A.C. No.
5581 January 14, 2014 On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross
Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration
Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the
Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the
complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that
the case be submitted for disposition.
case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his
wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed
against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the
Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former
residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also
received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to
him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00
to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received
death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences,
i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish
respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service;
and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt
of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy
of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be
directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy
of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under
Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit
the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City
as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned
with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not
paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing
the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with
the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1)
DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest
of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a)
ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008;
and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to
REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the
given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley
View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of
the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance
of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure
of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note
that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent
contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible
in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring
him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will
just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed
to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint
against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of
service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent,
the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When
said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the
disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court,
which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of
the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is
"not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately,
or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the
lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of
grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of Deeds of Marikina, with
an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina
C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her
husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement.
Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's
trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there
whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she
(complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to
interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured
complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the loan.
Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her
the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was released
by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of
documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave respondent the
authority for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the application for
the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the documents
required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check on her
property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her
application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her
apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed
on her property, which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who
bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent
about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After
verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was
acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D.
Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before
respondent to acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her
property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the
instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed selling
her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her
law office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients.
Respondent denied that she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to
construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who requested
her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she needed to
complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about
to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the
Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their conversation,
complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The
Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter,
complainant told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her
property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus
called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and
they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's
office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand
Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of
the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work
for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title,
together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the
balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform
respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in
the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what
transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never
entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244).
Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify
what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she
concocted her story when she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming
the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its
initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the
reception of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their
postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the
complaint, and directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of
complainant and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the
Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003,
respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale
executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land
in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be
considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed
by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her
memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the
IBP on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had
been dismissed in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC
held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno,
respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that
Anita Peña's signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land was made through
fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and
Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c)
knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted
his Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her
by complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner
Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively conspired with any
party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless,
Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her
signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search
in the National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her
witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title
was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's
denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November
1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records
Processor at the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent
her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral
in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it.14 Yet,
respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner.15 Later, complainant discovered
that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the
title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years,
complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her
property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent
kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her
loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's
land to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No.
61244 with respect to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd. for ₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her
presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if,
indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella
Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing
by complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of
the said Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he
affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he
later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's
testimony that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's
deception. Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to
perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed
to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party,
Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person
did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having
failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable
for violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and
her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the
notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be
perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent
guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore,
respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from
reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the
sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed
of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections
128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence
is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of
evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance
of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence
necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can
proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution
and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the
ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, or that no crime was committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that
she gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent
would apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in
complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw
complainant give her title to respondent.35 Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she
executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was
notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-
61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the
complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her
allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant
by facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's
approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court
of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November
1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall
keep a notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall
keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a
brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy
of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of
the month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled,
to the proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification,41 dated February 22,
1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for
the year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and
notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could
not also be found in the National Archives per the certification42 of the Archives Division Chief
Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as
notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the
said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of her
commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public
are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
for any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.1âwphi1
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the
certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
the important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still
and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the
general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the
that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to Roll of Attorneys.
prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting
verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. SO ORDERED.
The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial
Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was
notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as
it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the
deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of
records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said
Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As
a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Adm.Case No. 6490
(CBD 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother, Concepcion Tabang, filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or
suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit and gross
dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the legal advice of then incumbent
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare
agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consists of several
parcels of land belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia that under the
agrarian reform program of the government, she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of
agricultural land, as she already owns other parcels of land. Judge Gacott then advised her to
put the title of the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for
easy disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land using
fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia was able to secure individual titles over these parcels of land
in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion decided to sell the subject parcels
of land because they needed money for their medication and other necessary expenses. On the
pretext that he is going to help them sell the subject property to prospective buyers, respondent
borrowed the seven land titles from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from
the time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the property. He
informed herein complainants that he lost all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised
complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance of title. Following respondent’s advice,
Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting as the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious
owners, filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of land. However, in the
course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged
owners in the seven individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang
appear to have been signed by the same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The
public prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon the
alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court because the
alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing
of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-issuance of title, changing the
signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of cases was filed,
respondent executed or caused to be executed several documents, among which were
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by the
principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the annotation of these documents in the land
titles covering the subject properties. Thereafter, respondent caused the publication of a notice
representing himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire
to sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to
seven individuals. However, only three of these buyers were legitimate, while the remaining
four are dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels of land, respondent was
able to receive ₱3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was remitted to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of Special Power of Attorney
and Affidavit of Recovery, affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered owners of
the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership over the said lands upon himself,
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise allege
that this is not the only case wherein respondent sold properties of his clients to third persons
without his clients’ knowledge and consent.1
Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the material allegations of the
complainants. He claims that the seven land titles covering the subject properties are valid and
duly executed; and denies complainants’ allegations that the alleged owners are fictitious.
Respondent further claims that the registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land
to different individuals and his only participation in the said sale is that he was authorized by
the registered owners to collect from the buyers the full payment of the lands sold. He further
denies that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she merely acted as a broker
who was trying to promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to know that the
properties were sold by their registered owners, she called up the law office of respondent and
demanded that she be given her share or "balato" in the sale of the properties equivalent to
20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts exerted in promoting the sale of the subject
parcels of land; that when respondent turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light
and seek his disbarment. Respondent further denies complainants’ allegation that he sold real
properties of some of his clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases his role was
merely to notarize the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of
their properties.2
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro for report and recommendation. Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory
conference on November 25, 2003 after which she required the parties to submit their
respective position papers, together with all the necessary documents and duly verified
affidavits of their witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner Navarro
found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.4
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution adopting the report of
Commissioner Navarro. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed
the supreme punishment of disbarment.5
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in
his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership therein.6
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.7
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement
which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides
for the procedure of investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys
before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall
have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator
shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by
the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor
to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for
hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within
a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action
and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal investigation by
conducting a mandatory conference between the complainants and the respondent after both
parties have filed their complaint and answer, respectively. The mandatory conference was
supposedly held for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate
facts. However, no definitive result was reached during the conference as respondent continued
to deny all the allegations of the complainants. After the mandatory conference was held, no
further hearings were conducted. Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely required the
parties to submit their respective position papers, including all the necessary documents and
duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by both
parties and of the documents attached thereto, the Investigating Commissioner submitted her
Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the respondent and the imposition of
the penalty of disbarment being prayed for by complainants, the Investigating Commissioner
should not have simply relied on the parties’ position papers and the pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by them. She should have proceeded with the investigation by conducting
formal hearings and calling upon the parties to present additional evidence to support their
respective contentions. In the case of the complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should
have required the presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the affidavits presented
in evidence to prove the veracity of the allegations contained in said affidavits, at the same time
affording respondent the opportunity to cross- examine the supposed affiants. The failure of
the complainants to move for the presentation of the persons alleged to have executed the
subject affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further investigation,
considering its power to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have compelled the persons named
by the respondent as the original owners as well as the buyers of the subject properties to
appear before her. The appearance of these witnesses could have easily been facilitated
considering that the residence and office addresses of the three of the supposed buyers are all
located in Makati while the residence of three of the original owners are located within Manila
and the remaining four are residing in the province of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila.
To repeat, under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is authorized to issue
subpoena to compel the appearance of persons and witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants and
respondent consists of affidavits and photocopies of documents. Not one of the persons who
executed these affidavits and instruments was presented or subpoenaed by the Commissioner
to identify their affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in a
formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely on the issues raised in the
subject administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and
“the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten.”
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:
“Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.”
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice
of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner
strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.
While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.”
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as
a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements
for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt
of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in
the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the
conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto
has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law.This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty.
Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts
constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an
accounting of all the money and properties received by her from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications
Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation
(Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications
Corporation (Precedent).3
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its
members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he
earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of
stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (₱30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member
of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also
active members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with
the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s relation
with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship
was established between him and respondent although no formal document was executed by
them at that time. A Retainer Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent.
Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon
collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications company
based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his
means.6 Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.7
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent8
asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondent’s clients
in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter
explained that she had to send it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would
know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing
to worry about.9
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent
impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to resolve complainant’s problems. Respondent also convinced
complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam,
he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in
Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.12
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for
his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of
₱900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself.13 Sometime thereafter, complainant
again gave respondent ₱1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts were all part of Precedent’s collections
and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the company’s properties.15
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from
respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text
messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of
Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitel’s failed
investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure
order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages
from respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she
will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to
clear complainant’s name.16 In two separate e-mail messages,17 respondent again asked money
from complainant, ₱200,000 of which was handed by complainant’s wife while respondent was
confined in Saint Luke’s Hospital after giving birth,18 and another ₱700,000 allegedly to be given
to the NBI.19
Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle all complainant’s legal problems,
respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of
assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular
phones and accessories stored in complainant’s house and inside a warehouse.20 He also signed
a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.21
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about
this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and
lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The
findings are the same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds
were provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the
Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I
will need the accounting of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones, every
employees and directors[’] quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients
through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be
accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we
can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very
well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off.
I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients
who will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and
discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I
am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He
can help with all his connections. Val’s friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized
crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for
financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying
to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it
or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val. The funds
with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will
be able to send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients
and government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from
hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give
him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I
told you this will happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones
will stand by you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my
expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best
legal mind up there. You will be ok!
Candy22
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice, complainant returned to the country. On the
eve of his departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and
conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.23
About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told
them that she has already accumulated ₱12,500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and was willing to
give ₱2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told
complainant that without his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and
relieved, complainant accepted respondent’s offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind
and told complainant that she would instead invest the ₱2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a
business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family
needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed.
Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.24
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help
settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and
narrated how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases.25
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent
would either refuse to return complainant’s call or would abruptly terminate their telephone
conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for several months.26 In one instance, when
complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of Benefon’s obligation to
Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered
that she was very busy and that she would read Benefon’s letter only when she found time to
do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance and evasiveness,
complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money,
documents and properties given to the latter.27 Respondent rendered an accounting through a
letter dated December 20, 2004.28 When complainant found respondent’s explanation to be
inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting.29 Complainant
repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.30 Respondent
replied,31 explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had
been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she
said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability.32
Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint33 against respondent before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the
disbarment of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She
claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance
because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious
organization.35lavvph!1
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also
averred that the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and
accounted for.36 Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal
problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.37
To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint
for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Quezon City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.38 Respondent argued that on
this basis alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant to the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained
that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of
doubtful authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between
respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating
Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to
her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full
accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
43
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and, more importantly,
upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take
advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.44 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration
of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree.46
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel,
eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield
herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she
rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations,"47 precisely
because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause
of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.48
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant.49
This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on
contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was
correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation,
it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession.50 (Emphasis supplied.)1awphi1
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel
investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because
that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.52
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by giving
him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter,
respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping
him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party
claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested
with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latter’s help, she
would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was
willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.53 Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking,
as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,54 but also
toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of
respondent’s unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably displays respondent’s gross
ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know
that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by
the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of
Officers of an IBP Chapter56 even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of
the electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar
her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness
Protection Program.57 Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the
integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative
case against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to
determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be
dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her
membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the
Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.58 The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her
civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be
conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence,
to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove
that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to
evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6121 July 31, 2009
TRINIDAD H. CAMARA vs. ATTY. OSCAR AMANDY REYES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.: Before us is a Letter-Complaint1 filed by complainant Trinidad H. Camara against
respondent Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes.
Sometime in 2003, complainant hired the services of respondent to handle her case. As partial
acceptance fee, respondent received from complainant ₱50,000.00 evidenced by a receipt2
placed on his calling card. Respondent, however, took no steps to protect complainant’s
interest. As no service was rendered by respondent, complainant asked that he return the
amount given him so that she could use it in repairing her house. Respondent offered that he
would take charge of repairing the house. Yet, he again failed to fulfill his promise, which
prompted the complainant to reiterate her demand for the return of the money.3 As respondent
failed to give back the amount demanded, complainant initiated the instant case.
In his Answer, respondent prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the
matter has already been resolved by all the parties concerned. He added that complainant went
to his office and explained that she signed the letter-complaint not knowing that it was against
respondent, as she was made to believe that it was a complaint against her neighbor.4
Complainant and respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference; and to submit their
respective position papers.
On February 19, 2007, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.5
In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag made the following
findings:
There is proof that respondent receipted the amount of Php50,000.00 in his own handwriting.
Even his calling card was given to the complainants.
Canon 16, Rule 16.01 provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Using the above yardsticks, clearly the respondent is liable and failed to live [up] to [the] above
mentioned standards.
While it is true that complainant Trinidad Camara allegedly executed an affidavit, the same will
not save the respondent.lavvphil
As a general rule, disbarment proceeding shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute unless the Court motu proprio determines that there is no compelling
reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.
We reiterate that the respondent did not traverse the charges against him. He simply wanted
this case to be closed and terminated allegedly because he and Mrs. Camara had already
resolved their problem and the latter’s son, who also signed the letter-complaint as attorney-
in-fact has no authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it [is] most respectfully recommended that the respondent
be suspended for six (6) months from the active practice of law.6
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of the investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution a[s] Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for respondent’s violation of Canon
16, Rule 16.01, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Oscar Amandy Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree with the foregoing recommendation.
The Court notes that despite the opportunity accorded to respondent to refute the charges
against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation.7 It is incumbent upon
respondent to meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
These, respondent miserably failed to do.8
The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing
evidence to dispute the charges against him. In his answer, he did not even deny complainant’s
allegations. He only prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the problem
with complainant had already been resolved.
The alleged compromise between complainant and respondent is not enough to exonerate the
latter from the present disciplinary case. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved.9
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case.10
This is also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyers regardless of
complainant’s standing.11
When respondent accepted the amount of ₱50,000.00 from complainant, it was understood
that he agreed to take up the latter’s case, and that an attorney-client relationship between
them was established. From then on, it was expected that he would serve his client, herein
complainant, with competence, and attend to her cause with fidelity, care and
devotion.121avvphi1
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant’s case
and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.13 Specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to the latter’s genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert
his best efforts and ability to preserve his client’s cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his client, likewise, serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar
and to the public.14
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique
position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and
confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people, not only in the individual lawyer but also in the
legal profession as a whole, is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required
at all times to maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of their profession.15
The factual antecedents in Reyes v. Vitan16 and Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores17 bear a striking
similarity to the present case. In Reyes, complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer
for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charges against the former’s sister-in-law
and the latter’s niece. After receiving the amount of ₱17,000.00, respondent did not take any
action on complainant’s case. In Sencio, complainant therein, likewise, engaged the services of
Atty. Calvadores to prosecute the civil aspect of the case in relation to the death of her son in a
vehicular accident. The total amount of ₱12,000.00 was duly acknowledged and received by
respondent as attorney’s fees. Despite repeated assurances by respondent, complainant
discovered that the former had not filed any case on her behalf.
In both cases, we suspended the respondent lawyers for a period of six (6) months. Thus, we
impose the same penalty on respondent herein, as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522 of the IBP Board of Governors is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5834 February 22, 2011
TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The case originated from an administrative complaint1 filed by Teresita D. Santeco against
respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a
deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
In an En Banc Decision2 dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross
misconduct for, among others, abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith and persistent refusal
to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed
to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of ₱3,900.00 which
complainant paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
which she never filed.
Respondent moved to reconsider3 the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution4
dated February 24, 2004.
Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in
effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71,
sent a letter-report5 dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock
informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases
wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels
confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent
admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only
suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar
further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases.
Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her court confirming
the report.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocar’s letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution6 dated April 9, 2008,
required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed
to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment;
otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on
file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court
issued a Resolution7 on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly
recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.8
A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondent’s address of record at
"26-B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City" by registered mail. The
same was delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on
October 29, 2009, per certification9 dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of
the Marikina Central Post Office.
Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29,
2009 Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer
of the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The
said certification reads:
This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made
by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment
for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.10
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court.
The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court
orders and processes.11
Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the
court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed
this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against
her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty.
Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still
suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court.
Neither did she pay the ₱30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.
We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment.12
Sebastian v. Bajar13 teaches
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondent’s obstinate refusal
to comply with the Court’s orders not "only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof."141avvphi1
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of
membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself.
Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN
OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent’s personal record with the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8481 August 3, 2010
[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of
Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines,
Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and
exemplary damages.
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.2 It held that Ebanen voluntarily
resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the
NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.3
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution4
dated May 5, 2003.
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision5 dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no
constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution6 dated April 30, 2004.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA,
thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with
finality in a Resolution8 dated October 11, 2004.
Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions
dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied
her motion.9
Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited
pleading and noted without action Ebanen’s third motion for reconsideration.10
On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanen’s
Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005,
in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.11
On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final
and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment12 has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a
second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of
constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.
Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation
of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
Subsequently, in a Resolution13 dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and
Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.14 Both respondents admitted the filing
of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor
Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the
Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision
was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed that there was also no
violation of the rule on forum shopping.15
On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.16
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res
judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from
employment and was not constructively dismissed.
On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to
appear. Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty.
Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices
where he is employed as associate lawyer.
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against
Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed
all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said
labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the second complaint he
took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.17 He also admitted that during
the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as counsel
for Ebanen.18
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice
but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due
process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then
argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.19
He maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the
rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida
violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a
consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled before
the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second complaint
was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida
be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that
respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed
no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of
violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused
his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously
rejected by the courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification
as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata
and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint
be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality.
When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They
accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyer’s
oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."20
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the
rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint
against Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it
had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the
first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the
pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.21 He knew that the decision in the
subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the
second complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the
same on the ground of nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to
protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior
complaint deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with
finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled
to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict
and to comply with it.22
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:23
x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration
of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files
such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of
res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and
Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."25
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice
clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyer’s duty.26 This we will not tolerate.1avvphi1
In cases of similar nature,27 the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension
from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this
case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum
Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the
practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 5835 April 15, 2005
CARLOS B. REYES, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence1 and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Indeed, it
is his sworn duty not to delay no man for money or malice; and to conduct himself in a proper
manner not only to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.2
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias
Vitan for gross negligence.
The complaint alleges that sometime in June 2001, complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services
of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge
against his sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter's niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both
women refused to abide with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32, Manila, in Civil Case No. 99-92657 ordering the partition of the properties left
by complainant's brother Damaso B. Reyes; and that respondent, after receiving the amount of
P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's case.
We referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued several orders to respondent
directing him to file his answer to the complaint, but he failed to do so. He only sent his
secretary to represent him during the proceedings.
On April 18, 2001,3 IBP Commissioner Navarro submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her
Report and Recommendation quoted as follows:
"x x x. After going over the evidence on record, the undersigned noted that respondent ignored
all the Orders issued by this Commission and neither did he comply with any of those
Orders. Respondent even failed to submit the responsive pleadings he himself requested in his
motion and only sent his assistant secretary to represent him in the scheduled hearings of this
case. Up to and until the present, no pleadings was submitted despite respondent's allegations
that he was collating evidence to prove his side of the case.
It was complainant who submitted the supposed letters of the respondent Estelita Reyes and
Juliet Alegonza but there were no proofs when they sent and when the same were received by
the addressee.
Likewise, the complaint submitted by the complainant was only a format in the sense that it
was not signed by the respondent; the RTC Branch No. was left blank; there was no Civil Case
No. and there was no proof that said pleading was filed which amounts only to a mere scrap of
paper and not a pleading or authenticated document in the legal parlance.
As it is, nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his client for the legal
fees he collected which was paid by the complainant as reflected in the receipts issued by the
respondent in handwritten forms and signed by him.
Respondent not only violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Cannon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and did not inform
complainant the status of his case but also disregarded the orders of the Commission without
reasons which amounted to utter disrespect of authority and unethical conduct in the practice
of his profession, thus, should be sanctioned.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of his profession for a period of two (2) years from
receipt hereof; and refund to the complainant the amount of P17,000.00 paid to him for not
having extended his legal services to the complainant on a lawyer-client relationship within six
(6) months from receipt hereof."
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-406 adopting
and approving the above Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Navarro.
When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood
that he agreed to take up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship between
them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein
complainant, with competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case
and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
"Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights.4 An attorney is expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client
likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public.
In Santos vs. Lazaro,5 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-
quoted, is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his
client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.6
Significantly, respondent also violated his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will
not delay any man for money or malice and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client.
However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter
sanctions have been imposed for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity
of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
The facts of Sencio vs. Calvadores7 bear a striking similarity to the present case. Respondent
lawyer in Sencio did not return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure
to file the case. During the proceedings before the IBP, respondent did not file his answer to
the complaint nor appeared during the hearing notwithstanding his receipt of notices. We
found him guilty of violation of the lawyer's oath, malpractice and gross misconduct and
suspended him for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount of P12,000.00
with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of our Resolution until the
return of the amount.
In Garcia vs. Manuel,8 we suspended respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6)
months and ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the
complainant. We found him guilty of gross misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to
complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per
annum from the date of the promulgation of this Decision until the full amount shall have been
returned.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of
the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent's personal
records as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No.
1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages
filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant
Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and
judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for
disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate
Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty.
Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance
and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed
his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the
records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE
compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that
failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010
stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair
play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1 But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit
proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty.
Flores again failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its
stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby
filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer
to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything
right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by
failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his
MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the
respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government.
This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men.
Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the
authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial
system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court,
Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's
genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A
lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common
sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the
infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed
by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year
suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has
been in the practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years.
Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00
and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, ATTY. CARINGAL
vs. ....
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,]
A.C. No. 10584 since she was about four years old.
[Formerly CBD 10-2827] A : Yes, sir.
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs. Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent. plaintiff, isn’t it?
RESOLUTION
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her
LEONEN, J.:
cousins.
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ....
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5 THE WITNESS

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by : Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died THE COURT
in 1990.6
: What’s the name of the mother?
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7
executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self- ATTY. CARINGAL
Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.9
(Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied) THE WITNESS
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 : Yes, sir.
filed a Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12 Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t
it?
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13
which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, A : Of course.
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.15 Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you : Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn
requested to be marked as Exhibit B. the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was
only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and
THE COURT
that has been the subject of my continuing objection from the very beginning.
: Exhibit? THE COURT
ATTY. CARINGAL : But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned ATTY. REY SANTOS
from you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano
THE WITNESS Turla, your Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said
: Yes, sir. documents, your Honor.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial. THE COURT

A : Yes, sir. : So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication. ATTY. REY SANTOS

ATTY. REY SANTOS : No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics ATTY. CARINGAL
because it is not the issue in this case. : What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
....
ATTY. REY SANTOS
ATTY. CARINGAL : My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and
.... impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly THE COURT
notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book : So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the THE WITNESS
defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal
heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any : No, that is not true.
descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular
provision that you have drafted into this document . . . true or false? ATTY. CARINGAL

ATTY. REY SANTOS : That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have
drafted a document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,]
ten or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled
[sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty.
Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty.
Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also
alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims
of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information
acquired during his professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach
of trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s
estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit
states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29
Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos
knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago,
he is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn
Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due.
There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer
makes the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of
the taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit
of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant,
xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit
that Rufina Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for
his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that
were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental
income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the
Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that
the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla
and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and
was not representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he
[was] representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir
but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his
client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos,
payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of
administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty.
Caringal had no standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article
262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate
was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death
certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48
Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s
estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated
that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law."50
Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved
different parties and prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of
the Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically
proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or
merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand
admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that
he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s
daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent
admitted that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that
she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth
Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu
Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same because
of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s
sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself
in a position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he
is the only heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations
of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July
15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from
the practice of law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution.
However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in
order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla
v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily
refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent
Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report
of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the
Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted
as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is
entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent
was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s estate.62
(Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla
and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent.
Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he
previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently
proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated
Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds
that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the
estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to
be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do
his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was
also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis
in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers
are expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being
honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has
the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987
Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys"70 and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court
and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian
of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to
discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the
practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart
from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is
only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to
recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly,
"[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76 (Citations omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority
is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this
court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of
fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty.
Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10451 February 4, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in
his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
₱30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip)
and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were
done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8 Later,
however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed
in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to
sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by
Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading
to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge
that the affidavits at hand were falsified.11
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did
not appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007
hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received ₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order
to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear
for the case if the complainants would give him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to
Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected
from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.15
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election
protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing
of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense.
He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera.
As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion
in view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18
To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
complainants executed a document entitled "Release Waiver & Discharge,"19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against
him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated
in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respectto
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign
the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing, and
that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be credible
as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop in
which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on November
7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed that Atty.
De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his
client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and
in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election
protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession.24
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated
February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing
the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by
the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine
Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this
country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also
to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has
to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this
light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement
with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in
holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that
the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts– are given the opportunity to first-hand
observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the
falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s
comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this
score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits
but another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that
he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the
participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to
be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony
that he indeed participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit,
all in support of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation –
is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be
a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is
highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited
from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his client to dictate
the procedure in handling the case.35
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release
Waiver & Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case,
would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.1âwphi1 What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised
on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended
the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in
court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same
here.
Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
₱60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member
of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is SUSPENDED for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this
Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished
more severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia
Umaguing the amount of ₱60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
further administrative penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10681 February 3, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with
gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3
respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled
many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of
opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to
materialize.4
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent
merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to
respondent, which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their
new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to respondent.12
In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead,
respondent claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the
real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-
complaint15 charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits
lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice.16
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting
that Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to
collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.19

Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from their failed business venture, In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which alone, as evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing
he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, Nault and pointed out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the
who, believing that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a
aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party defendant in a
respondent’s name:6 related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent.22 In said pleading,
Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged thatit was respondent who incurred
Check No. Date Amount Payee the subject loan from them.23

0000561925 03-23-06 ₱750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-
0000561926 03-23-06 ₱850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa 2883.25 In the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled
0000561927 03-23-06 ₱900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated and the parties were directed to
submit their respective position papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit any.
Total: ₱2,500,000.00
The IBP Report and Recommendation
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of
the checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checksand that he On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) Commissioner), issued his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the
days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s
respondent.8 interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in
trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name
and that he personally received and encashed them. Annex "E"30 of the Verified Complaint
shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed
to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five
(5) days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be
implausible. The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not
the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter;
however, he did not.32 He also observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed
appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally, the Investigating
Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which categorically states that
he does not even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the
loan from them.35
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the
integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR.
Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his
disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to complainants,
with stipulated interest.37
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the
applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the
penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered
the return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated
interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however,
denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by
substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to ₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41
Also, Annex "E"42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of
the checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five
percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that
respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With respondent’s
direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any
credible indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeedthe
one who borrowed the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had
failed to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the
complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the
complainants and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a
₱2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On
the other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of
the checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the ₱2,500,000.00 plus
interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former
to wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued
in such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client
is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The
rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court
categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent
did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It
comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on
her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their
trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and
reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly,
there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the
IBP’s return directive.
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after
borrowing ₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and
representing conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and
respondent's continuous refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from
the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him
indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders
respondent to return to complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest
thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such
cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate,
distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent
received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration of his
professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies
beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon receipt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5914
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO and AIDA AMATORIO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP and ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and Aida
Amatorio (Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and Whelma Siton-
Yap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit to obtain
favorable judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was already an
out-of-court settlement between them and maliciously manifesting that their counsel, Atty.
Justo Paras (Atty. Paras) was suspended from the practice of law.1
The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection cases,
particularly, Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were filed against them
by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the complainants to compel
them to pay their indebtedness of 18,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory note. After
they filed their answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out
the same and to declare them in default on the ground that the said pleading was prepared by
a lawyer suspended from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was
however denied.2
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the complainants to collect
the amount of 94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record
for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its filing.3
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-court
settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents' law office. She appealed for the
respondents' consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of
installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered
her first payment of 20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a
written document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if
they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001
in the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they
will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents' assurance, the
complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were surprised to
receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two civil cases filed by the respondents,
declaring them in default for non-appearance in the pre-trial conference and ordering them to
pay the amount of their indebtedness and damages. The decision however did not mention the
out-of-court settlement between the parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued
tendering installment payments to the respondents upon the latter's assurance that they will
disregard the decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of- court settlement
before the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the
respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and
were in fact issued said writ.4 This prompted them to seek legal advice to address their
predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V. Carriaga who, after learning of the factual milieu of
their case, told them that they have a good ground to file a disbarment case against the
respondents. He, however, declined to handle the case himself as he disclosed that his wife is a
relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just
resumed his practice of law after his suspension.5
As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their counsel. Initially,
Atty. Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity between
him and the respondents may invite unwelcome repercussions. Even then, the complainants
insisted to retain his services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment
case against the respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).6
As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were
allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They
received threats of physical harm and Aida's continued employment as a public school teacher
was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house.
When they refused to yield to the respondents' intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of
charges against them, to wit: (1) an administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same
debts subject of this case; and (2) a criminal case for perjury against the complainants. To
alleviate their situation, they filed a Joint-Affidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this Court to warn
the respondents and to stop them from employing deplorable acts upon them.
In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March 14, 2003,
the respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable judgments in
Civil Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court
settlement, through the intercession of Rosa Yap Paras, estranged wife of Atty. Paras, but
denied that the complainants ever tendered any installment payment. They claimed that Atty.
Paras merely employed cajolery in order to entice the complainants to file the instant case to
retaliate against them. They asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents
served as counsel for his former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for
immorality, abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified documents which
resulted to his suspension.8
On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras clearly
defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and filed an answer
on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that
he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his suspension.9
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and Recommendation10 dated June 23,
2005, which pertinently states as follows:
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at the
very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or
confuse the civil courts in Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and
the authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21, 2001 which bore his signature
and written in a "Yap Law Office" letterhead. Such documentary evidence supports the theory
of the Complainants that there was indeed an out-of-court settlement prior to the pre-trial
hearings and that they were most likely assured that these cases would be dismissed. Their
absence during the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted to decisions adverse to them.
Moreover, the Motions for the Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the existence of partial
payments and the prior agreement which, if disclosed, would have led the court not to issue
such writs. Since Respondent Francisco Yap's signature appear in all the Acknowledgement
Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should be penalized. On the other
hand, Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the absence of any evidence
of her participation in such conduct. x x x.
All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the Counter Petition
for Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo Paras, which appears to be VERY
meritorious, be given due course in another proceeding with utmost dispatch.11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17, 2005, disposing
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for deliberately
neglecting, offering inaccurate allegations to purposely mislead or confuse the courts, Atty.
Francisco D. Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Atty.
Whelma F. Siton-Yap is exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation in such
conduct; however Respondents are Warned for indirectly misleading the Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for Review.14
On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the services of Atty.
Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can no longer
afford the services of a private counsel.
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial Affidavit,16 disclaiming
knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their
behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents. They
claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not explained to
them in a dialect which they understood. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a
disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing
to settle and pay their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the
respondents, but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the
cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them. They claimed that Atty.
Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle matters with
the respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled date. They also
asseverated that most of the statements contained in the complaint for disbarment were false
and that they wished to withdraw the said complaint.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 which
reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVII-2005-159
dated 17 December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the
admission of the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 proved that the
disbarment case filed against them was just fabricated by Atty. Paras. They pointed out the
complainants' statement that they were just made to sign the complaint for disbarment by Atty.
Paras to retaliate against them for having filed a case against him for falsification of documents
which sent him to prison for some time.
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing disappointment
over the fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the disbarment case against
Francisco. The letter pertinently stated:
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against ATTY.
FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted our JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and circumstances wherein the said disbarment complaint was
prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS consisting of fabrications and not
on facts. It was upon the machination and instigation of ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, that the simple
collection case of P94,000.00 more or less, became a multifaceted case in several forums.20
(Emphasis in the original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.
The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to Admit Judicial
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 reiterating their claim that the
filing of the disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras' maneuverings and that the allegations
against the respondents stated therein were false.
After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein the
complainants cleared them of the charges of misconduct and turned the blame on their own
counsel, Atty. Paras, for allegedly having made up the allegations in the disbarment complaint.
When the IBP Board of Governors sustained the imposition of suspension to Francisco, the
complainants themselves submitted a motion to admit the said judicial affidavit to this Court,
together with a motion to dismiss and withdraw complaint.
The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the
truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for
disbarment necessarily results to Francisco's absolution. The answer is in the negative.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.22
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar by
informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional and
private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to
breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the unworthy.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants' change of heart
by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for
disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the
lawyer not only hurts the client's cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal
profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be
disciplined notwithstanding the complainant's pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long
as there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment
may proceed "regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven
so warrant."23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the
filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring
lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred
the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined.1âwphi1 "The power to
discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and
withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be, especially when we consider that the law
profession and its exercise is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring
members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only but also to
maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves
unworthy thereof."24
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against
the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle
matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The
complainants' forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the
misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented
and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated
a resolution on the basis thereof.
To be clear, "[i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant."25 In the present case, it was clearly established that Francisco received
20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms of their out-
of-court settlement for the payment of the latter's outstanding obligations. The amount was
duly received and acknowledged by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the
letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny that they
told the complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore and that they will be the
one to inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the
attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the parties, rendered
a judgment by default against the complainants. The respondents even filed a motion for
execution of the decision but still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement
between them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening
event to the trial court, hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
The complainants' belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations
stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot stand
against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. It is inexplicable how the
complainants could now claim that the respondents were blameless when the records tell
otherwise. That they were simply duped by Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he
filed on their behalf is hardly believable considering that Aida is well-lettered, being a public
school teacher. They also do not claim that they were prevented from reading the contents of
the pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged. At any rate, while it may be true that
Atty. Paras fabricated some of the facts stated in the disbarment complaint, these matters are
trivial and do not relate to the facts material to the charge of misconduct against Francisco.
What clearly appears is that the facts material to the violation committed by Francisco are well-
established notwithstanding Atty. Paras' supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.
WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon receipt of
this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with severely.
For lack of evidence of her participation in the misconduct, Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is hereby
EXONERATED of the charges against her. SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015 ]
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Benjamin F.
Baterina.
The Facts
On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano's
own counsel, Atty. Baterina.
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to
take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge's
court.
The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed
by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property involved in
the suit is a strip of land located at the northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City.
The lot was wholly owned by Tejano's family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an
access road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the provincial government's
motor pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.[2]
The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges would
hear the case before Judge Arquelada became the branch's presiding judge in 2001.[3] Prior to
his appointment to the bench, however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors
assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case
No. 4046-V.[4]
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in
the former's bid to "take possession" of their property and was "collecting rentals from
squatters who had set up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663." In support of his
accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-43004[5] covering Lot
No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada; receipts
of rents paid to Terencio Florendo,[6] sheriff at Judge Arquelada's sala at the Vigan City RTC;
receipts of rents paid to Aida Calibuso,[7] who was expressly designated by Laderas as her
attorney-in-fact[8] in collecting said rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge
Arquelada's brother.[9]
As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina "miserably failed to advance [his] cause."
Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court
pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to present evidence after several
postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and confined at the hospital;[10] (2)
manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order declaring
their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do so;[11] (3) not only failed to
file said motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would not be
presenting any witnesses without consulting his clients;[12] and (4) failed to comply with the trial
court's order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.[13]
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Jose P. Perez informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since
it only has administrative supervision over officials and employees of the judiciary. However,
Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already "being acted upon" by the OCA.[14]
In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the
complaint within 10 days from notice.[15] Failing to comply with the Court's order, Atty. Baterina
was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once again
ordered to comply with the Court's 6 July 2009 Order.[16]
In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating
from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court's
indulgence and said that his failure to comply was "not at all intended to show disrespect to the
orders of the Honorable Tribunal."[17]
Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano case.
He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial
presentation of the plaintiffs' case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for
two years.[18] He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejano's mother and sister. However,
the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer. On the contrary,
it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the
termination of the case.[19] Atty. Baterina instead points to the "displayed bias" and "undue and
conflict of interest"[20] of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano's predicament.
The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina's explanation "not satisfactory"
and admonished him "to be more heedful of the Court's directives in order to avoid delay in the
disposition of [the] case." The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation
After the proceedings, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and
Recommendation,[21] part of which reads:
First, it appears that respondent's failure to appear in representation of his clients in the said
civil case before the RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in 2001.
While this is a justified reason for his non-appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed
to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That way, the RTC would have, in the meantime, ordered
plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer. Respondent's contention that the fact of his
suspension was nonetheless circularized to all courts of the Philippines including the RTC is
unavailing. Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of his
suspension in order to protect the interests of his clients.
Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he
explained the consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek another counsel's
assistance in the meantime. Clearly therefore, respondent's inaction falls short of the diligence
required of him as a lawyer.
Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to submit
their formal offer of evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard
of the RTC's Order dated 8 November 2004. Respondent's bare excuse that he remembers
making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the records of this case clearly reveal
the contrary. Because of the said inaction of respondent, his clients' case was dismissed by the
RTC.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's acts constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary
action against him. His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is,
therefore, respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), considering
that this is his second disciplinary action. x x x.[22]
On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the Fine of Fifty
Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent is hereby deleted.[23]
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the IBP's report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Lawyers have a "fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients," and
must act "in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility."[24]
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client's cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Once a lawyer's services are engaged, "he is duty
bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence,
care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him."[25] A
lawyer's acceptance to take up a case "impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its
termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory."[26]
Atty. Baterina's duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very
least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would
be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer even one suspended from practicing the profession owes it to his client to not "sit idly
by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty."[27] The client "should never be left
groping in the dark" and instead must be "adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case."[28]
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its
course without any effort to safeguard his clients' welfare in the meantime. His failure to file
the required pleadings on his clients' behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility[29] and renders him subject to disciplinary action.[30] The penalties
for a lawyer's failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine,
suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.[31]
Further, Atty. Baterina's reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming
of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court
processes, and even for the Court's disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial
court's orders in his clients' case, he even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary
proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina's medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court
would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his
duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, "are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court."[32] As such, Atty. Baterina should "know that a resolution
of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely."[33]
Proper Penalty
In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that "the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."[34]
The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being found
guilty of gross misconduct.[35] In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty.
Baterina for failing to file her Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and
recovery of possession where she and her siblings were defendants. Because of such failure,
Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to present her evidence,
and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.
Atty. Baterina was also found to have "convert[ed] the money of his client to his own personal
use without her consent" and "deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the amount of
P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an answer with counterclaim," which he never did.
The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina's "repeated failure to comply with the
resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Supreme Court."[36]
These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to his
clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible
behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated among the members of the Bar.
For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension
period of five (5) years.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this decision to all courts.
SO ORDERED.