LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Johnson vs Mackintosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)

• Discovery Doctrine as basis of State ownership of lands

discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest. The court based this decision on the idea that the Piankeshaw were not actually able to convey
the land because they never "owned" it in the traditional sense of the word.
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall upholds the McIntosh family’s ownership of land
purchased from the federal government. It reasons that since the federal government now controls the
land, the Indians have only a “right of occupancy” and hold no title to the land.
Marshall based the decision on the “Discovery Doctrine,” referring to the way colonial powers laid claim to
newly discovered land: in other words, title to the land lay with its discover. In Johnson v. McIntosh and other
cases, the doctrine had the effect of ignoring aboriginal land possession.
The title of land which has been discovered and conquered belongs entirely to the conquering nation,
subject only to the right of occupancy of the Indians.

2. Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552)

• Property acquired from former sovereign recognized provided that it was issued regularly and confirmed
by the new sovereign.

In 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority to make a grant of
lands, and the fact that the governor presided at a meeting of the territorial deputation at the time such a
grant was made, makes no difference, as the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and
the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.

3. Valenton vs Marciano, 3 Phil. Reports 537, 2 Off. Gaz., 434, March 30, 1904

• Occupant of State lands must make proof to acquire ownership;

• Acquisition is now by operations of law

4. Cariño vs Insular Government, 212 U. S., 449 23

• Possession since time immemorial is equivalent to a title;

• discovery doctrine abandoned in favor of indigenous title

Facts:

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the
owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory information and no other documentation. The application was granted by the court on March 4,
1904. An appeal was taken to the court of first instance of the province of Benguet, on behalf of the
government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The court of first instance found the facts and
dismissed the application upon grounds of law. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part
of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous
cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over said land has
prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a
character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never
used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection
against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose. In view of these provisions of the
law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a
conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain
had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto. While the State has always recognized the right of
the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that
he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until
he did the State remained the absolute owner.

5. Jones vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906 23

• The Land Registration Court does not adjudicate ownership of public lands but is merely confirming
compliance with the condition of a government grant under Section 54 of Act No. 496.

6. Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-24066, December 9, 1925

• Lands acquired “by operation of law” is no longer part of the public domain, thus, the Director of Lands
has no jurisdiction to dispose it.

• See also Section 8 of C.A. No. 141

7. Kincaid vs. Cabututan, GR No. 100072, November 29, 1916 25

• Spanish titles although evidences of ownership may be lost thru prescription. The exception, of course, is
the Torrens title, expressly recognized to be indefeasible and imprescriptible

8. Oh Cho vs Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-48321, August 31, 1946

• All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain.

FACTS: Oh Cho, the applicant, is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January
17, 1940. The lower court declared that the sale of the lot to the applicant was valid. Hence this appeal from
a judgment declaring the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province
of Tayabas in the name of the applicant,

ISSUE: Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to decree of registration of the lot, because he is alien, therefore
is disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

HELD: No. The court ruled that the applicant failed to show title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. Moreover, he failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest have
acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgage Law (Sec.19, Act 496). Nor does the applicant come under the exception, for the earliest possession
of the lot by his predecessors in interest begun in 1880. It may be argued that under the provisions of the
Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the
right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant;s immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent
is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been i possession at least since July 26, 1894.
The applican;t immediate predecessors in interest have failed to do so. They did not have any vested right in
the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called,
is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessor in interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. Thus, it
is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. Accordingly,
judgment is reversed and the applicant for registration dismissed.

9. Mapa vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-3793, February 19, 1908

• The only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands according to their agricultural
nature and productiveness

• Early cases

9. de Aldecoa vs Insular Government (G.R. No. 3894. March 12, 1909) 28

• Where land is not mining or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification
of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances.

Facts: Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, situated in the town
of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his application. After the formalities
of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the request of the applicant,
had been rendered, the Attorney-General objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the
Insular Government. Aldecoa, amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5
and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the land in
question, comprised in the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the
latter affords better facilities for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the
land in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same
be applied to the inscription of his land.

Issue: Whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural
land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public
lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations.

Ruling: Any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and
planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its nature, it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances. The SC said in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot
situated within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in
force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building
lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it was
ever mining or forest land. Article 1 of the royal decree states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains
in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are not included within
the following exceptions: (1) Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those
comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the
community; and (4) those lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of composition or
possessory information. It is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and
timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se
alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering
their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they were accorded, they are called agricultural
lands, urban lands or building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural
and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no
obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.

10. Cornelio Ramos vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 13298 November 19, 1918

• The presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature; the Director of
Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes

FACTS: Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as
such. Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government. Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has
been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under
color of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of
title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was
for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the
claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit
to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. In
this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and
appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the
name of the petitioner is hereby granted. The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in
the adverse possession of another.

11. Jocson vs Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-13756 , January 30, 1919

• The inclusion of manglares in the definition of forestry land in Administrative Code of 1917 does not
affect vested rights acquired prior to its enactment.

Jocson v. Director of Forestry; Definition found in the 1917 Administrative Code cannot affect rights vested
prior to its enactment; Act 926 applies to those cases

Addressing itself directly to Section 1820, the Court declared that “in the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), the Court said that the phrase ‘agricultural lands’ as used in Act 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have been the
meaning of the term ‘forestry’ under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the
public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment. These lands being
neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act 926.”

12. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926

• The petitioner should present evidence to show that the land is more valuable to forestry than to
agricultural purposes.

Facts: This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of
San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of
September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the
registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. On the 26th
day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the
registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose, which
included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action. Upon the issue and the proof
adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered
registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243,
which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that
judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower court committed an error in not
registering all of the land included in her opposition in her name. She then presented a motion for rehearing
and in support thereof presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in question is not
forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land.

Issue: Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands

Ruling: It was held that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry
purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during
the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be
settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior
to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in
question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause
the appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been
decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes.

13. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila (18 G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947)

• Residential lands are neither mineral nor timber lands therefore it must be classified as agricultural lands

Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941.
The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but
was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a
land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a
land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held: No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources.
The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent
and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although
it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining whether a parcel of
land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to
cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, “public agricultural land” was construed as referring to those
lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

14. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung (GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1979)

• It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation
and false data and information’s furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and
Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3
of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of
Baguio City was made a formal party defendant. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same on the
ground that they had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were
duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public
documents. The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because the
same were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private
properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same
privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July
31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now
indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the
same. The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province
and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province.

Issue: Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title of private respondents were 'indefeasible' simply
because that they were issued pursuant to the registration of the free patents of the private respondents
and whether or not they are entitled to the benefit of R.A 3872.

Held: No! Doctrine: A certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable.
The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide: Sec. 2. The provisions
of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be governed by
special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being privately
owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which
administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be
enacted. Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into — (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber,
and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Likewise, the trial court assumed without any factual
basis that the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision
of Republic Act No, 3872 reads: SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows: SEC. 44. Any natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth,
ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself'
or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition- or
who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall
be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of
such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares. A member of the national cultural minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not
the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.

15. Heirs of Amunategui vs Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983

• The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry; Forests do not lose classification if stripped of its cover In Heirs
of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, the Court held that “a forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. ‘Forested lands’ do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
‘forest’ is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.”