of
this decision. Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 210.
12 In a special message on March 8, 1822, President Monroe requested Congress to
recognize the independence of Buenos Aires, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Congress
readily complied, and on May 4, Monroe signed an act providing funds for such mis-
sions. Colombia was formally recognized on July 19, 1822, Mexico on December 12,
and Chile and Buenos Aires (United Provinces of La Plata) on January 27, 1823, Wil-
liam S. Robertson, History of the Latin American Nations (2nd ed.; New York, 1932),
pp. 224-225; cf. Phillips, Confed. of Europe, p. 247.
cognizing revolutionary governments and did not wish to pursue a policy so

strongly opposed by the Alliance. The Foreign Enlistment Act (1819),
"forced through an unwilling Parliament in defiance of public opinion,
showed how little real sympathy the Tory government had with the
rebels." 13 But Castlereagh could hardly ignore the clamor of the commercial
and industrial classes for recognition. Britain and Latin America had be-
come mutually supplementary: the one, the producer of manufactured com-
modities; the other, the producer of raw materials. British merchants and
manufacturers, who formed powerful lobbies in Parliament, regarded the
expansion of trade with the Spanish American colonies as the best means
of pulling England's economy out of the terrible international depression
which had swept over Europe and North America during the immediate
postwar period and had reached its nadir in 1819. The dilemma of John
Bull, moreover, became more desperate yet, when Spain, after 1815, broke
the entente with her wartime ally, blockaded the West Indies and Spanish
America, and seized several British merchant ships. Thus was produced the
paradox of Britain claiming of Spain compensation for injuries inflicted by
colonial authorities, while British merchants and soldiers were aiding
Spanish colonies to win their independence. 14
In these troubled times, the British shipper and merchant became in-
creasingly distinct classes. This division, well-established in London by
1815, often meant the loss of merchant support in the maintenance of ship-
ping discrimination and the formation of an alliance between merchant and
manufacturer. Manufacturing, because of its tremendous wartime growth,
now challenged trade as the basis of the economy. The capitalist bought a
seat in the Commons and in that capacity denounced or approved the
foreign policy of the ministry. During the Congress Era, the rich middle
class remained small, but the composition of the unreformed Parliament
definitely favored business interests.1 5
13 Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. II." EHR, XXX, 636.
14 Ibid., pp. 641, 643-644; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 121; "Foreign
Policy of England - Mr. Canning," For. Qu. Rev., vm (1831), 412; Canning to the
Commons, Apr. 14, 1823, Parl. Debates, new ser., vm, 879-880; Ellis, "British Reci-
procity System," pp. 60, 62-64, 67-68, 72, 76,90, 127-128, and 130-131. Five thousand
troops, in most cases Wellington's veterans, had been recruited in England and Ireland
to aid the South American rebels. These soldiers helped Simon Bolivar win the Battle
of Carabobo (June 24, 1821). Lord Cochrane founded the Chilian navy and with it
defeated the Spanish on the Pacific coast. "Loans of many millions sterling were
raised, chiefly in the London market, to provide the sinews of war." Col. E.M. Lloyd,
"Canning and Spanish America," TRHS, new ser., VIII (1903-1904), 82.
15 Boyce, Diplomatic Relations, p. 65; S. G. Checkland, "American versus West
Indian Traders in Liverpool, 1793-1815," Journal of Economic History, XVIII (March
1958), 142; William Cunningham, Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement
Realpolitiker that he was, the foreign secretary in 1821 and 1822 took
several cautious steps which produced significant results in three directions:
they modified the Latin American policy he had followed since 1812, ap-
peased the strong friends of the government, and brought about the com-
mercial recognition of the Spanish American colonies. On the economic
front, Castlereagh, as Leader of the House of Commons, vigorously sup-
ported the five trade and navigation bills introduced by Thomas Wallace,
Vice-President of the Board of Trade, to tum Britain from a mercantilist
system toward one of reciprocity and lower tariffs. First proposed in 1821,
these reforms, after a year's delay, were reintroduced in modified form on
May 20, 1822. The five bills passed without major amendment or division
in Parliament, and all received the royal assent on June 24,1822.1 6
Having separated the economic from the political aspects of the question,
Castlereagh now addressed himself to the latter. Commercial recognition
must be granted immediately, but political recognition could wait until the
opportune moment arrived. So long as Britain's trade with Latin America
continued to expand, "the great mass of public opinion," he thought, "would
not worry too much about the niceties of diplomatic recognition." 17 In the
spring of 1822, he returned to a plan he had conceived in 1807: the establish-
ment of monarchies in South America with or without the approval of Spain.
But he did not wish to act alone. Perhaps the concerted action of Britain
and the Alliance or Britain and France, the only European maritime p<Jwer
whose interest in this issue rivaled that of England, could persuade the South
Americans to create monarchical rather than republican governments. The
Vienna conference, scheduled for September, seemed to afford, moreover,
an excellent opportunity to gain the support of the continental courts for
British policy. On April 10 and again on May 5, 1822, Castlereagh took
Chateaubriand into his confidence and suggested that the new states might
be induced to adopt monarchial forms in exchange for recognition and
commercial privileges. France, the foreign secretary urged, should "act in
concert with England in everything pertaining to both the commercial and
political aspects of the Spanish colonies." 18 The Paris cabinet, however,
(London, 1905), pp. 34-36; Ellis, "British Reciprocity System," pp. 64, 76. More than
ninety M.P.'s had close connections with business or banking interests. As a group,
Ellis asserts, they were more liberal in their economic philosophy than the merchant
class, and the ministry seemed peculiarly sensitive to their criticism.
16 Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 428-429; for the provisions of these acts, see the Annual
Register, LXN (1822), 122-125 and Ellis, "Reciprocity System," pp. 88-92.
17 Webster, Castlereagh, p. 428.
18 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, London, Apr. 12, May 7, and 21, 1822, Anti-
oche, Chateau briand, pp. 234, 262, and 264; Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. II," EHR,
XXX, 641.
rejected these overtures, alleging not only that France must act in concert
with her allies, but also that she did not wish to offend Spain with whom
relations already were strained. The real reason for the refusal was, of
course, that both Villele and Montmorency were distrustful of Castlereagh
and jealous of Britain's power and prosperity.1 9
Rebuffed by France, Castlereagh resolved to act alone, regardless of the
approval or disapproval of other nations, including Spain. During the sum-
mer of 1822, he accorded the South American states de facto recognition
by recognizing them as belligerents, opening British ports to their ships, and
accrediting consuls to them to superintend British interests. He apparently
believed that the current trend of events would lead to complete recognition,
for on June 28, 1822, he warned Don Luis de Onis, the new Spanish ambas-
sador at London, that recognition of the insurgent American colonies was
only a question of time, if no reconciliation were made. He advised Spain
to recognize the independence of her transmarine provinces inasmuch as
she already had lost control over them. Britain would ask for no commercial
advantages, but only that she should be placed on an equal footing with
other nations. England, indeed, did not have to ask for advantages, since
neither Spain nor France - because each lacked the requisite merchant
marine and capital for investment - could possibly offer serious competition
in the commercial world. 20
It will be recalled that Castlereagh's instructions for the Vienna confer-
ence, written during July 1822, indicated that he regarded Spanish America
as more important to Britain than Spain. Having divided the Spanish colo-
nies into three groups, Castlereagh proposed a different policy toward each
category: with colonies still fighting for their independence, no relations
should be established; with colonies negotiating with the mother country
for recognition, relations should be suspended until the result of the negoti-
ations was known; but every colony that had won its independence should
be recognized. These instructions, however, were soon modified by Can-
ning, Castlereagh's successor, who united the Spanish American and slave
trade questions: Britain, he affirmed, would recognize only those states that
19 Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Paris, May 6 and 13, Antioch, Chateau briand,

pp. 270, 271; Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 290; Webster, Cast-
lereagh, pp. 430-431; C.L.B., "Des rapports de la France et de l'Europe avec l'Ame-
rique du Sud," Revue des deux mondes, 4th ser., XXXI (1838), 54.
20 Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 432-433; "Canning," For. Qu. Rev., VII, 411-412;
Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp.• I, 296; Wellington to Stuart,
Calais, Dec. 21, 1822, ibid., p. 664; Canning to the Commons, Apr. 14, 1823, ParI.
Debates. new ser., VIII, 891; Temperley, Canning, p. 41; Phillips, Confed. of Europe,
p. 247; Claude Farrere, Histoire de La marine franr;aise (Paris, 1956), pp. 323-324.
had completely abolished the slave trade and would not take part in any
declaration of the sovereignty of Spain over her revolted colonies. Spain's
inability to suppress piracy in the West Indies, moreover, constituted an-
other reason for British recognition. The policy of nonintervention in the
internal affairs of Spain, meanwhile, did not preclude vindication against
Spanish pirates. 21
2. Wellington's Dissent
Upon his arrival in Verona on October 15, Wellington cautioned Canning

not to be hasty in recognizing Colombia. He argued that commercial inter-
course with this state would bring immediate ruin to the British West Indies
since the products of the two areas were identical. The duke acknowledged
that eventually Britain must recognize the newly established governments of
South America, but he favored postponing recognition until absolutely
necessary; i.e., until these governments have been really constituted and
have become powers. He urged Canning not to seek "reasons for recognizing
them, and by recognizing them to constitute them." 22
Unimpressed by this argument, Canning requested Frederick Robinson,
President of the Board of Trade, to draft such commercial engagements as
he and the London merchants thought advisable in the event of recognition.
Informing Wellington of this step on October 29, Canning posed the ques-
tion: What choice does Britain have but between recognition or vindication
against Spain for injuries suffered? In view of the growing impatience of
mercantile and manufacturing interests, the foreign secretary declared, the
process of events cannot be stopped; acquiescence to the status quo cannot
be preached successfully to Parliament.23
On November 8, Canning confided to the Iron Duke that he considered
"the American questions ... out of all proportion more important, .. than
the European." Britain must act quickly, he affirmed, or "we shall rue the
loss of an opportunity never, never to be recovered." ,24
Two days later Wellington again remonstrated with his chief, revealing
his reluctance to break with the Alliance on this issue. It was, he said, a
point of honor not to be in a hurry to recognize the independence of Spain's
revolted colonies, and he would be ashamed to raise the matter at the Con-
21 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 287; Canning to Wellington, London,

Sept. 27 and Oct. 1, 1822, ibid., pp. 304-305, 357.
22 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 384.
23 Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 466.
'2<1 Canning to Wellington, London, Nov. 8, 1822, ibid., p. 511.
gress, if piracy in the West Indies did not give him "something to say besides
the argument of commercial advantage and the clamours of our people."
He did not see how the recognition of any colony would relieve Britain from
her difficulties with Spain. The duke concluded this remonstrance with a
statement that amounts to an epitome of his political creed:
I therefore have always been for going as far as was necessary, and never
further; and for justifying to Spain and the Allies each particular case. By so
doing, we shall stand as we ought to in the eyes of the world. If we go further,
we shall lose our character for justice and forbearance, which after all is what
constitutes our power .25
Wellington's sentiments reflected his ultra-Tory prejudices, but he sub-
ordinated his disagreement with Canning to his instructions. The duke's
views, nonetheless, exercised a restraining influence on the foreign secretary,
not only because of his enormous prestige, but also because he was a
member of the cabinet, a peer of the realm, and a royal favorite, who only
recently had persuaded George IV to readmit Canning himself to the
ministry. The king and cabinet, moreover, agreed with Wellington on the
Latin American Question, and Canning knew it. 26
3. The Villele - Montmorency Vendetta Revisited
The Wellington-Canning dissent was minor compared with the friction in

the French cabinet between the premier and his foreign minister, which, as
already noted, characterized French diplomacy at Verona, afterward leading
to the resignation of the latter. VilleIe and Montmorency no more agreed on
Latin American policy than they did on what posture to adopt toward Spain.
The premier's instructions for the Congress dated August 30, directed the
French delegation to propose mediation by the Alliance between Spain and
Portugal and their American colonies. If this mediation were extended and
rejected by the Iberian nations, the great powers should recognize the inde-
pendence of those Latin American states which already "are regularly
constituted." As a blow at British commerce, Villele suggested an inter-
national convention denying to any power special advantages in South
America. In an effort to unite the problem of Spain with the colonial ques-
tion, the premier urged his plenipotentiaries to have the Congress consider
the questions of Spain and of Spanish and Portuguese America together and

26 Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 72-73; Temperley, Canning, pp. 31, 34,
48, 112-113, and 486. Wellington held the minor cabinet post of Master-General of the
Ordinance.
to secure a contingent treaty either in the case of a Franco-Spanish war or

in the event of recognition of Hispanic American independence. 27
It is clear from these instructions that Villele - no less than Castlereagh
and Canning - considered South America as important to the national inter-
est as Spain and that his Latin American policy was motivated by jealousy
of Britain's commercial position. But he attempted to dissemble these views
when Wellington passed through Paris on his way to the Vienna conference.
The premier admitted to the duke in their interview of September 20 that
France had indeed sent agents to some of the Spanish colonies, but that
French merchants had little trade with any of them. The Paris cabinet, he
contended, had not encouraged commercial intercourse with these insurgent
provinces, nor had it recognized them in any way. Wellington, however,
was not deceived by these assurances. 28
In subsequent dispatches to Montmorency, VilleIe emphasized his desire
to recognize the revolted American colonies of Spain and Portugal. Since
Brazil already had adopted monarchial forms, the allies should not object
to recognizing this state. Spain should be encouraged and aided by the
"mediation of the powers and perhaps by their intervention" in establish-
ing a Spanish prince in Mexico. Such a plan was likely to succeed, for a
monarchy had been the first choice of the Mexicans. Villele vaguely hinted
that if the allies intervened in Spain, a French squadron might be used to
transport a Spanish Bourbon to Mexico. As an inducement to the allied
sovereigns to recognize the Latin American states that already were
organized, Villele offered to consider the conditional recognition of France's
own revolted colony of Santo DomingO. 29 Again it appears from this corre-
spondence that the paramount purpose of French policy was to deny Britain
the advantageous position of the most favored nation. The premier feared
that Britain would profit from a Franco-Spanish war by "concluding with
the insurgent states arrangements prejudicial to the interests of the
Continent." 30
Montmorency, however, was loath to follow his superior's instructions.
He wanted neither to raise the Spanish colonial issue at the Congress, nor,
27 Instructions pour Ie congres de Verone, Aug. 30, 1822, A.A.E., Congn!s de Ve-
rone, Vol. 721; cf. Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 231-234.
28 Ibid., p. 233; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,297.
29 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 23, Oct. 12 and 15, 1822, Villele, Memoires,
III, 70-71, 115-116, 122-123; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, quoted in
Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 261; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 17, 1822,
A.A.E., Congres de Verone, Vol. 721.
30 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 544; cf. Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec.
5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 80.
if it were initiated by another nation, to unite it with the affairs of the

motherland. If Spain refused mediation, which she was certain to do, the
only alternative would be recognition of the South American republics, an
act which the three eastern powers would regard as a violation of legitimacy.
The foreign minister was on the horns of a dilemma: to ignore his instruc-
tions could mean repudiation, but to follow them certainly would lead to
the equally distasteful alternatives of negotiating with the Spanish consti-
tutional government, which he wished to overthrow, or disregarding "the
ligitimate rights of Ferdinand VII by establishing relations with his rebel-
lious subjects." 31 France, he thought, had nothing to gain but embarrass-
ment by bringing this question before the Congress, a view supported by
the French delegation. Faced by a choice between loyalty and principle,
possibility and certainty, Montmorency refused to raise the Latin American
issue at Verona. Toward Spanish America, no less than toward Spain, the
foreign minister created a policy of his own. On November 22, he departed
for Paris to convert the king and council to his legitimist views, leaving
Chateaubriand in charge of the French delegation. 32
4. The British Brief
On Sunday, November 24, two days after the departure of Montmorency,

Wellington read two papers before a general conference of the allied
ministers. The first concerned the slave trade; the second was a "Memo-
randum on the Necessity of Some Further Recognition of the Independence
of the Spanish Colonies." In the latter, the duke based recognition on com-
mercial rather than political grounds in order to avoid raising the time-
worn question of legitimacy in connection with the Spanish colonies.
Realizing that many members of Parliament supported the cause of the
South American republics through liberal sympathy, Wellington admitted
that Britain already had recognized the youthful states so far as to accord
them the rights of belligerents and to negotiate with them through the com-
manding officers of British ships. He reminded his allies that the United
States had recently recognized the independence of four governments
established in Latin America and warned that non-recognition of so large
a portion of the world could disturb "the intercourse of civilized society."
There had been no redress, he emphasized, for the seizure of British mer-
chant ships in the West Indies by Spanish men-of-war. The duke concluded
31 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 545.

S2 Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 265; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22,
1822, Well. Desp., I, 563.
with a candemnatian af the piracy in the Caribbean Sea which had in-
creased as Spanish autharity in the New Warld decreased. England cauld
nat extirpate piracy withaut the aid af lacal autharities, and this ca-aper-
atian must lead inevitably to' the recagnitian de facto af several calanial
gavernments. 33
Thus Wellingtan, by representing the pressing need for eradicating piracy,
attempted to' secure from the Congress a declaratian that wauld amaunt to'
recagnitian of the independence af certain revalted South American cola-
nies. He did nat anticipate any abjections fram the cantinental powers to'
Britain's Latin American palicy, unless France or Russia va iced a cam-
plaint. NO' ane at Verona, he believed, knew or cared anything abaut cala-
nies and colonial policy, except as a means of finding in British canduct
some pretext far an attack on "aur high character and thus depreciate us
in the opinian af the warld." 34
5. The Anglo-Continental Impasse
Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France replied to' Wellingtan's nate an Thurs-
day, Navember 28. 35 Metternich admitted that England had a perfect right
to defend her commerce from piracy, but refused to' recagnize the inde-
pendence af the Spanish calonies until Spain had renaunced her savereignty
aver them. But until such time as his Catholic Majesty was campletely free
to direct his awn affairs, Austria wauld adapt a realistic attitude based upan
"cansideratians of general expediency." The Prussian reply was similar to'
the Austrian, except that Bernstorff admitted the principle an which Britain
had been acting. He abserved, hawever, that because of the civil war then
raging in Spain, the mament was quite inapportune for recagnizing her
revalted calonies. Russia annaunced that she wauld dO' nathing "which
might prejudice the questian af the independence af Sauth America." 36
33 Ibid., pp. 386-388; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19 and 26, 1822, ibid.,
pp. 545, 585-586. Britain specifically charged the governors of Puerto Cabello, Cuba,
and Puerto Rico with privateering.
34 Ibid., pp. 544-545, 586.
35 A discussion of the Spanish Colonial Question was scheduled for November 27,
but the debate on the Slave Trade and OIther issues lasted too late for another question
to be considered that night. Proces-verbal de la conference du 24 novembre 1822,
Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830: Select Documents from
the Foreign Office Archives, ed. C. K. Webster (London, 1938), II, 79.
36 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp. I, 616; Chateau-
briand, Congres de Verone, p. 45; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 545-546. For the
Austrian, Prussian, and Russian notes OIn the Spanish colonies, see Webster, Brit. and
Lat. Amer., II, 80-83. According to Webster, ibid., p. 79, "Russian" was accidentally
transposed for "Prussian" in Wellington's dispatch of Nov. 29 to Canning.
On this issue the tsar, still firmly committed to the views he had expressed
at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, maintained a discreet neutrality. Chateaubriand con-
tended that the cabinet of the Tuileries, no less than that of St. James,
sincerely desired the restoration of Spanish authority in South America in
order that peace and prosperity could return to that continent. He cautioned
his colleagues against "recognizing a political system virtually hostile to that
which governs Europe." In this question, Spain - "the sovereign de jure of
these colonies" - should be consulted first. France, nonetheless, "acknow-
ledges with England, that when disputes are protracted and the law of
nations can no longer be enforced, because of the impotence of one of the
parties, natural law resumes its sway." But to avoid "commercial rivalries
and ... precipitate measures," Chateaubriand appealed to the allied powers
to reach a common understanding on this issue and to adopt some general
plan, based on "the principle of generous reciprocity and perfect equality,"
which would safeguard the interests of Spain, those of her colonies, and
those of European nations, and would reconcile the rights of legitimacy with
the exigencies of policy. 37
Despite its vague and utopian tone, Chateau briand's note verbale not only
served the immediate purpose of obstructing British policy at the Congress,
but also it contained, though cleverly concealed, the germ of the author's
grand design for restoring peace in the New World by creating there new
constitutional, Bourbon monarchies. An analysis of the document reveals
that only such appanages could satisfy all the requisites and reservations
which it set forth: a political system conforming to that of Europe, a
guarantee of the interests of Spain and others nations, a reconciliation of
legitimacy with independence and national policy. The task assigned to
Chateaubriand was, moreover, extremely delicate. France neither wanted
to forfeit to Britain and the United States the commerce of Latin America
nor to forsake the principle of legitimacy and break with the eastern courts,
especially at a time when French Ultras were urging a Spanish war to
restore Ferdinand VII to absolute power. Chateaubriand, it must be re-
membered, was still ambassador at London; if his language were too anti-
British, that government might declare him persona non grata. Circum-
stances, therefore, required him to state the case for France in generalities
and to make reservations. 88 Notwithstanding Chateaubriand's later claim
that he had expressed the views of the French people, if not of the premier,
87 Note verbale sur les colonies espagnoles en Amerique, Chateaubriand, Congres

de Verone, pp. 46-47. The French reply is dated Nov. 26, 1822, perhaps in an attempt
to show independence of the Alliance.
38 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
VilleIe was delighted with his note, praising it as a "perfect response ....
It is only by thus treating questions with force, clearness, and political
acumen," he declared "that we can cease to remain entangled in the nets
of those shopkeeping islanders." 39 Since Chateaubriand succeeded Mont-
morency as foreign minister on December 28, 1822, his reply to Welling-
ton is all the more important. By it he committed France to an evasive, wait-
and-see policy toward Latin America and indicated the course he would
pursue in 1823-1824. 40 Indeed, in May 1824, he informed Prince Jules de
Polignac, the new French ambassador at London, that: "Our policy with
respect to the Spanish colonies is fully expressed in our declaration at
Verona." 41 For the moment, however, Chateaubriand's note did serve to
obstruct British policy.
Wellington declined to participate in the discussion which followed the
oral delivery of the allied notes unless the distinction was observed which
Castlereagh had made between three groups of colonies: (1) those in which
fighting still continued, (2) those in which the struggle had ended and the
local government was in complete possession, and (3) those that were negoti-
ating with Spain. Ignoring these categories, Chateaubriand proposed that
Spain be aided in subduing her revolted colonies; but Austria, Prussia, and
Russia refused to make any decision regarding the Spanish colonies without
consulting Ferdinand VII. In the ensuing debate, Britain's policy of re-
cognition de facto was assailed by the allied representatives. Prince Franz
Ludwig Hatzfeldt, Prussian ambassador to Austria, declared that he had
too much respect for the English navy to believe that Britain would be
forced to conclude treaties with the South American rebels or that she
could not, by her own force, clear the seas of pirates. Embarrassed by the
criticism of his colleagues, which seemed to justify his protest to Canning
of November 10, the Iron Duke put an end to the discussion by submitting
a note which stipulated that the court of St. James, far from wanting to
undermine Spanish authority in the New World, strongly desired the recon-
ciliation of Spain with her colonies. The measures proposed by the London
cabinet, he asserted, were designed to protect the manifold relations of
British subjects with the insurgent states. These ties, limited as they were by
necessity, had no relevancy to questions of right. Britain's allies, however,
took the view that it would be a contradiction to support reconciliation be-
39 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 5, 1822, ibid., p. 80.

40 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 108; Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR,
XXVII, 208; Robertson, France and Latin American Independence (Baltimore, 1939),
p. 244; Antioche, Chateau briand, p. 384.
41 Quoted in Robertson, France and Lat. Amer., p. 244.
tween Spain and her colonies and, at the same time, to prejudice these efforts
by adopting any measure that would acknowledge Spanish colonial inde-
pendence.42 Once again Wellington stood alone at the Congress. Despite
his disappointment, he realized, however, that it would be "quite hopeless"
to persuade the continental powers to adopt a common policy toward the
Spanish colonies. In retrospect, he consoled himself with the thought that at
least "none of them positively objects to what we are doing." 43
6. The Gameiro Affair
On Thursday, November 28, 1822 - the day the continental powers replied
to Wellington's memorandum on Latin America - Manoel Rodrigues
Gameiro Pessoa, a Brazilian envoy, arrived in Verona and was issued a pass-
port by Metternich allowing him to remain in the city. His mission was
twofold: to obtain the recognition of Brazilian independence by the allies
and to secure their mediation between Portugal and Brazil. In pursuit of this
dual objective, Gameiro, while still in Milan awaiting permission to come
to Verona, had addressed to the chancellor a memoire which presented the
case for Brazil. In it he stated that he held credentials from Dom Pedro, the
prince regent, to the Emperor of Austria. The cause of the prince, the envoy
declared, was legitimate and should not be confused with any other insurgent
government, not even that of the Urgel Regency, since his Royal Highness
intended to sustain in South America the cause of monarchy.44
4l! La Ferronnays to Montmorency, Verona, Dec. 1, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Ve-
rone, Vol. 721; proces-verbal de la conference du 28 novembre 1822, Webster, Brit.
and Lat. Amer., II, 83; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 546-547; Boyce, Diplomatic
Relations, pp. 57-58. In the absence of Bernstorff, who was confined to his bed by l\
severe case of gout, Hatzfeldt represented Prussia at the conferences of November 27
and 28. Entry for Wed., Nov. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 117; Chateaubriand,
Congres de Verone, p. 57. According to Perkins: "The frequent allusions to the subju-
gation of South America by the Holy Alliance are based on no sound interpretation
of events; the notion that any such course was intended is myth, rather than history"
(Perkins, "Russia and the Span. Cols.," AHR, XXVIII, 672). This opinion however,
is contradicted by Temperley, who declared: "It is important to recognize that the
actual project of recovering parts of Spanish America by force of arms for Spain,
whether in fact illusory or impossible, was not deemed so in Europe" (Temperley,
"French Designs," EHR, XL, 35). My own investigation leads me to support Temper-
ley's conclusion. If Perkins is right, neither Canning's talks with Richard Rush in
August 1823, nor his memorandum of October 9, 1823, to Polignac has any meaning.
43 Wellington to Canning, No. 45, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Webster, Brit. and Lat.
Amer., II, 79.
M Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 411; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, and
Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,616,642; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 200;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 547; Robertson, France and Lat. Amer., p. 274. Un-
known to the allied delegations at the Congress, Dom Pedro already had assumed the
To the great surprise of the Congress, Metternich, the ardent champion

of Spanish legitimacy, supported Dom Pedro's petition. After reading the
Brazilian memoire, to the five-power conference of November 29, he re-
quested the allied ministers to admit Gameiro to their discussions as the
official plenipotentiary of Brazil. Not without some embarrassment, the
chancellor observed that justice and injustice, good and evil, were inter-
mingled in the question of Brazil. He admitted that the former Portuguese
colony was in a state of revolt, but against a government whose legitimacy
had been destroyed by revolution. Austria, Metternich confessed, still main-
tained a minister at Rio, but there was a difference between the revolted
Spanish colonies and Brazil: the former were republics, whereas Brazil
alone was a monarchy. Apparently in the hope of preventing British sepa-
ration from the Alliance on the colonial question, he proposed that a confer-
ence be held in London to determine what should be done about this com-
plex issue. 45 Metternich's policy toward Brazil was not hypocritical, but
realistic, and it is quite probable that Friedrich von Gentz, his close friend
and co-worker, was responsible for this attitude. Another factor was, of
course, the family connection between the rulers of Brazil and Austria: in
1817 Dom Pedro had married the Archduchess Leopoldina, the second
daughter of Francis I. The Austrian chancellor was aware, too, of the close
bond between Britain and Portugal, and did not wish to become involved
with the British government for the sake of logic. In the distinction drawn.
he hoped to appeal to the conservatism of the allied ministers, and he almost
succeeded. 46
Britain and France took his proposal for a conference ad referendum,
though Wellington considered London as the most inconvenient of all lo-
cations for a conference on the affairs of Portugal and Brazil. Prussia and
Russia, however, appeared disposed to acquiesce in Austria's requests.
When the duke perceived that the recognition of Brazilian independence
title of emperor. On October 12, 1822, he had proclaimed the "Constitutional Empire
of Brazil," and on December 1, 1822, the coronation ceremony took place. Brazilians,
however, celebrate September 7, 1822, as their national birthday, for it was on this
day that Dom Pedro - while standing on the bank of the Ypiranga River near Sao
Paulo - declared the independence of Brazil, shouting: "Independence or Death."
This declaration is called the "Grito do Ypiranga."
4S Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 642; Viel-Castel, La
Restauration, XI, 547-549; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 200-201.
46 Ibid., Sweet, Gentz, pp. 236, 239; Baron de Loreto, "Reconnaissance de l'Empire
de Brezil par les puissances euro¢ennes (1823-1828)," Revue d'histoire diplomatique,
III (1889), 506. Unlike Britain, Austria did not recognize the constitutional government
established in Portugal by the Revolution of 1820. The Austrian minister had been
recalled following the insurrection of the Lisbon garrison on September 15, 1820,
which deposed the regency and established a provisional government.
was receiving support, he did an about-face and contradicted the arguments

he had just advanced in his note on the Spanish American colonies. He
protested that the allies could not possibly mediate between Portugal and
Brazil, since only one party had asked for mediation. Moreover, he could
neither recognize the independence of Brazil nor support the seating of its
minister, since he had no instructions on such an unforeseen question.
Finally, he reminded the allies "how inconsistent it would be with all that
had passed in this Congress if the independence of Brazil was in any manner
recognized .... " 47 When Chateaubriand and La Ferronnays supported Wel-
lington's observations, Metternich was constrained to ask: "Then what do
you want to do with M. Gameiro?" The allied ministers unanimously con-
curred that there was nothing to do but to send him home, and there the
subject was dropped.48
The most plausible explanation of Wellington's volte-face is that he feared
British recognition of Brazil would offend Portugal, with whom Britain had
a profitable commercial treaty. His private convictions, too, were opposed
to immediate recognition. He cannot be accused of acting in concert with
the allies, because on this issue he again opposed them. Nor was he guilty
of violating instructions, for they did not cover such an unexpected question.
On November 29 and December 10, 1822, he candidly informed Canning
of this affair and of his role in it; the foreign secretary never criticized his
stand.
In September 1823, Portugal requested British mediation, and after much
procrastination by John VI, the proposed conference on Brazil finally as-
sembled in London (July 12, 1824) under Austro-British sponsorship. Can-
ning did not object to working with Austria provided that Britain was left
a free hand in the matter of recognition should the mediation fail. The
conference was attended only by Austria, Britain, Brazil, and Portugal.
Despite Franco-Russian intrigues in Lisbon which encouraged Portuguese
duplicity and threatened to wreck the proceedings, the London conference
in March 1825 commissioned Sir Charles Stuart to negotiate directly with
Brazil and Portugal. In Lisbon Stuart explained that Britain's interests de-
manded that she recognize Brazil. but she wanted Portugal to take the first
step toward acknowledging a fait accompli. John VI yielded in May, and
47 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 642-643.

48 Ibid., p. 643; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 548-549; Robertson, France and
Lat. Amer., pp. 247-248. Mter the conference had adjourned, the duke engaged the
chancellor in a private conversation in which he again opposed holding a conference
on the Brazilian question. Britain, he observed, was the only power that could have
any influence on the issue. To bring in other nations would only make successful me-
diation more difficult.
Stuart set sail for Brazil, reaching Rio in July. After several sessions, he
secured on August 29 a treaty which recognized the independence of Brazil
under Emperor Pedro I. This treaty arrived in Lisbon on November 9,1825,
and ratifications were exchanged on the 20th; the peaceful separation of the
two states was complete. For this great diplomatic achievement, Canning
deserves major credit; the treaty was based on his projet, and he had kept
the negotiations going, first at London and later at Lisbon and Rio, despite
the opposition of France and Russia. But Metternich, too, deserves credit
for supporting Stuart's mission, despite his fear of the tsar. 49
7. The British Reservation
By not participating in a general discussion on the colonial issue, Wellington

left the British cabinet at full liberty to take whatever steps it deemed neces-
sary and proper. He inserted in the Protocol of November 28, moreover, a
stipulation reserving to his government complete freedom of action. Can-
ning regarded a free hand a necessity because he "wished recognition to be
a British, not a European action." 50 In December 1822, however, he was in
no hurry to take this final step. For the moment. the foreign secretary
thought it prudent to continue Castlereagh's policy of sending to the new
Latin American states commercial agents with consular powers. To Can-
ning, as to Villele, the establishment of monarchies in the New World was
preferable to republics, and each hoped that the mother country would be
the first to recognize the independence of her revolted colonies. But the
foreign secretary had his own motives for adopting a wait-and-see policy
regarding this issue: he wanted to help the Spanish constitutional govern-
ment and knew that neither Ferdinand nor the Madrid cabinet would con-
sent to immediate political recognition. Wellington's diplomacy, therefore.
coincided perfectly with his government's policy toward Latin America, and
Canning on November 29, 1822, congratulated him for doing in respect to
this question "all that could be desired. "51
Before adjourning the last session of the Congress on December 14, Met-
ternich, Nesselrode, and Bernstorff signed a circular dispatch, drafted by
Gentz, to be sent to their representatives at the various courts of Europe.
This circular summarized and commented on the results of the Congress,
49 Temperley, Canning. pp. 213-214, 217. 219-223.
50 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 616; Hauranne,
Hist. du govt. parI., p. 200; Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., J, 21.
51 Canning to A'Court, No. 35, London, Dec. 9, 1822, ibid., II, 401; Canning to
Wellington, Gloucester Lodge, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 621; Temperley, Can-
ning, pp. 112-113.
declaring, in part, that Spain's colonies had justified their separation from
the motherland by the very same political philosophy on which Spain had
founded her constitution, but which she condemned in South America. This
observation coincided with the concensus of the continental diplomatic
corps that the policy of Spain's constitutional regime toward the insurgent
colonies was inconsistent with its attitude toward the absolute government
of the king. As Baron Edmond de Boislecomte commented, it is astonishing
that so many Spaniards fail to see that the principle of popular sovereignty
gives "to the Spanish Americans the same right to free themselves from
Spain as that which the Spaniards had invoked to liberate themselves from
absolute power." 52
But Metternich, far from being a universal reactionary, privately favored
recognition of Hispanic American independence. A few months after the
Congress, the Austrian chancellor confided to Sir Henry Wellesley, the new
British ambassador at Vienna, that he considered as hopeless any project
to regain for Spain her lost colonies. "Spain would do well," he reasoned,
"to confine her efforts to the preservation of Cuba." He realized, too, that
it would be impossible to act without British aid, and that armed inter-
vention on behalf of Spain probably would mean war with England. His
policy, in short, was one of realistic moderation. 53
Villele's views, however, contrasted sharply with those of Metternich.
Jealous of Britain, but equally anxious to extract himself from the Iberian
imbroglio without loss of national honor or personal reputation, the premier
on December 5, 1822, frankly informed Sir Charles Stuart that a favorable
Franco-Spanish commercial treaty would contribute more than any other
measure to the prevention of a rupture between France and Spain. To
initiate this demarche, he offered Evaristo Justino-Fernandez, Duke of San
Lorenzo, Spanish ambassador at Paris, France's mediation between Spain
and any colony whose independence the Madrid government was disposed
to recognize. The price of this service, the premier declared, was the same
52 Circular of December 14, 1822, Verona, F. 0., Austria, 120/54; Boislecomte, A.

A. E., Vol. 722; Robertson, France and Lat. Amer., p.247.
53 Quoted in Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 213; Metternich to
Nesselrode, quoted in ibid., pp. 216-217; Sweet, Gentz, pp. 236, 241; Robertson, "Met-
ternich's Attitude toward Revolutions," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI
(1941), 550-558 (hereafter cited as HAHR). Recalled on October 18, 1822, Sir Charles
Stewart, while in Venice, took his leave of the Austrian emperor on December 29 and
did not return to Vienna. Sir Henry Wellesley, who was appointed his successor on
February 3, 1823, arrived in Vienna on June 25 and presented his credentials on July
3. Robert Gordon served as ad interim Minister Plenipotentiary. Wellesley was Wel-
lington's brother, and on January 21, 1828, he was created Baron Cowley. F.O.,
King's Letter Books, 90/6, and F.O., Miscellanea, Ser. I, 95/658.
commercial advantages enjoyed by Britain "under treaty with Spain or with

the colony in question." But if Spain, on the contrary, wished to reconquer
her insurgent colonies, France would place a fleet at her disposal. The
maintenance of peace between their respective countries, Villele assured San
Lorenzo, depended on the security of the king's life, Spanish consent to
France's mediation in the colonial question, or acceptance of France's offer
to convey "an Infant to Mexico or Peru, or to any other part of Spanish
America, attended by troops." Peace, the premier emphasized, did not
depend upon a modification of the Spanish constitution or even upon the
reconciliation of the king to a constitutional system. But these proposals,
however well-intentioned, had no chance of winning Spanish approval, for
the Cortes regarded any concession to France as a surrender to foreign
intimidation, and the obstinate Ferdinand VII would brook no interference
with what he considered his legitimate rights of sovereignty.54
When Wellington passed through Paris on his way home from Verona,
he found that Villele also was alarmed over the intended British expedition
to the West Indies. In an interview with the duke on December 10, the
premier protested the landing of a British force on Cuba. It was reported,
he asserted, that the British fleet had orders to resist the normal operations
of the Spanish guarda costas which the mother country employed to enforce
her monopoly of the commerce of her colonies. Wellington replied that such
action was necessary to put an end to the pirates whose headquarters were
on Cuba. The presence of a British fleet would not have the least effect on
Spanish possessions nor on the commerce of Havana. As for the Spanish
commercial monopoly, both king and Cortes since 1810 had recognized and
sanctioned British trade with the Spanish colonies.55
Canning, predictably, was highly incensed by Villele's Anglophobe atti-
tude, denouncing it as insolent hypocrisy that the premier should catechize
Britain's Latin American policy when France herself was mobilizing an
54 Stuart to Canning, No. 333, Paris, Dec. 4, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Wellington
to Canning, Nos. 48 and 53, Paris, Dec. 10 and 12, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,639-640,644-
645; A'Court to Wellington, Madrid, Dec. 24, 1822, ibid., p. 554; Temperley, Canning,
p.77.
55 Canning to Stuart, No. 14, Foreign Office, Dec. 1, 1822, F.O., France, 146/50;
Wellington to Canning, No. 48, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 637-638; Temper-
ley, Canning, p. 76. Wellington's statement that Spain in 1810 had given legal sanction
to British trade with Hispanic America is false. Canning made the same claim to
Richard Rush in November 1823, and again to Parliament in March 1824. This alle-
gation probably was intended to defend the status of this commerce, which was re-
garded as illegal by Spain, and to support the British policy of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of independent states. Dorothy B. Goebel, "British Trade to the Span-
ish Colonies, 1796-1823," AHR, XLIII (1938), 288. On December 10, 1822, Canning
informed the London diplomatic corps of the projected Cuban expedition.
army along the Pyrenees, planning expeditions against Spain's revolted

colonies, proposing commercial treaties with Spain on no other basis than
that of complete equality with England, and "then to tell us gravely that
France will not submit to our gaining any advantages in commerce and
territory." 56 There is something in Villele's tone, Canning confessed to
Wellington,
that really stirs one's blood - not in the way in which the atrocities and vio-
lences of revolutionary France have stirred it, for the last quarter of a century -
but in the good old constitutional way in which France and England used to
hate and provoke each other in times before revolutions were so plenty. Villele
seems to be a minister of those times; and I suspect, must be watched, and
perhaps checked, accordingly. 57
But on January 7, 1823, the foreign secretary suspended the Cuban expe-
dition as well as all operations against Spain, offering instead to negotiate
a commercial treaty with the Madrid government. The reasons for this
reversal were twofold: Spain's announcement that she was willing to redress
British grievances arising out of attacks by pirates and Spanish colonial
authorities upon British shipping in the West Indies and Canning's fear
that the coincidence of British naval operations against Cuba with a French
attack upon Spain (which he now thought probable), would create the
appearance of a concert and common cause between France and Britain,
a contingency that must be avoided. 58
The commercial motivation of Britain's Latin American policy was so
well understood by the continental allies that they were willing to credit the
rumors, which circulated at Verona and Paris, that Britain had a secret
agreement with Spain to support her cause at the Congress in return for an
advantageous treaty of commerce, and that Britain would take Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and whatever else she could get, if France attacked Spain.
Wellington, Stuart, and Canning were hard pressed to prove these reports
56 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 650.
57 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 17, 1822, ibid., p. 657.
58 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 6 and 8, ibid., pp. 627-628 and 629;
Canning to A'Court, No.2, Foreign Office, Jan. 7,1823, F.O., Spain, 185/91; Canning
to Stuart, No.2, Foreign Office, Jan. 10, 1823, Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., 11,111;
Temperley, Canning, p. 76. The influence of the United States in determining the policy
of European powers toward Latin America was very slight, but in 1822, alleged Ame-
rican designs on Cuba caused. Canning some anxious moments. He was prepared to
annex Puerto Rico, if the United States occupied Cuba, in order to preserve the ba-
lance of power in the Caribbean area. Canning to Wellington, Gloucester Lodge, Nov.
29,1822, Well. Desp., 1,621; Canning to Stuart, No. 14, Foreign Office, Dec. 1, 1822,
F.O., France, 146/50; Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 218; Tern-
perley, Canning, 169.
false, for denials meant nothing to those who had come to equate England
with commercial enterprise. 59
After the French invasion of Spain on April 7,1823, Villele and Chateau-
briand, returned to the policy of creating Bourbon monarchies in the New
World which, though independent, still would be Spanish appanages. The
premier even suggested to Louis-Antoine, the Duke of Angouleme, the
commander-in-chief of the French army, that he spare a few ships and men
for this project, but the duke refused, alleging that all resources were needed
to complete the conquest of the Peninsula. It is significant, however, that
neither the premier nor his foreign minister proposed the use of armed force
by France to restore Spain's rule over her disaffected colonies. The Paris
cabinet, like the Austrian chancellor, knew well that such intervention
would be "utterly hopeless" and, moreover, could lead to war with
England. 60
As the French army rapidly overran the Iberian Peninsula, Canning's
anxiety concerning France's policy toward Latin America grew apace.
Would military success embolden France to attempt armed intervention in
the Spanish colonies? At the beginning of October 1823, the foreign
secretary, in an effort to clarify French policy, engaged Prince Jules de
Polignac in a series of conversations, culminating in the "Polignac Memo-
randum" (October 9, 1823), by which France pledged not to use armed
force against the Spanish American colonies. The Paris cabinet, however,
preferred to postpone action on the colonial question until the restoration
of Ferdinand VII.61 Although it may appear that British sea power alone
had vetoed French action, such was not the case. France, no less than Eng-
land, opposed the reestablishment of the old regime in Latin America;
moreover, Angouleme, Metternich, and Ferdinand, all protested against the
plan of Villele and Chateaubriand to create Bourbon appanages in the New
World. The Spanish king, indeed, refused to consider any scheme which
even hinted at the independence of the disaffected Spanish colonies. 62
To prove to the continental powers that Britain would act in her own
interests, if they continually pursued theirs, the London cabinet in Decem-
59 Canning to Stuart, No. 15, Foreign Office, Dec. 1, 1822, F.O., France, 146/50;
Wellington to Stuart, Calais, Dec. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 663.
60 Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 210-211, Robertson, France
and Lat. Amer., pp. 260-264; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, pp. 408-409.
81 Ibid., pp. 414-417, 422; Robertson, France and Lat. Amer., pp. 267-270; Temper-
ley, Canning, pp. 99, 115-117.
ill! Carlos A. Villanueva, La monarquia en America: la Santa Alianza (Paris, 1913),
pp. 73-74; Robertson, "The Policy of Spain toward Its Revolted Colonies, 1820-1823,"
HAHR, VI (1926), 44-46.
ber 1824 approved the formal recognition of Buenos Aires, Colombia, and
Mexico, despite the opposition a autrance of Bathurst, Eldon, Wellington,
Westmoreland, and George IV. The King's Speech upon convoking Parlia-
ment, February 7, 1825, publicly announced this decision. In recommending
recognition, Canning and Liverpool used the French occupation of Spain
as their main argument. They were determined that "if France had Spain,
it should not be Spain 'with the Indies.''' British acknowledgment of
Brazilian independence followed in August 1825. Austria on December 30,
1825, and France on February 28, 1826, recognized only Brazil. So long as
Bourbons ruled on both sides of the Pyrenees, the court of the Tuileries
would not recognize the revolted Hispanic American colonies. But after the
July Revolution, Louis Philippe, prompted by the advice of Count Louis
Mathieu Mole, his foreign minister, and the demands of French liberals
and merchants, formally acknowledged in 1830-1831 the republican govern-
ments of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.
France's recognition, while more comprehensive than that of Britain, had
been deferred too long, however, to excite gratitude on the part of the Latin
American s. 63
8. A Retrospect
Although the common struggle of Europe against Napoleonic France had

practically assured the emancipation of Spanish America, it did not bring
immediate European recognition of this recently acquired independence.
By compelling the continental powers to take a stand at Verona on the
Spanish Colonial Question, so important to Britain, Canning revealed their
disunity and produced an impasse with them which, combined with his
recognition of certain Hispanic American republics in December 1824
hastened the collapse of the Alliance. For the sake of legitimacy and
Spanish sovereignty, Austria, Prussia, and Russia would do nothing, though
Prussia agreed with Britain that the need for destroying piracy might lead
to recognition. These powers would not act because their interests were
only remotely involved, and they could not act because they lacked the
requisite sea power. The Alliance, therefore, no more gave France a man-
date to intervene in Spanish America than in Spain itself.
63 "Canning," For. Qu. Rev., VIII, 417; C.L.B., "France et l'Amerique du Sud,"
Revue des deux mondes, 4th ser., XXXI, 54; Loreto, "Reconnaissance de Brezil," Rev.
d'hist. dipl., III, 519-522; Tempedey, Canning, pp. 144-147, 151; Robertson, France
and Lat. Amer., pp. 536, 543-545, 548-553, 558-559. Not until December 1827, did
Russia recognize the independence of Brazil. By May 1828, every European nation
except Spain had accorded recognition to the former Portuguese colony.
The Gameiro Affair caused Wellington and Mettemich to reverse sides,

but the result was the same - a stalemate, the corollary of which was to
leave to Britain independent action, just as the Spanish European Question
was resolved by permitting France a free hand. The negotiations at Verona
indicate, however, that Villele, like Castlereagh and Canning, considered
the Spanish Colonial Question as far more important than its European
counterpart.
France had a navy and merchant marine, but they were too small to offer
a serious challenge to British commerce. French merchants and manu-
facturers, moreover, did not have the capital necessary to expand their
trade with Latin America. Consequently, the keynote of French policy on
this issue - despite its vacillation and lack of direction - was: obtain con-
cessions equal to those granted Britain. France, like England, desired Latin
American independence, but VilleIe and Chateaubriand, restrained by the
doctrine of legitimacy, were reluctant to initiate steps toward its recognition.
Among the continental allies, moreover, only Russia encouraged the French
dream of Bourbon monarchies in the New World.
If French ministers were jealous of Britain's commercial pre-eminence
in South America, no British statesman could look with equanimity on a
French garrison at Cadiz. 64 Although these two attitudes might seem un-
related, they were, in fact, closely connected: the French invasion of Spain,
epilogue to the Congress of Verona, induced Canning to recognize Latin
American independence before he otherwise would have, thus legalizing
a trade which, though lucrative (£ 5,600,000 in British exports by 1823),
was largely contraband. 65 It is precisely in this causal relationship that the
Congress appears to have been a turning point in the colonial quest for
European recognition.
'64 cf. Chateaubriand to La Ferronnays, Paris, Aug. 23, 1823, Chateaubriand, Cor-
respondance, VI, 379.
85 Captain Josceline Bagot (ed.), George Canning and His Friends (London, 1909),
II, 144-145; Goebel, "British Trade," AHR, XLIII, 288, 291, 309, 314-318; Judith B.
Williams, "The Establishment of British Commerce with Argentina," HAHR, XV
(1935), 43-45.
CHAPTER VI
THE SLAVE TRADE QUESTION
The international action that was proposed ... [in the

slave trade negotiations] demanded too great a subor-
dination of national interests and prejudices to a com-
mon control for it to be accepted. The discussion ...
revealed how far Europe yet was from a common out-
look on such matters. To ask Frenchmen to allow
ships flying their flag to be searched by British vessels,
or to suggest to the British Admiralty the maintenance
of an international fleet ... to suppress this infamous
traffic, was to awake national prejudices of over-
whelming strength, ... however much a common duty
to humanity demanded action. As a Tuscan diploma-
tist - [observed], 'I see clearly that we have not yet
begun the age of gold.' - C. K. Webster.1
1. Genesis
For a decade and a half prior to the Congress of Verona, the suppression
of the slave trade had been an important and vexing subject of international
debate. As early as March 2, 1807, the United States had forbidden her
citizens to import slaves after January 1, 1808.2 Only three weeks later
(March 25, 1807) Britain followed suit. As a result of the successful lobby-
ing of William Wilberforce and the African Society, Parliament prohibited
this commerce within the empire after March 1, 1808. Thus the world's two
great maritime powers officially had abolished the slave trade by 1808. 3
1 Webster, Castelereagh, p. 168.

2 An act to prohibit the importation of slaves, Mar. 2, 1807, U.S., Public Statutes
at Large of the United States of America, ed. Richard Peters (Boston, 1848-1856), II
(1799-1813),426-430. Since Article I, section 9, of the United States' constitution pro-
vided only that Congress could not prohibit the importation of slaves prior to 1808,
the national legislature had enacted a law in 1794 (amended in 1800), to forbid Ameri-
can citizens or residents to engage in the slave trade in any way other than as im-
porters. The intent of these laws was to prevent American merchants from carrying
slaves for other nations and their colonies. An act to prohibit the slave trade, Mar.
22, 1794, ibid., I (1789-1798), 347-349; a supplementary act to prohibit the slave trade,
May 10, 1800, ibid., II, 70-71.
3 An act to prohibit the slave trade, British Historical Documents, ed. David C.
Douglas (London, 1950), XI, 803-804; Knight, Popular History, VII, 478. The abolition
bill passed the Commons on Feb. 23, 1807, and the Lords on Mar. 18; it received the
royal assent on Mar. 25 and became law (47 George III. Cap. 36). This act declared
that after May I, 1807, no ship should depart from a port anywhere in the Empire
for the purpose of slaving, and that no slave should be imported into a British colony
after March I, 1808.
But American and British humanitarians soon learned that it was one thing
to place abolition laws on the statute books and quite another to enforce
them. Many Yankee and English slavers barely hesitated long enough to
lower Old Glory or the Union Jack and to run up some other flag before
continuing this illegal traffic. They and the merchants of other countries,
notably Spain and Portugal, participated in the slave trade after 1808 be-
cause rewards remained great enough to justify the risks involved. The
reasons for this "black market" were twofold: it was cheaper to import
slaves than to rear them on colonial plantations, and effective means of
suppression did not yet exist. 4
Supreme at sea after Trafalgar, Britain, for the duration of the war
against Napoleonic France, did prevent her own subjects from engaging
in the slave trade under the Union Jack. But she could not eliminate the
practice of sailing under a foreign flag, nor could she very well interfere
with the slave traders of friendly states, especially those of her Iberian
allies. In a move designed to curtail this flagrant evasion, Wilberforce and
his friends tried unsuccessfully in 1808 to prevail upon Spencer Perceval,
the sympathetic Chancellor of the Exchequer, to persuade the Portland
ministry to offer the island of Trinidad in return for Spanish abolition. Two
years later the African Institution complained that the west coast of Africa
"swarmed with slave-traders" flying the Spanish and Portuguese flags and
that in many proven instances they were British subjects. 5
In response to these protests, the London cabinet took steps to strip the
aegis of foreign flags from British slavers. On February 19, 1810, a treaty
was signed with Portugal whereby that kingdom consented to restrict the
taking of slaves to its own possessions and to limit this traffic to Portuguese
SUbjects. In an effort to put its own house in order, Parliament on May 14,
1811, made slave trading a felony, punishable by transportation to a penal
colony for a maximum of fourteen years (51 George III. Cap. 23). As a
consequence of this act, British participation in the slave trade virtually
ceased. The War of 1812, of course, enabled Britain legally to seize
American slave ships, and after 1813, as the allied cause prospered on the
4 Monthly Repository, III (1808), 186; Thomas P. Martin, "Some International As-
pects of the Anti-Slavery Movement, 1818-1823," Journal of Economic and Business
History, I (November 1928), 137n; Philips D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A
Census (Madison, Wis., 1969), p. 231.
5 Edin. Rev., XVIII (1811), 307; Denis Gray, Spencer Perceval: The Evangelical
Prime Minister, 1762-1812 (Manchester, 1963), p. 26. The African Institution was
founded on April 14, 1807, to civilize black savages in Africa and to enforce the
British abolition of the slave trade. George Canning was a vice-president and charter
member of this society.
THE SLAVE TRADE QUESTION 163
continent, the London government made further progress toward inter-
nationalizing the anti-slave trade movement. On March 3, 1813, Sweden, in
exchange for Guadeloupe, prohibited her subjects from engaging in this
black commerce or importing slaves into her West Indian possession. Ten
months later, on January 14, 1814, Denmark agreed to cooperate with
Britain in the suppression of the slave trade. 6
By the end of March 1814, when the defeat of Napoleon appeared im-
minent, British abolitionists began preparations for the peace settlement
with France. The African Institution sent a delegation to discuss the slave
trade with Prime Minister Liverpool, and Wilberforce on March 28 urged
Lord Castlereagh, the foreign secretary, to threaten France with the loss
of her colonies unless she consented to complete and immediate abolition.
On April 11, 1814, the "Corsican Ogre" abdicated, and peace returned for
a season to Europe. The next month, when the allies assembled in Paris to
draft a peace treaty, English abolitionists led by Zachary Macaulay, former
governor of Sierra Leone (1799-1808) and editor of the Christian Observer,
were present, observing and acting. French colonial interests, of course,
insisted that the slave trade was absolutely necessary for the prosperity of
the colonies, but they also realized that the restoration of their colonies was
unlikely unless France agreed to abolition. British merchants, on the other
hand, argued that if France retained both her colonies and the traffic in
Negroes, the cause of humanity would be done great harm, and Britain's
own colonial interests would be hurt unless some compensating advantage
was extracted from France.7 But owing to Castlereagh's willingness to com-
promise and to allied indifference toward this issue (with the sale exception
of Tsar Alexander), France, by the Treaty of Paris (May 30,1814), not only
regained most of her lost colonies but also obtained a five year period of
grace (until June I, 1819), in which to end her slave trade. s This delay was
6 Anglo-PDrtuguese treaty, Feb. 19, 1810, BFSP, III (1815-1816), 904n; act fDr
rendering mDre effectual the abDlitiDn of the British slave trade, May 14, 1811, ibid.,
V (1817-1818), 571-572; separate article to' the AnglD-Swedish treaty, Mar. 3, 1813,
ibid., III, 886; Anglo-Danish treaty, Jan. 14, 1814, ibid.; Annual Register, LII (1810),
144-145. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 231, 267. Denmark had abDlished the slave
trade in 1805.
7 WilberfDrce to' Castlereagh, Mar. 28,1814, Castlereagh, Corresp., 3rd ser., I, 401;
Macaulay to' Castlereagh, May 29 and 30, 1814, ibid., 11,47-49 (Zachary Macaulay was
the father Df Thomas Babington, the historian and statesman.); address of the Com-
mons to' the Prince Regent, May 3, 1814, BFSP, III, 893-895. Castlereagh had been
foreign secretary since March 1812. LiverpoO'I became prime minister two months
later (May) upon the assassination of Perceval.
8 Britain returned all the French colonies she had occupied except TobagO', Santa
Lucia, Ile de France (Mauritius), Rodriguez, and the Seychelles (Art. viii). Sweden
resigned Guadeloupe (Art. ix), and Portugal restored French Guiana (Art. x).
granted in deference to the French desire to import a new supply of slaves

into Haiti (Saint Domingue), whose reconquest the Paris cabinet mistakenly
supposed to be imminent. The peace treaty, nonetheless, did condemn the
slave trade as "repugnant," and France agreed to support at the forth-
coming Congress of Vienna a declaration against it. Alexander, who had
profusely proclaimed his devotion to' abO'lition, complained to Britain's
abolitionists that Castlereagh, a former defender of this black traffic in the
Commons, had not supported his call for immediate French suppression of
the slave trade. While visiting England after the Paris Peace Conference,
the tsar declared to Wilberforce: "What could be done, when your own
ambassador gave way?" The British abolitionists reacted by renewing their
agitation for immediate and complete abolition. 9
Despite his private convictions, the foreign secretary, in deference to the
wishes of Parliament and public opinion, set about with renewed energy to
negotiate treaties with the Netherlands and Spain on the Slave Trade Ques-
tion. In exchange for the retrocession of Dutch Indonesian territories (Java
and its dependencies), which England had occupied in 1811, the government
of The Hague on June 15, 1814, abolished the abominable commerce. In
Madrid, meanwhile, British diplomacy met with far less success, for Spain
still regarded slavery as a necessary element of her colonial economy. After
prolonged discussions with Don Jose Miguel de Carvajal, the Duke of San
Carlos, the Spanish premier and foreign minister, Sir Henry Wellesley, the
English ambassador, obtained the vague and sonorous treaty of July 5,1814,
whereby Spain condemned the injustice and inhumanity of the slave trade
and promised not to allow any foreigner to use the Spanish flag for pro-
tection. Realizing that additional concessions would require a greater in-
ducement than an appeal to humanitarianism, Castlereagh on July 30 of-
fered Spain the balance of the war subsidy for that year (about £ 800,000)
in return for an agreement to abolish the slave trade within five years and,
meanwhile, to restrict it to West Africa south of the equator. For immediate
and complete Spanish abolition, Britain would assist Spain in raising a loan
9 Marquis Marie Joseph Paul de Lafayette to William H. Crawford, American Se-

cretary of War, May 26, 1814, Diary of James Gallatin (Secretary to Albert Gallatin,
a Great Peace Maker), 1813-1827, ed. Count James Francis Gallatin (New York,
1926), p. 23; William Frederick, the Duke of Gloucester, to Francis Hastings, Second
Earl of Moira, Oct. 15, 1814, Great Britain, Hist. MSS Comm., Report on the Manus-
cripts of the Late Reginald Rawdon Hastings, Esq., of the Manor House, Ashby de la
Zouche, ed. Francis Bickley (London, 1934), III, 306; additional article to the Treaty
of Paris, May 30, 1814, BFSP, III, 890; Robert Isaac and Samuel Wilberforce, Life
of William Wilberforce (Philadelphia, 1839), II, 145; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 454-
456; Rlie Halevy, History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, trans. E.T.
Watkin and D. A. Barker (New York, 1949), I, 457.
THE SLA VE TRADE QUESTION 165
of £ 2,000,000 on the credit of the two governments. But the consequence of
obduracy on this question, Castlereagh warned, could be a British boycott
of Spanish colonial produce. 10
Renewing negotiations with San Carlos in August 1814, Wellesley argued
that the slave trade was not really a Spanish enterprise, since most of the
slavers were Americans and Britons. Few slaves, moreover, ever reached
Spanish colonial plantations, for most of those carried to Latin America
were transshipped to the United States. He emphasized that Russia, Prussia,
and Austria were sympathetic to abolition and would support it at the
Congress of Vienna. With these arguments and the promise of a subsidy and
a loan, Wellesley urged the Madrid cabinet to suppress the slave trade, but
his diplomacy bore little fruit. By an additional article to the Anglo-Spanish
treaty of July 5, Spain agreed on August 28,1814, to restrict her subjects to
the direct slave trade between Africa and the Spanish colonies. Two months
later, in October, San Carlos promised that his government would confine
the commerce in Negroes to the coastal region of West Africa between the
equator and 10° north latitude and would abolish the traffic after eight
years. Because of this delay, however, Britain withheld her offer of generous
remuneration. Despite the rich British inducements which would have eased
her distressed financial condition, Spain refused to sanction immediate
abolition for fear such an act would incite to rebellion those colonies still
loyal to her.!1
2. The Impossible Quest
If statistics cited by Philip D. Curtin are accurate, the British government,

despite its wartime blockade of Europe and numerous negotiations, had
little success in suppressing the slave trade between 1807 and 1814. In 1807,
about 60,000 slaves had been transported across the Atlantic; yet seven
years after British abolition, their number was reckoned at 40,000, and most
of the ships carrying them flew the Spanish and Portuguese flags. Needless
to say, British abolitionists complained that the ministry was neglecting the
cause of humanity and called upon their government to suppress the slave
10 Wellesley to Castlereagh, June 17 and July 6, 1814, BFSP, III, 920-921; Castle-
reagh to Wellesley, July 30, 1814, ibid., pp. 923-926; same to same, Aug. 1, 1814,
Castlereagh Corresp., II, 73-74; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 458.
11 Wellesley to San Carlos, Aug. 20, 1814, BFSP, III, 928; additional article to the
Anglo-Spanish treaty of July 5, 1814, Aug. 28, 1814, ibid., p. 922; Wellesley to Cast-
lereagh, Aug. 31 and Oct. 23, 1814, ibid., pp. 929-930, 932.
trade utterly and immediately. The Congress of Vienna seemed to offer such
an opportunity. 12
In September 1814, the Congress began its work, and although Castle-
reagh strenuously pressed for complete and immediate abolition, all his
efforts were in vain. While paying lip service to her treaty obligations,
France refused even to restrict the slave trade. British proposals (1) that
France should prohibit the collecting of slaves on the northwestern coast
of Africa, where it had ceased during the war, (2) that a convention con-
ferring a mutual right of search and seizure be negotiated, and (3) that a
commercial boycott be invoked against any state which did not abide by
an international code regulating the slave trade, all met with French in-
transigence. Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, acting French
foreign minister, blandly ignored Castlereagh's offer on October 8 to cede
France a colony, or pay compensation, in exchange for immediate abolition.
French public opinion, indeed, was so openly opposed to suppression that
British merchants were allowed to fit out slave ships at Nantes and Bor-
deaux. But under pressure from the great powers, the Paris cabinet yielded
a little and in December issued regulations forbidding Frenchmen to trade in
slaves between Cape Palmas on the Ivory Coast and Cape Blanc on the
northwestern tip of Mauritania. 13
The Iberian states, meanwhile, were just as determined as France to
frustrate every measure for effective suppression the iniquitous traffic.
Spain adamantly held to her position of partial abolition at once and total
abolition in eight years, and Portugal conceded even less. The Marquis
12 Table 67, Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 234; Table 77, ibid., p. 268; ibid., pp.
265-267; cf. the English Monthly Magazine, XXXVIII (1814), 132, which estimated
that 100,000 slaves had been imported into the Americas in 1807, and 80,000 in 1814.
13 Memoirs of Prince de Talleyrand, ed. Duc de Broglie and trans. Raphael Ledos
de Beaufort and Mrs. Angus Hall (Boston, 1895), II, 182, 361-362; Wellington to
Castlereagh, Aug. 25, 1814, BFSP, III, 901-902 (Wellington, the new British ambassa-
dor to France, arrived in Paris on August 22 and presented his credentials two days
later.); Wellington to Talleyrand, Aug. 26, 1814, ibid., pp. 903-904; Wellington to
Castlereagh, Sept. 1, 1814, ibid., p. 903; Castlereagh to Bathurst, Sept. 3, 1814, ibid.,
p. 905; Castlereagh to Talleyrand, Oct. 8, 1814, ibid., pp. 939-940; Wellington to
Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814, Castlereagh, Corresp., II, 103; Wellington to Liverpool,
Sept. 13, 1814, ibid., p. 120; Liverpool to Wellington, Sept. 23, 1814, ibid., pp. 132-133;
Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 25, 1814, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, ed. C. K.
Webster (London, 1921), pp. 215-216; slave trade regulations of the French govern-
ment, Dec. 1814, A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions and Reci-
procal Regulations at Present Subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers,
ed. Lewis Hertslet (London, 1814-1924), III, 84-91 (hereafter cited as Herslet, Com-
mercial Treaties); Beckles Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, 1777-1927
New York, 1928), p. 153. Talleyrand did not officially become premier and foreign
minister until July 9, 1815.
Pedro de Palmella, Portuguese plenipotentiary to the Congress, indicated

to Castlereagh that for certain material considerations, he, too, would accept
a limited interdiction. The result of their negotiations was a treaty signed in
Vienna on January 22, 1815, which shrewdly provided for immediate Por-
tuguese suppression of the slave trade in the Northern Hemisphere and for
total abolition after January 21, 1823, a deadline later extended to February
1830. But for this convention, Britain paid a high price: £ 300,000 in com-
pensation, concellation of almost all of the £ 600,000 loan of 1809, and
modification in Portugal's favor ofthe 1810 commercial treaty.14
Faced with the combined opposition of France, Portugal, and Spain, the
Congress of Vienna failed to establish any means for the suppression of the
slave trade or even a deadline. It's only achievement relative to this issue
was the pious, but ineffectual, Protocol of February 8, 1815, which con-
demned the traffic in blacks as "repugnant to the principles of humanity
and universal morality ... [and as] a scourge which has so long desolated
Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity." This declaration on
June 9 became Annex XV of the Final Act of the Treaty of Vienna. Thus
each state was left free to take whatever steps the national interest seemed
to require. 15
Negotiations on this and other issues were cut short, however, by Na-
poleon's unexpected return to Europe. On March I, 1815, the Eagle arrived
in the Gulf of San Juan near Cannes and began his last flight which passed
through Paris and Waterloo to the rock of st. Helena. In a vain attempt to
gain British support for his restoration, Napoleon on March 29 proclaimed
the immediate and complete suppression of the slave trade. But after Water-
loo, Louis XVIII declared that the former emperor's edict of abolition was
not binding upon his government. When Castlereagh reminded him that,
while a displaced sovereign at Ghent, he, too, had abolished the traffic in
blacks, Louis conceded on July 30 that he, indeed, had outlawed the slave
trade. There was no question, however, that the Hundred Days had scrap-
ped the First Treaty of Paris and that another now must be negotiated. On
14 Treaty between Britain and Portugal for the restriction of the Portuguese slave
trade, Vienna, January 22, 1815, BFSP, III, 348-354; Webster, Castlereagh, pp.
459,460.
15 Protocole de la 4eme et derniere conference particuliere, Feb. 8, 1815, BFSP,
III, 969-971; declaration of the eight powers relative to the universal abolition of the
slave trade, Feb. 8, 1815, Map of Europe by Treaty, ed. Sir Edward Hertslet (London,
1875), I, 60-61. The eight powers were the signatories of the First Treaty of Paris:
Austria, Britain, France, Russia, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, and Sweden. At Vienna they
comprised the Committee of Eight which on January 16, 1815, declared itself to be a
special conference on the slave trade. Protocole de la conference ... tenue it Vienne,
Jan. 16, 1815, BFSP, III, 946-949.
the subject of the slave trade, Article XI of the Second Treaty of Paris (No-
vember 20, 1815), merely repeated and reaffirmed the provision of the
First Treaty which had required French prohibition within five years, a
dispensation which seems strange, indeed, in view of France's commitment
to immediate and complete abolition. From Rouen came the report that
the continuation of the commerce in Negroes was really intended to benefit
Britain, not France, whose merchants did not have sufficient capital. This
speculation, however, cannot be confirmed. i6
As a result of persistent British pressure, the Paris cabinet early in 1817
took the first tentative steps toward implementing its commitment of July
30, 1815, to suppress the slave trade. On January 8, Louis XVIII ordered
French officials to confiscate any vessel attempting to introduce slaves from
Africa into a French colony. Except for the slaves, who automatically be-
came freemen, the cargo would be forfeited to the crown, and the convicted
captain, if a Frenchman, would be forbidden ever again to command a
French ship. The liberated blacks would be employed by local officials on
colonial public works. But despite this ordinance, which was the first real
evidence of France's good faith in promoting the abolition of the slave trade,
this traffic revived in Goree and Senegal after their return to France. When
an official investigation revealed that French civil servants openly promoted
the slave trade in these colonies, an embarrassed Premier Richelieu ex-
plained to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, that the ordinance
of January 8, 1817, had forbidden specifically the importation of slaves into
a French colony, not their export. Thus colonial officials, by permitting the
slave trade, were within the letter of French law, if not its spirit.17
But if France would not please England by negotiating a bilateral treaty
which granted a right of mutual visit and search, she pleased herself. On
April 15, 1818, the French National Assembly finally enacted a law which
immediately prohibited any French subject or ship from participating in
the slave trade. To enforce this measure, France on June 24 dispatched a
16 Deeret imperial fran~ais, qui abolit la traite des noirs, Mar. 29, 1815, ibid., 196n;
Second Treaty of Paris, Nov. 20, 1815, ibid., 291·292; proceedings of the Spanish
Council of the Indies relative to the abolition of the slave trade, Feb. 1816, ibid., IV,
518; Monthly Repository, X (1815) 262; Eclectic Review, new. ser.; III (1815), 71.
17 Ordonnance du Roi de France qui pourvoit au cas OU i1 serait contrevenu aux
ordres de sa Majeste, concernant l'abolition de la traite des noirs, Jan. 8, 1817, BFSP,
IV, 755; memorandum on the contraband slave-trade, since the restoration of Senegal
and Goree to France, Castlereagh to d'Osmond, Jan. 24, 1818, ibid., VI, 273-276 (The
Marquis Rene-Eustache d'Osmond was French ambassador at London.); Stuart to
Castlereagh, Feb. 19, 1818, ibid., p. 305, Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 250. Some
of the "freed" slaves in Senegal were made indentured laborers for a term of fourteen
years, while others became "forced recruits" in the local army.
squadron to patrol her African colonial coasts. The ensuing capture of

several French slavers off the coast of Senegal seemed to indicated that the
Paris cabinet had sincerely espoused the cause of abolition and that the
French slave trade at last had ended, but subsequent eye-witness accounts
and captures proved otherwise. is
In view of France's determination to go it alone, Castlereagh wisely
looked elsewhere to gain support for his proposals to suppress the black
traffic. On July 28, 1817, he prevailed upon Portugal to grant a qualified
right of mutual search of their merchant ships on the high seas and to
create mixed courts of British and Portuguese jurists to adjudicate the case
of any ship detained under the pact. Portugal, her slavers already restricted
to the Southern Hemisphere, now required them to obtain a license and
declared that the Portuguese flag no longer protected them, if they carried
slaves to foreign colones. 19
Two months later Britain secured similar concessions from Spain, but
at the price of £ 400,000, just half the amount offered in 1814. By the
Anglo-Hispanic convention of September 23, Spain agreed to reciprocal
visit and mixed courts, to immediate prohibition of slave trading by her
subjects on the African coast north of the equator, and to total abolition
after May 30, 1820. While the subsidy undoubtedly was important to the
Spanish government, it was not the determining factor, since the merchants
of Havana had offered Madrid a bribe of £ 2,000,000 to continue the slave
trade. Spain appears to have made concessions primarily in the hope of
receiving British assistance in securing a reconciliation with the revolted
Spanish colonies. Since most of the emerging Latin American governments
already had abolished this iniquitous commerce, it would be inconsistent
for Britain to support a power which would reestablish it. 20
Rebuffed again by France in March 1818, Britain turned next to the
Netherlands in her quest for mutual search treaties. Though well-disposed
toward the idea, the Dutch ministry, without making a formal request,
hoped to obtain a monetary award such as that given Portugal and Spain.
After three months of negotiations, an Anglo-Dutch convention was con-
18 Stuart to Castlereagh, Mar. 2, 1818, BFSP, pp. 306-307; law for the punishment of
French subjects engaged in the slave trade, Apr. 15, 1818, Hertslet, Commercial
Treaties, III, 100-101; ordinance for the employment of a French naval force on the
coast of Mrica for the prevention of the slave trade, June 24, 1818, ibid., pp. 101-102.
19 Additional convention to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of Jan. 22, 1815, for pre-
venting the illicit traffic in slaves, July 28, 1817, ibid., II, 81-93.
20 Annual Register, LX (1818), 20-21; Anglo-Spanish treaty for preventing the illi-
cit traffic in slaves, Sept. 23, 1817, ibid., pp. 215-220; Castlereagh to Wellesley: con-
fidential memorandum, Aug. 20,1817, Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., II, 355; Webster,
Castlereagh, p. 459.
eluded on May 4, 1818, establishing the right of reciprocal visit and a system
of mixed courts. Disappointed that the treaty provided for no compen-
sation, the government of The Hague signed the treaty with reluctance. 21
By the fall of 1818, the total abolition of the slave trade appeared im-
minent, for the United States and all the maritime states of Europe, save
Portugal, had interdicted this traffic or had set May 30, 1820, as the dead-
line for final suppression. Unfortunately for the cause of abolition, how-
ever, Britain and Russia held differing views on how to extirpate the slave
trade, and France adamantly refused to enter into any mutual agreement
with Britain for its suppression. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Castle-
reagh on October 24 requested the great powers to urge Portugal to abolish
her slave trade on May 30, 1820, and solicited allied acceptance of a
qualified right of mutual search such as that already adopted by Britain,
Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands. On November 7, the tsar, with
Austrian and Prussian support, submitted a counterproposal which called
for the condemnation of the slave trade as piracy and the establishment of
an international police force on the Atlantic coast of Africa to exterminate
it. Opposing national interests, distrust, and jealousies, however, prevented
the adoption of either plan. Again, as at the Congress of Vienna, the five
great powers could agree only to draft another pious and eloquent condem-
nation of the traffic in Negroes, which was sent to King John VI of Portu-
gal, then a resident of Rio, an appeal that his Majesty ignored with im-
punity.22
Richelieu, who represented France at the Congress, was as opposed as
ever to granting any power the right to search French vessels. Since the
allied powers had withdrawn their army of occupation and had admitted
France to full membership in the Alliance (October 9), such a concession
at this time, the premier argued, would humiliate his country and arouse
discontent among her people. Would not the grant of a reciprocal right of
visit appear the price France had to pay for the evacuation of her territory?
France, moreover, shared with Russia and the United States the view that
21 Clancarty to CastIereagh, Feb. 10 and May 5, 1818, CastIereagh, Corresp., III,

406,436-437; Anglo-Dutch treaty for the prevention of the slave trade, May 4, 1818,
Annual Register, LX, 223-231.
22 CastIereagh to Bathurst, Nov. 2,1818, BFSP, VI, 57; British memorandum on the
slave trade, Nov. 1818, ibid., pp. 77-85; opinion du cabinet de Russie sur la traite des
Negres, Nov. 7, 1818, ibid., pp. 66-69; opinions des cabinets d'Autriche et de Prusse
sur 1a traite des Negres, Nov. 1818, ibid., pp. 75-76; project de lettre de cabinet des
souverains - [au] Roi de Portugal, Nov. 1818, ibid., pp. 85-86; CastIereagh to Henry
Chamberlain, British consul-general and charge d'affaires at Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 27,
1818, ibid., p. 143; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 168, 464. Thomas Clarkson represented
the English abolitionists' lobby at the Congress.
the right of search, however reciprocal, would violate their traditional
policy of freedom of the seas and infringe upon national sovereignty. Castle-
reagh's proposal, in sum, was simple, practical, and efficacious, but it had
no chance of being accepted by powers which desired to undermine British
naval supremacy as a means of promoting their own national security. The
foreign secretary, in retrospect, attributed the reluctance of Russia, Prussia,
and Austria to grant a right of mutual visit and search to the fact that no
slave trader had yet appeared on the coast of Africa under their flags, and
hence they felt "a sentiment of delicacy toward states more directly inter-
ested both in the local and maritime questions." But in France, he declared,
there existed a "moral incompetency" to accept this measure. 23
3. The Black Tide
While European diplomats engaged in idle discussions at Vienna, London,

Paris, and Aix-Ia-Chapelle, and approved meaningless declarations, the
"black tide" which flowed westward across the Atlantic assumed the pro-
portions of a flood. With the restoration of peace to Europe in 1815, the
wartime license of the British navy to suppress the slave trade was revoked,
and this infamous commerce revived and flourished with the ever increasing
demand for cotton and sugar, providing employment for the freebooters of
many nations, notably Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
and the United States. The only arrangements for enforcing international
abolition were the bilateral treaties Castlereagh had negotiated with the
lesser European states, but without the adherence of France and the United
States, the agreements had little effect on the slave trade. As John Quincy
Adams, the nationalist and isolationist American Secretary of State observed
on August 15, 1821, when he turned down a similar British proposal: "So
long as ... [the right of mutual search and seizure] shall be declined by any
23 Memoire fran~ais sur la traite des Negres, Nov. 1818, BFSP, VI, 69-75; Cast-
lereagh to Bathurst, NOIV. 23, 1818, ibid., pp. 80, 81-82; Sanuel F. Bemis, John Quincy
Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), p. 415,
Reginald Coupland, Wilberforce: A Narrative (Oxford, 1923), p. 452; Bradford Per-
kins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823 (Berkeley,
Calif., 1964), pp. 275-276, 277. Like France, the United States preferred to go it alone
on the stave trade question. On March 3, 1819, the Washington government appropri-
ated $ 100,000 to pay for enforcement of its acts of abolition and - to show abhorrence
of the black traffic - made it piracy on May 15, 1820. An additional act to prohibit
the slave trade, Mar. 3, 1819, U.S., Statutes at Large, III (1813-1823), 532-534; an act
to continue in force "an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish
the crime of piracy," May 15, 1820, ibid., pp. 600-601.
one Maritime State, however inconsiderable, its adoption by all others

would leave it altogether ineffectual." 24
When the London African Society in December 1816, estimated that
60,000 slaves were being taken annually from Africa, Castlereagh com-
plained that its volume now exceeded that of its eighteenth century heyday.
In the two weeks between December 7 and 21, 1816, 1,880 Negroes were
imported into Havana, Cuba, alone. Between October 31, 1820, and Sep-
tember 1, 1821, twenty-six ships entered the same port with 6,415 slaves.
"Of these vessels," the Tory Quarterly Review reported, "eighteen were
Spanish, five French, two Portuguese, and one American, none of which had
been judicially noticed by the government of the island." From July 1820
to October 1821, 190 slave ships entered the River Bonny, and 162 arrived
in the Calabar River. Most of these vessels were either French or Por-
tuguese. 25
Between 1819 and 1822, the slave trade not only increased with each
passing year, but French participation in it became more active than ever
before. Notwithstanding that the Paris cabinet in December 1819 sent in-
structions to colonial officials to enforce the law and established a special
commission to study the slave trade and to recommend means of enforcing
French abolition, most Frenchmen were inclined to ignore the slave trade
or to promote it. Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre, and Honfleur, all were deeply
24 Adams to Stratford Canning, British minister at Washington, Aug. 15, 1821,

BFSP, IX, 82; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 456-457, 463, 465. Despite constant urging by
the British government, the United States for forty years consistently refused to sign
with England a treaty conferring a reciprocal right of search of suspected slavers,
primarily because a similar practice had been a factor in causing the War of 1812. At
last in 1858, Britain gave up her claim to the right of visit; credit for this step belongs
to Lewis Cass, President Buchanan's Secretary of State. The issue, nonetheless, conti-
nued to be debated in the official correspondence of the two governments until the
American Civil War put an end of it forever. "As a part of his plan to attract European
opinion to the side of the North, Secretary Seward signed with Great Britain, on
April 7, 1862, a treaty granting a mutual right of search and setting up a system of
mixed courts for the adjudication of cases of seizures." Richard W. Van Alystyne, "The
British Right of Search and the African Slave Trade," JMH, II (1930), 37,46-47.
25 Report of the London African Society, Dec. 1816, BFSP, VI, 26, 33 (cf. Curtin
who estimates the annual average of slaves imported into the New World between
1811 and 1820 at 39,500. Table 67, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 234); European Magazine
and London Review, LXXI (1817), 169; Qu. Rev., XXVIII (1822-1823), 163-164; entry
for Dec. 23, 1816, Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, ed. Allan Nevins (New
York, 1929), 177-178. In the Spanish colonies, some officials gained wealth by accept-
ing bribes from slave traders. In Cuba, for example, the standard pay-off rate was
one doubloon ($ 17.50) for each slave landed. Thomas F. Buxton, The African Slave
Trade and 1ts Remedy (London, 1840), p. 217; William L. Mathieson, Great Britain
and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (London, 1929), pp. 14, 17. The Bonny and Calabar
rivers are located on the Gulf of Guinea, eastern Nigeria, in the vicinity of 4 0 56'N.
involved in this traffic. Some French merchantmen sailed from French to

Spanish ports, notably Bilbao and La Coruiia, to obtain papers and colors
before engaging in the slave trade. According to the reports of British
consuls and sea captains, the Sylph, Rodeur, Elize, Thetis, Marie, Catherine,
Jeune Estelle, Joseph, Ursule, Vigilante, Petite Betsy, Espoir, and Trident,
all were notorious French slavers. During the first ten months of 1820,
twenty-five slavers flying French colors appeared off the coast of West
Africa, and Commodore Sir George L. Collier, commander of the British
slave trade squadron, counted thirty more in Havana harbor in September.
From November 1820 to July 1821, 126 slavers (eighty-six Frenchmen and
the rest Spaniards), sailed from the River Bonny country, north of the
equator. In the eighteen months ending in August 1822, no less than four
hundred slave ships departed from Africa with more than 100,000 Negroes.
Approximately half of these vessels appeared to be French and the re-
mainder, Portuguese. Not all of these ships, of course, were really French.
After May 30, 1820, when Spain formally abolished the traffic in blacks,
many of her subjects and other nationals simply substituted the fleur-de-lis,
or any other flag that seemed safe, and continued their infamous vocation. 26
But despite this widespread practice, the following captures and incidents
clearly reveal how flagrantly many Frenchmen violated their own nation's
abolition law:
On February 8, 1819, Captain Hunn of the Redwing intercepted the
French ship, Sylph, carrying 388 slaves from the River Bonny to Guade-
loupe. Since Britain had no relevant treaty with France, Hunn's action
constituted a breach of international law. and Castlereagh had no choice
but to return the Sylph to France and to promise reparation. 27
2e Circular to British consuls at Nantes, Bordeaux, Bilbao, and Corunna, Mar. 10,
1819, BFSP, VI, 319; Stuart to Dessolle, Oct. 15 and Nov. 7, 1819, ibid., pp. 326; Col-
lier to Lords of the Admiralty, Oct. 1819, ibid., p. 178; Capt. Kelly of H.M.S. Pheasant
to John W. Croker, secretary to the admiralty, Oct. 29, 1819, ibid., p. 374; Castlereagh
to Palmella, Oct. 28, 1819, ibid., p. 174; Stuart to Castlereagh, Dec. 6, 1819, ibid., p.
329; paper on the French slave trade, Nov. 10, 1820, ibid., VIII, 365-369; extract of
letter, Antigua, Oct. 16, 1820, ibid., pp. 376-377; Capt. Leeke of H.M.S. Myrmidon to
Commodore Sir Robert Mends of H.M.S. Ephigenia, Sept. 12 and Nov. 7, 1821, ibid.,
X (1822-1823), 538-539, 540; French ordinance establishing a special commission to
enforce the slave trade laws, Dec. 22, 1819, Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, III, 117-
118; Qu. Rev., XXVIII, 164, 171-172, Annual Register, LXIII (1821), 113; Willson,
America's Ambassadors, p. 153.
l!7 Hunn to Sir Charles McCarthy, Governor of Sierra Leone, Feb. 20, 1819, BFSP,
VI, 320; Castlereagh to Stuart, June 7, 1819, ibid., p. 319. Sierra Leone was the head-
quarters of the British anti-slave trade squadron cruising off the coast of West Africa
Britain also maintained there a colony for freed slaves (Freetown), at which the U.S.
navy landed more recaptured blacks than at Liberia. Although a few returned to their
In May 1820, Commodore Collier captured four French slavers (the

Catherine, Jeune Estelle, Joseph, and Marie), but Castlereagh, as in the
Sylph affair, returned them with apologies. 28
On April 15, 1822, Commodore Sir Robert Mends, commanding the
British man-of-war, lphigenia, surprised three French ships, the Ursule,
Vigilante, and Petite Betsy, in the River Bonny. When British seamen at-
tempted to board them, the slave traders opened fire, killing two and
severely wounding five, before being overpowered. One vessel had 343
blacks aboard, another 218, and the third 247. Following precedent, the
ships and crews were turned over to French authorities at Cherbourg.29
Although a French squadron cruised off the Atlantic coast of Africa for
the express purpose of suppressing the slave trade, it did not make a single
capture during the last six months of 1822. Commenting on this fact, the
Quarterly Review charged that these
ships of war are known to have fallen in with many slaving vessels belonging to
their countrymen, to have boarded them, and, after an exchange of civilities,
to have left them unmolested to pursue their illegal and criminal traffic. Com-
mondore Du Plessis, commander of the French brig-of-war L'Huron, frankly
admitted that his orders did not authorize him to capture French ships engaged
in the slave traffic. Some of the officers of the French Navy were themselves
engaged in slaving. One such man, Lamprear, commanded the L'Espoir, a slave
ship.3n
From Pernambuco, Brazil, John Parkinson, the British consul, reported

another example of the indifference which France displayed toward her own
prohibition of the commerce in Negroes. On March 2, 1823, the French
ship, Trident, arrived in port with 126 blacks aboard. The French sloop-of-
war, L'Hirondelle, was "lying within a few cable lenghts" of the slaver, yet
no attempt was made to board or detain her. 31
During the first four months of 1823, fourteen French vessels received
cargoes of slaves in the Gallinas River. But British cruisers standing by
native tribes, most became recruits in the British army or indentured laborers in the
United States. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 249.
28 Castlereagh to Stuart, May 25 and 26, 1820, ibid., VIII, 334, 335-336 .
.29 Canning to Stuart, No. 1 (with 15 enclosures), London, Sept. 30, 1822, F.O.,
France, 146/50; Stuart to Canning, No. 274, Paris, Oct. 10, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48.
Also captured in the same engagement were two Spanish ships: the Vecua and Hanam.
30 Qu. Rev., XXVIII, 167, cf. Canning to Stuart, No.6, London, Nov. 1, 1822, F.O.,
France, 146/50. The source of this report was Governor McCarthy of Sierra Leone.
Du Plessis' orders permitted him to seize only those ships actually having slaves on
board.
31 Canning to Stuart, London, May 23, 1823, BFSP, X, 244-245, citing Parkinson's
report.
permitted these loadings "to be carried on with impunity," because their
captains, knowing that France did not permit foreign ships to search her
own, hesitiated to create an international incident.32
As the slave trade increased, flesh merchants became so brazen as to
openly flout British naval patrols. Aware that Britain's treaties did not
permit her to take a ship into custody unless slaves actually were aboard.
some slavers. upon the approach of a British cruiser. put their victims into
dinghies. rowed them to shore. and paraded them back and forth to taunt
the frustrated policeman. Others. when faced with capture on the high seas,
chained their Negroes, tied weights to the chains, marched them on deck.
and threw them overboard. Even when arrests were made, condemnation
was difficult to obtain. In addition to the experiences of Hunn and Collier
already cited. Captain Edward Trenchard of the U.S.S. Cyane captured on
April 10, 1820, ten vessels which appeared to be American. but found them
so completely covered by Spanish papers that he reluctantly released
them. 33
To the dismay of the London cabinet and British abolitionists, Spanish
and Portuguese slavers. with Dutch connivance. continued to procure blacks
north of the equator in violation of their governments' solemn treaties and
promises and to escape capture and condemnation by putting slaves over-
board. Castlereagh on September 22, 1820. bitterly protested to the Nether-
lands. Portugal. and Spain against these nefarious practices. From each he
demanded an end to the wanton and monstrous evasion of her treaty with
Britain. Reluctant to commit themselves on this issue. all three procrasti-
nated two years before making reply at the end of 1822. But Castlereagh
did not live to see the conclusion of this demarche. It remained for George
Canning. his successor in the Foreign Office. to complete the negotiations
begun in 1820. On December 10. 1822. Spain, hoping for assistance against
a threatened French invasion. acceded to Britain's request. Portugal on the
18th flatly refused to amend the 1817 treaty. and Marquis Silvester de
Pinheiro. the Portuguese foreign minister. tersely declared it was better for
his country to protect her golden goose - the slave trade - than to kill it.
In two conventions signed on December 31, 1822. and January 25. 1823.
the Dutch agreed to the British proposal. 34
3ll Ibid .• p. 244.

53 Collier to Croker, Jan. 13, 1820, ibid., VIII. 790; case of the schooner St. Salvador,
Jan. 25, 1820. ibid., pp. 86-88; Annual Register, LXIII, 113; U.S. Ship Cyane, Apr. 10,
1820. U.S. Congress. American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 2nd ser. (Washing-
ton, 1858), V, 96 (hereafter cited as ASP); suppression of the slave trade, Apr. 12, 1822,
ibid .• pp. 140-141.
34 The Mrican Institution to Castlereagh. Mar. 30. 1819, BFSP. VI, 156-157; Cast-
176 THE CONSGRES AT WORK
4. The Six Points
In the instructions for the Vienna conference, Castlereagh had stated

laconically: "The Slave Trade requires no comments," but Canning, whose
enthusiasm for abolition burned with "a flame almost as fierce as that of ...
his friend Wilberforce himself," thought comments were "urgently needed."
On September 30, he urged the duke to emphasize the necessity of effectual-
ly suppressing that dreadful traffic which is the "scandal of the civilized
world." 85
But the new foreign secretary, realistically, did not expect much from the
Congress. The Paris cabinet, he knew, would do nothing to further abolition,
since any ministry which pushed the issue faced repudiation by the National
Assembly. Both Canning and Wellington shared Castlereagh's view that the
French public did not regard the slave trade as a moral evil but looked upon
every French act to enforce abolition as kowtowing to England. The belief
that Britain's interest in this question was economic rather than humani-
tarian was widespread on the continent. People and governments through-
out Europe observed that Portuguese colonial produce was driving that of
Britain out of the market. Many suspected that England wished to suppress
the Atlantic slave trade in order to "share the injury she had inflicted on
herself by abolition," and thus save her colonial economy.36
lereagh to British ambassadors in Spain (Wellesley) and the Netherlands (Clancarty),

and to the British envoy in Brazil (Edward Thornton), Sept. 22, 1820, ibid., VIII, 228-
229; additional articles to the Anglo-Spanish treaty for the prevention of the slave
trade, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid., X, 87-88; Edward M. Ward, British charge d'affaires at
Lisbon, to Canning, Dec. 18, 1822, ibid., pp. 212-223; additional articles to the Anglo-
Dutch treaty of May 4, 1818, signed Dec. 31, 1822, and Jan. 25, 1823, ibid., pp. 554-561.
For a competent and detailed discussion of the international aspects of Britain's un-
successful quest for effective suppression of the black traffic during the Napoleonic
and Congress era, see James W. Hurst, "The Slave Trade Question in European Diplo-
macy, 1807-1822" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Dept. of History, North Texas State
University, 1966).
35 Bathurst to Stewart, No. 12, Foreign Office, Sept. 5, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54;
Wellington to George IV, London, Aug. 18, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 258; Bathurst to
Wellington, enclosing Castlereagh's instructions, Downing Street, Sept. 14, 1822, ibid.,
pp. 284, 287; Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 30, 1822, ibid., pp. 322-329; Tem-
perley, Canning, p. 313; Wright, Wellington, IV, 127.
38 Wellington to Zachary Macaulay, May 8, 1821, Well. Desp., I, 170; Wellington
to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, ibid., pp. 295-296; Canning to Wellington, London,
Sept. 30, 1822, F.O., Continent: Verona, 92/48; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct.
18, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 133; Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 323; Emile Bour-
geois, History of Modern France, 1815-1913 (Cambridge, England, 1922), I, 52; Hugh
G. Soulsby, Right of Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations, 1814-
1862 (Baltimore, 1933), p. 13; Frank J. Klingberg, The Anti-Slavery Movement in
England (New Haven, 1926), p. 167.
This mercenary view of British policy received support from an unex-

pected quarter when William Huskisson, a Liberal Tory M. P. and Can-
ning's close friend, observed that the importation of blacks into Brazil,
Cuba, and the French West Indies had risen in direct proportion to the
increased production of the non-British colonies of the Western Hemisphere.
A correlation existed between rising colonial production and the expanding
slave trade, which, he declared, clearly indicated the need for free trade
laws. On April I, 1822, Huskisson argued before the House of Commons
that
Had the British West India Islands been at liberty to export their produce to
all the northern parts of America, we should not have found the people of ...
[the United States] deriving all of their supplies of certain articles, from the
colonies of other European states, which were thereby induced to enlarge their
cultivation, and to import an additional number of slaves. 37
With economic rivalry among the maritime powers of Europe buttressing
such political principles as freedom of the seas and national sovereignty, the
prospects for futhering abolition at Verona, as Canning perceived, were
"discouraging." That this appraisal was correct was soon indicated by
Wellington's reports from the Congress.
Despite the acrimonious debate over the Spanish Question, which alien-
ated England from the continental courts, Wellington did not neglect the
slave trade issue. Before the end of October, he had conversed privately
with the tsar and all the allied ministers about the scourge of humanity.
Alexander, Nesselrode, and Mettemich assured him that they were anxious
to adopt any measure to check this evil traffic, which the maritime powers
would support, and they could enforce. Montmorency, following Villele's
instructions, declared "that his government had done everything in their
power, in way of law and execution of law, to prevent the slave trade ... "
France, nonetheless, stood ready to consider any British proposal for ending
the commerce in Negroes "short of exposing French ships on the high seas
to search by foreign ships of war, to which ... France could never consent."
Had England discovered some means of obtaining her object which her
allies could effectually support? When the duke, in obedience to Canning's
directive of October I, suggested that the maritime powers might "negotiate
37 ParI. Debates, new ser., VI (1822), 1427. On January 31, 1822, Huskisson was
appointed Treasurer of the Navy, and on April 5, 1823, he was given the important
cabinet post of President of the Board of Trade. He held both offices simultaneously.
Anna Lane Lingelbach, "William Huskisson as President of the Board of Trade,"
AHR, XLIII (July 1938), 759-760; Huskisson Papers, ed. Lewis S. Benjamin (New
York, 1931), pp. vii-xiii; George Dangerfield, Era of Good Feeling (New York, 1953),
p. 261; DNB, X, 325.
slave-trading into piracy," the French foreign minister replied that France
could not accept the proposal, and the continental cabinets appeared only
slightly less opposed to it. Unaware that negotiations were pending between
Russia and Portugal for giving preference to Brazilian over British sugar in
Russian ports, Wellington next proposed that the allies prohibit the impor-
tation of Brazilian sugar. Nesselrode gave no answer but showed signs of
disapproval, and the Austrian and Prussian delegations only "smiled."
After all, Brazilian sugar was the same as British, except for price, and it
was brought to Europe by the British merchant marine, which Britain
could regulate. The great powers, it appears, were willing to adopt any
measure to suppress the slave trade, provided that it did not require them
to make a sacrifice. 38
As at Vienna and Aix-Ia-Chapelle, so again British abolitionists were
represented at an international reunion of sovereigns. Their men in Verona
were William Allen, who "lectured Kings and Emperors, and their ministers,
daily upon the iniquity of the slave trade," and General Kenneth Macaulay,
Zachary's brother.39 To Alexander, Allen delivered a personal letter from
Wilberforce, requesting the emperor's support in suppressing the abomi-
nable traffic: "We should have no favourable opinion of his Majesty's
religious and moral character," Wilberforce declared, "if he did not honest-
ly exert his powers on our behalf." 40 But these urgent appeals had no more
success at Verona than at previous congresses in influencing statesmen
whose value system was governed by raison d' etat and whose actions belied
their frequent protests of righteous indignation at the "horrible commerce
in sentient beings." 41 Their treatment of Wellington's proposals relative
to this issue is a case in point.
On Sunday, November 17, the duke submitted a memorandum on the
slave trade to the tsar in the hope of obtaining his support before presenting
it to the Congress at a formal conference. In a lengthy preface to its specific
recommendations, the note contends that this traffic has steadily increased
since 1815 until it now exists "on a greater scale than at any previous
period," this despite the fact that Portugal and Brazil are the only Christian
38 WellingtO'n to' Canning, Verona, Oct. 28, 1822, F.O., Continent: Verona, 92/49;
Canning to' WellingtO'n, Foreign Office, Oct. 1, 1822, ibid., 92/48. WellingtO'n seems
nO't to' have realized that Canning had nO' intention of excluding from English ports
the produce O'f Brazil or any other cO'lony employing slave labO'r, although the foreign
secretary implied as much in his dispatch of October 1.
39 Gleig, Wellington, p. 300; see alsO' R.I. and S. Wilberforce, Wilberforce, 11,224;
Betty Fladeland, "Abolitionist Pressures on the CO'ncert of Europe, 1814-1822," JMH,
XXXVIII (Dec. 1966),371.
40 Coupland, Wilberforce, p. 452.
states in the world "which still legally permit the [slave] trade," and by
treaty Portugal confines it to her own subjects and possessions south of the
equator. According to the laws of all European countries, it is, therefore,
contraband trade in the Northern Hemisphere. Yet during seven months
of 1821, the minute continues, 38,000 Negroes were carried away from that
region of the African coast between the Gallinas and Calabar Rivers,
north of the line. From July 1820 to October 1821, no less than 352
ships entered the rivers of Africa to buy slaves, and each could hold
from 500 to 600 blacks. If filled, they carried nearly 200,000 human
beings to "a bondage without remedy and without return." This contra-
band trade, the note alleges, is transacted generally under the pro-
tection of the fleur de lis, since France refuses to sign any treaty granting
even a limited reciprocal right of search and seizure of ships engaged in the
slave trade. The British government, believing the time has come for the
allied sovereigns to suppress this criminal commerce, proposes the follow-
ing measures: (1) a renewal of the declaration of the Congress of Vienna
(February 8, 1815) condemning the slave trade, (2) a recommendation that
the maritime powers negotiate a convention which would brand the "barter
in blacks" as piracy, (3) a declaration committing each power to withdraw
the protection of its flag from foreign slave traders, (4) a declaration "that
the Sovereigns will not receive in their dominions colonial produce from
those countries which have not abolished, or shall continue to carry on the
slave trade," (5) a recommendation that France adopt a strict registry of
slaves in her colonies as Richelieu had suggested at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, and
(6) a recommendation that France grant the vessel, its equipment, and head
money as a prize to the French captain who captures a French slave ship.4.2
After studying the British note for two days, Alexander replied on the
19th that he would support all of its objects except that which would require
the great powers to boycott the colonial produce of all states that continue
the slave trade (i.e., Spain and France). Protesting that this resolution was
too broad, he suggested that it be so amended as to apply only to those
countries which "had not abolished the trade by law" (i.e., Portugal and
Brazil), and that they "should have time and notice." Anxious to secure
the tsar's support for all of his proposals "in the exact form in which they
were made," the duke recast his fourth proposition to confine its purview
to "those countries which have not abolished the slave trade." But this was
42 Wellington to Canning, Nov. 19, 1822, F.O., Continent; Verona, 92/50; British
memorandum on the slave trade, Verona, Nov. 24, 1822, BFSP, X, 95-100; cf. Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 539-540; Qu. Rev. XXVIII, 164; Alison, History of Eu-
rope, II, 628. Head money, as used here, means a reward for each slave liberated.
the only concession Wellington would make. When the French plenipo-
tentiaries pleaded with him "to make some slight alterations" in his memo-
randum before presenting it, he refused. 43
Thus assured of Russian support, Wellington read his Six Points to the
five-power ministers' conference of November 24. Following their presen-
tation, he proposed a conference in London to discuss measures for the
efficient and definitive abolition of the slave traffic. The four continental
powers immediately endorsed the object of the duke's memoire and pro-
tested their readiness to reaffirm the Vienna declaration condemning the
slave trade. Nesselrode, whose response was typical, declared that his
sovereign
would never disavow the principles and the sentiments, which had caused him
to regard for all times the Slave Trade as a Commerce condemned by religion,
justice, and humanity; and that He was ready to concur in the Measures, that
His Allies should judge feasible in order to assure the total and definitive
Abolition of this Commerce.
But the allied ministers refused to commit themselves on Wellington's re-
maining five points, agreeing only to study them and to have their answers
ready by the next conference scheduled for Wednesday, November 27.44
5. The Implacable French and Diffident Allies
Informed on Tuesday night, the 26th, that the tsar had changed his stand
on the Slave Trade Question and would not support at the Congress the
British proposals, Wellington called upon Nesselrode and Lieven the next
morning for clarification. Upon reading the Russian reply to his note, he
discovered that "it went, in fact, to nothing, excepting to the general de-
claration and to the Portuguese trade .... " As for the other measures pro-
posed by England, they should be reserved for Anglo-French negotiations
to be opened in Paris, at which time the Russian ambassador would second
his British colleague. Russian support, in sum, now was made contingent
upon a future demarche; if such never took place, there could be no claim
upon his Majesty's good offices. Appalled at this unexpected shift, the duke
threatened that if better treatment of his proposals were not forthcoming, he
would withdraw them and explain to the Congress that he should not have
43 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19 and 29, 1822, F.O., Continent: Verona,
92/50 and 52; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 540.
44 Minutes of the conference of November 24, 1822, Verona, BFSP, X, 94-95; Wel-
lington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 585; entry for Sun., Nov.
24, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 113. The conference lasted from 2:00 to 4:00 P.M.
made them without the tsar's promise of complete support; or, he would
stipulate in the protocol of that afternoon's conference, just after the Russian
note, that the emperor had reneged on this pledge. But this remonstrance
accomplished little. Nesselrode and Lieven reassured the duke that Russia
would support British negotiations at Paris and agreed further to insert in
their note "a distinct admission that the trade ought to be made piracy,"
a recommendation Alexander himself had made at Aix-Ia-Chapelle. These
commitments were, however, meaningless gestures to placate Wellington
and to camouflage the tsar's "abandonment" of England. In view of past
French obduracy on this issue, the Russian ministers, like Canning, were
confident France would never permit the slave trade to be labeled piracy.
But the duke was not deceived by these promises. Ruefully, he remarked
to his chief: "1 doubt our having any effectual support from the Emperor
of Russia." 45
On the afternoon of November 27, the continental powers made their
official replies to Wellington's Six Points. Condemning slavery in severe
terms, Metternich affirmed that the slave trade was morally wrong and that
the Vienna declaration should be renewed. But the issue of denouncing the
traffic in blacks as piracy should be decided by the maritime powers. The
recommendations specifically addressed to the French cabinet, he con-
tended, could best be settled by direct Anglo-French negotiations. The
Austrian ambassador in Paris (Baron Karl Vincent), would support the
British measures in such a manner as he deemed most proper. The Prussian
and Russian answers followed the Austrian line; i.e., slavery is abhorrent
and ought to be abolished, but Britain and France should settle their own
differences. But Hatzfeldt, who represented Prussia in the absence of the
gout stricken foreign minister, declined to take a stand on any of the British
proposals, except the general declaration against the slave trade. The Prus-
sian government, he explained, must reserve judgment until France had
presented her case. As for the proposed embargo on colonial produce from
countries which had not abolished the traffic in Negroes, Nesselrode argued
that it would be "more efficacious" for the great powers to interdict all
commerce with Portugal, unless she ceased the criminal traffic, a proposition
that Britain, with her lucrative carrying trade, was sure to reject.46
The weakness of the Prussian note Wellington attributed to the absence
45 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 617; entry for
Wed., Nov. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 114; Fladeland, "Abolitionist Pressures,"
1MB, XXXVIII, 373.
46 Austrian, Prussian, and Russian replies to Wellington's memorandum on the
slave trade, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, BFSP, X, 102, 106-109; Annual Register, LXV,
83-85; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 542.
of King Frederick William III (who was still touring Italy), and to the illness
of Bernstorff. Equally disappointed in the Russian response, the duke
declared that he would have exposed the tsar's "abandonment of me," if
his note had not condemned the slave trade as piracy.47
The French memoire came from the pen of Chateaubriand. Though
moderate and dignified in tone, its courteous form but thinly veiled the am-
bassador's deep anti-British bias and particular resentment of Wellington's
proposals to end the slave trade. For Chateau briand, whose father had been
a successful slave trader and privateer, shared Villele's view that abolition
was a British imposed burden, and every effort to enforce it, "a national
disgrace." Adroitly the viscount defended French interests and honor, but
the eloquent phraseology of his note, though a credit to the author, hardly
made it more palatable to British taste. 48
In his opening statement, Chateaubriand applauded "the zeal manifested
by England, in the prosecution of her benevolent designs." But France, he
asserted, is just as anxious as the court of st. James to suppress "a traffic
which is equally condemned by God and man." The volume of the "Black
Tide," while not as large as the London cabinet alleges, is still so great that
Christendom is horrified by the "increasing suffering of these victims of
infamous cupidity." The allied powers, of course, are unanimous in their
desire to abolish the slave trade, but "abolition involves questions of a
more complex nature." Both the First Treaty of Paris and the Vienna
declaration had admitted the necessity of acting with caution and with "a
due regard to the interests, habits, and even the privations of ... subjects."
How long, he asked, had that measure been rejected by Parliament, though
it was "supported by one of the greatest ministers England ever produced
[William Pitt, the Younger]?" British colonials had had twenty years to
prepare for the day when the slave trade would end, but French sugar
plantations had had almost no time.
Taking the British note point by point, Chateaubriand refuted its alle-
gations against France. To the charge that the slave trade "is especially
47 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 617-618.

48 French memoire on the slave trade, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, BFSP, X, 102-106; cf.
Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 40-44; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 540-
54l. Rene-Auguste de Chateaubriand (1718-1786), a Breton, liked to think of himself
as a "gentleman-corsair." A shrewd businessman and a captain at twenty-eight, he ac-
cumulated a fortune of almost 600,000 livres in thirty-three years. He was especially
proud of one cruise from the Guinea coast to the French West Indies. Commanding the
Apollo, with his brother Pierre as first mate, he "carried 414 blacks, of whom only
16 died on the voyage ... , a remarkable success for the average losses varied from 5
to 30 per cent." Maurois, Chateau briand, pp. 12-13. Between 1817 and 1843, the mean
death rate at sea was 9.1 per cent. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 235.
carried on under the French flag," he replied:

Pirates may hoist honorable colors: France cannot affirm that brigands have
not borrowed hers; but it will never be with her knowledge that dishonor and
crime find protection under the French flag.
If the French public is less opposed than the British to abolition, there are
good reasons for this attitude: they remember that Haitians (Negroes) have
murdered Frenchmen and that Britain has forced abolition upon France in
their peace treaty. The subject, therefore, is "stamped with that unpopularity
which naturally attaches to all acts of force" in any state embued with a
strong national spirit. No one can doubt, the plenipotentiary argued, that
abolition of the slave trade would have been less popular in England, had that
measure been preceded by the ruin and massacre of the English in the Antilles.
Was the French government lax in enforcing its proscription of this barba-
rous traffic? No, Chateaubriand answered, the law is effectively implement-
ed, and already there have been numerous convictions of slavers and
condemnations of their ships. The extreme precautions taken by these
criminals to hide their victims prove that French squadrons are vigilant
and that the law is rigorously enforced; nevertheless, legal penalties, which
are already severe, will be increased "as soon as public opinion is prepared
for the change." But all foreign interference, he warned, only "augments
the difficulties of the French government, and tends to retard the object
which all men of generous feeling are anxious to see attained."
At length, Chateaubriand addressed himself to Wellington's coercive
measures. First, the court of the Tuileries, he assured the conference, was
ready to sign a collective declaration designed "to check the odious traffic
and to visit all criminals with the vengeance of the laws." Secondly, the
plenipotentiaries of his most Christian Majesty, without commenting on the
merits or advisability of treating the slave trade as piracy, do not consider
the Congress competent to adopt such a measure, which would become "a
general law of the civilized world." Thirdly, nothing is more just than "to
deny the use and protection of the French flag to foreigners who may employ
it to cover the slave trade ... , but France has no need to defend crimes she
has never permitted." Fourthly, the proposal to prohibit the importation of
goods from the colonial possessions of those powers which have not abolish-
ed the slave trade will affect only Portugal. But Portugal has no representa-
tive at the Congress; therefore, this subject cannot be discussed. 49 "It is
49 At Aix-Ia-Chapelle, the allies had agreed not to discuss at a future conference
any problem involving a country not represented. Neither Spain nor Portugal had been
invited to send delegates to Verona, and none were present. Britain and France,
but just," Chateaubriand observed, "that she should be heard in her own
defense before she receives sentence." Fifthly, the registry of slaves is a
suggestion which France may adopt at some future date, though it cannot
be denied that
this intervention of government authority will be a sort of encroachment on the
right of property, that most sacred of all rights, which the laws of Great Britain
respect, even amidst their errors and caprices.
Sixthly, the other measures recommended to France are good, but "they
are subjects for the enactment of laws, and consequently they must await
the favor of public opinion to insure their success."
In concluding his memoire, Chateaubriand raised again the old and
vexing issue of search and seizure of ships engaged in the slave trade, a
question which Wellington, in deference to the tsar, had carefully refrained
from including in his Six Points. The Paris cabinet, the ambassador de-
clared, could never consent to a convention conferring such a right, how-
ever limited and reciprocal, since the French constitution forbids confis-
cation. Should anyone require proof that France sincerely desires to rid the
seas of slave traders, he has only to recall that this very year
French blood has been shed on the coast of Africa. France acknowledges the
freedom of the seas to all foreign flags, to whatever country they belong. She
claims for herself only that independence which she respects in others, and
which belongs to her dignity.5o
The keynote of France's policy on the slave trade, as on other issues, was
to avoid discussion of any measure which might impede the free exercise
of her national sovereignty. On the issue of French participation in the
black commerce, Chateaubriand acted as a disciple of laissez-faire doctrines.
But notwithstanding his protests at Verona and the more reserved assur-
ances of VilleIe at Paris that France was "neither less active nor less severe"
than Britain in pursuing and punishing slave traders, all the world knew
that these declarations were false. 51
moreover, were the only nations at the Congress which recognized the new government
of Portugal established by the August Revolution. In November 1820, Austria, Prus-
sia, and Russia had recalled their ministers from Lisbon in protest against the Portu-
guese constitution and had not returned them. It should be noted that in this case
the action of the three eastern powers did not lead to war. Temperley, Canning, pp.
190-191.
50 French memoire on the slave trade, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, BFSP, X, 102-106;
Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 40-44.
51 Stuart to Canning, No. 274, Paris, Oct. 10, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48. While
avoiding the appearance of a joint demarche with his British colleague, Albert Galla-
tin, the American minister at Paris, urged the French cabinet "to take effectual meas-
ures to check the infraction of their laws and the abuse of their flag which is at pre-
Because the hour was late and two questions yet remained on the agenda,
further discussion of Wellington's proposals was postponed until 2 P.M.
the next day.52 At the conference of Thursday, November 28, the French
ministers again opposed the duke's recommendation that the slave trade
be assimilated to piracy, contending that they could not "prescribe to their
government the name, forms, terms, and the scope of a Law." 53 At length,
all the British measures were rejected except that which requested a renewal
of the general condemnation of the commerce in Negroes. Quoting from
the Vienna Protocol of February 8,1815, the allied courts avowed that they
had not ceased to regard the slave trade as "a Scourge, which has too long
devastated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity." To search
for effectual means of ending this "illicit and sinful" traffic was "a sacred
duty," but in accepting this quest, they insisted that such measures must
also be compatible with their rights and the interests of their subjects.54
Notwithstanding the indictment of the slave trade as morally wrong, cruel.
and unchristian, the continental powers objected even to calling their pro-
nouncement a declaration. since none was to be promulgated on any other
subject. Would not such a title appear to give the traffic in blacks an un-
deserved high status? Thus, what Wellington intended should be a "general
declaration" became instead a "Resolution." Though disappointed that
nothing practical had been accomplished at Verona, the duke still thought
that a general resolution would serve the same purpose as a declaration and
that those cabinet memoires which supported some of his points could be
useful in future negotiations. In an effort to convert the intent of the Slave
Trade Resolution into a demarche. Wellington attached to the protocol of
November 28 an agreement to hold a London conference on the slave trade
"to concert ... the measures to be adopted under the different notes.... "
Metternich, Hatzfeldt, and Nesselrode favored this proposal, but Chateau-
briand, noncommittal as usual, took it ad referendum. To placate the dis-
satisfied duke, Tsar Alexander on the 29th consented to add to the Russian
note a specific engagement to support British slave trade negotiations in
Paris. Appeased, Wellington declared: "The case ... now stands as I could
sent notorious along the whole extent of the African coast." An abolitionist at heart,
Gallatin abhorred the slave trade and slavery; cf. Adams Gallatin, p. 67.
52 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 8; entry for Wed., Nov. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher,
III, 114. The issues which remained to be considered were the Eastern Question and
the Navigation of the Rhine.
53 Proces-verbal of the conference of Nov. 28, 1822, BFSP, X, 101; cf. Chateau-
briand, Congres de Verone, p. 40.
54 Slave Trade Resolution, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Hertslet, Europe by Treaty, I,
695-696.
wish it. ... " The next day he left for home. Future negotiations were in the
hands of George Canning. 55
Apparently satisfied that the duke, indeed, had done in respect to this
question "more than could be expected," the foreign secretary on Novem-
ber 29 bestowed upon him the royal "approbation" for his "endeavours to
restrain, if not finally to extinguish, that disgraceful and abominable traf-
fic." 56 Wilberforce was more lavish, and less realistic, in his praise, con-
gratulating Wellington for the "admirable zeal, perseverance, judgement,
and temper" with which he had argued at Verona the case for the abolition
of the slave trade. 57
6. A Retrospect
As the result of persistent British efforts, by the end of 1818 all the maritime
states of Europe, except Portugal, had legally abolished the traffic in
Negroes or had set May 30, 1820, as the date for its final prohibition. On
the statute books, abolition appeared to be virtually complete, but in
practice the slave trade continued unabated. With the restoration of peace
to Europe in 1815, the British navy's wartime license to suppress the black
commerce had ended; thereafter the Atlantic slave trade revived. It was one
thing to enact abolition laws and to negotiate treaties with the same intent
but quite another to enforce them.
After 1815 the British abolitionists continued to work as hard as ever to
achieve effective suppression, but now without the widespread public sup-
port they once had enjoyed. The success of British abolition in 1807 and
the apparent European success in 1815 at Vienna and Paris convinced many
Britons that the quest had been achieved, and thus they lost interest in it.
Their attention, moreover, was absorbed by the deepening economic de-
pression precipitated by the abrupt end of wartime spending and pro-
duction. But British abolitionists, despite their weakened position, redoubled
their efforts to regain lost support at home and to inspire the ministry to
negotiate effective anti-slave trade treaties with other maritime states.
Casdereagh was ready with a superb plan for suppression, but one which
had little likelihood of immediate acceptance by major powers, because it
raised the touchy issue of search and seizure on the high seas. But he soon
55 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 618; proces-verbal

of the conference of Nov. 28, 1822, BFSP, X, 101.
56 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 621; same
to same, Gloucester Lodge, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid.
57 Quoted in Coupland, Wilberforce, p. 453.
,
concluded 'conventions with such lesser states as Portugal (1817), Spain
(1817), and the Netherlands (1818), establishing a qualified, reciprocal right
of visit, though the acquiescence of the Iberian states had to be bought.
France, Russia, and the United States, all rejected Britain's overtures to
negotiate similar treaties on the ground that such a concession would in-
fringe upon national sovereignty.
The British abolitionists, unable to make headway at home and still
doubtful of Castlereagh's zeal for their cause, dispatched Clarkson to the
Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle to influence allied delegations and to make
another appeal to the humanity of the tsar. At the Congress, Castlereagh
urged acceptance of a qualified right of visit, and Alexander proposed an
international police force to suppress the slave trade. Opposing national
interests, distrust, and jealousies, however, prevented the adoption of either
plan. Indeed, its only accomplishment was the composition of another
meaningless declaration against the traffic in Negroes, which was sent to
Portugal. King John ignored the appeal, and the slave trade continued to
flourish with the ever increasing demand for cotton and sugar.
Because Britain's colonies no longer had free access to the huge supply
of cheap African labor, their produce could not compete profitably in the
world market. The continental powers perceived that international abolition
would materially benefit Britain's colonial economy, then suffering from
depression;~The Slave Trade Question thus became a mixture of economic,
political, and humanitarian considerations. Castlereagh made no significant
progress in promoting abolition, and Canning, during his first four months
in office, closed only a few loopholes in the treaties negotiated by his
predecessor. The new foreign secretary expected little of the Congress of
Verona and, therefore, was not disappointed that it accomplished nothing of
practical value relative to this issue. Wellington, with the firm support of
Alexander, might have achieved more than a meaningless resolution, but
the tsar's support was shifting sand. Once again the great powers declared
the slave trade to be morally wrong and unchristian, but their condemnation
had the fatal defect of not containing a single provision for enforcement.
Despite the resolution's lofty sentiments, some of its signers were insincere;
their apparent endorsement indicates only that they were willing to pay
lip service to British demands. Sixteen years later (1838), Chateaubriand,
in bitter retrospect, revealed his true opinion of Britain's stand on this
question when he commented in his Congres de Verone:
One must admire... the Christian spirit and its contribution, past and
present, to the advancement of civilization; but it was a singular thing, this
perseverance of the Cabinet of Saint James in introducing into every congress,
in the midst of the most important issues and vital interests, that trivial and
remote question of the abolition of the slave trade. England feared that the
commerce she reluctantly renounced would fall into the hands of another
nation; she wanted to force France, Spain, Portugal, and Holland suddenly
to change their colonial system, without considering whether those states had
attained such a degree of moral preparation as would render it safe to emanci-
pate the blacks, by abandoning to the mercy of Providence the property and
lives of the whites. What England had done, other nations were called upon
to do, to the detriment of their navigation and colonies.... The Marquess of
Londonderry, the Duke of Wellington, enemies of freedom in their own coun-
try, Mr. Canning, disciple of William Pitt and the opponent of parliamentary
reform, all these Tories, hostile for thirty years to the motion of Wilberforce,
now became enthusiastic for the emancipation of negroes, while execrating the
liberty of whites. Englishmen have been sold into slavery in America as recently
as the time of Cromwell. The secret of these contraditions lies in the private
interests and mercantile spirit of England; it is necessary to understand this in
order not to be duped by a philanthropy so ardent and yet so recent: philan-
thropy is the counterfeit coin of charity.58
Commenting specifically on Wellington's slave trade memorandum, Cha-
teaubriand assailed what he regarded as its "three unreasonable pre-
tensions": the right to inspect suspected slavers, the right to condemn the
traffic in blacks as piracy, and the right to interdict the importation of
colonial produce cultivated by slave labor. He charged that Britain's pro-
posals at Verona had been motivated by a desire "to attack with impunity
all the navies of the world" and to substitute for the colonial products of
other nations her own and those of India. 59 The Anglophobe author appears
to have overlooked the fact that slave labor also produced British colonial
commodities. Not until 1837 did Parliament finally and effectively abolish
slavery within the Empire. It will be recalled, too, that Wellington did not
propose to the Congress a treaty conferring the mutual right of search and
seizure but merely alluded to France's past refusal to sign such a convention
with England.
In the negotiations at Verona relative to the slave trade, France succeeded
in frustrating British policy. If Wellington's victory was a moral triumph,
that of Chateaubriand was diplomatic. The duke learned that words are
cheap when no action is intended.
58 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 39-40.

59 Ibid., p. 40.
7. Epilogue
While the crowned heads of Europe and their ministers debated inter-
national problems at Verona, Wilberforce, who remained. in London, be-
came concerned that Canning would sacrifice abolition to economic ad-
vantages. To allay his fears, Canning reaffirmed his opposition to the Bra-
zilian slave trade, but frankly confessed that Britain would not give up her
trade with Brazil, even if the continental powers did so. "I am afraid," he
replied, "that would amount to sacrificing the import and re-export of her
sugar and cotton, and who would dare do such a thing, without consulting
fully the commercial part of the nation?" 60
When Brazil declared her independence on September 7, 1822, Canning
hoped that Portugal, faced with the loss of the Brazilian slave market,
would finally accept abolition. Perhaps the offer of British recognition of
Brazilian independence could, moreover, secure that country's suppression
of the slave trade. But these hopes were quickly dashed by Dom Pedro I.
Emperor of Brazil, who considered the traffic in Negroes the keystone of
his nation's economy. On October 21, he confronted Portugal with the
choice of war or continuing "ancient commercial relations" between the
two states. Then, seeking to exploit the British desire for abolition. Mari-
scaldo Campo Brant. the Brazilian commissioner at London. hinted on
November 14 that Brazil would, indeed. abolish the slave trade, if Britain
immediately recognized the independence of Brazi1. 61
With the slave trade hanging about Britain's neck like an albatross and
with no hope of success at Verona, Canning on November 15 requested the
cabinet to recognize Brazil as soon as that state embraced abolition. The
British West Indian economy, he declared, would suffer so long as the
Brazilian slave trade continued. Brazilian abolition, moreover, would be
a great step toward general suppression. 62 But Britain must act quickly;
60 Canning to Wilberforce, Glouc~ter Lodge, Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 474.
U Proclamation of the Emperor of Brazil to Portugal, Oct. 21, 1822, BFSP, X,
945-946; Brant to Canning, London, Nov. 14, 1822, Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., II,
397n-398n. How important the slave trade was to the Brazilian economy is indicated
by the following statistics: of the 394, 500 blacks imported into the New World be-
tween 1811 and 1820,266,800 went to Brazil. During three of those years (1817-1820),
45,800 slaves were carried to Latin America in "ships known to the British Foreign
Office," and 44,100 - or 96.3 per cent of them - entered through Brazilian ports. In
the next decade (1821-1830), the London cabinet certified that Brazil imported, at
least, 277,200 of the 341,300 slav~ transported to the Americas, or 81.2 per cent of
the total. Tables 67 and 68, Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 234, 237.
6! During 1822, 20,483 slaves were transported from Africa to Brazil. of whom 1388
died in transit; in 1823 the volume of this black traffic increased to 29.211, of whom
2499 died on the way. Temperley. Canning. p. 213.
if another power recognized Brazil first, London's offer would not be as

attractive. Although the ministry rejected Canning's appeal, because it
wished Portugal to be the first to recognize her disaffected colony, his
diplomacy and perseverance eventually prevailed. In August 1825, Britain
recognized Brazil, and fifteen months later (November 23, 1826) concluded
with her a convention for the suppression of the slave trade. 63
Despite pious condemnations and theoretical abolition by the major
maritime powers, the slave trade continued on a substantial scale; between
1821 and 1830, 505,600 slaves were imported into American territories for
an annual average of 50,600, an increase of 11,100 over the mean for the
previous decade. 64 As a Tuscan diplomat observed: "I see clearly that we
have not yet begun the age of gold." 65
83 Canning's cabinet memorandum, Nov. 15, Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., II, 397-
398; Temperley, Canning, 224. Britain's treaties did not permit her cruisers to interfere
with the activities of Portuguese slavers south of the equator until 1839, nor with Bra-
zilian slave traders until 1845.
64 Table 67, Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 234. Of the total cited in the text
(505,600), 325,000 went to Brazil.
85 Quoted in Webster, Castlereagh, p. 168. A narration of the numerous futile at-
tempts during the nineteenth century to suppress the Atlantic slave trade does not fall
within the scope of this work. Not until Brazil abolished slavery on May 13, 1888,
was this traffic finally brought to an end. But slavery and the slave trade still exist
and are increasing in East Africa, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries.
As recently as March 22, 1967, the United Nations Human Rights Commission asked
Secretary General U Thant for material on this issue toward which, among the
great powers, France alone maintains a "flippantly arrogant" attitude. Richard L.
Tobin, "Slavery Still Plagues the Earth: An Editorial," Saturday Review, L, No. 18
(May 6,1967),24,50. For a detailed discussion of this question until 1870, see W. E. B.
Du Bois, Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America,
1638-1870 (New York, 1896), and Mathieson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade. For
twentieth century attempts to eradicate this ancient evil, see C. W. W. Greenidge,
Slavery (London, 1958). Hurst, "Slave Trade Question," pp. 100-108, gives a good
brief survey of this subject from 1822 to 1966.
CHAPTER VII
THE ITALIAN CONGRESS
Nature did well provide for our weak state

When she raised that mountain screen,
The Alps, to guard us from the German rage.
o gentle Latin blood, throw down this burden,
Rise up from this shame, do not worship a name
Empty of all subject. To let a Nordic fury,
A savage race, conquer our minds and souls
Is our own sin - and that no natural disgrace. -
Petrarch. 1
1. The Charles Albert Affair
When allied ministers discussed at Vienna the succession of Charles Albert

to the Sardinian throne, Metternich had found himself in a highly em-
barrassing position. He did not dare admit his secret design to extend Habs-
burg hegemony over Sardinia. Realizing that anything he sponsored would
be resented by France and several of the Italian states, he had tried to hide
his real ambition by pretending sympathy for the Prince of Carignan. The
dispossession of the heir-presumptive, he had declared, was a false policy,
but Charles Felix was adamant. No one, however, was fooled by this
smokescreen, and Metternich's maneuvering became an open secret. Com-
pelled by the protests of England, France, and Russia on behalf of the
prince to take a different tack, the chancellor had abandoned his scheme to
substitute the Archduke Francis IV of Modena for Charles Albert and had
supported the plan of Charles Felix to replace the prince in the order of
succession with his son. 2
Upon his arrival in Verona, Metternich continued to pose as the defender
of Charles Albert and to throw all responsibility for initiating proceedings
against him on the King of Sardinia, whose actions seemed to confirm the
charge. On the eve of the Congress, Pope Pius VII, at the instigation of the
Duke of Blacas, French ambassador at Rome, had requested Charles Felix
to restore his cousin to favor. But the appeal had no effect; his Sardinian
Majesty replied to the Holy Father that "as a man, he could forgive, but
1 From "ltalia Mia," Petrarch Sonnets and Songs, trans. A.M. Armi (New York,
1946), p. 203.
~ Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; Hill to Canning, Turin, Oct. 12 and 17, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 428-429; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. parI., VII, 198; Viel-Castel, La Restaura-
tion, XI, 461; Spellanzon, Storia di Risorgimento, II, 179-180.
that as a king his duties commanded him still ... to stand aloof from the
prince." 3 With feigned regret, Metternich deplored this decision, alleging
that he, too, had tried to persuade Charles Felix to adopt a more tolerant
policy but that his Majesty was resolved to abdicate rather than suffer
coercion. 4
Although Wellington was not a silent observer of the Charles Albert af-
fair, he avoided committing his government, for where Britannia's interests
were not involved, she maintained a posture of watchful neutrality, an
attitude apparent in the duke's reaction to the chancellor's confidential
memoire of October 29. Having argued that the prince's continued residence
in Florence had made that city "a rallying point" for revolutionaries and
thus had created a situation which posed "a real danger to Italy," Metter-
nich proposed that Charles Albert renounce his claims in favor of his infant
son, who should then be educated in Turin by Charles Felix. Wellington
described the Austrian memorandum as "a very able and satisfactory state-
ment" but denied that there was any "legal proof" which could convict
the Prince of Carignan of conspiracy. He thought, therefore, that the King
of Sardinia should recognize the prince as the heir to the throne, should
receive him at court, and treat him according to the rank of an heir-
apparent. 5
The French delegation strongly opposed every attempt to undermine
Charles Albert and encouraged the Italian courts to resist the schemes of
Charles Felix and Metternich. To thwart these intrigues, France even
threatened to take the Carignan affair into "an official and general confer-
ence." Chateaubriand confided to Gentz, moreover, that France might be
obliged to make public French protests against the attempts of proscribe the
prince. Faithful to Villele's instructions and French interests, Chateaubriand
reminded Gentz that the order of succession in the House of Savoy-Carignan
had been confirmed by the Congress of Vienna. The principle of legitimacy
required, therefore, that the claims of this House be recognized. The substi-
tution of a son for the father would violate this principle. The day that
legitimacy was annulled by its traditional defenders would be a great
triumph for revolutionaries. 6
3 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 567. Charles Felix answered in an eight page

letter in his own handwriting.
4 Ibid.; Hill to Canning, Turin, Oct. 17, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 429.
5 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 456; Viel-Castel, La Res-
tauration, XI, 567-568.
6 Ibid., pp. 568-569; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 7; Louis Costa de Beauregard, La
jeunesse du roi Charles Albert (paris, 1889), p. 229; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari.,
VII, 198.
Finally, the tsar cast aside the cloak: of disinterest, which he had donned
at Vienna for the purpose of preserving the solidarity of the Alliance. He
and his ministers (Nesselrode, Pozzo, and Tatischev), all worked behind
the scenes on behalf of the prince. 7
Throughout the Congress, the Grand Duke Ferdinand III of Tuscany,
Charles Albert's father-in-law, and Prince Neri Corsini the Senior, the
Tuscan Minister of the Interior, pleaded the prince's cause. In private talks
with Bernstorff, Chateaubriand, Metternich, Pozzo, and Wellington, Corsini
spoke of the youth and inexperience of Charles Albert, represented the issue
as a "family affair," and requested their support. When Charles Felix
arrived in Verona on October 30, Grand Duke Ferdinand immediately
solicited him to pardon the young prince. s
Only Bernstorff among the allied ministers and Francis IV among the
Italian princes appeared openly hostile to Charles Albert, and there is reason
to believe that the Prussian foreign minister's bold declaration that the
Prince of Carignan was a criminal conspirator of whose guilt there was the
strongest proof was intended only to convince Metternich of his support.
Bernstorff, in fact, did nothing to translate this charge into any practical
measure; meanwhile, George Frederick Petitpierre, the Prussian charge
d'affaires at Turin, exerted covert pressure in favor of the prince. Francis IV
of Modena, an Austrian archduke, supported the cause of Victor Emmanuel
II (then age two) on the chance that Charles Felix might soon die and
himself become regent of Sardinia during the new king's minority. Even
Count Victor de La Tour, the able and patriotic Sardinian foreign minister,
opposed the plan to settle the succession on Charles Albert's infant son,
commenting that the "formation of a Regency, in the event of the King's
demise, would open the road to every species of intrigue and be attended
with much danger to the country." The truth of this observation was un-
contested. 9
In the face of the concerted opposition of France, Russia, Britain, the
Papacy, and Tuscany, Metternich in November yielded with as much grace
as possible. It was simply another case of the cake not being worth the
candle.1O Concluding that Austrian interests would be ill-served by further
interference with the Sardinian succession, he discreetly suggested to
7 VieI-CasteI, La Restauration, XI, 570; Beauregard, Charles Albert, p. 229.

8 Ibid., pp. 222-227.
9 Hill to Canning, Turin, Oct. 17, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 43; Viel-Castel, La Restaura-
tion, XI, 568; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 161 and 227; cf. Hill to Cast-
lereagh, No. 24, Turin, Oct. 24, 1821, F.O., Sardinia, 67/63.
10 Corsini to Count Vittorio de FossombToni, Tuscan prime minister, Verona, Nov.
18, 1822, in Beauregard, Charles Albert, pp. 228-229.
Alexander and Wellington that Charles Felix should restore the Prince of
Carignan to his favor, but should require him to promise, when he ascended
the throne, "to govern according to the laws, and not to make any alteration
without the consent of constituted authorities in Piedmont, Savoy, and
Genoa." Notwithstanding the duke's protest against "the fatality of such
an arrangement," and the observation of Count de Pralormo, the Sardinian
minister at Paris, that such a forced oath would be nullified the instant
Charles Albert became king, the chancellor's solution ultimately was ac-
cepted by the great powers and Sardinia. l l
Charles Felix's icy attitude toward Charles Albert, meanwhile, began to
thaw under the impact of several diverse influences. Resentment of Austrian
interference, the encouragement of France and Britain, the importunities of
the tsar and Ferdinand of Tuscany, and the birth of another heir, all com-
bined to produce in November a change of policy. As his Sardinian Majesty
explained:
Either Bubna or Metternich has misunderstood me. I never intended that they
should encroach upon my rights to judge a prince of my blood; ... it is neither
proper nor even decent for me to accuse my own cousin before the Congress.1 2
But this defiant stance toward Austria did not make negotiations with
Charles Felix less difficult. The tsar at last interceded directly with the
obstinate king and obtained from him the promise to answer "in benevolent
words" the prince's letter announcing that his wife again was in childbed.
On November 15, the Princess Maria Theresa of Carignan gave birth to her
second son, named Ferdinand after his grandfather. The arrival of this
infant had a profound effect on the childless Charles Felix who was anxious
to keep the succession in the House of Savoy. Thus the intercession of the
tsar and a new-born son conspired to bring about a reconciliation between
the king and the prince.1 3
Still there were conditions which were not met until 1824. In 1823,
Charles Albert made his amende honorable by going with the French army
on its Spanish expedition. In the storming of the Trocadero on August 30,
he so distinguished himself for bravery that a deputation of French soldiers
presented him with the woolen epaulettes of a fallen comrade and hailed
him as "a grenadier of France." After the war, he lived for three months
11 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 610-611; Schroeder,

Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 227-228; Beauregard, Charles Albert, p. 236.
12 Quoted in ibid., p. 227. Count Ferdinand Bubna von Lititz was the Austrian
commanding general in Lombardy.
13 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 570; Beauregard, Charles Albert, pp. 226, 227-
229.
THE IT ALlAN CONGRESS 195
in France, for Charles Felix refused to pardon him until he had signed an
act "to preserve intact the fundamental foundations and the organic forms
of the monarchy." But with the death of Victor Emmanuel I in January
1824, Charles Albert was permitted to return to Piedmont. The Vienna
cabinet, meanwhile, forced a "shocking" (effroyable) humiliation on Sar-
dinia. During the last days of January 1824, the Prince of Carignan signed
a secret agreement to place himself, when he ascended the throne, under the
guidance of a council of the higher clergy and the Knights of the Annunziata
and to preserve the absolute monarchy. On April 27,1831, he became King
of Sardinia-Piedmont.1 4
If Austria could not prevent the ascendancy of Charles Albert to the
throne, she succeeded, at least, in curtailing his freedom with a reactionary
curia. It is not surprising that this prince, dovoutly loyal to his country,
fought a war for Italian independence against Austria.
2. The Evacuation of Piedmont
The presence of 12,000 Austrian troops in eastern Piedmont indeed vexed

and intimidated the Turin government, as Metternich undoubtedly intended
that it should. In June 1821, while negotiations to establish the occupation
were still in progress at Novara, Count de La Tour, had protested that it
was completely unnecessary and that its heavy cost would hurt, not help,
the restored monarchy.15 Count Pralormo had been even more intemperate
in his criticism of the proposed occupation, charging that Austria intended
to destroy the independence of the Crown of Sardinia, to discredit the Govern-
ment of the King in the country, and finally, by the imposition of the most
intolerable and most humiliating yoke, to re-animate that national hatred
against Austria which was the the chief driving force and motive of the revo-
lution in the month of March. 1'6
These protests notwithstanding, the Convention of Novara, July 24, 1821,
compelled Sardinia to support the unwanted Austrian force at least until
14 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 346; Domenico Berti, Cesare
Alfieri (Rome, 1877), p. 77. Outside of the cabinets of Turin and Vienna, only Count
Pralormo, the new Sardinian minister to Austria, and the Marquis. Cesare d'Alfieri di
Sostegno who had succeeded him at Paris, knew of this secret treaty. It remained a
state secret until February 1848, when Charles Albert broke it by giving Sardinia a
constitution.
15 Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, June 23, 1821, cited by Schroeder, Metternich's
Diplomacy, p. 157.
16 Metternich to Binder, Vienna, June 28, 1821, with enclosure: "Rapport du Mi-
nistre de S.M. Ie Roi de Sardaigne a son Cabinet," n.d., quoted in ibid.
the Italian congress scheduled for next fall reviewed the situation of the
kingdomP
As the appointed time for the Congress of Verona approached, the
conservative, but nationalistic, Charles Felix in September 1822 appealed
to London, Paris, and st. Petersburg for assistance in ridding his country
of the vexatious and restraining Austrian occupation. Alexander, Canning,
and Villele promptly complied by transmitting appropriate instructions to
their respective congressional delegations. The tsar even went so far as to
declare that the evacuation of Piedmont would produce "a salutary effect ...
in Europe." The chancellor, however, clever diplomat that he was, again
resorted to guile, alleging at Vienna and Verona that he personally favored
a policy of withdrawal but that his sovereign and some of his cabinet col-
leagues did not share this opinion.1 8 When Pozzo urged Mettemich to
evacuate Piedmont, he replied:
You are preaching to a convert: I may feel free to sign immediately the recall
of our troops, but the Emperor does not share my confidence [securi/(~]. Stadion
likes to have 10,000 soldiers supported by foreigners, and Bellegarde sees in the
removal of part of the army from a wartime basis the undermining of his proper
authority. Herein lies the center of my opposition. 19
Despite the congruity of French and British policy on this issue, there
yet remained subtle differences of motivation and procedure. Villele, antici-
pating that Austria might consent to withdraw her troops from Piedmont
on the condition that she keep a garrison at Alessandria, objected even to
this possible compromise. This occupation, he declared, "would be a drain
on the finances of Piedmont and would deprive the King of Sardinia of
every moral advantage that he could and should expect from a complete
evacuation." Thus France, always hostile to expanding Habsburg influence
in Italy, would be satisfied with nothing less that "complete evacuation."
Canning, by contrast, left Wellington free to judge for himself whether or
17 Convention of Novara, July 24,1821 (printed French copy), F.O., Austria, 7/164.
The four signatories of this treaty were Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia. Ratifi-
cations were exchanged in Milan on September 16, 1821.
18 Stuart to Canning, No. 257, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Alexan-
der to La Ferronnays: personal interview, Verona, Nov. 25, 1822, Boislecomte, A.A.E.,
720, 328; ibid., 722, 67, 70; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 47-48; Count St.
Martin d'Aglil:, Sardinian minister at London, to Canning, London, Sept. 23, 1822,
enclosing precis of Castlereagh-Aglil: interview, London, Aug. 7, 1822, Well. Desp.,
I, 309-310; Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, ibid., pp. 307-308; Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 565.
19 Quoted in Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 328. Field Marshal Count Heinrich Joseph
Johannes von Bellegarde (1756-1845) was President of the Austrian Council of War,
1820-1825. For a sympathetic account of his life, see Karl, Freiherr von Smola, Das
Leben des Feldmarschalls Heinrich Grafen von Bellegarde (Vienna, 1847).
not the occupation was still necessary. If the duke found that Austrian
troops were no longer needed, he was authorized to state that the British
government considered withdrawal to be "in the highest degree wise and
salutary." If, however, his Grace decided the foreign garrison should be
continued, he had only to "preserve an absolute silence in any discussion
of Italian affairs." But it is clear that the foreign secretary favored the
evacuation of Piedmont, because he knew France had promised to support
the Sardinian appeal and did not wish this cause to succeed "by the active
interference of France alone." British policy, in sum, remained one of
interested neutrality, but in northern Italy, as elsewhere, this interest was
intensified by rivalry with France. If the Congress ended the occupation
of Piedmont, France must share credit for this success with Britain.20
On Friday, October 18, 1822, Metternich and Wellington had their first
conversation on Italian affairs. The chancellor contended that he was as
anxious to recall Austrian troops from Piedmont as the King of Sardinia
was to have them withdrawn. Indeed, if Charles Felix did not want them,
he (Metternich) would not even attend the conference that decided whether
or not they remained. But he quickly added, perhaps because of his secret
aversion to complete evacuation, that Austria was also ready to reduce
their number "as much as General Bubna should think consistent with their
safety." 21
At the time of his first interview with Metternich on Italy, Wellington
was ignorant of French policy toward evacuation, having just arrived in
Verona. Nor had he made up his own mind on this subject. He frankly
confessed to Canning that "I [have not] yet sufficient information to enable
me to judge whether the troops ought to be withdrawn or not." 22 At Milan,
meanwhile, General Ferdinand Bubna, commander of Austrian forces in
Lombardy, admitted there was no reason for maintaining auxiliary troops
in Piedmont, since he could observe that country just as well from the east
side of the Ticino River. This opinion was reinforced by Charles Felix, who,
upon his arrival in Verona on October 30, reaffirmed his conviction that
an army of occupation was no longer necessary.28
But by the first week in November, Wellington had become alarmed over
the prospect of a Franco-Spanish war and a Russian army of observation
in Sardinia; consequently, he entered into secret conversations with Charles
20 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 47-48; Canning to Wellington, London,

Sept. 27,1822, Well. Desp., 1,307-308.
21 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 383.
22 Ibid.
Felix (November 13-17), in which he asserted that France

was going to fight an opinion with troops corrupted by the same opinion; that
the commotions resulting from it would reverberate with force in Piedmont;
that ... this completely foreign danger demanded extraordinary support; that
he [Wellington] therefore thought the presence of the Austrian auxiliary corps
in his state was necessary until the question of Spain was terminated. 24
Charles Felix admitted the cogency and truth of the duke's arguments and
declared he had no objection to Austrian troops remaining for some time
longer, if the final date of their withdrawal was fixed. With this assurance,
Wellington, during the next ten days called on La Tour and Mettemich to
discuss this subject and to convert them, if possible, to his persuasion,.25
On the morning of November 27, the duke again saw the Sardinian foreign
minister; the same evening he obtained an audience with Charles Felix, at
which his Majesty proposed the evacuation of the Austrian army by thirds:
i.e., 4,000 beginning four months from October 1, 1822; 4,000 four months
later, and 4,000 on September 30, 1823. Wellington, however, countered
this plan with one of his own, calling for the withdrawal of 4,000 troops one
month after the close of the Congress; 3,000 on March 31, 1823, and 5,000
on September 30, 1823. The duke argued that his proposal had the military
advantage of leaving 5,000 men for the last six months, while being less
expensive. The king agreed to consider this plan and seemed disposed to
adopt it. 26
After the audience had ended, Wellington saw Mettemich and gave him
a precis of his talks with the Sardinian king and his minister. Pleased with
the duke's scheme for the evacuation of Piedmont, the chancellor readily
adopted it as the basis for Austrian policy. The next day (November 28),
Wellington outlined his proposal to La Tour, requesting him to support it
and to urge its acceptance by his Sardinian Majesty.27 La Tour replied on
the 29th that Charles Felix approved the duke's plan with one exception:
he wished "to substitute the fixed date of December 31, 1822, for that un-
f4 Ibid.; cf. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 609.
26 Ibid. I can find no evidence to support Boislecomte's charge (repeated by Viel-
Castel, La Restauration, XI, 564-565), that Wellington was Austria's emissary to get
the King of Sardinia to reverse his position. The duke acted on his own initiative and
convictions in his negotiations with Charles Felix. It appears that, conversely, Welling-
ton influenced Metternich.
$ Wellington to Metternich, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 594; Wellington
to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 609. Wellington thought La Tour was the
author of the king's plan.
In Wellington to La Tour, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
THE ITALIAN CONGRESS
certain one of one month after the close of the Congress, for the departure
of the first 4000 men. 2S
Before leaving Verona on November 30, Wellington informed London-
derry (Sir Charles Stewart) of the negotiations on Piedmontese evacuation
and of Austrian and Sardinian acceptance of his proposal. He urged Stewart
to prevail upon La Tour to present it, since the Emperor of Austria might
be reluctant to take the initiative in the agreed-upon arrangement. La Tour,
furthermore, should be persuaded that January 31, 1823 - four months from
October 1, 1822 - was the better date for beginning the withdrawal, since it
was the date which Charles Felix himself had suggested on November 27.29
Following these instructions, Londonderry had an interview with the
Sardinian foreign minister on December 1, urging that the first contingent
of Austrian troops should not retire until January 31, 1823. La Tour, how-
ever, refused to commit himself and denied any knowledge of the king's
suggestion that the evacuation should commence four months from October
1, 1822. Since Wellington himself, he observed, had proposed its beginning
one month after the end of the Congress, December 31, 1822, should be
acceptable both to the duke and to the Austrian chancellor.30
At the first confidential ministers' conference on Italy, December 2 - the
first of a series which constituted a sort of Italian congress within the
Congress - La Tour presented a long memoire on the state of Piedmont
and the strength and location of Sardinian troops. He concluded that
Austrian soldiers were no longer needed and formally requested their
evacuation according to Wellington's proposal, except that December 31,
1822, was proposed as the date of commencement. Although the protocol
of the conference was based on his statement, La Tour asked that it be
regarded strictly as a confidential piece de cabinet and not entered on the
journal. The following day, December 3, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and
Sardinia reached the final agreement on the evacuation of Piedmont. Wel-
lington's plan for a 4:3:5 ratio was adopted in toto, except for the substi-
tution of December 31,1822, for January 31, 1823. 31
The British and French plenipotentiaries were officially informed of
these decisions at the first general conference on Italy, December 4. The
proces-verbal of December 2, was read to them, and copies were circulated.
28 La Tour to Wellington, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 610.

29 Wellington to Stewart, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., pp. 620-621.
30 Stewart to Canning, No.2, Verona, Dec. 3, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
31 Stewart to Canning, No.3, Verona, Dec. 5, 1822, enclosing the proces-verbal of
the conference of December 2, ibid.; Stewart to Canning, separate: secret and confi-
dential, Verona, Dec. 5, 1822, ibid.; Metternich to Stewart, Verona, Dec. 3, 1822,
ibid.; La Tour to Stewart, Verona, Dec. 3, 1822, ibid.
Chateaubriand and La Ferronnays expressed satisfaction with the arrange-

ment, and Stewart manifested pleasure that the army of occupation was
diminishing and would soon cease to exist. The official protocol was signed
at the second general conference on Italian affairs, December 5, by Metter-
nich, LebzeItern, Hatzfeldt, Nesselrode, Tatischev, and La Tour. Stewart
also signed this and other protocols, but he put a note after his name,
stating he was not authorized to enter into discussions. Having observed
these diplomatic formalities, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia signed
on December 14 the definitive convention which set forth the details of the
evacuation.32
Had the French delegates at Verona known the agreement was essentially
a British piece, they might not have been so pleased. Mettemich, being well-
aware of French hostility to Austrian influence in Italy, avoided all conver-
sation on Italian affairs with the French ministers. Not until December 1,
1822, did he break his long silence by informing La Ferronnays that the
Piedmontese problem had been settled. Even then he averred that he would
have preferred, like the French cabinet, to begin the evacuation immediately,
but that the King of Sardinia and the Emperor of Austria had decided
otherwise. 33 The important role of Wellington in these negotiations was
kept secret, though it was almost the only concrete achievement of his
diplomacy at the Congress.
3. The Evacuation of Naples
The white haired, septuagenarian Ferdinand I considered Austrian bayonets

necessary to prop up his insecure throne, yet the cost of maintaining an
army of 52,000 was ruining the economy of the kingdom and undermining
the absolute government it was supposed to protect. The annual deficit
had reached 1,500,000 ducats (c. $ 3,375,000), and taxation was so heavy
it could not be increased. These dangers constituted the horns of the dilem-
ma inherent in the corrupt and tyrannical absolutism of Naples. But though
the king would not do without his expensive Austrian guard, he did request
a reduction of its size and cost. 34
At Verona, Prince Alvaro Ruffo, the Neapolitan premier, declared that
52 Stewart to Canning, Nos. 1, 3,6, and 9, Verona, Dec. 3, 5, 10, and 13, 1822, ibid.;
protocol of the conference of December 5, 1822, ibid.; Boisiecomte, A.A.E., 722, 10;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 612·613.
33 Ibid., p. 547.
34 Hamilton to the Foreign Office, No. 57, Naples, Sept. 1,1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54;
Serre to Villele, Naples, Sept. 26, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, VI, 491; Schroeder,
Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 152·153.
his country could no longer support Austrian troops on the wartime basis
established by the Convention of Naples, October 18, 182l. If the cost of
maintenance were not decreased from eleven million ducats to six million,
it would be necessary to suspend payments. To investigate the state of
Neapolitan finances and to make recommendations regarding the army of
occupation, Mettemich appointed a special fact-finding commission com-
posed of Count Karl Ludwig Ficquelmont, Austrian minister at Naples, and
Count Andreas von Mercy of the finance ministry. Their report confirmed
that Ruffo's statement indeed was true and that to relieve this distressing
situation, the occupying garrison should be reduced in size and placed on
a peacetime footing. Notwithstanding the advice of his own commission,
which was warmly seconded by Count Johann Philipp Stadion, the Austrian
finance minister, Mettemich would promise only to shift the maintenance
of the army to a peacetime basis. 3D
The affairs of Naples were considered at Verona in the same secrecy as
those of Sardinia, since Austria wished to prevent her Italian policy from
becoming a subject for debate by a general conference at which France
would surely try to cause trouble. The evacuation of Naples, therefore, was
settled behind the scenes in private negotiations between Mettemich and
Ruffo. But pressure from Austria's continental allies to heed the pleas of
the Neapolitan premier was an important, though tacit, factor in their
conversations. The role of Britain in this affair, however, was minor. Only
after Mettemich already had decided to reduce the military occupation of
Naples did Wellington urge him to decrease it by half. Still the duke
cautioned Stewart that his instructions were the same as at Laibach: not
to interfere in any Italian question (except the occupation of Piedmont),
unless British interests are involved. 36
Although the Convention of Naples did not call for a review of the
military occupation for another eighteen months, Mettemich hoped that
an earlier "disinterested Demonstration" by the Vienna court would have a
salutary effect on the "mischievous Incriminations" circulated about
Austria. At the first general conference on Italian affairs, December 4, he
announced that a definitive report on Naples would be ready in a few days.
The chancellor revealed, however, that the Austrian corps would be reduced
from 52,000 to 35,000 - a reduction of 17,000 - and that Neapolitan troops
would immediately replace the Austrian garrison in Sicily, with the ex-
8& Ibid.; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 9; Viel-Castel; La Restauration, XI, 574-575.

38 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 610; Wellington
to Stewart, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 620; Stewart to Canning, No.1, Verona,
Dec. 3, 1822, P.O., Austria, 120/54.
ception of Palermo. Prince Ruffo, he declared, was trying to secure

Hanoverian and Swiss mercenaries, and Austria hoped France would assist
Naples in this project. Neither Chateaubriand nor La Ferronnays raised
any objections to this proposal. 37
The conference of the five courts and Naples met on December 8, in two
sessions, the first in the morning and the second in the evening. At the
morning session, Ruffo submitted a memoire officially requesting the
reduction of Austrian troops in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to 35,000
and a modification of the Neapolitan governmental structure established
by Article III of the Laibach Protocol of February 20, 1821. The present
organization, he argued, tended to divide the kingdom by maintaining
separate administrations in the two parts of the realm (Naples and Sicily),
each with its own Council of State and corps consultatif (advisory Consulta).
Assuming that a union of the two administrative divisions was desirable,
the premier proposed that the Sicilian Council of State, which met at
Palermo, be moved to Naples to be near the king. The two councils would
continue to meet separately to discuss the government of their respective
districts. When matters of general welfare or common interest arose, the
two bodies could easily combine to form a general assembly. According
to prearrangement, the three eastern powers granted both of Ruffo's re-
quests, and Metternich, Lebzeltern, Hatzfeldt, Nesselrode, Tatischev, and
Ruffo duly signed the prods-verbal. Since neither Britain nor France had
been a party to the Protocol of February 20, 1821, or to the Convention
of Naples, they silently observed this little drama. But after it had ended,
some discussion ensued between Chateaubriand, Metternich, and Ruffo
concerning Sicilian acceptance of the change in administration. The premier
assured the French plenipotentiary that the reorganization would be general-
ly approved throughout the island, except in Palermo whose citizens
"aimed at nothing less than the Separation of the two Countries, and whom
no measure could satisfy." Thus the last vestige of that autonomy which
had been the gift of Lord William Bentinck to Sicily in June 1812 was
erased without a word of protest from Britain. 38
At the evening meeting, December 8, Ruffo presented a note on the hiring
of foreign mercenaries: 3,000 Hanoverians and 3,000 Swiss, who would
replace 6,000 Austrians. A convention with Hanover already had been
37 Ibid.; Stewart to Canning, No.3, Verona, Dec. 5,1822, ibid.

38 Proces-verbal of conference of December 8, ibid.; Stewart to Canning, No.5,
Verona, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid. For a good recent discussion of Bentinck's work in
Sicily, see Harold Acton, The Bourbons of Naples, 1734-1825 (London, 1956), pp.
580-626.
signed but not ratified. In addition to these German troops, the king was
anxious to hire some Swiss regiments so that he would have in his service
a foreign corps which by its nature was impervious to local "party spirit."
Would the allied courts, therefore, support Naples in her negotiations with
the cantons? The great powers readily complied with this request, and
France, in particular, "promised the most active support ... for a negoti-
ation whose success would facilitate the evacuation of the Neapolitan states
by Austrian forces." 39
The definitive convention for the withdrawal of Austrian soldiers from
Naples (like the similar treaty with Sardinia), was signed on December 14,
the last day of the Congress. It provided for the recall of 17,000 men in
April 1823 and for the end of the occupation in October 1824. But as this
date approached, the fearful Ferdinand concluded another convention in
May 1824 which extended the occupation for two more years. The death
of the old king on January 4, 1825, however, led to a revision of this ar-
rangement. Francis I, his successor, though a devout absolutist like his
father, desired to relieve the financial burden of his subjects. By the Con-
vention of Milan, May 28, 1825, Austria agreed to reduce her forces in
Naples to only 12,000 in March 1826 in return for a one year extension of
the period of occupation. Not until the end of March 1827 did the last
Austrian regiment leave the kingdom, six years after its arrival. 40
To Metternich the evacuation of Naples was anathema. The security of
the polyglot Habsburg Monarchy, he believed, depended upon the repose
of the peninsula, but only Austrian troops in the Two Sicilies could assure
this pacification. So long as they were quartered at foreign expense, more-
over, the imperial treasury would be relieved of the cost of maintenance.
For purely Austrian interests, therefore, Metternich resisted to the end the
evacuation of Naples. That he reluctantly yielded was due to the opposition
of Austria's allies and to the insistence of Luigi de Medici, the Neapolitan
finance minister who became premier in 1823, that the foreign occupation
was "an intolerable burden" which would force him to float another loan and
thus to increase still further the kingdom's "terrifying deficit." Distrustful
of Medici, whom he suspected of being a Francophile and a Liberal, Metter-
nich in January 1825 sent Count Anton Apponyi, Austrian minister at
Rome, on a special mission to Naples to ascertain the policies of the new
39 Note of Ruffo on Swiss Troops, Verona, Dec. 8, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 583-584.
40 Ibid., pp. 581, 613; Francis I to Prince of Castelcicala, Neapolitan minister at
Paris, Naples, Feb. 2, 1825, in Ruggero Moscati, II regno delle Due Sicilie e [,Austria:
Documenti dal marzo 1821 al novembre 1830 (Naples, 1937), I, 254-258; Schroeder,
Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 154; Acton, Bourbons of Naples, p. 694.
king and to investigate the economic condition of his realm. Notwithstand-

ing that both Apponyi and Carl Rothschild agreed with the premier's ap-
praisal of Neapolitan finances, the chancellor and the Emperor Francis did
not resign themselves to the terms of the Convention of Milan until De-
cember 1826. Even the withdrawal of 17,000 troops in April 1823 did not
lead to the anticipated reduction of maintenance costs, since Austria
continued to keep the occupation army on a wartime footing. It does not
appear, however, that Mettemich deliberately reneged on his promise to
Ruffo at Verona. Apparently, Field Marshal Count Heinrich von Belle-
garde, President of the Austrian Council of War, and General Count Johann
Marie Frimont, commander of the occupation army in Naples, convinced
that this question fell within their special jurisdiction, had decided the
troops would remain on a wartime basis. The chancellor simply could not
budge them from this determination. 41
France, Russia, the Papacy, Sardinia, and Tuscany, all shared a desire
to undermine Habsburg influence in Italy and to contain its advance. France
had cause to fear Austrian domination of a state on her frontier (Sardinia),
and Austro-French rivalry in the peninsula stretched back some three
centuries to the days of Maximilian I and Charles VIII. The Papacy, Sar-
dinia, and Tuscany opposed Austria to protect their sovereignty. But Britain
had no such interests at stake. Canning apparently felt a genuine sympathy
for the Italian states which were bullied and bled by Austria. It cost John
Bull nothing to say a word in their behalf to the Vienna cabinet, and such
intercession would enhance British prestige in Italy. Sardinians and Nea-
politans should understand that England, though more discreet in her
actions than France, was no less their friend. The new foreign secretary,
moreover, was more sensitive than Castlereagh ever became to public
opinion, and the cause of the Italians had been popularized in England by
Byron and Shelley. British policy toward Italian affairs was, in sum, an
extension of Canning's Liberal Toryism. 42
41 Mettemich to Apponyi, Vienna, Jan. 25, 1825, Moscati, Due Sicilie e I'Austria.
II, 258-265; Apponyi to Mettemich, Naples, Feb. 16, 1825, ibid .• pp. 271-274; cf.
ibid., I, 272-289, 295-296; II, 228-236 and 290-292; Acton, Bourbons of Naples. pp.
699-700; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 153-155. After the Congress of
Verona, Ruffo returned to Vienna, "his spiritual home," as Neapolitan ambassador.
42 Trevelyan, British History, p. 207. In December 1825, Metternich complained
of "subversive English propaganda" in Naples. Mettemich to Ficquelmont, Vienna,
Dec. 21, 1825, cited by Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 154.
4. Metternich's Italian League (Lega Italica)
The confederation of Italy under Austrian control was a Metternichian

dream that never became reality. Since the Congress of Vienna, the chan-
cellor had harbored the ambition of fonning an Italian league similar to the
loosely-knit Gennan Bund. His policy in this, as in other Italian questions,
was the "inevitable concomitant" of the multinational nature of the Habs-
burg Empire. "If Italy and Gennany caught cold," Schroeder euphemis-
tically explains, "Austria would die of pneumonia." A defensive con-
federation of Italian princes under Austrian primacy would at once serve
the triple purpose of repressing revolutionaries, resisting French influence,
and thwarting the unification of the peninsula. At Laibach, the expected
opposition of France to the project, the hostile reaction of the Italian states
(motivated by the spirit of particularism), and Russia's refusal to support
it without French approval, all combined to deter Metternich from officially
raising this issue. At Verona, however, he revived the long-cherished plan,
though he prudently resorted to subtle means of introducing it. A direct
approach, he knew, would immediately "terrify spirits." 43
Once more as at Laibach, the chancellor used a "Commission of Inquiry"
as a stalking-horse. In recommending this idea to the tsar, he argued that
such a commission, patterned after the famous committee on un-autocratic
activities established at Mainz by the Carlsbad Decrees (September 20,
1819), would constitute "a center of infonnation and investigation" of
revolutionary plots. Althought Alexander, suspicious of Austrian ambitions
in the peninsula and still committed to preserving the independence of small
states, had rejected this proposal at Laibach, he now was tired of discussing
Italian problems and "was disposed to accept without debate or examination
every proposition and argument based on hatred of revolution and the
necessity of erecting barriers against it." 44 Taking advantage of the tsar's
43 Schroeder, "Metternich Studies," lMH, XXXIII, 253-254; Schroeder, Metter-
nich's Diplomacy, pp. 9, 24n, 127-128, 254-255; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,
570-571; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. parI., VII, 198; Hennan, Metternich, p. 113. For
two scholarly studies of the Italian League based on Austrian and Italian sources,
see: Antonio M. Bettanini, "Un disegno di confederazione italiana nella politica
internazionale della restaurazione," Studi di storia dei trattati e politica internazionale
(Padua, 1939), pp. 3-50, and Karl Grossmann, "Metternichs Plan eines italienischen
Bundes," Historische Blatter, No.4 (1931), 37-76. While Grossmann, in contrast to
Bettanini, criticizes Sardinia and defends Austria, both authorities agree that the
proposed Italian confederation stemmed from Austrian raison d'etat and political
necessity and that the Italian states, especially Sardinia, opposed it for similar
reasons.
44 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 566; cf. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy,
pp. 127-128; Metternich, "Apercru sur les affaires d'Italie et sur quelques remMes it
mood, Metternich painted for him a "most fearful" picture of the state of
Italy and the activities of the Carbonari. Thus presented, Alexander made
no objections to the scheme for a central investigation committee. 45
The chancellor next discussed his project with Count La Tour, who
agreed to support it after Metternich had dropped his insistence that Milan
should be the seat of the information center and had suggested Piacenza in
Parma for this purpose. On November 23, the Austrian minister submitted
his plan to Giuseppe Cardinal Spina as the "only effective means of striking
against the Carbonari." But the Papal nuncio, whose mission to the Con-
gress Metternich had attempted to forestall, was unimpressed by this argu-
ment. The cardinal protested that the proposal would create "grave in-
conveniences" for the Italian courts, since a joint committee of their dele-
gates would jeopardize the confidential and delicate communications which
each exchanged with Austria. That same day, when La Tour spoke to
Spina in behalf of the Commission of Inquiry, the nuncio raised similar
objections to it. 46
Informed that Metternich had renewed the gambit begun at Laibach, the
Roman curia ordered Spina to reject it in the most positive terms in order
to restrict Austrian influence in the peninsula and to preserve the inde-
pendence of the Holy See. Ercole Cardinal Consalvi, Papal secretary of
state, declared that it was beneath the dignity and character of the Holy
Father to sit on a police commission. The Italian governments, moreover,
were capable of defending themselves, but such a project "would weaken
them ... by placing them under the apparent tutelage of a power so un-
popular and detested as Austria." To these arguments, Spina added that
hatred of Austria was one of the principal causes of the troubles which
beset Italy. Papal diplomacy at Verona clearly indicates that both Con salvi
and Spina were motivated by the traditional antagonism of the Vatican to
German hegemony in Italy and by a common devotion to the doctrine of
neutrality with regard to the political alliances and alignments of the age.
The Papal secretary, who was virtually governor of Rome, successfully
parried all of Metternich's moves to draw the Holy See into his "system"
and staunchly defended the principle of non-intervention. 47
employer," Laibach, May 15, 1821, cited by ibid., p. 127; Hauranne, Rist. du govt.
pari., VII, 198.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 572; Hauranne, Rist. du govt. pari., VII, 198; Silvio Furlani, "La Santa
Sede e il Congresso di Verona," Nuova rivista storica, XXXIX (1955), 465-491, and
XL (1956), 14-47. The best source for Consalvi's foreign policy during this period is
the Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec Ie Prince Clement de Metter-
At the nuncio's request, La Ferronnays, French ambassador to Russia,
obtained an audience with the tsar and warmly seconded Papal opposition
to Metternich's project for a central Italian commission of secret police.
Thus warned, Alexander promised to examine carefully the Austrian pro-
posal. On La Ferronnays' advice, Spina, too, sought and gained an interview
with the Russian emperor. To correct the distorted picture of the political
situation in Italy which the chancellor had given the tsar, Spina cautioned:
Your Majesty must not believe all he hears about the carbonari, their number,
the impossibility of stopping them. In the states of the Holy Father, at Bologna,
for example, we have quarantined them. 48
Under the impact of the joint French and Papal protests, Alexander
reversed his position on the Commission of Inquiry and threw his influence
into the balance against it. Britain, too, disapproved of the scheme, but she
maintained a discreet silence. 49
Among Italian ministers, therefore, it was the Papal delegate who first
defied Austria by attacking a policy which, under the pretext of fighting
revolution, tended in reality to reduce the Italian states to the status of
satellites. So effectively did the cardinal press his assault that the Duke of
Modena, "the intimate confidant of all the projects of the Vienna Cabinet,"
accused him of favoring the revolutionary party. In refuting this charge,
Spina anathematized "the sometimes cruel absolutism of that petty prince,
whose ultra-conservative system was the exaggeration, one could say the
caricature, of that of the Vienna Court." 50
This was fiery language for an Italian statesman, and it was heard with
effect. His colleagues, who had not dared to oppose the Austrian scheme
for a political inquisition, now seeing the battle engaged, took heart. Mansi,
the minister of Lucca, and Corsini, the Tuscan envoy, broke their long
silence and joined La Tour - who had recanted his earlier approval of the
project - in protesting against it. When the penitent Sardinian foreign
minister, now in concert with the Papal nuncio, requested Metternich to give
them in writing the details of his proposed Italian information center, he
appeared willing to accede to their demand but later rejected it. Opposed
by all the states of Italy, except Modena, and deserted in this affair even
by Prussia, the Austrian chancellor came at last to accept the realities of
the situation and abandoned his plan for an Italian league. But undaunted
nich, 1815-1823, ed. Charles van Duerm (Louvain, 1899). E. L. Fischer's Cardinal
Consalvi (Mainz, 1899), is a good biographical study.
48 Quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 566.
49 Ibid., pp. 572-573; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 198.
50 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 566-567; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 45.
by this defeat, Mettemich introduced yet another antirevolutionary measure,

an Italian postal system under Austrian direction, which, however, suffered
the same predictable fate. Angered by the determined opposition of the
Holy See, Sardinia, and Tuscany - which were backed by France and
Russia - the chancellor vented his frustration on Cardinal Spina by ex-
changing bitter recriminations with him.51
At the five-power conference of December 8, Metternich complained
that the Italian states, especially the Papacy, showed "too much apathy and
carelessness in the surveillance of revolutionary machinations." The ad-
monition to institute administrative "reforms," which the eastern courts
had issued at Laibach (May 1821), remained unheeded. To exhort them
to adopt more effective measures for the repression of all liberal political
activities, he proposed a new "Paternal admonition," similar to the Austrian
Laibach circular of May 12, 1821. The conference approved his recom-
mendation and commissioned Lebzeltem to draft the piece de cabinet.
Commenting on this action, La Ferronnays, who astutely perceived that
what Metternich really wanted was a right of supervision over all the govern-
ments of the peninsula, declared that France had no objections to giving
useful advice to the Italian princes, but that she would oppose any effort to
infringe upon the independence of the courts of Italy. The chancellor made
no direct response to this warning, but quickly brought the meeting to a close.
After scheduling another allied ministers' meeting for the morning of De-
cember 11 to discuss LebzeItern's circular and announcing that the first
general conference of all the Italian states would assemble later that same
day (the 11 th), he adjourned the colloquy.52
As the meeting broke up, La Ferronnays approached Metternich and
again spoke to him of the alarm which "the idea of a commission of inquiry
had inspired in Cardinal Spina and the ministers of Tuscany and Lucca."
Exasperated by French interference in the Austrian sphere of influence and
provoked by the stout resistance of the Holy See to his projects, the chan-
cellor retorted with a bitter attack on the Papacy as "a government without
order, regularity, or solidarity." The maladministration of priests and the
corruption of the Papal States, he declared, had created a situation which
was at once burdensome to the people who had to support it and dangerous
51 Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 198; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 573;
Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 225; Furlani, "La questione postale italiana
al Congresso di Verona," Nuova rivista storica, XXX (1948),36-49.
52 Proces-verbal of the five-power conference, Verona, December 8, 1822, F.O.,
Austria, 120/54; Stewart to Canning, No.5, Verona, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid.; Hauranne,
Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 198; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 584-585; Schroeder,
Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 125.
to Italy, "because it protected ... the carbonari whose center was established
on pontifical territory." When informed of these accusations, Spina em-
phatically denied them and countered by asserting "the Italian population,
almost without distinction of sect or party, detested Austria and groaned
from the subjugation in which she held Italy." If Austria desired to vilify
the pontifical government, he charged, it was because she coveted the
Marches and Legations (Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna).53
The ministers of the five great powers met again on Wednesday morning,
December 11, to hear Metternich read the circular which Austria, Prussia,
and Russia planned to communicate to their legations at the Italian courts.
Commenting on recent events in the peninsula, this piece de cabinet declared
that the revolutionary fires which had seared Naples and Piedmont could
not have spread so rapidly had not highly inflammable materials fed the
flames. It appeared obvious, therefore, that military occupation alone
could not guarantee the permanent peace of Italy; the Italian states them-
selves must reform their administrative systems. The allied sovereigns had
no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of independent states, but
wished only to indicate the similarity of interests which all powers, both
great and small, had in preserving the tranquillity of Europe. As it was the
responsibility of "all members of the great European family" to protect
Italy from exposure to new troubles, so it was clearly the duty of the eastern
courts to give advice and direction to the Italian governments. After the
reading of Lebzeltern's circular, Prussia and Russia accepted it without
difficulty, though Hatzfeldt complained that it was not severe enough.54
At 9:00 P.M. that same day, the ministers of the "Twelve Cabinets,"
which included all the courts of Italy, assembled to hear the resolutions
which announced the evacuation of Sardinia and the reduction of the army
of occupation in Naples, and to receive the new "admonition" to institute
administrative reforms, a solemn obligation which the Laibach conference
had imposed upon them. Most of the Italian ministers, however, were out-
raged at being summoned to hear this latest reprimand. Spina and Corsini,
indeed, announced their intention to reply to it. For this purpose, as well
as for reviewing each government's long awaited program for combating
any political agitation which threatened to undermine the monarchial
1I3 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 585-586; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII,
199. At the Congress of Vienna, Austria had restored to the Pope the Legations and
the Marches (Ancona, Fenno, and Treviso), but had maintained garrisons in Ferrara
and Comacchio, despite Consalvi's protests.
edifice, another plenary session of the Italian congress was scheduled for
the evening of Friday, December 13,iw
The results of the second conference of the twelve cabinets, which
climaxed the discussions on Italy, were disappointing to Metternich. The
Italian princes protested a desire to act in concert with the autocratic powers
in maintaining the tranquillity of the peninsula, but their declarations on
"reforms and ameliorations," couched in vague and sonorous language,
thinly veiled their resistance to any further Austrian encroachment upon
their independence. Cardinal Spina and Prince Corsini were more interested
in defending their respective governments against the allegations of the
Austrian circular of December 11 than in presenting programs of adminis-
trative reforms, though each supported a policy of moderate and intelligent
absolutism. The most enlightened declaration was that of Count Neipperg
of Parma which reported: (1) the publication of a new civil and criminal
code, (2) the establishment of a Council of State, (3) the creation of a
municipal system which "gave to the cities greater freedom in the manage-
ment of local affairs," (4) the founding of a college for the nobility, and
(5) the sponsoring of public works designed to improve interior navigation.
By contrast, the program outlined by Marquis Filippo de Molza, the foreign
minister of Modena, was completely reactionary. After thanking the allied
sovereigns for their efforts to assure the repose of Italy, Molza contended
that this goal could be achieved only through the adoption of such measures
as those already implemented by Francis IV in his duchy, viz.: (1) the
promotion of religion and the clergy as a means of strengthening the throne,
(2) the exaltation of the nobility, "that indispensable support of mon-
archies," (3) the extention of the exercise of autocratic authority, (4) the
amendment of laws against lese-majeste in order to facilitate conviction and
to abolish judicial pardons for this crime, (5) the reform of the system of
public instruction by restricting the number of students who would be
allowed an advanced education and by educating those of diverse social
classes in separate colleges, instead of mustering all in one great university,
so that each student could receive an education commensurate with his
"condition" (i.e., social status), and (6) the surveillance of the press and the
55 Ibid., pp. 589-590; Proces-verbal of the conference of December 11, 1822, F.O.,
Austria, 120/54; Stewart to Canning, No.8, Verona, Dec. 12, 1822, ibid.; entries for
Wed., Dec. 11 and Fri., Dec. 13, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 119, 120; Schroeder,
Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 226. Since the session of December 11 was the first
attended by all of the Italian ministers, it is called, "The First General Conference of
the Twelve Cabinets at Verona." The twelve cabinets were: Austria (including Lom-
bardy-Venetia), Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Lucca, Modena, Naples, Parma,
Sardinia, Tuscany, and the Holy See.
3uppression of injurious writings. But these "reforms," Molza observed, will
never produce the desired results so long as Italy is exposed to the "per-
nicious influence" of the revolutions of Spain and Portugal. The eastern
powers accepted these declarations without comment, except for a general
reaffirmation of their sincere interest in the destinies of the Italian states and
a promise to follow carefully the development of the program each prince
had adopted.l;6
After December 8, Mettemich abandoned his plans for an Italian postal
union and a central police commission as steps toward the founding of an
Italian league under Austrian primacy. The general conferences of the 11th
and 13th are significant in that none of these projects is even mentioned
during their lengthy proceedings. It is not entirely accurate, therefore, to
dismiss the declarations of December 13 as meaningless, because they
served at least to frustrate the chancellor's Italian schemes. The strange
political alliance of France, Russia, the Holy See, Sardinia, and Tuscany
had triumphed over Austria. The contention of Bettanini and Schroeder
that Metternich's plan for an Italian league collapsed against Sardinian
opposition, supported by France and Russia, is true enough in general, but
at the Congress of Verona in particular, the Papacy, backed by France,
took the initiative in thwarting this design.57 It was Spina, not La Tour, who
belled the cat.
5. The Sardinian Waldenses
In pursuance of a policy begun by Oliver Cromwell, Canning on October 13

instructed Wellington to obtain the assurance of the King of Sardinia that
the Waldenses (Vaudois) of his realm would receive toleration, good treat-
ment, and respect for their privileges. Subsequently the duke spoke to La
Tour about the welfare of the Protestant community, recommending it to
the special protection of his Sardinian Majesty. In broaching the subject on
November 12, Wellington confided to La Tour that the London cabinet was
anxious that Charles Felix should enjoy a noble reputation and that English-
men should think him tolerant and kind toward "their Protestant brethren"
who were his subjects. The foreign minister received this recommendation
with apparent good grace and pledged that everything should be done to
1i6 Proces-verbal of the conference of December 13, 1822, with attached decla-
rations, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Stewart to Canning, No.9, Verona, Dec. 13, 1822, ibid.,
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 609-611. Metternich privately condemned all of the
declarations except Molza's, which he praised as "the only one worth anything."
57 Cf. Schroeder, "Metternich Studies," IMH, XXXIII, 248-249.
assure the Vaudois of the king's "paternal affection" for them. He admitted
that an edict favorable to the Waldenses had been signed, but not published,
and promised that it would be promulgated as soon as the king returned to
Turin. As the interview ended, La Tour requested Wellington to inform
William Hill, the British minister at Turin, of their conversation and to
invite him to mention the Waldenses, if ever he should think it necessary.58
But these were empty promises. To Charles Felix, a devout son of the
Roman Communion, the solution to the Vaudois problem was simple: if
they wished to avoid persecution, they had only to become Catholics. As a
nationalist, he resented foreign interference and forbade his subjects to
seek it. His policy toward the Vaudois, therefore, continued to be severely
repressive, imposing upon them numerous disabilities which were not
removed until Charles Albert's Edict of Emancipation (February 17, 1848)
granted them complete religious toleration and full civil rights. As a conse-
quence of this dolorous epilogue, British interest in the welfare of the
Sardinian Waldenses did not end with Wellington's petition on their behalf
at the Congress of Verona. During the first half of the nineteenth century,
Englishmen gave of their talent and treasure to assist these poor people of
the Alpine Valleys of Savoy. Dr. William S. Gilly, an English clergyman who
visited them in 1823, founded a Waldensian college at La Torre and solicited
help for them through his writings, especially by his book, Narrative of an
Excursion to the Mountains of Piedmont and Researches among the
Vaudois (London, 1824). Another Englishman, the one-legged Colonel John
Charles Beckwith who lived among them for thirty-five years, founded no
less than 120 schools and in 1849 built a Vaudois church in Turin. He died
in La Torre in 1862. These and other benefactors are still revered by the
Sardinian Waldenses.59
6. The Swiss Confederation and Piedmontese Refugees
At the conference of December 5 between the five powers and Sardinia,

La Tour, at the urging of Metternich, presented a note on the Piedmontese
revolutionaries to whom the Swiss cantons had granted asylum. These
58 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Oct. 15, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 358; Wel-
lington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 533.
59 Walter F. Adeney, "Waldenses," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed.
James Hastings, XII, 672-673; Hugh Macmillan, "A Glimpse of the Waldensian
Valleys," British and Foreign Evangelical Review, XXXIII (1884) 63-67; for two
critical studies of the Waldenses, see Jean-Armand Chabrand, Vaudois et Protestants
des Alps (Grenoble, 1886), which contains many hitherto unpublished documents,
and Emilio Comba, Histoire des Vaudois (Paris, 1901).
conspirators, the foreign minister charged, were sowing seeds of discontent

and sedition not only in Sardinia but in all adjoining countries, especially
France. His Sardinian Majesty already had requested the Confederation
government to expell these "delinquents" from its territory, and Bern
seemed disposed to accede to this demand, but no foreign minister of a
bordering state would issue them passports. The Alliance, La Tour con-
cluded, should adopt some measure to remove the menace to Switzerland's
neighbors. At his request, however, the Sardinian petition was treated as a
confidential communication and kept from the protocol. 60
Following the presentation of La Tour's memoire, an intense debate
ensued. Metternich denounced the Swiss cantons as "a foyer for all the
intriguing and mischievous spirits who had been banished from different
states." Supporting the view that the Alliance should intervene in this ques-
tion, he proposed that the allied courts should create a fund to finance the
transportation of these refugees to Hamburg or some other port, whence
they could sail to America or elsewhere. Until they were aboard ship, they
would, of course, be kept under police surveillance. Although Metternich
did not dare admit it at Verona, he really wanted to extradite some of these
conspirators to stand trial. Prussia and Russia promised to act in concert
with Austria and Sardinia, but Britain and France demurred. Stewart con-
fessed that, in the absence of instructions, he did not think his government
would participate in such a project nor contribute to a fund to implement
it. Chateaubriand replied simply that he would have to take this issue ad
referendum. Finally, all agreed to discuss the problem further at a future
meeting and to delete from the protocol of December 5 any notice of what
had passed. 61
Returning to this issue on December 14, the last day of the Congress,
La Tour complained of the futility of previous negotiations to obtain the
expulsion of Piedmontese rebels from their Swiss sanctuary. Their removal,
he declared, was absolutely necessary to the security of Sardinia. Austria,
Prussia, and Russia again promised their good offices to support the Sar-
dinian demand, but Metternich did not repeat his earlier request for a
refugee fund. Convinced that the granting of asylum to "Jacobins" consti-
tuted a moral violation of Swiss neutrality, the chancellor tried a different
tack. Taking advantage of the rush and confusion which attended the close
of the Congress, he inserted into the proces-verbal a principle which no
constitutional state could admit:
60 Stewart to Canning, No.4, Verona, Dec. 5, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.

61 Ibid.; Metternich to Binder, Laibach, May 14, 1821, cited by Schroeder, Metter-
nich's Diplomacy, p. 227n; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 580.
that any European state, placed in a position analogous to Sardinia's, which

judged its security compromised by. . . individuals condemned and banished
for political crimes, would be justified in taking the same measures and asking
the same assistance from the Allied Powers. 62
La Ferronnays and Caraman, their attention focused on other questions,
did not perceive that this principle controverted the French system of
government. Thus they accepted the proposal that the three eastern powers,
through their ambassadors in Paris, should concert with the French cabinet
on the most effective means of redressing Sardinia's just grievance against
Switzerland. This commitment was, of course, disavowed by the French
government.611
The purpose behind Metternich's subtle maneuver was the establishment
of a system of action that would be applicable to all similar cases, especially
that of Austria. La Tour's petition, which he had instigated, provided a
convenient pretext for another attempt at muzzling the liberal press in
Switzerland and Germany which threatened to foment unrest among
Austria's minority nationalities. At Verona and afterward, the chancellor
not only attacked the freedom of the press and the presses of constitutional
regimes, but also condemned the existence of this form of government in
Europe. No longer did he have to contend with the opposition of Russia,
for the tsar now gave his moral support to all Austrian efforts to restrain
the development of the constitutional system in Germany. Backed by Russia
and Prussia, Metternich's coercive policy toward the Swiss cantons finally
bore limited results when the Diet agreed to place moderate curbs on the
freedom of the press and the admission of aliens and to deport some Ger-
man and Italian revolutionaries. The Confederation, however, stubbornly
refused to renounce its traditional policy of granting asylum to political
refugees, and after the failure of the revolutions of 1830, a considerable
number of Germans, Italians, and Poles found sanctuary within its
borders. 64
62 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 398-399.
63 Ibid.; Proces-verbal of the conference of December 14, 1822, P.O., Austria,
120/54; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 611-612. Chateaubriand had left Verona
on the 13th.
64 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 411; Paul Schweizer, Geschichte der schweizerischen
Neutralitiit (Frauenfeld, 1895), pp. 659-687; Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Liberty:
The Swiss Example (London, 1956), pp. 57, 68, 75-76; Edgar Bonjour, Swiss Neu-
trality, Its History and Meaning (London, 1946), pp. 27-28; cf. Arnold Winkler,
"Metternich und die Schweiz," Zeitschrift fur schweizerische Geschichte, VII (1927),
60-116 and 127-163, and Werner Naf, "Die Schweiz im 'System' Metternichs," in
Gesamtdeutsche Vergangenheit: Festschrift fur Heinrich von Srbik (Munich, 1938),
pp. 255-265. Winkler's scholarly monograph is more critical of Metternich's Swiss
policy than Naf's brief account.
THE IT ALlAN CONGRESS 215
7. The Knights of Malta
As the conference of December 14 was about to adjourn, Mettemich

presented a memoire on behalf of Count Achille Fran90is de Jouffroy, an
editor of the ultra-Royalist Gazette de France. requesting the restitution
of the properties of the Knights of Malta. This predominantly French order,
known also as the Knights of st. John of Jerusalem, had been expelled from
Malta by Napoleon in June 1798. while he was en route to Egypt. But the
French in turn had surrendered the strategic island to Britain in July 1800.
The Peace of Amiens (March 25. 1802), indeed had provided for the
restoration of Malta to the Knights, but the British government, encouraged
by the Maltese themselves, had refused to evacuate it and in 1813 had
recognized them as British SUbjects. Jouffroy's request, therefore, was ri-
diculous, and it would never have come before the Congress but for the
count's friendship with Gentz. To grant it would have required a revision
of the Treaty of Vienna which had confirmed Britain's possession of Malta.
Even the Maltese, fearful that the return of the Knights would be followed
by the reestablishment of French influence, objected to the Order's resto-
ration. The great powers, needless to say, gave this petition short shrift; no
sooner had they heard it than they rejected it without dissent and without
discussion. 65
8. The Aldobrandini Appeal
During the closing days of the Congress, the great powers received yet
another petition, a purely personal plea from Prince Francesco Borghese
Aldobrandini, requesting the restitution of the salt works (brine springs) at
Dtirkheim and Kreuznach in the Rhenish Palatinate. Already the prince on
March 2, 1822, had presented a similar appeal to Louis XVIII. This
problem, too, stemmed from the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (June
9, 1815), which had transferred Dlirkheim, fifteen miles northwest of Spires,
to King Maximilian I (Max Joseph) of Bavaria, and Kreuznach, nine miles
south of Bingen, to Grand Duke Louis X of Hesse. The reclamation noted
that both the congresses of Aix-Ia-Chapelle and Laibach had "recommend-
ed" the return of these properties, but that these favorable judgments had
not been implemented. The issue was a delicate one because the continental
courts wished neither to antagonize the German rulers who were the new
owners nor to offend the ancient and eminent Aldobrandini family, who
65 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 399; Viel-Castel, La Restauration. XI, 612.

had given the world Pope Clement VIII (1592-1605). Consequently, they
evaded responsibility in the case by transferring it to the ambassadorial
conference in Paris for examination. These ambassadors, of course, did not
find that the prince's petition was sufficient reason to revise the Treaty of
Vienna. 66
9. A Retrospect
Even as Metternich opposed armed intervention in the Near East and Spain,
where Habsburg interests were only remotely involved, he urged its use in
Italy, an area within Austria's sphere of influence. Notwithstanding the
invasion and occupation of Naples and Piedmont in 1821, the chancellor's
Italian policy was executed with restraint, though it was not always real-
istically conceived. Commenting on this policy in 1838, Chateaubriand
observed in retrospect:
Austria applauded herself too much for her success against the revolutionaries
of Italy; her fears caused her to see conspirators where there was only the pro-
gressive movement of the ideas of a nation impatient of a foreign yoke, and
deprived of her nationality by conquest. One could not think like M. de Metter-
nich, when he saw passing through Verona cages of order and happiness which
conveyed to the Spielberg Silvio Pellico with all the most enlightened and dis-
tinguished men that Italy possessed. 67
This indictment, however, is neither accurate nor fair, for, while the chan-
cellor occasionally sanctioned reactionary acts, his Italian policy usually was
one of moderation, amnesty, and administrative reform. In Naples, indeed,
he successfully intervened to stop Canosa's arbitrary arrests, whippings,
and other illegal measures better suited "to ruin than to promote the King's
interests." Thanks to Count Ficquelmont's protests, hundreds of political
prisoners were saved from execution and many even released from prison,
a general amnesty toward the Carbonari was decreed, and finally, on July
28, 1821, the brutal Canosa was forced to resign.68 Metternich's treatment
66 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 411; Prince Francesco Borghese Aldobrandini,

Requere de . .. prince Aldobrandini au Roi, demandant l'intervention du gouverne-
ment franr;ais pour lui faire restituer la propriete des salines de Creuznach et de
Durkeim, etc., Paris, March 2, 1822. In 1806, when Hesse-Darmstadt entered the
Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon raised Landgrave Louis X to the rank of grand
duke, a title which the Congress of Vienna confirmed in June 1815, upon that
Rhenish state's admission to the German Bund. Thereafter the former Landgraviate
of Hesse-Darmstadt was known simply as the Grand Duchy of Hesse.
67 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 67-68.
68 Acton, Bourbons of Naples, pp. 689-692. Prince Antonio di Canosa was the
Neapolitan minister of police.
of Italy during the Congress Era was, in sum, neither tyrannical nor
capricious; moreover, he had no aggressive designs on Italian territory, the
annexation of Milan having been motivated by a desire for a buffer zone
against Italian nationalism. In the peninsula, no less than in Gennany, the
chancellor wanted to preserve peace and the status quo as a means of safe-
guarding Austria's security (one might even say, slumber). But the achieve-
ment of this ambition ultimately eluded his grasp.69
Mettemich's diplomacy on Italian issues at the Congress of Verona did
not reveal his political acumen at its best. He was mistaken in believing the
Zeitgeist favorable for the adoption of his plans for a postal union and a
central police commission, the latter as the first step toward the establish-
ment of an Italian league under Austrian leadership. These projects fell
victim to the Scylla of Italian particularism and the Charybdis of French
and Russian opposition. In the face of the same combination, he abandoned
his efforts to remove Charles Albert from the Sardinian succession and
granted concessions which promoted the evacuation of Piedmont and
Naples. The chancellor's ability to accept failures and modifications indi-
cates that basically his was not a policy of unrelenting reaction nor in-
flexible legitimacy. Finally, his relations with the Italian princes reveal
another dilemma: his inability to persuade them to rule wisely or to penn it
another power (e.g., France) to try.
Neither the rationale of Mettemich's policy nor the deterrent of Austrian
military power could countervail the rising strength of Italian liberalism and
nationalism. Within a decade, the peninsula again fell victim to a revolution-
ary contagion. The subsequent repression conferred only temporary relief,
and by 1861, Habsburg hegemony had succumbed to the Risorgimento.
If the historical process is indeed evolutionary, the Austrian chancellor did
not have at his command the resources necessary to tum the trend. At last
the Italians rose and responded triumphantly to the ancient challenge of
Petrarch's ltalia Mia "to cast down the burden of a Nordic fury."
69 Cf. R. John Rath, Fall 0/ the Napoleonic Kingdom 0/ Italy, 1814 (New York,
1941), and his article, "L'amministrazione austricaca nel Lombardo-Veneto (1814-
1821)," Archivio economico deli'uni/icazione itaiiana, ser. I, IX (1959), fasc. 1;
Schroeder, "Metternich Studies," IMH, XXXIII, 249-251.
CHAPTER VIII
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM
There is a golden maxim, which applies as well to

polities as ... to morals - 'Do unto others as you would
that others should do unto you.' But to England, I
should say, 'Do unto others what you have made
others do unto you.' - Canning, April 14, 18231
1. The Austrian War Debt
After the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain found herself in a position analo-
gous to that of the United States following World War I: it was the first
time either nation was faced with the necessity of pressing an ally for repay-
ment of loans granted during a common struggle. In both instances the
debtor states were too exhausted and impecunious to repay fully their war
debts. In the century between the congresses of Vienna and Versailles, the
tables were turned on England, and as she passed from a creditor to a debtor
nation, she confronted the United States with the same argument that
Austria once had presented to her.
Although the British cabinet during the years after Waterloo was beset
with major international problems created by revolutions in South America,
Spain, Italy, and Greece, it did not neglect the relatively minor issue of the
Austrian debt. The issue was new for Britain, and one which the Tory
ministry was reluctant to press, since it threatened to strain Anglo-Austrian
relations at a time (1821-1822) when Britain was seeking an entente with
Austria to restrain Russia from declaring war on the Porte. But faced by
domestic discontent, Castlereagh yielded to public opinion and followed a
policy which he personally believed was inimical to the national interest.
On May 4, 1795, before the collapse of the First Coalition against France,
Baron Franz de Paula Thugut, the Austrian chancellor, had negotiated a
loan of £ 4,600,000 from Britain; on April 29, 1797, he contracted a second
loan of £ 1,620,000. These two loans comprised the Austrian debt. The
granting of loans in these instances was a departure from Britain's tra-
ditional policy of subsidizing her allies, but the Austrian government had
preferred loans as more consistent with Habsburg dignity. From 1795 to
1798, Austria paid interest on the first debt, but after 1798, Britain paid the
1 Canning in the Commons, Apr. 14, 1823, ParI. Debates, new ser., VIII, 895.
interest on both loans. By 1821 the accumulated interest had increased the
original sum borrowed (£ 6,220,000) to almost £ 14,000,000. By January
1822, the interest alone had reached £ 10,601,955. During the same period
(1798-1822), the interest on the interest amounted to an additional
£ 6,693,935. Thus the total debt in 1822 - capital and interest - was
£ 23,515,890. 2
The British government might have forgiven all or most of this debt had
not the attacks and questions of the Opposition kept the matter before
Parliament after 1816. Castlereagh had raised the question of the debt at
Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), but Metternich had refused to pay it. During 1821
and 1822, largely because of anti-Austrian sentiment in England, pressure
on the ministry to settle this question greatly increased. Austria's sup-
pression of the liberal movements in Naples and Piedmont (1820-21),
bitterly denounced in Britain, fostered the impression that Austrian finances
were in a flourishing condition. The Opposition in Parliament demanded
repayment of the debt and reproached the ministry for failing to secure it.
Surely, if Austria had so much money to spend on armed intervention in
Italy, she could easily repay her just debts. s
Negotiations were renewed in April 1821, but again no progress was made.
Annoyed by the desultory fashion in which Austria conducted these talks,
Castlereagh decided to take up the matter directly with Metternich when the
two met at Hanover in October 1821. Castlereagh knew, of course, that the
resources of the Austrian treasury were insufficient to pay the full amount
of the accumulated debt, but at Hanover he insisted on a token payment.
Metternich, however, refused to recognize either the existence of the debt or
the principle of a money payment. The loan, he declared, had been paid in
full with Austrian blood during the common struggle against Napoleon. 4
2 John Irving, M. P. on special mission, to Count Johann Philipp Stadion, Austrian

finance minister, Vienna, Sept. 21, 1821, F.O., Austria, 120/49; Wellington to Metter-
nich, Verona, Oct. 19, 1822, ibid., 120/54; BFSP, XI (1823-1824), 103; Pari. Debates,
new ser., IV (Jan.-Apr., 1821), 1220; cf. Webster, Castlereagh, p. 401. This section is
based on my article, "Britain and the Austrian War Debt, 1821-1823," The Historian,
XX, No.3 (May 1958), 328-346.
II Irvin~ to Stadion, Vienna, Sept. 21,1821, F.O., Austria, 120/49; Pari. Debates, IV,
1226, and V (Apr.-July, 1821), 1281; "History of Europe," Annual Register, LXIII
(1821), 161-162 (Robert Smith and J. W. Ward led the attack on the ministry in June
1821.); 6sterreichische Staatsvertrage, England, ed. Alfred F. Pribram (Vienna, 1913),
II (1749·0ct. 1813), 454-456. Pribram has written a narrative supplement to Vol. II
which extends the coverage of Austro-British conventions to 1847.
4 Gordon to Castlereagh, separate (encl. with No. 75), Vienna, Oct. 13, 1821, F.O.,
Austria, 7/164; same to same, separate and confidential, Vienna, Oct. 15, 1821, ibid.
(While at Hanover, Castlereagh received the first dispatch on October 21 and the
second on the 23rd.); Castlereagh to Gordon, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, F.O., Continent:
Sir Charles K. Webster gives a different account of the discussions at

Hanover on this issue, cautiously stating that Metternich "seems to have
made definite promises, but Stadion, the Finance Minister, subsequently
refused to ratify them and wrote a Memorandum to that effect, which Met-
ternich forwarded to London in a vain effort to persuade the British govern-
ment. Castlereagh altogether refused to accept mere commercial concessions
as were offered." Nonetheless, the chancellor later denied that he had ever
admitted at Hanover, or elsewhere, that the "British claim was morally or
legally binding upon the Austrian government" or that in the absence of
obligation, even expediency required a monetary settlement. He insisted,
moreover, that the British cabinet could produce no document to prove "the
admission by the Emperor of the principle of a money payment. ... " At
Hanover Metternich admitted only that the "common interest ... enjoins
a moderate and conciliatory settlement," but he did not commit himself on
the important issue of the "mode and means of compensation. "5
With such opposing views, no progress was possible at Hanover, and the
resulting stalemate lasted two years. In April 1822, Castlereagh endowed
Robert Gordon, secretary of the Vienna embassy, with plenipotentiary
powers to negotiate the settlement of the Austrian debt, but during the
spring and summer of 1822, Gordon's efforts to obtain payment were
countered by Metternichian inconsistencies and procrastinations. Finally,
on August 20, Gordon addressed another memoire to Metternich, hoping
to reopen negotiations. The chancellor replied on September 8 that he had
not forgotten the loan but hesitated to appoint a plenipotentiary to
negotiate. 6
In London, meanwhile, Castlereagh's plans to attend the Vienna confer-
ence were canceled by suicide, his mission given to Wellington, and his
"whole heritage" bequeathed to Canning. Thereafter, popular confidence
in Parliamentary action was restored by the evidence of what could be
accomplished even in the unreformed House. Although Whigs had been
lukewarm toward the recent war with Napoleonic France, they now found
themselves attuned to the rising national indignation against "the ob-
scurantism and despotism" of Britain's late allies. Englishmen had not
Hanover, 92/47; Gordon memorandum on the Austrian loan, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822,
P.O., Austria, 120/54; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, Well. Desp., I,
587-588.
5 Ibid., Webster, Castlereagh, p. 401; Irving to Castlereagh, Vienna, Oct. 14, 1821,
F.O., Austria, 120/49; Castlereagh to Gordon, separate, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, ibid.;
Metternich to Castlereagh, Vienna, Dec. 5, 1821, ibid.
6 Stewart to Bathurst, No.4, Vienna, Sept. 8, 1822, ibid., 120/54; Gordon memoran-
dum on the Austrian loan, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid.
GREAT BRIT AIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 221
fought in Spain to restore the Inquisition, nor to re-enslave those who had
just been liberated from the French hegemony. The result of this attitude
was that the Whigs, under the leadership of Henry Brougham and Lord
John Russell, often supported the Liberal Tories in debates and divisions.
The existence of this ad hoc alliance was demonstrated by the demands of
both parties for the repayment of the Austrian war debt in retaliation for
Metternich's reactionary role at the Conference of Troppau-Laibach and
for Austria's consequent suppression of the liberal movements in Naples
and Sardinia-Piedmont. This rising Austrophobia did not go unnoticed by
the chancellor, who realized, of course, that it was British opposition to
his policies which again had brought forward this claim. 7
Arriving in Vienna on September 29, Wellington was surprised to find
that the Austrian debt was no closer to settlement than it had been the year
previous at Hanover. He and Gordon attributed this delay to Mettemich's
hope of obtaining easier terms from Castlereagh when he came to Vienna,
and, after his death, from the minister who replaced him. Annoyed by the
chancellor's procrastination, Wellington tried to set the negotiations in
motion, only to be met with evasion. On September 30 Mettemich requested
the duke to submit his plan for settling the affair to Count Johann Philipp
Stadion; the finance minister, however, referred him back to the chancellor.
Twice more while in Vienna Wellington called on Stadion, but "was not so
fortunate as to find him at home." Again Wellington remonstrated with
Mettemich on October 2, declaring that the British claim had been admitted,
and that he had in his possession the bonds given Britain as collateral. It
was imperative that a settlement be reached before the next session of
Parliament. But the chancellor neither answered this note nor acknowledged
its receipt; nor did he have time to discuss the subject with. Wellington
before the Vienna conference ended. The day the duke presented his memo-
randum, the Emperor Francis and Mettemich left for Verona, where the
crowned heads of Europe and their ministers were gathering to transact all
remaining business. 8 Again further discussion of the Austrian loan was
postponed. Metternich, in short, confronted Castlereagh first, then Gordon
and Wellington, with a policy of evasion.
7 Irving to Castlerea.gh, Vienna, Oct. 14, 1821, ibid., 120/49; Castlereagh to Gordon,
separate, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, ibid.; "History of Europe," Annual Register, LXIII,
161-162; Trevelyan, British History, pp. 196, 106; Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 299-
300.
8 Gordon's notes on the Austrian loan, Vienna, Oct. 4, and Verona, Nov. 28, 1822,
P.O., Austria, 120/54; Wellington to Gordon, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid.; Welling-
ton to Metternich, Vienna, Oct. 2, and Verona, Nov. 8,1822, Well. Desp., I, 339, 509;
Metternich to Wellington, Salzburg, Oct. 3, 1822, ibid., p. 340.
Wellington, meanwhile, anxiously awaited the next courier from London.

On October 3 Canning's orders arrived, directing him to attend the Congress
of Verona. In anticipation of reaching an agreement on the Austrian loan at
Verona, the duke took with him twelve papers pertinent to it, dating back
to April 23, 1821, and covering the talks at Hanover.9
The question of the loan was raised at the Congress on Friday, October
18. In a private interview with Metternich, Wellington demanded recognition
of Britain's claims. The chancellor again denied the existence of the debt,
declaring that the London cabinet should not seek such acknowledgement,
for, if in fact the debt existed, the whole sum should be paid. He contended,
moreover, that Britain's silence on the debt when the two nations had ar-
ranged for the transfer of credits on other occasions tended to prove that
Britain as well as Austria considered the whole matter as closed. Wellington
refuted this interpretation of British policy by referring to the treaties and
securities in British possession and the interest which Austria had paid on
one of the loans for two years. Was Austria in the habit of paying interest
on a debt which she denied existed? Could Metternich produce any docu-
ment to prove the debt had been canceled, or its claim renounced?10
The following day the duke sent to the Austrian chancellor a plan for
liquidating the loan. From the total debt of £ 23,515,890, Britain was pre-
pared to deduct the interest (£ 10,601 ,955) and the interest on the interest
(£ 6,693,935), leaving the original capital debt of £ 6,220,000. From this sum
Britain would deduct an additional third (£ 2,073,333), making the amount
which Austria must pay £ 4,146,667. Of this sum, Wellington proposed that
£ 3,000,000 sterling be paid in two years in equal installments, while the
remaining £ 1,146,667 could be paid in commidities over the same period in
proportions most convenient to Austria. For her part, Britain would return
the Austrian securities and consolidate the "Austrian Loan" with the public
debt, thus erasing that term from the treasury accounts. 11
When ten days had passed without an answer to his proposal, Wellington
dispatched two official notes to Metternich on the matter - one on October
29, and the other a week later on November 7 - to draw his attention "to
an object highly important to the honour and interest of both governments."
In the second note, he requested the chancellor to set a date for a discussion
of this subject. On November 7 Metternich replied that the "money arrange-
9 Wellington to Metternich, Vienna, Oct. 3, 1822, ibid., p. 340; Canning to Welling-
ton, Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid., pp. 349-350; Wellington to Canning, Vienna,
Oct. 4, and Verona, NOIV. 18, 1822, ibid., pp. 354,542.
11 Wellington's note to Metternich on the Austrian loan, Verona, Oct. 19, 1822,
F.O., Austria, 120/54.
ment" had not yet been submitted to the emperor, nor had Count Stadion's
opinion on it been obtained. The statement about Stadion's attitude is
patently untrue, for he consistently had maintained that repayment would
ruin Austrian finances which showed a deficit of £ 2,000,000 by the end of
1822. Surprised and exasperated, Wellington, on November 8 sent a strongly
worded note to Metternich, reminding him of past British efforts at Vienna
and Hanover to settle the debt. The duke declared, moreover, that he
definitely was dissatisfied with the lack of cooperation and the inertia of the
Austrian cabinet in the matter.12
This action brought a quick response: the next day Metternich asked
Wellington if he still adhered to his proposal of October 19 for settling the
debt. When the duke answered that he did, the chancellor rejoined that "he
had understood from the late Lord Londonderry that the affair might be
arranged on better terms." Wellington replied confidentially that Britain
would settle for a smaller sum of money, but that the time limit must then
be reduced. The interview ended as Metternich promised to make "a farther
[sic] and satisfactory communication" in the near future. 13
On Sunday, November 24, Metternich reassured Wellington that "in a
day or two" he should send him "an official note, recognising on the part of
the Emperor the principle of an arrangement, and of the payment of a sum
of money." He then suggested that plenipotentiaries be named to negotiate
the affair at Vienna. Wellington complained that the matter was just where
it had been left by Castlereagh at the Hanover conference. Metternich
denied this, declaring that he had never admitted the existence of the debt,
nor even the principle of a money payment. To this assertion, the duke
countered that Castlereagh's understanding of the question had been quite
different, and that Castlereagh had repeated in his presence that the debt
could not be settled without the payment of money. Gordon's instructions,
indeed, were founded on this principle. Mettemich insisted the British
government could produce no document to prove the emperor accepted the
principle of a money payment, but he now was prepared to do so by an
official note. Wellington warned that if no arrangement were made, the
Austrian securities might be sold to recover the debt. If this were done,
replied Metternich, Austria would cry down the value of the securities. At
12 Wellington to Metternich, Verona, Oct. 29, Nov. 7, and 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I,
468-469, 508, 509; Pribram, 6sterreichische Staatsvertriige, England, II, 558; Corti,
House of Rothschild, p. 296. In the interest of consistency and simplicity, the old
Austrian gulden has been converted into its English pound value. One pound equaled
ten gulden; hence, £ 2,000,000 was the equivalent of 20,000,000 gulden.
111 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 26,1822, Well. Desp., 1,587; Wellington to
Gordon, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
this point the interview was interrupted, but later in the day (November 24),
the duke sent the chancellor a message requesting that the promised note,
which accepted the principle of a money payment, should be delivered by
Tuesday, November 26. On that date a courier was leaving for London by
whom Wellington desired to inform his government how this affair stood.
Metternich promised the desired communication before the departure of the
courier. 14
In a private conversation with Metternich on the morning of November
26, Wellington asserted that the British government might think the chan-
cellor had "manoeuvred a little" in the transaction of the loan, if the affair
were not settled in the very near future. Consequently, he would do well
to consider whether any further delay was worth the injury such a belief
would cause him. Again the conversation was interrupted, but that after-
noon Wellington received a message from Metternich requesting him to call
again that night to pick up the long awaited Austrian note. The memoire,
as might have been expected, was far from satisfactory. Metternich an-
nounced that Austria was ready to negotiate a settlement, which she desired
just as ardently as Britain, but the Vienna court could not enter into im-
mediate negotiations as Wellington insisted. The state of Austrian finances
would not permit a definitive decision at the moment, but the chancellor
was willing to appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate a settlement in Vienna
with Gordon. To facilitate these negotiations, Metternich finally consented
to a monetary sacrifice, but the mode and quota of this sacrifice remained
to be determined at Vienna in concert with Stadion. The note concluded
with the inane hope that the affair could be settled before the opening of
the next session of Parliament,15
In Metternich's memorandum of November 26, and verbally that night,
upon transmitting it to Wellington, he requested the duke not to "send home
his note, or to write upon the Austrian loan by the courier who was going
off, as he was in hopes ... [of saying] something more satisfactory." 16 For
the next two days Wellington heard nothing more from him.
On the morning of Wednesday, November 27, the duke replied to the
Austrian note. He refused to apologize for pressing Austria to settle an
issue which had been pending for more than a year and regretted the slow-
ness of negotiations. He was surprised, moreover, that there could have
14 WellingtO'n to' Canning, Verona, NO'v. 26,1822, Well. Desp., I, 587-588; Welling-
tO'n to' Metternich, VerO'na, NO'v. 24, 1822, ibid., p. 578; Metternich to' WellingtO'n,
Verona, NO'v. 25, 1822, ibid., p. 584.
15 WellingtO'n to' Canning, VerO'na, NO'v. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 607; Metternich to'
Wellington, VerO'na, NO'v. 26, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
16 Wellington to' Canning, Verona, Nov. 29,1822, Well. Desp., I, 607.
GREA T BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 225
been such a difference between the two governments respecting the basis
of settlement. Nor was he satisfied with "the point at which the negotiation
stood." 17
Later the same day, when Wellington took his leave of Francis I, his
Imperial Majesty admitted that "as a man of honour and conscience," he
owed the money, but that, on the other hand, "be bad considered the debt
as canceled by the services. . . rendered to the cause, by the sacrifices ...
made, and the misfortunes which he had suffered, for which there could be
no compensation." In reply the duke emphasized the necessity of coming to
some arrangement, assuring the emperor that his "services and his present
situation" would be taken into consideration in making a settlement. "Every-
thing," he affirmed, "[will] be done to make the payment easy to [your]
finances." 18
At Wellington's request, Robert Gordon prepared a memorandum on the
Austrian loan which he transmitted to his Grace on November 29. Gordon
thought Mettemich had procrastinated before Castlereagh's death, hoping
that when he came to Vienna, easier terms could be obtained. But in the
long run, he was confident a favorable termination of the question would
be achieved. But Gordon, who was responsible for settling this affair, was
thoroughly disgusted with Metternich. He complained to the duke:
Prince Metternich's language will naturally be, as at first, inconsistent and
provoking: the excuses for past delay, frivolous: and to make a merit of avow-
ing now for the first time a principle in writing, which he has for this year past
solemnly avowed by word of mouth both to the late Lord Londonderry and
myself, is to say the least of it, ridiculous.1 9
On Friday, November 29, Wellington directed Gordon "to carry on the
negotiations under the instructions which he had received from the late
Lord Londonderry, and to press it to a conclusion, if possible, before the
meeting of Parliament."2o
Later on the 29th, Metternich called on Wellington to offer the payment
of £ 2,000,000 sterling and £ 1,000,000 in timber and quicksilver. He re-
quested, however, that the duke make
an effort with the [British] Cabinet to make some reduction of this sum if
possible, that nothing should be mentioned of money to be paid till the negoti-
17 Wellington to Metternich, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, ibid., pp. 594-595.

19 Gordon's note on the Austrian loan, Verona, Nov. 28,1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54.
20 Wellington to Gordon, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid.; cf. Wellington to Canning,
Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 608.
ation should be concluded, and that every facility should be given in the
negotiation for the payment of the money by Austria.21
Since Wellington left Verona early the next morning, this was his last
conversation with Metternich at the Congress. After the duke had returned
to England, he informed the chancellor on December 26, 1822, that the
cabinet had agreed on two million in timber and mercury as the lowest
possible sum. While the time of payment would not be accelerated, the
ministry desired that the debt be paid in equal installments in 1823 and 1824.
The note closed with the hope that an agreement would be reached in time
to be presented to Parliament on February 4, 1823. 22
The duke's hopes were unfulfilled for he did not fathom the intricacies
of Austrian policy. After his Grace had departed from Verona, Metternich
pointedly suggested to Gordon that he return to Vienna immediately to
begin negotiations with Stadion. Acting on this counsel, Gordon left Verona
on December 11 and arrived in Vienna on the 19th. But he found himself
the victim of another Metternichian maneuever. Stadion refused to enter into
an official discussion before the return of the emperor, who was not ex-
pected until January 23,1823. The finance minister admitted he, indeed, had
received from Verona a communication enabling him to draw up a plan, but
he could not show it to the English envoy until the emperor approved it.
Gordon, in short, found himself again whipsawed by Metternich and
Stadion.23
On January 23, 1823, a protocol on the Austrian loan was initiated in
Vienna, but agreement again was delayed by continued Austrian protests
that the £ 3,000,000 demanded by Britain would overtax the imperial
treasury. Stadion did not exaggerate: in April 1823 he estimated that by the
end of the fiscal year 1824 the deficit in the treasury would reach £ 3,500,000.
To meet this impending financial crisis, the Austrian government borrowed
that same month £ 3,000,000 from four banking firms, including the House
of Rothschild. 24
Metternich now offered £ 3,000,000 in five per cent debentures at an
issue price which would reduce their real value to £ 2,000,000, but the
London cabinet promptly rejected this proposal. Frustrated, the chancellor
resorted to extra-diplomatic channels to obtain a reduction in the British
demands. He summoned Solomon Rothschild, requesting him to influence
21 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 619.
211Wellington to Metternich, London, Dec. 26, 1822, ibid., pp. 668·669.
23 Gordon to Canning, No. 39, Vienna, Dec. 25, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120(54.
24 Metternich to Wellington, Vienna, Jan. 23, 1823, Well. Desp., II, 16; BFSP, XI,
26-28; Stadion's report, April 29, 1823, State Archives, Vienna, cited by Corti, House
of Rothschild, p. 298.
the British ministry through his brother Nathan, a naturalized British
citizen. Solomon immediately wrote Nathan of his conversation with Met-
ternich and urged him to convince Frederick J. Robinson, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, that the Austrian offer was just, that more could not be offered,
and that it should be promptly accepted. Solomon's exhortation to use
caution hardly was needed by a person of Nathan's abilities.25
The English Rothschild wisely secured the aid of the banking houses of
Baring and Reid-Irving before approaching the ministry. By October the
three firms had persuaded the London cabinet to reduce its claims by
£ 500,000, provided that Austria consented to pay the whole amount -
£ 2,500,000 - in money, instead of only part in cash and the rest in com-
modities. Although this sum exceeded the maximum offered by Austria by
more than £ 500,000, the three houses agreed to accept less than originally
requested for their services. They finally received £ 3,000,000 in Austrian
five per cent debentures at an issue price of approximately 82 2/3 per cent. 26
Stadion reluctantly accepted this compromise, and on November 17, 1823,
he and Gordon signed in Vienna a definitive treaty, stipulating that the
Houses of Rothschild, Baring, and Reid-Irving pay to the British treasury
on behalf of Austria the sum of £ 2,500,000 sterling. 27
On February 3, 1824, the Austrian loan convention was presented to
Parliament, which ratified it on March 16 and approved an act providing for
repayment in six installments as follows:
December 1, 1823 £ 100,000 (already paid)
August 1, 1824 £ 200,000
April 1, 1825 £ 300,000
December 1, 1825 £ 300,000
August 1, 1826 £ 300,000
June 1, 1827 £ 1,300,000
As an incentive to make payments before the dates on which they fell
due, a discount of five per cent was granted for all sums paid in anticipa-
tion of installments. Because of these percentages Britain returned to the
25 Solomon to Nathan Rothschild, undated, 1823, States Archives, Vienna, in ibid.,

pp. 300-301.
26 Baring, Rothschild, and Irving to Stadion, London, Oct. 15, 1823, State Archives,
Vienna, cited by ibid., p. 30l.
27 Anglo-Austrian Convention on the Austrian Loan, Vienna, November 17, 1823,
Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, ill, 4-5; BFSP, XI 26-28; Corti, House of Rothschild,
p.298.
Exchequer only £ 2,200,000, or a little better than one-third of what she

paid out of it to Austria. 28
Solomon Rothschild boasted to Metternich that he and his London col-
leagues had succeeded in settling a longstanding issue "entirely to the satis-
faction ... of the imperial government." He then requested a commission
of two or three per cent to the underwriters "in view of the fact that the
transaction ... [was] such an advantageous one to the treasury." For him-
self, he declared: "I gladly renounce the possibility of deriving any further
emoluments." 29
The settlement of the debt caused a speculation in Austrian bonds in
which the expectations of the underwriters were fully justified. As early
as January 1824, the bonds showed a marked increase in value. The average
price on the London Stock Exchange in 1824, the first year of issue, was
93; and in 1825, 94. Baron Philipp von Neumann, charge d'affaires of the
Austrian embassy in London, estimated that the actual profit to the brothers
Rothschild by April 1824 had reached £ 1,824,600 or more than two-thirds
of the loan in only four months. One can readily understand Solomon's high
spirits and his generous gesture in refusing "any further emoluments." The
settlement of the debt was one of the most profitable pieces of business ever
transacted by the House of Rothschild. The transaction, too, improved
Austrian credit. By the end of January 1824, the demand for Austrian
securities was so great that they were quoted at a premium of over five
per cent.30
The affair of the Austrian loan illustrates the influence of public opinion
(even in an unrefornled Parliament), in shaping British foreign policy. Had
it not been for extensive and arrant Austrophobia, which found vociferous
expression in the press and the Opposition, Castlereagh and his successor
probably would not have pressed Austria for a settlement of her war debt.
The British cabinet, more concerned about votes in the House than Austrian
silver, regarded its token repayment as a redress of grievances. In the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, the power of public opinion became, of
course, a major consideration in determining national policy, a factor which
has not always led to salutary results. The affair of the Austrian loan
28 Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, III, 9; Pari. Debates, new ser., X (Feb.-Mar., 1824),
501; BFSP, XI, 104.
29 Solomon Rothschild to Metternich, Vienna, Oct. 31, 1823, in Corti, House at
Rothschild, pp. 301-302.
30 Neumann's report, London, Apr. 9, 1824, Pribram, Osterreichische Staatsvertrii-
ge, England, II, 573; Count Zichy memorandum, Jan. 28, 1824, State Archives, Vienna,
cited by Corti, House ot Rothschild, p. 303. Count Stephan Zichy was the Austrian
ambassador at Berlin.
illustrates the impolitic diplomacy which the ministry was forced to adopt in
self-interest to the prejudice of the national interest. Even Sir Charles
Webster admits that the British claim was "a little shabby in view of all the
circumstances," and that had the debt been greater, "much damage might
have been done, not only to Europe, but also to the reputation and material
interests of Britain herself." 81
Next to public opinion in influencing national policy (and sometimes more
important), are special interests groups or "lobbies." Such extralegal forces
were active in the politics of post-Napoleonic Britain and were influential
in persuading the ministry to reduce its claims by £ 500,000. The houses of
Rothschild, Baring, and Reid-Irving were not strangers to the art of fishing
for fortunes in the troubled political waters of the early nineteenth century.
Any principles involved in settling the Austrian war debt should be dis-
counted as the usual parlance of diplomacy; it is doubtful that Castlereagh,
Canning, or Wellington really thought Austria was morally obligated to
repay the loan. The granting of a loan to Austria in the first place was a
departure from Britain's traditional practice of subsidizing her allies. After
World War I, the British government itself confronted the United States
with the same argument used by Austria in 1822: viz., 'We consider the
war debt as already paid in full by our soldiers' blood and lives.' As be-
tween individuals, so between states, it depends on whose ox is being gored.
2. The Russian Ukase 82
On September 16 (N.S.), 1821, Tsar Alexander I decreed:

(1) ... The whole of the north-west coast of America, beginning from
Behring Straits to the 51 of northern latitude, also from the Aleutian Islands
0
to the eastern coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile Islands ... to the
south cape of the Island of Urup, viz., to the 45 50' north latitude, is ex-
0
clusively granted to Russian subjects.

(2) It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels not only to land on the
coasts and islands belonging to Russia as stated above, but also, to approach
them within less than 100 Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is subject to
confiscation along with the whole cargo.33
31 Webster, Castlereagh, p. 402.

32 This section is based on my article, "The Russian Ukase and the Monroe Doc-
trine: A Re-evaluation," Pacific Historical Review (hereafter cited as PHR), XXXVI,
No.1 (February 1967), 13-26.
33 Ukase of September 4 [O.S.], 1821, U.S. Cong., Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Pro-
ceedings (Washington, 1904), II, 25; for the original text, see P. Tikhmenev, lstoriches-
koe Obozranie Obrazovanie Rossiysko Amerikanskoi Kompaniy [Historical Survey of
Thus proclaimed the Russian emperor in the famous ukase with which he
prefaced and sanctioned sixty-three commercial regulations proposed by
the Russian-American Company.34 No ship sailing from a port in Europe
after March 1, 1822, nor from the United States after July 1, he declared,
could legitimately plead ignorance of them. But before the latter day arrived,
Alexander had tacitly lifted his interdiction.35
For nearly a century and a half, this decree has remained an enigma,
evoking such questions as these: Did the tsar intend to pursue a policy of
aggression in North America, or did he merely wish to redress the grievances
of the Russian-American Company in which he held shares? 36 Did the
Ukase of 1821 summon the Monroe Doctrine into existence? Why did the
emperor withdraw his decree so quickly? Was there any relationship be-
tween the tsar's policy in the Near East and his aims in Russian America
(Alaska)? Both statesmen and historians have attempted to answer these
questions, but their pronouncements are a confusing welter of contradictions.
The genesis of the Ukase of September 16, 182], can be traced back some
twenty-three years to a meeting of Siberian merchants in Irkutsk. There
on August 3,1798, the Shelikov-Golikov Company, the Mylnikov Company,
and two smaller concerns merged to form the United American Company
for trading between Alaska and Asia. A year later Nikolai Rezanov, at once
the company's chief agent in St. Petersburg and the emperor's chamberlain,
persuaded Paul I to grant his employer a charter similar to that given by
the Formation of the Russian-American Company] (St. Petersburg, 1861-1863), I, App.,

p. 27. The Ukase was signed by Count D. Gurlev, Minister of Finance. The Italian
mile is equal to one minute of latitude or 1,620 yards (4,860 feet); it is, therefore, 420
feet shorter than the English mile. It is also the same distance as the ancient Roman
mile which Russia had carried over into the modern era. One hundred Italian miles
is approximately thirty marine leagues, a limit chosen because of precedents found
in both the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Ghent (1814). Bagot to Castle-
reagh, No. 56, St. Petersburg, Nov. 17/29, 1821, F.O., Russia, 181/44; George David-
son, The Alaska Boundary (San Francisco, 1903), pp. 44-45.
34 Harold Temperley erroneously gives September 28 as the date of this decree,
having added twelve days to the New Style date of the 16th; see Foreign Policy of
Canning, 1822-1827, p. 104.
M Count Pierre de Poletica to John Q. Adams, Washington, Feb. 11, 1822, ASP,
IV (Mar. 1815-May 1822), 857-861. With his official note, Poletica, the Russian mi-
nister at Washington, enclosed copies both of the ukase and the new regulations. The
latter had been completed and approved by Guriev in March 1821, but had to await
the tsar's return from Laibach to receive his signature.
38 Tsar Alexander, the Empress Elizabeth, and the Grand Duke Constantine, the
tsar's brother, each held twenty shares valued at 500 paper rubles per share in 1821.
Since the paper ruble then was worth about 20 cents, the emperor's holdings were
nominal, amounting to only $ 2,000. In any case, he donated all of his dividends to
charity. Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, 1730-1885, (San Fransisco, 1886), pp.
381, 527.
the British government to the East India Company. By imperial ukase, the
tsar on July 8, 1799, issued a twenty-year charter which confirmed the
consolidation of the preceding year, changed the association's name to
Russian-American Company, and extended its jurisdiction southward to the
55th degree of north latitude. Since this decree was purely domestic in form,
it was not communicated to any foreign power. It trespassed upon the rights
of Spain, of course, but Russia then was at war with Spain, that nation being
a French ally after 1796. All Europe, indeed, was so engrossed in the
struggle against France that it paid no attention to the Ukase of 1799.37
By absorbing the efforts and resources of Britain and Spain, the
Napoleonic Wars permitted American traders a free hand along the north-
west coast of America. The Yankees came in increasing numbers, poached
on the Russian company's preserve, and traded the Indians firearms, am-
munition, swords, liquor, and coarse manufactures for otter and seal pelts.
These furs were then traded in Canton for tea, silk, nankeens, and other
articles destined for the United States and Europe. After 1796, the
Americans outstripped all rivals and came to enjoy a virtual monopoly of
the fur trade between Alaska and China. In May 1808 and again in January
1810, Russia protested American encroachment on its sphere of influence
and urged that the United States require its citizens to trade exclusively with
Russian agents at Kodiak, 700 miles west of New Archangel (Sitka), instead
of directly with the natives of Russian America. Since American profits
from this commerce averaged a net of 500 per cent every year, these pro-
posals, needless to say, were declined. 3s
In October 1813, the influence of the Russian-American Company
37 Henry Middleton to J. Q. Adams, No. 35, St. Petersburg, Apr. 19, 1824, ASP,
V, 461; Ukase of July 8, 1799, Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Proceedings, II, 23-25;
Bancroft, Alaska, pp. 377-380; S. B. Okun, The Russian-American Company, ed. B.
D. Grekov and trans. Carl Ginsburg (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 35, 41-44 (publish-
ed in the Soviet Union in 1939); N. Politovsky, Kratkoie Istoricheskoi Obozranie y
Deistvie Rossiysko-Amerik [Brief Historical Review of the Origin and Transactions of
the Russian-American Company] (St. Petersburg, 1861); for an excellent account of the
ea.rly activities of the company, see Hans Pilder, Die Russisch-Amerikanische Handels-
Kompanie bis 1825 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1914). Grigory Ivanovich Shelikov is generally
regarded as the founder of the Russian-American Company, and Rezanov was his
son-in-law.
38 Chancellor Nicolas Romanzov to Levett Harris, U.S. consul, St. Petersburg, May
17,1808, ASP, V, 437; Andre de Daschkov, Russian charge d'affaires, to Robert Smith,
U.S. Secretary of State, Philadelphia. Jan. 4, 1810, ibid.; Bagot to Castlereagh, No. 56,
St. Petersburg, Nov. 17/29, 1821, F.O., Russia, 181/44; Bancroft, History of the North-
west Coast, (San Francisco, 1884), I, 523; John C. Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations
of the United States with Russia, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and
Political Science, XXIV (1906) 158; Benjamin P. Thomas, Russo-American Relations,
1815-1867, Johns Hopkins Studies, XLVIII (1930), 41.
within the tsarist government greatly increased when the emperor placed it
under the direct control of the Council of State. Being pressed by the
company's directors for protection against the Bostonian interlopers, and
having failed to obtain satisfaction from Washington, the tsar, after some
hesitation, issued the Ukase of September 16, 1821, the immediate occasion
for which was the renewal of the company's charter. Nine days later,
Alexander issued another imperial decree, granting a second twenty-year
charter retroactive to July 8, 1819, since the original charter had been ex-
tended beyond that date on an ad hoc basis. The two ukases of September
1821, no less than that of July 1799, were grants to a semi-official organi-
zation, and all three contained several identical provisions.a9
Notwithstanding the evidence that all of these decrees resulted from the
successful lobbying of Russian merchants rather than from carefully planned
state policy, Harold Temperley in 1925 saw in them proof that the St.
Petersburg cabinet a century earlier "was extending a long arm over the
Pacific." Fearful of this menace, the United States solved the Russian
problem by proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine. Dexter Perkins, Samuel F.
Bemis, Benjamin P. Thomas, and Max M. Laserson have supported this
view, all affirming that the noncolonization clause of the Monroe Doctrine
had been aimed primarily at Alexander. This interpretation, however, was
scarcely new in the 1920's, for George Canning in 1824 had made the same
assertion to Count Christophe de Lieven, Russian ambassador at London,
and also to Sir Charles Bagot, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, neither
of whom agreed with him. Lieven, understandably incensed by the charge,
vehemently denied it at the time.<W In this, as in other views, it appears that
89 Board of Directors, Russian-American Comp., to Chief Manager, St. Petersburg,

Sept. 20, 1821, U.S. Cong., Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbi-
tration Convened at Paris, 1893 (Washington, 1895), 11,41, Ukase of September 13/25,
1821: second charter of the Russian-American Company, Alaskan Boundary Tribunal,
Proceedings, II, 26-28; Middleton to Nesselrode: confidential memorial, St. Peters-
burg, Dec. 17, 1824, ASP, V, 452; Davidson, Alaska Boundary, p. 43; Michel Ponia-
towski, Histoire de la Russie d'Amerique et de l'Alaska (Paris, 1958), pp. 187-188;
Thomas, Russo-American Relations, p. 41; William A. Williams, American-Russian
Relations, 1781-1947 (New York, 1952), pp. 10-11; Bagot, Canning, II, 206. The Rus-
sian-American Company used a seal and flag bearing the imperial coat-of-arms and
paid no direct duty to the gOlVernment. Davidson, Alaska Boundary, p. 36.
40 Temperley, Canning, pp. 104-105; Thomas, Russo-American Relations, p. 175;
Max M. Laserson, American Impact on Russia, Diplomatic and Idealogicaf, 1784-1914
(New York, 1950), p. 113; ct. Clarence L. Andrews, "Russian Plans for American Do-
minion," Washington Historical Quarterly, XVIII, No.2 (Apr. 1927), 83-92; Lieven
to Nesselrode, London, 2/14 Jan. 1824, Russia, Recueil des traites et conventions con-
clus par fa Russie avec les puissances etrangeres, ed. Fedor FedorOlVitch Martens (St.
Petersburg, 1874-1909), XI, 311; Canning to Bagot, Foreign Office, Jan. 9, 1824,
Bagot, Canning, II, 209-210; Bemis, John Quincy Adams, pp. 368, 496; D. Perkins,
Temperley has placed too much reliance upon Canning's unsupported

opinion.
To Henry Middelton, the American minister to Russia, the whole affair
of the Russian Ukase seemed much like a tempest in a teapot, and to Can-
ning, it was ridiculous. The decree was officially transmitted to the London
cabinet on November 12, 1821, and to the Washington government on
February 11, 1822. In a show of force, the tsar dispatched to the North
Pacific three frigates: the Apollo, Kreiser, and Ladoga. Castlereagh and
Adams immediately and vigorously protested his pretentions to territorial
sovereignty and commercial exclusion north of the 51st parallel, but they
need not have bothered. Even before the declaration of September 16 be-
came effective for ships departing American ports (July 1, 1822), it was
practically annulled, but no official announcement of this fact was made. In
June 1822, the emperor ordered his cruisers to confine their surveillance to
coastal waters north of 55°, to exercise caution, and to stop only those
foreign ships actually engaged in contraband trade with Russian settlements.
A month later (July 24), Count Capo d'Istria, the Russian foreign minister,
explained to Middleton that the Ukase would not be enforced since "the
Emperor has already had the good sense to see that this affair should not
be pushed too far." 41
Monroe Doctrine, pp. 30-31. Perkins is sometimes careless with his facts; e.g., Adams'
July 4 oration was made in 1821, not 1822, and on two occasions, Perkins has Cast-
lereagh representing Britain at the Congress of Verona, despite the fact that he
committed suicide on Aug. 12, 1822, two months before the opening of that reunion
on Oct. 17, not shortly afterward. He apparently has confused Castlereagh with his
half-brother Sir Charles Stewart, who became Lord Londonderry upon the death of
the foreign secretary.
41 Baron Paul Nicolay to Marquis of Londonderry, London, Oct. 31/No'V. 12, 1821,
F.O., Russia, 65/132; Middleton to Adams, No. 23, Petersburg, Aug. 8/20, 1822,
Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Proceedings, II, 42-43; Castlereagh to Bagot, No.5, Fo-
reign Office, Jan. 19, 1822, F.O., Russia, 181/48; Castlereagh to Lieven, London, Jan.
18, 1822 (encl. with No.2), ibid.; Poletica to Adams, Washington, Feb. 11, 1822,
ASP, IV, 856-857; Adams to Poletica, Washington, Feb. 25 and Mar. 30, 1822, ibid .•
pp. 861, 863; Adams to Poletica, Dept. of State, Apr. 24, 1822, John Q. Adams,
Writings, ed. W. C. Ford (New York, 1913-1917), VII (1820-1823), 245-246; Nesselrode
to Tuyll, St. Petersburg, July 1/13, 1822, "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in
Washington, 1818-1825," AHR, XVIII (1913), 336-338; Minister of Finance to Direc-
tors of Russian-American Comp., St. Petersburg, July 18, 1822, U.S. Cong., Fur Seal
Arbitration, II, 53; Annual Register, LXIV (1822), 576-584; Temperley, Canning, pp.
104-105; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 82-83; Bancroft, Alaska, pp. 539-540.
Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode shared the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Greek for-
mulated policy, while the German took care of the details of running the department
and wrote most of the correspondence. Their exact titles were: (Capo d'Istria) "Seen!-
taire d'J;;tat pres de 1a personne de Sa Majeste Imperiale"; (Nesselrode) "Secretaire
d'J;;tat dirigeant Ie Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres."
But what does this statement mean: that the tsar had retreated before
Anglo-American protests, as Bemis contends, or that he had had the good
sense to see that the decree, productive of more trouble than treasure, was
a Pandora's box, and he did not need Adams and Canning to tell him what
was obvious? Recent American historiography on this point reflects the
influence of the Soviet historian, Semen Bentsionovich Okun. Since the
appearance of his Russian-American Company in 1939, Anatole G. Ma-
zour, Thomas A. Bailey, and Laserson, all have accepted the Okun thesis
that Alexander annulled his ukase out of a desire to avoid friction with
Britain and the United States at the moment (June 1822) he was contem-
plating the partition of Turkey under the guise of aiding his co-religionists,
the Greeks. Since Britain opposed Russian intervention in the Greek revolt,
it would be unwise to let relations with other powers deteriorate at the
same time. As Bailey tersely explains, why push America into the arms of
John Bull "over an issue involving a wilderness of questionable value to
land-sated Russia? American friendship in the long run would be worth
vastly more than a few cargoes of smelly furs." 42 Thus, in a gamble to ob-
tain a free hand in the Near East, the tsar made concessions in North
America.
If one accepts the premise that Alexander desired a war with the Porte,
the conclusions of Okun and his American disciples appear sound. But one
of the prominent myths of modem Russia is precisely the proposition that
the tsar plotted hostilities against the Turks after the outbreak of the Greek
insurrection in April 1821. Just the reverse was true: Alexander was tired
of wars; his intentions were entirely peaceful. Between 1821 and 1823, more
than 335,000 men were demobilized from the Russian army - hardly a
proper preparation for war. During the last three years of his life, the
"enigmatic emperor" lost interest in foreign affairs, devoting more and more
attention to internal policy and religion. He spoke openly of abdicating and
becoming a monk. According to Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, this state
of mind explains his passivity from 1822-25. 43
Capo d'Istria, the leader of the st. Petersburg war party, fell from power
at the end of July 1822 on the very issue of war with the Porte. In his
42 Bemis, John Quincy Adams, pp. 497-498; Okun, Russian-American Company,
pp. 82-83, 92; Laserson, American Impact on Russia, p. 113; Thomas A. Bailey, Ame-
rica Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca,
1950), p. 31; Anatole G. Mazour, "The Russian-American and Anglo-Russian Conven-
tions, 1824-1825: An Interpretation," PHR, XIV, No.3 (Sept. 1945),306-307.
43 Bagort to Canning, No. 21, St. Petersburg, May 13, 1823, Bagot, Canning, II, 176;
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 pp. 418,420-421, and by the same
author, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954), pp. 12-14. In May
1823, the Russian army was estimated at 564,000 men, 1,450 guns, and 138,000 horses.
memoirs, he states that Alexander believed a Russian declaration of war
on the Turk would be a victory for the Paris Liberals, but that Austria,
England, and the Porte, all misunderstood his moderation. For more than
two years, Bagot steadfastly affirmed that the tsar did not want war and that
"he will not have it." After an audience with the emperor in April 1825,
Stratford Canning affirmed that his Majesty's views were emphatically
pacific and that he had furnished numerous proofs of his conscientious
desire "to avoid the necessity of an appeal to arms." Augustus G. Stapleton,
George Canning's private secretary and biographer, repeatedly commented
on Alexander's desire for peace from 1822 to 1825 and once declared that
he was "decidedly adverse to war with Turkey." 44
The myth of the tsar's aggressive designs on the Porte derives from the
distrust of Canning and Metternich and from hearsay. In January 1826,
Lord Strangford reported that he had heard about a conversation between
Nesselrode and an anonymous friend which allegedly occurred just after
Alexander's death. According to the story, the Russian foreign minister,
when asked what the tsar's real intentions had been, answered: "War; had
he lived, it would at this hour have been proclaimed."45 It will be a sad day
for Clio when her garment is made of such flimsy fabric. This report of the
tsar's belligerency is no more than legend and should be swept into the
limbo of history reserved for apocryphal accounts. And with this denoue-
ment, the contention that Russia's policies in the Near East and North
America were connected collapses.
Notwithstanding Bemis's assertion, there is no simple explanation for
the tsar's withdrawal of his ukase. Several factors, the most important of
which was lack of profits, influenced the decision. Among them were:
administrative corruption, inefficiency, and extravagance within the main
office of the Russian-American Company; lack of merchandise for barter
with the Indians; the ruthless extermination of fur· bearing animals between
the Kenai Peninsula and Baranov Island, a fact which forced the company
to look south of 55° where the Indians had been prudent enough to conserve
their major trade commodity; the company's exploitation of Aleuts, Indians,
Russian employees, and clergy, which offended Alexander's humanitarian-
ism and latent liberalism. All of these abuses were more responsible than
the "culpable enterprises" of Yankee adventurers for the steady decline in
44 Capo d'Istria, "Ma carriere publique," Sbornik, III (1868), 269, 274; Bagot to
Canning, private, St. Petersburg, June 14, 1823, Bagot, Canning, II, 185; Stratford to
George Canning, St. Petersburg, Apr. 4, 1825, Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, I, 370-
371; Stapleton, Canning, II, 384-386, 395, 398-399, 405.
40 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878, p. 14; Bagot, Canning, II,
185.
the company's profits since 1819. These reprehensible activities, revealed to

the tsar by the joint investigations of A. Y. Druzhenin, director of the
Chancery of the Ministry of Finance, and Captain Vasilii M. Golovnin,
aroused his ire and brought forth his condemnation.46
Other considerations, too, prompted the emperor to adopt a policy of
withdrawal in 1822. The income of many boyars depended on their ability
to sell the products of their estates (flax, hemp, timber), to British merchant
houses in St. Petersburg and Riga. Both nobles and merchants, sensitive to
any development that would hurt their profits, formed powerful vested
interests which pressed the government to annul the Ukase. Alexander,
moreover, was as anxious as Adams to avoid any incident which would
endanger Russo-American friendship. He regarded the United States as a
member of the European state system. Seeing both nations as weak naval
powers, he believed they should cooperate to undermine Britain's naval
supremacy. Since the days of the League of Armed Neutrality, this common
concern had helped to unite them and now constituted another inducement
to return to Russia's traditional policy of advocating freedom of the seas. 47
Quite apart from principle, there were, finally, the twin practical prob-
lems of enforcement and cost. Geography favored the Americans. The
skerrigaard coast of Alaska, punctuated by thousands of islands and sliced
by as many fjords, made it virtually impossible to apprehend Yankee
smugglers. Moreover, the expense of equipping and sending ships round-
the-world in futile attempts to enforce the commercial interdict and to
relieve its economic stranglehold on the Russian settlements became so
great that the company's expedition planned for 1822 was abandoned. Both
cabinet and company thus came to regard interdiction as an ill-advised
48 Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 67-71; Poniatowski, Russie d'Amerique,

pp. 198,205; Bancroft, Alaska, p. 528; Poletica to Adams, Washington, Feb. 28, 1822,
Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Proceedings, II, 35. The Russian-American Company
paid dividends of 155 rubles in 1819, only 82 in 1821, and none thereafter until 1827,
when a dividend of 147 rubles was declared. During the same period that the company
showed no profit (1822-1826), its directors each received a salary of 15,000 rubles
annually plus a bonus of 100,000 rubles.
47 Nesselrode to Tuyll, Verona, Dec. 2/14, 1822, "Russian Corresp.," AHR, XVIII,
538-539; Tuyll to Nesselrode, Washington, Apr. 28/May 10, 1823, ibid., p. 545; Albert
Gallatin to Adams, New York, June 24, 1823, Albert Gallatin, Writings, ed. Henry
Adams (philadelphia, 1879), II, 272 (Gallatin had just returned from Paris, where he
had served as American minister since 1816.); Davidson, Alaska Boundary, p. 45;
M.S. Anderson, Britain's Discovery of Russia, 1553-1815 (London, 1958), pp. 126, 158;
Edward H. Tatum, Jr., United States and Europe, 1815-1823: A Study in the Back-
ground of the Monroe Doctrine (Berkeley, Cal., 1936), pp. 115-116, 139.
policy which, in any case, was too ambitious and expensive to be main-
tained. 48
Neither Adams nor Canning, to be sure, were satisfied with Alexander's
quiet retreat from a position he probably never intended to defend. The
Anglo-American view was that an unwarranted public pretention required
a public renunciation as a guarantee that it would not be reasserted. But
they never doubted that the tsar would put his withdrawal into writing. In
July 1822, more than a year before the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated,
he had offered to negotiate a treaty with each. Perhaps the greatest irony
of the whole affair was that the directors of the Russian-American Company
in 1822 began to supplicate the emperor to repeal the very regulations for
which they were chiefly responsible. The embargo on foreign commerce had
brought famine to the Russian-American posts, ruin to shareholders, and
discontent to the Indians. The directors now repented their folly and urged
the emperor to negotiate treaties with Britain and the United States. But
because British territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest also were ex-
tensive, Bagot could make no progress toward negotiating a mutually ac-
ceptable convention during the summer of 1822. To break the impasse,
Castlereagh planned to discuss the question directly with Nesse1rode when
the two met in Vienna in September. But when the foreign secretary com-
mitted suicide (August 12), this responsibility devolved upon Wellington. 49
48 Mairin Mitchell, Maritime History of Russia, 848-1948 (London, 1949),224-225;

Okun, Russian-American Company, p. 68; Poniatowski, Russie d'Amerique, p. 205.
Between 1819 and 1821, three expeditions cost the company 2,400,000 rubles. No
American merchantman was ever sunk and only one, the Pearl, was captured (1822),
but in response to an American protest, it was released in 1824 and compensation paid.
U.S. Cong., Fur Seal Arbitration, IV, 45.
49 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Sept. 27, 1822, ibid., p. 34; Canning to
Bagot, No.4, Foreign Office, Feb. 25, 1823, and No. 12, July 12, 1823, F.O., Russia,
181/52; Adams to Poletica, Washington, Mar. 30, 1822, ASP, IV, 863; Adams to Tuyll,
Washington, May 7, 1823, ibid., V, 435-436; Canning to Lievcn, Foreign Office, Sept.
12, 1824, Davidson, Alaska Boundary, pp. 46-47; George to Stratford Canning, Lon-
don, Dec. 8, 1824, Poniatowski, Russie d'Amerique, p. 348; cf. ibid., pp. 200-201; Lane-
Poole, Stratford Canning, I, 363; Nesse1rode to TuyU, St. Petersburg, July 13/25, 1822,
Martens, Recueil des traites, XI, 313; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822,
Well. Desp., I, 615-616; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 68, 86-87; Bancroft,
Alaska, pp. 538-541; E. E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870 (New York, 1961),
III, 606-609. Although American merchants defied the Ukase and continued to trade
with the Indians as before, the Russian squadron did effectively prevent any foreign
commerce with Alaskan ports. To avert starvation, General Nicholas N. Muraviev, the
colonial governor, took the only course open to him: in 1823 he disobeyed his orders
and bought supplies from foreigners. He even purchased the American brig, Arab,
renamed her the Baikal, and hired the crew to sail the ship with her entire cargo to
Sitka. Later, this same Yankee crew sailed another vessel, the Rurik, to California
and the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands on a foraging expedition. Included in the provi-
On Thursday, October 17, 1822, two days after the duke's arrival in
Verona, he transmitted to the Russian foreign minister a memorandum which
again protested against the tsar's unwarranted assumption of sovereignty in
the North Pacific. There is reason to believe, he declared, that the area in
question had been discovered by British explorers. Part of the disputed
territory, moreover, had been occupied for years by subjects of his Britannic
Majesty.
The English North-West Company and the Hudson's Bay Company have for
many years established forts and other trading stations in a country called New
Caledonia, situated to the west of a range of mountains, called the Rocky
Mountains, and extending along the shores of the Pacific Ocean from latitude
49° to latitude 60° .1>0
The Hudson's Bay Company, the note concluded, had trading posts on the
Mackenzie River as far north as latitude 66°30'. Significantly, the duke did
not claim any British establishments along the coast, though he specifically
cited interior stations situated on Fraser's lake (55°N lat. and 127°W long.),
M'Cleod's lake (55° and 124°), Stewart's lake 54°30' and 125°), and at the
Rocky Mountain Portage (56° and 121°).51
When one considers that the tsar already had tacitly withdrawn the Ukase
of September 16 and had offered to negotiate a convention with England,
Wellington's note of October 17 seems unnecessarily harsh, but generals,
after all, are seldom renowned for their tact. Shocked and angered by the
vehemence of the British protest, Nesselrode waited five weeks before re-
sponding to it. Then, on Saturday, November 23, he affirmed that Russia
had no desire to go beyond the established limits of her possessions on the
northwest American coast. It is a known fact, he asserted, that the Russian-
American Company, as early as 1799, had founded settlements as far south
as the 55th parallel. Although these posts had received official publicity at
the time, Britain then had made no protest. Even the most recent and
detailed British maps did not indicate any of the trading stations which the
London cabinet alleged were located between 51 ° and 60° north latitude.
The emperor, nonetheless, was ready to negotiate "on the basis of mutual
propriety ... the definitive boundaries" which the two powers claimed for
their possessions on the northwestern coast of America. This negotiation,
he believed, would end "without difficulty to the mutual satisfaction of the
sions brought back to Alaska were such "necessities" as 217 gallons of rum and 133
gallons of brandy."
50 Wellington to Nesselrode, Verona, Oct. 17, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 372-373.
51 Ibid. Sir J. H. Pelly, Duputy-Govemor of the Hudson's Bay Company, supplied
the London cabinet with material on the company's trading posts in western Canada.
Pelly to Canning, London, Sept. 25, 1822, ibid., pp. 312-314.
GREA T BRIT AIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 239
two states." It would then be found that the precautionary measures taken
regarding Russian-America not only conformed to the tsar's rights of
sovereignty, but also to international law. 52
Although the Russian note is dated November 23, Nesselrode did not
transmit it to Wellington until the night of the 27th. Even then he avoided
a personal confrontation with the duke by using Count Lieven as an inter-
mediary. When Wellington had read the memoire, he bluntly told the
ambassador, who awaited his reply, that it did not enable "his Majesty's
government to found upon it any negotiation to settle the questions arising
out of the ukase.... " 53 The issue, he declared, stood exactly where it had
been. Returning to the attack on the following day (November 28), Welling-
ton informed Lieven that the London cabinet did not acknowledge either the
"existence or the extent" of the exclusive sovereignty which the tsar claimed
in North America. Russia's assumption of the right to exclude foreign ships
from a considerable area of the open sea was, moreover, a violation of inter-
national law. Britain, of course, could not found a negotiation on a paper in
which such a proscription again was broadly set forth. No nation on Earth,
the Iron Duke pronounced, has the right to deny another the free use of the
open sea, though any power, of its own accord, can restrict itself from
navigating a particular coast or sea. The Russian note of November 23 was
inconsistent with this principle, but if the tsar would declare his readiness
to negotiate "upon the whole subject," without restating the objectionable
interdiction of the Ukase, which Britain could not admit, the issue could be
settled amicably and satisfactorily by the two governments. 54
Time was now an important factor, but on Friday, November 29, the eve
of Wellington's departure from Verona, he and Nesselrode held their final
conversation and at last put the Northwestern Question "in a train of
negotiation." In an entente cordiale, they agreed: (1) that both the Russian
memoire of November 23, and the British reply of the 28th should be
considered "void acts" (non avenus); and (2) that upon Lieven's return to
London, he should assure the foreign secretary by means of an official
communication that the emperor was ready to negotiate "upon the whole
question of. .. [his] claims in North America, reserving them all if the
result of the negotiation should not be satisfactory to both parties." To
Canning, Wellington remarked that this was the kind of note for which he
52 Nesselrode to Wellington, Verona, Nov. 23, 1822, ibid., 577-578.

54 Wellington to Lieven, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid., pp. 606-607.
had wished. Thus the discussion of the Russian ukase at Verona terminated
in a spirit of amity.55
But the duke's expectations notwithstanding, negotiations did not ensue
from the Congress, primarily because of a disagreement between Britain
and the United States over procedure. Although both nations had acted in
concert in protesting against the "mare clausum ukase," Canning through-
out 1823 hesitated to accept Adams' proposal for a joint Anglo-American
demarche to conclude with Russia a tripartite convention officially with-
drawing the interdiction. Canning not only distrusted Adams, but also
doubted the wisdom of cooperation on an issue over which the London and
Washington governments themselves held such conflicting views. Separate,
but parallel, negotiations, the foreign secretary thought, would be more
effective.56
As Adams had foreseen, Britain, having a common frontier with Russia
in America and almost no trade along the northwest coast, even as late as
1822, was far more concerned about the territorial than the commercial
question. Not only did the Hudson's Bay Company neglect the lucrative
China market, but Russian trade in seal and sea-otter pelts did not conflict
with British commerce, which was oriented eastward across the continent
(down the Finlay, Peace, and Slave rivers to Lake Athabaska), with beaver
still the most important fur, and St. Petersburg, the primary market. The
chief competitor of the Hudson's Bay Company had been the Northwest
Company, and their rivalry almost brought ruin to both before they merged
on March 26, 1821. In short, while Adams emphasized the coastal trade
aspect of the Northwestern Question, Canning concentrated on the bounda-
ry issue. His objective was to push Russia north or 55° and the United
States south of 49°. As early as July 1823, Adams, indeed, had offered to
settle for the 49th parallel, but Canning rejected this line, since it would
give to the United States almost the entire course of the Columbia River and
many of its tributaries. The British secretary condemned American claims
as "not less extravagant in regard to Territorial Sovereignty, than those
which were previously advanced by Russia, with respect to Maritime Juris-
diction." Canning feared a Russo-American entente on the boundary issue.
To him Adams was trying to revive the pretentions of Spain in the Nootka
55 Wellington to Canning, VerO'na, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., pp. 615-616.

56 Canning to Bagot, NO'. 12, FO'reign Office, July 12, 1823, F.O., Russia, 181/52;
Canning to Stuart, London, July 23, 1823, F.O., France, 146/56; Temperley, Canning,
pp. 104-105, 491. For a competent and detailed account of these negotiations, which
culminated in the Anglo-Russian Convention of February 28, 1825, see Richard A.
Ward, "Great Britain and the Russian Ukase of September 16, 1821" (unpublished
M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1970), pp. 25-49, 61-73.
Sound Affair. Any claims to territory between 42° and 51 ° were just as
inadmissible in 1823 as they had been in 1790. Although the Tory Quarterly
Review recommended acceptance of a line drawn at "48° or thereabouts,"
the powerful Hudson's Bay Company opposed the proposed continuance
of the 1818 boundary from the Rocky Mountains to the coast. 57 For these
reasons, Canning declined joint negotiations with the United States vis-a.-vis
Russia, but in Janury 1824, he seized upon the Monroe Doctrine as a pretext
for this decision. As he explained to Bagot, this "extraordinary doctrine"
constituted another factor which could be "stated to Mr. Rush with more
explicitness, than those which I have just now detailed." 58 But Canning
cautioned Bagot that in his dealings with Middleton, he should be guided by
Titania's advice to the fairies:
Be kind and courteous to this gentleman;
Hop in his walks and gambol in his eyes;
Feed him with apricots and dewberries. 59
In contrast to the cordiality of Russo-American relations in the 1820's,
described by William A. Williams as "a realistic romance," those of Britain
and the United States, if correct, were far from friendly. Canning regarded
the Yankees with cynical contempt and suspicion, an attitude which Adams
and Monroe reciprocated. Canning privately called his American counter-
part "a scoundrel," and his cousin, Stratford Canning, who was British
minister at Washington from 1820-1823, sarcastically referred to Adams as
"Squintz." On his part, the American secretary delivered a long diatribe
against Britain in a Fourth of July oration to Congress, 1821. 60 The
American public at large bore toward England, according to Edward H.
Tatum, Jr., "an active hatred which was ... the product of tradition and
57 Canning to Bagot, No. 12, Foreign Office, July 12, 1823, F.O., Russia, 181/52;
Pelly to Castlereagh, London, Mar. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 317-318; Pelly to Canning,
London, Sept. 25, 1822, ibid., I, 313; Wellington to Nesselrode, Verona, Oct. 17, 1822,
ibid., 372-373; entry for Dec. 18, 1823, Rush, A Residence, II, 82-83; entry for Jan. 2,
1824, ibid., p. 86-87; Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, III, 405-406, 610; Bancroft, North-
west Coast, I, 582-584; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 78, 84; Davidson, Alas-
ka Boundary, pp. 39-40, 46; Bemis, John Quincy Adams, p. 519, Ward, "Britain and
the Ukase," pp. 40-41, 44-46.
58 Canning to Bagot, No.2, Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1823, F.O., Russia, 181/52.
Canning informed Rush of this decision on Jan. 6, 1824. Rush, A Residence, II, 88-89.
59 Canning to Bagot, private and confidential, Gloucester Lodge, Jan. 22, 1824,
Bagot, Canning, II, 217, quoting A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act III, Scene 1.
80 Williams, American-Russian Relations, pp. 3-4; George to Statford Canning, Lon-
don, Mar. 17, 1824, Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, I, 336; Stratford Canning to Ba-
got, private and confidential, July 25, 1824, Bagot, Canning, II, 271; George Canning
to Bagot, Gloucester Lodge, Jan. 22, 1824, ibid., pp. 215·216; Poletica to Nesselrode,
Philadelphia, July 12/24, 1821, "Russian Corresp.," AHR, XVIII, 327.
unreasoning instinct." 61 Disputes over Oregon, Cuba, the Maine-New

Brunswick boundary, the Ambrister-Arbuthnot Affair, the right of search
and seizure on the high seas, and the closure of British West Indian ports
to American traders, all conspired to strain Anglo-American relations in
the 1820's. Washington's northwest boundary question was with Britain,
not Russia; the Secretary of State feared Britain, not Russia, because he
knew the tsar had no political ambitions in North America, but was inter-
ested only in the fur-trade. An analysis of this state of affairs with all its
complex factors, conflicting interests, personal ambitions and animosities
seemes to support Tatum's assertion that the noncolonization clause of the
Monroe Doctrine was a warning to Britain, not Russia or France as others
contend. The assertion that Monroe and Adams feared Russian aggrandize-
ment on the northwest coast is a myth. They wished only to use Russia as
a counterpoise to Britain in the Oregon territory; Canning and Alexander,
ironically, appear to have cast the United States in the same role. Each of
the three powers, in short, sought to play its two rivals against each other.62
As Canning viewed this political triangle: "The effect of the ultra-liberalism
of our Yankee co-operators on the ultra-despotism of our Aix-Ia-Chapelle
allies gives me just the balance that I wanted." 63
Aware of this situation and urged on by the directors of the Russian-
American Company, the tsar created few difficulties for the American
negotiation. As Temperley succinctly explains:
Alexander regarded Adams as a sincere republican who negotiated with
Monarchists, Canning as an insincere Monarchist who negotiated with Re-
publicans. He differed with Adams only over America, with Canning over
everything in Europe. Moreover, he thought that if he showed favour to the
81 Tatum, United States and Europe, p. 57.

62 Canning to British Commissioners (William Huskisson and Stratford Canning),
Foreign Office, May 31, 1824, Some Official Correspondence of George Canning, ed.
Edward J. Stapleton (London, 1887), II, 77, 79-80; "Second Report of a Committee of
the House of Representatives of the United States: Northwest Coast of America, May
15, 1826," ibid., pp. 99, 108-109; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 448-453; Victor J. Farrar,
"The Reopening of the Russo-American Convention of 1824," Wash. Hist. Qu., XI
(1920), 83-88; Tatum, United States and Europe, pp. 273-278, 279-294; Mitchell,
Maritime History of Russia, p. 240; Ward, "Britain and the Ukase," pp. 47-48. The
works of Temperley, Perkins, Bemis, and Bailey already have been cited. The thesis
that the Monroe Doctrine was aimed at France is ably presented by Arthur P.
Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830
(Baltimore, 1941), pp. 492-506.
63 Canning to Bagot, private and confidential, Gloucester Lodge, Jan. 22, 1822,
Bagot, Canning, II, 217-218.

United States he would raise up a rival to the commercial marine of England.
Hence he was more amiable to the one than to the other.64
On April 7 (N.S.), 1824, the tsar authorized the company to resume trade
with foreigners at Sitka, and ten days later (April 17), he concluded with
Middleton the Russo-American convention. By its terms, the southern
boundary of Alaska was fixed at 54°40', and Americans were given free
access to the coasts and inland waterways of all Russian possessions for ten
years. 65
After great difficulty, occasioned chiefly by boundary disputes, Stratford
Canning 66 managed to secure a similar treaty which was signed in St. Pe-
tersburg on February 28, 1825. By its provisions, Britain reluctantly
accepted the 54°40' line as the southern limit of Russian America, but she
gained free navigation of the Pacific, access to the Bering Strait for the
purpose of whaling, sovereignty over the entire course of the Mackenzie
River, and admission to Sitka for ten years. (Canning had wanted free access
to this port forever.) The Northwestern Question thus was officially, ef-
fectively, and peacefully settled. 67
64 Ternperley, Canning, pp. 492-493. The high regard which Adams and Alexander
held for each other undoubtedly stemmed from their cordial association while Adams
was minister at St. Petersburg, 1809-1814.
65 Russo-American Convention, st. Petersburg, Apr. 5/17, 1824, ASP, V, 432-435
(French text and official English translation); Middleton to Adams, No. 35, Apr. 19,
1824, ibid., p. 461; Okun, Russian-American Company, pp. 86-87; Lester B. Shippee,
"Oregon and the Diplomacy of 1821-1827," Chap. III of The Federal Relations of
Oregon, in Oregon Historical Quarterly, XIX (Sept. 1918), 196. The U.S. Senate
ratified this convention in January 1825. In contrast to Adams' exultation, the Treaty
of 1824 evoked from the Russian-American Company the vigorous protest that it
went too far. The directors wanted the Bostonians barred from the Siberian coast,
the Aleutian Islands, and all of Alaska north of 57°. Nesselrode memorandum, St.
Petersburg. July 21, 1824, U.S. Cong., Fur Seal Arbitration, II, 54-55.
68 Stratford Canning was in St. Petersburg on a special mission from Jan. 29 to
Apr. 17, 1825. His instructions of Dec. 8, 1824, gave him full powers to attend the
tsar's proposed conference on Turkish affairs and to negotiate a treaty on the N orth-
west Question. The former power, however, was canceled when the emperor delayed
sending to Constantinople Ribeaupierre, the newly appointed Russian ambassador.
(Instead Minciaky was sent as charge d'affaires.) Bagot had left St. Petersburg on
Sept. 4, 1824, to become ambassador at The Hague. During the interval between his
departure and the arrival of Viscount Strangford on Nov. 7, 1825, first, Edward M.
Ward (Sept. 4, 1824-Apr. 13, 1825), and then, Edward C. Disbrowe (Apr. 13-Nov.7,
1825) held the post of ad interim minister plenipotentiary. F.O., Russia, 65/144; F.O.,
Great Britain and General: full powers and commissions, 1823-1834, 83/889; F.O.,
King's Letter Books: Russia, 1799-1828, 90/59; F.O., Miscellana, Series I: Royal
Letters, Russia, 1816-1834,95/676.
67 Anglo-Russian Convention, St. Petersburg, Feb. 16/28, 1825, Martens, Recueil
des traites, XI, 316-322, which gives the French and Russian texts; for the official
English translation, see Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, Proceedings, II, 14-16; Temper-
ley, Canning, p. 493; Ward, "Britain and the Ukase," pp. 61-73.
In resume, the major conclusions reached in this investigation are:

(1) that Russia had no imperialistic designs on North America in the
1820's; (2) that the Ukase of September 16 did not summon the Monroe
Doctrine into existence; (3) that the noncolonization clause of the Monroe
Doctrine was aimed at Britain, not Russia, as Tatum has contended; (4) that
for the last four years of his reign, Alexander wanted peace, not war, with
Turkey; (5) that, therefore, no connection existed between the Near Eastern
and Northwestern questions; (6) that the tsar revoked his commercial inter-
dict and contracted his territorial claims for a variety of reasons, all of
which involved purely Russian interests; Anglo-American protests had little
or nothing to do with it; (7) that discussion at the Congress of Verona did
little to promote the settlement of this issue, primarily because of Welling-
ton's tactlessness; (8) that Canning never seriously considered joint negoti-
ations with the United States to obtain revocation of the Russian ukase, but
seized upon the Monroe Doctrine as a pretext for declining Adams' over-
ture; (9) that each of the three great powers involved tried to play the other
two against the third; (10) that during these proceedings the Monroe Doc-
trine was not on trial; indeed, it was not even mentioned. They are mistaken
who say that the Treaty of 1824 marked the first triumph of this famous
declaration.
During 1821 and 1822, two fundamental issues - the Russo-Turkish dispute
and the Greek war of independence - comprised the Eastern Crisis, but by
the opening of the Congress of Verona, they had become intricately inter-
woven. The former, it will be recalled, stemmed from Turkish violation of
treaties which gave Russia extensive rights in Moldavia and Wallachia and
enabled the tsar to claim protectorship over the Christian minority in the
Ottoman Empire. When the sultan retaliated against his rebellious Greek
subjects by closing the Straits to their ships and fanatical Janizaries
murdered Patriarch Gregory, these historical components became fused into
a single complex problem. 68
Neither the British Parliament nor the nation fully realized the gravity
of the Eastern Question until Stroganov's departure from Constantinople in
August 1821, but from the moment Russia severed diplomatic relations
with the Porte, Britain opposed any intervention in the affairs of Turkey.
Although British policy was based on complex, shifting, and often
66 Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 54, 59-60; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and
Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 416-418.
contradictory factors, four considerations were paramount: (1) the pro-
tection of British trade on the Black Sea, (2) the maintenance of the Otto-
man Empire and Persia as barriers to the further advance of Russia south-
ward toward the Levant, where Britain had important commercial interests,
(3) control of the Ionian Islands, over which England had held a protector-
ate since 1815, and (4) Britain's traditional interest in preserving the
continental balance of power which, in this case, meant supporting Austria
as a means of preventing the spread of Russian influence into Central
Europe and the Balkans, especially Serbia and Bosnia. In short, Britain's
strategic position in the Mediterranean and the security of her commercial
interests dictated that the London cabinet should maintain peace between
Russia and Turkey and should observe strict neutrality in the Greco-Otto-
man conflict. 69
To discover a formula for solving the Eastern Question, Britain cooper-
ated with Austria, whose interests in the area paralleled and complimented
her own; and by October 1822, their efforts had succeeded in easing the
Russo-Turkish crisis, despite the additional demands on the Porte which
the tsar had raised at Vienna. The Congress of Verona wisely refrained
from making this issue an "affaire de congres," but treated it confidentially
as a cabinet question. The conversations, moreover, were confined entirely
to the points of the Russian note of September 26, which was reaffirmed on
November 9, 1822. The attitude of the Russian ministers indicated that all
idea of a rupture with Turkey had been abandoned. The tsar had resorted to
severe language only to avoid being accused of weakness or fear. In reality,
his thoughts were so occupied with Spain that he waited only for the first
opportunity to return his ambassador to the Porte. Much depended, how-
ever, on the tone of the Turkish reply to the Russian note of September 26. 70
The first five-power ministers' conference on the Eastern Question at
Verona was held on Saturday, November 9, and was attended by Metter-
89 Driault, La question d'Orient, p. 107; Ward and Gooch, Camb. Hist. oj Brit.
For. Pol., II, 42; Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 58; Schroeder, Metternich's Di-
plomacy, pp. 10-11; Bartlett, Castlereagh, pp. 225-226. For an account of British rule
in the Ionian Iles, see Fran90is Lenormant, La question ionienne devant l'Europe
(Paris, 1859), and, by the same author, La Grece et les iles ioniennes, etudes de
politique et d'histoire contemporaine (Paris, 1865). In both works, Lenormant em-
phasized Britain's Grecophobe policies in the islands.
70 Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, July 15, 1821, Lebzeltern, Rapports,
p. 76; Bagot to Castlereagh, St. Petersburg, June 20, 1821, quoted in Webster, Castle-
reagh, pp. 358-359; declaration of Count Tatischev, Verona, Nov. 9,1822, Well. Desp.,
1,525-528; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 116; Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 140, 149, 156-
157, 166-167; Lebzeltern, Memoires, p. 423; Jelavich, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 56;
Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 58-59, 69.
nich, Tatischev, Wellington, Caraman, and Hatzfeldt. Tatischev opened the

proceedings by presenting a memoire in which he complained that since the
Vienna conference, the Turks had done nothing to honor their promise to
redress Russian grievances. On the contrary they had added new griefs to
them and had not replied to the proposal sent to them from Vienna (i.e.,
the note of September 26). Despite the Porte's assurances that Turkish
troops would be withdrawn from Wallachia and Moldavia, they still covered
the Principalities. The Reis-Effendi's accusation of August 27 that Russian
agents had instigated the Greek revolt was, of course, completely false.
This insurrection, Tatischev affirmed, was the work of the same sects which
had caused upheavals in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. He concluded the
declaration by reproducing textually the Russian Circular of September 26
as a statement of the only conditions for reestablishing diplomatic relations
between the two empires. 71
When Tatischev had thus established the audacity of the Porte in im-
puting to Russia anything other than moderation, Metternich was ready
with a eulogy to the noble and disinterested views of the tsar. He assured
Tatischev that Austria had in some measure persuaded the sultan that
Russian agents had had nothing to do with the Greek insurrection. Long
before the revolt began, he had called the Porte's attention to the work of
Greek revolutionaries who had intimate connections with their comrades
in other countries. In conclusion, the chancellor praised the tsar for his
forbearance and promised to support at Constantinople his just demands. 72
Caraman and Hatzfeldt, "declared their entire adherence" to Metternich's
declaration and promised, with Wellington, to answer the Russian memoire
at a future conference. 73
As aforesaid, Russia's commerce on the Black Sea and the passage of
her ships thence into the Mediterranean were of major interest to Britain.
It had been the custom for Russia and other nations who had permission
71 Precis of the conference of Nov. 9, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 524-525; declaration
of Tatischev, Verona, Nov. 9, 1822, ibid., pp. 525-528; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 116.
72 Declaration of the Austrian cabinet, Verona, Nov. 9, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 528-
529; cf. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,116-117.
73 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 523. Although
Alexander had become reconciled to Strangford at Vienna, Tatischev continued to
oppose leaving the interests of Russia in his hands and suggested that Baron Ludwig
von Lebzeltern, Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, who was then in Verona, be
entrusted with this mission. Indeed, the Russian delegation at the Congress considered
Strangford's "precis of his conference of the 27th of August with the Reis Effendi ...
to be a romance from beginning to end." During the first two weeks of November,
therefore, the departure of Lebzeltern for Constantinople was generally regarded in
Verona as imminent. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 540;
cf. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 115.
to pass the Straits to give the protection of their flags to the vessels of states
which did not enjoy this privilege. But with the outbreak of the revolt in the
Morea, Greek merchants had scarcely waited long enough to lower the
Turkish crescent and star before raising the tsarist ensign. The subsequent
rupture of Russo-Turkish relations, however, had led the Porte to declare,
as a customs regulation, it would no longer recognize Russian protection
of Greek ships. The tsar, of course, had protested that this measure was
directed against Russian trade, but his actions at Vienna and Verona
indicate that he was less interested in securing the revocation of this interdict
than in obtaining for Denmark, Naples, Sardinia, and Spain the privilege of
passing the Bosphorus. Since the size of Russia's merchant marine was in-
sufficient to maintain the prosperity of the Crimean provinces, what Alexan-
der really wanted was to increase the number of nations trading in the Black
Sea area, thus stimulating commerce. 74
The dispute arising from Turkish restrictions on Black Sea trade did
not involve the violation of any treaty but stemmed from long custom which
had sanctioned the Ottoman practice of permitting ships to sail the Straits
under false flags. But at Vienna, it will be recalled, the tsar had not insisted
upon a return to this practice; on the contrary, he had offered the Porte an
alternative: "Accept the passage [through the Straits] of Sicilian, Portuguese,
Spanish, and other vessels [sailing under their own flags]."75 To force his
allies to support this additional demand on Turkey, Alexander threatened
not to renew diplomatic relations with the Porte until this new issue had
been settled. The maneuver succeeded: while Strangford supported Sar-
dinia's efforts at Constantinople to secure free passage of the Bosphorus,
Metternich announced at Verona on November 5 that Austria would assist
Denmark and Naples in similar negotiations. 76
Informed by Strangford of the tsar's proposals for settling the Black Sea
commercial question, Canning on October 25 denounced the use of false
flags to protect ships navigating the Straits as "preposterous," unjustified,
and an obvious "afterthought," an opinion shared alike by Liverpool, Ro-
binson, Strangford, and Wellington, though Canning at this time did not
know of the duke's concurrence. 77 The secretary put the question to his
74 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 489-490.

75 Nesselrode to Montmorency (copy of note), Vienna, Sept. 26, 1822, A.A.E.,
Congres de Verone, Vol. 723.
78 Ibid.; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 5,1822, Well. Desp., 1,490.
77 Strangford to Canning, No. 151, Vienna, Oct. 5, 1822, ibid., p. 432; Canning
to Wellington, Foreign Office, Oct. 25, 1822, ibid., p. 431; Wellington to Canning,
Verona, Nov. 5 and 18, 1822, ibid., pp. 490 and 539-540.
Grace:
Is it possible for the Emperor [Alexander], who quarrelled upon the ground of
treaties, and professed himself to be satisfied if treaties were fulfilled, to quarrel
again, and proceed to extremities, on a point on which he has neither treaties
nor right on his side? 78
Canning, therefore, instructed Wellington not to support, nor "to urge ...
as an object of negotiation," Russian "protection of an unprivileged navi-
gation" on the Black Sea. This admanition, hawever, was unnecessary, for
the duke already had condemned the use of false flags as "a bad practice." 79
Neither Wellington, nor Metternich, nor Lebzeltern believed Alexander
intended
to assert the right that his flag should cover Greek vessels, particularly at this
moment, or that the Porte should concede ... such an abuse of the privilege of
passing granted to the Russian flag ....80
The tsar, indeed, never mentioned this demand as one which he expected
Britain to support and urge upon the Parte. Strangford appears not only
to' have misunderstood the meaning af the Russian note of September 26
but also to have deliberately misrepresented to Canning the real views of
Wellington on this issue. The duke, in fact, strongly favored the use of
British good offices on behalf of those states which had not yet secured
the privilege of passing the Straits, an apinion fram which Strangford dis-
sented. The admission of other natians to Black Sea commerce, the viscount
argued, would seriously hurt British shipping in the area. To Wellington,
however, the issue was clear: did Britain wish to' preserve peace or to pratect
her commerce. It seemed certain, tao, that the Porte would grant the re-
quested rights of passage, since Austria, France, and Prussia already had
thrown their influence into the balance to achieve this end. Britain, the duke
contended, had nothing to gain by refusing her good offices, and Canning's
supplementary instructions af November 15 confirmed this view. S!
While the Wellington-Strangford debate continued, his Grace completed
the preliminary draft of his reply to Tatischev's note of November 9, and
on Tuesday, the 12th, he showed it to Nesselrode. Still bound by Canning's
instructions of October 25, the duke explained to' the Russian fa reign
minister that the London cabinet could nat adapt "the principle of making
78 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Oct. 25,1822, ibid., p. 431.
79 Ibid., p. 433; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, ibid., p. 60. Welling-
ton received these instructions on Nov. 5.
80 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 539.
81 Ibid., pp. 539-542; Strangford to Wellington, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 469;
Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Nov. 15, 1822, ibid., pp. 535-536.
the Black Sea another Baltic, or of the Bosphorus a Sound ... ," and the
sultan certainly would not accept it unless he were beaten in war, a con-
tingency which must be avoided. A Russo-Turkish conflict, Wellington
feared, would wreck the Alliance and thus unlease civil disorders and revo-
lution throughout Europe. For the present, therefore, Britain could go no
further than to continue assisting Sardinia through good offices to obtain
permission to pass the Straits. 8.2
Displeased by British views on the commercial aspect of the Eastern
Question, Nesselrode reproached Wellington for drawing too fine a dis-
tinction between demands founded on treaty and those which were not and
complained that Britain was less cooperative than Russia's other allies. The
duke answered that Britain's language was necessarily "cautious and
measured," since she knew she must do what she promised. Disturbed by
this obstinate attitude, Nesselrode urged Wellington to hold back his note
until he should know whether the London cabinet would joint the other
allied courts in persuading the Porte to issue firmans (sultanic command-
ments) to foreign ships for the navigation of the Straits. Because his own
convictions, strengthened by the further appeals of Nesselrode and Lieven,
disposed Wellington to accede to this request, he was relieved by the arrival
of Canning's supplementary instructions of November 15 which authorized
him to alter the British position on the Black Sea commerce issue. Britain,
the foreign secretary now declared, would support the petitions of Denmark,
Naples, and Portugal to obtain the privilege of passing the Bosphorus. but
it was expedient to conclude the negotiation with the Porte on Sardinia's
behalf before "the interests of any other Power are blended with it." Circum-
stances completely independent of the Eastern Question (meaning the
threat of a Franco-Spanish war). made it inconvenient, even useless, to
initiate at Constantinople a demarche on behalf of Spain at the present
time. sa
At a special four-power conference on Tuesday. November 26, France.
Prussia, and Britain replied to the Russian note of the 9th.B4 The Marquis
de Caraman declared that France agreed completely with Russia on the
82 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 523; Bartlett, Castle-
reagh, p. 228.
83 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12 and 28,1822, Well. Desp., 1,524,598-
599; Lieven to Wellington, Verona, Nov. 1822, ibid., p. 478; (This note is undated,
but it probably was written and transmitted to Wellington about the 20th.); Canning
to Wellington, Foreign Office, Nov. 15, 1822, ibid., p. 536.
84 Proces-verbal de la conference du 26me novembre 1822, ibid., p. 599; Boisle-
comte, A.A.E., 722, 8. Metternich did not attend this conference since he had answered
the Russian note on November 9, immediately after Tatischev had presented it.
conditions "attached to the reestablishment of her regular diplomatic

relations with the Porte." 85 Expressing similar approval of the Russian
memoire, Hatzfeldt asserted that Prussia would join her allies in prevailing
upon the sultan to grant the tsar's "just demands." 86 Britain, Wellington
affirmed, desired the renewal of amicable relations between Russia and the
Porte, but she also wanted the restoration of prosperity to Russia's Black
Sea trade. To achieve the first objective, Strangford would use his influence
to persuade the Porte to announce officially what it had tacit1~ done to
comply with the "Four Points" of the tsar's ultimatum of July 18, 1821:
(1) the reestablishment of Christian churches in Greece destroyed since the
beginning of the insurrection, (2) the protection of the Christian religion,
(3) the grant of amnesty to innocent Greeks as well as those who returned
to their former allegiance, and (4) the evacuation of Ottoman forces from
the Danubian Principalities and the restoration of the hospodars to their
former authority. To obtain the second goal, Britain, in concert with her
allies, would use her good offices to secure the passage of the Straits by
ships of nations lacking that privilege. This Turkish concession, the duke
declared, would "place the commerce of the Black Sea upon a better footing
than that on which it stood previous to the recent disturbances .... 87
The French and Prussian notes differed from the British declaration in
two important respects: the former made no statement of interest in the
Black Sea trade nor even a specific reference to it, while the latter contained
a commentary favorable to Turkey, averring that the Porte already had
complied with every demand to which Russia was entitled under existing
treaties. Indeed, Wellington boldly asserted: "It is to be hoped that the time
is not far distant, when his Imperial Majesty will consider that the Porte
is entitled to the expression of his high satisfaction.... " 88
After Caraman, Hatzfeldt, and Wellington had answered the Russian
memoire of November 9, they agreed, at Tatischev's request, to meet the
following evening to receive the tsar's reaction to their replies. For this
85 Declaration du marquis de Caraman, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, Well . Desp., I,

600-601.
86 Declaration du prince de Hatzfeldt, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, ibid., p. 601.
87 Declaration du duc de Wellington, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, ibid., pp. 599-600; cf.
Prokesch-Osten, Abtall der Grieschen, III, 95-101; Capo d'Istria, "Ma carriere pu-
blique," Sbornik, III, 267.
Btl Declaration du duc de Wellington, Verona, Nov. 26, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 600;
cf. Stuart to Bathurst, No. 246, Paris, Sept. 5, 1822, P.O., France, 146/48, quoting
dispatches from Constantinople of August 10, and from Vienna of August 24, 1822;
Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O.,
Austria, 120/54; Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 150; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari.
VII, 196; Webster, Cast/ereagh, pp. 378-380, 396-400; Temperley, Canning, p. 325.
purpose, Metternich, too, attended the conference of the 27th. Alexander

conveyed his satisfaction with the allied support of the conditions set forth
in the Circular of September 26 as the only ones on which he could re-
establish relations with the Ottoman Empire. The rights and interests of
Russia did not permit him to make further concessions; but as Metternich
and Wellington had hoped, the emperor left the direction of negotiations
at Constantinople in the hands of his allies, though he warned them that he
expected these proceedings to be fruitful. 89
For a while at Vienna, Alexander had been disposed to replace the
Turkophile Strangford with the Austrian ambassador to the Porte; but due
to the intercession of Metternich and Wellington, by the time discussion
of eastern affairs was resumed at Verona, the viscount had been restored
to the emperor's favor and the "censure of his past conduct ... removed." 90
Strangford, reprimanded for his indiscreet language at Vienna and Verona
and admonished to represent Britain, not himself and his grievances against
the tsar, again was placed in charge of negotiations with the Porte. In this
capacity, he was directed to take the lead in discussions with the Reis-
Effendi and "to fix" for the other allied ministers "the part which they are
to take severally in the negotiation." 91 Because of the importance which
both Britain and Russia attached to the Black Sea grain trade, Wellington
pointedly instructed Strangford to urge the Porte to perform every treaty
provision which favored Russian commerce and to proceed with arranging
for Sardinian ships to pass the Bosphorus, for the London cabinet could
not undertake another demarche until that negotiation had ended. Depart-
ing from Verona on Thursday, November 28, Strangford returned to his
post via Trieste and Corfu. With him went the hopes of Metternich and
Wellington that he was now "satisfied ... and disposed to do his best," for
his influence at Constantinople was great. 92
If the Congress of Verona disposed of the Russo-Turkish dispute by
89 Proces-verbal de la conference du 26me novembre 1822, Well. Desp., I, 599;
proces-verbal de 1a conference du 27me novembre 1822, ibid., p. 601; declaration
du comte Tatischev, Verona, Nov. 27,1822, ibid., p. 602.
90 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid., p. 599; cf. same to same,
Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 540; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confi-
dential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 3;
Gentz, Depeches inedites, 11,146; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 457-458.
91 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 540; Wellington
to Strangford: Separate Memorandum, Verona, Nov. 28,1822, ibid., p. 604.
92 Wellington's Memorandum for Lord Strangford, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid.,
p. 603; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 540-541. Upon his
arrival in Constantinople, Strangford found the new Austrian internuncio, Baron
Franz von Ottenfels, who had presented his credentials to the sultan on October 15.
Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 159; Prokesch-Osten, Abfall der Griechen, I, 179.
adopting a "meaningless formula," which "involved no action," it dis-

avowed the Greeks' struggle for independence by turning a deaf ear to their
appeals for assistance. The Austrian and British delegations took great pains
to separate the Greek from the Russo-Ottoman question, for they recognized
that the tsar's treaties gave him a certain right to intervene in the Danubian
Principalities. But once the Congress had accepted the distinction, it ignored
the cause of modem Hellas.93
Throughout 1822 Strangford's orders from home remained the same: do
not meddle in Greek affairs. Castlereagh at first had shown no sympathy
at all for the Greek cause, regarding it as essentially revolutionary - an out-
growth of the same spirit of insurrection which was systematically spread-
ing over Europe. Even if the Greeks succeeded in expelling the Turks, he
had argued in 1821, they would have difficulty in establishing a stable
government. 94 But by July 1822, as Castlereagh's instructions for the Vienna
conference clearly reveal, he had begun to plan for the future. He foresaw
that the time was near when Britain, on the precedent of the Spanish
American colonies, must recognize the Greeks as belligerents. Castlereagh,
moreover, contemplated the "creation of a qualified Greek government,"
but he warned that Britain must not commit herself "beyond the limits of
good offices: engagements in the nature of a guarantee are to be considered
altogether inadmissable." 95
In placing the protection of Turkey above the cause of Greek inde-
pendence, Castlereagh for once agreed with British public opinion. As Cha-
teaubriand commented in July 1822:
All England is Turkish through Russophobia. This sentiment is advantageous at
the moment, because it is favorable to peace. But at the bottom of this policy,
there is something inexplicable, or rather very explicable: peace but with the
abasement of Russia. That is the secret;96
The romantic ambassador's observation is, of course, an exaggeration;
nonetheless, it is more accurate than Trevelyan's opposing statement that
the classical and literary education that then moulded and inspired the
Qa Sweet, Gentz, p. 248; Crawley, The Greek Question, p. 26; Hauranne, Hist. du
govt. parI., VII, 196; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 536; entries for Mon., Nov. 4,
and Sat., Nov. 9,1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, 111,105,107.
Q4 Castlereagh to Alexander, Foreign Office, July 16, 1821, Castlereagh, Corresp.,
3rd. ser., IV, 403-404; Castlereagh to Bagot, Foreign Office, Dec. 14, 1821, ibid., 445;
same to same, No. 13, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, F.O., Continent: Hanover, 92/47;
Crawley, The Greek Question, p. 35.
QS Castlereagh's instructions, Well. Desp., I, 284-285; cf. Webster, Castlereagh, pp.
399-400; Bartlett, Castlereagh, 230-231.
Q8 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, No. 41, London, July 19, 1822, A.A.E.,
I'Angleterre: correspondance, 1822,615,316.
GREAT BRIT AIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 253
English mind had the power to make Englishmen sympathize with Greece,
even more than Christianity had the power to make them sympathize with
Balkan Christians. "Whereas the sympathy with South America had its roots
in commerce," the Whig historian wrote in 1922, "the sympathy with Greece
had its roots in culture." 97 In 1822, before Byron had died at Missolonghi,
only the intellectuals supported the cause of Greek liberty. The vast majority
of Englishmen, as Chateaubriand perceived, were indeed anti-Russian rather
than pro-Greek.98
Canning, no less than CastIereagh, wanted to remain neutral in the Greek
revolution. Though a Grecophile at heart, the new foreign secretary did not
permit this bias to influence his conduct of foreign affairs. If he wished
the Greeks well, he also disliked involving Britain in any continental issue.
But British Levantine interests, as aforesaid, demanded the containment of
Russian hegemony in the Near East. Canning, therefore, continued his
predecessor's policy of defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire but
initiated a new tactical move: the grant of undercover support to the Greeks
as a means of weakening the tsar's influence with them. Conditions for
setting this plan in motion were, however, unfavorable in the fall of 1822.
At this time, Canning, of course, had no intention of openly supporting the
Greeks. As he explained: if England used force in Greece, she "would be
accused of joining the Holy Alliance." 99
The Greek insurgents, meanwhile, though unassisted by any of the great
powers, made significant military and political progress. Due largely to
their command of the sea, they had liberated most of the Morea, Boeotia,
and Attica from the Ottoman yoke by the end of 1821. In Epidaurus on
January 27, 1822, the Greeks had proclaimed their independence, and at
Argos they had established a moderate and monarchist provisional govern-
ment, known as the Senate of Argos. When this body learned of the reunion
of sovereigns at Verona, it dispatched Count Andrew Metaxas and Francis
Jourdain to plead the cause of Greece before the Congress. Their mission
was threefold: (1) to attempt once more to gain the tsar's support, or failing
that to solicit his assistance in acquiring credits from England and France,
(2) to obtain the recognition of Greek independence, and (3) to secure a
European prince to be King of Greece. 1oo
97 Trevelyan, British History, p. 214.
9B Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 395, 400; Bartlett, Castlereagh, pp. 229-230.
99 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 419; Anderson, Eastern
Question, p. 58; Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, 1,116.
160 Declaration of Independence of the Greek Nation, Epidaurus, Jan. 27, 1822.
Martens, Nouveau recueil, VI, 141-144; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 196;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 536; Isambert, 1ndep. grecque et Eur., p. 145.
Arriving in Ancona at the end of October, Metaxas on November 3 in-

formed Pope Pius VII of his mission and assured his Holiness that the
Greeks did not conspire with men who sought "to overturn the throne and
the altar." On the contrary, they hoped to erect a Christian throne and had
taken up arms only to defend their altars. Surely, he argued, "a reunion
of Christian princes would not oblige them to become Mohammedans." 101
Turning next to the task of obtaining an invitation to the Congress, Metaxas
and Jourdain sent their credentials to Metternich with the request that they
be received as plenipotentiaries of Greece. In support of their petition, the
two envoys forwarded to the sovereigns at Verona a note dated Argos,
August 29, 1822, which declared that Greece would not accept any arrange-
ment which did not recognize her complete independence. The provisional
government, moreover, would reject any treaty regarding the status of
Greece to which it was not a party. To Caraman, Metaxas privately com-
plained that the unwanted defense of his compatriots by revolutionaries had
soiled the pure cause of Hellas. The Greeks, he affirmed, certainly did not
want "to establish in their own nation institutions incompatible with the
repose of Europe .... " Were this the case, they would not have requested
the crowned heads of Europe "to give them anyone for a sovereign, pro-
vided only that he was Christian." 102 While awaiting answers to these
various communications, the Greek delegation remained at Ancona.
Alexander at first favored admitting the Greek envoys, but Metternich
gave him such "frightful information" about philhellenic societies in
Germany that anti-revolutionary ardor replaced his original tolerant atti-
tude. The tsar realized, moreover, that an independent Greece with a liberal
constitution would threaten not only Russia's interests but also the cause
of autocracy. For these reasons, he condemned the Greek insurrection as
"wholly unworthy of sympathy," a reaction which expressed the mood of
the Congress. 103 According to Gentz, "it was a matter of courtesy not to
mention Turkish difficulties at Verona," and when Chateaubriand was
asked what he made of the Greek question, he tersely replied: "Nothing." 104
Wellington thought the most the Greeks could expect from the Congress was
a resolution to the Porte demanding on their behalf amnesty and religious

102 Ibid., p. 537. Strangford, too, carried to Verona letters from the Senate of Argos
which identified Metaxas as the "Deputy of the Greek Government to the Congress.'·
Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 157.
103 Ibid.; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 196; Cresson, Holy Alliance, p. 110;
Ielavich, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 68. The framers of the Greek Constitution of 1822
copied American and French models.
104 Quoted in Helene du Coudray, Metternich (New Haven, 1936), p. 221.
GREA T BRIT AIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 255
toleration. Under these circumstances, the allied ministers treated the

appeals of the Senate of Argos with silence, a response which Metternich
interpreted as a satisfactory understanding among the allies. On November
28, the great powers, without discussion or dissent, refused passports to the
Greek delegation, though they directed Strangford to urge the Porte to treat
their countrymen "with moderation and justice." 105 At the chancellor's
request, the Pontifical government detained the Greek delegation at Ancona
and informed Metaxas that he would not be received at Verona, and that
he would do well to save himself the expense of a useless journey, which in
any case would terminate at the frontiers of the Austrian states. 106
The pope likewise rejected the appeals of the Greeks and ordered
Metaxas to leave Ancona. Upon his departure, he published a "Reply to the
Calumnies Directed against the Greeks by Their Enemies." To the Greek
provisional government, he confessed the failure of his mission and observed
"with sadness" that the princes have abandoned the Greeks, who now must
put "all of their confidence in their muskets and swords." 107
While the rejection of the Greek cause astounded the friends of Greece,
it gave great satisfaction to the Turks. Commenting on this repudiation,
Gentz declared:
It is a remarkable circumstance ... that after all the stormy discussions, all the
diplomatic maneuvers, and the immense excitement which this famous insur-
rection has produced in all the nations of Europe, not one voice has been raised
in favor of the Greeks at the Congress of Verona.10S
While the great powers denied both moral and material aid to the Greeks,
several British and French commercial establishments sent arms and grain
to the sultan and to his vassal, Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt. In 1822,
the Diana, an Egyptian man-of-war, was repaired and refitted in London.
Agents of Briggs and Company, while acting as representatives of the
Egyptian government, served also on British consular staffs in Cairo and
Alexandria. Samuel Briggs kept up a steady correspondence with Canning
and Joseph Planta, permanent undersecretary of foreign affairs, in an at-
tempt to persuade the ministry to spend money in Egypt to increase her
cotton production, thus making Britain independent of American cotton.
105 Ibid.; Wellington to Sir Frederick Adam, British governor of the Ionian Isles,
Verona, Nov. 16, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 539; Wellington's Memorandum for Lord
Strangford, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid., p. 603; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 8; Gentz,
Depeches inedites, II, 158.
108 Ibid.
107 lsambert, Indep. grecque et Eur., p. 145.
108 Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 157.
But the efforts of this commercial lobby notwithstanding, British gold and
volunteers did much to sustain the insurgent cause in Greece as in South
America, and on the continent, philhellenic societies in Stuttgard, Darm-
stadt, Leghorn, and in Switzerland also raised funds and volunteer corps to
be sent to Greece. Though rebuffed by the Congress, the Greeks, after 1822,
looked to Britain for assistance, but they did not despair that someday
Europe would intervene in their behalf. In this expectation, they were not
disappointed.t 09
The conversations on the Eastern Question at Verona, in contrast to those
at Vienna, were definitely anticlimactic, but in each instance, Anglo-
Austrian diplomacy was triumphant. The Greek cause was ignored, and
Strangford, restored to the tsar's confidence, was returned to Constantinople
with instructions to obtain Turkish acceptance of the Three Points of the
Russian note of September 26, 1822: (1) guarantees to the Greeks of
amnesty and good government and toleration of the Christian religion,
(2) the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia, and (3) the revocation of
restrictions on the navigation of the Straits. The London cabinet readily
seconded the first two demands but demurred on the third. Fearing the
abuse of the Russian flag, Canning agreed to support those nations which
then were negotiating for permission to pass the Bosphorus, a measure
advocated by Wellington but opposed by Strangford. The small merchant
fleets of Denmark, Naples, Portugal, and Sardinia did not, of course, pose
any threat to the British carrying trade in the Black Sea. This alternative,
moreover, was quite preferable to a Russo-Turkish war, with all its unfore-
seen consequences, or to granting Russia a free hand to extend the pro-
tection of her flag over foreign ships.110
Because Strangford considered that the sultan already had given satis-
faction on the first point, he stressed the last two. In February 1823, the
Porte, under his constant prodding, finally notified Russia of the evacuation
of the Principalities (then proceeding with agonizing slowness), and of the
reestablishment therein of normal government. Turkey also announced in
September 1823 the removal of restrictions on Russian Black Sea commerce,
a concession which was more technical than real, for Turkish authorities
issued firmans for the passage of the Straits with great reluctance. In 1824
109 Ibid.; Isambert, Indep. grecque et Eur., p. 146; Sweet, Gentz, p. 260; Temperley,
Canning, pp. 335-336; Frederick S. Rodkey, "The Attempt of Briggs and Co. to Guide
British Policy in the Levant in the Interest of Mehemit Ali Pasha, 1821~41," JMH, V
(1933), 326. In 1824 a consortium of British bankers loaned the Greek government
£ 3,800,000. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 419-420.
110 Metternich to Ottenfels, Venice, Dec. 21, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 621;
Temperley, Canning, pp. 325-326.
less than 500 ships departed from Odessa, in contrast to over 3000 in 1819,
and this situation did not materially improve until the Treaty of Adrianople
(Article VII), September 14, 1829, guaranteed the free navigation of the
Straits not only to Russian merchantmen but also to the ships of all nations
at peace with the Ottoman Empire. To compensate for this injury, the
Russians, between 1823 and the outbreak of the Turkish war in 1828,
resumed their use of Greek ships and sailed them under the protection of
the tsarist ensign, a practice which Mahmud II could not prevent.1 11
Canning, meanwhile, had taken the first step toward separating Britain
from the Alliance. In March 1823, he recognized the Greeks as belligerents,
a measure anticipated by Castlereagh in his instructions for the Congress.
This action, however, did not mean a departure from Britain's policy of
neutrality. It was only a tactical move which facilitated the protection of
British commerce from Greek pirates, as the Turkish navy was too weak
to defend it effectively. Canning felt obliged to adopt the same neutral atti-
tude toward both Greeks and Turks, since the ships of each carried British
trade. Metternich, however, vigorously protested this step which posed a
material threat to Austria. To him the Greeks were a "half savage people"
whose revolt against their legitimate sovereign had provided a pretext for
tsarist intervention in Turkey. He not only gave the Porte his complete
diplomatic support, but in 1823 even furnished Austrian ships to carry
munitions and troops for the sultan. The Greeks, he feared, once given the
status of belligerents, would grow stronger at sea. The danger was real, and
by 1826 over a hundred Austrian vessels had been taken prize or sunk by
the Greeks. But Canning would not reconsider; anxious to break the
Alliance, he already had decided to use the Greek question as a wedge to
split it down the middle. 112
For all Strangford's adroitness in negotiation with the Porte, Anglo-
Austrian mediation ultimately failed to solve the Eastern Question. After
March 1823, serious friction developed between Austria and England, and
after August 1825, the tsar, because of Metternich's intrigues with the Turks,
refused to cooperate with Austria on this issue. Although Minciaky went
to Constantinople as Russian charge d'affaires in 1825, and Ribeaupierre
followed him as ambassador in 1827, a permanent solution to the Eastern
111 Ibid., p. 326; Strangford to Metternich, Constantinople, Feb. 28, 1823, cited by
Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 191-192; Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 60,
73; V. J. Puryear, "Odessa, Its Rise and International Importance, 1815-1850," PHR,
III (1934), 198. The Principalities were not completely evacuated until 1826.
112 Temperley, Canning, pp. 326, 329, 358; Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 58-59.
Question eluded the great powers like a will-o'-the wisp.113 This enigmatic
issue, indeed, has continued to confront and confound European diplomats
up to the present. During the nineteenth century, it merely shifted from
one phase to another. Its three main elements were: (1) rising Balkan
nationalism and rivalry, (2) rivalry between Russia and the West, and (3) the
corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire. The diplomacy of Austria
and Britain did succeed, however. in preserving peace in the Near East
until 1828 and in keeping Russia out of the Balkans. The continuation of
this policy vis-a.-vis commissars no less than tsars has culminated in the
"Truman Doctrine" and the NATO alliance of contemporary world politics.
4. The Navigation of the Rhine
Whether in the Black Sea, the Levant, the North Pacific, the Caribbean, or
along the Rhine. Britain had commercial interests of great value. During
the first years of the Post-Napoleonic Era. she glutted continental markets
with her stockpiled manufactures and colonial produce. In Germany and
the Netherlands. Britain held powerful political and economic advantages.
Through Hanover she shipped vast quantities of goods cheaply to the
Germanic states. With low tariffs and a large transit trade. Holland became
another corridor for the passage of commodities to the continent, with
Rotterdam the emporium of British trade with states along the Rhine and
Meuse rivers.114
Notwithstanding that England's commercial ties with Europe had been
firmly reestablished by 1816. her merchants were vexed by numerous post-
war problems: the general increase of tariffs. the shipping competition of
the Hansa cities and Scandinavian countries (which had been neutral during
the later years of the war). the rise of continental manufacturing. American
rivalry. and depression. The collapse of the wartime economic boom caused
most European nations to return to protection and mercantilism. The
saturation of the continent by British goods provided another incentive for
higher tariffs, while the British corn laws hurt European agricultural inter-
113 Ibid., pp. 63-65; A. V. Fadeev, Rossiya i vostochnyi krizis 20-x godov XIX veka
[Russia and the Eastern Crisis of the 1820's] (Moscow, 1958), p. 96; Lobanov-Ros-
tovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 415, 426; Temperley. Canning, pp. 338-339.
After the Porte adhered to the Convention of Akkerman (October 7, 1826), Ribeau-
pierre returned to Constantinople, arriving there on February 11, 1827.
114 Albert Demangeon and Lucien Febvre, Le Rhin: problemes d'histoire et d'eco-
nomie (Paris, 1935), p. 188; Johannes C. Westermann, The Netherlands and the United
States, Their Relations in the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century (The Hague, 1935),
pp. 47-50, 347-349.
ests. After 1815, Britain maintained her import duties at their wartime high
level which hindered trade and prompted retaliation. France increased her
tariffs in 1816 and 1822, strongly protecting farmers and manufacturers.
The Russians dreamed of rapid industrialization behind a high tariff wall.
The Dutch in 1816 initiated a trend toward higher tariffs. Three years later
Prussia originated the Zollverein system, though it proved to be the most
modest major tariff in Europe. This tide of protectionism did not tum until
the 1820'S.115
Among the several factors at work, increasing continental tariffs was the
most influential in causing the decline of British trade. Not only did pro-
tection fail to revive continental commerce and shipping appreciably, but
the international depression, which reached its nadir in 1819, aggravated the
situation. Seeking relief for their commercial interests, Prussia and the
Netherlands after 1821 adopted high discriminatory duties on goods and
tonnage, a policy similar to that used successfully by the United States since
1815. The Brussels government, moreover, prohibited in 1822 the transit of
thirty-five articles through Dutch territory via the Rhine. 116 Included in
the embargo were such staples as molasses, sugar, salt, tea, smoked or dried
fish, hoop-wood, cask staves, iron ore, and scrap-iron. Britain, the dominant
trader, was the avowed object of this retaliation. Ironically, Britain herself,
by saturating European markets and maintaining high tariffs, had set off
this chain of events. It now behooved her statesmen to protect Britannia's
interests, and Canning was equal to the task.ll7
115 Ibid., p. 163; "Commercial Intercourse with Foreign Nations," Mar. 15, 1822,
U.S. Cong., American State Papers; Commerce and Navigation, ed. Walter Lowrie
and Walter S. Franklin (Washington, 1832-1834), II, 635; W. O. Henderson, The
Zollverein (Cambridge, England, 1939), pp. 15, 31-35, 37,43; Leone Levi, History of
British Commerce and the Economic Progress of the British Nation, 1763-1878
(London, 1880), p. 152; Ivo Nikolai Lamb, Free Trade and Protection in Germany,
1868-1879 (Wiesbaden, 1963), p. 2; Herbert Heaton, Economic History of Europe
(New York, 1936), p. 672; W. E. Lingelbach, "Saxon-American Relations, 1778-
1828," AHR, XVII (April, 1912), 517-539. The most liberal traders were the Hansa
towns (Bremen, Hamburg, and LUbeck), which thrived on commerce and had little
cause for adopting protection.
116 Between 1815 and 1830, Brussels served, concurrently with The Hague, as the
seat of government and royal residence of the Netherlands. William I usually held
court at Laeken Palace just outside the city. In 1822 a new palace for the Prince of
Orange was under construction in Brussels. Fulford, George IV, p. 189.
117 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Oct. 25, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 419; "List
of Articles of which the Import, Export, or Transit is Prohibited by the late Tariff
in the Netherlands, [Brussels, August 26, 1822]," ibid. pp. 424-425; Etienne Con-
stantin de Gerlache, Histoire du royaume des Pays-Bas, depuis 1814 jusqu'en 1830
(Bruxelles, 1839), I, 372-373; II, 117, 170, 172. For a scholarly treatment of Britain's
commercial relations with the continent, 1815-1822, see Ellis, "British Reciprocity
System," pp. 47-59.
Castlereagh, of course, had immediately and vigorously protested this new

policy of protection and exclusion, but the Dutch declined to make any
concession without British reciprocity. Canning, however, tried a different
tack. Convinced that any "prohibition of transit" violated the Treaty of
Vienna, he directed Wellington on October 25, 1822, to raise this issue at
Verona with those powers which had signed this act. On November 12, the
duke discussed the Dutch restrictions on Rhenish commerce with the
ministers of France and Prussia, two states which also had a special interest
in this question, since their territories bordered that river. The London and
Paris cabinets for once found themselves on the same side of a commercial
issue, both agreeing that the tariff law of the Netherlands indeed constituted
a violation of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. But here the entente
ended, for Montmorency's Anglophobia would not permit cooperation with
Britain, even on a matter of common interest. To him, as to other French
delegates at Verona, England's accusation against the Dutch merely funish-
ed another proof that she was "always ready to sacrifice every other con-
sideration to her commercial interests." 118 Bernstodf was no more co-
operative. While critical of the Dutch regulation which required foreign
ships leaving or entering the Rhine to stop at Rotterdam or some other
seaport, he defended the right of the powers along the river to levy transit
duties. 119
Since the reglement for enforcing Article XXXII of the Annex to
the Treaty of Vienna (which prohibited the collection of transit duties),
had not been ratified, Rhine commerce was still governed by the law of
1804. Wellington, nonetheless, contended that neither the Netherlands nor
any power situated on the Rhine or any other international river regulated
by the special articles of the Treaty of Vienna (Le., the Danube, Elbe, Main,
Meuse, Moselle, Neckar, and Oder rivers), had the right to collect such
duties under that treaty. While admitting that they were not douanes, he
protested that they were contrary to the principle of free navigation dis-
tinctly expressed by the Treaty of Vienna and its Annex. Along a river like
the Rhine, moreover, even a small duty levied by every state would amount
to a prohibition. 120
Though the duke cogently argued his case, he could not overcome the

119 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Oct. 25, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 419; Wel-
lington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., pp. 529-530; "Memorandum on the
Navigation of the Rhine," Verona, Nov. 27,1822, ibid., p. 386.
120 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 530; Amry Vanden-
bosch, Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics (The
Hague, 1959), pp. 251-252.
enmity of the French and Prussian ministers, who promised only to consider
a collective demarche to bring the subject to the attention of the Brussels
government. Discouraged but undaunted by their reaction, Wellington
resolved to go it alone. At the five-power ministers' conference of Novem-
ber 27, he presented a note on the navigation of the Rhine. The Nether-
lands, he declared, by closing the mouth of that river to many articles of
commerce, had violated not only Article VI of the Treaty of Vienna but
also its Annex, which provided for the free navigation of the Rhine. To
remendy this evil, the duke proposed that the allied ministers at Brussels
make an effort to induce the Dutch government to execute faithfully the
Treaty of 1815 on this subject. Austria, Prussia, and Russia acquiesced in
the British proposal, but the French ministers took it ad referendem. With-
out the concurrence of France, nothing official could be done at Verona;
consequently, the matter was pressed no further at the Congress. 121
Dutch obstinacy, meanwhile, paralyzed the Central Rhine Commission,
which had begun its work at Mainz on August 15, 1816. So long as the
Netherlands denied that the Commission had any jurisdiction over that
section of the Rhine which flowed within its frontiers, that organization
could accomplish nothing. After the Congress had closed, the Brussels
government, indeed, continued for nine more years to frustrate all efforts
to solve this problem. Though Britain in 1823 concluded with the Nether-
lands a reciprocal trade agreement which secured to the ships of each king-
dom the free use of the other's ports, the Dutch stood firm on the Rhine
question. Not until September 10, 1826, did William I declare his readiness
to comply with the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna concerning the
navigation of that international waterway and announce that on April 1,
1827, the Brussels government would abolish the tolls on traffic entering and
leaving the Rhine-Lek, substituting for them a moderate navigation duty.
But the law which required transshipment in Dutch ports remained in force.
The ensuing negotiations among the Rhenish states on this issue and the
authority of the Central Rhine Commission lasted four years. Finally, on
March 31, 1831, the six members of the Commission (Baden, Bavaria,
France, Grand Duchy of Hesse, the Netherlands, and Prussia) signed the
Act of Mainz which (1) declared the entire course of the Rhine, including
the Lek and Waal mouths, completely free; (2) abolished the Dutch trans-
shipment obligation; (3) permitted the Netherlands to levy a navigation duty
121 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 529-530; "Memo-
randum on the Navigation of the Rhine," Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, ibid., pp. 385-386;
Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 8; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 549.
122 William I's decree of September 10, 1826 (English translation), Hertslet, Com-
which corresponded to the tolls (vetrois) collected on the rest of the river;
(4) increased the membership of the Rhine Commission to seven by admit-
ting Nassau and revised the voting strength of each state by giving twenty-
four votes to Prussia, twelve each to France and the Netherlands, eleven to
Baden, six to Hesse, four to Bavaria, and three to Nassau, for a total of
seventy-two votes; and (5) established a system of inspection and a mixed
tribunal for the enforcement of transit regulations, the maintenance of
channels and towpaths, and the adjudication of disputes. The year 1831
is, therefore, a memorable date, for the Act of Mainz is the first inter-
national convention for the navigation of the Rhine (Rheinschiffahrtsakte).
Although the Act of Mannheim (October 1868) abolished all duties and tolls
based solely on navigation, the Netherlands, until the present time, has
steadfastly refused to internationalize the Rhine estuary through her terri-
tory. National control of the river, the Dutch are convinced, is necessary not
only for the economic protection of the nation, but also for the prosperity
of Rotterdam. 122
5. A Retrospect
The congressional debates in Verona on special issues clearly reveal the

national interests of the powers there assembled and the consequent diffi-
culty of ever achieving a united "Alliance policy." The Alliance was used
only as an instrument of policy when it served national interests, as in the
Eastern Question. Here, Anglo-Austrian diplomacy appeared triumphant,
but the tsar's moderation and aversion to war also helped to preserve the
status quo in the Near East. By rejecting the Greek appeal for assistance,
the Congress ignored one of the most important currents of the nineteenth
century: nationalism, which triumphed alike in Latin America and Greece,
and which, in the twentieth century, has spread from Europe to Africa and
Southeast Asia. In its negation of nationalism and liberalism, the Congress
of Verona differed little from that of Vienna.
Throughout the discussions at Verona, Canning's diplomacy consistently
sought to obtain two objects: the protection of British commercial interests
and the ascendancy of political and economic liberalism abroad, though not
at home. Sometimes these considerations were combined, as in the Spanish
Colonial Question; but of the two aims, pursuance of the first so over-
shadowed concern for the second that British policy at the Congress ap-
peared as a quest for commercial supremacy throughout the world. By the
mercial Treaties, Ill, 317-319; Demangeon and Febvre, Le Rhin, pp. 194-196;
Trevelyan, British History, pp. 202-203; Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy, p. 276.
close of the nineteenth century. this quest had been well-nigh achieved. but
at the cost of exciting the envy and enmity of her European nighbors. a
factor which played an important role in the development of British iso-
lation. England. it appears. did not heed Canning's admonition of April 14.
1823. to "do unto others as she had made others do unto her."
CHAPTER IX
THE CURTAIN FALLS
The Holy alliance ... is per se a public nuisance. It is

impossible [for] a confederacy of kings ... to dictate
laws to nations without exciting ... the indignation of
every free country ... [and] sowing seeds of civil war
in the very countries with which they interfered, in
order, as they pretended, to establish tranquillity.
Lord Archibald Hamilton, March 27, 1823.1
1. The Verona Circular (December 14, 1822)
Before adjourning the last session of the Congress on December 14, Metter-
nich, Nesselrode, and Bernstorff signed a circular dispatch, drafted by
Gentz, to be sent to their ministers at the various courts of Europe. This
circular gave a resume of the results of the Congress as well as a commentary
on them which took the form of declarations on Italy, the Near East and
Greece, and Spain. These pronouncements clearly illustrate the contempt
with which the three eastern courts regarded liberal movements and repre-
sentative political institutions. 2
The manifesto began with the announcement of the evacuation of Pied-
mont and the reduction of the Austrian army in Naples, emphasizing this
accomplishment as a sign of benevolence. The autocratic monarchs rejoiced
as being able to leave the security and tranquillity of the [Italian] people to the
Princes to whom Providence ... intrusted them, and to deprive calumny of its
last remaining pretext to disseminate doubts respecting the independence of
Italian Princes)l
The sovereigns reaffirmed their sincere solicitude for the welfare of Italy
and maintained that no secret ambition or interest had influenced the
1 Lord Archibald Hamilton in the Commons, Mar. 27, 1823, ParI. Debates, new
ser., VIII, 774. Hamilton (1770-1827) was a political reformer and an active member
of the Whig Opposition.
2 Circular of December 14, 1822, Verona, P.O., Austria, 120/54; this document also
may be found in Martens, Nouveau recueil, VI, 189-195; Hauranne, Hist. du govt.
parI., VII, 211. Before returning to Vienna, Mettemich traveled to Munich for a
conference with the King of Bavaria. While in that city, he published the Verona
Circular in the Munich Gazette on January 3, 1823. Thereafter, it appeared in almost
every newspaper and journal in Europe, and even in America. Mettemich, Memoires,
III, 466.
3 Verona Circular, F.O., Austria, 120/54; "The Verona Circular," Gentleman's
Magazine, XCIII, 74.
decisions which imperious necessity had forced them to take in 1821. Their
only desire had been to resist revolution, to restore order and peace, and to
furnish legitimate governments with the support they had a right to demand.
Such had been the only object of the monarchs' thoughts and efforts.4
The three courts had achieved such a satisfactory entente in the Eastern
Question before the Congress assembled that only the result of that under-
standing needed to be set forth. The Greek rebellion and the revolutions of
Naples and Piedmont were manifestly similar in origin, all three being
branches of a great revolutionary conspiracy. The eastern powers regretted
that the "firebrand of rebellion had been thrown into the Ottoman Empire,"
and condemned the Greek revolt as a "rash and criminal enterprise." 5
The absolute monarchs reserved for Spain a special denunciation, which
was hardly designed to induce the Cortes to modify the Spanish consti-
tution. Lofty language and noble sentiments ill concealed the hostility and
menace of its tone and meaning. The remonstrance began with the assertion
that, if the object of civilization were the destruction of society and the only
purpose of an army were to seize the government with impunity, the
"Spanish revolution may claim the admiration of the age, and the military
rising of the island of Leon may serve as a pattern for reformers." 6 But
Spain has lost her happiness and fame, and is suffering from the inevitable
consequences of violating the eternal moral laws of the world. She is the
prey of riots and convulsions; her rich colonies have revolted, justifying
their separation by the same political philosophy on which the mother coun-
try has founded its constitution. In her present state of dissolution, she is
a menace to civilization and to the principles of the European confederation.
The judgment of the sovereigns is that their legations shall quit the
Peninsula. 7
The policy of the monarchs, as all Europe must acknowledge, is in com-
plete harmony with the interests of the people and the independence of their
governments. The only enemies of the Alliance are "those who conspire
against the legal authority of the one and the simplicity of the other, to
plunge both into a common abyss of destruction." The only object of the
Alliance is peace. But, though peace exists between the powers, it "cannot
diffuse its blessings on society, so long as the fermentation is kept up which,
in more than one country, inflames people's minds." 8
4 Verona Circular, F.O., Austria, 120/54.

5 Ibid.
• Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
With but few exceptions, reaction to the Congress predictably followed

party lines. Barthold Georg Niebuhr, the famous historian of the Roman
Empire and Prussian ambassador to the Holy See, expressed the attitude
of most opponents of a Franco-Spanish war when he posed the question: "If
peace can be preserved, why give the appearance of wanting to wage war." 9
One notable exception was the extravagant George IV of England. As King
of Hanover, he declared his complete approval of the resolutions of Verona
and the determination of the continental courts to stamp out revolutions
which endangered the status quo of Europe, and consequently of Hanover.
This, despite the fact that Britain had refused to sign the Verona Circular.1o
Hidden under the sonorousness of this manifesto is one important de-
cision which profoundly influenced subsequent Franco-Spanish relations.
Despite Villele's efforts to restrain the three eastern courts, they announced
their resolve to sever diplomatic relations with Spain. The moment for
executing this grave verdict, however, was left to the discretion of the
ambassadorial conference at Paris, but so far as they were concerned, the
Rubicon had been crossed.
2. Exodus
By the end of November, Montmorency, Pozzo di Borgo, Wellington, and

Strangford, all had left Verona to return to their respective posts. On De-
cember 11, Ferdinand I of Naples departed for Vienna, where he resided
for several months, because he feared returning to his kingdom, and on the
evening of December 13, Chateaubriand set out for Paris. The mass exodus
from Verona, however, did not begin until December 14, with Venice as the
immediate destination of most of the sovereigns and their ministers. The
Emperor of Austria left on the 14th; the tsar followed on the 15th; and
Metternich, Nesselrode, Tatischev, and Gentz took the road to Venice on
the 16th. Although La Ferronnays followed them thence, he later repaired
to Paris to report on the latest developments of the Congress, before return-
ing to St. Petersburg. l l
9 Niebuhr to Serre, Rome, Nov. 30, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 556-557.
10 Niebuhr to Serre, Rome, Mar. 18, 1823, ibid., V, 101. Niebuhr obtained his
information from Ernest Friedrich Herbert, Count of Mtinster-Ludenburg. Cf. Ful-
ford, George IV, pp. 212-213, who states that the king "privately sent a message to
Louis XVIII wishing him every success in the projected invasion."
11 Stewart to Canning, Venice, Dec. 22, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Serre to his
mother, Verona, Dec. 9, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 561; Comte Antoine
Jacques Boulaye de 1a Meurthe to Serre, Ay, Jan. 11, 1823, ibid., V, 10; Caraman
to Serre, Vienna, Apr. 5, 1823, ibid., p. 116n; Chateaubriand to Mme Duras, Verona,
Dec. 12, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 307; Metternich, Memoires, III,
After enjoying the sites and pleasures of Venice for a week. Alexander
on December 22 began the long trek home. At Innsbruck he paused for
further conversations with Mettemich and his brother-in-law William I.
King of Wiirttemberg, while Nesselrode rode ahead and reached the Rus-
sian capital on January 28, 1823, five days before the tsar, who arrived on
February 2, after an absence of more than five months. 12
Leaving Venice on Christmas day, 1822, Mettemich reached Innsbruck
at 3 A.M., Saturday, December 28. He took his last leave of the Russian
emperor on the 29th and two days later pushed on to Munich in bitterly
cold weather, arriving in the Bavarian capital on New Year's day, 1823.
Despite the hardships involved in making the journey at this time of year,
two ambitions drove the chancellor on: (1) the desire to give Max Joseph,
a constitutional monarch, a firsthand account of the Congress's deliberations
and to urge him to support the "application of the same principles in Ger-
many," and (2) the determination to publish the Verona Circular in the
Munich Gazette, as a warning to German liberals. These objectives ac-
complished, Mettemich returned to Vienna on January 6, three days after
the Emperor Francis. 18
One by one the actors left the stage. The Congress of Verona, "the last
muster, the last splendid pageant of those forces which had ruled the world
since 1815," had ended. 14
3. The Second Villele-Wellington Interview
Wellington's mission, however, did not terminate with the close of the
Congress. At Canning's request, the duke remained in Paris for eleven days
to support the premier against the war faction. In Villele's avowed pacifism,
Canning saw "one more chance of perserving peace, if ... [Wellington]
should be on hand to encourage him during the first conflict of the two
parties in the French government." 15 Convinced that Villele, Louis XVIII,
and the Duke of Angouleme (the king's nephew), all opposed war, Welling-
423, 424-425; entries for Dec. 13, 16, and 19, 1822, Gentz, TagebUcher, III, 120, 122;
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 608, 617. On December 22, while in Venice, Lord
Charles Stewart presented his recall to the Emperor Francis I and departed for
home the next day.
12 Bagot to Canning, No.4, St. Petersburg, Feb. 5, 1823, F.O., Russia, 181/55;
Metternich, Memoires, III, 424-426.
13 Ibid., pp. 425-426, 466, '481; entry for Sat., Dec. 28, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher.
The winter of 1822 was particularly severe. The temperature in Innsbruck on De-
cember 31 was 10° below zero. Entry for Tues., Dec. 31, 1822, ibid., p. 126.
15 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 3, 1822, Well. Desp .• I, 624-625.
ton felt confident that he could concert with the premier some formula to
insure peace along the Pyrenees. 16
The duke and the dispatches to the allied ministers at Madrid reached
Paris the same day - Monday, December 9. That night Wellington had his
first conversation with Villele, who still professed to espouse the same
peaceful views he had proclaimed in September. Circumstances in Spain,
the premier affirmed, had altered materially since the eastern courts at
Verona had drafted dispatches to send to Madrid: the Spanish Royalists
had been defeated, and their cause now seemed to be lost. The constitutional
government, moreover, had shown recently a greater degree of moderation.
If transmitted now, these offensive notes would hurt France and aid the
revolutionists. Consequently, he had requested on the preceding Thursday
(December 5), that the transmission of these dispatches be suspended until
the occurrence of one of the events stipulated by the proces-verbal as a cause
for war. Villcle had taken this action despite the opposition of Mont-
morency, who had promised before leaving the Congress that the Paris
cabinet would supplement these notes with a similar remonstrance,17
The divergence of opinion between the two ministers stemmed from the
fact that Villele regarded the Spanish Question as exclusively French and
sincerely desired to find a reasonable pretext for a peaceful solution of it,
while Montmorency considered it as a European problem and anxiously
sought an excuse for war. But when the duke broached the subject of Mont-
morency's diplomacy, the premier protested that he and the foreign minister
agreed completely on Spanish policy and that the king consequently had
created Montmorency a duke. But this avowal did not deceive Wellington,
and events soon proved that VilleIe had resorted to pretense only to conceal
disunity within the French cabinet. 1s
When VilleIe and Wellington renewed their talks on December 10, the
premier, it will be recalled, protested the planned British expedition against
11 Ibid.; Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 6, 1822, ibid., p. 625; Wel-
lington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 9, 1822, ibid., pp. 633-634; Wellington-Charles Greville
interview, Jan. 25, 1823, Greville Memoirs, ed. Henry Reeve (London, 1874), I, 67.
17 Stuart to Canning, No. 336, Paris, Dec. 9, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Welling-
ton to Canning, Paris, Dec. 9 and 10, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 633-634, 635-636; Walpole,
History of England, m, 50.
18 Ibid.; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 636; Villele,
Memoires, III, 270. On December 1, the day after Montmorency's return to Paris,
Louis XVIII offered him the title, "Duke of Verona," as a reward for his services
to France at the Congress. The viscount, however, declined this honor and received
instead the family title, "Duke of Montmorency." Stuart to Canning, No. 330, Paris,
Dec. 2, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Herriot, Madame Recamier, II, 120; Edinburgh
Magazine, XI (Sept., 1822),738.
Cuba and proposed a formula for preventing the rupture of Franco-Spanish
relations: if the Madrid government accepted French mediation between
Spain and her revolted colonies and concluded with France a commercial
treaty which granted her equality with England in all Spanish ports, peace
could be preserved between the two Bourbon monarchies. But if Spain
desired to reconquer her disaffected colonies, France would place at her
disposal the expedition fitting out in French ports. In response to this
declaration, Wellington categorically denied that Britain had ever required
or desired "any exclusive advantage in the commerce of any country." She
had always endeavored, he affirmed, to found relations with other powers
on "good understanding" and mutual benefit. As for the Cuban operation,
its sole purpose was to destroy pirate headquarters located on the island.
Wellington, however, did not offer British mediation in the Spanish Question,
a proposal authorized by Canning on December 6. The Paris cabinet, the
duke thought, would prefer anything to an acknowledgment of British
influence in Spain. Exercizing the discretion given him, he announced
merely that his government stood ready to assist in the search for a solution
to the Franco-Spanish dispute. Villele's answer, though civil, was noncom-
mittal,19
Provoked by Villele's Anglophobe attitude, Canning denounced his peace
proposals as "insolence" and hypocrisy. To Wellington, he confessed:
I long to tell M. de Villele ... that we will trade with the late Spanish American
colonies, whether France likes it or not; that we will not respect the Spanish
Guarda Costas, which attempt to interdiot that trade to us; and that if France
sends a large fleet to help the Guarda Costas, we will send a larger to watch (at
least) their operations.2o
Wellington's dispatch of December 10, relating his "singular conver-
sation" with Villele, reached the Foreign Office Friday morning, the 13th.
Canning's immediate response was to instruct his Grace not to delay the
offer of mediation. This step, so necessary "for the clear and perfect dis-
charge of the duty of the British government," should be taken before the
allied dispatches are transmitted to Madrid, an action now delayed by
Villele's eleventh hour appeal to Verona. Notwithstanding its certain re-
jection by France, an offer of this kind, Canning thought, would give the
ministry "a clear case" and make a favorable impression on Parliament. To
19 See above, p. 155-156; Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 6, 1822,

Well. Desp., I, 626-627; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid., 637-640.
20 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, 6 P.M., Dec. 13, 1822, ibid., p. 650.
save time, he sent Wellington a draft of the note he wished presented to the
Paris cabinet.21
In Paris, meanwhile, the VilleIe-Wellington talks continued. The premier
reaffirmed his desire for some revision of the Spanish constitution which
would give him a pretext for withdrawing the Army of Observation "with-
out loss of credit." He insisted that he did not care about the provisions of
the constitution provided that it was legitimate, i.e., one which proceeded
from the king and was not forced upon him, a view which the king and
Monsieur (Count of Artois) wholeheartedly shared. In an audience on the
12th, his Majesty suggested to the duke that if England really wanted to be
of service, she should persuade the Spanish to reform their political system
in order to give their king greater authority and personal security, and the
system itself more stability. This remark by the King of France rallied
failing British hopes for peace; perhaps the Cortes would listen to the advice
of the Duke of Wellington, who was also a Spanish grandee and popular
in Spain.22
But Canning, astute statesman that he was, correctly perceived that the
French allegations against Spain - the instability of her constitution, the
menace to the king's life and liberty, the insulting speeches in the Cortes,
and the provocative articles in the Madrid newspapers - were not the real
grounds for complaint against that unfortunate kingdom. True, the Spanish
constitution was, at once, too popular and too close to France, but the
French Royalists desired war for another reason:
The real, though unavowed cause, [he observed], is perhaps the passion ... now
felt in France for something of eclat and of national exertion; a sort of false
appetite for glory, which they disguise to others ... under the pretence of a
genuine necessity for vindicating the national honour and national safety by
war.23
Villele's suggestion that a favorable Franco-Spanish commercial treaty
would help to preserve peace indicated to Canning, moreover, that the pre-
mier intended to use the support of the three eastern courts, not against
Spain, but against Britain.
He will say (or probably has said) to Spain, "see, we have all Europe ready to
fall upon you. We can crush you in a moment; but give up your connexion with
England, and we will spare you; nay more, we will help you to do her and her
commerce all manner of harm." 24
21 Ibid., pp. 649-650.
22 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 12, 16, and 19, 1822, ibid., pp. 645, 651-653,
659; Walpole, History of England, III, 51.
23 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 629-630.
24 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, 6 P.M., Dec. 13, 1822, ibid., p. 650.
But only Russia, he foresaw, would exert her influence to the utmost to
push France into a Spanish war.26
Pursuant to Canning's instructions of the 13th, Wellington, on Monday,
December 16, read to Villele the note offering British mediation between
France and Spain, which he intended to transmit to Montmorency. Speaking
as an individual, the premier advised the duke not to present it. To do so
would be useless, since the French government could neither ask for nor
accept the mediation of a power "suspected by the public opinion of France
of being favorably inclined to Spain." But when Wellington persisted, ex-
plaining that the British cabinet still wished him to make the offer, Villele
acquiesced. The next day an obedient, but reluctant, duke presented to the
foreign minister the official offer of British mediation. Montmorency ac-
cepted the note without comment, except the conventional promise that he
would "lay it before the King." He then informed Wellington that Russia
and Austria had agreed to a short delay in the transmission of the Verona
dispatches, but that they did not wish "to appear to give way (se rendre)
to the Spanish revolution." The notes, therefore, must "arrive at Madrid in
such time ... that the Spanish government may be certain ... they were
sent from, and [were] the consequences of, the Congress of Verona." This
was, however, a personal judgment (aper9u); Chateau briand, who was ex-
pected on the 20th, would bring the formal replies to the premier's request.26
Two days later (Thursday, the 19th) Villele and Montmorency again
declined to answer the British offer of mediation, alleging that no decision
could be reached on this question or that of sending a remonstrance to
Madrid, in concert with the other three courts, until Chateaubriand arrived
with the latest news from Verona. They left no doubt, however, that British
mediation on any Spanish question would be refused. But to Canning, its
rejection mattered little, since the gesture had been made.27
Still anxious to secure some pretext which would permit France to have
peace with honor, the resourceful VilleIe, on December 19, suggested that
British adherence to the proces-verbal of November 17, would enable
France to separate from the other continental powers with regard to the
25 Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 8, 1822, ibid., pp. 628-629.

28 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 16 and 17, 1822, ibid., pp. 653-654, 656-657;
Wellington to Montmorency, Paris, Dec. 17, 1822, ibid., pp. 655-656; Wellington to
the Earl of Clancarty, British ambassador to the Netherlands, Paris, Dec. 17, 1822,
ibid., p. 662. Wellington thought the cabinet had made a mistake to insist on the
offer of mediation at this time and told Canning so. Wellington to Canning, Paris,
Dec. 16, 1822, ibid., pp. 654-655.
27 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 19, 1822, ibid., p. 660; Temperley, Canning,
pp.68-69.
transmission of the dispatches. The proces-verbal, he argued, was only

defensive; if Britain signed it, he would "willingly wait for the result of
events in Spain; .,. if Spain made any reasonable concession, there could
be no doubt upon the subject." Wellington, of course, refused.28
Since his negotiations with Villele had reached a stalemate, Wellington
left Paris on Friday, December 20. The next day he advised Stuart from
Calais to refute emphatically the false rumors which had circulated at
Verona and Paris, even among French ministers, that Britain had a secret
agreement with Spain to support her cause at the Congress in return for
an advantageous commercial treaty, and that Britain would seize Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and whatever else she could get, if France invaded Spain.
Villele, Montmorency, and even Louis XVIII "were not free from these
absurd notions." On the 22nd, Wellington once again set foot on English
soil and three days later made his report to the cabinet. His mission had
been completed. 21I
4. A Retrospect
Five main currents shaped the course of events at the Congress of Verona:
(1) French jealousy of Britain, (2) universal suspicion of British motives,
(3) the influence of Russia, (4) Anglo-Austrian fear of Russian expansion
toward the Levant, and (5) the dominant role of self-interest, which under-
lay all other considerations.
The sources of Anglo-French rivalry were British influence in the
councils of the Spanish government, Britain's thriving trade with Latin
America, Wellington's stand on the questions of Spain, the Spanish colonies,
and the slave trade, Canning's proposed expedition against the Cuban
pirates, and, of course, a long tradition of antagonism. Convinced that
British policy toward Latin America and the slave trade was absolutely
selfish, France made her offer to mediate between Spain and her insurgent
colonies contingent upon her receiving commercial privileges equal to those
already granted to Britain. The Congress of Verona accentuated French
jealousy of Britain by adding new causes for complaint.
The continental powers, and especially France, attributed Wellington's
adamant refusal to aid or sanction intervention in Spain to Britain's fear
that her commercial treaties with the constitutional government would be
28 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 660-661.

29 Le Moniteur universel, LXI (Dec. 21, 1822), 1727; Wellington to Stuart, Calais,
Dec. 21, 1822, P.O., Continent: Congress of Verona, 92/52; Canning to Wellington,
Coombe Wood, 11 A.M., Dec. 23, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 664-665.
jeopardized by any such project. Both Castlereagh and Canning, however,

considered the Spanish Colonial Question more important than that of Spain
and regarded a free South America as necessary to the commercial future
of Britain. They agreed, therefore, that in the event of a Franco-Spanish
war, England should remain neutral. Clearly, material self-interest played
a major role in the formulation of British policy on such issues as Latin
American independence, the Russian Ukase of September 16, 1821, the
Russo-Turkish dispute, and the navigation of the Rhine, but the influence
of this causative factor never became so exclusive as to constitute economic
determinism. Its significance in other questions, moreover, was secondary.
The humanitarianism of a small but determined group of abolitionists
provided the prime impulse behind Britain's campaign to suppress the
Atlantic slave trade. In Italy she supported the Habsburg hegemony as a
means of preserving the stability of that divided peninsula. Other factors,
too, affected Britain's relations with the allied courts: her traditional interest
in maintaining the European balance of power, Canning's strong aversion to
congress diplomacy, and public opinion - a variable and volatile agent,
because it is emotional - now swayed one way by sympathy for liberalism
abroad and then another by unreasoning prejUdice.
If the tsar's enthusiasm for an invasion of Spain by a Russian or, at least,
an allied army disturbed England, it terrified France and embarrassed
Austria and Prussia. Fearing the transit of Russian troops through Austrian
territory, Metternich at Verona adroitly secured the services of Mont-
morency and Wellington in blocking this project. But the chancellor dis-
approved, too, of French intervention, being apprehensive that a victorious
campaign would revive French militarism and threaten the balance of
power. Any interference in Spain, moreover, would alienate Britain at
precisely the moment he wanted to conciliate her. Thus Metternich was on
the horns of a dilemma.
If Britain had a flourishing carrying trade in the Black Sea and the
Levant, Austria had Russia as a neighbor. In the Near East, therefore, the
court of St. James and the Hofburg each needed the other as an ally, and
here the maintenance of the status quo served the interests of both. To
preserve the balance of power, Britain defended Austria's sphere of influ-
ence in Mitteleuropa from Russian encroachment, as she had done at the
Congress of Vienna in the Polish-Saxon Question. The Greek insurrection.
moreover, posed two additional problems for Habsburg security, one foreign
and the other domestic. If the Greeks lost, or even appeared to be losing,
Alexander, out of sympathy for his co-religionists, might answer their
appeals for help with a declaration of war on the Porte. If the Greeks won.
some of Austria's own subjects might be encouraged to emulate them.

Because of the polyglot character of Habsburg demography any national
liberation movement on Austria's frontiers - whether Italian, Serb.
Rumanian, or Greek - was equally anathema to the Vienna government.
For these reasons, Austria and Britain acted in concert to mediate the
Russo-Turkish dispute, and the tsar, because of his loyalty to the Alliance.
moderation, and aversion to war, supported their efforts.
At the end of the Congress, Vienna was still allied with London and st.
Petersburg, but neither bond was as strong as it once had been. With the
death of Castlereagh, Austria's union with Britain had lost the character of
confidence and intimacy which had been its essence and strength. The
ascendancy of Canning had inaugurated a new era of mutual Anglo-
Austrian distrust which contributed to the rise of British isolationism.
Austro-Russian relations, meanwhile. had been estranged by Metternich's
token support of Russian policy in the Spanish Question and Alexander's
growing impatience with the unproductive mediation at Constantinople.
But the great debate at Verona focused on Spain. On this issue, the allied
powers were so divided. even before the Congress began, that concerted
action was impossible. Under these circumstances, the intervention of the
Congress was confined to three "insignificant dispatches," as Chateaubriand
called them, and France, far from being the instrument of the Alliance,
actually pursued a separate, national policy against the wishes of Britain.
Austria, and Prussia. For all practical purposes, the Alliance, indeed, was
dead. Thus the traditional interpretation that the eastern courts gave France
a mandate to invade Spain in myth.
PART III
PROBLEMS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY
AND INTERPRETATION
CHAPTER X
WELLINGTON AND THE CONGRESS
Statesman, yet friend to truth! of soul sincere,

In action faithful, and in honour clear;
Who broke no promise, serv'd no private end,
Who gain'd no title, and who lost no friend. - Pope.1
1. The Alleged Crime
One of the most provocative problems to emerge from the Congress of

Verona involves the question of Wellington's loyalty and ability as the
British plenipotentiary: Did he faithfully and vigorously execute Canning's
instructions, or did he betray the foreign secretary and oppose his policy?
Historians disagree on the answer. One school contends that the duke, good
soldier that he was, loyally and effectively followed his orders, while
another counters that he deliberately undermined his government's policy
and even gave France a plan for the conquest of Spain. Still a third school
asserts that Wellington, a mere tyro in diplomacy, played an ineffectual and
incompetent role at Verona. This scholarly debate has consumed an extra-
ordinary amount of time, research, and print.
2. The Prosecution
The first published criticism of the duke's diplomacy appeared in 1852,

when Alphonse de Lamartine alleged that Wellington had approved of the
French army of observation on the Spanish frontier. 2 Twenty-five years
later Henri Martin questioned the duke's loyalty to his chief. Wellington,
he declared, had opposed "liberalism throughout the Continent and had
used little zeal in contending against hostile schemes" aimed at Spain.3 But
these claims, despite the prestige of their authors, went almost unnoticed
in England until October 1888, when Lord John Acton, who was usually
prudent in his statements, charged that "While Canning was straining all
his resources to stay the invasion of Spain, the Duke of Wellington showed
1 Alexander Pope, "Epistle to Mr. Addison," 1.67.

2 Lamartine, La Restauration, VII, 106.
3 Martin, Histoire de France depuis 1789 jusqu'a nos jours (2nd ed.; Paris, 1878-
1885), IV, 308. A staunch republican, Martin in 1871 entered the National Assembly
as the deputy of Aisne, and in 1876 he became a life senator.
278 PROBLEMS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND INTERPRETATION
his fidelity to his colleague by exhorting the French Government to push

on boldly and defy him." 4
Writing in 1895. Fedor Fedorovitch Martens, the Russian historian and
archivist, not only concurred in Acton's indictment of the duke, but went
even further, accusing him of treason. In a historical essay based on docu-
ments in the imperial Russian archives, Martens contended that Wellington
sympathized so completely with French intervention in the internal affairs
of Spain, that after returning to London, he secretly communicated to Count
Lieven "a plan of military operations which the French army, in his opinion,
should adopt in Spain." According to this scheme, French forces should
quickly converge on Madrid. No time should be wasted in besieging for-
tresses and strong places, nor should the French fleet attempt a blockade
of Cadiz. All efforts must be directed toward the swift capture of the
Spanish capital in order to forestall the formation of guerilla units. The
Russian ambassador transmitted this plan to his government which relayed
it to Paris, where the Duke of Angouleme adopted it. Wellington, more-
over, gave Lieven, "in the most absolute secrecy," the confidential dis-
patches of Lord Fitzroy Somerset, describing the internal situation in
Spain. 5
In three articles written between 1913 and 1920. John Eric Sidney Green,
a British historian, revived these accusations and elaborated on them. Ac-
cording to his thesis, the duke, while not overstepping his instructions in
purely official relations, nonetheless placed limits on these relations by not
attending several conferences. He felt "embarrassment and regret ... while
playing his official role." Thus a distinction must be made between Welling-
ton, the statesman, representing his government's views, and Wellington,
the individual, expressing privately his personal opinions. The duke created
the impression that while Britain would not join an attack on Spain, she
might connive secretly at the fall of the constitutional government, as Castle-
reagh had done with respect to Naples. 6 Wellington, moreover,
feU so much under the influence of Mettemich as practically to substitute an
Austrian policy for a British policy at the congress, and ... this assumption
carries with it the inevitable corollary that the Congress of Verona cannot there-
fore be said to have opened up a new era in British foreign policy.... The
famous protest of 30 October was, for all practical purposes, withdrawn;
4 Lord John Emerich E. D. Acton, "Review of J. Frank Bright's A History of
England, 1837-1880," EHR, III (Oct. 1888),800.
5 Martens, Recueil des traites, XI. 305-306; Lieven to Nesselrode, London, Feb. 25
and Mar. 16, 1823, cited by ibid.
, Green, "Wellington, Boislecomte, and the Congress of Verona, 1822," TRHS,
4th ser., I (1918), 64. 73.
WELLINGTON AND THE CONGRESS 279
secondly, ... the protests of 19 and 20 November appear to have been written
partly with the object of providing a substitute for the paper of 30 October, and
partly with the intention of throwing dust in the eyes of parliament; and thirdly,
... so far from doing all that in him lay to thwart the French in ,their design
of invading Spain, Wellington may even have supplied them with a plan of
campaign, placing at their disposal his unrivalled military talents, and his expert
knowledge of that country which was the object of their joint deliberations.7
Green attributes Wellington's alleged disloyalty primarily to his aversion
to democracy, disapproval of Canning's policy of isolation, and personal
dislike of his colleague. The duke's aristocratic nature, moreover, inclined
him toward Mettemich's political system. George IV, who regarded the
foreign secretary as a charlatan and did not wish to see England separated
from the Alliance, shared Wellington's antipathy to Canning. By disregard-
ing his chief's instructions, therefore, the duke was being loyal to the king,
to his High Tory friends (both British and foreign, especially Esterhazy
and Lieven), and to his own political creed, against "the ambition of a
democratic minister." If this interpretation is true, Green argues, the
accepted ideas about the role of the Congress of Verona in the development
of British foreign policy must be revised. British diplomacy did fail at
Verona, despite Canning's eloquent assurances to the contrary. It did not
break the Alliance, nor did it prevent a Franco-Spanish war.8
The primary source for these accusations is the unpublished, private
diary of Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte (1796-1863),9 who was
twenty-six at the time of the Congress of Verona. Sent to the Congress at the
request of La Ferronnays, his trusted confidant, he served as a secretary
of the French delegation. His "Resume historique du congres de Verone"
was written at the wish of La Ferronnays who used it, but Boislecomte had
his own reasons for writing it. At Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, he col-
lected material for a history of French foreign policy during the Restau-
ration. Disappointed in this project, he turned these materials over to the
Ministere des Affaires :Btrangeres. 10 In addition to the present writer, only
four other historians (Louis de Viel-Castel, Duvergier de Hauranne, J. E. S.
Green, and William S. Robertson), have used Baron Boislecomte's manu-
script.
If the charges of Acton, Martens, and Green are true, Wellington is,
indeed, guilty of betraying Canning and violating the confidence of the
7 Green, Wellington and the Congress of Verona, 1822," EHR, XXXV (1920),
200-201.
8 Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 72-74, 75-76.
9 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 75-76,100.
10 Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 60-62.
cabinet. In that case, one must ruefully conclude that the hero of Waterloo,
through treachery, had made the transition to fallen idol in only seven
years. But the accusations may not be true.
3. The Defense
Harold Temperley and Miss H. M. Lackland, who have ably defended the
duke's diplomacy at Verona, emphatically deny that he "was guilty of
deliberate treachery to Canning." 11 Despite cajoleries, flattery, and special
favors shown him by Alexander, Metternich, and Marie Louise, Welling-
ton remained resolute. As Chateaubriand has testified: "In vain was the
successor of Marlborough caressed to make him deviate from his country's
policy; it was all lost time." 12 He refused, in sum, to act in concert with the
eastern courts
in putting moral pressure on Spain, or with France in actually threatening force.
He separated British action completely from the others, broke up the congress
and the solidarity of the European alliance, and departed "mecontent de nous
tous," as Metternich said. 13
Although Wellington undoubtedly let it be seen that he disapproved of
his government's attitude, the Congress as a whole accepted his remon-
strance of October 30 at face value. On November 9, Countess Lieven
reported: The duke "is bored; they vex him .... He sighs for the moment
of his departure." 14 The opinion of this astute lady is important, because
Wellington, Metternich, and Nesselrode were frequent visitors of her salon.
The date - November 9 - is long enough after the duke's note of October
30 for all parties to have considered its consequences. The chancellor
showed his annoyance by discontinuing his regular correspondence with
Wellington for several months. 15
The "Iron Duke" was not always discreet in his actions, and he probably
did say privately at the Congress that if France wanted to invade Spain,
she must do it swiftly. He apparently repeated this opinion on January 3,
1823, to the Count Andre Charles de Marcellus, French charge d'affaires
at London, declaring that a French army could march to Madrid quickly
11 Temperley, Canning, p. 485; cf. Lackland, "Wellington at Verona," EHR, XXXV
(Oct. 1920), 574-575, 579.
13 Temperley, "Canning, Wellington, and George the Fourth," EHR, XXXVIII
(Apr. 1923), 209.
14 Mme Lieven to Lady Granville, Verona, Nov. 9, 1822, Granville MSS, quoted
in Temperley, Canning, p. 485.
15 Ibid.
and without danger, but that once there it could not remain indefinitely
without exciting resentment in Spain which would threaten French interests.
He had expressed the same view to Villele in an attempt to convince him of
the inexpediency of invading Spain, and the premier admitted later that
Wellington's prediction had come true.1 6
Temperley finds no authority other than Fedor Martens that Wellington
secretly transmitted a military plan to Lieven for the conquest of Spain,
and he considers Martens misleading and inaccurate. While Wellington
opposed withdrawing from the Alliance, he vigorously disapproved of
intervention in Spain either by the Alliance or France. Consequently, he
advised the Paris cabinet against invading Spain. It was, of course, a mis-
take to tell France to go quickly, if she went at all, and an indiscretion to
show the Congress that he was executing his instructions with reluctance.
Wellington's breach with the continental powers in October 1822. none-
theless, produced a strong effect.17
Temperley concludes that the charge that the duke betrayed his official
chief at Verona is insupportable, though an estrangement between the two
did begin at this time. True, Wellington later took part in foreign (Russian
and Austrian) attempts to overthrow Canning, but these intrigues did not
result from the Congress of Verona. On the contrary, they were a conse-
quence of Canning's efforts in February and March, 1823, to stop France
by appealing to British public opinion and of his violent attacks on the
French government in April after war began.1 8
Miss Lackland is less judicious in her language than Temperley, perhaps
because her purpose is to refute the Green thesis, which she contends has
only revived the worn out, old Whig "bugaboo" that the hero of Waterloo
had been the dupe of Montmorency and the tool of Metternich at Verona.
18 Marcellus to Chateaubriand, London, Jan. 3, 1823, A.A.E., Angleterre: Corre-

spondance, 1823, Vol. 616; Granville to Canning, Paris, Dec. 8, 1824, F.O., France,
146/61; Temperley, "Wellington and George IV," EHR, XXXVIII, 209. The private
letters published in Marcellus, Politique de La Restauration en 1822 et 1823 (Paris,
1853) are unreliable. The French diplomat deliberately falsified the dates and details
of conversations but did not change the general views of the speakers, as the official
correspondence (A.A.E., Angleterre, Vol. 616) reveals. Temperley suggests that Mar-
cellus made the alterations "for dramatic effect," rather than from a desire to distort
the truth.
17 Temperley, Canning, pp. 482, 485-486.
18 Ibid., pp. 80-82, 86-90, 486. In addition to George IV and Wellington, three
other ultra-Tory cabinet ministers participated in the unsuccessful intrigue to remove
Canning in 1823 and 1824: Eldon (the chancellor), Westmoreland (lord privy seal),
and Harrowby (president of the council). The gambit failed because of Canning's
popularity and Liverpool's loyality to his foreign secretary.
Her answer is based largely on Austrian sources supplied by Sir Charles

K. Webster.19
Miss Lackland begins her vindication of Wellington by observing that
he, more than anyone else, was responsible for putting Canning in office.
As a military man, the duke was accustomed to taking and obeying orders:
disloyalty would have been contrary to his character and training. Green's
chief source of information, Boislecomte, was a minor official in the French
delegation, whose theory for explaining Wellington's conduct, Green him-
self admits is fallacious. Boislecomte probably gleaned most of his infor-
mation from La Ferronnays, who was on more or less intimate terms with
the tsar, but even La Ferronnays was not permitted to attend the most
important conferences.20
The secrecy which enshrouded these conversations may be measured by
Montmorency's dismay at learning that Chateaubriand knew something
which had passed at a confidential meeting. Since Boislecomte was not
included in "the charmed circle," he could get his "facts" only from those
who were or from secondary accounts; consequently, it is entirely possible
that some unfounded rumors are included in his diary. Boislecomte, there-
fore, is not a satisfactory source, and his statements cannot outweigh the
testimony of men who associated directly with Wellington. 21 An exami-
nation of their notes and memoirs reveals their contradiction of Boislecomte
in many cases.
Chateaubriand, as a close friend of Alexander and as a French pleni-
potentiary at the Congress, was in a position to be better informed than
Boislecomte. Both before and after Montmorency's departure, Chateau-
briand declared that Wellington vigorously opposed all measures suggested
by the continental courts regarding the Spanish Question. After November
22, Chateaubriand's primacy in the French delegation put him in close
communication with Wellington so that he was well-acquainted with the
duke's views and actions.l!2
In his correspondence and memoires, Metternich made no reference of
Wellington's ever having acted in concert with him. On the contrary, he
19 Lackland, "Wellington at Verona," EHR, XXXV, 574, 576.

20 Ibid., pp. 574-575; cf. Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes,
CXLIll,563.
21 Lackland, "Wellington at Verona," EHR, XXXV, 575-576.
22 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance,
III, 271; same to same, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 247-248;
Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 106, 108-109; Memoires of Baron Hyde de
Neuville: Outlaw, Exile, Ambassador, trans. and abr. Frances Jackson (London, 1913),
II, 114, 119.
severely criticized the duke for his incompetence as a diplomat. On De-

cember 2, 1822, late in the history of the Congress, the chancellor confided
to Philipp von Neumann, the Austrian charge d'affaires at London,23 that
Wellington had not the diplomatist's most indispensable qualities, that he had,
of course, expected "des nuances delica,tes et recherchees" from the duke, but
that he had been quite unprepared for the inefficiency with which the said duke
had conducted affairs at Verona, and ... he instructed Neumann to find if the
"ligne plus acerbe" taken by England ... were to be ascribed to Wellington's
instructions, or to his own attitude.24
This dispatch reveals that Wellington was far from having reached an
entente with Metternich during November, 1822.
The chancellor's contempt for the duke's diplomatic ability was warml¥
shared by Gentz, his co-worker and alter ego, who described the British
plenipotentiary as "the most pitiful diplomat which this government has
perhaps ever employed in important business," and condemned his notes
as "nothing but sorrowful monuments of a government fallen away from all
good principles." 25 In a similar vein, the Austrian publicist complained
that Wellington's remonstrance of October 30 was indicative of "his entire,
highly unenlightened system on the Spanish Question." 26 Again comment-
ing on the duke's conference of November 20 with the four cabinet ministers
he exclaimed: It was "one of the most serious and vehement" at Verona!
"What a day!" 27 Later Gentz observed in retrospect that Wellington had
remained inflexible in his denunciation of all intervention whatsoever in the
internal affairs of Spain, and as the secretary of the Congress, he was in a
position to knoW. 28 Thus Gentz, too, contradicts Green's thesis that Welling-
ton had fallen in with Metternich's views.
Montmorency's reports to Villele also complain of the duke's opposition
to French policy. Unfortunately, the foreign minister's account of the Con-
gress has been lost, but Alfred F. Nettement, the historian who used it,
quotes Montmorency to prove that Wellington scrupulously and constantly
intoned his instructions and that he could not, therefore, have led a double
life at Verona.29
23 The regular position of Neumann was secretary of the embassy, but he was
acting charge d'affaires while Prince Esterhazy, the ambassador, attended the Congress
of Verona.
24 La.ckland, "Wellington at Verona," ERH, XXXV, 576.
25 Gentz, "Spanische Frage," n.d., Kongressakten, Verona, Fasc. 45, quoted in
Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 22On.
26 Entry for Wed., Oct. 30, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 102.
27 Entry for Wed., Nov. 20, 1822, ibid., p. 111.
28 Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 161.
29 Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 273; Lackland, "Wellington at Verona," EHR,
XXXV, 577.
It is regrettable, of course, that Wellington allowed himself to be drawn

into conversations of a military nature, but his conduct is understandable,
since military campaigns and strategy constituted his profession. In this
case, the interest proved to be a weakness. He made a mistake which
created "an entirely erroneous impression on his hearer's minds." so He
was not, however, as incapable as Mettemich and Gentz have characterized
him. Since Alexander, Mettemich, Montmorency, and Chateau briand, all
were determined to intervene in Spain in some way (though they disagreed
on the kind of intervention and the means to be used), it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for anyone, even were he endowed with the
great diplomatic talents of a Castlereagh or a Canning, to have prevented
them from realizing their goal. Wellington did what he could. As Miss
Lackland has affirmed,
His function at the Congress was to be "an objection and an obstacle," and
Metternich's outburst to Neumann is a measure of how well he played the part.
He was doomed to defeat from the beginning, but he could and did hamper the
proceedings of his opponents at every stage.3 !
Among the older historians of this period, Sir Archibald Alison, W. A.
Phillips, Robert W. Seton-Watson, and G. N. Wright, all insist that Welling-
ton was obstinate in his loyalty to Canning's instructions, a verdict shared
by Sir Charles Petrie, a recent biographer of the duke. 32 Writing in 1956,
Petrie admits that Wellington disliked Canning but contends that he also
distrusted George IV and never had any real affection for him. The duke,
indeed, opposed Canning's support of the constitutional parties of Spain
and Portugal and protested against British recognition of the Spanish
American colonies, but the antagonism between the two developed slowly
as their differences over foreign policy came into increasing conflict. At
Verona, Petrie declares, Wellington "was quite content" to serve as Can-
ning's obedient instrument.ss
4. The Verdict
It is easier to blame Wellington than to explain him, but his defense is

convincing. Even Green, his chief critic, conceded that neither Wellington
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 578.
S2 Alison, History of Europe, II, 629, 636; Cresson, Holy Alliance, p. 111; Phillips,
Confed, of Europe, p. 259; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, p. 76; Wright, Life ot
Well., IV, 136-137.
ss Petrie, Wellington, pp. 222, 224-225.
nor Mettemich approved of a French invasion and did not conceal their
aversion to such a move. 34
Before a warrant is issued, it must be shown that a crime has been com-
mitted. In this case, it does not appear that one has. Wellington stands ac-
cused of having failed at Verona to prevent the continental powers from
resolving on intervention in Spain and even of having secretly collaborated
with them. This interpretation is based on misinformation and myth. The
Congress of Verona did not decide on armed intervention in Spain, nor did
it render a Franco-Spanish war inevitable. The allied courts acted with
prudence and delicacy in the Spanish affair. Far from prescribing to France
what measures she should adopt, they left the Paris cabinet at complete
liberty to follow whatever course it thought proper. A struggle developed
within the French government between the pro-war and anti-war factions
in which the former triumphed, and thus war came. The Congress of Ve-
rona, as Gentz observed, barely scratched the surface of the Spanish affair.36
If France subsequently went to war, it was not the fault of Wellington or
Canning, nor even of Metternich or Villele, all of whom opposed war.
Wellington, in sum, was a High Tory, but he also was honest. He did not
undermine his government's policy at Verona nor did he betray Canning,
though he sometimes was indiscreet in his language. The Acton-Green
interpretation of British policy at the Congress is untenable.
34 Green, "Wellington and the Congress," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 74.

35 Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 164, 174-177.
CHAPTER XI
CHATEAUBRIAND AND THE CONGRESS
[Chateaubrianda ... united' with a fine imagination the

friendliness and simplicity of a child.... His self-
esteem gave him a great desire for praise, with no taint
of disdain or disparagement, but ... he never boggled
at listening to home-truths. He never brought a heart
to his relationships, only that natural pliancy and love
of praise which. .. invariably made him the tool of
stronger-minded people than himself, who knew how
to flatter his vanity that they might use his gifts.
Madame de Montcalm 1
1. The Debate
Who was responsible for Chateaubriand's mission to the Congress of

Verona, and what was its purpose? For more than a century, these correla-
tive questions have been the focus of a scholarly controversy which began in
1849 with the appearance of Chateaubriand's Memoires d'outre-tombe. In
this celebrated work, he boasts that he employed the Duchess Claire de
Duras to win over Villele and then used Villele to force the hand of Mont-
morency, thus achieving his ambition to attend the Congress. Concerning
the role of Juliette Recamier in this intrigue, he maintains a discreet silence. 2
But the Souvenirs et correspondance of this astute lady, published ten
years later (1859), throws considerable light on this question. Jean Guillau-
me, Baron Hyde de Neuville, a confidant of all parties, indeed gives her
full credit for resolving the impasse in favor of the great writer. He asserts
in his Memoires (which appeared between 1888-1892), that only the "deli-
cate hand" of Madame Recamier was "capable of touching this situation,
bristling with difficulties." 3 In a private conversation with the baron, she
confided:
Your friend's cause is gained. He will go to Verona; and he owes this appoint-
ment, which he so much desired, not to M. de Villele, but to the Viscount de
Montmorency, who has generously put an end to my anxiety.4
1 Quoted in Maurois, Chateau briand, pp. 239-240. The Ma.rquise Armande de
Montcalm was the Duke of Richelieu's sister.
2 Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 119, 129.
8 Hyde de Neuville, Memoirs, II, 117. Volume II, covering the reign of Louis
XVIII (1814-1824), was published in 1890.
4 Mme R6camier to Hyde de Neuville, n.d., quoted in ibid., p. 118. This conver-
sation must have taken place at the end of August. Villele informed Chateaubriand of
his appointment on the 27th.
The foreign minister, she claimed, "had conquered his personal repugnance
in order to comply with her wish." 1\
Madame Recamier's frank avowal, supported by Baron Hyde de Neu-
ville, appeared to settle the matter, but two twentieth century historians,
Gabriel Pailhes and Kazimierz Waliszewski, renewed the debate. Pailhes,
in his La duchesse de Duras et Chateau briand, published in 1910, cate-
gorically declares: "It is to Villele, and hence to Mme de Duras, and not at
all to Montmorency, nor consequently to Mme Recamier, that... [Cha-
teaubriand] owed the realization of his dream." 6 Taking a different tack
entirely, Waliszewski, in his Le Regne d'Alexandre Ier, which appeared in
1925, suggests that Pozzo di Borgo and Countess Tolstoy, whose Paris salon
was frequented by the ultra-Royalists, had obtained the appointment of
Chateau briand to the Verona delegation, a conclusion repeated in 1947 by
Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky.7
These opinions, however, settled nothing and served only to confuse
the issue. In an attempt to appease the partisans of the duchess and madame,
while ignoring those of the countess, the diplomatic Andre Maurois af-
firmed in 1938 that Chateaubriand's "Egerias," Duras and Recamier,
should share equally the credit for securing the seat in the Congress which
he coveted. But Maurois' ambivalence satisfied no one; thus the controversy
continued. In 1951 Maurice Levaillant, the editor of Chateaubriand's
Memoires and his Lettres a Madame Recamier, and E. Beau de Lomenie,
his collaborator, revived the Recamier-Neuville thesis. They admit the
existence of "parallel intrigues," and even agree that Madame de Duras
did, indeed, obtain Villele's approval of Chateaubriand's mission to Ve-
rona, but Madame Recamier, they contend, deserves the greater accolade,
because she overcame a more formidable obstacle: the opposition of Mont-
morency.8
The cognency of these arguments notwithstanding, the historian, who is
constantly confronted by the plurality of causation, will realize that the case
thus stated is too dualistic and dogmatic. None of the participants in the
debate even mentions such factors as the influence of the court coterie, the
work of Hyacinthe Pilorge and Marcellus (both colleagues of Chateaubriand
at the London embassy), Castlereagh's suicide, and the self-interest of
Villele, who in August 1822 had not yet advanced from finance minister to
5 Ibid.
6 Pailhes, Duras et Chateau briand, p. 216.
7 Waliszewski, Alexandre ler, ill, 103; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe,
1789-1825, p. 398.
B Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 255; Chateaubriand, Lettres a Madame Recamier,
eel. Maurice Levaillant and E. Beau de Lomenie (Paris, 1951), pp. 111-112.
premier. And what of the purpose of the ambitious ambassador's mission?

Was he sent only to please two determined and persuasive women, or did
the Paris cabinet fear the loss of his support and that of his friends, if he
were not sent to Verona? Was Villele's favorable decision influenced by his
rivalry with Montmorency or by a desire to have someone at the Congress
who could sway sovereigns, especially the tsar, with his genius? These and
other questions indicate the need for a reassessment of Chateaubriand's
mission to the Congress of Verona. The case is not closed.
2. Ambition and Intrigue
The genesis of the Chateaubriand-Montmorency feud stretches back to the

fall of the moderate Richelieu ministry in December 1821. With the as-
cendancy of the "cabinet of the Right," Chateaubriand sought and expected
the portfolio of foreign affairs, for he was the political ally of Villele and
Corbiere and had brought them into the previous ministry. Louis XIII and
Villele, however, considered him too ultra, and the ultra-Royalists thought
him too liberal. No one wanted him in the cabinet. The royal ordinance of
December 15, therefore, assigned this coveted post to Mathieu de Mont-
morency. Chateaubriand's spleen was great, yet somehow he had to be
conciliated since the new government could not command a majority in
National Assembly without his support. Villele's offer of the Ministry of
Public Instruction, a departmental office under Corbiere, he rejected with
scorn and denounced the ministry as "wretches" for inflicting such a wound
to his pride. At last, Montmorency on the 27th suggested the offer of an
embassy "to appease the wrath of Achilles." Chateaubriand yielded but
declared that he would accept only that of London. On January 4, 1822,
the council agreed, and on the 9th, an ordinance announced his appoint-
ment. Thus the new government bought the support of this talented but
dangerous man and, by the same stroke, removed him from France. Though
mollified, Chateaubriand was never pleased with the London embassy, for
he knew the king and council had banished him. He still yearned to be
foreign minister and believed his friends had betrayed him.9
In Chateaubriand's character, fickleness rubbed shoulders with ambition.
Commenting on this aspect of his personality, Charles A. Sainte-Beuve, the
9 Ibid., pp. 107·108; Villele, Memoires, II, 477, 487-488, 496-497, and III, 19;
Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 89; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 410·411;
Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, n.d., and Dec. 27, 1821, in Pailhes, Duras et
Chateau briand, 203·204, 206; Herriot, Madame Recamier, II, 93, 97·98; Antioche,
Chateau briand, pp. 204·206; Maurois, Chateau briand, pp. 247·248; Fourcassie, Villele,
pp. 194·195.
famous literary critic and editor of his works, once remarked that he is
never content, always ready to give up what he has undertaken ... , wanting
everything and not caring for anything, ... believing that all the sacrificies are
on his side, and complaining of the ingratitude of others as though he alone had
done everything. HI
Chateau briand's actions during 1822, indeed, testify to the validity of
Sainte-Beuve's assessment. The new ambassador to England reached his
post on April 5, and before a month had passed, he began the campaign to
represent France at the congress then scheduled for September in Florence.
He conceded that Montmorency, as foreign minister, should be first pleni-
potentiary, but he would not yield second place to' anyone. From May to
August, he left no stone unturned to persuade the Paris cabinet to send him
to the "assembly of Kings." 11 Appealing directly to Villele on May 17, he
frankly confessed this aspiration: "It is the thing I desire most earnestly and
for which I ask you; it is there that I shall succeed in acquiring, in your
interests, that diplomatic preponderance which increases for me day by
day." 12 On June II, he approached Montmorency in a manner which was
almost obsequious:
I take this occasion to ask you, noble viscount, to grant me what is the end
of my diplomatic ambition.
I want to attend the congress. I think that it is in the best interests of us both
that you send me to negotiate directly with the sovereigns of Europe; thus you
will complete my career, and you will always have me at your service to win
you friends and to repulse your enemies.13
Continuing in the same vein, the ambassador criticized two of his colleagues
in the French diplomatic corps - Caraman in Vienna and La Ferronnays in
st. Petersburg - who seemed likely rivals for the coveted congressional
delegation. For the king, he proposed the Duke of Blacas; for the foreign
minister, the Duke of Laval; and for his party and the ministry, himself,
"ambassador to the first power of Europe." 14
10 Causeries du lundi (Paris, 1851-1862), XN (1859), 316-317.

11 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, May 3, 1822, Recamier, Corre-
spondance, I, 395; Antioche, Chateau briand, pp. 229-230; Pailhes, Duras et Chateau-
briand, p. 214.
12 Chateaubriand to Villele, London, May 17, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 27.
13 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, London, June 11, 1822, Recamier, Corre-
spondance, I, 416-417. On this same date, Chateaubriand sent Mme R6camier a copy of
this dispatch and requested her intercession in his behalf.
14 Ibid., pp. 417-419.
For my nomination to the congress, [Chateaubriand observed], you will have a

remarkable precedence: the Prince d'Esterhazy is going there; he, like myself.
is an ambassador to London.
Noble viscount, whoever says that I am not your friend, and that I want your
place, ,is guilty of committing an ignoble falsehood. I never envy them in
prosperity.15
In the face of such solicitations, Villele and Montmorency remained
courteous but non-committal, because neither they nor the king trusted
Chateau briand, and all three regarded him as an ambitious poet who was a
mere tyro in diplomacy. They suspected him, too, of being pro-Russian,
since he corresponded regularly with Empress Elizabeth. It was she, more-
over, who had financed his journey to Jerusalem which resulted in his
famous book, ltineraire a Jerusalem. Finally, Montmorency himself wished
to represent "his party and the ministry" at the Congress. 16
When Chateaubriand's direct approach failed to produce the desired
result, he resorted to the "mysteries of the antechamber." In the past, his
mistress, Madame Recamier, had been the key which unlocked the door for
his political advancement. The mission assigned to her in this "grande af-
faire" was to conquer Montmorency. But not content with only one string
in his bow, he deputied the Duchess of Duras to press Villele. Part of her
assignment was to undermine Laval, Montmorency's cousin, whom Cha-
teaubriand feared as his chief rival,17
To Madame Recamier, Chateaubriand professed that his only reason for
desiring to go to the Congress was that it would bring him back to Paris
to see her. He assured her that his only thoughts were of returning to her
"little cell," that his three months absence from her side seemed more like
three centuries. To Madame Duras, he suggested that his presence at the
Congress would be of eminent profit to France, since he knew the kings
and ministers of Europe. He solicited her help, too, in securing for himself
the blue ribbon of St. Louis, as befitted his rank of ambassador. Duras,
however, rebuked him for his ambition, which seemed to overshadow every
other feeling, and informed him that she knew of his "double manoeuvre"
15 Ibid., p. 419.
16 Villele, Memoires, Ill, 33; Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, June 23,
1822, Recamier, Correspondance, I, 422; Herriot, Madame Recamier, ll, 99; Maurois,
Chateau briand, p. 247; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 397.
17 Chateaubriand to Mme R6camier, London, May 31, 1822; R6camier, Corre-
spondance, 1,401; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, Ill, 119; Herriot, Madame
Recamier, II, 87,99. In June 1822, Laval replaced Blacas as ambassador to the Holy
See. Montmorency informed Chateaubriand of this appointment and commented
sarcastically: "So now you are rid of a powerful competitor for the congress.' Chateau-
briand to Mme R6camier, London, June 23, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, I, 422.
of using Mme Recamier and herself as twin egerias. But she swallowed her
pride and did as he requested. During June, she talked to Villele, repre-
senting to him that "Chateaubriand at Verona would be an ornament for
France. The sovereigns," she asserted, "would have someone with whom
to talk." Although the argument seemed to take effect, Villele would make
no promises. 1S
Having become impatient and despondent by the end of June, Chateau-
briand formulated a new plan. Although he still preferred the Congress, he
now aspired to Montmorency's post. On June 23, he inquired of Madame
Recamier:
If Mathieu goes to Vienna or to Florence, why should they not confide in me the
portfolio of foreign affairs for the interim? Mathieu must know my loyalty, and
he knows that nothing in the world would prevent me from returning the port-
folio to him on his return.19
Early in July, the ambassador advised his charming confederate to secure
the support of "Sosthene and his friends" in sending him to the Congress,
if Montmorency did not attend, or in making him foreign minister for the
interim, if he did go. By Sosthene and his friends, he meant La Roche-
foucauld, Montmorency's son-in-law, and Zoe Talon, Countess du Cayla,
the royal mistress, whose influence Villele himself had used to increase and
perpetuate his power.20
Even in the tragedy of Castlereagh's suicide, Chateaubriand saw an
opportunity for the advancement of his ambition. To Madame Recamier, he
declared:
It is astonishing news and a great change of fortune! Hyacinthe [Pilorge] is hap-
pier than I ... ! If you use this moment well, everything can be arranged.
Lord Londonderry's death may change Mathieu's plans about the congress;
for ... it is probable that ... [the new foreign secretary] will not go to Vienna.
There would no longer be any objection to me ... , if Mathieu, in his turn, gave
way.21
But Montmorency did not intend to give way, and, above all, he did not
want to negotiate at Vienna, or any other place, under Chateaubriand's
surveillance.
18 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, May 3, July 9, and Aug. 16, 1822,
ibid., pp. 395, 425, 432; Villele, Memoires, III, 28; Chateaubriand, Lettres a Mme
Recamier, p. 111; Hemot, Madame Recamier, II, 111-112; Maurois, Chateau briand,
pp. 247-248. The term, "egeria," comes from Roman mythology and means a woman
who am-ises a statesman.
19 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, June 23, 1822, Recamier, Corre-
spondance, I, 423.
20 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, July 5, ibid., pp. 423-424.
21 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Aug. 13, 1822, ibid., pp. 430-431.
3. The Mission
By the middle of August, Chateaubriand had almost given up hope of

attending the Congress, but driven by desperation, he resolved on yet an-
other tactic: on the 15th he sent Hyacinthe Pilorge, his private secretary,
to Paris to plead his case before VilleIe and Montmorency. After an absence
of six days, Pilorge returned to London on the 21st to report that the
ministers had refused his entreaties but that their "refusal was disguised by
vagueness." He also brought back a letter from the foreign minister which,
despite its "ironical phrases," made it clear that Montmorency did not want
Chateaubriand at the Congress. 22 Bitter and melancholy, the ambassador
thought of resigning his post. "Anything," he protested, "is better than
serving men so little capable of judging ... events and appreciating their
friends." 23
The reaction is understandable, but the truth seems to be that Mont-
morency and VilleIe were weary of Chateaubriand's importuning. The
foreign minister washed his hands of the affair and declared in disgust that
he would let the council decide what to do about the egotistic poet's pre-
tentions. 24 The finance minister implored Hyde de Neuville to urge the
ambassador "to greater moderation." Neuville, however, not only declined
to intervene with his friend but even advised Villele that "Chateaubriand
would be in a better position to represent France than anyone else, on ac-
count of the favour with which he was regarded by Alexander. "26
Exasperated by Montmorency's letter of August 17, the ambassador
resorted to one last maneuver. On the night of August 21, less than twelve
hours after Pilorge's return to London, he dispatched Marcellus, his first
secretary, to settle the question. Arriving in Paris on the 24th, Marcellus
went straight to Villele and Montmorency and set forth "the generous
motives, the urgent, personal, and intimate reasons which must determine
22 Marcellus, La Restauration, p. 87; Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug.

17, 1822, Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 123-124; Antioche, Chateau-
briand, pp. 353, 355-356.
23 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Aug. 21, 1822, Recamier, Corre-
spondance, I, 435.
24 Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug. 17, 1822, Chateaubriand, Memoires
d'outre-tombe, III, 123-124; Herriot, Madame Recamier, II, 111.
25 Hyde de Neuville, Memoirs, II, 114. Neuville had just arrived in Paris (August
16) from Washington, where he had served as French minister since June 1816, except
for a nine-months· leave of absence (May 1820 to February 1821), during which he
returned to France.
them ... to accede to the desire of M. de Chateaubriand." 26 After three
days of debate, in which La Rochefoucald and the court coterie took an
active part, the council, on the night of the 26th, appointed Montmorency
to go "to Vienna to the sovereigns, in order to settle in concert with them the
preliminaries of the Congress [of Verona]," and assigned Chateaubriand,
La Ferronnays, and Caraman to the delegation at Verona for the purpose
of drafting the final texts of the protocols which would be proposed at
Vienna. 27
Returning to London on the night of August 29, Marcellus awoke Cha-
teaubriand, who was hardly sleeping, and gave him the good news: "They
have abstained from refusing me! You have been nominated plenipotentiary
to Verona." 28 Marcellus then gave him two confidential letters, one from
Montmorency and the other from Villele, announcing his mission. In his
joy, Chateaubriand kissed his secretary, but the next morning he rushed into
Marcellus' room, "very upset, almost furious," and declared that he no
longer wanted to go to the Congress. But on September 8, after much inner
conflict and self-debate, he embarked from Dover for the continent. The
affair had ended, and the mission had begun. 29
But what had caused this dramatic reversal of fortune? For four months
Villele and Montmorency had successfully resisted the pressure of Chateau-
briand's two "zelatrices," and as late as August 24, his candidacy for the
Congress appeared lost. Yet two days later his cause triumphed. Clio, it
seems, is a capricious muse. But, as it often happens in human affairs, an
unforeseen event - an accident - occurred which changed the course of
history: the death of Castlereagh. By the 24th, Villele had foreseen that this
tragedy would stalemate negotiations at Vienna and force their transfer to
Verona, in which event, Montmorency would surely want to follow the
sovereigns. Contemptuous of the foreign minister, whom he regarded as a
"nullity," and fearful that his diplomacy in the Spanish Question would
forfeit France's independence of action to the eastern powers, Villele con-
cluded that he must have an envoy at Verona to keep an eye on Mont-
26 Marcellus, La Restauration, pp. 87-88; cf. Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 284;

Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Aug. 21,1822, Recamier, Correspondance,
1,434-435.
27 Vilh~le, Memoires, III, 33-34; La Rochefoucald to Mme du Cayla, Paris, n.d.,
La Rochefoucald, Memoires, VIII, 100-101; Marcellus; La Restauration, p. 88.
28 Ibid.; Antioche, Clzateaubriand, pp. 358.
29 Marcellus, La Restauration, p. 88; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug. 27, 1822,
Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 125; Chateaubriand to Villele, London,
Aug. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 249; Chateaubriand to Mme
Recamier, London, Sept. 3, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, I, 438; Pailhes, Duras
et Chateau briand, pp. 216-217.
morency. Self-interest required this precaution. But whom should he send?

Had not Chateaubriand repeatedly rendered homage, and did he not also
dislike Montmorency? Here then was the man to send. 30 In the council
meeting of August 26, the finance minister triumphed over his rival. It is
Villele alone who deserves credit for winning the day. "The King," Mar-
cellus reported, "cared little about it; M. de Montmorency did not want him;
the rest of the council remained cool and without direct influence on the
issue. M. de Villele knocked down all obstacles." 81 Chateaubriand's mis-
sion, in sum, was to counter-balance the influence of Montmorency and to
serve as Villele's man in Verona.
Juliette R6camier undoubtedly was sincere in believing that Chateau-
briand owed his appointment to Montmorency whose opposition she had
overcome. This is what the foreign minister wanted her to think, but the
testimony of Marcellus clearly indicates that he deceived her by taking
credit for a council decision he could not prevent. Chateaubriand, however,
was not duped. Having learned the truth from his first secretary, he confided
to Madame R6camier on September 3: "The affair is settled, but with what
bad grace on Mathieu's part! Villele has been excellent. ... " 82 Later,
Montmorency himself admitted to Juliette that he was very reluctant to
spend a fortnight with Chateaubriand in Verona, but he again assured her
that "there are considerations higher than these which would make me
decide to sacrifice my own tastes if necessary.... " 33
As Montmorency had resisted the appeals of Madame Recamier, so
Villele held firm against the entreaties of the Duchess of Duras and the
Countess du Cayla. Far from being persuaded by them, he seems to have
resented their intercession. In Chateaubriand's case, however, Villele's
self-interest coincided with the object of their intrigue. That the king shared
the views of his finance minister is revealed by his actions during the last
30 Mme de Duras to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug. 15, 1822, Aglmor Bardoux, Etudes
sociales et politiques: ta duchesse de Duras, (Paris, 1898), p. 377; Stuart to Canning,
No. 258, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Stuart to Canning, No. 269, Paris,
Oct. 2, 1822, ibid.; Villele, Memoires, III, 33-34, 38; Villele to Serre, Paris, Sept. 15,
1822, Serre, Correspondance, N, 484; Villele to Marcellus, Paris, Oct. 6, 1822,
Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 282; La Rochefoucald, Memoires, VI, 395-396; VII,
69-71; VIII, 131, 150-151; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 444-445, 455; Chateaubriand to
Villele, Paris, Oct. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, m, 265; Gabriac.
"Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 560-561.
31 Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 282.
32 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Sept. 3, 1822, Recamier, Corre-
spondance, I. 438.
33 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Vienna, Sept. 25, 1822, quoted in Herriot,
Madame Recamier, II, 117. As of this date, the foreign minister had not received
orders to proceed to Verona.
week of August. Not only did he confirm the appointments made by his
council on the 26th, but also he decided to elevate Villele to the premier-
ship in order to check the ultra-Royalist influence of Montmorency. The
decree of September 4 implemented this decision. For these reasons, Cha-
teaubriand's boast that he had used Villele's bias (prevention) against
Montmorency to force the latter's hand, while admittedly arrogant, seems
correct.34
4. Reception at Verona
After waiting in Paris for three weeks, while the council deliberated over
the general instructions for the Congress, Chateaubriand resumed his
journey to Verona on October 5. He sent before him Count Hilaire £tienne
de Boissy, one of his London attaches, to prepare his apartment at the
Casa Lorenzi. For traveling companions he had the Count of Aspremont,
another attache, Duke Henri Louis de Rauzan, Madame Duras' son-in-law,
and the faithful Hyacinthe Pilorge. 35 Having recovered his old arrogance,
he declared on the eve of his departure from the French capital: Mont-
morency "can do nothing without me, for I am the bearer of the instructions
and the full powers." 36 Arriving in Verona on the 14th, he looked forward
to achieving great diplomatic triumphs and to receiving the admiration due
his renown as an author. The reality, predictably, fell short of the expec-
tation. 37
Chateaubriand had anticipated, of course, that Montmorency would snub
him. For the duration of the foreign minister's stay at the Congress, relations
between the two constituted an armed truce; they were correct but not
cordial. Montmorency, indeed, complained about Chateaubriand's "stiff-
ness and unsociability which make others ill at ease with him and compli-
34 Villele, Memoires, III, 8 and 38; Hyde de Neuville, Memoirs, II, 114, 117;
Herriot, Madame Recamier, II, 99; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 129;
see above, pp. 25-26.
35 Chateaubriand to Villele, Paris, Oct. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance,
III, 265; Villele to Marcellus, Paris, Oct. 6, 1822, Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 282;
Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Oct. 15, 1822, Paiihes, Duras et Chateau-
briand, p. 218; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe, III, 135 and notes; Gabriac,
"Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 560-561. For an analysis of
these instructions, see above, pp. 73-74.
36 Chateaubriand to Marcellus, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, Marcellus, La Restauration,
p.97.
37 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Oct. 15, 1822, Pailhes, Duras el
Chateau briand, p. 218; Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 257.
cate relations that ... should be simplified." 38 But the ambassador was
completely unprepared for the disdainful reaction of the sovereigns and
their ministers, with the notable exception of Tsar Alexander, who was
gracious and "full of noble and generous qualities." The Emperor Francis
at first refused to give Chateaubriand an audience, but he later relented
and received him on October 23, in order to quiet the rumors of his hostility
to the French plenipotentiary. Mettemich and his master, in reality, re-
garded "the author of Atala as an intruder" in politics and diplomacy, but
they feared his influence on the tsar.89 To discredit him, the chancellor
resorted "to ridicule sufficient to shake his self-conceit" and even charged
that he had arrived in Verona "with his pockets full of constitutions; he
was the light of Europe; he came to show the Congress what a man he
was." 40 That the stratagem achieved some success is indicated by the
change in Alexander's attitude toward Chateaubriand. Though the emperor
continued to behave with courtesy, a coolness crept into their relations.
Nonetheless, the benevolent intercession of Countess Tolstoy and the
removal of Montmorency's influence effected a reconciliation, so that the
friendship of the two, who had so much in common, was stronger at the
close of the Congress than it had been at the beginning. At their last conver-
sation on December 12, the tsar, indeed, became melancholy at the thought
of his friend's imminent departure and requested Chateaubriand to corre-
spond with him privately.41
So long as Montmorency remained at Verona, he did not permit Chateau-
briand to attend major conferences. Piqued by this exclusion, he refused
invitations to the little suppers and soirees given by Mettemich and Wel-
lington, for which Rossini provided the music. He spent most of his time
in the company of the secretaries of the French delegation. Among them,
"his young folk," he found the admiration so essential to his ego, and they,
in tum, were flattered by his attention.4:2 One of them, the Marquis Joseph
Alphonse de Gabriac, La Ferronnays' private secretary, confessed to his
"Diary":
38 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Recamier, Corre-

spondance, I, 449.
39 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, ibid., p. 447; Boisle·
comte, A.A.E., 722, 4, 77; Waliszewski, Alexandre ler, III, 100.
40 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 76-77; cr., Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue des
deux mondes, CXLIII, 562-563.
41 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 101, 105-106; Chateaubriand to Mme de
Duras, Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," ST AS, CXLVII, 423.
42 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Oct. 31 and Nov. 5, 1822, Chateau-
briand, Correspondance, III, 374, 375; Toye, Rossini, p. 89. Chateaubriand did not
assist at a ministerial conference on Spain until October 31.
I am struck with the practical justice and clarity of his ideas .... He is the kind
of man who is given more to meditation than to improvisation ... , a man of
absolutely superior talent.43
By the end of October, however, Chateaubriand was bored to death and
depressed that he had done nothing great. Indeed, he found so little to
occupy his attention at Verona that he visited Mantua for a few days,
ostensibly to see the tomb of Virgil.4 4 Observing his colleague's strange
behavior, Montmorency guessed the truth:
I have an idea, [he remarked to Mme Recamier], that he must be very bored by
the kind of life he has chosen to lead, and I do not know if he finds his great
desire to come to the Congress entirely justified by his success. 45
By his shyness, vanity, and reserve, Chateaubriand antagonized not only
his colleagues at Verona, but also the feminine element. Pozzo di Borgo
expressed the attitude of most congress goers when he derisively described
the great man as that "child of fifty who stammers politics, and who was
hurled into the midst of the congress like a Congreve rocket." 46 Countess
Lieven, who had taken a dislike to him in London, remarked disdainfully:
He is "a hump-back without a hump" who wears on his sleeve "an outworn
heart that is for sale though it no longer finds bidders." 47 When he was
presented to Queen Christina of Sardinia, she inquired, with feigned cordi-
ality, if he were related to M. de Chateaubriand, the writer. He "was very
nettled" by the question, which clearly was designed to spike his pretentions
of being a diplomat and statesman. 48 Though such disparaging epithets as
43 Entry for Sun., Oct. 27, 1822, quoted in Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue
des deux mondes, CXLIII, 562.
44 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Oct. 29 and Nov. 5, 1822, Chateau-
briand, Correspondance, III, 373, 375; Maurois, Chateaubriand, p. 257. Chateau-
briand's "private letter" to Marcellus, October 25, published in Marcellus, La
Restauration, pp. 99-101, is an invention which probably was forged by Marcellus
himself. According to this spurious document, the ambassador complained to his first
secretary: "Here we have done nothing great; I often walk by myself, and sometimes
I fancy that I am accredited to the tomb of Juliet rather than to a European Congress."
It must be admitted, however, that the "letter," fabrication though it be, does accu-
rately reflect Chateaubriand's mood at this time. See Louis Thomas's editorial com-
ment in Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 270n; cf. Waliszewski, Alexandre Ier,
III, 103.
spondance, I, 449.
46 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Paiihes, Duras e/
Chateau briand, p. 225; Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822,
Chateaubriand, Correspondance, Ill, 290, cf. Bardoux, Duchesse de Duras, p. 420.
47 Quoted in Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 252.
48 Ibid., p. 257; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 455. Queen Christina was the daughter of
Ferdinand I of Naples.
these may be extravagant and unfair, they serve, at least, to illustrate the
contempt in which Chateaubriand was held by most of his contemporaries
at Verona.
But as the day approached for Montmorency to leave Verona, the picture
changed; Chateaubriand became the man of the hour, the man of "great
adventures," as the French foreign minister called him. He boasted to
Madame Duras, and even to Villele, that after Montmorency's departure
"my achievements shall advance." 49 Characteristically, his attitude toward
Metternich and others turned contemptuous. The chancellor, whom he had
described earlier as "a perfect gentleman, pleasant, and capable," became
a mediocrity, with neither depth nor vision, whose whole talent consists in be-
littling everything, in reducing to nothing what appears to be something, and
who has ascendancy only over weaklings. He is false .... He was to Lovelace
in his youth what he is to Mazarin in his maturity. He tries to seduce everyone
who approaches him ....50
Pozzo di Borgo, he now discovered, was "a furious Ultra," and even Alex-
ander, recently so "full of noble and generous qualities," degenerated into
a "very weak: and irresolute" ruler, who would doubtless "pass in history
for a simpleton and a dupe." 51 Nor did Chateaubriand's own countrymen
escape the venom of his pen. No adjective was too severe to denounce
Montmorency, his rete noire: he was "canting, scheming, envious, and
stupid." 52 Caraman was "a hideous thing to see ... , the most insipid and
slothful valet of Metternich that one can encounter." So long as he remained
in Vienna, it was impossible to know anything about Austria. 53 Countess
Lieven remained, as she always had been, "that wretched creature." 54

spondance, I, 452; Chatea.ubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Bardoux,
Duchesse de Duras, p. 407; Chatea.ubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 20, 1822, Chateau-
briand, Correspondance, III, 285.
50 Chatea.ubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Pailhes, Duras et
Chateaubriand, p. 224; cf. Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822,
Recamier, Correspondance, I, 447.
51 Chatea.ubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 12 and 13, 1822, Pailhes, Dura~
et Chateau briand, p. 224-225, 226.
52 Chatea.ubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 30, 1822, Bardoux, "Congres de
Verone," ST AS, CXLVII, 419.
53 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Bardoux, Duchesse de
Duras, p. 407.
54 Ibid. Only Countess Tolstoy among the great ladies, and Gentz among the major
participants, continued to enjoy the ambassador's favor. The former remained the
"good countess," whose salon he frequented, and the latter retained his position as
"a man above and very superior to others.... " Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras,
Verona, Nov. 16, 1822, Chatea.ubriand, Correspomiance, III, 279.
Verily, hell hath no fury like that of Chateaubriand scorned. The thought
never occurred to him that if he could have been deceived about so many
people during the first weeks of the Congress, his perspicacity was not what
he supposed it to be.
When Chateaubriand left Verona on Friday evening, December 13, 1822,
he had been in charge of the French delegation exactly three weeks. Yet he
was convinced that he would leave in his wake
the reputation of a capable man and one to be feared. I am much sought after
at present, but these people are too sorry to like me .... They had need of me for
the Spanish colonies. I showed them the way. They stared with amazement,
observed the way that I had discovered, and were afraid.55
The man of letters undoubtedly possessed brilliant gifts, but his accomplish-
ments at Verona failed to justify his lofty claims. One critic called him a
"brilliant imposter," and Metternich contended that he possessed "none
of the elements which form a statesman." 56 The truth seems to be, as Tem-
perley has observed, that Chateaubriand
was no match for trained diplomats at their own game. Ready to intrigue, he
was too hasty and excitable to deceive men who knew every turn of the diplo-
matic fence. In fact, he was always acting a part and trying to make himself out
more important than he was.67
His genius notwithstanding, the author-diplomat exerted but slight influence
on the decisions of the Congress and gained ascendancy over one man only,
the tsar, whose personality, imagination, and views matched his own.
5. A Retrospect
Chateaubriand's campaign for the Congress reveals more than his ambition
and vanity; it sheds light on the "mysteries of the antechamber" in Resto-
ration France. The power of the court coterie and the sway of "petticoat
politics," though no longer preponderant, as in the days of Madame Pom-
padour, clearly influenced the policies of the Paris cabinet. But historians of
the period, and especially biographers of its dramatis personae, have exag-
gerated the importance of these elements in gaining the day for the ambas-
sador. Neither Villele nor Montmorency yielded to the importunities of
mesdames Duras and Recamier, and each seems to have resented their
55 Chateaubriand to Mme de Dums, Verona, Nov. 30, 1822, ibid., p. 297.

56 Tempedey, Canning, p. 61; Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, July 14, 1824,
quoted in ibid., p. 60.
57 Ibid., p. 61.
intercession. Until Castlereagh's plans to attend the Vienna conference were

canceled by death, both ministers were determined to keep Chateaubriand
in London. Montmorency persisted in this view as late as August 26, but by
this date, Villele had decided upon a new tack. Convinced that the British
foreign secretary's suicide would virtually paralyze deliberations in Vienna,
and fearful that Montmorency's belligerent posture toward Spain would
involve France in an unnecessary war which he hoped to avoid, Villele
resolved to dispatch Chateaubriand to Verona to serve as his special agent
and as a counterpoise to the foreign minister's legitimist obsession. He un-
doubtedly believed, moreover, that the romantic author's literary reputation
and friendship with the tsar would enhance his prestige and effectiveness
at the Congress, an argument used by both the Duchess of Duras and Baron
Hyde de Neuville. At the council meeting of August 26, the finance minister
overcame all obstacles, and Montmorency accepted the cabinet's decision,
though in taking credit for it, he deceived Madame Recamier. The deter-
mining factors in Chateaubriand's mission were VilleIe's assessment of
what constituted his own and his country's interests and his actual control
of the council, which the king confirmed on September 4 by awarding him
the premiership.
Clearly Villele was unaware of Chateaubriand's true sentiments at the
time of his nomination to the Verona delegation and for the duration of the
Congress. He supposed that the ambassador's views were akin to his own:
non-intervention in Spain and independence from Alliance control. But in
this belief, he was badly mistaken, for Chateau briand , while in London.
had developed a Spanish policy more bellicose than Montmorency's and
more nationalistic. He wanted France alone to wage war on Spain for the
greater glory of the monarchy, the nation, and Chateaubriand. His interest
in the Spanish Question was, indeed, one of the reasons for his anxiety to
play an important personal role at the Congress. But having associated his
own fortune with that of Villele, Chateaubriand took care to keep his real
views a secret. How well he succeeded is indicated by the assumption of
Boislecomte and Pasquier that he was the true interpreter of the premier's
opinions.
Villele was, of course, as badly served at Verona by the fickle ambassador
as by the clerical aristocrat; nonetheless, Chateaubriand willfully intrigued
against Montmorency to promote his own ambition to become foreign
minister, and he could not have worked harder to achieve this goal had he
been the premier's disciple. In this matter, his motives made no difference.
That he failed to undermine the foreign minister at the Congress was due
primarily to his lack of influence and to Mettemich's intervention in Mont-
morency's behalf. Chateaubriand, meanwhile, sulked and complained of

boredom, but after his superior had departed, his mood changed, and he
became the man of the hour. While he ridiculed his colleagues with caustic
wit, he boasted of his own diplomatic successes. These claims, however,
cannot stand the scrutiny of critical analysis. Only over the mystical Alexan-
der did Chateaubriand's imagination gain sway, but the dreams of each,
however Quixotic, were important, for the tsar and his able ambassador at
Paris, Pozzo di Borgo, firmly supported the ambassador's plans for a
Spanish war and sought his admission to the ministry.
The whole affair of Chateaubriand and his Congress, in retrospect, tends
to support Spinoza's observation that it occasionally happens that "a vain
man may become proud and imagine himself pleasing to all when he is in
reality a universal nuisance." 58
58 Benedict Spinoza, Ethics, Pt. ill, Prop. XXVI, note.

CHAPTER XII
CHATEA UBRIAND'S WAR
The great affair of the Congress of Verona was the war

with Spain. It has been said, and is still repeated, that
this war was forced upon France: this is precisely the
reverse of the truth. If anyone is to blame for that
memorable enterprise, it is the author of this history;
M. de Villele was opposed to hostilities.... On that
subject, [he] agreed with three-fourths of the Al-
liance.... - Chateaubriand (1838) 1
1. The French Ministerial Crisis (December 1822)
Immediately upon Montmorency's return to Paris, November 30, the contest

between him and Villele was joined. The Paris ambassadors' conference,
meanwhile, pressed the French cabinet to concert with the eastern courts,
a policy opposed by some of the ultra-Royalist journals which emphasized
the imperative duty of France to declare war on Spain. 2 The Quotidienne,
which expressed the views of Joseph Franyois Michaud, the historian and
publicist, was as hostile to the Alliance as to the premier. The indecisive and
temporizing policy of the Congress of Verona, it declared, would never
triumph at Paris, for war was inevitable. The Drapeau blanc, the organ of
Alphonse Dieudonne Martainville and Felicite Robert de Lamennais, then
an ultramontane priest, also urged an independent, national posture, a
position close to that of Chateaubriand. Martainville attacked the vacillation
of the ministry and called upon France to take up arms, not against Spain,
but for Spain. It was not sufficient just to overthrow the Spanish revolution,
for it still remained to reestablish in Europe a social order based on the
union of political principles with religious faith.3 On this point, the Drapeau
1 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 37. See also Bourquin, Sainte Alliance,

p.349.
2 La Foudre, VII, No. 114 (Dec. 5, 1822), 315; Stuart to Canning, No. 336, Paris,
Dec. 9, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 9, 1822, Well.
Desp., I, 633-635; Wellington to Clancarty, Paris, Dec. 19, 1822, ibid., p. 622, Bertier,
La Restauration, p. 254. Neither Wellington nor Stuart attended the first meeting of
the ambassadors' conference on December 13. Temperley, "Canning and the Confer-
ences of the Four Allied Governments at Paris, 1823-1826," AHR, XXX (1924-1925),
19.
3 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 602; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 204-205.
Other contributing editors of the Drapeau blanc were Haller, O'Mahony, Saint-
Victor, and Sarran.
blanc critized the Alliance, alleging that it had been founded upon a fallacy.
Lamennais inquired:
What is the Christianity on which the Holy Alliance rests? The reunion of
several sects which have neither the same faith nor the same leader. Therefore,
either the Holy Alliance has no base, or it supposes that all sects profess Christi-
anity equally. In the first case, there is no alliance at all; in the second, it rests
on indifference to all religions. 4
La Foudre, however, was as extravagant in its praise of the Alliance and
Montmorency as it was outspoken in its hostility to Villele, accusing him of
"perpetuating governmental irresolution and public uncertainty." Its issue
of December 15 denounced what it called the "pretended peace with Spain"
and charged the premier with having instituted in the cabinet "a systematic
veto of every project for armed intervention in Spain." On the 20th, it
ridiculed Wellington's plea that France should disband her army of obser-
vation and seek a rapprochement with Spain. 5 With caustic wit, La Foudre
observed:
His Grace, [Wellington], showed us, it is true, his savoir-faire in 1815, and how
easy it was for him to graft legitimacy on regicide; but Spain is not France after
Waterloo; there is ... no Fouche in Madrid: indeed, there is no apostate ready
to sell the revolution to the Crown and the Crown to the revolution. 6
In more temperate language, Jouffroy's Gazette de France and, of course,
L'Etoile, Montmorency's journal, also supported the Alliance, justified war
as the only means of delivering France from the dangers of the Spanish
revolution, and attacked the hesitation of the cabinet. The position of the
Journal des Debats, influenced by Chateaubriand, was unique: it was the
only unofficial paper in the entire Royalist press which remained loyal to
Villele and argued that the Alliance had no right to intervene in Spain. As
premier, he frequently reprinted articles from the Debats in the official
Moniteur, a practice which the ultra-Royalists denounced as "a scandal."
Their reaction to the Moniteur's editorials was equally contemptuous:
"They are so ambigious and obscure," La Foudre scoffed, "that an oracle is
necessary to interpret them." 7
4 Quoted in ibid., p. 205. By 1828 Lamennais had become a Liberal Catholic.
Defrocked in 1834 for advocating the separation of church and state and democratic
reforms in France, he joined Louis Blanc's socialist movement.
5 La Foudre, VII, Nos. 114, 116, 117, and 119 (Dec. 5, IS, 20, and 30, 1822), 315,
365, 411, and 440. The principal contributors at this time were Alphonse de Beau-
champ and the Count of Saint-Roman.
6 Ibid., No. 117 (Dec. 20,1822), p. 397.
7 Ibid., Nos. 107 and 111 (Oct. 20 and Nov. 20, 1822), pp. 156 and 246. See also
Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 594-596, 600, 602; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari.;
VII, 204-205.
The Royalists' campaign for war notwithstanding, Stuart insisted that the
majority of Parisians still wanted peace. Certainly the business community
opposed war, for the Council of Manufactures and Commerce had petition-
ed the government in November to refrain from any project for armed
intervention in Spain. The journalistic attacks upon the premier by the
fanatical wing of his own party did, indeed, embarrass him, but they failed
to shake his resolve to maintain peace, a stand warmly applauded by the
Liberal (Constitutional Monarchist) press. s
The Constitutionnel, the most important Liberal paper, contended that
nothing could stop the success of the revolution in Spain and that war would
only hurt French commerce. The Courrier franrais agreed with these obser-
vations but went further by declaring that France could not support a war.
The Miroir attacked intervention in Spain with, or without, the support of
the Alliance, while almost all of the journals of the Center and Left depre-
cated the possible consequences of war for France. But, notwithstanding the
congruity of these views with those of Villele, even the Liberal papers
reproached him for not issuing a declaration which clearly supported the
maintenance of peace. With a circulation more than double that of the ultra-
Royalist journals, the Liberal press during November and December 1822
continually urged the government to adopt a policy of moderation toward
Spain, a factor which undoubtedly encouraged the premier in his opposition
to war.9
Into this environment, charged with domestic and international tension
and intrigue, Chateaubriand returned on Friday, December 20, with the
latest news from Verona. He assured Villele of his devotion to the cause of
peace and even declared that a Spanish war would pose "a grave danger
to the two branches of the House of Bourbon." 10 But he took no part in the
8 Stuart to Canning, No. 348, Paris, Dec. 19, 1822, F.O. France, 146/48; La Foudre,
VII, No. 112 (Nov. 25, 1822), 280; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822
Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 83. Villele disdainfully referred to the ultra-
Royalist papers as "petty journals."
9 La Foudre, VII, Nos. 104, 110, and 112 (Oct. 10, Nov. 15, and Nov. 25, 1822),
64-65, 220-221, 270; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 602. In 1823 the Constitutionnel,
with 16,250 subscribers, had a circulation almost double that of the three leading
ultra-Royalist journals combined: the Quotidienne with 5,800; the Moniteur, 2,250;
and the Drapeau blanc, 1,900. The moderate Journal des Debats, with a circulation
of 13,000, became a Liberal paper in 1824, after the ascendancy of Charles X. Artz,
France under the Restoration, pp. 85, 88.
10 Entry for Mon., Dec. 23, 1822, "Secret Diary of Mr. T. E. Darby, a British Spy
in France," F.O., 97/168. Darby's diary is in French, but his reports are in English.
CHA TEA UBRIAND'S WAR 305
Villele-Montmorency feud. Under pretext of extreme fatigue, he hardly left
his home and thus avoided being compromised by this affair.l1
The Paris ambassadors' conference, meanwhile, held its second session
on December 23 to adopt some measure which would force the Paris cabinet
to collaborate with the eastern courts. Acting under the direction of Pozzo
di Borgo, that fiery apostle of war, their excellencies, Baron Karl von
Vincent of Austria and Baron von Maltzahn of Prussia, agreed to execute
immediately the decision of the Verona Circular to sever diplomatic re-
lations with Spain. 12 The next day (December 24), Posso issued an ulti-
matium: France must make known her resolution in three days or the conti-
nental allies would act without her.13 Despite his reluctane to choose be-
tween the moderate, national policy of Villele and the more belligerent,
Alliance policy of Montmorency, Louis XVIII now had to take a stand.
On the afternoon of December 25, the council met under the presidency of
the king to hear and discuss the dispatch which the premier and the foreign
minister each proposed to send to Madrid. Each, too, had his resignation in
his pocket should the cabinet return a verdict against him. When the vote
was taken, Villele stood alone. Even the loyal Corbiere deserted him on this
issue. But Louis XVIII, in accordance with the doctrine of divine right,
overruled the council in favor of the premier. His policy defeated, Mont-
morency resigned the same evening. 14
To placate the ultras as well as to retain the support of the eastern
powers, VilleIe on December 26 offered Chateaubriand the post of foreign
minister, which he had coveted for so long, but he pretended reluctance
to accept it on the grounds of his friendship with Montmorency. Though
he twice refused the portfolio, because he wanted to be begged, he feared
that this feigned self-sacrifice would be taken at face value. Consequently,
when Louis XVIII on the 27th ordered him to accept, he promptly obeyed
and cautioned Villele to announce his appointment at the same time as
Montmorency's resignation, lest the ultra-Royalist journals "go up in
smoke" and the king renege on his decision. The next day Chateaubriand's
11 Stuart to Canning, No. 350, Paris, Dec. 23, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Pasquier.
Memoires, V, 459; Temperley, Canning, p. 69.
12 The Verona Circular of December 14 arrived in Paris on the 22nd. Temperley,
"Canning and the Conferences," AHR, XXX, 19.
13 Ibid.; entry for Wed., Dec. 4, 1822, Darby, "Diary," P.O., 97/168; Bagot to
Canning, No.9, St. Petersburg, Mar. 22, 1823, P.O., Russia, 181/55; Canning to
Wellington, Foreign Office, Dec. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 629; La Foudre, VII, Nos.
114 and 119 (Dec. 5 and 30,1822),315,440-441.
14 Stuart to Canning, No. 356, Paris, Dec. 25, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Villele,
Memoires, III, 270, 275-276; Temperley, Canning, pp. 71-72; Fourcassie, Viltete,
pp. 235-238.
ascendancy became official when the Moniteur published the royal ordi-
nance appointing him to succeed Montmorency.1s
Within France the reaction to Chateau briand's nomination generally fol-
lowed party lines: the Royalists applauded, while the Liberals objected. But
on the extreme Right, Montmorency and his son-in-law La Rochefoucauld,
both leaders of the Congregation, headed a group of adversaries who be-
lieved the ambitious author had broken faith with them by accepting the
portfolio of foreign affairs. They awaited only an opportunity for revenge.
but for the moment, they veiled their enmity with silence. 16 Pasquier. who
had been Montmorency's predecessor, spoke for most Liberals when he
observed:
M. de Chateaubriand was one of those men to whom it was more dangerous to
submit than to fight against, and from whom one could not free himself once
he had accepted him.17
No one. however. not even public opinion. was deceived by the ambas-
sador's pretence of disinterest. self-sacrifice. and dread. Those who were
indulgent of him must have smiled at this comedy.18
Foreign reaction to Chateaubriad's elevation to the ministry was no less
divided. Tsar Alexander and Pozzo di Borgo were as delighted as Canning
and Metternich were distrustful and disappointed. The British foreign
secretary had no more confidence in him as a diplomat than Frederick the
Great had in Voltaire. and when the Austrian chancellor heard the news.
he ruefully observed that the former ambassador was more "a man of
letters than one of affairs. qualities too often found in opposition to one
another." 19
From Montmorency's return to Paris (November 30) to Christmas day,
15 Villele. Memoires, 278-279, 285-286; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outre-tombe,

III, 172-174; Chateaubriand to Villele, Paris, Dec. 26 and 28, 1822, Chateaubriand,
Correspondance, III, 309, 314; Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, Paris, Dec. 26, 1822,
Chateaubriand, Lettres a madame Recamier, pp. 157-158; Chateaubriand to Mme
de Duras, Paris, Dec. 28, 1822, Pailhes, Duras et Chateau briand, pp. 229; Pasquier,
Memoires, V, 463; Stuart to Canning, No. 359, Paris, Dec. 30, 1822, F.O., France,
146/48; Maurois, Chateau briand, pp. 260-261. In 1822 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was located on the rue des Capucines, not the Quai d'Orsay, as it is today.
16 Ibid., p. 261; La Foudre, VIII, Nos. 120 and 121 (Jan. 5 and 10, 1823), 4-6, 33,
and 36. Hyde de Neuville, Memoirs, II, 118, 120-121; Herriot, Madame Recamier, II,
121-122, 124.
17 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 463.
18 Ibid.; Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Paris, Dec. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand,
Correspondance, III, 311-312; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 117, 118-119;
Maurois, Chateau briand, pp. 260-261.
19 Temperley, Canning, pp. 61,62,72; Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, Jan. 18, 1823,
quoted in ibid., p. 60; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 109-110.
CHA TEAUBRIAND'S WAR 307
a struggle ensued within the French ministry between the partisans of war
and peace. The foreign minister, supported by Pozzo di Borgo, pressed for
war, while the premier, seconded by Wellington, defended the cause of
peace, and Chateau briand, to further his own interests, remained silent.
This dichotomy and the ever-present threat of a divine right veto, not vacil-
lation or timidity on Villele's part, created the indecision deplored alike by
ultra-Royalists and Liberals. The premier, as Canning and Metternich both
admitted, was indeed a man of great tenacity, courage, and tactical resource-
fulness. Throughout December he resolutely refused to yield to the demands
of either the fanatical Royalists or the eastern powers. Thus Villele, the
premier of an ultra-Royalist cabinet, ironically stood with the Liberal op-
position against his own party on the issue of a Spanish war.20
The influence of the Royalist journals, small in circulation and divided
in their attitude toward the Alliance, appears to have been a negligible
factor in the ministerial crisis of 1822. Of more importance were: (1) the
moderation of the king and premier, (2) French nationalism which would be
outraged, if France became the lackey of the Alliance, and (3) the support of
the Liberal press. Montmorency's successor had to come from the ranks
of the ultra-Royalist party, because it controlled the Chamber of Deputies.
To Villele, Chateaubriand seemed the best choice for the post: a Royalist,
he could by his eloquence win support for the ministry both within and
without the government; the author of De la monarchie selon la charte
might even influence the liberal Center; he had had valuable diplomatic
experience at Berlin, London, and Verona; a friend of the tsar, his appoint-
ment would assure France of Russia's support against Britain; and, above
all, Villele supposed that Chateaubriand was a faithful disciple of his own
pacific views. The ministerial crisis of December 1822, in sum, indicates
that the great weakness of French policy at this time was that no single
person or group controlled it. 21
2. France Goes It Alone
Between the resignation of Montmorency on December 25 and his replace-

ment by Chateaubriand on the 28th, Villele had three days in which to
separate France from the eastern allies. On the 26th, he transmitted his
dispatch to Count Auguste Pelletier de La Garde, French ambassador to
l!O La Foudre, VII, Nos. 115 and 119 (Dec. 10 and 30, 1822), 344-345, 443; Tern-
perley, Canning, 58-59,60.

21 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 72; Villele, Memoires, III, 278-279; Maurois, Chateau briand,
pp. 259, 261; Fourcassie, Vil/ele, pp. 239-240.
Spain, to be presented simultaneously with those of Austria, Prussia, and

Russia; but, significantly, it did not recall La Garde. 22 Villele probably
was influenced by Chateaubriand's suggestion of December 12 that the
French minister should remain after the allies had withdrawn theirs, in order
to deprive England of the "role she proposed to play herself, that of medi-
ator." .23 In any case, the content of the note suggests that the premier,
equally distrustful of British motives, agreed on this point with Chateau-
briand.
Villele assured the Cortes that despite the dangers which attended the
Spanish civil war, France desired the maintenance of relations. The mis-
fortunes of Spain, he asserted, stemmed from two factors: the refusal of her
king to accept the Constitution of 1812 upon his return to Madrid in 1814
and the germination of the Revolution of 1820 in a military insurrection.
Although the civil war raging on territory adjacent to France had forced
her to assemble a corps d' observation along the Pyrenees, the Paris cabinet
sincerely hoped that the Madrid government would find a remedy for the
ills which disturbed the courts of Europe and imposed on them "painful
precautions." France stood ready to help Spain recover her prosperity, but
she could not relax her "precautionary measures" as long as the Peninsula
was tom by factional strife. If, moreover, French interests continued to be
compromised and his Most Christian Majesty lost hope of an improvement,
he would not hesitate to recall his ambassador.24
That Villele's dispatch of December 26 was intended not only to deprive
Britain of the role of mediator but also to give France an advantage over
the eastern powers, should they withdraw their ministers from Madrid, is
indicated by France's formal rejection that very day of the British offer of
mediation. But the Paris cabinet accompanied this refusal with an ac-
ceptance of England's good offices in the Franco-Spanish dispute. 2 ;'; The
premier's efforts to find a diplomatic solution to this question were, how-
ever, largely nullified by a blunder which vexed the Madrid government.
His note to La Garde appeared in the Moniteur on the 27th, and Spanish
ministers first learned of it by reading the newspapers, rather than through
22 Villele, Memoires, III, 278; Edinburgh Magazine, XII (Jan.-June, 1823), 112-113.
I!llChateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Dec. 12, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance,
II1,305.
24 Villele to La Garde, Paris, Dec. 26, 1822, Moniteur universel, LXI (Dec. 27,
1822), 1748; cf. Temperley, Canning, pp. 69-71. For an English translation of this
dispatch, see Edinburgh Magazine, XII, 112-113.
25 Montmorency to Wellington, Paris, Dec. 24, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 667; Stuart to
Canning, No. 357, Paris, Dec. 26, 1822, P.O., France, 146/48. Though dated the 24th,
Montmorency's note of refusal was not transmitted until two days later. It was his
last official act as foreign minister.
official channels. The pride and dignity of Spanish Royalists and Consti-
tutionalists alike "were wounded by so undiplomatic a disregard of their
feelings." 26
Once in office, Chateaubriand cast off the mask of moderation and lost
no time in bringing about war. On January 5, 1823, he repeated to La Garde
all the French grounds for complaint against Spain, but before this note
reached Madrid the allied ministers had departed. On the 9th, Schepeler,
the Prussian envoy, demanded his passport; the next day Brunetti and
Bulgary, the Austrian and Russian charges d'affaires respectively, followed
suit, though Austria left a consul in Madrid. Evaristo San Miguel, the
Spanish foreign minister, transmitted their passports on the 11th and en-
closed with each a brief reply. Incensed by the allied notes, he, on the 10th,
had instructed Justino Fernandez, the Duke of San Lorenzo, his ambassador
at Paris, to resist all concessions to France. Three days later the Madrid
cabinet repented its haste and requested British good offices to settle the
Franco-Spanish dispute. But this afterthought came too late; Chateau-
briand used the defiance of San Miguel's note of January 10 (which reached
Paris the 16th), and the violation of the French frontier by a single Spanish
officer as a pretext for severing relations with Spain. On January 18, despite
the opposition of Villele, he ordered La Garde to ask for his passports. The
French ambassador quit Madrid on the 30th and on February 3 reached
Bayonne. 27
In Paris, meanwhile, the ambassadors' conference met on January 12
and drafted a protocol defending its decision of December 23 to withdraw
the allied ministers from Madrid, despite France's independent action in
leaving hers. When Pozzo learned, however, of La Garde's recall, he im-
mediately summoned another meeting in the hope of associating France
with the Alliance. But these efforts failed, for both Villele and Chateau-
briand chose to follow an independence course. 28

27 Ibid., pp. 76-77; Temperley, "Canning and the Conferences," AHR, XXX, 19;
Gentleman's Magazine, XCIII (Jan.-June, 1823), 75; Chateaubriand, Congres de Ve-
rone, p. 134; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part II," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV,
68-72; Alison, History of Europe, II, 642-643; Fourcassie, Viltele, pp. 243-244;
Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, pp. 351-354; for San Miguel's answers to the allied notes,
see Martens, Nouveau recueil, VI, 206-209. At the council meeting of January 18,
1823, the premier again stood alone in urging a wait-and-see policy toward Spain.
With the Council united against him, he was powerless to prevent it from endorsing
Chateaubriand's demand for the immediate breaking of diplomatic relations. Pasquier,
Memoires, V, 472-480; Hall, Bourbon Restoration, pp. 333-334.
28 Temperley, "Canning and the Conferences," AHR, XXX, 19.
During the first weeks of January 1823, the premier continued to exert a
restraining influence in the Paris cabinet, while waiting in vain for Britain
to induce the Spanish government to moderate its language and conduct.
The diplomacy of Montmorency and Chateaubriand had placed him in a
dilemma: he did not want war, yet he could not back down from the defiant
tone they had assumed at the Congress without loss to his personal repu-
tation and French prestige. VilU:le at last despaired of upholding the national
honor short of war, and on January 25, he reluctantly fell in with the plans
of his foreign minister. An able financier and an astute minister, he ap-
preciated the realities of the situation and realized that he could not maintain
peace with Spain and remain in office. The war party in the Chamber of
Deputies constituted five-sixths of that body by January 1823, while it had
comprised only one-fifth the year before. French Royalists and Clericals
regarded war as a swift and cheap means of reviving the glory of the Empire
on behalf of the Bourbons. Anti-British feeling also ran high, and many
Frenchmen regarded an invasion of Spain as a blow at England. Even some
Radicals favored war because they thought Louis XVIII would lose it. By
the end of February, Baron Pasquier, a pacifist, admitted that war was
inevitable and that only one Frenchman in a thousand was opposed to it.
A realistic appraisal of the premier's dilemma indicates, therefore, that he
was justified in yielding rather than resigning. 29
Apprised of this situation by Vincent and fearful that Chateaubriand
intended to establish in Spain a moderate constitution based on the French
Charte, Metternich began a series of maneuvers designed at first to preserve
peace, but later to control French intervention. At the end of January, he
urged the Paris cabinet to accept British mediation, a proposal which Cha-
teaubriand, of course, ignored. Next, he tried to confine French intervention
to giving material aid to Spanish Royalists. Failing in this expediency, he
vainly attempted to restrain France with ambassadorial conferences.
Finally, realizing that he could not deter the Paris government from its
course, the chancellor proposed in March that the French invasion and
occupation should be directed by an allied commission. Failure to accept
such supervision, he warned, would result in the withdrawal of the support
29 Boulaye to Serre, Paris, Feb. 22, 1823, Serre, Correspondance, V, 63; Pasquier
to Serre, Paris, Feb. 23, 1823, ibid., p. 67; Wellington-Charles Grevi11e interview,
Jan. 25, 1823, Greville, Memoirs, I, 68; Edinburgh Magazine, XI, 738; Gentleman's
Magazine, XCIII, 266; Castellane, Journal, I, '451; Alison, History of Europe, II,
641-642; Temperley, Canning, p. 484; Gentile, "Chateaubrland," Studi politici, IV, 21.
On February 14, Chateaubriand predicted war in twenty-days, if nothing happened
before that time. Chateaubriand to Marcellus, Paris, Feb. 14, 1823, Marcellus, La
Restauration, p. 144.
eRA TEA UBRIAND'S WAR 311
promised by the eastern powers at Verona. But Chateaubriand. already

assured of the tsar's assistance. if Britain entered the conflict as Spain's ally.
knew that this was an empty threat. Frustrated at every tum. Mettemich
by April had become reconciled to French armed intervention in Spain. but
resourceful statesman that he was. he made yet another attempt to fetter
France. On April 3. he proposed that Ferdinand I of Naples (who had lived
in Vienna since the Congress of Verona). as the closest relative (uncle) and
heir to Ferdinand VII. be appointed regent of Spain until the latter's liber-
ation. The French army. meanwhile. would be placed under the orders of
Fabrizio Ruffo, the Prince of Castelcicala, Neapolitan ambassador at Paris.
acting as the regent's representative. But Chateaubriand. supported by the
tsar, immediately rejected this scheme, and nothing more was heard of it.
France, in sum, wished to taste the fruits of war and did not want the eastern
powers, especially Austria, to gain control of Spain. so
Canning, too, worked furiously to prevent a Franco-Spanish war. but
rather than try to restrain France, he pressed the Cortes to make concessions.
Had not Louis XVIII and Villele both affirmed that if Spain modified her
constitution, friendly relations would be restored between the two countries?
Acting on this suggestion. the foreign secretary, early in January 1823. sent
Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Wellington's secretary, to Madrid to assist Sir
William A'Court in urging the Spanish government to give the king the
authority necessary to execute his office. Somerset carried with him a letter
from Wellington, written in the duke's capacity of a Spanish grandee.
advising the Cortes to make some modification in its constitution. Although
San Miguel accepted British good offices on the 13th, the recall of the allied
ministers at this juncture seriously jeopardized whatever chance of success
this mission might have had, and on the 28th. Louis XVIII's speech con-
voking the French chambers administered the coup de grace. The king's
address was equally obnoxious to the Spanish Cortes and British Parlia-
ment because of its high-flying doctrines of legitimacy and divine right. 3t
80 Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, Jan. 30 and Feb. 6, 1823, cited by Schroeder,

Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 230-231; Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, Feb. 4 and
Mar. 6, 1823, cited by ibid.; Chateaubriand to Marcellus, Paris, June 2, 1823, Cha-
teaubriand, Correspondance, IV, 251; Chateaubriand to Caraman, Paris, June 8, 1823,
Bertier de Sauvigny, "Un dossier de lettres inedites de Chateaubriand,' 'Revue d'his-
toire moderne et contemporaine, III (Oct.-Dec. 1956), 309-310; Bertier, "Metternich
and Chateaubriand en 1823: documents inedits," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, LXX
(1956),200-212; Chateaubriand, La guerre d'Espagne de 1823, pp. 184-185; Lobanov-
Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 400-402; Temperley, "Canning and the
Conferences," AHR, XXX, 20.
31 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 10, 12, and 16, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 639,
644-645, 652-653; Canning to Fitzroy Somerset, Foreign Office, Jan. 6, 1823, ibid.,
Louis declared from the throne:

The infatuation ... at Madrid ... leaves little hope of preserving peace. I have
ordered the recall of my minister: one hundred thousand Frenchmen, com-
manded by a Prince of my family, ... are ready to march, invoking the God of
St. Louis, for the sake of preserving the throne of Spain to a descendant of
Henry IV .... Let Ferdinand VII be free to give to his people institutions which
they cannot hold but from him .... 3.2
The king's speech was tantamount to a declaration of war and as such was
received by Pozzo di Borgo and the French ultra-Royalists with exultation.
A month later the Chambers voted the military credits necessary to finance
the expedition, and on April 7, an army of 100,000 troops, commanded by
the Duke of Angouleme, Louis' nephew, crossed the Bidassoa. Thus began
the Franco-Spanish War which Austria, Britain, and Prussia had tried to
prevent. By invading Spain, France pursued a national, independent policy
with neither mandate nor commission from the Alliance. It was a French
war fought for dynastic and ultra- Royalist interests. 33
3. Britain Adopts Neutrality
The British public and press were almost universal in their condemnation
of Louis XVIII's speech from the throne. Canning, therefore, spoke for
most Englishmen when he informed the Paris cabinet on February 3, that
the pretension that political institutions must emanate from the will of the
sovereign was a principle which struck "at the roots of the British Consti-
tution." No English minister, moreover, could ever countenance France's
claim that her example should serve as a guide for other states, and still
less could he admit that France possessed an exclusive right to impose that
example upon Spain, because of the kinship of their dynasties. In an inter-
view with Marcellus on the 4th, Canning again bluntly denounced Louis'
II, 9; Walpole, History of England, III, 51; Alison, History of Europe, II, 642; Tem-
perley, Canning, pp. 76-77. A close friend of Wellington, Lord Fitzroy Somerset had
served as the duke's aide-de-camp and military secretary during the Peninsular War
and the Waterloo Campaign. In 1819 he again became secretary to Wellington and
accompanied the duke to the Congress of Verona. Somerset, however, is best known
by his later title of Baron Raglan (1852) and for his command of the British army in
the Crimea, 1854-1855.
32 Speech of Louis XVIII to the French Legislature, Tues., Jan. 28, 1823, Gentle-
man's Magazine, XCIII, 170.
33 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 37; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. II,"
Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV, 73; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 349; Fourcassie,
Viltele, p. 245; Temperley, Canning, p. 78. Contrary to Chateaubriand's prediction
that the occupation of Spain would be unnecessary, France garrisoned an army of
45,000 men in that kingdom until September 1828.
CHA TEAUBRIAND'S WAR 313
address, but he did not rely solely on official protests to prevent a Franco-
Spanish war. During February 1823, both he and Liverpool resorted to
several stratagems to play upon French fears of British intervention. On the
7th, the prime minister gravely confided to Marcellus that France's bel-
ligerent posture had forced him to delete the word "neutrality" from the
British king's speech to Parliament. On the 19th, Canning increased the
strength of the royal navy from 21,000 to 25,000 men, and two days later, he
lifted the embargo on the export of arms to Spain and South America.34
Alarmed that growing Francophobia in England might. indeed, drive her
reluctant government into war, Chateaubriand on February 17 conferred
with the ambassadors of the eastern powers. Reassured of allied support
in case of British intervention in behalf of Spain. he assumed an attitude of
equanimity toward England.3s To Marcellus he commented on March 3:
"Let my honorable friend Canning fume as much as he pleases. He is foiled.
He has dreamed of war and is powerless to make it. That is the secret of
his ill humor." 36
If Chateaubriand's response to British opposition seemed almost cavalier,
the tsar's reaction was sanguinary. On March 15, he dispatched a circular
note to London. Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, announcing that he would regard
a British declaration of war on France "as a general attack against all the
allies and that he would accept without hesitation the consequences of this
principle." 37 He reminded the London cabinet, moreover, that it had not
supported the revolutionary cause in Naples and Piedmont. This warning,
however, was irrelevant to the shaping of British policy and, in any case,
was unnecessary, for Canning had no intention of fighting in Spain and had
so informed A'Court as early as February 9. Only if France invaded
Portugal or helped Spain to reconquer her revolted American colonies, did
he propose to fight. On March 21, before the Russian circular had arrived
in London, the foreign secretary officially proclaimed British neutrality in
the imminent struggle.3S
34 Ibid., pp. 79-81.

35 Ibid., pp. 80-82; Chateaubriand to Marcellus, Paris, Feb. 17, 1823, A.A.E.,
Angleterre: Correspondance, Vol. 616.
38 Chateaubriand to Marcellus, Paris, Mar. 3, 1823, Marcellus, La Restauration,
p.155.
37 Nesselrode's circular dispatch, St. Petersburg, Mar. 3/15, 1823, Chateaubriand,
La guerre d'Espagne, pp. 237-238; Nesselrode to Lieven, separate dispatch, St. Pe-
tersburg, Mar. 3/15, 1823, ibid., p. 238; see also Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. II,"
Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV, 77.
38 Canning to Stuart, Foreign Office, Mar. 31, 1823, BFSP, X, 64-70; Temperley,
Canning, pp. 81-83. The British government, of course, was not unanimous in opposing
French policy toward Spain. George IV, Harrowby, and Westmoreland, all approved
Canning's difficulties, however, did not disappear with the adoption of

neutrality, for the Whigs hoped to tum to their own advantage British
public opposition to the Franco-Spanish War. On April 14, only seven days
after the invasion had begun, the foreign secretary appeared before the
House of Commons and, with brilliant oratory and merciless logic, defended
his diplomacy at Verona and Paris and the decision to adopt neutrality. In
support of his arguments, he laid on the table a large folio of state papers
and dispatches, an unconventional act which shocked Wellington, Metter-
nich, and Chateaubriand, who interpreted it as a vulgar bid for the support
of radicals. The liberal Henry Brougham, a maverick Whig, indeed warmly
applauded Canning's speech, but a group of orthodox Whigs, led by James
Macdonald, decided to challenge the government on its policy in the Spanish
Question. On April 28, Macdonald introduced in the House an omnibus
motion of censure which denounced Wellington's diplomacy at Verona,
Louis XVIII's assertion that "nations cannot lawfully enjoy any civil
privileges but from the spontaneous grant of their kings," the French in-
vasion of Spain, and the ministry's conduct of all negotiations relative to
Spain. Immediately after the reading of this motion, Stuart Wortley, a Tory
M.P., offered an amendment to it, expressing the concurrence of the Com-
mons in the government's conduct of the late negotiations and the "deep
regret that those endeavours had proved unavailing." 39
For three days Canning held his peace in the debate on Macdonald's
motion and Wortley's amendment; then on April 30, the last day of the
debate, he declared that Britain was determined to have no part in the
French intervention in Spain, even though the dissolution of the Alliance
should result from this refusal. British opposition had caused the Congress
of Verona to separate without adopting "any joint operation of a hostile
character against Spain." 40 To support this contention, Canning quoted
Montmorency and A'Court. On December 26, 1822, the day after Mont-
morency's resignation, he had confided to Stuart that the measures proposed
at Verona "would have been entirely successful if England had thought her-
self at liberty to concur in them." 41 A'Court's analysis of the official
Spanish reaction to the Congress seemed to confirm this opinion. He had
the French invasion of Spain; the Duke of York and Peel did not want a war with
France; and Wellington advised Marcellus that if a French army marched quickly
to Madrid, there would be no danger. Knowledge of this disunity undoubtedly caused
the Paris cabinet to discount the protests of Canning and Liverpool. Ibid., p. 82.
39 Ibid., pp. 83, 88; ParI. Debates, new ser., VIII, 1327, 1332-1333.
40 Ibid., col. 1482.
U Stuart to Canning, quoting a personal interview with Montmorency, Paris, Dec.
26, 1822, "Parliamentary Papers," ibid., class A, No. 11, col. 916.
reported on January 7, 1823, that the Madrid government had felt "comfort
and relief" when it learned that "the Congress of Verona had broken up
with no other result than the bruta fuimina [ineffectual thunderbolts] of the
three despatches from the courts in alliance with France." 42 The in-
structions given to Wellington, Canning argued, undoubtedly prevented
concerted action against Spain.
The immediate object of England ... [he declared], was to hinder the impress
of a joint character from being affixed to the war - if war there must be - with
Spain; - to take care that the war should not grow out of an assumed juris-
diction of the congress; - to keep within reasonable bounds that predominating
areopagitical spirit, which the memorandum of the British Cabinet of May,
1820, describes as beyond the sphere of the original conception and understood
principles of the alliance - an alliance never intended as a union for the govern-
ment of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other
states.43
How successful the foreign secretary was in convincing his countrymen that
he had won a great diplomatic victory is indicated by the Commons' over-
whelming approval of Wortley's amendment, 372-20. But Canning's boast.
notwithstanding its acceptance by Tempedey and others, does not stand up
under critical examination. Astute statesman that he was, he made capital
out of the disunity of the Alliance (which predated the Congress of Verona),
and the determination of Villele and Chateaubriand to go it alone. True,
Canning did seem pleased that the Congress had ended without coming to
an agreement on the Spanish Question, but only because he had no confi-
dence in the efficacy of the system, which he wanted to destroy.44 A con-
firmed isolationist, he observed with evident relief: "The issue of Verona
has split the one and indivisible Alliance ... and so things are getting back
to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all." 45
4. A Retrospect
From December 1822 until the end of January 1823, Villele assiduously,
but vainly, sought for some excuse which would enable him to withdraw
the corps d' observation from the Spanish frontier and, at the same time,
42 A'Court to Canning, Madrid, Jan. 7, 1823, ibid., class B, No. 14, col. 935.
43 Ibid., col. 1483.
44 Ibid., col. 1548; Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, I, 29. Canning's instructions to
Wellington, Temperley contends, were "clearly intended to break up the congress
system, and ... [were] in fact successful." Ward and Gooch, Camb. Hist of Brit. For.
Pol., II, 113.
45 Canning to Sir Charles Bagot, Foreign Office, Jan. 3, 1823, quoted in Phillips,
Confed. of Europe. p.264.
to save French honor and his personal reputation. He did not want war, but
the diplomacy of Montmorency and Chateaubriand had placed him in a
dilemma. Spanish commercial concessions at first seemed to the premier to
offer a solution, and he informed Stuart that a Franco-Spanish war could
be prevented, if Spain gave France the same commercial advantages en-
joyed by England. When Spain refused to make such concessions, Villele
continued to wait while Britain requested the Cortes to modify the Spanish
constitution. British influence at Madrid, however, was not strong enough
to prevail over anti-French bias. Again the premier tried to' avoid a break:
with Spain, this time by gaining England's adherence to the proces-verbal
of November 17, 1822. But this request, too, was refused; thus he was left
without any pretext by which he could honorably extract himself from his
difficulties short of war.
That Villele was a determined and resourceful statesman is manifest from
his forcing of Montmorency's resignation and his two-month stand against
the French war party and the tsar. With five-sixths of the Chamber, a
majority of the royal council, most of the ultra-Royalist journals, and
Russia, all clamoring for armed intervention, the premier, on January 25,
reluctantly fell in with the plans of his foreign minister. The advocates of
war were too strong, even for the combined efforts of VilleIe, Mettemich,
and Canning, and so war came.
Writing in 1838, Chateaubriand boasted that the Franco-Spanish conflict
of 1823 was his war, not the Alliance's.46 Recent historians of the French
Restoration, however, are prone to scoff at his soaring phrases and to dis-
miss his Memoires as a piece of egregious egotism. But if honest arrogance
really is preferable to humble hypocrisy, the brilliant litterateur should be
given his due. The claim has merit. Even Temperley conceded that Cha-
teaubriand's ascendancy made war probable, and Jean Fourcassie, Villele's
biographer, asserts that it "signified immediate war." 47 The premier, in
short, avoided Montmorency's sling only to impale himself on Chateau-
briand's pike. The question of war or peace with Spain was decided in
Paris, not Verona. The Congress, therefore, did not cause and could not
have prevented hostilities along the Pyrenees.

47 Temperley, Canning, p. 72; Fourcassie, Vi/le/e, p. 243. See also Bourquin, Sainte
Alliance, p. 349.
EPILOGUE
FROM CONGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE
The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible

Alliance into three parts as distinct as the Constitutions
of England, France, and Muscovy .... Villele is a
minister of thirty years ago - no revolutionary
scoundrel: but constitutionally hating England, as
Choiseul and Vergennes used to hate us - and so things
are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every
nation for itself and God for us all. Only bid your
Emperor [Alexander] be quiet, for the time for Are-
opagus and the like of that is gone by.
Canning, January 3, 1823.1
1. The Secret Treaty of Verona
The secret treaty of Verona, so often cited by historians and statesmen as

proof of the autocratic and aggresive designs of the Alliance, is now known
to be a newspaper forgery, apparently fabricated by the Lisbon corre-
spondent of the London Morning Chronicle. The "treaty," dated Novem-
ber 22, 1822, purported to demonstrate that the continental powers, with
the connivance of the Papacy, plotted the overthrow of representative
governments and the freedom of the press throughout Europe. After the
appearance of the document in the Chronicle of June 11, 1823, Lieven,
Esterhazy, Marcellus, and Werther immediately labeled it spurious and
aprocryphal, and many contemporary journals followed suit. Later Cha-
teaubriand and the other ministers who allegedly had signed it publicly
repudiated the treaty. Their denials ended the controversy for a while, but
twenty-three years later (April 8, 1846), the National, a Paris newspaper,
repeated the anachronisms and flaws which give the forgery away; where-
upon the Gazette de France (April 9, 1846), the Courrier (April 11, 1846),
and the Echo fran9ais (April 11, 1846), challenged this refutation, thus
renewing the debate. 2
In 1853, Count Andre Charles de Marcellus, the life-long friend and
sometime colleague of Chateaubriand, published his Politique de la Res-
tauration en 1822 et 1823, in which appears a historical sketch of the secret
treaty of Verona and a detailed refutation of its articles based on a conver-
I Canning to Bagot, Foreign Office, Jan. 3, 1823, quoted in Phillips, Con/ed. 0/

Europe, p. 264.
2 All of these newspapers are quoted in Marcellus, La Restauration, pp. 56-59.
318 EPILOGUE
sation with Chateaubriand, April II, 1846.3 When Marcellus had read the
secret treaty of Verona to Chateaubriand, the latter replied:
There are many people who will read into history what they want to read into
it .... The newspapers ... are always right about me and my candor.... I am
a wicked person, a criminal. I am one of the infamous emigres . .. , intoxicated
by divine right, who has always trampled under foot the institutions and inter-
ests of France, who signed at Verona his degradation, and in the Spanish Cam-
paign, his disgrace .... I am hostile to all progress, devoid of all talent; I have
impoverished the century, causing it to fall back into barbarity.... Without
doubt, the discovery of this secret treaty of Verona is an event. Another pearl
for future historians! Those skillful gravediggers have artistically disinterred it.
For their rare excavation they, indeed, merit the praise of their country. It has
not a word, nor even a semblance of truth .... This wretched composition, this
clumsy parody, does not deserve the honor we have accorded it, you to read it,
and I to listen to it .... I declare to you, if they accused me of having assas-
sinated my father, I would not ... deny it today, for tomorrow they would
demonstrate, in some way, that I had also murdered my mother. 4
It would be tedious and repetitious to recount here all the historical in-
accuracies cited by the National, Chateaubriand, Marcellus, and others, but
an analysis of the major points of the forgery's denouement is essential to
the Congress's historiography.
(1) Metternich, Chateaubriand, Bernstorff, and Nesselrode, in that order,
allegedly signed the treaty on November 22, the day of Montmorency's
departure from Verona, but on that date, Chateaubriand could not sign
anything, whether official or secret. Until November 22, only Montmorency
had the power to sign acts of the Congress, and after that date, Chateau-
briand, La Ferronnays, and Caraman signed jointly all protocols and
proces-verbaux.
(2) The calendar of the Congress lists no conference for November 22.
(3) The phrase "Holy Alliance" appears in the Preamble, but the allied
ministers themselves never used this expression, even in private corre-
spondence, because they regarded it as a term of derision.
(4) Article III presents Alexander I, a schismatic emperor, and Frederick
William III, a heretical king, requesting the cooperation of the pope in a
secret treaty he could not sign, a highly improbable situation, if not an im-
possible one.
3 Ibid., pp. 56-80.

4 Ibid., pp. 61-64. In September 1935, T. R. Schellenberg rescued Chateaubriand's
refutation of the secret treaty of Verona from oblivion but added little to his rebuttal.
Schellenberg, "The Secret Treaty of Verona: A Newspaper Forgery," IMH, VII (Sept.
1935), 280-291.
FROM CONGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE 319
(5) Article IV stipulated that the "two emperors" would give France an
annual subsidy of 20,000,000 francs ($ 4,000,000) each to help her crush
the Spanish and Portuguese revolutions, a financial burden which neither
nation could bear. But even if the Austrian treasury could have afforded
such extravagance, Mettemich opposed a Franco-Spanish war. The financial
difficulties of Russia, moreover, forced the tsar, while at Verona, to negoti-
ate a Rothschild loan. Alexander, in any case, would hardly have supported
any army whose loyalty and efficiency he mistrusted. And why was Prussia
exempted from contributing anything? When war came, France had to
finance it herself. Finally, the reference to the "two emperors" is colloquial.
(6) Article VI contains an anachronistic allusion to the "war with Spain."
The Paris cabinet did not decide until January 1823 to invade the peninsula.
The necessary preparations required another two months, and the invasion
did not begin until April 7.
(7) No copy of the secret treaty of Verona can be found in any of the
European archives. 5
The document, spurious though it is, nonetheless has value as an illus-
tration of what contemporary Liberals thought of the European Pentarchy
and the Congress of Verona. The fact that it was so readily published and
accepted in America, throws light on public opinion and critical scholarship
in this country. American historians (who should have known better), have
cited it as proof of the reactionary character of the continental powers
during the Congress Era. 6
Writing in 1935, at a time when the United States' refusal to join the
League of Nations was still the focus of popular debate, T. R. Schellenberg
observed that his countrymen were fearful of
the specter of a European Coalition against democracy - a specter arising out
of a forged treaty that should long since have been buried. An interpretation
of the European Concert had thus arisen which not only ignores its significance
as an international experiment, but which justifies also the proclamation of a
doctrine which prevents the United States from participating in any such ex-
periment. 7
5 This analysis is based on the "treaty" itself, the critiques of Marcellus, La Restau-
ration, pp. 68-72, 79, Schellenberg, "Secret Treaty," JMH, VII, 283-285, 288, and on
my own investigation. According to the London Morning Chronicle, the original text
of the treaty was French but that the paper had received it in English translation.
6 Niles' Weekly Register, XXIV (Aug. 2, 1823), 347; Robertson, France and Lat.
Amer., pp. 248-250; Schellenberg, "Secret Treaty," JMH, VII, 280. Even Charles
and Mary Beard accepted this document as authenic.
7 Ibid., pp. 290-291.
320 EPILOGUE
Whether the secret treaty of Verona is guilty or innocent of such momentous

future developments, it is, at least, an incisive commentary on Liberal
reaction to the Congress of Verona.
2. The Congress and the Alliance
With the secret treaty of Verona exposed as a forgery and the intervention
of the Congress confined to three harmless dispatches, what, then, is the
significance of this assembly of kings? To answer this question, the Congress
of Verona must be considered in its relationship to the Quintuple Alliance,
of which it was "the last muster, the last splendid pageant." Before the
Congress was yet two weeks old, Baron Eugene de Vitrolles, a moderate
French Royalist, predicted: "[it] ... will be the last of the European con-
gresses; the sovereigns are estranged - divided, dissatisfied - looking after
... their personal interests and individual defense.... " 8 Even Mettemich
tacitly admitted a cleavage in the Alliance when he proposed to the tsar at
Verona that a central committee of the northern powers (Austria, Prussia,
and Russia) be established at Vienna. From the Austrian point of view, the
Congress had negative results. Henceforth the chancellor frowned on con-
gresses. 9 To Gentz he confided on December 26, 1823: "Before talking
about congresses, it is necessary to come to an accord on many matters, and
the way to do this is through simple conferences." 10
The Congress of Verona failed to restore the unity of the Alliance, be-
cause its members were linked only by treaties rather than by strong bonds
of common interests. Their ambitions and policies often differed and some-
times clashed. Under such circumstances no compact is likely to endure for
long. After 1820, the Alliance became an instrument for interference and
intervention "instead of having for its object the maintenance of national
independence." 11
Diversity of policy toward the slave trade, Latin America, and the minor
issues discussed at Verona, though sharp in some instances, did not seriously
threaten the unity of the Congress nor the foundations of the Alliance. The
great obstacle on which the Congress foundered was the European Spanish
Question. Britain, Austria, and Prussia steadfastly opposed armed inter-
8 Vitrolles to Lamennais, Paris, Oct. 26, 1822, Correspondance inedite entre La-
mennais et Ie baron de Vitrolles, 1819-1853, ed. Eugene Forgues (Paris, 1886), p. 116.
Both Vitrolles and Lamennais, former associates on the editorial staff of the Conser-
vateur, opposed a Franco-Spanish war.
9 Private letter, Verona, n.d., Mettemich, Memoires, III, 476; Sweet, Gentz., p. 235.
10 Quoted in ibid., p. 239.
11 Qu. Rev., XXXVIII (1828), 179, 189; see also For. Qu. Rev., VIII (1831), 430.
vention in Spain. The two German courts desired only a "moral re-
monstrance" against the Spanish revolution, while Britain objected even to
a diplomatic protest at Madrid. The tsar dreamed of war and advocated the
invasion of Spain either by a Russian or an allied army, but when convinced
that such a project was impractical, he favored French military operations
against the Spanish Liberals. Villele, however, hoped to remain at peace
with Spain, and if public opinion and the ultra-Royalists had not forced him
to yield, peace might have been maintained. By invading Spain, France
separated herself from the Alliance, as Britain earlier had broken with it
when Wellington withdrew from the Congress of Verona.
Britain had helped to create the Congress System, because she thought
her interests would suffer without an envoy to protect them in the councils
of Europe. When she discovered that the Pentarchy no longer served her
interests, she seceded from it. After the Napoleonic Wars, England aspired
to maintain in the Alliance the position of leadership she had held in the
war-time coalitions against France, but in this she failed. As Myrna Boyce
has explained,
After Aix-Ia-Chapelle, her influence ... passed, due largely to the new economic
relations between herself and the European states. Her armies were no longer
needed in Europe, her subsidies belonged to the war period. After 1818, there
was little need of English loans. No longer did economic obligations necessitate
a dependent attitude upon Great Britain. With economic independence secured,
the Powers were at liberty to oppose British interests. 12
Despite the failure of the Congress of Verona to achieve concerted action
on even one major question, it did reach agreement on several minor issues;
for example, the evacuation of Piedmont, the reduction of Austrian troops
in Naples, the reconciliation of Charles Felix and his cousin Charles Albert,
and the restraint of the tsar in the east. The significance of the Congress,
however, lies in its contribution to the collapse of the Congress System.
Far from healing the schism in the Alliance, the Senate of Verona, indeed,
worsened it.
3. Fall of the Alliance
Liberalism and nationalism, two of the dominant forces of the nineteenth

century, not only undermined the Congress System but also defeated all
attempts to revive it. During the 1820's, the Latin American and Eastern
questions, in particular, contributed to its demise. At the insistence of Cha-
12 Boyce, Diplomatic Relations, p. 72.

322 EPILOGUE
teaubriand, Ferdinand VII on December 26, 1823, formally invited Canning

to attend a congress in Paris on Spanish American affairs. Though all the
continental courts urged the foreign secretary's presence, he, on January 30,
1824, refused to attend the proposed congress, because he wanted recog-
nition of the revolted Spanish colonies "to be a British, not a European
action." 13 An ambassadorial conference did, indeed, meet twice at Paris -
on February 21 and again on March 21 - but without British participation,
it accomplished nothing. The tsar, meanwhile, pressed his allies to reunite
in st. Petersburg to consider the Eastern Question. Metternich seconded the
proposal, for he wanted "to lure the Russian fly into the congress parlour
and there enwrap him gently in the silken mesh of his diplomacy." 14
Canning, however, declined the invitation, though he might have accepted
it, if a congress had appeared to be the only means of averting a Russo-
Turkish war. Paralleling events in Paris, an ambassadorial conference met
in St. Petersburg on June 17 and July 2, 1824, but it failed to take any step
toward the restoration of Russo-Ottoman relations or the pacification of
Greece. Thus, by the end of 1824, Britain had separated from the Alliance
on the questions of Latin American and Greek independence. 15
One consequence of Canning's diplomacy of isolation was an estrange-
ment of Anglo-Russian relations which lasted for two years. But by August
1825, Russia, too, was isolated, having broken with Austria over the Eastern
Question. Acutely aware of the weakness of his position, Alexander made
the first overture toward a rapprochement with Britain. On August 31, he
commissioned Countess Lieven (who was then in St. Petersburg), to inform
Canning that Russia was ready to cooperate with Britain over Greece. In a
confidential interview with the foreign secretary at Seaford on October 24,
the Lievens communicated to him the tsar's "great secret." Despite the
death of Alexander at Taganrog on December 1, Canning and the Lievens
kept the idea of an Anglo-Russian entente alive. As the foreign secretary
had guessed, Nicholas, disillusioned with his continental allies who, he
believed, had treated his brother "shabbily," was ready to sign a separate
treaty with Britain. In February 1826, Canning sent Wellington to st. Pe-
tersburg, ostensibly to congratulate the new tsar upon his ascendancy, but
actually to save Greece while "restraining Russia and keeping her in line
13 Webster, Brit. and Lat. Amer., I, 21-22.

15 Ibid., pp. 134-137, 330-331, 332-336; Temperley, "Canning and the Conferences,"
AH R, XXX, 22, 34; Sweet, Gentz, p. 254; Temperley and Penson, Docs., Old and
New, p. 65. Bagot attended the two St. Petersburg conferences, but Canning dis-
avowed him for exceeding his instructions.
with British policy." HI After five weeks of negotiation, Nesselrode, Welling-
ton, and Lieven signed the St. Petersburg Protocol on April 4, 1826, the
first international convention dealing with the status of Greece.17 This im-
portant protocol provided for
joint formulation, and joint or separate mediation, of a settlement between
Turkey and the Greeks, on the basis of an autonomous and tributary Greek
principality.18
The signing of the protocol produced a sensation in Vienna and Paris. Met-
ternich was incensed, declaring the treaty "deplorable." The Paris cabinet
was alarmed, and La Ferronnays even asked Nicholas if the Alliance were
still in effect. The tsar replied with a halfhearted profession of loyalty to the
European system. After six months of equivocation, France on December
18, declared her adherence to the st. Petersburg Protocol, but Austria and
Prussia refused to associate with the Anglo-Russian plan for Greek pacifi-
cation. 19
The consequences of this agreement were far reaching. It signaled not
only the beginning of a new stage in the diplomatic history of the Greek
War for Independence, but also the creation of a new triple alliance of
Britain, Russia, and France in the place of the old quadruple bond. Thus
the Greek problem split the autocratic powers, but only until 1833, by which
time Greece had become an independent kingdom. The Diplomatic Revo-
lution of 1826, moreover, was the first time since 1812 that Russia shifted
to this system, which throughout the nineteenth century served as an alterna-
tive to the alliance of the three eastern courts whenever the latter appeared
inimical to tsarist interests.20
Within four years after the Congress of Verona, Canning had administered
the coup de grlice to the Pentarchy and had replaced in with another system.
As late as 1824, Metternich still wondered why Britain had withdrawn from
16 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878, p. 16. See also Temperley,

Canning, pp. 339-340, 345-347, 349-351; Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 62-64;
Canning to Liverpool, Seaford, Oct. 25, 1825, Stapleton, George Canning, pp. 465-466;
Wellington instructions, Foreign Office, Feb. 10, 1826, Well. Desp., III, 85-93. Wel-
lington, accompanied by Count Lieven, arrived in St. Petersburg on February 26,
1826.
17 Temperley, Canning, pp. 354-355, 390-391; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and
Europe, 1825-1878, p. 17; Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 65.
lB Quoted in Sweet, Gentz, p. 260. For the French text of the Anglo-Russian
protocol of April 4, 1826, see Ternperley, Canning, App. VII, pp. 586-587.
19 Driault and Lheritier, Hist. de La Grece, I, 320; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and
Europe, 1825-1878, pp. 18-19.
20 1bid., p. 19; Sweet, Gentz, p. 260. The St. Petersburg Protocol soon was converted
into a formal pact: the Treaty of London, July 6, 1827.
324 EPILOGUE
the Alliance and wrote Wellington for enlightenment. The duke's reply of
February 24 is a classic statement of the British position. The estrangement,
he asserted, had begun at Aix-la-Chapelle with the Anglo-Russian dispute
over the casus foederis of the Second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815).
Later, the publication of the Troppau Protocol (November 19.1820) without
Britain's consent had revealed to the world this disagreement over the
purpose of the Alliance. The challenge could not go unanswered. and Eng-
land. in self-defense. had protested against this declaration. These actions
made it apparent that Britain and the continental powers were not following
the same course. Neither events themselves. nor the men who caused them.
drove England from the Congress System. but the way in which deliberations
were conducted. and
the great pains taken by some to disgust us with the Alliance, and the little
pains taken by others to conciliate us towards it, and finally, the unmerited
calumnies of which we have been the object, which have been circulated.... 21
England was not wholly responsible for her isolation. for it had been forced
upon her by the untoward actions of the allies. "It requires all the temper,
moderation, and circumspection of our Councils," Wellington declared, "to
bear the manner in which we have been treated .... " 22
While Metternich meditated and moralized on the collapse of the Con-
gress System and the loss of his influence over the tsar, Canning. with the
help of the Lievens. initiated a realistic romance with Russia. Perhaps the
most fitting symbol of the fall of the Alliance would be a picture of Canning
and Pozzo di Borgo. that former apostle of war with Spain, strolling arm-in-
arm through the streets of Paris in September 1826.23
4. The Legacy
Long after its demise. the Congress System continued to be an international

ideal. but the principle of intervention was not again practically applied.
The British point of view eventually triumphed; viz.• that when a specific
problem arose, the interested parties might, indeed, meet in a congress to
seek a solution to it. But a congress must be created for each case, as the
Congress of Berlin was called to consider the revision of the Treaty of San
Stefano. The powers, moreover. had to agree to act in concert, and the
refusal of anyone state to cooperate usually paralyzed the whole demarche.
21 Wellington to Metternich. London. Feb. 24, 1824. Well. Desp., III, 222-223.
22 Ibid., p. 224.
During the nineteenth century after the Congress of Verona, only two
congresses were held - that of Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878) - but between
1830 and 1884, there were no less than seventeen conferences. The dis-
tinction between these two types of international meetings has never been
precisely defined, but the most consistent difference is that a congress of the
great powers was attended by the heads of state or their foreign ministers,
while a conference was confined to the ambassadors accredited to the
sponsoring power and the foreign minister of the host state. Thus the great
powers attended international meetings as often after 1822 as before, but
they met on an ad hoc basis; their coalition was looser and not motivated
by a determination to rule the world; and the agenda was restricted to inter-
national questions to the exclusion of internal problems. These were the
three distinguishing characteristics of the conference system which came to
be called the Concert of Europe.24
The transition from Congress System to Concert of Europe was reluctant-
ly accepted by the continental powers who considered ad hoc conferences
inadequate. France in 1836, Austria in 1840, and Russia in 1859, all pro-
posed congresses, but these attempts to restore a former system were frus-
trated, as they had been inspired, by great power rivalry. Only England was
satisfied with the existing concert and resisted all efforts to remodel it into
a new federation of Europe.25
If the three eastern powers could not restore the European Pentarchy,
they were, at least, successful in reviving the old Troppau system. Alarmed
by the revolutionary movements in France and Belgium and the possible
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in Sep-
tember 1833 met at Mlinchengratz in Bohemia. Russia was represented by
the tsar himself and Nesselrode; Austria by Francis I, Metternich, and
Ficquelmont; and Prussia by Crown Prince Frederick William. When Ni-
cholas proposed a public reaffirmation of the Alliance, as it had been inter-
preted at Troppau, Frederick William balked, but since he was not author-
ized to sign treaties in any case, Nesselrode and Ficquelmont were sent to
Berlin to conclude a treaty with Prussia embodying the results of discussions
at Mlinchengratz. On October 15, 1833, the secret Treaty of Berlin was
signed, reviving the old "Holy Alliance," and providing for meetings at
regular intervals. In an attempt to reassert the ideas of Troppau-Laibach and
Verona, the autocratic powers reaffirmed the right of intervention in the
24 Webster, The Art and Practice ot Diplomacy (London, 1961), pp. 55, 58-59, 67,
69; F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit ot Peace: Theory and Practice in the History
at Relations between States (Cambridge, England, 1963), pp. 213-215.
lIS Ibid., pp. 214-216.
326 EPILOGUE
internal affairs of an independent state. But this bold reassertion of the

Troppau Protocol was softened by the qualification that intervention must
be requested by the legitimate sovereign. In accordance with the provision
for periodic meetings, the next conference met in October 1835 at Toplitz.26
While the revived alliance of the three northern courts had no influence
in Western Europe, it was the only reality in Eastern Europe (with tempo-
rary breaks), until the fall of Bismarck. It proved an effective instrument in
settling the Cracow Affair (1846) and in suppressing the Hungarian Revo-
lution (1849). The strength and tenacity of this diplomatic legacy is indicated
by a statement of the French ambassador at Constantinople on the eve of
the Crimean War. Referring to the Franco-Austro-British alliance just
concluded (1854), he congratulated the Emperor Napoleon III: "You have
inflicted a mortal blow on the Holy Alliance." 27
The Congress System, as distinct from the Concert of Europe and the
alliance of the three eastern powers, occupies in man's quest for peace
through international conferences and organizations a position which is
almost midway between Emeric Cruce's Nouveau Cynee (1623) and the
United Nations of contemporary fame. Although the Pentarchy became a
tool of reaction, it nonetheless proved an instrument of peace; and peace
was the primary need of Europe after two decades of war. The Congress
System constitutes a significant chapter in the rise of internationalism, and
the Congress of Verona, the last page of that chapter.
28 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878, pp. 104-105; Jelavich, Russian

Foreign Policy, pp. 100-101. Russia and Prussia were seriously considering inter-
vention in Belgium on behalf of the King of the Netherlands, but the stern attitude
of Britain and France and the necessity of maintaining a large Russian army in
Poland (The Polish rebellion of 1830 had just been suppressed.), prevented the
realization of this project.
27 Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Ox-
ford, 1954), p. 70. If the history of Cracow as an independent republic ended on
November 16, 1846, with its annexation to Galicia, the Cracovians added a tragic
epilogue in April 1848, when they expelled the Austrian garrison and briefly re-
gained their independence. The uprising, however, was Quixotic. After bombarding
the city, Field Marshal Count de Castiglione recaptured it on April 26. Never again
did the former republic challenge Habsburg rule. The Times (London), Nov. 25, 1846,
p. 3; ibid., Dec. 7, 1846, p. 3; ibid., May 6, 1848, p. 6; ibid., Mar. 10, 1849, p. 5.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. PRIMARY SOURCES
A. Manuscript Collections
Adams, John Quincy. "Diary." Reels 35-37 of Microfilms of the Adams Papers.
608 reels, Boston, 1954.
France. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Archives des Affaires Etrangeres.
Russie: correspondance, 1821. Vol. 161.
Angleterre: correspondance, 1822. Vol. 615.
- . Angleterre: correspondance, 1823. Vol. 616.
- . Boislecomte, Charles Edmond, baron de. "Resume historique des congres
de: Troppau, Laybach, et Verone." Signed: Verona, December 15, 1822.
Vol. 720.
Boislecomte (1796-1863) attended each of these conferences as a secretary
of the French delegation. Disappointed in his ambition to write a history of
French foreign policy during the Restauration, he deposited this diary and
historical essay in the foreign ministry archives.
- . Le congres de Verone, 1822: correspondance et protocoles. Vol. 721.
- . Boislecomte. "Resume historique du congres de Verone." Signed: Verona,
December 15, 1822. Vol. 722.
In this volume, Boislecomte describes the meeting of the French delegation
on November 8, 1822, an account which is missing from the text found in
Volume 720; otherwise the two narratives are identical.
- . France et les etats divers de l'Europe, 1822: Le congres de Verone. Vol. 723.
This volume contains a collection of documents (dispatches, notes, proces-
verbaux), relative to the negotiations at Vienna as well as Verona.
Great Britain. Public Record Office MSS. Foreign Office. Austria: general
correspondence, Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stewart, 1820. File 7, folio 148
(F.O., 7/148).
- . Austria: general correspondence, Gordon to Castlereagh, Aug.-Dec., 1821.
File 7, folio 164 (F.O., 7/164).
- . Austria: correspondence, Gordon to Castlereagh, Oct.-Dec., 1821. File 120,
folio 49 (F.O., 120/49).
- . Austria: correspondence, Stewart to Bathurst and Canning, Sept.-Dec.,
1822. File 120, folio 54 (F.O., 120/54).
This folio contains the protocols and notes of the Congress of Verona on
the Austrian war debt, the slave trade, and Italian affairs. Included, too, are
328 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Stewart's correspondence with Metternich, Wellington, and William Hamilton

of Naples.
- . Continent, Hanover Conference: Castlereagh's correspondence, Sept. 12-
Oct. 20, 1821. File 92, folio 46 (F.O., 92/46).
- . Continent, Hanover Conference: Castlereagh's notes and correspondence
to Bagot, Gordon, Strangford, and Stuart, Sept. 22-0ct. 28, 1821. File 92,
folio 47 (F.O., 92/47).
- . Continent, Congress of Verona: Bathurst and Canning to Wellington, Sept.
14-Dec. 17, 1822. File 92, folio 48 (F.O., 92/48).
- . Continent, Congress of Verona: Wellington to Canning, Paris, Vienna, and
Verona, Sept. 21-0ct. 29, 1822. File 92, folio 49 (F.O., 92/49).
- . Continent, Congress of Verona: Wellington to Canning, Nov. 5-22, 1822.
File 92, folio 50 (F.O., 92/50).
- . Continent, Congress of Verona: Wellington to Canning, Nov. 26-28, 1822.
File 92, folio 51 (F.O., 92/51).
- . Continent, Congress of Verona: Wellington to Canning, Paris and Calais,
Nov. 29-Dec. 21,1822. File 92, folio 52 (F.O., 92/52).
- . France: correspondence, Sir Charles Stuart to Canning, Sept.-Dec., 1822.
File 146, folio 48 (F.O., 146/48).
- . France: correspondence, Castlereagh and Canning to Stuart, June-Dec ..
1822. File 146, folio 50 (F.O., 146/50).
- . France: correspondence, Stuart to Canning, Jan.-Mar., 1823. File 146, folio
51 (F.O., 146/51).
-. France: correspondence, Stuart to Canning, Apr.-June, 1823. File 146, folio
52 (F.O., 146/52).
-. France: correspondence, Canning to Stuart, Jan.-May, 1823. File 146, folio
55 (F.O., 146/55).
-. France: correspondence, Canning to Stuart, June-Dec., 1823. File 146, folio
56 (F.O., 146/56).
- . France: correspondence, Stuart and Granville to Canning, Nov.-Dec., 1824.
File 146, folio 61 (F.O., 146/61).
- . Great Britain and General: full powers and commissions, 1813-1822. File
83, folio 888 (F.O., 83/888).
- . Great Britain and General: full powers and commissions, 1823-1834. File
83, folio 889 (F.O., 83/889).
- . Howard de Walden Papers, July 1820-July 1821. File 360, folio 2 (F.O.,
360/2).
King's Letter Books: Austria, 1800-1827. File 90, folio 6 (F.O., 90/6).
King's Letter Books: France, 1800-1828. File 90, folio 18 (F.O., 90/18).
King's Letter Books: Italy, 1820-1827. File 90, folio 45 (F.O., 90/45).
King's Letter Books: Russia, 1799-1828. File 90, folio 59 (F.O., 90/59).
King's Letter Books: Spain, 1801-1828. File 90, folio 64 (F.O., 90/64).
Miscellanea, Series I: Royal Letters, Instructions (South), 1814-1834. File
95, folio 453 (F.O., 95/453).
-. Miscellanea, Series I: Royal Letters, Austria, 1814-1834. File 95, folio 658
(F.O., 95/658).
-. Miscellanea, Series I: Royal Letters, Russia, 1816-1834. File 95, folio 676
(F.O., 95/676).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 329
- . Miscellanea, Series I: Royal Letters, Sicily, 1814-1834. File 95, folio 680
F.O., 95/680).
- . Russia: General correspondence, Lieven and Nicolay to Foreign Office,
Aug.-Dec., 1821. File 65, folio 132 (F.O., 65/132).
- . Russia: correspondence relative to Stratford Canning's special mission,
Jan. 29-Apr. 17, 1825. File 65, folio 144 (F.O., 65/144).
- . Russia: correspondence, Bagot to Foreign Office, 1821. File 181, folio 44
(F.O., 181/44).
- . Russia: copies of correspondence, Strangford to Castlereagh, Sept.-Dec.,
1821. File 181, folio 46 (F.O., 181/46).
- . Russia: correspondence, Castlereagh and Canning to Sir Charles Bagot,
1822. File 181, folio 48 (F.O., 181/48).
- . Russia: correspondence, Bagot to Canning, 1823. File 181, folio 50 (F.O.,
181/50).
- . Russia: correspondence, Canning to Bagot, Jan.-July, 1823. File 181, folio
52 (F.O., 181/52).
- . Russia: correspondence, Bagot to Canning, Jan.-May, 1823. File 181, folio
55 (F.O., 181/55).
- . Sardinia: correspondence, William Hill to Castlereagh, 1821. File 67, folio
63 (F.O., 67/63).
- . Spain: correspondence, Canning to Sir William A'Court, Jan.-Sept., 1823.
File 185, folio 91 (F.O., 185/91).
- . Supplement to General Correspondence: France, 1822-1825, "Secret Diary
of Mr. T. E. Darby, a British Spy in France." File 97, folio 168 (F.O., 97/
168).
The diary is in French, but Darby's reports are in English.
- . Turkey: correspondence, Castlereagh to Strangford, 1821. File 78, folio 97
(F.O., 78/97).
B. Public Documents and Records
Austria. Osterreichische Staatsvertriige, England. Edited by Alfred F. Pribram.

2 volt. Vienna, 1913.
Austria. Recueil des traites et conventions conclus par l' Autriche avec les puis-
sances etrangeres depuis 1763 jusqu'ii nos jours. Edited by Baron Leopold
von Neumann and Adolphe de Plason. 12 vols. Vienna, 1877-1888. Vol. IV
(1822-1846).
Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 18/2-1830: Selected Docu-
ments from the Foreign Office Archives. Edited by Sir Charles K. Webster.
2 vols. London, 1938.
British Diplomacy, 1813-1815. Edited by C. K. Webster. London, 1921.
This volume publishes a collection of documents relevant to the Congress
of Vienna.
Canning, George. Selected Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning.
Edited by Robert Walsh. Philadelphia, 1835.
"Documents: The Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Notes to Spain, and the
Verona Circular of December 14, 1822," Annual Register, Vol. LXIV (1822).
330 BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Documents: Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804-1806," American His-

torical Review, Vol. VI (1900-01).
"Documents: Protocols of the Conferences of Representatives of the Allied
Powers Respecting Spanish America, 1824-1825," ibid., Vol. XXII (1916-
1917).
English Historical Documents. Edited by David C. Douglas. 12 vols. London,
1953-1967. Vol. XI (1959).
Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or
Documents, Old and New. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley and L. M. Penson.
Cambridge, England, 1938.
Great Britain. Foreign Office. British and Foreign State Papers. Edited by
Lewis Hertslet. 183 vols. London, 1841-1958. Vols I (1812-1814), III-VI
(1815-1819), VIII-XI (1820-1824).
- . A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal
Regulations at Present Subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers.
Edited by Lewis Hertslet. 31 vols. London, 1827-1925. Vols. I-III.
- . Parliament. Parliamentary Debates, New Series. Edited by T. C. Hansard.
Vols V-X (1821-1824), XII (1825), and XIX (1828).
Gusman, Don Juan. "Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains," Edinburgh Review,
XIII (Jan. 1809).
The Map of Europe by Treaty. Edited by Sir Edward Hertslet. 4 vols. London.
1875-1891. Vol. I.
Nouveau recueil de traites d'alliance, de paix, de treve, ... des puissances et hats
d' Europe. Edited by George Frederick Martens and Baron Charles de Mar-
tens. 16 vols. Gottingen, 1817-1842.
Recueil manuel et pratique de traites, conventions et autre actes diplomatiques.
Edited by Baron Charles de Martens and Baron Ferdinand de Cussy. 7 vols.
Leipzig. 1846-1857. Vol. III.
Russia. Correspondance diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de Russie
en France et de France en Russie avec leurs governements de 1814 a 1830.
Edited by Aleksandr A. Polovtsov. 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1902-1907. Vols.
II and III.
- . Recueil des traites et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances
etrangeres. Edited by Fedor Fedorovitch Martens. 15 vols. St. Petersburg,
1874-1909. Vol. Xl.
United States. The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America.
Edited by Richard Peters. 76 vols. Boston, 1848-1856. Vols. I-III (1789-1823).
- . Congress. American State Papers: Commerce and Navigation. Edited by
Walter Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin. 2 vols. Washington, 1832-1834.
- . American State Papers: Foreign Relations. Edited by Walter Lowrie,
Matthew St. Clair Clarke, et al. 6 vols. Washington, 1832-1859. Vols. IV
andV.
- . Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration Convened
at Paris, 1893. 16 vols. Washington, 1895. Vols. II and IV.
- . Alaskan Boundary Tribunal. Proceedings. 7 vols. Washington, 1904. Vol. II.
(Serial Set 4600-4605, Senate Doc. No. 162.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 331
C. Published Correspondence
Adams, John Q. Writings of John Quincy Adams. Edited by W. C. Ford. 7 vols.

New York, 1913-1917. Vol. VII (1820-1823).
Antioche, Adhemar, comte d'. Chateaubriand, ambassadeur a Londres (1822),
d'apres ses depeches inedites. Paris, 1912.
Bardoux, Agenor. "Le congres de Verone, d'apres Ie papiers de mme la duchesse
de Duras," Seances et travaux de I'Academie des Sciences morales et politi-
ques (Institut de France), Vol. CXLVII (1897).
Bertier de Sauvigny, Rev. Guillaume de. "Un dossier de lettres inedites de
Chateaubriand," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, Vol. III, No.4
(Oct.-Dec., 1956).
- . "Metternich et Chateaubriand en 1823: documents inedits," Revue
d'histoire diplomatique, LXX (Sept. 1956).
This article consists of a collection of dispatches drawn from the Vienna
Staatsarchiv.
Canning, George. George Canning and His Friends. Edited by Captain Josce-
line Bagot. 2 vols. London, 1909.
This collection contains most of Canning's private dispatches to Bagot
while he was British ambassador at St. Petersburg and The Hague.
- . Some Official Correspondence of George Canning. Edited by Edward J.
Stapleton. 2 vols. London, 1887.
This is a well-edited collection with many useful comments.
CastIereagh, Robert Stewart, Second Marquess of Londonderry and Viscount.
Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh.
Edited by his brother Charles W. Vane. 12 vols. in 3 ser. London, 1848-1853.
Chateaubriand, Fran~ois Rene, vicomte de. Correspondance generale de Cha-
teaubriand. Edited by Louis Thomas. 5 vols. Paris, 1912-1924.
- . Lettres a Madame Recamier. Edited by Maurice LevaiIIant and E. Beau
de Lomenie. Paris, 1951.
Consalvi, Ercole Cardinal. Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec
Ie Prince Clement de Metternich, 1815-1823. Edited by Charles Van Duerm.
Louvain, 1899.
"Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825," Ameri-
can Historical Review, Vol. XVIII, No.2 (Jan. 1913) and No.3 (Apr. 1913).
Creevey, Thomas. The Creevey Papers. Edited by Sir Herbert Maxwell. 2 vols.
London, 1904.
Creevey was a Whig M.P. of the early nineteenth century, and his papers
are a useful counterpoise to the Tory Croker Papers. These volumes are a
composite of Creevey's journals and correspondence. His diary has not
survived.
Gabriac, Joseph Paul Fran~ois, marquis de. "Chateaubriand et Ia guerre d'Es-
pagne, d'apres des documents inedits, Part I: les conferences de Vienne et Ie
congres de Verone," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII (1897).
The author's father, the Marquis Joseph Alphonse de Gabriac (1792-1865)
was La Ferronnays' private secretary at Verona.
332 BIBLIOGRAPHY
- . "Chateaubriand et la guerre d'Espagne, Part II: Chateaubriand: ministre

des affaires etrangeres," ibid., Vol. CXLIV (1897).
Gallatin, Albert. Writings of Albert Gallatin. Edited by Henry Adams. 3 vols.
Philadelphia, 1897.
Gentz, Friedrich von. Depeches inedites du chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars
de Valachie pour servir a l'histoire de la politique europeenne (1813 a 1828).
Edited by Count Anton von Prokesch-Osten. 3 vols. Paris, 1876-1877.
Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission. Report on the Manuscripts
of Earl Bathurst, Preserved at Cirencester Park. Edited by Francis Bickley.
London, 1923.
This volume contains an excellent collection of Bathurst's correspondence
with Canning and Wellington.
- . Report on the Manuscripts of the Late Reginald Rawdon Hastings, Esq.,
of the Manor House, Ashby de la Zouche. Edited by Francis Bickley. 4 vols.
London, 1934. Vol. III.
Huskisson, William. The Huskisson Papers. Edited by Lewis S. Benjamin. New
York,1931.
Lamennais, Hugues Felicite Robert de. Correspondance inedite entre Lamen-
nais et Ie baron de Vitro lies, 1819-1853. Edited by Eugene Forgues. Paris,
1886.
Lebzeltern, Ludwig, Count von. Un collaborateur de Metternich: memoires et
papiers de Lebzeltern. Edited by Emmanuel de Levis-Mirepoix. Paris, 1949.
- . Les rapports diplomatiques de Lebzeltern, ministre d'Autriche a la cour de
Russie (1816-1826). Edited by Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch. St. Pe-
tersburg, 1913.
Lieven, Princess Dorothea. Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey.
Edited and translated by Guy Le Strange. 3 vols. London, 1890.
- . Letters of Dorothea, Princess Lieven, during her Residence in London,
1812-1834. Edited by Lionel G. Robinson. London, 1902.
- . The Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich, 1820-1826.
Edited and translated by Peter Quennell. London, 1937.
Moscati, Ruggero. II regno delle Due Sicilie e I'Austria: Documenti dal marzo
1821 al novembre 1830. 2 vols. Naples, 1937.
This collection published many dispatches drawn from the Vienna ar-
chives, especially the Metternich-Ficquelmont correspondence from 1821 to
1823.
Nesselrode, Karl Robert, Count von. Lettres et papiers de chancelier comte de
Nesselrode, 1760-1850. Edited by Comte A. de Nesselrode. 11 vols. Paris,
1908-1912. Vol. VI (1819-1827).
Pailhes, Gabriel. La duchesse de Duras et Chateaubriand d'apres des docu-
ments in edits. Paris, 1910.
This volume is essentially a collection of the Chateaubriand-Duras private
correspondence. The letters, however, are connected by brief, transitional
paragraphs which are sometimes interpretive.
Prokesch-Osten, Anton, Count von. Geschichte des Ab/alls der Griechen vom
Tiirkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Griindung des Hellenischen Ko-
nigreiches aus Diplomatischen Standpuncte. 6 vols. Vienna, 1867-1880.
Volume III is a collection of documents from the Vienna State Archives
given to Prokesch-Osten by Metternich.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 333
Recamier, Jeanne Fran<;:oise Juliette. Souvenirs et correspondance tires des
papiers de madame Recamier. Edited by Amelie Lenormant. 2 vols. Paris,
1859.
Mme Charles (Amelie) Lenormant was the niece and adoptive daughter
of Mme Recamier. Isaphene M. Luyster has translated this collection into
English under the title: Memoirs and Correspondence of Madame Recamier
(London, 1867).
Serre, Pierre Fran<;:ois Hercule, comte de. Correspondance du comte de Serre,
1796-1824. Edited by Comte Fran<;:ois H. de Serre. 5 vols. Paris, 1876-1877.
Vols. IV and V.
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of. Despatches, Correspondence, and
Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G. Edited by
his son Arthur Richard Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. 8 vols. London, 1867-
1880. Vols. I and II.
Unlike the published correspondence of Chateaubriand, Metternich, and
others, these papers of Wellington, despite his ultra-Tory bias, are com-
pletely trustworthy.
D. Autobiographies, Diaries, and Memoirs

Adams, John Quincy. The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845. Edited
by Allan Nevins. New York, 1929.
Not an unabridged edition of Adams, "Diary," this volume publishes a
selection of its most important entries.
Buckingham, Richard Plantagenet Temple Grenville, Second Duke of. Memoirs
of the Court of George IV. 2 vols. London, 1859.
Capo d'lstria, Count J oannes. "Aper<;:u de rna carriere publique, depuis 1789
jusqu'a 1822," Sbornik Russkoe istoricheskoe Obschestvo [Collection of the
Russian Historical Society]. 148 vols. St. Petersburg, 1864-1916. Vol. III
(1868).
This memoire was addressed to Nicholas I and signed in Geneva, Decem-
ber 24, 1826.
Castellane, Boniface. comte de. Journal du marechal de Castellane, 1804-1862.
Edited by the comtesse de Beaulaincourt and P. Le Brethon. 5 vols. Paris,
1895-1897. Vol. I.
Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan. Gli Seritti di Carlo Alberto sui moto pie-
montese del 1821. Edited by Vittorio Fiorini. Rome, 1900.
Chateau briand, Fran<;:ois Rene, vicomte de. Le congres de Verone and La
guerre d'Espagne. Vol. XII, Oeuvres completes de Chateaubriand. Edited
by Charles A. Saint-Beuve. Nouvelle ed. 12 vols. Paris, 1929-1938.
The memoirs of Chateaubriand are noted more for their egotism and
brilliant literary style than for historical accuracy. Nonetheless, they are im-
portant because the author was a plenipotentiary at the Congress and later
became foreign minister.
- . Memoires d'outre-tombe. Edited by Maurice Levaillant. Cent. ed., rev. 4
vols. in 2. Paris, 1949-1950.
Gallatin, James. The Diary of James Gallatin (Secretary to Albert Gallatin, a
Great Peacemaker), 1813-1827. Edited by Count James Francis Gallatin.
New York, 1926.
334 BIBLIOGRAPHY
This alleged diary is a forgery, the work of James Francis Gallatin. For
the denouement, see Raymond Walters, Jr., "The James Gallatin Diary: A
Fraud?", American Historical Review, LXII (July 1957), 878-885.
Gentz, Friedrich von. Aus dem Nachlass Varnhagen's von Ense: Tagebiicher
von Friedrich von Gentz. Edited by Ludmilla Assing. 4 vols. in 2. Leipzig,
1873-1874.
This diary is a vaIuable source for the history of the Congress, since Gentz
was its general secretary and Mettemich's alter ego.
George IV, King of England. Memoirs of George IV. Edited by Robert Huish.
2 vols. London, 1830.
Greville, Charles Cavendish Fulke. The Greville Memoirs. Edited by Henry
Reeve. 3 vols. London, 1874-1887.
Greville's diary is a valuable source for the history of British politics during
the late Georgian and early Victorian eras. A Tory politician, Greville was
clerk of the privy council for forty years. These volumes contain excerpts
from his diary spanning the period, 1814-1860. Reeve, his successor at the
privy council, not only suppressed many entries but also edited the text in
order to soften it.
- . The Greville Diary. Edited by P. W. Wilson. 2 vols. New York, 1927.
These volumes publish additional selections from Reeve's copy of Gre-
ville's diary, which is now in the Bodleian Library. The original manuscript
is deposited in the British Museum.
Hyde de Neuville, Jean Guillaume, baron. Memoirs of Baron Hyde de Neu-
ville: Outlaw, Exile, Ambassador. Translated and abridged by Frances Jack-
son. 2 vols. London, 1913.
Hyde de Neuville was at once a legitimist and a constitutional monarchist.
A confidant of Chateaubriand and Villele, his memoirs shed light on their
policies and rivalry.
La Rochefoucauld, Louis Framrois Sosthene, vicomte de. Memoires de M. de
La Rochefoucauld, duc de Doudeauville. Edited by F. Claude. 15 vols. Paris,
1861-1864. Vols. VI-VIII.
La Rochefoucauld was Montmorency's son-in-law and a confidant of
Mme du Cayla, the royal mistress. His memoirs are a valuable source for the
domestic politics and court intrigues of the Restauration.
Lieven, Princess Dorothea. The Unpublished Diary and Political Sketches of
Princess Lieven, together with Some of Her Letters. Edited by Harold Tem-
perley. London, 1925.
Mettemich-Winneburg, Clemens Lothar Wenzel, prince de. Memoires, docu-
ments, et ecrits divers laisses par Ie prince de Metternich. Edited by his son
Prince Richard de Mettemich. 8 vols. Paris, 1880-1884. Vol. III.
The memoirs of the Austrian chancellor are too egocentric and meager
to be of much value for the Congress. The published private letters and
documents, however, are useful.
Neumann, Philipp, Baron von. The Diary of Philipp von Neumann. Edited and
translated by E. Beresford Chancellor. 2 vols. London, 1928. Vol. I (1819-
1833).
Neumann was the Austrian charge d'affaires in London.
Pasquier, Etienne Denis, duc. La Restauration, 1820-1824. Vol. V of Histoire
BIBLIOGRAPHY 335
de mon temps, memoires du chancelier Pasquier. Edited by Ie duc d'Audif-
fret-Pasquier. Paris, 1893-1895.
Pasquier held the post of foreign minister in Richelieu's Second Ministry.
His are the most reliable, if not the best written, French memoirs of the
period.
Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, duc de. "Le Second ministere du duc de Riche-
lieu: fragment d'autobiographie, 1819-1821," Revue historique. Edited by
Felix Alcan, Vol. XXXVII (mai-aout, 1888).
This brief autobiography was signed on January 2,1822.
Rochechouart, Comte de. Souvenirs sur la Revolution, l' Empire et la Restau-
ration. Paris, 1933.
Rush, Richard. Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, 1819-1829.
2 vols. Philadelphia, 1845.
Rush's memoirs are valuable, but they must be used with caution for he
edited them in retrospect.
Talleyrand-Perigord, prince de Benevento, Charles Maurice de. Memoirs of
Prince de Talleyrand. Edited by Albert, duc de Broglie and translated by
Raphael Ledos de Beaufort and Mrs. Angus Hall. 5 vols. Boston, 1895. Vols.
II and III.
Villele, Jean Baptiste, comte de. Memoires et correspondance du comte de
VilLe/e. 2nd ed. 5 vols. Paris, 1887-1890. Vols. II and III.
In Volume III of these memoirs, the French premier gives the official
account of the negotiations at Verona and publishes many important dis-
patches to Montmorency and Chateaubriand. Villele, however, is discreet in
his narrative.
Vitrolles, Eugene d'Armand, baron de. Memoires et relations politique du baron
de Vitrolles. Edited by Eugene Forgues. 3 vols. Paris, 1884. Vol. III.
E. Contemporary Works
Aldobrandini, Prince Francesco Borghese. Requete de ... prince Aldobrandini
au Roi, demandant l'intervention du gouvernement franflais pour lui faire
restituer la propriete des salines de Creuznach et de Durkeim. Paris, March
2,1822.
The prince privately published this petition in a bid to gain sympathy and
support for his cause.
Bignon, Louis Pierre :E:douard, baron. Les cabinets et les peuples, depuis 1815
jusqu' ala fin de 1822. 2nd ed. Paris, 1823.
Buxton, Thomas F. The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy. London, 1840.
Capefigue, Jean Baptiste Honore Raymond. Histoire de la Restauration et des
causes qui ont amene la chute de la branche a/nee des Bourbons. 10 vols.
Paris, 1831-1833. Vol. VII.
Gerlache, :E:tienne Constantin de. Histoire du royaume des Pays-Bas, depuis
1814 jusqu'en 1830.2 vols. Bruxelles, 1839.
The author was a member of the States-General. The narrative reflects
his pro-Belgian bias.
Gilly, William S. Narrative of an Excursion to the Mountains of Piedmont and
Researches Among the Vaudois. London, 1824.
336 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dr. Gilly, an English clergyman, visited the Vaudois (Waldenses) in 1823

and founded a college at La Torre for them.
Gorres, Joseph von. Die Heilige Allianz und die Volker, Auf dem Kongress von
Verona. Stuttgart, 1822.
Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de. Histoire de la Restauration. 8 vols. Paris,
1851-1852. Vol. III.
Marcellus, Andre Charles Demartin du Tyrac, comte de. Chateaubriand et son
temps. Paris, 1859.
Count Marcellus was first secretary of the French embassy in London
while Chateaubriand was ambassador. The two men were life-long friends.
- . Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823. Paris, 1853.
The private letters published in this volume are unreliable, because Mar-
cellus deliberately falsified the dates and details of conversations.
Smola, Karl, Baron von. Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Heinrich Grafen von
Bellegarde. Vienna, 1847.
Stapleton, Augustus Granville. George Canning and His Times. London, 1859.
-. The Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning. 2nd. ed.
London, 1831.
Stapleton was Canning's private secretary, but he is not always reliable.
His narrative, moreover, is marred by an anti-Castlereagh and anti-Welling-
ton bias.
Wilberforce, Robert Isaac and Wilberforce, Samuel. The Life of William Wil-
berforce. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1839.
F. Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals

Annual Register, Vols. LII (1810), LX (1818), and LXIII-LXV (1821-1823).
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vols. XII-XlII (1822-1823).
Chambers' Edinburgh Journal, Vol. I (1832-33).
Eclectic Review, New Series, Vol. III (1815).
Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany: A New Series of the Scots Maga-
zine, Vols. XI (1822) and XII (1823).
Edinburgh Review, Vols. XIII (1809), XVII-XVIII (1811), XXVII (1816),
XXXII (1819), XXXV (1821), XXXVIII (1823), and XLI (1824).
The Edinburgh Review was the chief Whig organ of the early nineteenth
century.
England Goes to Press: The English People's Opinion on Foreign Affairs as
Reflected in Their Newspapers since Waterloo. Edited by Raymond Postgate
and Aylmer Vallance. Indianapolis, 1937.
European Magazine and London Review, Vol. LXXI (1817).
Foreign Quarterly Review, Vols. VIII-IX (1831-1832), and XII (1833).
La Foudre, Vols. VII (Oct.-Dec., 1822) and VIII (Jan.-Mar., 1823).
La Foudre (The Thunderbolt) was an ultra-Royalist journal.
Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, Vols. XCI-XCIII (182]-
1823).
Le Moniteur universel, Vol. LXI (Nov. 1821-Dec. 1822).
The Moniteur was the official organ of the French government in which
royal ordonnances and documents were published.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 337
Monthly Magazine, Vol. XXXVIII (1814).

Monthly Repository, Vols. III (1808) and X (1815).
Niles' Weekly Register, Vols. XXIII (Jan. 25, 1823) and XXIV (Apr. 5 and
Aug. 2, 1823).
Quarterly Review, Vols. XXVIII (Oct. 1822-Jan. 1823) and XXXVIII (July-
Oct., 1828).
This journal is the Tory response to the Edinburgh Review.
Sainte-Beuve, Charles A., Causeries du Lundi. 15 vols. Paris, 1851-1862. Vol.
XIV.
This work is a collection of essays and reviews which appeared in the
Constitutionnel between 1849 and 1852.
The Times (London), Nov. 25-Dec. 7, 1846 and May 6, 1848-Mar. 10, 1849.
Westminister Review, Vol. 1(1824).
II. SECONDARY ACCOUNTS
A. General Biographies
Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Edited by R. von Lilliencron and F. X. von
Wegele. 56 vols. Leipzig, 1875-1912.
Biographie universelle. Edited by Joseph Franc;:ois Michaud. Nouv. ed. 45 vols.
Paris, 1843-1865.
Dictionary of National Biography. Edited by Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee.
22 vols. London, 1908-1909.
Taylor, G. R. Stirling. English Political Portraits of the Nineteenth Century.
Boston, 1929.
Willson, Beckles. America's Ambassadors to France, 1777-1927. New York,
1928.
Based on James Gallatin's diary, a proven forgery, the chapter on Albert
Gallatin is almost worthless.
B. Specific Biographies
Adams, Henry. Life of Albert Gallatin. Philadelphia, 1879.
Aldington, Richard. The Duke: Being an Account of the Life and Achievements
of Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington. New York, 1943.
Alison, Sir Archibald. Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart. 3 vols.
Edinburgh, 1861.
Bardoux, Agenor. Etudes sociales et politiques: la duchesse de Duras. Paris,
1898.
Bartlett, Christopher John. Castlereagh. New York, 1966.
This biography is based entirely on published sources and accounts and is
largely a synthesis of Webster's scholarly study of the foreign secretary.
Berti, Domenico. Cesare Alfiere. Rome, 1877.
Buchan, Susan. The Sword of State: Wellington after Waterloo. New York,
1928.
Costa de Beauregard, Louis. La jeunesse du roi Charles Albert. Paris, 1889.
Coupland, Reginald. Wilberforce: A Narrative. Oxford, 1923.
338 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crousaz-Cretet, Leon de. Le duc de Richelieu en Russie et en France, 1766-

1822. Paris, 1897.
Du Coudray, Helene. Metternich. New Haven, 1936.
Fischer, E. L. Cardinal Consalvi. Mainz, 1899.
Fourcassie, Jean. Villele. Paris, 1954.
This study is based upon extensive research in Villele's private papers,
drawn from the family archives, and in contemporary published sources. An
annex publishes a number of new documents.
Fulford, Roger. George the Fourth, 1762-1830. Capricorn Bks. ed. New York,
1963.
This study attempts to rehabilitate the "royal rake" and contends that he
was less dissolute and more talented than most of his biographers have sup-
posed.
Gleig, G. R. The Life of Arthur, Duke of Wellington. People's Ed. London,
1865.
Gray, Denis. Spencer Perceval: The Evangelical Prime Minister, 1762-1812.
Manchester, 1963.
Griinwald, Constantin de. Metternich. Translated by Dorothy Todd. London,
1953.
Guedalla, Philip. Wellington. New York, 1931.
Herman, Arthur. Metternich. London, 1932.
This biography is essentially an abridgment of Srbik's monumental study.
Herriot, Edouard. Madame Recamier. Trans. by Alys Hallard. 2 vols. London,
1926.
Hyde, H. Montgomery. Princess Lieven. Boston, 1938.
Lane-Poole, Stanley. Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount
Stratford de Redcliffe, 2 vols. London, 1888.
These volumes publish many of the private letters of George Canning to
his cousin Stratford.
Maggiolo, Adrien, vicomte. Corse, France et Russie: Pozzo di Borgo, 1764-
1842. Paris, 1890.
Mann, Golo. Secretary of Europe: The Life of Friedrich Gentz, Enemy of
Napoleon. Translated by William H. Woglom. New Haven, 1946.
Marriott, Sir John A. Ransome. Castlereagh: The Political Life of Robert,
Second Marquess of Londonderry. London, 1936.
Maurois, Andre. Chateaubriand. Translated by Vera Fraser. London, 1938.
Morton, Frederic. The Rothschilds: A Family Portrait. New York, 1963.
Ouvaroff, Count S. S. "Stein and Pozzo di Borgo," Biographical Tracts (1832-
1861). Translated by D. Forbes Campbell. London, 1861.
Pertz, George Heinrich. Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein. 6 vols.
Berlin, 1849-1855. Vol. V (1815-1823).
Petrie, Sir Charles. Wellington: A Reassessment. London, 1956.
Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von. Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch. 3 vols.
Munich,1925.
This monumental biography is the basis for all recent studies of the chan-
cellor. Srbik contends that Metternich was essentially a European rather than
an Austrian statesman and that his political principles, though conservative,
were not reactionary.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 339
Sweet, Paul R. Friedrich von Gentz: Defender of the Old Order. Madison,
Wis., 1941.
This study, which is superior to Mann's biography, is based on extensive
research in the Austrian, British, and German archives.
Toye, Francis. Rossini: A Study in Tragi-Comedy. New York, 1947.
Turquan, Joseph. A Great Coquette: Madame Recamier and Her Salon. Trans-
lated from the French, no trans. London, 1913.
Wright, G. N. Life and Campaigns of Arthur, Duke of Wellington. 4 vols.
London, 1841. Vol. IV.
C. Histories and Monographs

Acton, Harold. The Bourbons of Naples, 1734-1825. London, 1956.
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of
Vienna. New York, 1958.
Alison, Sir Archibald. History of Europe from the Fall of Napoleon to the
Accession of Louis Napoleon. 8 vols. Edinburgh, 1853. Vol. n.
Allen, A. M. A History of Verona. London, 1910.
Anderson, M. S. Britain's Discovery of Russia, 1553-1815. London, 1958.
- . The Eastern Question. London, 1966.
Artz, Frederick B. France under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814-1830. New
York, 1963.
- . Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832. Vol. XIV of The Rise of Modern
Europe. Edited by William L. Langer. New York, 1934.
Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from
Early Times to Our Day. Ithaca, N.Y., 1950.
Bancroft, Hubert H. History of Alaska, 1730-1885. San Francisco, 1886.
- . History of the Northwest Coast. 2 vols. San Francisco, 1884.
Bemis, Samuel F. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American
Foreign Policy. New York, 1949.
Though an excellent monograph, this study sacrifices interpretation for
detailed narrative.
Bertier de Sauvigny, Rev. Guillaume de. Metternich et son temps. Paris, 1959.
This recent study gives a favorable, though judicious, portrait of Metter-
nich and publishes for the first time many of his dispatches.
- . La Restauration. Paris, 1955.
The Bourbon Restoration, translated by Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), is an excellent English version of
the 1963 French edition of this scholarly study. Professor Case has provided
an up-to-date, classified bibliography and a detailed index. The translation,
commissioned by the Society for French Historical Studies, was prepared in
close consultation with the author, "a clerical historian, sympathetic to the
monarchical ideal" (p. vii) and to the regime.
- . Un type d'ultra-royaliste: Ie comte Ferdinand de Bertier (1782-1864) et
i'enigme de la Congregation. Paris, 1948.
Bianchi, Nicomede. Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia
dall'anno 1814 all'anno 1861.8 vols. Turin, 1865-1872. Vol. II.
Bonjour, Edgar. Swiss Neutrality, Its History and Meaning. London, 1946.
340 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bourgeois, Emile. History of Modern France, 1815-1913. 2 vols. Cambridge,

England, 1922.
Bourquin, Maurice. Histoire de la Sainte Alliance. Geneva, 1954.
This study is the best recent general account of the subject.
Boyce, Myrna. The Diplomatic Relations of England with the Quadruple Al-
liance, 1815-1830. University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. VII.
Iowa City, 1922.
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1911. Edited by Sir Adol-
phus W. Ward and George P. Gooch. 2 vols. New York, 1922-1923. Vol. II.
Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X, The Restoration. Edited by A. W. Ward,
G. W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes. 13 vols. New York, 1902-191t.
Chabrand, Jean-Armand. Vaudois et Protestants des Alps. Grenoble, 1886.
This study contains many hitherto unpublished documents.
Comba, Emilio. Histoire des Vaudois. Paris, 190t.
Corti, Egon Caesar, Count. The Rise of the House of Rothschild. Translated
by Brian and Beatrix Lunn. New York, 1928.
Crawley, C. W. The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy
in the Near East, 1821-1833. Cambridge, England, 1930.
Cresson, W. P. The Holy Alliance: The European Background of the Monroe
Doctrine. New York, 1922.
While secretary of the American embassy in Petrograd after the March
Revolution, 1917, Cresson had access to unpublished materials in the Russian
Imperal Archives and Foreign Ministry Archives.
Cunningham, William. Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement. London,
1905.
Curtin, Philip D. The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census. Madison, Wis., 1969.
A scholarly statistical analysis, this study revises previously accepted
figures on the volume of this traffic and reveals that abolitionist societies and
even the British Foreign Office delib~rately exaggerated their estimates.
Dangerfield, George. Era of Good Feeling. New York, 1953.
Davidson, George. The Alaska Boundary. San Francisco, 1903.
Demangeon, Albert and Febvre, Lucien. Le Rhin: problemes d'histoire et
d'economie. Paris, 1935.
Deschamps, Pere Nicolas. Les Societes secretes et la societe. 4th ed. 3 vols.
Avignon, 1881.
Driault, Edouard. La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a la paix de
Sevres. 8th ed. Paris, 192t.
- and Lheritier, Michel. Histoire diplomatique de fa Grece de 1821 a nos
jours. 5 vols. Paris, 1925-1926. Vol. I.
Du Bois, W. E. B. The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United
States of America, 1638-1870. New York, 1896.
Duggan, Stephen P. H. The Eastern Question: A Study of Diplomacy. Co-
lumbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XIV,
No.3. New York, 1902.
Fadeev, Anatolii Vsevolodovich. Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-x godov XIX
Veka [Russia and the Eastern Crisis of the 1820's]. Moscow, 1959.
This study is based upon extensive research in the Russian archives.
Farrere, Claude. Histoire de la marine fran~aise. Paris, 1956.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 341
Greenidge, C. W. W. Slavery. London, 1958.

Grosjean, Georges. La politique exterieure de la Restauration et l'AUemagne.
Paris, 1930.
Guillon, Edouard. Les complots militaires sous la Restauration. Paris, 1895.
Halevy, Elie. A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century. Trans-
lated by E. I. Watkin and D. A. Walker. 3 vols. New York, 1949. Vol. I.
Hall, John R. The Bourbon Restoration. London, 1909.
This study is a good older account which is almost entirely political in its
treatment of the period.
Hauranne, Duvergier de. Histoire de gouvernement parlementaire en France,
1814-1848.10 vols. Paris, 1857-1872. Vol. VII.
A moderate liberal, Hauranne was one of the editors of the Globe. His
account of the period, based upon extensive use of newspapers and un-
published memoirs, is well-informed and perceptive.
Heaton, Herbert. Economic History of Europe. New York, 1936.
Henderson, W. O. The Zollverein. Cambridge, England, 1939.
Hildt, John C. Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia.
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol.
XXIV, Nos. 5-6. Baltimore, 1906.
Hinsley, F. H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the
History of Relations between States. Cambridge, England, 1963.
Hyde, H. Montgomery. The Strange Death of Lord Castlereagh. London, 1959.
Hyde contends that Castlereagh. indeed, was the victim of a conspiracy:
blackmail for a homosexual act he did not commit. Unable to extract himself
from the dilemma, he committed suicide.
Isambert, Gaston. L'lndependance grecque et l'Europe. Paris, 1900.
Jelavich, Barbara. A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914. Lippincott
History Series. Philadelphia, 1964.
J orga, Nicolas. Geschichte des Rumaenischen V olkes im Rahmen seiner Staats-
bildungen. 2 vols. Gotha, 1905. Vol. II.
Kaufmann, William W. British Policy and the Independence of Latin America,
1804-1828. New Haven, Conn., 1951.
King, Bolton. History of Italian Unity, Being a Political History of Italy from
1814 to 1871. 2 vols. London, 1899.
Kissinger, Henry A. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the
Problems of Peace, 1812-1822. Boston, 1957.
This book is a synthesis of the work of others, especially of Webster's two
volumes on Castlereagh's foreign policy.
Klingberg, Frank J. The Anti-Slavery Movement in England. New Haven,
Conn., 1926.
Knight, Charles. Popular History of England. 8 vols. London, 1867-1868. Vol.
VIII.
Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example. London, 1956.
La Fuye, Maurice de and Babeau, Emile Albert. La Sainte-Alliance: 1815-1848.
Paris, 1948.
This work is sympathetic to Tsar Alexander's attempt to base great power
relations on the tenets of Christianity.
Lamb, Ivo Nikolai. Free Trade and Protectionism in Germany, 1868-1879.
Wiesbaden, 1963.
342 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Laserson, Max M. American Impact on Russia, Diplomatic and Ideological,

1784-1914. New York, 1950.
Before immigrating to the United States, Laserson was the Vice-Director
of the Department of Nationalities in Russia's Home Ministry under the
short-lived Kerensky government of 1917.
Lenormant, Fran~ois. La Grece et les iles ioniennes, etudes de politique et
d'histoire contemporaine. Paris, 1865.
- . La question ionienne devant [,Europe. Paris, 1859.
Levi, Leone. History of British Commerce and the Economic Progress of the
British Nation, 1763-1878. London, 1880.
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Andrei A. Russia and Europe, 1789-1825. Durham, N.C.,
1947.
- . Russia and Europe, 1825-1878. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954.
Martin, Henri. Histoire de France depuis 1789 jusqu'a nos jours. 2nd ed. 8 vols.
Paris, 1878-1885. Vol. IV.
A staunch republican politician, Martin in 1876 became a life Senator of
France.
Martineau, Harriet. A History of the Thirty Years' Peace, 1816-1846. 4 vols.
London, 1877. Vol. I (1816-1824).
Mathieson, William L. Great Britain and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865. London.
1929.
Miliukov, Paul, Seignobos, Charles, et al. Les successeurs de Pierre Ie Grand.
Vol. II of Histoire de Russie. 3 vols. Paris, 1932.
Mitchell, Martin. The Maritime History of Russia, 848-1948, London, 1949.
Nettement, Alfred Fran~ois. Histoire de la Restauration. 8 vols. Paris, 1860-
1870. Vol. VI.
Based on extensive use of French archival material, this work, which is
sympathetic to the regime, is the best multi-volume study of the Restoration.
Nettement also consulted Montmorency's own account of the Congress of
Verona before its disappearance.
Okun, Semen Bentsionovich. The Russian-American Company. Edited by
B. D. Grekov and translated by Carl Ginsburg. Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
This study, first published in the Soviet Union in 1939, is based upon
extensive use of Russian archival material.
Perkins, Bradford. Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States,
1812-1823. Berkeley, Calif., 1964.
This study is the third volume of a trilogy which won the 1965 Bancroft
Prize Award.
Perkins, Dexter. A History of the Monroe Doctrine. New ed. Boston, 1955.
This work, the classic study of the Monroe Doctrine, is based in part on
research in the British and French archives.
Phillips, W. A. The Confederation of Europe. London, 1920.
Pilder, Hans. Die Russisch-Amerikanische Handels-Kompanie bis 1825. Berlin
and Leipzig, 1914.
This study is the best account of the early activities of the company.
Pinon, Rene. Histoire diplomatique, 1515-1928. Vol. IX, Histoire de fa nation
franr;aise. Edited by Gabriel Hanotaux. 15 vols. Paris, 1929.
Politovsky, N. Kratkoie Istoricheskoie Obozranie y Deistvie Rossiysko-Amerik
BIBLIOGRAPHY 343
[Brief Historical Review of the Origin and Transactions of the Russian
American Company]. St. Petersburg, 1861.
Poniatowski, Michel. Histoire de la Russie d' Amerique et de I' Alaska. Paris,
1958.
Probyn, John W. Italy from the Fall of Napoleon I in 1815 to the Year 1890.
London, 1891.
Rath, R. John. The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, 1814. New York,
1941.
Renouvin, Pierre. Le XIXe siecie, Part I: De 1815 a 1871. Vol. V, Histoire des
relations internationales. Paris, 1954.
Rich, E. E. Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870. 3 vols. New York, 1961. Vol.
III.
Robertson, William S. France and Latin-American Independence. Baltimore,
1939.
This excellent study is based on extensive research in the French foreign
ministry archives.
-. History of the Latin American Nations. 2nd ed. New York, 1932.
-. Rise of the Spanish-American Republics. New York, 1942.
Rose, J. Holland. William Pitt and National Revival. London, 1911.
Schroeder, Paul W. Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, /820-1823. Austin,
1962.
This study is a scholarly monograph based largely on unpublished material
drawn from the Vienna archives.
Schweizer, Paul. Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitat. Frauenfeld, 1895.
Seton-Watson, Robert W. Britain in Europe, 1789-1914. Cambridge, England,
1938.
Sorel, Albert. "L'Alliance russe et la Restauration," Essais d'histoire et de
critique. 2nd ed. Paris, 1883.
Soulsby, Hugh G. The Right of Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American
Relations, 1814-1862. Baltimore, 1933.
Spellanzon, Cesare. Storia del Risorgimento e dell'Unitii d'ltalia. 5 vols. Milan,
1933-1951. Vols. I and II.
Tatum, Edward H., Jr. The United States and Europe, 1815-1823: A Study in
the Background of the Monroe Doctrine. Berkeley, Calif., 1936.
Tatum contends that the non-colonization clause of the Monroe Doctrine
was aimed primarily at Britain, not Russia.
Taylor, A. J. P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Oxford, 1954.
Temperley, Harold W. V. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827. London,
1925.
This classic study, based on extensive research in European archives, is the
indispensable tool for any student of Canning's foreign policy.
Thomas, Benjamin P. Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. XLVIII, No.2.
Baltimore, 1930.
Tikhmenev, P. Istoricheskoe Obozranie Obrazovanie Rossiysko Amerikanskoi
Kompaniy [Historical Survey of the Formation of the Russian-American
Company]. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1861-1863.
344 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Trevelyan, George M. British History in the Nineteenth Centwy and After,

1782-1919. London, 1947.
Vandenbosch, Amry. Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power
Politics. The Hague, 1959.
Vayra, Pietro. La leggenda di una corona: Carlo Alberto e Ie perdidie
austriache. Turin, 1896.
Viel-Castel, Charles Louis, baron de. Histoire de la Restauration. 20 vols. Paris,
1860-1878. Vols. IX-XI.
A diplomat himself, Viel-Castel focuses on the diplomatic questions which
faced the restored Bourbon monarchy. This monumental work, based on
materials drawn from the French archives, publishes many important docu-
ments. It is, however, critical of the regime.
Villanueva, Carlos A. La monarquia en America: la Santa Alianza. Paris, 1913.
Waliszewski, Kazimierz. La Russie il y a cent ans: Ie regne d'Alexandre ler.
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Webster, Sir Charles K. The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain
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In this scholarly monograph, based on copius use of archival material,
Webster does for Castlereagh what Temperley did for Canning. A lengthy
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Westermann, Johannes C. The Netherlands and the United States, Their
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D. Professional Publications and Periodicals
Acton, John Emerich E. D., Baron. "Review of J. Franck Bright's A History

of England, 1837-1880," English Historical Review, Vol. III (Oct. 1888).
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Bertier de Sauvigny, Rev. Guillaume de. "Metternich et l'intervention fran!;aise
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Bettanini, Antonio M. "Un disegno di confederazione italiana nella politica
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 345
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-. "La Santa Sede e il Congresso di Verona," ibid., Vols. XXXIX (1955) and
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Goebel, Dorothy B. "British Trade to the Spanish Colonies, 1796-1823,"
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Green, Captain John Eric Sidney. "Castlereagh's Instructions for the Confer-
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-. "Wellington and the Congress of Verona, 1822," English Historical Review,
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Lackland, H. M. "Wellington at Verona," English Historical Review, Vol.
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Lingelbach, Anna Lane. "William Huskisson as President of the Board of
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INDEX
A and Latin America, 139-140; and Met-

Aachen. See Aix-la-Chapelle ternich, 257, 267, 274; and Sardinia-
Abisbal, Henry O'Donnell, Count of, 27 Piedmont, 196; and Secret Treaty of
A'Court, Sir William, 68-69, 311, 313, Verona, 318-319; and the slave trade,
314-315 164, 170, 179, 180-181, 185; and Spain,
Acton, Lord John Emerich E. D., 277-278 44, 91, 94, 113; and Cardinal Spina,
Adams, John Quincy: Anglophobia of, 207; and Strangford, 50, 53, 251; and
241; Latin America, 139n; North- Turkey, 8, 51, 105, 234-235; and Ukase
western Question, 240-244; quoted on of September 16, 1821, 229-230, 232,
the right of search, 171-172 234-235, 236; and Vienna conference
Addington, Henry (Viscount Sidmouth), (1822), 40, 50, 66; and William Allen,
137 66. See also the Eastern Question, Ot-
Adrianople, Treaty of (Sept. 14, 1829), toman Empire, and the Spanish Ques-
257 tion
African Institution, 162, 163 Alfieri di Sostegno, Marquis Cesare d',
African Society (London), 161, 172 195n
Aix-Ia-Chapelle (Aachen), Congress of Alison, Sir Archibald, 17, 23, 284
(1818): 139; and Anglo-Russian es- Allen, William, 66, 67, 178
trangement, 324; and Austrian war Allgemeine Zeitung (Augsburg), 128
debt, 219; Declaration of (Nov. 15, Alopeus, Count David d', 8n; and Spain,
1818), 102; and France, 170; and Latin 28-29
America, 139; Portugal, 170; and the Amiens, Peace of (1802), 137-138,215
slave trade, 170-171, 179, 181 Ancillon, Johann, 8, 28-29
Alaska, 230-231, 235-236, 238; North- Andalusia, 27, 61
western Question, 240-244 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Alliance
Aldobrandini, Prince Francesco Borg- (Feb. 19, 1810), 118n
hese, 215 Angouleme, Louis-Antoine de Bourbon,
Alessandria, 54, 196 Duke of, 158,267,278, 312
Alexander I, Tsar of Russia: and J. Q. Annual Register, quoted, 77
Adams, 236-242, 243n; and the Al- Apponyi, Count Anton, 203-204
liance, 11,244; and Charles Albert, 56, Argentina, 140, 159
193; and Castiereagh, 10-11; and Cha- Armee d'observation, 33, 270, 308, 315
teaubriand, 109,296,298,301,306; and Army of the Faith (Spanish), 30, 126
Circular of Mar. 15, 1823, 313; death Artois, Charles Philippe, Count of, 25,
of, 322; and France, 47, 91, 109, 301; 38,270
and Greece, 5-6, 50, 254, 322; and Aspremont, Count of, 295
Prince Hohenlohe, 66; and Holy Al- Austria: passim; and Brazil, 152-154, 159;
liance, 66n; and the Italian League, demography of, 205, 214, 274; and the
205-206; at Laibach conference, 5-6, 8; Eastern Question, 10, 48-53, 246, 257,
350 INDEX
322-323, 325; and Greek insurrection, Boyce, Myrna, 321

273-274; and the Ottoman Empire, 257- Brant, Mariscaldo Campo, 189
258; and Portugal, 152n; and Sardinia- Brazil: and French recognition, 146; and
Piedmont, 195; treasury deficit of, 223, the Gameiro mission, 151-153; the
226; and war debt to Britain, 218-229. independence of, 118, 152n, 153-154,
See also Francis J, Gentz, Metternich, 189-190; and the London conference,
and the Spanish Question 153; slavery and the slave trade, 177,
178-179, 189n, 190n
B Briggs, Samuel, 255
Bagot, Sir Charles, 8, 322 Brougham, Henry, 221, 314
Bailey, Thomas A., 234 Brunetti, Count, Austrian charge at
Baring, House of, 227 Madrid, 90, 309
Bathurst, Henry, 3rd Earl, 23n, 159 Bubna von Lititz, General Count Ferdi-
Beauchamp, Alphonse de, 303n nand, 194, 197
Beckwith, Colonel John Charles, 212 Bucharest, Treaty of (1812), 6
Belgium, 325, 326n Buenos Aires. See Argentina
Bellegarde, Field Marshal Count Hein- Bulgary, Count, Russian minister to
rich Joseph Johannes von, 196, 204 Spain, 120, 309
Bellune, Claude Victor-Perrin, Duke of Burghersh, General John Fane, Lord, 76
(Marshal Victor), 32
Bemis, Samuel F., 232, 234, 235 C
Bentinck, Lord William, 202 Calabar River, 172, 179
Berlin, Congress of (1878), 324-325 Camereiro mission, 67n-68n
Berlin, Treaty of (1833), 325 Canning, George: passim; and Adams;
Bermudes, Zea de, 44n 240-241; and the African Institution,
Bernstorff, Count Christian Gunther von: 162n; and Alexander, 235; and the Al-
and Charles Albert, 57, 193; and the liance, 37, 317, 323; ascendancy of, 14;
Eastern Question, 9; and France, 123; and Bagot, 322; and Black Sea com-
and the Hanover conference, 9; illness merce, 247; and Brazil, 153-154, 178.
of, 181-182; and Latin America, 148; 189-190; and British public opinion, 17,
and Metternich, 123; and Spain, 45, 89, 281 ; and Castlereagh, 15 -17, 69-72, and
122-123. See also Prussia and the "come what may" dispatch, 71; and
Spanish Question Congress System, 136; and Cuba, lIOn,
Berry, Marie Caroline, Duchesse de, 33n 157; and the Eastern Question, 70, 247,
Bettanini, Antonio M., 211 253, 257, 322-323; and Franco-Spanish
Binder von Kriegelstein, Baron Friedrich, dispute, 104, 136, 157, 311, 313; and
56 French Royalists, 270; and Greece, 70,
Blacas, Pierre Louis, Duke of, 57, 191, 253, 257; and Italy, 204; and Latin
289 America, 70, 137, 143-144, 144-145,
Black Sea: Russian commerce in, 51, 247- 154; and Louis XVIII, 312; and Met-
249, 251, 256; Turkish restrictions on ternich, 257, 274; and the Monroe Doc-
navigation in 51, 53. See also the trine, 232-233, 241, 244; and the Otto-
Eastern Question and the Straits man Empire, 70, 253, 323; and policy
Boislecomte, Charles Edmond, Baron de: of isolationism, 15-16, 274, 279, 315,
diary of, 279; and La Ferronnays, 279, 322; and Portugal, 118n, 189-190; and
282; and popular sovereignty, 155; and Sardinia, 196-197; and the slave trade,
Franco-Spanish war, 106; and Welling- 70-71, 176, 189-190; and Verona di-
ton, 279 plomacy, 314; and Villele, 26, 37, 156-
Boissy, Hilaire etienne, Count de, 295 157,269,271-272; and Waldenses, 211;
Bolivar, Simon, 141n and Wellington, 24, 277-279, 281, 284
Bombelles, Count Heinrich von, 55 Canning, Stratford: and Adams, 241; and
Bosphorus, the. See Straits, the Alexander, 235; and Northwestern
Bourse, the Paris, 129 Question, 243
INDEX 351
Canosa, Prince Antonio di, 216 Albert, 54-55, 191-192, 193, 194-195;
Canossa, Marchese di, 77 a nationalist, 194, 196, 212; and Pied-
Capo d'lstria, Count Joannes: fall of, montese revolt, 54-55; and Waldenses,
40, 234; and the Russian Ukase, 233; 211-212
wants Turkish war, 8 Charte. the French, 56, 310
Carabobo, Battle of (1821), 141n Chateaubriand, Francois Rene, Viscount
Caraman, Victor-Louis Charles, Marquis de: passim; and Alexander, 109, 2%,
of, 40; and the Eastern Question, 246, 298, 301,306,311; ambition of, 111,288-
249-250; and Sardinian refugees, 214; 289, 290; anti-British bias, 109; and Can-
opposes Spanish war, 107 ning, 188, 313; and Caraman, 289, 298;
Carbonari: in France, 30; and in Italy, and Castlereagh, 188, 291; character,
206,216 286,289; and Charles Albert, 192; and
Carlsbad Decrees (Sept. 20, 1819),205 Congress of Verona, 72-73, 80, 289-
Casa Lorenzi, 77 293, 2%-299; and Mme Duras, 287,
Cass, Lewis, 172 290-291, 294; becomes foreign minis-
Castelcicala, Fabrizio Ruffo, Prince of, ter, ISO, 305-306; and French Royalist
311 press, 302-303; and Gentz, 298n; and
Castiglione, Field Marshal Count de, Greece, 254; and La Ferronnays, 289;
326n recalls La Garde, 309; and Latin
Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount America, 142-143, 149, 158; and
(2nd Marquess of Londonderry): pas- Countess Lieven, 79, 297-298; and
sim; and Alexander, 10-11; and Marie Louise, 80; and Metternich, 81,
Austrian war debt, 22, 24, 218-220, 223, 216, 298, 311; and Montmorency, 110,
225; and Canning, 15-17, 69-72; com- 288, 290, 294, 295-2%, 298, 300, 306;
mits suicide, 13; and Circular of and Naples, 202; and Pozzo di Borgo,
January 19, 1821, 17; and Congress of 100,298,306,309; and Mme R6carnier,
Aix-Ia-Chapelle, 19, 21, 170-171; and 286-287; 290-291, 294, 299-300; and
Congress of Verona, 5, 19-23; and Sardinian refugees, 213; and the slave
Congress of Vienna, 166-167; and trade, 182-184; 185; and Secret Treaty
Eastern Question, 10, 16; and France, of Verona, 318-319; and Spain, 107,
34; and Greece, 20, 252; and the 109-110, 125, 300, 302, 309-311; and
Hanover conference, 9-13; and Italy, Villele, 72-73, 111, 288-290, 292, 294-
22, 56; and Latin America, 19, 138, 295, 300, 307-308, 309-310, 316; and
140-141, 142-143; and the Neapolitan Wellington, 117, 188, 280, 282
revolution, 19n, 278; opposes Russo- Chateaubriand, Rene-Auguste, Viscount
Turkish war, 20; policy of noninter- de (father of preceding), 182n
vention, 19-20, 23; and the Russian Chile, 140, 141n
Ukase, 22, 233; and the slave trade, 22, Christian Observer, 163
163-164, 173-174; State Paper of May Christina, Queen of Sardinia, 80, 297
5,1820,29,34,94-95,96,315 Circular of January 19, 1821 (British), 17,
Catalani, Madame Angelica, 78 96
Catherine the Great, 6 Circular of March 15, 1823 (Russian),
Cayla, Zoe Talon, Countess du, 26n, 291, 313
294 Circular of September 26,1822 (Russian),
Central Rhine Commission, 261-262 51-52, 245-246, 251, 256
Charles of Spain, Count, 86-87, 86n Clanwilliam, Richard, 3rd Earl of,S, 76
Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, 54- Clarkson, Thomas, 170n
58; and Congress of Verona, 191-195; Collier, Commodore George L., 173, 174
reconciliation with Charles Felix, 194- Colombia, 138n, 140, 144, 159
195; and Waldenses, 212 "Commission of Inquiry" (Italian), 205-
Charles Felix, Duke of Genevois, and 208
King of Sardinia, 54,76; and Austrian Concert of Europe, 319, 325
occupation, 1%, 197-198; and Charles Congregation, the, 25n, 306
352 INDEX
Congress System, the, 4, 17, 321, 326; 11-12, 48, 245-257, 273-274; and the
collapse of, 323-234; and Concert of Anglo-Russian rapprochement, 322-
Europe, 325 323; and Austrian memorandum of
Congress v. conference, 325 April 19, 1822,51; and Black Sea com-
Consalvi, Ercole Cardinal, 206 merce, 247-249, 251, 256; and the
Conservateur, 320n Congress of Verona, 245-256; and the
Constitution of 1812 (Spanish), 27, 118, Four Points, 7, 250; genesis of, 5-8; and
122; and Canning, 311, 316; and the Hanover conference, 9-13; and
Prussia, 122; and Russia, 28, 44, 120; the Miinchengratz conference, 325;
and Sardinia, 54, 56; and Villele, 270, and the Russian Circular of September
308 26, 1822, 51-52, 245-246, 251, 256; and
Constitutionnel, 304 Russo-Turkish dispute, 13, 15,244-245,
Conyngham, Elizabeth Denison, Mar- 251-252; and Tatischev mission, 48, 48n.
chioness, 13 See also Canning, Castlereagh, Danu-
Corbiere, Jacques Joseph, Count de, 25, bian Principalities, Greece, Metternich,
288, 305 Ottoman Empire, and Strangford
Cordon sanitaire, 29-30, 33 2cho jram,;ais, 317
Corsini, the Senior, Prince Neri,76, 193; Egypt,255
criticizes "Commission of Inquiry," Eldon, John, 1st Earl of, 159, 281n
206-207; defends Tuscany, 209-210 Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, 79, 290
Cortes (Spanish), 27-28, 31, 34, 38, 122, England. See Great Britain
265, 308, 311, 316 Eroles, Joaquin Ibanez, Baron de, 30
Cotta, Baron Johann Friedrich, 128 Esperey, Franchet d', 33
Courrier jram,;ais, 304, 317 Espoz y Mina, General Francisco, 27, 126
Cracow Affair (1846), 326n Esterhazy von Galantha, Prince Paul
Cromwell, Oliver, 211 Anton, 40, 279, 290, 317
Cruce, Emeric, 326 2toile, 303
Cuba, 155, 157, 157n, 269, 272; and Europe: balance of power in, 245, 273;
pirates, 156; and the slave trade, 172n, and the Greek revolt, 254, 256; liberal-
177 ism and nationalism in, 262, 321; post-
Curtin, Philip D., 165 war depression in, 186, 258-259, 321;
and the Verona Circular, 264-266
D Europe, Confederation of, 265
Dalberg, l!meric-Joseph, Duke of, 56 "European Pentarchy," 8, 81, 135, 326;
Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and attempts to revive, 325; and liberal
Wallachia), 7, 48-49, 51, 244, 246, 256 opinion, 319
Dashkoff, Andre, 49 F
Della Torre, General. See La Tour, Count Family Compact, the Bourbon, 43, 135
de Federal Act (June 8, 1815), the German,
Denmark, 163 65
Dessolle, Jean Joseph, Marquis de, 1'40 Ferdinand I, King of Naples, 58-59, 76,
Diplomatic Revolution of 1826, 322-323 311; wants Austrian guard, 200, 203;
Divine right, doctrine of, 311-312 death,203
Dom Pedro. See Pedro I Ferdinand III, Grand Duke of Tuscany,
Drapeau blanc, 302-303 55, 193
Druzhenin, A. Y., 236 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain: captivity
Diirkheim, 215 of, 31; duplicity of, 32; and Spanish
Duras, Claire de Kersaint, Duchess of, Colonial Question, 139, 156, 158, 322;
111,286,287,290-291,294 and Spanish Constitution of 1812, 27
Fernan-Nufiez, Carlos Jose Francisco
E Gutierrez de los Rios, Count of, 138
Eastern Question, the: and Alexander I, Ficquelmont, Count Karl Ludwig, 201,
60, 322; and Anglo-Austrian mediation, 216, 325
INDEX 353
Florence, Congress of, 3-4, 11 Gameiro, Manoel, 77, 151-154
Foreign Enlistment Act (1819), 36, 141 Gazette de France, 303,317
Forsyth, John, 28, 28n Genevois, Duke of. See Charles Felix
Foudre, 303 Gentz, Chevalier Friedrich von, 40: and
F ourcassie, Jean, 316 Brazil, 152; and Greek revolt, 254-255;
France: passim; and the Alliance, 170, impartiality of, 128; and Solomon
309, 321; Anglophobia in, 28, 36; Rothschild, 127-128; and Spanish
rivalry with Austria, 73-74, 196, 200, Question, 96, 121; and Verona Circular,
204; and Brazil, 74, 159, rivalry with 154-155, 264; and Wellington, 283
Britain, 74, 104, 143, 197, 272; influ- George IV, King of Great Britain and
ence of court coterie, 293, 299, and Hanover: and Canning, 14, 279; visits
Charles Albert Affair, 192; disunity Hanover, 9, 12; and Latin America,
within ministry, 91-92, 305, 307; dis- 159; and Spain, 313n-314n; and Verona
unity within Verona delegation, 107- Circular, 266
111, 114; insurrections in, 30; and Italy, Ghica, Prince Gregory, 48
73, 196, 200, 204; and Latin America, Gilly, Dr. William S., 212
74, 140, 143, 156-157, 158-159; and the Golovnin, Captain Vasilii M., 236
Liberal press, 304; and Naples, 202- Gomez, Valentin, 140n
203; nationalism in, 135, 307; navi- Gordon, Sir Robert, 40; and the Austrian
gation of the Rhine, 260-261; opposes war debt, 220-221, 224-227; and the
right of search, 170; fear of Russia, 74, Vienna conference, 45-46, 67
272-273; adheres to St. Petersburg Great Britain: passim; influence of abo-
Protocol (1826), 323; and the slave litionists in, 178,273; and the Alliance,
trade, 36, 168-169, 172-175, 184; and 12, 321, 323-324; Anglo-Dutch con-
Spain, 27-34, 35, 158, 271, 308-309; vention (May 4, 1818), 169-170; Anglo-
decline of state bonds, 129; and the Portuguese treaty (Jan. 22, 1815), 167;
ultra-Royalist press, 302-303. See also Anglo-Portuguese treaty (July 28,
Chateaubriand, Montmorency, and 1817), 169; Anglo-Spanish treaty (July
Villele 5, 1814), 164-165; and Austrian inter-
Francis I, Emperor of Austria: and vention in Naples, 106; Austrophobia
Austrian war debt, 225; attends Con- in, 221, 228; and Black Sea commerce,
gress, 65, 75; and Miinchengriitz con- 53, 247-249, 251, 256; and Brazil, 159,
ference, 325; pacifism of, 127; and 189-190; and the Eastern Question, lO-
Spain, 88 ll, 20, 48,244-245, 273-274; European
Francis I, King of Naples, 203 market of, 258; rivalry with France, 74,
Francis IV, Duke of Modena, 55, 76; 104, 143, 197,271-272; and Greece, 20,
and Charles Albert, 191, 193; reaction- 70, 252-253, 257, 322; and policy of
ary rule of, 210; and Spina, 207 isolationism, 15-16, 274, 277, 279, 315,
Frederick William, Crown Prince of 322, 324; and Latin America, 19, 21,
Prussia, 325 70, 137-138, 141-142, 147-149, 150-153,
Frederick William III, King of Prussia, 157, 322; manufacturing in, 141; mo-
76 tives, distrust of, 135-136; and Italy,
Freyre, General Manuel, 27 22, 201, 204; and Northwestern Ques-
Frimont, General Count Johann Marie, tion, 237, 238-239, 240-244; and Otto-
204 man Empire, 20, 70, 253, 323; and
G reciprocity system (commercial), 142;
Gabriac, Joseph Alphonse, Marquis of, and self-interest, 273; and the slave
28n; quoted on Chateaubriand, 296- trade, 161, 164-165, 167-170, 188, 273;
297 and Spain, 19-20, 34,71,94-95,96, 104,
Gabriac, Joseph Paul, Marquis of, 136, 138, 157, 311-313; Verona di-
quoted, 32 plomacy of, 273, 314. See also Canning,
Gallatin, Albert, 184n-185n Castlereagh, George IV, Strangford,
Gallinas River, 174, 179 and Wellington
354 INDEX
Greece: passim; and Anglo-Russian co- Humboldt, Baron Friedrich Alexander

operation, 322; and Canning, 70, 253, von,40
257; and Castlereagh, 20, 252; and Con- Huskisson, William, 177. 177n
gress of Verona, 252-256; proclaims Hyde de Neuville, Jean Guillaume,
independence, 253; and Metternich, Baron, 286-287, 292
254-255, 257, 323-325; and Ottoman
Empire, 6-7, 48, 51, 253; and philliel- I
lenic societies, 254, 256; and Russian Ionian Islands, 245
policy, 6-7, 48, 250; and St. Petersburg lphigenia, 174
Protocol (1826), 323; Senate of Argos, Italian affairs. See specific issues
253; and Verona Circular, 265; War Italian League, the: Metternich's plan for
for Independence, 6-7, 48, 253, 322- an, 205-211
323. See also, Eastern Question, Otto- Italy: passim; British policy toward, 273;
man Empire, Russia, and Strangford Habsburg hegemony in, 217; and the
Greek Question, the. See Greece Verona Circular, 264-265. See also
Green, John Eric Sidney, 103n; and Tern- various Italian states and Metternich
perley, 97; and Wellington, 278-279 ltineraire iz Jerusalem, 290
Gregory, Patriarch, 6, 244
"Grito do Ypiranga," 152n
Guriev. Count D., 230n J
Janizaries, 8, 244
John VI, King of Portugal, 153; and
Brazil, 154, 189-190; and the slave
H
trade, 167, 169-170
Habsburg Monarchy. See Austria
Jouffroy, Count Achille Franc;:ois de, 303;
Haiti. See Santo Domingo
quoted on Castlereagh's death, 181;
Hamid Bey, 49n
and Knights of Malta, 215
Hamilton. Lord Archibald, quoted, 264
Jourdain, Francis: Verona mission, 253-
Hamilton. William R., 68
Hanover, 258, 266 255
Hanover Conference (1821). 8-13; and Journal des Debats, 303
Austrian war debt, 219-220 July Revolution, 159
Hansa cities. 258
Hardenberg. Prince Karl Augustus, 76 K
Harrowby. Dudley Ryder. lst Earl of, Kaufmann, William W.: quoted, 16
281n, 313n-314n Knapton, E. J.: cited, 66n
Hatzfeldt, Prince Franz Ludwig von, 40; Knights of the Annunziata, 195
and Eastern Question, 246, 250; and the Knights of the Faith (Chevaliers de la
slave trade, 181, 185; and the Spanish Foi),25n
Colonial Question, 150 Knights of Malta, 215
Havana: and the slave trade. 169, 172, Kreuznach, 215
173 Krlidener, Baroness Julie von, 66n
Hervey, Lionel C., 68-69 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of (1774), 6
Hesse. Grand Duchy of, 215, 216n
Hesse-Darmstadt, Landgraviate of, 216n L
Hill, William. 56,212 Lackland, Miss H. M.: defends Welling-
Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schillingsftirst, ton, 280-282, 284
Alexander Leopold Franz. Prince of, La Ferronnays, Pierre-Louis Ferron,
66 Count de, 40, 266; astuteness of, 98-99,
Holland. See Netherlands, the 100; and Boislecomte, 279, 282; and
"Holy Alliance," 66, 318; Lamennais Italian affairs, 202, 207-208; a national-
quoted on, 303; revival of, 325-326 ist, 11'4; and Sardinian refugees, 214;
Holy See. See Papacy and the Spanish Question, 91-92, 98,
Hudson's Bay Company. 238, 240-241 107
INDEX 355
La Garde, Augustin Pelletier, Count de: 313; and the Straits, 247; and Welling-
goes to Madrid (1821), 30; and Villele's ton, 23
policy, 307-308; recalled, 309 Liverpool Ship Owners Association, 21n
Laibach Circular of May 12, 1821 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Andrei A., 234, 287
(Austrian), 208 Lomenie, E. Beau de, 287
Laibach, Conference of (1821). See Trop- London, Treaty of (July 6,1827), 323n
pau-Laibach, Conference of Londonderry, Frances Anne, Marchion-
Laibach Protocol (Feb. 20,1821),202 ess of (Lady Stewart), 79
Laibach resolution (Feb. 25, 1821), 3, 41 Louis X, Grand Duke of Hesse, 215,
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 277 216n
Lamb, Sir Frederick James, 76 Louis XVIII, King of France: and
Lamennais, Felicite Robert de, 302-303 Chateaubriand, 288, 305; and minis-
La Plata. See Argentina terial crisis (Dec. 1822), 305-306; and
La Rochefoucauld, Louis Fran~ois Sos- Montmorency, 25, 25n, 26n, 305; and
thene, Viscount de, 25n, 26n, 291, 293 the slave trade, 167-168; and Spain, 32,
Latin America. See Spanish Colonial 39, 270; speech from throne (Jan. 28,
Question 1823), 311-312; and Villele, 26, 305
La Tour, General Count Victor Amadeus Louis Philippe, King of the French, 159
de, 55, 76; and Charles Albert, 193; Uitzow, Count Rudolph, 7
protests Metternich's Italian schemes,
206-207; and evacuation of Piedmont, M
195, 198-199; and Sardinian emigres, Macaulay, General Kenneth, 178
212-214; and Waldenses, 211-212 Macaulay, Zachary, 163
La Tour du Pin, Frederic Seraphin, Mar- Macdonald, James, 314
quis de, 28-29, charge at Turin, 56 Mackenzie River, 238, 243
La Tour-Maubourg, Florimond de Fay, Mahmud II, Sultan of the Ottoman
Marquis de, 36 Empire, 6, 48, 257
Laval, Adrien de Montmorency, Duke Mainz, Act of (March 31, 1831), 261-262
of, 28, 30,289,290 Maltzahn, Baron von, 305
Lebzeltem, Baron Ludwig von, 9, 40; and Mann, Golo, 70
Eastern Question, 246n; drafts Italian Mannheim, Act of (1868), 262
circular, 208, 209 Mansi, minister of Lucca, 207
Legations, the Papal, 209 Marai'l.on, Antonio (The Trappist), 30
Legitimacy, 311; and Brazil, 151; and Marcellus, Andre Charles Demartin du
Charles Albert Mfari, 192; doctrine of, Tyrac, Count de, 69, 280; and Canning,
55; and Latin America, 147, 149; re- 312-313; and Chateaubriand's Verona
strains Paris cabinet, 160 mission, 287, 292-293; and the Secret
Leopoldina, Empress of Brazil: Austrian Treaty of Verona, 317-318
archduchess, 152 Marches, the, 209
Levaillant, Maurice, 287 Marie Louise, Archduchess of Parma, 76;
adultery of, 80; marriage to N eipperg,
Liberal press (French): influence of, 307 80
Lieven, Count Christophe de, 9, 317; and Maria Theresa, Princess of Carignan, 194
Greece, 323; and the Hanover confer- Martainville, Alphonse Dieudonne, 302
ence, 9, 11; and the Russian Ukase, Martens, Fedor F., 278
232,239; goes to Verona, 65 Martin, Henri, 277
Lieven, Countess Dorothea: and Anglo- Martinez de la Rosa, Francisco, 30-31
Russian rapprochement, 322; and Mataflorida, Marquis of, 30
Chateaubriand, 79, 297-298; and Met- Maurois, Andre, 287
ternich, 9, 79, 79n; and Wellington, 280 Maximilian I (Max Joseph), King of
Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Bavaria, 215, 264n, 267
Earl of: and Canning, 14, 159, 281n; Mazour, Anatole G., 234
and the slave trade, 163; and Spain, Medici, Luigi de, 203-204
356 INDEX
Memoires d'outre-tombe, 286 Miranda, General Francisco, 137, 138n

Mends, Commodore Sir Robert, 174 Miroir, 304
Menshikov, Prince Alexander S., 66 Mocenigo, Count Georges de, 56
Mercy, Andreas, Count von, 201 Modena, Duchy of, 55, 210
Metaxas, Count Andrew: mission to Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 255
Verona, 253-255 Mohammed Sadik, 7, 48
Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens Lothar Moldavia. See Danubian Principalities
Wenzel, Prince von: passim; and Mole, Count Louis Mathieu, 159
Alexander I, 11-12, 44-45, 257, 267, Molza, Marquis Filippo de, 76, 210
274; and the Alliance, 100, 325; and Monarchie selon la charte, De la, 307
the Austrian war debt, 220-229; and Moniteur universel, 303, 308
Brazil, 152-154; and Canning, 17, 257, Monroe, President James, 241-242
274; and Castlereagh, 4-5, 13; and Monroe Doctrine, 232-233, 241-242, 244
Charles Albert, 55-58, 191-192, 194- Monsieur. See Artois, Count of
195; and Chateaubriand, 81, 127, 216, Montcalm, Marquise Arrnande de:
298-299, 306, 311; and Congress of quoted on Chateaubriand, 286
Verona, genesis of, 4; congresses, atti-
Montmorency, Mathieu Jean, Viscount
tude toward, after 1822, 320; and
de: passim; and the Alliance, 107, 303;
constitutional government, 214; du-
and Chateaubriand, 110, 288, 289-294,
plicity of, 44-45, 52, 112; and the
295-296, 298, 300, 306; and colleagues,
Eastern Question,S, 10, 11-12, 48, 51,
25-26, 108, 114; and the Congress of
245-257, 273-274, 325; and France, 45,
Verona, 66, 107-108, 119, created duke,
92, 117, 200, 310-311; Greece, policy
268n; becomes French foreign minister,
toward, 254-255, 257; and Hanover
25; violates his instructions, 87, 89; and
conference, 9-13; and Italian schemes,
Latin America, 140, 143, 145-146, 147;
205-208, 210; and Latin America, 148,
and Metternich, 43; resigns from
155; and the Liberal press, 214; and
ministry, 305; Royalist press (French).
Max Joseph, 65,267; and the Metaxas
303; and the slave trade, 177-178; and
mission, 254-255; moderation of, 12-13,
the Spanish Question, 25, 31-32, 42-43,
43-45, 93, 98, 216-217; Miinchengriitz
85-87, 93-94, 94-96, 98, 107, 113, 268,
conference, 325; and Naples, occu-
271, 305; and the Urgel Regency, 33;
pation of, 201, 203-204; and Papacy,
and the Vienna conference, 25, 40, 42-
208-209; and St. Petersburg Protocol
43; and Villele, 25-26, 72, 74, 108, 111,
(1826), 323; and Sardinia-Piedmont,
126, 133,268, 302, 305; and Wellington,
evacuation of, 195-198; and Sardinian
102-103, 106, 271, 283
refugees, 213; and the Secret Treaty
of Verona; 318-319; and the slave Morning Chronicle (London), 317, 319n
trade, 181, 185; and the Spanish Ques- Miinchengratz, Conference of (1833), 325
tion, 29, 43, 44-46, 82, 84-85, 93, 101, Munich Gazette, 264n, 267
121, 127; and Strangford, 50, 52; and Muraviev, General Nicholas N., 237n
Switzerland, 212-214; and Tatischev, Mylnikov Company, 230
48, 48n, 52; Verona diplomacy, 273;
and Wellington, 23, 96-97, 283 N
Mexico, 140,146,156,159 Naples: passim; British policy toward,
Meyendorff, Baron Peter, 81 201-202; evacuation of, 54, 58-59, 200-
Michaud, Joseph Fran~ois, 302 204; hires foreign mercenaries, 202-
Middleton, Henry, 233, 243 203; poverty of, 200; revolt in, 3, 56.
Milan, Convention of (May 28, 1825), See also Ferdinand I, Medici, Metter-
203,204 nich, and Ruffo
Minciaky, Russian consul general for Naples, Convention of (Oct. 18, 1821),
Principalities, 51, 257 201
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (French), Napoleon I: abdication of, 163; death, 80;
306n and the Hundred Days, 167; and the
INDEX 357
Knights of Malta, 215; and the Penin- Oscar, Crown Prince of Sweden, 77
sular War, 138 Osmond, Rene-Eustache, Marquis d',
National, 317-318 168n
National Assembly (French): votes mili- Ottenfels, Baron Franz von, 251n
tary credits, 312; and the slave trade, Ottomon Empire, the: passim; and
36, 168 Austria, 51, 257-258; and Christian
Nationalism: in France, 307; in Italy, 217 minority in, 244; decline of, 258; and
Navigation laws (American), 21n-22n Great Britain, 11-12, 20, 48, 70, 247,
Navigation laws (British), 142; and Latin 253,257,273-274, 322-323; and Greece,
America, 21, 22n 5-7, 48, 51, 253, 257, 322-323; and
Navigation laws (Spanish), lIOn, 138 Miinchengratz conference (1833), 325;
Neipperg, Count Adam Adelbert von, partition of, 234; and Russia, 8, 13, 15,
76; marries Marie Louise of Parma, 48-49, 51-52, 105, 234-235, 244-246,
80; reform program of, 210 251-252, 256, 325; and the Straits, 6,
Nesselrode, Karl Robert, Count von: 48, 52-53, 247-249, 251, 256. See also
passim; and the Congress of Verona, Alexander I, the Danubian Principal-
genesis of, 4; and the Eastern Question, ities, the Eastern Question, and Strang-
51-53, 245-246, 247-249, 251, 256; and ford
Greece, 323; and the Miinchengratz Ouvrard, Gabriel Julien, 77, 127, 130;
conference (1833), 325; and Pozzo di attends the Congress of Verona, 131;
Borgo, 46; and the Russian Ukase, 238- supplies French army (1823), 132; mis-
239; and the slave trade, 180-181, 185; leads Wellington, 132
and the Spanish Question, 100, 104, 113,
120-121; and the Vienna conference P
(1822), 40, 46; and Wellington, 106 Pailhes, Gabriel, 287
Netherlands, the: and British trade, 258; Palazzo cappellari, 77
and the navigation of the Rhine, 259- Palermo, 202
262; and the slave trade, 164, 169-170, Palmella, Marquis Pedro de, 167
175 Papacy, the: opposes Austrian policy,
Nettement, Alfred F., 283 206-208, 209-211; and the Secret Treaty
Neumann, Baron Philipp von, 69, 228, of Verona, 317. See also Pius VII and
283 Spina
New Archangel. See Sitka Paris Ambassadors' Conference, the: and
Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 322; and the French separatism, 309; and Latin
Alliance, 323; and the Miinchengratz America, 139; and the Spanish Ques-
conference (1833), 325 tion, 302, 305
Nicolay, Baron Paul A., 69 Paris, First Treaty of (May 30, 1814), 163
Niebuhr, Barthold G., 266 Paris, Second Treaty of (Nov. 20, 1815),
Nootka Sound Incident (1790), 137, 240· 168, 324
241 Parkinson, John, 174
Northwest Company, 240 Parliament (British): and the Austrian
Nouveau Cynee, 326 war debt, 219, 227; composition, 141;
Novara, Convention of (July 24, 1821), and the Eastern Question, 244
195-196 Pasquier, Etienne-Denis, Baron (later
Duke): and Chateaubriand, 306; and
o the Piedmontese revolt, 56; and the
Odessa: center of Russian wheat trade, Russian alliance, 111; Spanish policy,
6,49,257 28-29; and war with Spain (1823), 310
O'Donnell, Henry. See Abisbal, Count of Paul I, Tsar of Russia, 230-231
Okun, Semen B., 234 Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, 151, 151n-
Onis, Don Luis de, 143 152n, 154; marries Archduchess Leo-
Opposition (British): and the Austrian poldina, 152; and the slave trade, 189-
war debt, 219, 220-221, 228 190
358 INDEX
Pellico, Silvio, 216 Proces-verbal of November 17, 1822,

Pelly, Sir J. H., 238n 114-115; and Vill~le, 125, 268, 271-272
Perceval, Spencer, 162 Prussia: passim; Treaty of Berlin (1833),
Perez de Castro, Evaristo, 28 325; and Charles Albert Affair, 56, 57,
Perkins, Dexter, 232, 233n; quoted on the 193; and Eastern Question, 9, 52, 250,
Holy Alliance, 151n 323, 325; and France, 123; and the
Petitpierre, George F., 56, 193 Mtlnchengrlitz conference (1833), 325;
Petrarch, Francesco, 217; quoted on and navigation of the Rhine, 260-261;
Germans, 191 and the St. Petersburg Protocol (1826),
Petrie, Sir Charles, 284 323; and the Sardinian refugees, 213-
Phillips, W. A., 284 214; and the Spanish Question, 89, 122-
Piedmont. See Sardinia-Piedmont 123; and the Zollverein. 259. See also
Pinheiro, Marquis Silvester de, 175 Bernstorff and Hatzfeldt
Pilorge, Hyacinthe, 287, 291, 292, 295 Public opinion (American): enmity to-
Pini, Russian consul general at Bucha- ward England, 241-242; and the Con-
rest, 51 gress of Verona, 319
Piracy (West Indian), 144-145, 148, 156- Public opinion (British): and the Austrian
157; and Cuba, 269; and the slave war debt, 218, 228; fickleness of, 273;
trade, 170, 185 and foreign policy, 16-17; Franco-
Pisani, Russian consul general at Jassy, phobia, 313; opposes Franco-Spanish
51 war, 314; and Greek independence,
Pitt, William, the Younger, 15, 22n; and 252; and Latin America, 140, 142;
Latin America, 137-138; and the slave political power of, 228-229; and the
trade, 182 Quintuple Alliance, 220-221
Pius vn, Pope, 191; and the Metaxas Public opinion (French): and Britain's
mission, 254-255 Spanish policy, 271; and Chateau-
Planta, JOIepb, 255 briand's ascendancy, 306; and the slave
Poland, 326n trade, 36, 166, 176, 183; and war with
Poletica, Count Pierre de, 2300 Spain, 126, 304, 310
Polignac, Prince Jules de, 150 Puerto Rico, 148n, 157, 157n, 272
Polignac Memorandum (Oct. 9, 1823),
158 Q
Quarterly Review: and the Oregon
Politique de la Restauration en 1822 el boundary question, 241; quoted on the
1823, 317-318
slave trade, 172, 174
Pope, Alexander, 277 Quasi-Quintuple Alliance, the, 14-15
POPham. Captain Sir Home, 138 Quesada, General Vicente Jenaro de, 30
Porte, the. See Ottoman Empire Quintuple Alliance, the, 8, 262, Britain
Portugal: and Canning, 313; Great excluded from, 106; Canning quoted
Britain, treaties with, 118, 162, 167, on, 315; and the Congress of Verona,
169; Revolution of 1820 in, 118, 152n, 320-321; disunity of, 61-62, 315; fall
184n; and the slave trade, 166-167. of, 159, 321-324; admission of France,
178-179; unrepresented at Verona, 183 170; and the French press, 302-304;
Pozzo di Bargo, Count Charles Andre: and the Greek Question, 257; and the
passim; and Chateaubriand, 287, 297- Sardinian refugees, 213. See also Con-
298; and the French ministry, 46; and cert of Europe, Congress System, and
Latin America, 139; and the Spanish European Pentarchy
Question, 29, 98, 100-101, 307; at the Quiroga, Colonel Antonio, 27
Vienna conference (1822), 40, 46; un- Quotidienne. 302
popularity at Verona, 81; and the
Verona Circular, 305; and Vill~le, 46, R
307,309 Rainer, Archduke of Austria and Viceroy
Pralormo, Count de, 194, 195 of Lombardy-Venetia, 77
INDEX 359
Rauzan, Henri Louis, Duke of, 295 Royalist press (French), influence of, 307
Rayneval, Count Fran~ois-Gerard de, Ruffo, Prince Alvaro, 58-59, 76; and
140n foreign mercenaries, 202-203; and
Recamier, Jeanne Fran~oise Juliette, 73; government of Naples, 202; and occu-
and Chateaubriand, 286-287, 290-291, pation of Naples, 200-201
294, 299-300 Russell, Lord John, 221
Reid-Irving, House of, 227 Russia: passim; Anglo-Russian Con-
Rezanov, Nikolai, 230 vention of 1825, 243; army, size of
Rhine River, navigation of, 258-262 (1823), 234n; breaks with Austria on
Ribeaupierre, Russian ambassador to Eastern Question, 257, 322; Black Sea
Turkey, 257 commerce, 247-248; boyars, income of,
Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Duke of: 236; and Brazil, 159n; and Charles
fall of his second ministry, 25; con- Albert Affair, 57; Constitution of 1812
ceives Franco-Russian alliance, 111; (Spanish),28, 120; and freedom of the
and the La Tour du Pin mission, 28-29; seas, principle of, 236; policy toward
and the right of search, 170; and the Greece, 3,6-8,49, 51,250, 322-323; use
slave trade, 168, 179; Spanish colonies, and protection of Greek ships, 247-248,
139-140; Spanish policy of, 28-30 257; Latin American policy, 148-149,
Rieben, Hans, 12 160; and the MUnchengriitz conference
Riego y Nunez, Colonel Rafael del, 27 (1833), 325; and the Northwestern
Right of search (visit), the: and Anglo- Question, 234-235, 240-244; opposes
American relations, 172n; Chateau- right of search, 170-171; and the Roth-
briand denounces 184, 188; and the schild loan, 128, 319; Russo-American
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 170; and Convention of 1824, 243; Russo-Ameri-
France, 168, 170-171, 177, 179; and the can friendship, 236; Russo-Turkish dis-
Netherlands, 169-170; and Portugal, pute, 8, 13, 15, 48, 51, 105, 234-235,
169; and Russo-American policy to- 244-245, 251-252, 322-323; the St.
ward, 170-171; and Spain, 169 Petersburg Protocol (1826), 323; and
Risorgimento, the, 217 Sardinia, 56, 213. See also Alexander
River Bonny, 172-173, 174 I, the Eastern Question, Nesselrode,
Robinson, Frederick J. (later Viscount and the Spanish Question
Goderich and 1st Earl of Ripon): and Russian America. See Alaska
the Austrian war debt, 227; and navi- Russian-American Company, 230-231,
gation of the Straits, 247; and the 235,236,238,242,243
Spanish Colonial Question, 144
Rossini, Gioacchino, 77, 296; and James S
Rothschild, 13On; provides music for Sainte-Beuve, Charles A.: quoted on
the Congress, 78-79 Chateaubriand, 288-289
Rothschild, Amschel, 130 St. Petersburg Protocol of April 4, 1826,
Rothschild, Carl, 77; and Naples, 204; at 323
Verona, 130 Saint-Roman, Count of, 303n
Rothschild, James, 77, 129; receives San Carlos, Don Jose Miguel de Carvajal,
Order of St. Vladimir, 128; and Ros- Duke of, 164
sini, l30n; underwrites French invasion San Lorenzo, Evaristo Justino-Fernan-
of Spain, 130 dez, Duke of, 155, 309
Rothschild, Solomon, 77; finances Aus- San Miguel, Colonel Evaristo de, 31, 34,
trian invasion of Naples, 127; and the 309
Austrian war debt, 226-227, 228; and Santarosa, Santorre di, 54
courier service of, 129; and Gentz, 128; Santo Domingo (Saint Domingue), 146,
and Metternich, 130, 226, 228, receives 164
Order of St. Vladimir, 128; and Rus- Sardinia-Piedmont: passim; and Austria,
sian loan, 128, 319 194-195, 206-207; emigres in Switzer-
Rotterdam, 258 land, 212-214; evacuation of, 54-58,
360 INDEX
195-200; Revolution of 1821, 54-56; Slave Trade Resolution (Nov. 28, 1822),
and the Straits, 247, 249; and Walden- the Verona, 185
ses, 211-212. See also Charles Albert, Somerset, Lord Fitzroy James Henry
Charles Felix, La Tour, and Metter- (later Baron Raglan), 278; Madrid
nich mission, 312n, 313
Sannento, De Moraes, 118 Spain: passim; Anglo-Spanish convention
Savoy, House of, 54-55, 58 of September 23, 1817, 169; Anglo-
Savoy-Carignan, House of, 192 Spanish treaty of December 10, 1822,
Schepeler, Bartholomaus, Prussian char- 175; and Britain, 147, 157, 309; colonial
ge at Madrid, 122; recalled, 309 commercial monopoly, 156; and
Schroeder, Paul W.: quoted on Austrian France, 27-34, 158; plan for invading,
demography, 205; quoted on Metter- 88, 278; Radicals, ascendancy of, 31;
nich and constitutions, 66; cited on Revolution of 1820, 27, 30, 120-121,
opposition to Metternich's Italian 308; and the slave trade, 164-165, 175,
schemes, 211; interpretation of Villele's See also Ferdinand VII, the Spanish
Spanish policy, 74n Colonial Question, the Spanish Ques-
Senate of Argos, 253, 255 tion, and the Urgel Regency
Serre, Pierre Francois Hercule, Count de, Spanish Colonial Question, the: passim;
37 and the fall of the Alliance, 321-322;
Seton-Watson, Robert W., 284 and Canning, 70,137,143-144,144-145,
Seward, William H., 172n 154, 157-158, 159; and Castlereagh, 19,
Shelikov, Grigory I., 231n 138, 140-141, 142-143; and Chateau-
briand, 142-143, 149, 158; and the
Shelikov-Golikov Company, 230 Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle (1818),
Sicily: Austrian evacuation of, 201-202; 139-140; and the Congress of Verona
and Bentinck, 202 (1822), 147-151, 154-155, 160; and the
Sierra Leone, 173n eastern courts, 148-149, 159, 160; and
Sitka (New Archangel), 231, 237n, 243 Ferdinand VII, 139, 156, 158, 322; and
Slave Trade Question, the: passim; influ- legitimacy, 144; and Louis Philippe,
ence of British abolitionists, 164, 178, 159; and Metternich, 5, 155, 158, 159;
186, 273; and Alexander I, 163, 177, and Montmorency, 145-147; origins of.
180-181; and Brazil, 177, 178-179, 189n, 137-144; and piracy, 145, 148, 159, and
1900; and Canning, 70-71, 176, 189- Richelieu, 139-140; and the Verofta
190; Castlereagh, 22, 163-164, 173-174; Circular, 154-155; and Villele, 74, 145-
and the Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle 146, 155-156, 158, 160; and Wellington,
(1818), 170-171; and the Congress of 144-145, 147-148, 154
Vienna (1814-1815), 166-167, 185; and Spanish Question, the: passim; Alexander
the Congress of Verona (1822), 176- I demands casus foederis. 99; British
188; and Denmark, 163; and France, policy toward, 19-20, 69, 71, 90, 101,
~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~ 269, 271-272; and the Congress of
188, 19On; and Havana, 169, 172, 173; Verona, 88-89, 119, 320; forces which
and the Netherlands, 164, 169-170, 175; influenced, 133; and French policy to-
origins of, 161-165; and piracy, 170, ward, 31-34, 73, 74; and French press,
171n, 178, 179-180, 181, 183, 185; and 302-304; and Montmorency, 25, 31-32,
Portugal, 166-167, 175, 178-179; and 42-43,85-87,93-94,94-96, 98, 107, 113,
the right of search, 168-169, 170-172, 268, 271, 305; and the Proces-verbal
177, 179, 184, 188; and Spain, 164-165, of November 17, 1822, 114-116; a
175; and Sweden, 163; and the United retrospect, 133-136; and first Villele-
Nations, 19On; and the United States, Wellington interview, 3'4-36; and
161-162,165,171-172, 172n, 173n, 174n, second Villele-Wellington interview
175, 187; and Wellington's Six Points, 268-272. See also various powers of
179-180, 184; and Wilberforce, 161, Europe, their rulers, and ministers
162, 163, 178, 186, 189 Spielberg, the, 216
INDEX 361
Spina, Giuseppe Cardinal, 77; and Tarragona, Archbishop of, 30
Alexander I, 207; and Austria, 208-209; Tatischev, Count Dmitri, 38, 40; and the
and Francis IV of Modena, 207; and Eastern Question, 50,246; and Spanish
Metternich's Commission of Inquiry, America, 139; and the Spanish Ques-
206,211 tion,46
Spinoza, Benedict: quoted, 301 Tatum, Edward H., Jr., 241-242; cited on
Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von, 12 the Monroe Doctrine, 242, 244
Stadion, Johann Philipp, Count von, 58n, Tegemsee conference (October, 1822), 65
196; and the Austrian war debt, 220- Temperley, Harold W. V.: cited on Can-
221, 223-224, 226, 227; and the occu- ning's foreign policy, 315; evaluation
pation of Naples, 201 of Chateaubriand, 299, 316; interpre-
Stapleton, Augustus G.: quoted, 60; and tation of the Monroe Doctrine, 232-
Alexander's pacifism, 235 233; quoted on the reconquest of
State Paper of May 5, 1820 (British), 29, Spanish America, 151n; interpretation
34,94-95, 96, 315 of Wellington's note of October 30,
Stein, Baron Heinrich vom: cited on 1822, 96-97, 135; defends Wellington,
Metternich, 81 280-281
Stewart, Lord Charles (3rd Marquess of Thugut, Baron Franz de Paula, 218
Londonderry), 6, 42; and the evacu- Toplitz, Conference of (1835), 326
ation of Piedmont, 199-200; and the Tolstoy, Countess: and Chateaubriand,
Sardinian refugees, 213; and the 79,287,296
Spanish Question, 106, 112; retires from Trenchard, Captain Edward, 175
the Vienna embassy, 67, 267n Trevelyan, George M.: evaluation of
Stock Exchange (London), 228 Castlereagh and Canning, quoted, 18;
Stourdza, Prince J onitza, 48 cited on British sympathy for the
Straits, the: closure of, 49; navigation of, Greeks, 252-253
6, 48, 52-53, 247-249, 251, 256 Trocadero, the, 194
Strangford, Percy Smythe, Viscount, 7, Troppau-Laibach, Conference of (1820-
40, 67; and conference of August 27, 1821), 3-4,42, 45, 62, 95, 105-106, 221,
1822, with Reis-Effendi, 49-50; and 325; and disunity of the Alliance, 14-
Metternich, 49-50, 52-53; reprimanded, 15, 17, 324; and Metternich's Italian
251; and Russo-Turkish dispute, 52; league idea, 205
and the Straits, 247-248, 251; and Troppau Protocol (Nov. 19, 1820), the,
Stroganov, 7, 52; tactlessness of, 50, 12, 60; Britain challenges, 17, 324;
52-53; Turkophile bias of, 50; Welling- reassertion of, 326
ton, 53,248,251 "Truman Doctrine," the, 258
Stroganov, Baron Gregory A.: severs Tschaousch-Bachi, Gianib, 49
relations with the Porte, 6-7, 244; and Turin, 54, 55
Strangford, 7,52 Turkey. See Ottoman Empire
Stuart, Sir Charles: mission to Brazil, Turko-Persian War (1821-1823), 49n
153-154; protests La Tour du Pin's Tuscany, Grand Duchy of, 55; opposes
mission, 28; cited on Parisian public Austrian policies in Italy, 204. See also
opinion, 304; and Villele, 26, 37-38, Corsini and Ferdinand III
155-156 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the. See Naples
Sweden: abolishes the slave trade, 163
Sweet, Paul R.: quoted, 44 U
Swiss Confederation. See Switzerland Ukase of July 8,1799,231
Switzerland: gives asylum to Sardinian Ukase of September 16, 1821, 229-231;
emigres, 212-214 and Anglo-American relations, 240-
Sylph, La, 173 244; and Anglo-Russian relations, 243-
T 244; and the Congress of Verona, 238-
Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince of Beneven- 239; withdrawal of, 233, 237-238, 240
to, Charles Maurice de, 166 Ukase of September 25, 1821, 232
362 INDEX
United American Company, 230 Victor Emmanual II, 193

United Nations, 326 Vida, Marco Girolamo: quoted, 3
United Nations Human Rights Commis- Vienna, Conference of (1822), 4-5, 11;
sion,190n and Austrian war debt, 221; convenes,
United States, the: passim; Anglo-Ameri- 40-42; and the Eastern Question, 48-
can relations, 241-242; and the British 53; and Italian questions, 54-59; a
reciprocity system, 21n-22n; and the retrospect, 59-62; and the Spanish
China trade, 231; and Latin America, Question, 42-48
139-140, 147; and the Monroe Doc- Vienna, Congress of (1814-1815): the
trine, 232, 241-242, 244; and the North- German Federal Act, 65; and House of
western Question, 240-244; opposes Savoy-Carignan, 192; the Legations
right of search, 170-171, 172n; abolish- and the Marches, 209n; and the slave
es the slave trade, 161; declares slave trade, 166-167
trading piracy, 171n; and the War of Vienna Protocol of February 8, 1815:
1812, 162 denounces the slave trade, 167, 185
Urgel Regency, the, 30,45; appeals to the Vienna, Treaty of (Jan. 22, 1815), 118n,
Congress of Verona, 86; fall of, 126; 167
and Ouvrard, 131 Vienna, Treaty (Final Act) of (June 9,
1815): and the Aldobrandini affair,
V 215; and Malta, 215; and navigation of
Vaudois. See Waldenses the Rhine, 260-261
Velikiye Luki, Treaty of (1812), 28 Villele, Jean Baptiste Joseph, Count de:
Venice, 266-267 passim; fears Alexander I's ambition,
Verona Circular (Dec. 14, 1822), the, 154- 27; dislikes Alliance, 27; Anglophobia
155, 264-266 of, 156, 269; and Brazil, 146; and
Verona, Congress of (1822): passim; British expedition to Cuba, 156; Can-
agenda, 62, 82; arrival of delegations, ning's appraisal of, 37; supports
75-76; and the Austrian war debt, 222- Charles Albert, 73; and Chateaubriand,
226; and Brazil, 151-154; and British 72-73, 74, 108, 111, 288-292, 293-294,
foreign policy, 278-279; British re- 300, 307-308, 309-310, 316; reinforces
action to, 314-315; and the Charles Al- cordon sanitaire, 33; and the Eastern
bert Affair, 191-195; exodus, 266-267; Question, 36-37; supports evacuation
and French reaction to, 302-305; and of Piedmont, 196; and the French
disunity among great powers, 81, 96- press, 302-304; instructions for the
99, 103, 135; and liberal opinion, 319; Congress, 72-74; Italian policy, 38; the
and liberalism and nationalism, 262; La Garde dispatch, 308; Latin Ameri-
main currents at, 272; Montmorency's can policY, 74, 136, 143, 145-146, 155-
appraisal of, 314; origins of, 3-5; public 156, 158, 160; and Mexico, 146; and
reaction to, 266; and the Quintuple Montmorency, 25-26, 72, 74, 108, 111,
Alliance, 320-321; a retrospect, 272- 126, 133, 268, 302-303, 305, 306-307;
274; and the slave trade, 176-188; and and Ouvrard, 131; political views, 26-
the Spanish dispatches, 105, 120-123, 27; becomes premier, 25-26; and
135; Spanish reaction to, 315; and the Proces-verbal of November 17, 1822,
Turko-Greek question, 252-256; and 125, 268, 271-272; and James Roth-
the Ukase of September 16, 1821,238- schild, 130; and the slave trade, 36;
239; and the Waldenses, 211-212. See Spanish policy, 31-32, 35-36, 37, 39,73-
also various questions and personali- 74, 74n, 125-126, 133, 136, 155, 307-
ties 308,310; denounces Tatischev, 38; and
Verona, Secret Treaty of: a forgery, 317- the Urgel Regency, 73, 131; badly
319 served at Verona, 74,108,111; and the
Victor, Marshal. See Bellune, Duke of Vienna conference (1822), 38, 72;
Victor Emmanual I, King of Sardinia- yields to war party, 310; and Welling-
Piedmont: abdication, 54; death, 195 ton interviews, 34-36; 267-272
INDEX 363
Vincent, Baron Karl von, 305 November 17, 1822, 114-115, 271-272;
Vitrolles, Eugene d'Arroand, Baron de, and the Rhine, navigation of, 260-261;
320 and the Russian Circular of September
Vo!konsky, Prince Nikita, 66 26, 1822,53,246,251; and the Russian
Volkonsky, Princess Zenaide, 79 Ukase, 238-239; and the slave trade,
71,179-180,181; and the Spanish Ques-
W tion, 34-36, 61, 88, 94-96, 101-102, 116,
Waldenses, 70, 211-212; Edict of Emanci- 268-272, 280-281, 285; St. Petersburg
pation (1848), 212 mission, 322-323; and Sardinia-Pied-
Waliszewski, Kazimierz, 287 mont, evacuation of, 197-198; and the
Wallace, Thomas, 22n, 142 Straits, 53, 248, 250; and Strangford,
Wallachia. See Danubian Principalities 53,248,251; high TOrYism, 24, 88, 145;
War of 1812, 162 Verona diplomacy, 134-135, 278-279,
Ward, Sir Adolphus W., 59 284-285; and the Vienna conference
Webster, Sir Charles K.: cited on the (1822), 23, 42, 47, 53, 67; Villele con-
Austrian war debt, 220, 229; interpre- versations, 34-36, 267-272; and Walden-
tation of the Vienna conference (1822), ses, 211-212
59; and the vindication of Wellington, Werther, Baron Heinrich Wilhelm von,
282 69, 317
Webster, Daniel: quoted, 19 West Indies (British): and abolition of the
Wellesley, Sir Henry (Baron Cowley), 28, slave trade, 177, 189
34, 155, 155n; and the Spanish slave Westmoreland, John Fane, 10th Earl of:
trade, 164-165 opposes Canning's Latin American
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of: policy, 159; attempts to overthrow
passim; and Alexander I, 47, 124; and Canning, 281n; supports French in-
William Allen, 67; and the Austrian vasion of Spain (1823), 313n-314n
war debt, 221-226; and Britain's with- Wilberforce, William, 161, 162, 178, 186;
drawal from the Alliance, 324; and and Canning, 189; and French abo-
antipathy toward Canning, 24, 284; lition, 163
and Canning's ascendancy, 14; accused William I, King of the Netherlands, 259n,
of disloyalty to Canning, 277-279; at- 261, 326n
tempts to overthrow Canning, 281 ; William I, King of WUrttemberg, 267
criticizes Canning's publicity program, Williams, William A., 241
17,314; and the Charles Albert Affair, Wortley, Stuart, 314
192; and Chateaubriand, 117, 188,280, Wright, G. N., 284
282; and the Gameiro Mfair, 153; and
George IV, 14, 284; illness of, 23, 41n, Y
61; and La Foudre, 303; and the Ypsilanti, Alexander,S
Spanish Colonial Question, 140-141, Ypsilanti, Demetrios, 5
144-145, 147-148, 154, 159; and Louis
XVIII, 37, 267-268, 272; and Metter- Z
nich, 23, 96-97, 124, 283; and Naples, Zichy, Count Stephan, 41
evacuation of, 201; recalls Peninsular Zollverein, the, 259
War, 88; and the Proces-verbal of

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THE EUROPEAN PENTARCHY

IRBY C. NICHOLS, JR.

MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE I 1971

ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1110-9 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2725-0

PAULINE WRIGHT NICHOLS

IRBY COGHILL NICHOLS

WHO INSPIRED ME TO BECOME

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822 1

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE CoNGRESS 3

THE ROAD TO VIENNA 19

THE VIENNA STALEMATE 40

THE CONGRESS AT WORK: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1822 63

FROM VmNNA TO VERONA: PRELlMINARmS TO THE CoNGRESS 65

THE SPANISH QUESTION 84

THE SPANISH CoLONIAL QUESTION 137

THE SLAVB TRADE QUESTION 161

5. The Implacable French and Diffident Allies 180

THE ITALIAN CONGRESS 191

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM 218

THE CURTAIN FALLS 264

PROBLEMS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND INTERPRETATION 275

WELLINGTON AND THE CoNGRESS 277

3. The Defense 280

CHATEAUBRIAND AND THE CONGRESS 286

CHATEAUBRIAND'S WAR 302

FROM CoNGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE 317

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS:

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE CONGRESS

Himself his moldering monument survives,

1. The Congress Is Called

participation, the chancellor on June 6, 1822, suggested that only issues of

2. The Eastern Question

Metternich's anxiety to have British assistance at the Vienna conference is

6 Metternich to Castlereagh, private letter, Vienna, June 6, 1822, cited by Sir

ambassador to the Porte, vigorously protested against these horrors and

the Quintuple Alliance, or the "European Pentarchy," to use Metternich's

3. The Hanoverian Rendezvous

processes of diplomatic intercourse, which could be done only by a personal

conversations between Castlereagh and Metternich got underway on Satur-

The arrival of Count Lieven in Hanover on October 28 was a matter of

Castlereagh, however, did not commit himself at Hanover to attend

good Austrian, motivated by concern for purely Habsburg interests. 25 His

4. The Shift from Castlereagh to Canning

himself in brothels, "had been deliberately entrapped" by a youth disguised as a

30 Augustus Granville Stapleton. Political Life of the Right Honourable George

with Europe, while Canning favored a policy of isolation. Castlereagh had

33 Temperley, Canning, p. 48; Webster and Temperley, "British Policy in the

36 Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHI, 1,159-160.

39 Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHJ, I, 166-168; Welling-

THE ROAD TO VIENNA

Let our object be our country, our whole country, and

1. The Castlereagh Instructions

3 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 286.

There is no mistaking the commercial motivation behind British interest in

In July 1822, Castlereagh, while preparing his instructions, had informed

The pacific character of Castlereagh's instructions - which stands in

2. The Wellington Mission

After Castlereagh's death, Count Lieven called on Prime Minister Liverpool

12 Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 171-172.

3. The Ascendancy of Villele

On December 12, 1821, the moderate ministry of the Duke of Richelieu

17 Pasquier, Mernoires, V, 410-411; Rev. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, La

written memorandum or to promise to follow the oral instructions given