GRISWORLD vs CONNECTICUT
people.” (read: the explicit and heretofore decided implicit guarantees
Relevant Facts: Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director
for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice
to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her
colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized
the provision of counseling, and other medical treatment, to married
persons for purposes of preventing conception.
(it was not a crime to sell birth control devices, but it was a crime to
use any drug or medicinal instrument for the purpose of preventing
contraception)
Issue: Under constitutional law, does the Constitution protect the right
of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple’s ability to be
counseled in the use of contraceptives?
Holding: Yes. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of
this right and is therefore null and void.
Court’s Rationale/Reasoning: Though the Constitution does not
explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees
within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a
right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in
marital relations.
Under the rulings of Meyer and Pierce, and other 1st Amendment
cases, the implicit right to do things associated with those
Amendments has been granted. The same rule should apply here: the
3rd Amendment stops soldiers (read: police power or executive
branch) from quartering soldiers in one’s home, the 5th Amendment
enables persons to a zone of privacy which the gov’t may not force
someone to surrender to their detriment, and the 9th Amendment
explicitly says “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
in the Bill of Rights cannot be used against people)
Rule: Under the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 9th Amendments, the right to family
was created and thus protects the right of marital privacy.
Dissenting: (Justice Black with Stewart): There is no constitutional
right to privacy, as the majority says there is. There are some
constitutional guarantees, like the 4th Amendment, but not the 14th,
which Black generally calls a stretch. As for the 9th Amendment, there
is no need for this analysis, as the Framers created this Amendment to
“assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was
intended to limit Federal Government to the powers granted expressly
or by necessary implication.
(Justice Stewart with Black): The law does not violate the Constitution,
although the law itself is silly, outdated, and unenforceable.
Concurring: (Justices Goldberg, Warren, Brennan): Doesn’t think that
the ninth amendment, as introduced by Madison to Congress, was to
protect the people from the other eight amendments’ specificity. This
concurrence feels that the original eight were fine enough to stand on
their own as protective of the penumbra the majority brings to light in
this decision.
(Harlan): The use of the constitutional amendments are not necessary
to justify this ruling, when the court takes a look at the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers.
(White): Feels this is a due process violation of the 14th Amendment.
This is the state acting to limit a right to family, and there is no
justification by Connecticut’s argument it reinforces a ban on illicit
sexual relationships.
EISENSTADT V. BAIRD
Relevant Facts: William Baird was arrested and charged with a felony
for distributing contraceptive foam to an unmarried woman following
a lecture he delivered to students on contraception. Under
Massachusetts law, it was a felony for anyone other than a doctor or
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives, and even licensed
professionals were restricted from distributing contraceptives to
anyone but married couples. Baird was convicted in state court, and
his appeals were unsuccessful. He then filed for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court, seeking to challenge his conviction on
constitutional grounds and directed his suit against Eisenstadt, the
sheriff that prosecuted his case. The district court dismissed his
petition, but the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was
a per se prohibition on contraception at odds with both fundamental
human rights and Supreme Court precedent.
Issues: Does the differing treatment of unmarried and married
persons with regard to contraception under Massachusetts law violate
Equal Protection or Due Process?
Holding: Yes, respondent has standing to challenge the law. Yes, the
asserted justifications for restricting contraceptives were insufficient
and there was not valid reason for differentiating between married
and unmarried persons based on the record thus violating equal
protection guarantees. The Court did not reach the Due Process issue.
Reasoning: Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall. First, the Court considered
the threshold standing issue. The majority considered that the statute
in question was not a health statute, thus enabling Baird to attack it
directly as there would then be no basis for prohibiting his conduct
under the terms of the law. However, the Court based its standing
decision on the ability of Baird to assert third party interests, in this
case the right of unmarried persons to seek contraceptives, comparing
the case to Griswold (where the Court concluded privacy guarantees
extended to married couples seeking contraception) and concluding
that third-party protection rationales were stronger where
distributors but not users were subject to prosecution given the result
on availability of contraceptives. Turning to the merits, Justice
Brennan pointed out that Equal Protection assumes equality of
treatment but does not forestall the possibility of differentiation, so
long as differing treatment results from reasonable, non-arbitrary
distinctions bearing a substantial relation to the legislation at issue. In
this case, the Court considered that the statute was contained in the
chapter pertaining to morals, evincing legislative intent to regulate
conduct it found objectionable rather than the public health.
Furthermore, if public health were the true aim, the statute is both
discriminatory and over-broad, regulating differently classes of
persons but subject to health concerns and prohibiting behavior that
may rationally be viewed as in the interests of public health. Turning
to the important privacy considerations in the background of this case,
the Court pointed out that the interests of unmarried individuals are
just as apparent as married couples in protecting important, private
conduct from state intrusion. While not decided on privacy grounds,
the Court was aided by Griswold and other cases in evaluating the
nature of differentiation by the State in the legislation at issue. The
State failed to provide an adequate justification for treating married
and unmarried persons differently, or a legitimate concern for public
health, and therefore the statute violated the equal protection rights
of the very persons Baird asserted the right to aide.
Concurrence/Dissent: Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion.
While he joined the majority, he would have decided the case on
narrower, First Amendment grounds. Justice Douglas reasoned that
Baird gave a lengthy presentation on contraception and related
subjects, and afterward provided a single sample of contraceptives to
a member of the audience. Justice Douglas opined that his actions
could have reasonably been construed as an aide to his speech, and
though involving conduct, protected as a necessary component of
Baird’s right to free expression. Justice White concurred in the result,
joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice White argued that because Baird
could not have been convicted of distribution the foam product at
issue to a married person, the State did not have a legitimate interest
in regulating his conduct, and thus his conviction could not stand.
Justice White would have preferred to decide the case on this more
narrow rationale and avoid delving into uncharted constitutional
territory regarding the rights of unmarried couples to access
contraceptives. Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the record
was unclear on the health effects of the product in question. He
believed that the State had a legitimate interest in restricting the
channels of distribution of medical products and advice to qualified
professionals, and saw no basis for preventing rational restrictions in
service of that goal.
Conclusion: Equal protection prevents states from treating unmarried
couples differently than married couples with regard to distribution of
birth control, absent a reasonable reason for doing so that was lacking
in this case. The Court rested its holding on equal protection grounds,
rather than due process or privacy concerns.
ROE vs WADE
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who
wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly
situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes
criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of
the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions
except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an
abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment
that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction
to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing
the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant,
and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed
physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of
her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another
jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the
statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by
the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of
personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority
of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory
changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At
common law abortion performed before quickening (the first
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable
offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established
common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of
criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this
argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant
women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the
situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first
trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the
prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized
by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related
to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the
health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even
proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of
the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of
the potential life of the unborn child.
Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally
accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in
this case.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all
abortions except in the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the
mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However,
it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the
statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such
as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to
address the question of when life begins.
DAVID vs ARROYO
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and
the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president,
then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and
at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally
permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor,
was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of
national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such
power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and
partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of
the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because
there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said
PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled
that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following
way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis
in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and
the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle
liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The
7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’
and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC
ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such must be based on the following:
criterion has been met.
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
nd
Pursuant to the 2 sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
Congress may prescribe.
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to policy declared by Congress.
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted Declaration
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate president by the president.
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private

corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise
of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such