Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for
Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R.
Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy
of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the
Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him.6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the
case be submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative
case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than
Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court.
Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten
him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they
filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of
the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former
residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also
received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to
him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00
to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received
death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences,
i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish
respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and
(b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt
of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy
of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be
directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy
of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under
Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit
the correct and present address of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City
as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned
with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City."16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City.17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not
paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing
the comment required thereon.18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1)
DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the
arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30,
2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved
to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the
given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley
View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of
the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that
the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent
contracted the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring
him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just
ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against
him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of
service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent,
the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When
said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the
disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of
the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is
"not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays
a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the
lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.1âwphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016

SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.

VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainants Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty.
Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent) for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical
conduct in dealings with other persons.

The Facts

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand
letter2 dated February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained
not only threatening but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously
maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several
news clippings3 that were attached to the demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and
claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and
besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively
liable therefor.

In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the
verified complaint. However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's
address given by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then
ordered6 to furnish the Court the complete and correct address of respondent. Still,
complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the Court resolved,7 among
others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the
case for a mandatory conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw

Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory
hearings. Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations
"RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP
directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers together with documentary
exhibits, if any.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the
IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the
amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.12chanrobleslaw

The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified
complaint. Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the
mandatory hearings, as well as to file his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was
tantamount to defiance of the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the process, purposely
delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that respondent be held in
contempt of court.13chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the
fine imposed on him.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable based on the allegations of the verified complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a
demand for them to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words
that maligned their character. It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally
liable for worthless or bum checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement
offices revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA
NUEZCA' responded to our search being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases
and litigations. Other record check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer
disclosure in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for them
arise, [sic]

All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate
entities, for the necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law
known as the "Credit Information Systems Act of 2008."

x xxx

II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they
proved to be "worthless and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks
Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.

III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking
advantage of her helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are
also criminally liable under ART. 318, OTHER DECEITS. RPC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged
indebtedness of complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and
refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there
is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper
jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in
shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been
copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched
complainants' reputation to its recipients.

At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and
attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the
complainants remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's]
failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are
evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for
his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules of Court."18chanrobleslaw

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.19 Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are
licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.21 Thus, respondent ought to temper
his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case
of Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier22 where
respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for
employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering
that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case,
the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law should
be meted upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule

8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the
Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 6567 : April 16, 2008]

JOSE C. SABERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C.
Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for
allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the
bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of
the bank, for cancellation of the bank's registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose
from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were
given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife, despite alleged full payment of the
loan and interests.

Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with
Affirmative Defenses3 to the Petition stating, inter alia,

5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose
C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain'
x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply.

Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any
factual or legal basis," complainant filed the present complaint.

Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his
constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel
and acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his
(complainant's) wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence, there was no more
reason to continue holding the collaterals.

Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife
and "her children" who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.

In his Comment6 to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was
"nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper" in the way he used the word "blackmail" to
characterize the suit against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is
not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other party.

By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,8 IBP Investigating Commissioner
Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal.
Unless the person accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be
imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that person's act as blackmail.

Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and
to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client's claim or defense in line with his duty under
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:

A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not state his personal
belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 159 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary and
irrelevant to the case," respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of professional
conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross
misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.

By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP Board of Governors
disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.

The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the
case to this Court.11

Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition
filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B12 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for
violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court that the same be "reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
reasons on which it is based."
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the
recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed
by respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral
turpitude.

In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint
against him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and
Bonpin that he filed the Answer objected to by complainant.

Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact
which he had backed up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by
complainant and his wife against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the
allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations
made in any complaint or initiatory pleading.

Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious imputations
of wrongdoing against his clients - the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal
activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.

Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language
was used, he was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing dishonor
to it. He admits that because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up
complainant's indignation for which he asked the latter's and this Court's clemency.

In his Reply,13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment reveals the latter's propensity
to deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondent's claim that the administrative complaint
was a "harassing act," deducible from the "fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of
which has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner," is bereft of factual basis.

Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal
cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal
charges against him for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery
against him and his wife.

Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for clemency.

This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his
pleadings.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. 14

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.16
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.17 In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.18

It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not
before a court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made
by lawyers before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck down in Lubiano v.
Gordolla,19 thus:

Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations
Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law,
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought
to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.20

The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.

Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the
BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of
pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of
their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such
remark or comment.21

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have
consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be,
but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.22 The test of
relevancy has been stated, thus:

x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory

matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x.23

Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the
ascription of 'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately
related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's
alleged alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply
discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the further allegation that the
Petition was "another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for
financial gain." Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering
that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank
and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances.

Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a "Notice of
Resolution" was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice
simply stated that on January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVII-2007-036 in which it:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that
the IBP Board of Governors' decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law
on which the same is based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons
on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the
reason for the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings
with which they are not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors
has reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning.24

With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently
considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary
action, which should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly
proven serious administrative charges.25

Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a
grievous character as to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies, the
Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is
considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.

WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T.

Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He
is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty.
Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public,
for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's
office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation
of lawyer-client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and
receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of
absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular
entries in his notarial registers.7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of
his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that
involved her husband and her parents-in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the
complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed
against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client,
Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests. 9

Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same
administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was
not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno,
these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this
document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten
name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide
claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to
simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better
cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the
irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire
him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an
associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was
Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should
not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his
pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.

In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in
his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions
respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection,
a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."19

However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively
liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the
evidence presented on this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized
the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt
of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was
indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only
hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The
retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.21 But despite this previous
attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be
held liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally
unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty.
Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and
abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22

For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty.
Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and
insulting language.23

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the
evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the
Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two
years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but
this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and
accordingly confirms them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties
identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to
show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his
admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as
notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR
number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information.
However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this
document never appeared in his notarial register and was never included in his notarial
report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his
notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details
as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on
May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to
his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial
commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such
as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide
could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his
notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar
admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear
from the evidence before us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial
registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had
been irregularly numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two
4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
Disinterested Persons
Petition for Issuance of
4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
Owner's Duplicate copy
Affidavit of Parental
4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Consent
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently
bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall
keep only one active notarial register at any given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of
simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule
VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial
register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial
register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally
administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is
vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform
it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to
address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to
allow the antedating of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several
active notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of
his clients requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers
and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to
receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His
flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and
excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32

Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno,
his former law firm's client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left
ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject
matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno
with the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family
pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this
only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged
mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption
as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case
and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan
engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record
shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he
acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition
against the representation of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings

The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the
following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide
used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his
opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the
whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid
for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a
clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as
regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words — a
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any
offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even
in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty
of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is
found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16,
2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O.
Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint2 for damages
against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together
with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-
774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10,
2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R.
number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not
2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a
copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning
him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was
incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss
[your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max
Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial
stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x
x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner
not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging
enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted
services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well
as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted,
Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7,
the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos.
8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of
damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission
of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate
Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo
when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted
that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of
guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or
annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer
over a case x x x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended
the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information
would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to
warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication
between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed
to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando,
warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for
reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with
modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review

on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint
against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a
manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the
Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and
"satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however,
the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to
malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules.
Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which
should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the
event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a
member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware
that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly
improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,

constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members
of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando
transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that
his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for
damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his
violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof
from the records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant)

against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant
claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a
different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato
Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free
patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy
to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without
a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming
that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented
the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land
to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which
were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty
of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval
Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a
government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of
dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against
him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case
No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was
the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9,
2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil
Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming
opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon
filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed
against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge
Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from
the service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and
Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government
institution. However, respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT
College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his
designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except
honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no
objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted
an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who
interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to

Reply5 on 20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20
February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the
parties and denied each other's allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner
Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before
the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the
IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross
misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found
that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by
complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty
and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint
filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's
client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by
OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals;
and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a
judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP
Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. 9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and

complexion"10 and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife
of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not
foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in
filing the administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the
resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself
with vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v.
Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the
parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant
claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of
Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in
the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato
Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of
Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with
the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was
the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or
after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other
words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-
1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was
issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x
x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of
the free patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a
copy of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish
complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to
file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title
so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact
demanding an examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls
outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that
respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds
certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents
merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official
records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a
deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman
Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing
parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs
the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths
and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on
the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis
and conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are
bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the
proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the
MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete
evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal

Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-
Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a
judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
any government office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being
disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College
of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached
to his designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of
his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and
approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case
against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only
temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the
OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from
reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous
administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should
have declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of
such positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a
public office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she
continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to
comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which
merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a
certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to
the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2)
using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross
misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct

and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that
the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrar
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony
J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and
Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above
his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s
affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified
the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an
affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence.
The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that
the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other
clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to

Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that
the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the
Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial
and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for
the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the

Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice
of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their
law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing
in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9,
for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the
act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in
his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry
the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his
law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this
task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed
by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation
of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as
a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing
one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate.
Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,

BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP Board of Governors
which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further,
he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008,
submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of
18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:

1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C.

Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;

2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L.
Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;

3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to

Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;

4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;

5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez
Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;

6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and
sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;

7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco
and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;

8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita
Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;

9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao,

notarized on March 27, 2008;

10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio
and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps.
Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;

12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila
Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;

13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay
and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;

14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on
April 1, 2008;

15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development

Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;

16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda
Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;

17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to
Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and

18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and
Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who
had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who
caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see
respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on
March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.3

The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed
the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize
the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11,
2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement
of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and that any advice on
how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.5

This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter.
In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those
were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own
inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred
that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.

The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When
the case was called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent
appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that
his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper,9 to
which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial
practice.

The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as
Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was
not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that
respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of
the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an
office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining
to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard
required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his
office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s
commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of
two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended
that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he
should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple
negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.

On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of
respondent stating:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
affirmed.13

On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.

The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary
of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents
were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country.
This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public"
refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office
open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register
within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this
Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him
could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned
as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years
that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was
his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and
could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18
documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such
prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years is appropriate.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary
public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should,
thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.15 Where
the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his
secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice
law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer
to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into
his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted
therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead,
they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic
instruments would be undermined.18

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take
lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a
notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE

VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in
his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip)
and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were
done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature
affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin
to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by
Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading
to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that
the affidavits at hand were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing;
and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order
to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for
the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected
from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s

disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election
protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of
Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He
added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As
he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in
view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To
add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled “Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him
and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated
in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could
sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on
November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed
that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the
affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated

February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing
the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
 The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by
the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and
to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in
holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the
IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary
proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-hand observe
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on
the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he
had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation
in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is
that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a
mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended
the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in
court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same
here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation

in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia

Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further
administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.

No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND

NATIONALISM-OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA
ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees,
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17,
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to
and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with
the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving
the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union
leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record,
Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales,
union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30
A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were
wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents
complied with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will
not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts
as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter
the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction
of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies."4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court,
but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder
to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one
way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of
any and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132518 March 28, 2000

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT,

MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners,
vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and
CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13
December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in
an action for recovery of possession and damages.

The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.
Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to
exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No.
1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was no
partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique
situation where there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision
plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order
was registered in the Register of Deeds.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot
No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot. Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and
Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered
owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide lot No.
1639. 2 Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order 3 directing
the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows:

a) Hermogenes Olis — lot 1639-A

b) Pascual Olis — lot 1639-B

c) Bartolome Maglucot — lot 1639-C

d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot — lot 1639-D

 e) Anselmo Lara — lot 1639-E

f) Tomas Maglucot — lot 1639-F. 4

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in
1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses
on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs.
Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessors-in-
interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming
ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.

After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the
existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils (purported
owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) 5 as indubitable proof that there was a
subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-
in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for
partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of
law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its
absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to
deny the existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there
was one. 7 Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the houses of respondents,
expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a
conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter. 9

The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:

1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises

thereof and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs;

2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for

attorney's fees:

3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for
actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time
they actually vacate the premises in question;

4. To pay the costs. 10

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch
plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of
partition. 11 The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following
reversible errors:

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING

POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;

II
 IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS
AND OFFER TO BUY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT
1639-D. HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;

III

IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF
WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE;

IV

IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE

UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE
CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY
STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF
PROCEDURE; 12

Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided
among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the
subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by
Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot
himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he
averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the
partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations
covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto
Maglucot." 15 Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from
claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial
confirmation in 1952, and respondents' acquiescence because they themselves exclusively
exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. 16

For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize
that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised, or notified of the
tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the
same. 17 Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to show any court approval
of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT
No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any
encumbrance or partition whatsoever. 19

After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we
find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there
was a valid partition in 1952.

Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record." 20 This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in
that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider
the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition.

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition
which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper,
and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the
commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. 21 The first phase of a partition
and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of
all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is
not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership
does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the
parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e.,
either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final
one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 22 The second phase commences
when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In
that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity
to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." Such an order is, to be
sure, final and appealable. 23

The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing
partition is that it is final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a final determination of the
co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence,
if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the
parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot be disturbed.

The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does
it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it
is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is
something more to be done on the merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not
interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue
submitted. 25

However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella
vs. Carrascoso, 26 which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In
addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not
binding. 27 In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus,
interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by
their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the
decree, 28 especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been
incurred in the execution of the commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to
the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.

This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas
vs. Cinco. 30 In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to
submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order
appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan already
existing and tentatively followed by the parties.

Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the
court are not binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not apply in case where the
parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The
purpose of the court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the
parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made
pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the
court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the
commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising
this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision
plan.

The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to
tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied
specific portions of Lot No. 1639.33 It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No.
1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual
Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly,
after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.

From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision
plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that the court was aware that the
parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. With the factual backdrop, said court ordered the partition and
appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not
be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot
No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same
sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is
no showing that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any
objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of the
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.

It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the
partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently
permitted to avoid partition. 34 It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding
partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case
where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time.

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession
of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another
party. 35 A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. 36 In other words,
they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in
part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. 37 Parties who had received the
property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of
it. 38 Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already
occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this
action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the
other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the
sketch plan.

In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his
adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would
otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel
may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or
election by acceptance or benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by
a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no
disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own. 39 Ratification means that one
under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
knowingly made, which amounts to ratification of what was therefore unauthorized, and
becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40

The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D.
Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not
have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated
testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and,
subsequently, to Ruperta Salma was for the payment of real property taxes. We are not
persuaded. In its quite improbable that the parties would be unaware of the difference in their
treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to
show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the
records are tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that
respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily
verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.

The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the
possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an
owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. 41 Since the possession of
respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter
were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the
present action was commenced.

Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support presumption. 42 Thus,
after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. 43 It has been held
that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a
long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was
an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been
lost and were not recorded. 44 And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided
into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants
in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may
fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name
it bears. 45

Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any
partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no
partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of the
subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole
evidence of partition.

Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of
strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the
deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder. 46 As originally conceived, registration is merely a species of notice. The act of
registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and
to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that recorded instrument exist and
are genuine. 48

It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was
merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition.
By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot.
The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate
titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral
court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties.
The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that
respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the
oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual
partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having
been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition
was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance
with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the
permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-
settled. In Espina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez
vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:
 On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable

at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has actually been consummated
by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of
the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and
the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of
cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised
acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will
confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on
the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to
parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the
agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right
of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have
stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation
of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between
tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to
enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.

Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents
Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto
Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents were
built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.

On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were
informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot,
respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness
and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida Maglucot further testified that they
refused the offer because they also intend to use the lot for a residential purpose. 53 This
testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this
finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the
petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said
lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not co-
owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.

On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio
Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo
Maglucot and Regina Barot, 55 Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of Severo Maglucot
and Samni Posida 56 showing that the houses of the above-mentioned persons are constructed
on the land of Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the
same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public
documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein are presumed to be
true and accurate. 58 The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only
made to appear as owner of the land in their respective declarations because he was the
administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.

No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No.
1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the
original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said lot showing the
partition into six portions. 59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition
for review on certiorari.1âwphi1 Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to
the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study
of the law "by the researcher." 60 Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having
"sweepingly stated without reference to the record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records on
hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA
decision, stating that "this will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the
researcher." 62

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an
institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not
the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly
improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal.
Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession
regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished
for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts. 63

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174759 September 7, 2011

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First
Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine of ₱2,000.00,
the petitioners have come to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First
Division’s finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because the
language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was
contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006,1 whereby the CTA
First Division disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F.
Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT.
Each counsel is

hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT
for a period of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.2
and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,3 whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for
reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.

Antecedents

The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought
from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid
from 1995 until 2000.4 After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for
refund,5 Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield
Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor
of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.6 Surfield later amended its petition to include
its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.7

On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the
claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of
mandamus.8

Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review
(CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City
Assessor, Mandaluyong City).9 The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice
Caesar A. Casanova.

In its decision dated January 5, 2006,10 the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 25311 and Section
22612 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield,13 insisting that the CTA
had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282;14 and arguing that the
CTA First Division manifested its "lack of understanding or respect" for the doctrine of stare
decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250
SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.

On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfield’s motion for reconsideration. On the
issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section
7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals
from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the
real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was
claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning
real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a
separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.

In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the
motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they
should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be
considered as the final decision on the matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioner’s counsel that "it is gross ignorance of the
law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the
grossness of this Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal
expression of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case" and "this Court lacked
the understanding and respect for the doctrine of "stare decisis" as derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to "observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers;" they vow solemnly to conduct themselves "with all
good fidelity…to the courts." As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance." Therefore, petitioner’s
counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why
he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.15

The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,16 in which they appeared to
apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among others, "necessary to bluntly call
the Honorable Court’s attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade." 17

In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners’ apology wanting in
sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were "so strong, which brings
disrepute the Court’s honor and integrity" for brazenly pointing to "the Court’s alleged ignorance
and grave abuse of discretion," to wit:

In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel
and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Court’s
alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which
brings disrepute the Court’s honor and integrity. We quote:

a) "Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing.
However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable
Court’s attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The
advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court
in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of
dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based" (par. 3 of the
Compliance; docket, p. 349);

b) "Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored
Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that "(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or
rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the
Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3).
Hence, the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to
have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable
Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation
of undersigned counsel’s perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why
the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction"
(par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);18

Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of
court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts,
sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay ₱2,000.00 as fine.

Seeking reconsideration,19 the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct
contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to
describe the error of judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the
decision makers; (b) there was no "unfounded accusation or allegation," or "scandalous,
offensive or menacing," "intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening," or "vile, rude and
repulsive" statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no
statement in their motion for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the
administration of the law into disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their
compliance.20

Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which
declared through its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The
scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment almost always result to
the destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the Court.21

and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each
counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO, ORDERED.22

Issues

Arguing that they were merely prompted by their "(z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error"
committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the
law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding
that:

THE PETITIONERS’ LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE

WAS CONTUMACIOUS;

II

THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE

ARROGANT;

III

THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE
SUPREME COURT; AND

IV

THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT

CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict
legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division;
and that the statements described by the CTA First Division as "abrasive, offensive, derogatory,
offensive and disrespectful" should be viewed within the context of the general tone and
language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was "tempered,
restrained and respectful" and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or
as "a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court" to be penalized as direct
contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology; and that
they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and
the character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements
reflected no humility, nor were they "expressive of a contrite heart;" and that their submissions
instead "reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride
the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision."23

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not
abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.24
 Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its
discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys
thus:

Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges
provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that
regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of
In re: Almacen:25

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it
is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx

xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)26

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Here, the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a)
"[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction
over the instant petition;"27 (b) "[t]he grossness of the Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is
matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction;"28 and (c) the
"Honorable Court’s lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis."29

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting
prompt penalty.
We agree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as
attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of
gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a
serious allegation,30 and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt
because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.31 This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive
or malicious statements are not read in open court.32 Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S.
Caguioa,33 where the petitioner’s motion for clarification stated that the respondent judge’s
decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and
sophistry, the Court held that "a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is
direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice."34

In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners’ statements were
"strong, tactless and hurtful,"35 regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily
assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of their position "in a case under
consideration" and because "an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings."36

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for
the characterization that the statements were "strong, tactless and hurtful," although obviously
correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such
"strong, tactless and hurtful" statements were used to explain their client’s position in the
case.37 The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First
Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their "strong, tactless and hurtful"
language minimized on the basis that "snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels
are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter
feelings."38 By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as "totally unaware or
ignorant" of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other equally harsh
statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First
Division. To hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the
petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether
unwarranted.

The petitioners’ disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their
side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized such
disdain in the following telling words:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Court’s attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and
transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the
Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was
based.

xxx

10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section
7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that "(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the
Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of
the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally
unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was
gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as
well as, the grossness of the Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case were an
honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsel’s perception that was influenced by its
failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack
of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)39

We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the
statements had they convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft
of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions
involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This result
became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic
Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to
wit:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx

(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis
supplied)

xxx

(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)

xxx

As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the "(d)ecisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them
in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction." The provision is clearly limited to local
tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA
cognizance of appeals of the "(d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals." In its
resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained why,
contrary to the petitioners’ urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real
property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.40

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted
their blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the untenability of
their legal position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated
March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their "perception" about the CTA First
Division’s "being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3)" due to "the terseness of the Decision dated
05 January 2006," viz:

12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006,
the undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section
7(a)(3). Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in
the 05 January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned counsels to
have formed the above-mentioned perception.41 (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners’
contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige,
should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no
sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and temperate
language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate
language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should
strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by "heated and acrimonious tone," as
the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,42 to wit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of
the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to
express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive
force of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience
has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice. We therefore
bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing
attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their
contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court.1âwphi1 They threw
out self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that
all members of the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the
nobility of their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest degree of
zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between
liberty and license.43 Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that
language, though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful
as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession.44 It is always
worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that
were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not
offensive.45 No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an
officer of the Court calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or
its judge. Clearly, the petitioners’ criticism of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done in
good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.

The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of
court in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or
fail.46 We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the petitioners was
preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that attorneys and
their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners’ tone of apology was probably
feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not
merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of
₱2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and
offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.

The Court’s treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings
and other written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform.
The treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court
or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a warning (to
be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a
fine of ₱2,000.00, a fine of ₱5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as
contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel
S. Sorreda,47 the errant lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters
and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Although he
was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no separate penalty on
him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that
resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,48 the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his strong statements
to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more
circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern
warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which
declared such language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuñez v. Atty.
Arturo B. Astorga,49 Atty. Astorga was meted a ₱2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was
dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar, 50 the Court
prescribed a higher fine of ₱5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against Atty. Alar who, in his
motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC First
Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.

Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they
should "explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held
for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action,"51 the CTA First Division was content
with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1,52 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and
did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended court’s
treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine
of ₱2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration
the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second
highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted. Yet, they
are warned against using offensive or intemperate language towards a court or its judge in the
future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.

ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16,
2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and
Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to
pay the fine of ₱2,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015

TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complaint, v. ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a letter-complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
by Teodulo2 Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer.

On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint3 for forcible entry against
complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon,
Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys.
Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the
assigned attorney.5

On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and
affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be
submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the
defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision6 in favor of the
plaintiffs.7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal8 with sufficient bond.

In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the
appeal based on Section 7(b),10 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty.
Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order11 pointing out
that it had granted four motions for extension and still no appeal memorandum was filed.

On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged
that in failing to file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great
damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of
his professional duties as a lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred.

On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment.13

On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from Atty. Lavadia stating
that he cannot file a comment because he did not receive a copy of the complaint.14 The Court,
thus, required Enriquez to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days and
required the latter to file his comment within 10 days from receipt thereof.15

On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed16 the Court that he sent a copy of the complaint and
its annexes to Atty. Lavadia on December 6, 2002 as evinced by a receipt.17

Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case load and family problems as
reasons in both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the Court
giving Atty. Lavadia another 60 days within which to file his comment.19

On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to
his wife's continued illness.20 The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would be
the last extension it would grant.21

Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment within 10 days
from notice.22 Still, Atty. Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a P1,000.00
fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine and ordered him to comply with its
previous resolutions.23

Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional time to file his comment
this time stating that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife's illness which
was caused by "dark-beings." He claimed that a series of unfortunate events plagued them, i.e.,
their house was razed by a fire, the hard drive of his computer crashing, and his family
members falling ill due to a "dark being."25 The Court thus granted a 30-day extension.26

Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19, 2007 Resolution imposed
a fine of P2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment within five days from
notice.27 There is no record to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007 Resolution.

In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.28

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference29 on January
14, 2011 but both parties failed to appear.30 Parties were then ordered to submit their position
papers within ten days from receipt of the Order.

On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint having
lost his copy in a fire that razed his home.31 The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a
copy of the complaint. It also directed the parties to file their position papers within 15 days from
August 1,2011.32

In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Lavadia be
disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not
only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel
in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client's interest, he also displayed a willful,
defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the Court. By his actions
the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and responsibilities as an
attorney.

On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP CBD.34

Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36

After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the IBP that Atty. Lavadia is
administratively liable.

We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and
obligations.37 Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession's exacting standards.38 A
lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer's oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general
categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client.39 A
lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the Court's
disciplinary authority.40

In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client
and to the court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia's propensity for filing motions for extension of
time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the CPR which
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 12.03. - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing
of this complaint. In the course of this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this
Court his willful defiance and disregard for court orders.

LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03

A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.41 Lawyers are reminded
to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services
and failing to render the services is a violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also
stated that a lawyer's failure to file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the
CPR.43 We pointed to the fiduciary nature of a lawyer's duty to his client. We
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's
interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of
his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the
management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is
expected from a lawyer.44 (Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the
CPR. There, Atty. Mallari, after being granted a total of 245 days to file his client's appellant's
brief failed to file the same, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered Atty.
Mallari's act a shameless disregard of his duties as a lawyer and found him to be unfit for
membership in the noble profession.46 In the recent case of Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty.
Jimenez was found administratively liable for failing to file the appellant's brief on behalf of his
client.

Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the
preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to
discharge his duties. He failed to file his client's position paper rendering his client in default.
While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal
memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the
appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly
transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.

As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the appeal
memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted
him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal
memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly
asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is
liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11

Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the
court and its judicial officers. We read this provision in relation to Rules 10.0349 and 12.03 of the
CPR for this rule does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.

In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in Sebastian v.

Bajar51 where we stated that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent's conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays
a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent's deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to their processes. (Citations omitted).

The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to
file his comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty.
Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and
requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court's resolutions. In
fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his
repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight years, this
Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for extension to
file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.

While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his
act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court.
This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge
his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa52 the Court's Resolution is
not a mere request. A lawyer's blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court's orders
underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave Atty. Lavadia every
opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to fail to
do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court's orders merits disciplinary action.

We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez53 that the determination of whether an attorney should be
disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension
and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading.

In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia's first infraction. However, given his
proven propensity for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this
Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clients engage
his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the
gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude towards
the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP
appropriate.cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating
Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014

EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE

BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainants Euprocina I.

Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie
Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D.
Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him
with making false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in
disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.cra1awredjgc

The Facts

Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties) in

Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International Development
Corp. (Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and construction defects3 in the housing units
and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the
monthly amortizations they had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein
complainants Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10, 2002,
while the second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan8 on March 3,
2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M. Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and
Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by
herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.

Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission
cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review13 before the
HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said
petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated
that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that
Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on
September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).15

On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another
complaint16 against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and
the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the
certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its Credit and
Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan,17 Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not
aware of any action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal
or agency.18 The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment,
plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of
Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum
shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any
knowledge of any similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.21

On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was
its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings
have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or
agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein
complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment
complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition,
complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he
only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against
forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment.22

Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative charges
against him.23

In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 200524 and May 12,
2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment26 on the ground that its
statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the
existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.cra1awredjgc

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty.
Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.

The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that
the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps.
Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said
complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May
24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its
existence, more so, since both complaints involve the same transaction and essential facts,
and a decision on the rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment
complaint.28 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno
cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the
notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications
against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be
held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.29

In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended
penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively
liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month.cra1awredjgc

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.

Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v.
CA32 as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement
should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the
certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with
the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.33cralawlawlibrary

Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification
against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring
counsel to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be
held administratively liable.

Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions
for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases
without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment
case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission
cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint
for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as
well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally,
on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against
the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum
shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.

Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno –
as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even
bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be
imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law was
imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false and
untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a
similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion,
had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.

Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a
separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the
document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.35 Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e.,
that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability
of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 36 to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it,
the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of
the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had
his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a
period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to
additionally impose the same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the
multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the
office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify
him from being commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded
that:38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument.

xxxx

When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand
and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should
surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given
without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a
graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of
his unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false

declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as
malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he
is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his
notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6681, June 17, 2015

VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II, Complainant, v. ATTY. NESTOR C.

BARBOSA, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-7051 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) in Administrative Case No. 6681. This Resolution imposed on Atty. Nestor
C. Barbosa (respondent) the penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for
violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedent Facts

A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis
(Rodis) against her father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P.
Canaco (Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of
live birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of
live birth that she was married to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San Fernando,
Camarines Sur when no such marriage took place.

On April 24, 2002, an Information2 was filed against Canaco for violation of Sections 1 and 2 in
relation with Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 651.3 Particularly, Canaco was charged of
"willfully, unlawfully and knowingly making false statements in the Certificate of Live Birth form
for her son Victor P. Delos Santos who was born on June 30, 1982 by falsely stating that she
was married to the father of her son, RICARDO P. DELOS SANTOS on September 1, 1974."4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 111152 and assigned to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 43 of Quezon City.

At the preliminary conference held on May 24, 2004, the respondent, as counsel de parte of
Canaco, objected to the Prosecution's offer in evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of
Victor Canaco Delos Santos. As a result, the MeTC issued an order resetting the preliminary
conference to October 19, 2004 in order to give the prosecution time to file a certified true copy
of the birth certificate.

On May 25, 2004, the respondent sent letters5 dated May 24, 2004 to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital.
The pertinent portions of these letters state:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RE: ALLEGED CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH CODED AS
6826111, COVERED BY REGISTERED NUMBER 2499 LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, QUEZON
CITY.

There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of Certificate of Live Birth
above indicated which refers to one certain VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this
connection, please be guided by provisions of our existing laws regarding possible violation of
the secrecy and confidentiality of records.

Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists, please be guided that my
client, VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS, has never authorized anybody to secure a copy,
Xerox or otherwise, and only upon his written authority and with undersigned counsel's
signature and verification may a copy be officially reproduced, if any exist.

Under penalty of law. This May 24, 2004.

(signed)
ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA
Counsel for Victor Canaco De Los Santos
Room 402, PNB Building,
City of Naga

Noted by:

(signed)
Victor C. De Los Santos" [Emphasis supplied.]
On October 19, 2004, the MeTC noted the manifestation of the complainant that they failed to
secure a certified true copy of the birth certificate of the accused's son because of the
respondent's letter. Thus, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum ordering the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to produce a certified true
copy of the live birth of Victor Canaco delos Santos who alleged to have been born on June 30,
1982 under Registry No. LCR 2499.

Canaco, through the respondent, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated October
19, 2004 directing the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum. In its order dated
July 8, 2005, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II [herein complainant (brother of Rodis and son of
Delos Santos, Sr.)] filed a complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent for obstruction
of justice.6

In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of his client Canaco's son is
VICTOR C. DE LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR P. DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the
Information charging Canaco with violation of Presidential Decree No. 651. Thus, the
respondent vehemently denied that he intentionally intended to delay and obstruct the
proceedings in the MeTC.7

The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for insufficiency of evidence.8

The Case

On February 22, 2005, the complainant filed a Petition for Disbarment9 with the Court, charging
the respondent with multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional
Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and delaying the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152
against Canaco.

The complainant alleged that the respondent's act of sending out the letters dated May 24, 2004
was criminally and maliciously done to delay, impeded, obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the
prosecution of Canaco, who is the respondent's client.10

The complainant further contended that the respondent's letters were not justified by any
tenable and lawful defense11 and were made to suppress and conceal the subject birth record to
impair its availability, authenticity, verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No.
111152 before the MeTC.

Lastly, the complainant submitted that the acts of respondent constituted multiple gross
violations of his oath as a lawyer, of the Canons of Professional Ethics, and of his duties as an
attorney under the Rules of Court.12

In his Comment-Opposition13 dated June 8, 2005, the respondent argued that the complainant
is a disgruntled litigant whose series of cases, filed together with his group, had all been
dismissed and the respondent was the opposing counsel in these dismissals.14

The respondent further asserted that this case is a violation of the rule on forum shopping since
it is the tenth case pending on the same set of facts.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution15 dated August 24, 2005, we referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation. In her Report and Recommendation,16 IBP Commissioner Lolita A.
Quisumbing found the respondent administratively liable for violating his oath as a lawyer and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Commissioner opined
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent's acts of objecting to the offer in evidence of a photocopy of the birth certificate of
Victor C. De Los Santos which necessitated the postponement of the preliminary conference in
order to afford the prosecution the opportunity to secure a certified true copy thereof was a
calculated ploy to delay the successful prosecution of the case. To guarantee its further delay,
on the same day of the preliminary conference; i.e., on 24 May 2004, he prepared the letter
addressed to the Office of the Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office and St.
Luke's Hospital to prevent or delay the issuance of the certified true copy of the birth certificate.
Such conduct is unethical, improper and inexcusable.17

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent acts of (1) writing and sending out the letter
dated 24 May 2004 and of (2) deliberately misleading the MeTC, the Supreme Court and
this Commission into believing that Victor Canaco De Los Santos (accused's son whose
birth certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in
the Information) are two (2) different persons as constituting gross violation of his oath
as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent's acts were
unethical, improper and committed with no other prompt and efficient disposition of the case.
Lawyers are reminded that as officers of the court, they have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Barbosa be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a Resolution19 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. However, the IBP Board of
Governors modified the IBP Commissioner's recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year to six (6) months.

Atty. Barbosa moved to reconsider the BOG resolution. In a Resolution20 dated December 11,
2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law to a period of only three months.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

After a careful study of the records, the Court approves the findings of the IBP Commission and
the IBP Board of Governors, but resolves to modify the recommended penalty of suspension
from the practice of law to a period of one (1) year.

Unduly Delaying the Proceedings

Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03 also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not,
for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause."

Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise states that "[a]
lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes."

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.21 A
lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy
and efficient administration of justice.22

In the present case, in disregard of the METC's intent to expedite the proceedings through its
Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital to prevent the
prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos
Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow the
prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent committed willful
disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the
proceedings in the criminal case.

Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client

Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe candor, fairness, and
good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice.23

In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the Commission and this Court into
believing that Victor Canaco De Los Santos (Canaco's son whose birth certificate is at issue in
the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information) are different persons.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Commissioner that the difference in the middle
initial is a mere typographical error on the part of the City Prosecutor. The criminal case
involved one and the same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth certificate has been at
issue.

Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission, that might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 24

In Molina v. Magat,25 the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law was
imposed against the lawyer who made false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings.
Here, the respondent committed breaches of ethical rules beyond what was committed in
Molina; his defiance and willful disobedience to a lawful order of the MeTC and the act of
misleading the MeTC, the Commission, and this Court as to the identity of his client
constitute gross violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

For clearly falling short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court finds that the appropriate penalty should be a suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year as originally recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C.

Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and
Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Public Information Office, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be prominently posted in the
Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution shall forthwith be suspended from the practice
of law and shall formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started. He shall furnish
all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance a copy of this
manifestation.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5325, February 09, 2016

NEMESIO FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROY PRULE

EDIZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty.
Ediza) administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court upheld the findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six
months.
Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint/Affidavit1 dated 8 September 2000 filed by the
spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran (complainants). The subject of the complaint was a
3.5525 hectare parcel of unregistered land located in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
which was covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal, a relative, who gave the
property to complainants.

From the records, the Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them
to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of
complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds
given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants into thinking that he would register, using
the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. These actions, which deprived
complainants of their property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a member of the
legal profession.

The Court, in its Decision dated 19 October 2011, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of
law for six months, effective upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to
complainants the two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal into signing; and
(3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38, representing the
amount he deceived them into paying him, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully
paid. The Court further warned Atty. Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Thereafter, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration2 dated 18 November 2011 which was
denied by the Court in a Resolution3 dated 8 February 2012 for lack of substantial merit.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Manifestation of Compliance (On the Order of Suspension)4 dated 29
May 2012 through the Office of the Bar Confidant. He also attached a sworn
statement5 attesting that he desisted from the practice of law for six months from receipt of the
decision on 18 November 2011 until 29 May 2012.

In a Resolution6 dated 3 September 2012, the Court deferred action on the Manifestation of
Compliance and adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty.
Ediza be required to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local Chapter where he is a member
and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his profession, both stating that he
had desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; and (2) show
proof of payment to complainants of P125,463.38 plus legal interest, and the return of the two
sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign. The Court also
required complainants to manifest whether Atty. Ediza had already paid the said amount and
returned the said documents.

In an undated letter written in the vernacular, complainants wrote the Court that Atty. Ediza had
yet to comply with the Court's Decision and asked the Court's assistance in implementing the
same. Later, in a Verified Compliance with Manifestation executed with the assistance of the
Public Attorney's Office, complainants informed the Court that as of 17 October 2012, Atty.
Ediza had not paid any single centavo and neither had he returned the required documents.

In a Resolution7 dated 25 February 2013, the Court noted the manifestations and further
ordered Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in
contempt and to comply with the Decision.

In a Manifestation Showing Cause8 dated 22 April 2013, Atty. Ediza claimed that he had no
intention to defy the Court's authority or challenge its orders and that he had served his
suspension, but asked the Court to consider that the two sets of documents were merely
fictional. He also claimed that he was at a loss as to which 'documents' the Decision was
referring to because the same were supposedly not alleged with particularity and he had been
barred by the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline from requesting a bill
of particulars. Atty. Ediza alleged that due to the ambiguity about the 'documents,' the judgment
was incomplete and unenforceable. Moreover, Atty. Ediza claimed that the alleged lack of due
process in the administrative case rendered the entire proceedings void; and consequently,
even the order to pay the sum should be stricken off.
The Court, in its 15 July 2013 Resolution,9 found this last explanation unsatisfactory and further
required Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision within ten days from notice,
warning him of a more severe penalty in the event of his continued failure to do so.

On 22 November 2013, the Office of the Chief Justice received a handwritten letter, in the
vernacular, from complainants requesting information on the status of the administrative case.
Again, complainants wrote the Court two letters in February 2014, one dated 5 February and
another an undated letter received by the Court on 18 February, requesting for the immediate
resolution and information on the status of the administrative case.

The Court, in its 4 June 2014 Resolution,10 noted this last letter from complainants and required
Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be held in contempt for
failure to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision, and again ordered him to conform to the
same.

Meanwhile, on 13 July 2014, complainants again wrote the Office of the Chief Justice reiterating
Atty. Ediza's failure to comply with the Court's directives, and noted that it had been 17 years
since the dispute with Atty. Ediza began.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Compliance with a Motion to Reopen/Reinvestigate the Case dated 2
August 2014, claiming that he had discovered new evidence which would prove that
complainants had been engaging in fraudulent schemes that resulted in him being victimized.
Briefly, Atty. Ediza claimed that complainants never had ownership over the subject property,
and that when they initially sought his services in preparing the document that would effect the
sale and conveyance of the land in their favor, they employed the aid of a poseur to
misrepresent the real Sartiga Epal, the supposed transferor of the property. Atty. Ediza attached
the affidavits of allegedly the surviving spouse and sons of Sartiga Epal to substantiate said
averments.

In its 12 November 2014 Resolution, the Court denied the motion to reopen/reinvestigate the
case for lack of merit and again required Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011
Decision within five days from notice.

On 5 January 2015, the Office of the Chief Justice received another letter from complainants,
requesting the issuance of a writ of execution. In the meantime, Atty. Ediza filed on 7 February
2015 a Manifestation and Motion, asking the Court to stay the execution of the 19 October 2011
Decision insofar as it required the return of money and documents to complainants, and to note
his service of the suspension and lift the same.

More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, Atty.
Ediza has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his
profession both stating that he has desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to
29 May 2012; (2) pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3)
return the two sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign.

The Court issued numerous Resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25 February 2013, 15 July
2013, 4 June 2014, and 12 November 2014, requiring Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October
2011 Decision and show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be held in
contempt for his failure to abide by the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and
blatantly disregarded and obstinately defied these orders from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza
responded by (1) claiming ignorance over the documents stated in the Decision, and worse,
adjudged that the documents were fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered evidence; (3)
demanding to stay the execution of the Decision; and (4) reporting that he has complied with the
order of suspension without submitting any required certifications from the IBP and the Office of
the Executive Judge.

The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to
the Court which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed
upon him, despite the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his
administrative liability. In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores,11 the Court held that its resolutions should
not be construed as mere requests from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and
completely. The failure of Atty. Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his
character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful orders and directives.

As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes
of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN
THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.

In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite
the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to
stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in
following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision over him. In Martinez v.
Zoleta,12 we held that the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative
complaints. It bears stressing that a disregard of Court directives constitutes grave or serious
misconduct13 and gross or willful insubordination14 which warrant disciplinary sanction by this
Court.15

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional authority is Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer
from the practice of law. The provision states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, we are aware that the power to disbar is
one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the
Court.16 However, Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and unwillingness to comply with the Court's
directives, which we deem to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar,
warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court.17 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest
degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession.18 Clearly, Atty.
Ediza's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and
his name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of respondent. Further, let other copies be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.

VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
 Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that
he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed
no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses,
the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and
place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,
1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-
20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of
the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed
upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety
and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed
from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act;
and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,
his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in
person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and
candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time
to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
—

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure
you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam
in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast
out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also
to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,

generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
 Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify
their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that
even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its
truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end,
after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in
thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow.
As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between
 forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the
reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth
to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to
have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same

petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
 Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of

right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need
for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew —
or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period
of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he
did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu
Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by

Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice
shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of
a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear
that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he
loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire
Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him
in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6
F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -
all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or

publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming
a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely
to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips
of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit
Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is
his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June
26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism
of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence
in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations
then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95
Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous

publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could
be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law
the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public
confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is

protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall
be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not
appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of

the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right,
and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting
to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
 judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends
to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to
the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of

prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking
man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as
well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such
right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply
than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine
after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct
in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we
have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect
in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard
to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced
by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer,
with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive,
vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress
in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned
by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent
his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on
the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
 for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act,
and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings
of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court,
for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said
the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,

constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3
N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a
sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in
reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect
much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and
mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of
mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to
the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient
lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of
the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the
bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts
of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable
nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless
illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional

contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i
local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put
an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming
session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in

the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision
of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this
Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be

respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed
from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
 the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference
to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court
as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members
of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may
still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts

in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution
of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions
as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only
blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only
be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves
whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should
the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge
the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range
from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70) - LAWYERS' DUTY

FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his
client by Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual “peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”
 He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to
argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent
injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that:
“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which
Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his
client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on
he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment.
For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on
the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August
17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on
Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by
Court of Appeals.

HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
“professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the
practice of law until further orders.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE

PROSECUTOR.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144,
entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P.
Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer
to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution
was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the
counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected
thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion
perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the
cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix
the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which
motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003,
respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the
Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder
suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a
bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when
the evidence of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the
case for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would
file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent
and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court
on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for
the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only
for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the
presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation
of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press
conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why
he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr.
Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the
case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's
Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss.
For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a
semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting
that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and
quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was
caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt
of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered
to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent
to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in
contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the
interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00
and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and
2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent
allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does
not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed
ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly
prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered
him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in
contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However,
respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by
someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment
does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was
interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response during
the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was
not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly

violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the
Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10

The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2,
2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon
ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay
pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind
yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro,
ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the
law should be disbarred. That's it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug
sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso
nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan
siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon
na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining
iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the
law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to
insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his
law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the
law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a
look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako
nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa
dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was
"given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00
as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon
siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal."
Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross
ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya
sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an
nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang
akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a
judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In
fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder . . . .)

xxx
 BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa
may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong
pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa
balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa
intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw
Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law . .
..

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to
humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because
he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong
with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a
judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all
and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of
law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan

kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the
problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga
ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka
Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko
nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are
ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been
reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is
studying mahjong.11

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in
the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under
Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the
same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus,
it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the
Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005,
together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order
dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim.
Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the
requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be
heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard
of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross
misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or
willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional
career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral
fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to
the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing
the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144
was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for
redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his
disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law,
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he
was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica19 held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an
officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which
he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014

MELODY R. NERY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
(Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for
making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.

The Facts

In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged
the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien
adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to
Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could
represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a
marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana
₱100,000.00, in installment: (a) ₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) ₱50,000.00 on 2
October 2008; and (c) ₱40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts
since she trusted Sampana.

On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the
petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they
needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was
set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not
receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12
March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the
petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in
the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the
₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth
₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for
adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the
₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.

In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner
Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during
the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position papers.

In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.

On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,5 Sampana argued that Nery’s
allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving "one
package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana
alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status
and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana
suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended
[adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the
documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract,
but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not
file it because he was still waiting for the certification.

Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition
for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any
case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal
services and actual expenses.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of

malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing
to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report and recommendation, as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a petition
for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio
Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and ORDERED
to RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos with
legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.7

The Ruling of the Court

The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the dutyof fidelity to the client’s cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to the court,
their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client thatmay come
into his possession.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and
flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to
her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.11

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the
status of the petition.1âwphi1 He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept
the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon
demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.12

This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana,13 we
already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon
him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a
repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after receiving the filing
and partial service fee. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous
rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty for Sampana’s malpractice and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) years.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the
time of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then
6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015

MICHAEL RUBY, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO AND ATTY. RUDOLPH

DILLA BAYOT, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Michael Ruby (complainant) with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Erlinda B.
Espejo (Atty. Espejo) and Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot (Atty. Bayot) (respondents) for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The complainant alleged that he and his mother, Felicitas Ruby Bihla (Felicitas), engaged the
services of the respondents in connection with a case for cancellation and nullification of deeds
of donation. Pursuant to the retainer agreement2 dated August 29, 2009, the complainant and
Felicitas would pay Atty. Espejo the amount of P100,000.00 as acceptance fee, P70,000.00 of
which was actually paid upon the signing of the agreement and the remaining P30,000.00 to be
paid after the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The complainant and Felicitas likewise agreed to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as appearance
fee for every hearing, which was apparently later reduced to P4,000.00.

On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of P50,000.00 as
payment for filing fee.3 On September 16, 2009, Atty. Espejo filed the complaint for nullification
and cancellation of deeds of donation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 219. However, the actual filing fee that was paid by her only amounted to
P7,561.00;4 she failed to account for the excess amount given her despite several demand
letters5 therefor.

On September 23, 2009, Atty. Espejo allegedly asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the
amount of P30,000.00 – the remaining balance of the acceptance fee agreed upon –
notwithstanding that the prayer for the issuance of a TRO has yet to be heard. The complainant
asserted that the same was not yet due, but Atty. Espejo told him that Atty. Bayot was in dire
need of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the amount of P8,000.00 supposedly as
partial payment for the balance of the acceptance fee and an additional P4,000.00 as
appearance fee for the September 22, 2009 hearing.6cralawlawlibrary

On September 25, 2009, Atty. Espejo called the complainant informing him of the need to file a
separate petition for the issuance of a TRO. She allegedly asked for P50,000.00 to be used as
“representation fee.” The complainant was able to bargain with Atty. Espejo and gave her
P20,000.00 instead.7cralawlawlibrary

Meanwhile, on September 24, 2009, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the complainant’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO. The complainant alleged that the respondents failed to
apprise him of the denial of his prayer for the issuance of a TRO; that he only came to know of
said denial on November 3, 2009 when he visited the RTC.9cralawlawlibrary

On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited the amount of P4,000.00 to the bank account
of Atty. Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons through
publications, which was set at 2:00 p.m. on even date. However, Atty. Bayot allegedly did not
appear in court and instead met with the complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice, telling them that he already talked to the clerk of court who assured him that the court
would grant their motion.10cralawlawlibrary

Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to update him as to the status of his
complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their counsel.
Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of the complainant and
that he was merely a collaborating counsel.

In its Order11 dated January 7, 2010, the IBP-CBD directed the respondents to submit their
respective answers to the complaint.

In his Answer,12 Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not the counsel of the complainant; that he
merely assisted him and Atty. Espejo. He averred that Atty. Espejo, with the complainant’s
consent, sought his help for the sole purpose of drafting a complaint. He pointed out that it was
Atty. Espejo who signed and filed the complaint in the RTC.13cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Bayot further pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement that was entered
into by the complainant, Felicitas, and Atty. Espejo. He also denied having any knowledge as to
the P50,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo as filing fees.14cralawlawlibrary

As to the P12,000.00 that was given him, he claimed that he was entitled to P4,000.00 thereof
since the said amount was his appearance fee. He pointed out that he appeared before the
RTC’s hearing for the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009. On the other hand, the
P8,000.00 was paid to him as part of the acceptance fee, which was then already due since the
RTC had already heard their prayer for the issuance of a TRO.15cralawlawlibrary

He also denied any knowledge as to the P20,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo purportedly
for “representation fee” that would be used to file a new petition for the issuance of a
TRO.16cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Bayot admitted that he was the one who drafted the motion to serve summons through
publication, but pointed out that it was Atty. Espejo who signed and filed it in the RTC. He also
admitted that he was the one who was supposed to attend the hearing of the said motion, but
claimed that he was only requested to do so by Atty. Espejo since the latter had another
commitment. He denied requesting from the complainant the amount of P4,000.00 as
appearance fee, alleging that it was the latter who insisted on depositing the same in his bank
account.17cralawlawlibrary

During the said hearing, Atty. Bayot claimed that when he checked the court’s calendar, he
noticed that their motion was not included. Allegedly, the clerk of court told him that she would
just tell the judge to consider their motion submitted for resolution.18cralawlawlibrary

On the other hand, Atty. Espejo, in her Answer,19 denied asking for P50,000.00 from the
complainant as filing fees. She insisted that it was the complainant who voluntarily gave her the
money to cover the filing fees. She further alleged that she was not able to account for the
excess amount because her files were destroyed when her office was flooded due to a
typhoon. She also denied having asked another P50,000.00 from the complainant as
“representation fee,” asserting that the said amount was for the payment of the injunction bond
once the prayer for the issuance of a TRO is issued.

Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

On May 3, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation,20 which recommended the penalty of censure against the respondents. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Bayot and the complainant had a lawyer-client
relationship notwithstanding that the former was not the counsel of record in the case. That his
admission that he was a collaborating counsel was sufficient to constitute a lawyer client
relationship. Moreover, considering that Atty. Bayot initially received the amount of P12,000.00
from the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner opined that he can no longer deny that
he was the lawyer of the complainant. The Investigating Commissioner further found
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Parenthetically, Respondents had asked and demanded prompt payment of their attorney’s fees
or appearance fees and even asked for amounts for dubious purposes yet they, just the same,
performed their duties to their clients leisurely and lethargically. Worse, when the trusting
Complainant had noticed that his case was headed for disaster and wanted Respondents to
explain their obviously slothful and listless services, they disappeared or became evasive thus
fortifying the conclusion that they indeed have performed and carried out their duties to
Complainant way below the standards set by the Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility.21
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nevertheless, the Investigating Commissioner found that the complainant failed to prove that he
indeed suffered injury as a result of the respondents’ conduct and, accordingly, should only be
meted the penalty of censure.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,22 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification
that the penalty imposed upon Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot was increased from censure to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Atty. Bayot moved to reconsider the Resolution dated March 20, 2013 issued by the IBP Board
of Governors.23 The complainant likewise filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the IBP
Board of Governors to order the respondents to refund to him the amount he paid to the
respondents.24 In the meantime, Atty. Espejo passed away.25cralawlawlibrary

On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,26 which dismissed the
case insofar as Atty. Espejo in view of her demise. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed Atty.
Bayot’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.

On December 3, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution,27 which, inter alia, considered the case
closed and terminated as to Atty. Espejo on account of her death. Accordingly, the Court’s
disquisition in this case would only be limited to the liability of Atty. Bayot.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Bayot violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which would warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court modifies the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.

Atty. Bayot claimed that he is not the counsel of record of the complainant in the case before the
RTC. He pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement entered into by the
complainant and Atty. Espejo. Thus, Atty. Bayot claimed, the complainant had no cause of
action against him.

The Court does not agree.

It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the counsel of record in the case that was filed in the
RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact that it was only Atty. Espejo who signed the retainer
agreement. However, the evidence on record, including Atty. Bayot’s admissions, points to the
conclusion that a lawyer-client relationship existed between him and the complainant.

Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC. He was
likewise the one who prepared the motion to serve summons through publication. He likewise
appeared as counsel for the complainant in the hearings of the case before the RTC. He
likewise advised the complainant on the status of the case.
More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received P8,000.00, which is part of the
acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement, from the complainant. It is true that it was
Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the said amount. However, Atty.
Bayot admitted that he accepted from the complainant the said P8,000.00 without even
explaining what the said amount was for.

The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client relationship existed

between Atty. Bayot and the complainant. “Documentary formalism is not an essential element
in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in
any matter pertinent to his profession.”28 Further, acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.29 Accordingly, as regards the case before the RTC,
the complainant had two counsels – Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.cralawred

xxxx

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Accordingly, Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the
latter informed of the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or
property collected or received from the complainant. He may be held administratively liable for
any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in his dealing with the complainant.

In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,30 the Court emphasized that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected
of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client
and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a
lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his
possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his
own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of
a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to
a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.31 (Citations omitted)

Nevertheless, the administrative liability of a lawyer for any infractions of his duties attaches
only to such circumstances, which he is personally accountable for. It would be plainly unjust if
a lawyer would be held accountable for acts, which he did not commit.

The Investigating Commissioner’s findings, which was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors,
did not make a distinction as to which specific acts or omissions the respondents are each
personally responsible for. This is inequitable since either of the respondents may not be held
personally liable for the infractions committed by the other.

Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for the failure to account for and return the excess of the
P50,000.00 which was paid by the complainant for the filing fees. The evidence on record
shows that it was Atty. Espejo alone who received the said amount and that she was the one
who paid the filing fees when the complaint was filed with the RTC. That Atty. Bayot had no
knowledge of the said amount paid by the complainant for the filing fees is even admitted by the
complainant himself during the proceedings before the IBP-
CBD, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ATTY. BAYOT: So, Atty. Espejo ask you for P50,000[.00] as filing fee.

MR. RUBY: Admitted.

ATTY. BAYOT: That when he asked you about that, Atty. Bayot was not present.

MR. RUBY: Admitted.cralawred

xxxx

ATTY. BAYOT: That later on you gave Atty. Espejo the P50,000[.00].

MR. RUBY: Admitted.

ATTY. BAYOT: That Atty. Bayot was not also present at that time.

MR. RUBY: Admitted.cralawred

xxxx

ATTY. BAYOT: That never did Atty. Bayot ask you or followed-up from you the P50,000[.00]
that Atty. Espejo was asking as filing fee?

MR. RUBY: Admitted.cralawred

xxxx

MR. RUBY: You have nothing to do with the P50,000[.00] that was Atty. Espejo.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, in her Answer, Atty. Espejo admitted that she was the one who failed to account for the
filing fees, alleging that the files in her office were destroyed by flood. Likewise, the demand
letters written by the complainant, which were seeking the accounting for the ?50,000.00 filing
fee, were all solely addressed to Atty. Espejo. Clearly, Atty. Bayot may not be held
administratively liable for the failure to account for the filing fees.

Atty. Bayot cannot also be held liable for the P20,000.00 which Atty. Espejo asked from the
complainant for “representation fee.” The complainant failed to adduce any evidence that would
establish that Atty. Bayot knew of and came into possession of the said amount paid by the
complainant.

On the other hand, Atty. Bayot is legally entitled to the P8,000.00 he received from the
complainant on September 23, 2009, the same being his share in the acceptance fee agreed to
by the complainant in the retainer agreement. He is likewise legally entitled to the P4,000.00
from the complainant on even date as it is the payment for his appearance fee in the hearing for
the issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009.

However, Atty. Bayot is not entitled to the P4,000.00 which the complainant deposited to his
bank account on October 23, 2009. Atty. Bayot admitted that there was no hearing scheduled
on the said date; their motion to serve summons through publication was not included in the
RTC’s calendar that day. Accordingly, Atty. Bayot is obliged to return the said amount to the
complainant.

As regards the complainant’s charge of gross neglect against Atty. Bayot, the Court finds the
same unsubstantiated. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.33cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by
the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license. Considering, however, the serious
consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon
a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar.

The complainant merely alleged that, after the hearing on the motion to serve summons through
publication, the respondents had “made themselves scarce” and failed to update him on the
status of the case before the RTC. However, other than his bare allegations, the complainant
failed to present any evidence that would show that Atty. Bayot was indeed remiss in his duties
to the complainant.

However, the complainant’s November 4, 2009 letter34 to Atty. Espejo tells a different story. In
the said letter, the complainant asked Atty. Espejo to withdraw as being the counsel of record in
the case before the RTC in favor of Atty. Bayot since he was the one who actually prepared the
pleadings and attended the hearings of their motions. In any case, the charge of neglect
against Atty. Bayot was premature, if not unfair, considering that, at that time, the case
before the RTC was still in the early stages; the pre-trial and trial have not even started
yet. That they lost their bid for the issuance of a TRO is not tantamount to neglect on the part of
Atty. Bayot.

However, Atty. Bayot is not entirely without fault. This administrative complaint was brought
about by his intervention when the complainant sought the legal services of Atty. Espejo. Atty.
Bayot undertook to prepare the complaint to be filed with the RTC and the motion to serve
summons through publication, attended the hearings, and advised the complainant as to the
status of the case without formally entering his appearance as counsel of record. He was able
to obtain remuneration for his legal services sans any direct responsibility as to the progress of
the case. Atty. Bayot is reminded to be more circumspect in his dealings with clients.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot is hereby ADMONISHED to exercise more prudence
and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to return to Michael Ruby within
fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) representing his
appearance fee received from the latter on October 23, 2009 with a warning that failure on his
part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S.

TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND
ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P.
CALUYA, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C.

Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation
of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon
City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil
action they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They
caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the
notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No.
8261),2 the complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No.
251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24,
2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell
the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the
complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the
plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio,
Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its
order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants' lack of objection thereto and the
defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May
16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone
calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the
annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
N-290546; and (2) the arinotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants' Motion to
Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to
Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon
Ricafort who had signed the letter.

Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries
PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March
30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting
documents on or before such scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose
whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid
him for his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their
case. They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens without a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty.
Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11

Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert
Torres had been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which
included the mediation process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in
the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into
entering the agreement in the same way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions
contained therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in
good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he
should not be held responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such as that before
the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had received
from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the
RTC.

In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom
he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized
the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no
knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and
that the present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against
him with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him.

Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr.,
another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of
official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no
irregularity occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party,
thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another
sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and
was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same
parties and rested on similar allegations against the respondents.

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate
the arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he
adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment.19

Ruling

We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his
conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity
and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to
disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to
establish any censurable conduct against them.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the
general duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science
stamps and that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. 21 A purely ministerial
act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely
ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to
see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala,
Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC
order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine
documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found the
same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it became
obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not
bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the
matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within
the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or
invalidity of a document registered by the Register of Deeds.

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with
each other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the
amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty.
Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated
May 16, 2008.

The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy

because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an
act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing
evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the
dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to
support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active
pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had
themselves entered into.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation
as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their
counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty.
Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half
of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing
to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was
concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters
subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly
stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to
assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged
failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to
enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to
come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T.
Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of:
(1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information received from his client;1 and
(2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.2

In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the
legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty.
Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido
Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he
obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the
Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana
asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez,
Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana)
and had instigated the complaint for this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003,
IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for
representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract
which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Cañete,
respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale
executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by
complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent
nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in view
of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the
absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting
employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x

xxx

Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same property,
the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on
behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which his duty to another client
requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted,
respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and
valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)3

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.4

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules.5 The IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors
denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote
a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted below:

Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."7 The
prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client
that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to
use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."9

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is
present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Thus, if a
lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other
client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still another test
is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.10 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm -
_ftn [emphasis ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty.
Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest
over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana,
the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s
favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over
the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had
knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the
defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of
Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in
the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose
the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously
retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an

exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to
Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana
did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he
accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that although
Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse
claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim;
Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as
counsel by Zenaida Cañete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain
the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense
of representing conflicting interests.12

We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the
charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for
representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense
is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a
specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained
allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida
Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.
has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.13 He also averred in
his Answer that:

6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on
behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked
[the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex "4")
to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored
it. Neither did she object to respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the
ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint
against her.14 1âwphi1

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana,
as shown by the above circumstances.

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.16 In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.17 This is all that we did in this
case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court
allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient
towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9537 June 10, 2013

(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)

DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee)
against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489,
now A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004 until
January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00).2

Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if
the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He claimed
that Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward from the Bureau
of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she claimed to be not in
the business of lending money, the former initially refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando
allegedly persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will issue
postdated checks and sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of
Mejorado and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty. Simando was
quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo,
gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang
buwan ito, bayad ka na."3

Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the
latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts of
money. Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit:4

Date: Amount
November 11, 2006 Php 400,000.00
November 24, 2006 200,000.00
November 27, 2006 400,000.00
December 7, 2006 200,000.00
December 13, 2006 200,000.00
Total: Php1,400,000.00

When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed
and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee
instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch
with Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action.
However, even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked
Atty. Simando why no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that
he was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di
kasuhan din ninyo ako!"5

Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal
actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced to terminate her
contract with Atty. Simando.

Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated
June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of the loans of
Mejorado.

In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a co-maker and claimed that
novation had occurred because complainant had allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado
without his knowledge.6

Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she gave upon
him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get a
loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to
help her to favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.

On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him.7

In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that complainant, who is
engaged in lending money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated the financial
transaction between her and Mejorado. He narrated that complainant asked him if it is true that
Mejorado is his client as she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's reward
with the Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his client, complainant signified
that she is willing to give money for Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the release of
the informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the amount and
that payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim for informer's
reward.9

Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an
investment but he signed as co-maker in all the receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.10

Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high interest rates from
borrowers.11 He narrated several instances and civil cases where complainant was engaged in
money-lending where he divulged that even after defendants had already paid their loan,
complainant still persists in collecting from them.12 Respondent asserted that he knew of these
transactions, because he was among the four lawyers who handled complainant's case.13

Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close to each
other, the latter had given Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up at the
price of ₱500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional
investments made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given without his knowledge.

Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around ₱2 Million which included
the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the latter required Mejorado to
issue five (5) checks with a total value of ₱7,033,500.00, an amount more than the actual value
which Mejorado received.14

Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the issued checks shall be
presented to the bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the
checks to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks.
Atty. Simando further denied that he refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He claimed
that complainant never instructed him to file legal action, since the latter knew that Mejorado is
obligated to pay only upon receipt of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyerclient relationship, since Dr.
Lee voluntarily made the financial investment with Mejorado and that he merely introduced
complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer
against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting interest as there was no case between
Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them.15

In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered into was a mere
investment. She insisted that she lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as
co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan.16 To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the
written loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that the money received was a loan
with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as co-maker.17 She further claimed that she
did not know Mejorado and it was respondent who brought him to her and requested her to
assist Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for Mejorado and
agreed to sign as co-maker.

Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the payment only of the loan
amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent
had signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his obligation was already extinguished
by novation holds no water, since what was being collected is merely his obligation pertaining to
the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.

Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even divulged confidential
informations he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against her in the
present case, thus, committing another unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.

Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January 15, 2010. Both
parties requested for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both failed to agree on a
certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated the
mandatory conference and instead required the parties to submit their respective position
papers.18

On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.

Respondent moved for reconsideration.

On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's motion for
reconsideration for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension. The
Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against respondent was
dismissed.

RULING

We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interest:

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for
one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.19

In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's violation of the above
parameters, as established by the following circumstances on record:

First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between complainant and Atty.
Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received by respondent and the latter's
representation in certain legal matters pertaining to complainant's business;

Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him albeit in a case claiming
rewards against the Bureau of Customs;

Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced complainant and Mejorado to
each other for the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while having knowledge that
complainant's interests could possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically
such client's interests, he is duty-bound to protect;

Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients, respondent
consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;

Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:

(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant despite the
latter's instruction to do so;

(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory notes arising
from the loan agreement between his two clients;

(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.

Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as
creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his
present or former client.

Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because complainant and respondent
are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing clients in both
cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered into by the
complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of
interest, moreso when he signed as co-maker.

Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an investment and not a loan is
difficult to accept, considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all along that the intention of the parties
was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be
presupposed that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and the consequences of signing as
co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability without exposing himself from administrative
liability, if not civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show proof of
receipts of various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and signed by the
respondent as co-maker, the latter, however, other than his bare denials, failed to show proof
that the money given was an investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter
however slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s
private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In the process
of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.21

We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid payment of his
liability.1âwphi1 First, in his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there was
novation which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by
Mejorado for which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan. Finally, he
alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits will be paid only after Mejorado
receives the payment for his claim for reward which complainant violated when she presented
the checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his
reputation as a lawyer.22

Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.23 In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
informations24 which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship.

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any representation situation from
"the point of view that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of impaired
loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. 26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of
the Bar.

Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that
we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from
the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.

Antecedents

Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty.
Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest
of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS
Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers were
Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.

Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the
demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their
complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July
26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate officials
of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa1was presented to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally
charged Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2

In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility
of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to
them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for
their desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in
turn they received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3

Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period of
negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November 27,
2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them
that whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect
would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he
had already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.4

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds
and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not
liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation
but was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as
their counsel with ICS Corporation.

Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on
September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with
Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.6

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however,
that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty.
Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the
proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of
Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in said courts.8 They also submitted a
certification issued on November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in
the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by the
blotter logbook of that unit.9

On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and
praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and
respect reposed in him as their counsel.10

Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days from
notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to
supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.

On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.12

By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.

In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise
settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation,
on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his
group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison
by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.

On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15

In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007,16 the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence,
and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim
that his legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003
upon the execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even admitted
during the mandatory conference that there was no formal termination of his legal
services;17 that his professional obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not
end upon execution of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it
that the settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in
behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of
law for six months, viz:

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and diligence and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18

In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for two
years.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20 denying
Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.

The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21

On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and
denied the motion for its lack of merit.23

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility
of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent
Samson and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very same person whom Samson
and his group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters
and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against
Sison and the others in the RTC in Quezon City.

Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group
entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed
to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases
until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate
that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was
still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and
excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.26

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.28

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.

Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client,
either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an
assumed public purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such
abuse.

Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a
client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on
both sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation x x x.29

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge
and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.32 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.33

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that
the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences
acquired in the previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself.35 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death
of the client.36

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them
of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either
to outrightly decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice
Sison to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer
the proper sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision,
with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and
entered m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice
of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation "unknown at
the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties
wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco
adopted his Answer. The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against
complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda
Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed as IS
No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was
the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and
original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:

Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named

stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of
₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said
amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the
deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the
books of Clarion.

On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez
by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet
(GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed
shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant
and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to
go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal
shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this was
reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s knowledge.
This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes
property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence
of complainant.

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s
money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true
and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated and
converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its
factual averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered
in the affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the
sale of the property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco
Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
however, were paid.

5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale
of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the
sale had already been farmed out to different corporations established by complainant
and her sister.

6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money
of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the
trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where
he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators
and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the
subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s
orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the
legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the
Forbes property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United
States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s son,
Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in
order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to
the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result,
almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective
buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00;
that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they
were in constant communication with him; that all these representations, however, turned out to
be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale
were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez
likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc.,
by the members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the
complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty.
Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding the said
transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that
complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion,
but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these were all
under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as
legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was
formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he
admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes
property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm, he averred that
these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel
ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests
because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in
litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove,
the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer,
the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client
relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts
by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled that "the fact that
one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this
suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent
acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This
was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not
covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of
the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of desistance
executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD
as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After
weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in
the records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and
Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when
he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report
stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership
to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out
Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued
the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in
violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings
and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary
action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis
involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval in his
professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of
Jimenez.

As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of
the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity
as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and
friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this
duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought
advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own
words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14

Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez,
stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty.
Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the
documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These documents
were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in
2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was
Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating
the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked
Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he could go home.
When he filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who
committed crimes against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco
silent and to prevent the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

 The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act
or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the part of the public.

Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts,
to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect
the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering
that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law."20

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters
regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making
it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were
fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced
by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid
transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the
Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes.
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and
was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to

complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public
documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers
are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the Court would, in
effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of
the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held
within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions.22

In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be
misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding
truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court.23

From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR,
namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith candor,
fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged
Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard
isto avoid representing conflicting interests…"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in
this wise:

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight
for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer
in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties
between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting
and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client
relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny
of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she
was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, considering
its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal
counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers
of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in showing that Atty.
Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained
as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly
engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint
lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a
detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties.
Atty. Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself.
Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional
relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD
without even updating her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation of
the case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by
preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s
children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks
were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty.
Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty.
Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty.
Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and

it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails
to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty.
Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had communicated to
Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings
at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if
there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the
privilege applies, failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake
untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice
and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished
to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 2404, August 17, 2016

NILO B. DIONGZON, Petitioner, v. ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's interests in the latter's business dealings is duty-
bound to keep the confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client relationship had
ended. If he represents any other party in a case against his former client over a business deal
he oversaw during the time of their professional relationship, he is guilty of representing
conflicting interests, and should be properly sanctioned for ethical misconduct.

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for review of the Resolution No. 2013-160 adopted by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on the complaint for disbarment filed
by the complainant against respondent Atty. William Mirano,1 whereby the IBP Board of
Governors found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interest, and recommended
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year. The respondent assails the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Antecedents

On the dates material to this case, the complainant was a businessman engaged in the fishing
industry in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. In 1979, he retained the respondent as his legal
counsel to represent him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10679 then pending in the City Court
of Bacolod City (Branch 1). In November 1981, the complainant again retained the respondent
as his lawyer in relation to the execution of two deeds of sale covering the boats the former was
selling to Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales (Gonzaleses).2 In January 1982, the
parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that covered legal representation in
cases and transactions involving, the fishing business of the complainant.3chanrobleslaw

In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued the complainant for replevin and damages, and sought
the annulment of the aforementioned deeds of sale.4 They were represented by Atty. Romeo
Flora, the associate of the respondent in his law office. It appears that the bond they filed to
justify the manual delivery of the boats subject of the suit had been notarially acknowledged
before the respondent without the knowledge and prior consent of the complainant;5 and that
the respondent eventually entered his appearance as the counsel for the Gonzaleses against
the respondent.6chanrobleslaw

On May 24, 1982, therefore, the complainant initiated this administrative complaint for
disbarment against the respondent by verified letter-complaint.7chanrobleslaw

The respondent thereafter sought several times the extension of the time for him to file his
comment.

In the meantime, Atty. Flora, in an attempt to explain why the respondent had appeared as
counsel for the Gonzaleses, filed a manifestation claiming that the Gonzaleses had been his
own personal clients, and that he had only requested the respondent's appearance because he
had been indisposed at the time.8chanrobleslaw

The complainant belied the explanation of Atty. Flora, however, and pointed out that Atty. Flora
was actually a new lawyer then working in the law office of the respondent.9 As proof, the
complainant submitted the stationery showing the letterhead of the law office of the respondent
that included Atty. Flora's name as an associate.10chanrobleslaw

In his answer dated September 9, 1982,11 the respondent stated that the complainant had been
his client in a different civil case; that the complainant had never consulted him upon any other
legal matter; that the complainant had only presented the deeds of sale prepared by another
lawyer because he had not been contented with the terms thereof: that he had not been the
complainant's retained counsel because the retainer agreement did not take effect; that he had
returned the amount paid to him by the complainant; that he had appeared for the Gonzaleses
only after their evidence against the complainant had been presented; that the complainant had
approached him when he needed a lawyer to defend him from an estafa charge: and that the
complainant had even wanted him to falsify documents in relation to that estafa case, but
because he had refused his bidding, the complainant had then filed this administrative case
against him.12chanrobleslaw

Proceedings before the IBP

The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The case was heard over a long period
of time spanning 1985 to 2003,13 and the IBP Board of Governors finally recommended on
February 13, 2013 that the respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as the
counsel for the opponents of the complainant with whom he had an existing lawyer-client
relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as an attorney; and that he should be
punished with suspension from the practice of law for one year.

The Court noted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors on April 1, 2014.

The respondent filed in this Court a Manifestation with Motion and a Supplement to
Manifestation with Motion, wherein he proceeded to argue against the findings although he
initially claimed not to have been furnished with the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation.
He posited that he still had a pending Motion for Reconsideration in the IBP, and requested that
this case be remanded to the IBP for disposition.

Ruling of the Court

We uphold the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors because they
were substantiated by the records.

On the preliminary matter of procedure being raised by the respondent, it is unnecessary to

remand this case to the IBP for further investigation and disposition by the IBP. Remanding the
case to the IBP would be superfluous and unnecessary. The complaint was filed in 1982, and
since then the case underwent three decades of hearings before different investigating
commissioners of the IBP. The matters subject of the complaint were extensively covered and
sifted. In our view, the records are already adequate for resolution of the charge against the
respondent, which, after all, is something that only the Court can ultimately do.

Was the respondent guilty of representing conflict of interest?

The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a
legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or
for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment
on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of
his client. No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in
formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be considered and agreed to by
the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must contain all the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the parties.

In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer contract to the complainant, the terms of
which are stated below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to take charge of the legal matters of the
former in connection with his fishing business, and the attorney accepts such retainer and
employment subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. That the term of this contract shall be for two "2" years beginning February, 1982 but is
deemed automatically renewed for the same period if not terminated by both parties by
virtue of an agreement to that effect and signed by them;
 2. That the compensation to be paid by the client for the services of the attorney, .shall be
three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month;

3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times by CLIENT on all business requiring his
professional advice and opinion and when the ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a
copy shall be sent to the CLIENT;

4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer contract shall include consultations,
opinions, legal advices, preparations and drafting of contracts and other legal papers,
and other legal works, in connection with the business of the CLIENT, except those
cases involving trials in court, which if they are entrusted to the ATTORNEY, shall
be subject to a new agreement;14

Both parties signed their retainer contract on January 20, IS82. Contrary to the assertion of the
respondent, the retainer agreement did not contain a suspensive condition that affected its
effectivity as of the date of its execution. It simply stipulated that the respondent would represent
the interests of the complainant in all matters pertaining to his fishing business, thereby
formalizing their lawyer-client relationship. The respondent's insistence that the complainant
should return all the checks to the Gonzaleses relative to the sale of the fishing boats was
clearly not part of the contract.

The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in 1979 and
lasted until 1982. The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not alter the
juridical existence of their lawyer-client relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the
sale of the boats to the Gonzaleses, the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in the
capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and even notarized the same. He became aware of the
details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality generated by his lawyer-client relationship with
the complainant.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor,

fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Specifically, Canon
15.03 demands that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists where a
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs
an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or
when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against the
latter.15 The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and confidence.16 A
lawyer has a duty to preserve his client's confidence in him, even if their relationship ends. The
purpose is to assure freedom of communication between the lawyer and the client in order to
enable the former to properly represent and serve the latter's interests. To use against the latter
any information the former gains during the relationship is deplorable and unethical.

When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the
complainant, the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become privy
to the terms of the sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated
because the complainant had not expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of
the Gonzaleses. It would have been more prudent for him to have excused himself from
representing either party in the civil case.

In cavalier fashion, the respondent has cited his accomplishments as a member and officer of
the IBP in his region to buttress his claim of being more credible than the complainant,
supposedly a convicted felon. But such a defense is unworthy of consideration in this instance
because the praiseworthiness of one's accomplishments and professional reputation never
furnishes the license for any ethical lawyer to flagrantly and knowingly violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

On the penalty, we note that suspension from the practice of law for one year was imposed on
the lawyer who had appeared as defense counsel for the accused in an estafa case despite
having written and sent the demand letter for the complainant in the same case.17 In another
case, the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who had initially drafted a deed of sale for
the client, and who eventually filed a case against said client to annul the same contract.18 Such
penalty is appropriate and commensurate for this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution adopted on February 13, 2013 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; FINDS and DECLARES Atty.
William N. Mirano guilty of ethical misconduct due to conflict of interest,
and, ACCORDINGLY, SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for ONE YEAR, effective
immediately upon receipt of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Mirano in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and a copy of this decision be furnished
to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6174 November 16, 2011

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-1961 of the Board of Governors,

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint2 for disbarment filed by Lydia
Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W.
Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to
Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks.3 Respondent advised complainant to wait for the
lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.4

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation5 filed by respondent for and
on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latter’s daughter Karen
Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms.
Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,6 respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a
demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long
standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by
complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered. It was
allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another
lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty.
Manuel A. Año.

To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms.
Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but
on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Año.

Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He
further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact,
they are "comares" for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms.
Torralba.7 Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her
daughter’s request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by
complainant and complainant’s daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for
Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the
joint proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a
moderator or arbiter of the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an
out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful
insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of ₱50,000.00 in settlement
of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks
caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on
respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced
malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.8

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,9 as

adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.

It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent
in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84
entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated that the movants in these cases
are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these
cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing
the same sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant
because there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued
that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment
complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting
the demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter
was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged
by complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in the demand
letter sent to the defaulting debtor10, respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client
relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability.
Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the
prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the
moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.11 We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta12 that it is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.13

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties
with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had
obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste.14 In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts
connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of
the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.15

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.16

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat17 is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1awp++i1 The test is ‘whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.’18 This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.19 Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.20 Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.21

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Año who was eventually
engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a client’s cause of action by another
lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only
malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client
relationship.

Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law for
one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record
as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M.

SABITSANA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI,
JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A lawyer may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's word,
believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owes his client his undivided loyalty.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the January 25, 2007 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250, and its January 11,
2008 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

Factual Antecedents

On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale5 in favor
of respondent Juanito Muertegui6 (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered
land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7

Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual
possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real
property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.

On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale.8 The
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992.9 TD No. 1996 was
cancelled and a new one, TD No. 5327,10 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although
Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in
1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements on the property, which
shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon.

When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under
the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter11 dated August
24, 1998 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’
CENRO/PENRO office in Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that he was the true
owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance until the
issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.

On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case No. B-
109712 for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana
and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of
possession and ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The
Complaint13 prayed, among others, that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter,
and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void and of no effect; that petitioners be ordered to
respect and recognize Juanito’s title over the lot; and that moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,14 petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null
and void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they
acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by
prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval,
Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of
land the assessed value of which is merely ₱1,230.00.

The evidence and testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner
Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and
that as such, he was consulted by the family before the sale was executed; that after the sale to
Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot,
and planted the same to coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.’s death, his wife
Caseldita, succeeded him in the possession and exercise of rights over the lot.

On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was told by a
member of the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui family
had bought the lot, but she could not show the document of sale; that he then conducted an
investigation with the offices of the municipal and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any
document, record, or other proof of the sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that
the lot was still in the name of Garcia; that given the foregoing revelations, he concluded that
the Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they probably did not want him to buy the property
because they were interested in buying it for themselves considering that it was adjacent to a lot
which they owned; that he then proceeded to purchase the lot from Garcia; that after purchasing
the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October 1991 to inform her of the sale; that he then took
possession of the lot and gathered ipil-ipil for firewood and harvested coconuts and calamansi
from the lot; and that he constructed a rip-rap on the property sometime in 1996 and 1997.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 28, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision15 which decrees as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants, hereby declaring the Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1981 as
valid and preferred while the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 October 1991 and Tax Declaration
No. 5327 in the name of Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. are VOID and of no legal effect.

The Provincial Assessor and the Municipal Assessor of Naval are directed to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 5327 as void and done in bad faith.

Further, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff Juanito Muertigui,
represented by his attorney-in-fact Domingo Muertigui, Jr. the amounts of:

a) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

b) ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

c) Costs.

SO ORDERED.16

The trial court held that petitioners are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was
the Muertegui family’s lawyer, and was informed beforehand by Carmen that her family had
purchased the lot; thus, he knew of the sale to Juanito. After conducting an investigation, he
found out that the sale was not registered. With this information in mind, Atty. Sabitsana went on
to purchase the same lot and raced to register the sale ahead of the Muerteguis, expecting that
his purchase and prior registration would prevail over that of his clients, the Muerteguis.
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code,17 the trial court declared that even though petitioners
were first to register their sale, the same was not done in good faith. And because petitioners’
registration was not in good faith, preference should be given to the sale in favor of Juanito, as
he was the first to take possession of the lot in good faith, and the sale to petitioners must be
declared null and void for it casts a cloud upon the Muertegui title.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but the trial court denied19 the same.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners appealed to the CA20 asserting that the sale to Juanito was null and void for lack of
marital consent; that the sale to them is valid; that the lower court erred in applying Article 1544
of the Civil Code; that the Complaint should have been barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel; that respondent had no cause of action; that respondent was not entitled to an award
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and that they should be the ones awarded attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.

The CA, through its questioned January 25, 2007 Decision,21 denied the appeal and affirmed
the trial court’s Decision in toto. It held that even though the lot admittedly was conjugal
property, the absence of Soledad’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to
Juanito absolutely null and void, but merely voidable. Since Garcia and his wife were married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code22 should apply; and under
the said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void, but
merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the
same remains valid.

The CA added that the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito was not notarized could not
affect its validity. As against the notarized deed of sale in favor of petitioners, the CA held that
the sale in favor of Juanito still prevails. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the CA said that
the determining factor is petitioners’ good faith, or the lack of it. It held that even though
petitioners were first to register the sale in their favor, they did not do so in good faith, for they
already knew beforehand of Garcia’s prior sale to Juanito. By virtue of Atty. Sabitsana’s
professional and confidential relationship with the Muertegui family, petitioners came to know
about the prior sale to the Muerteguis and the latter’s possession of the lot, and yet they pushed
through with the second sale. Far from acting in good faith, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana used his
legal knowledge to take advantage of his clients by registering his purchase ahead of them.

Finally, the CA declared that Juanito, as the rightful owner of the lot, possessed the requisite
cause of action to institute the suit for quieting of title and obtain judgment in his favor, and is
entitled as well to an award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, which the trial court
correctly held to be just and equitable under the circumstances.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated
October 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.23

Issues

Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT
THAT THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY ₱1,230.00 (AND
STATED MARKET VALUE OF ONLY ₱3,450.00).

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE
INSTEAD OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529)
CONSIDERING THAT THE SUBJECT LAND WAS UNREGISTERED.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT
WAS ALREADY BARRED [BY] LACHES AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
 IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES TO THE RESPONDENT.24

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners assert that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case. They
argue that since the assessed value of the lot was a mere ₱1,230.00, jurisdiction over the case
lies with the first level courts, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691,25 which expanded their
exclusive original jurisdiction to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs."26 Petitioners thus
conclude that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-1097 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners next insist that the lot, being unregistered land, is beyond the coverage of Article
1544 of the Civil Code, and instead, the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 should
apply. This being the case, the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito is valid only as between him and
the seller Garcia, pursuant to Section 113 of PD 1529;27 it cannot affect petitioners who are not
parties thereto.

On the issue of estoppel, laches and prescription, petitioners insist that from the time they
informed the Muerteguis in writing about their purchase of the lot, or in October 1991, the latter
did not notify them of their prior purchase of the lot, nor did respondent interpose any objection
to the sale in their favor. It was only in 1998 that Domingo Jr. showed to petitioners the
unnotarized deed of sale. According to petitioners, this seven-year period of silence and inaction
on the Muerteguis’ part should be taken against them and construed as neglect on their part to
assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. As such, their action to quiet title should
be deemed barred by laches and estoppel.

Lastly, petitioners take exception to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
claiming that since there was no bad faith on their part, such award may not be considered just
and equitable under the circumstances. Still, an award of attorney’s fees should remain the
exception rather than the rule; and in awarding the same, there must have been an express
finding of facts and law justifying such award, a requirement that is absent in this case.

Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the questioned CA Decision and Resolution; the
dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. B-1097; the deletion of the award of attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses in respondent’s favor; and a declaration that they are the true and
rightful owners of the lot.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. He
likewise insists that Article 1544 applies to the case because there is a clear case of double sale
of the same property to different buyers, and the bottom line thereof lies in petitioners’ lack of
good faith in entering into the subsequent sale. On the issue of laches/estoppel, respondent
echoes the CA’s view that he was persistent in the exercise of his rights over the lot, having
previously filed a complaint for recovery of the lot, which unfortunately was dismissed based on
technicality.

On the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respondent finds refuge in Article 2208
of the Civil Code,28 citing three instances which fortify the award in his favor – petitioners’ acts
compelled him to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests; their gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to recognize his ownership and possession over the lot; and the justness and
equitableness of his case.

Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may
be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute.
Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24,
1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a
cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to
obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.

Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Both courts seem to have forgotten that the provision does not apply to sales involving
unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant
only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from
the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on
the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.31

Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.

What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that
any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The question
to be resolved therefore is: who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the
disputed lot?

Respondent has a better right to the lot.

The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of
sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991,
or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while
the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia
was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale
between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public
document under the Civil Code,33 is only for convenience, and not for validity or
enforceability.34 And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no
longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.

Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was
no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier
sale was unrecorded.35 Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null
and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.36

Specifically, we held in Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo37 that:

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice
to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean
that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
Petitioners’ defense of prescription, laches and estoppel are unavailing since their claim is
based on a null and void deed of sale. The fact that the Muerteguis failed to interpose any
objection to the sale in petitioners’ favor does not change anything, nor could it give rise to a
right in their favor; their purchase remains void and ineffective as far as the Muerteguis are
concerned.

The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.

Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad
faith. It also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the
Muertegui family. Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as
possible to forestall any legal complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property,
he did exactly the opposite: taking advantage of the situation and the information he gathered
from his inquiries and investigation, he bought the very same lot and immediately caused the
registration thereof ahead of his clients, thinking that his purchase and prior registration would
prevail. The Court cannot tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead of protecting his client’s
interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically preyed on him.

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his
client, using the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale
and registration thereof ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he
nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis
were simply bluffing when Carmen told him that they had already bought the same; this is too
convenient an excuse to be believed. As the Muertegui family lawyer, he had no right to take a
position, using information disclosed to him in confidence by his client, that would place him in
possible conflict with his duty. He may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on
his client’s word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the Muerteguis
his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to
himself.38

Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of
view that there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is, to
evaluate if his representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client."39

Moreover, as the Muertegui family’s lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard
his client's property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his
general agency.40

Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still
owed them his loyalty.1âwphi1 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client on a matter involving confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was
counsel. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment.41 This is underscored by the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained
information from Carmen which he used to his advantage and to the detriment of his client.

from the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing
the sale of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover,
petitioner Atty. Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and
by his acts, jeopardized their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial
court's and the CA's findings, this provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs in favor of the respondent.

Thus said, judgment must be rendered in favor of respondent to prevent the petitioners' void
sale from casting a cloud upon his valid title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 25, 2007 Decision
and the January 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014

DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint1 filed by Daria O.
Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).

Antecedents

Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from
Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal3 from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed
by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually
resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer
Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005.

Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease.
Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.

Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis &
Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in
force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed,
on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.5

In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business

partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole proprietress
of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal
and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the law office as her
retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information
regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent
admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took
advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.
Thus:

3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW
OFFICE as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent in
several cases;

3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in his
office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing the latter
 that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventory of all items at the
former Nashville Country Music Lounge;

3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which] the latter
x xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the present administrator
of the building, Benjie Pinlac;

3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for
further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later informed that the
business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven
days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place to Novie Balageo which the
latter readily accepted;

3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Balageo in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as partner of
Novie Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;

3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and
Benjie Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage of
the retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and]
Complainant as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related by
complainant to Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s business;

3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie Balageo
and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent [was unaware
of];

3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it
prudent] to xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed his
Motion to Withdraw As Counsel. x x x

3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
[Complaint's] subject matter. x x x7

On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and

Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for a
period of one year.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof that
respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant.10

Our Ruling

It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with
respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo
of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented
and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said
Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
appearance for Balageo.

Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 It provides:

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client."11 The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.12 In Quiambao v. Atty.
Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.14

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is
actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between
Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement.
We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,16 this
Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged
the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage
of any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its professional dealings with the
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the
complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot
represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting
interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have
simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.

The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from
the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.17 We thus adopt the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice
of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation "unknown at
the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties
wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco
adopted his Answer. The Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against
complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda
Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed as IS
No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was
the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and
original stockholders of Clarion were as follows:

Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named

stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of
₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said
amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the
deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the
books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez
by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet
(GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed
shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant
and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to
go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal
shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this was
reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s knowledge.
This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes
property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence
of complainant.

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s
money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true
and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated and
converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its
factual averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered
in the affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the
sale of the property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco
Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
however, were paid.
 5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale
of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the
sale had already been farmed out to different corporations established by complainant
and her sister.

6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money
of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the
trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where
he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators
and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the
subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s
orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the
legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the
Forbes property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United
States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s son,
Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in
order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to
the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result,
almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective
buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00;
that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they
were in constant communication with him; that all these representations, however, turned out to
be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale
were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez
likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc.,
by the members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the
complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty.
Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding the said
transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that
complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion,
but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these were all
under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as
legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was
formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he
admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes
property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm, he averred that
these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel
ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests
because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in
litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove,
the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer,
the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client
relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts
by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled that "the fact that
one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this
suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent
acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This
was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not
covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of
the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of desistance
executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD
as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After
weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in
the records would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and
Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when
he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report
stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership
to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out
Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued
the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in
violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings
and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary
action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis
involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval in his
professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of
Jimenez.

As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of
the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity
as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and
friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this
duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought
advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own
words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14

Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez,
stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty.
Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the
documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These documents
were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in
2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was
Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating
the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked
Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he could go home.
When he filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who
committed crimes against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco
silent and to prevent the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act
or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the part of the public.

Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts,
to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect
the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering
that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law."20

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters
regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making
it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were
fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced
by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid
transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the
Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes.
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and
was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to

complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public
documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers
are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the Court would, in
effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of
the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held
within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions.22

In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be
misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding
truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court.23

From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR,
namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith candor,
fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged
Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard
isto avoid representing conflicting interests…"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in
this wise:

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight
for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer
in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties
between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting
and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client
relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny
of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she
was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, considering
its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal
counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers
of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in showing that Atty.
Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained
as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly
engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint
lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a
detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties.
Atty. Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself.
Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional
relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD
without even updating her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation of
the case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by
preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.27

Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s
children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks
were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty.
Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty.
Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty.
Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and

it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel
not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails
to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty.
Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had communicated to
Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings
at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if
there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the
privilege applies, failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake
untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice
and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished
to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so
that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015

WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO,
ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY.
RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED
RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009

filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily
Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty.
Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and
Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.

The Facts

In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and
Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was impleaded as
respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The
labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain
Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same
law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR,5 to wit:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of
the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and
the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his
own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the
other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and
not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by
FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor cases
but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant did not have any
monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss
complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and
that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that
would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other
lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he
was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed and
terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been
retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified
theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. 15

In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty
of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013
Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the rule
on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3)
suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of
complainant’s labor cases.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.20

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.21 In
this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented conflicting
interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was
engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However,
after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the
filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As
the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its
failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all
cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an organization of
individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding
handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of
interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding
in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela included,
would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to decline
FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as the
charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court
finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of
suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient
organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As
such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact
that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment.22

WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip
Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7110, April 20, 2016

ARTHUR S. TULIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHANGIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Arthur S. Tulio (Tulio) against respondent Atty.
Gregory F. Buhangin (Atty. Buhangin), docketed as A.C. No. 7110 for Gross Dishonesty in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his Complaint dated March 8, 2006,1 Tulio narrated that he became acquainted with Atty.
Buhangin even during the time when he was a surveyor and not yet a lawyer. He alleged that as
a surveyor then, Atty. Buhangin was the one who prepared survey plans for the complainant in
connection with the estate left by his mother. Eventually, when he became a lawyer, Tulio
sought his legal advice concerning a property owned by his mother which was then transferred
in the names of third parties.

On June 29, 2000, by virtue of Tulio's agreement with his siblings, Atty. Buhangin prepared and
notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights dated June 29, 2000 which was signed by all of his
siblings in his favor. Thereafter, Tulio engaged the services of Atty. Buhangin to represent him
in filing a case for specific performance and damages which was docketed as Civil Case No.
4866-R entitled "Heirs of Angelina S. Tulio, represented by Arthur S. Tulio vs. Heirs of Artemio
E. Patacsil, represented by Lennie Ayuste" before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3.2 Through his efforts, Tulio claims that he and the defendants in Civil Case No. 4866-R
agreed to a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.

On December 10, 2005, to Tulio's surprise, Atty. Buhangin represented his siblings and filed a
complaint against him over legal matters which he had entrusted to him. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6185-R pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 7 and entitled "Deogracias S. Tulio, et.al. vs. Arthur S. Tulio" for rescission of the deed
of waiver of rights which he himself prepared and notarized. Tulio further averred that Atty.
Buhangin made misrepresentations in the complaint since he knew beforehand that his siblings
waived their rights in his favor over the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 67145 even before
Civil Case No. 4866-R was filed.

On January 2, 2006, Tulio immediately filed a Motion to Disqualify3 Atty. Buhangin for his
unethical conduct in gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Subsequently,
on January 11, 2006, Atty. Buhangin filed a Motion to Withdraw4 as counsel. It was stated in the
said motion that Atty. Buhangin: "due to conflict of interest, undersigned respectfully requests
that he be allowed by this Honorable Court to withdraw his appearance in this case as counsel
for the plaintiff."

Complainant alleged that the actions of Atty. Buhangin were deliberate and intentional in order
to serve his own personal interests against his interests as his client, hence, constitutes gross
dishonesty in violation of his oath and responsibility as a lawyer and notary public.

Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Buhangin.

On April 5, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Buhangin to file his Comment relative to the
complaint filed against him.5

In compliance, Atty. Buhangin submitted his Comment6 on January 12, 2007, where he admitted
that indeed he had been engaged as legal counsel of the Estate of Angeline Tulio, represented
by the heirs of Angeline Tulio which included among others Deogracias S. Tulio, Gloria Tulio-
Bucaoto, Tita Tulio-Guerrero, Anthony Tulio and complainant Tulio. He, however, asserted that
his legal representation was neither personal nor directed in favor of complainant Tulio alone
but instead in the latter's capacity as an heir of Angeline Tulio. Atty. Buhangin disputed Tulio's
claim that the latter personally engaged his services as legal counsel for Civil Case No. 4866-R
and insisted that his legal representation was made for and in behalf of the heirs of Angeline
Tulio. Atty. Buhangin alleged that Tulio abused the confidence lodged upon him by his siblings
by executing the deed of waiver of rights in his favor, for the purpose of depriving the other heirs
of Angeline Tulio their lawful shares in the estate of their mother. He maintained that there was
no conflict of interest when he filed the complaint for the declaration of nullity of the waiver of
rights as he was in fact merely protecting the interests of the other heirs of Angeline Tulio.

On February 14, 2007, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.7

Mandatory conferences between the parties were set on July 24, 2007 and September 3, 2007.
However, only complainant appeared without counsel, while Atty. Buhangin failed to appear in
both instances despite prior notice. Thus, the IBP, in its Order dated September 3, 2007,
directed Atty. Buhangin to show cause why he should not be given anymore the chance to
participate in the proceedings before the Commission. Both parties were likewise directed to
submit their verified Position Papers. Again, only Tulio submitted his Position Paper while Atty.
Buhangin failed anew to comply with the Order of the Commission.

In his Position Paper dated October 9, 2007, Tulio refuted Atty. Buhangin's allegation that he
represents the heirs of Angeline Tulio, and that his legal representation is not personal to him
alone. Tulio pointed out that in his motion to withdraw as counsel, Atty. Buhangin had, in fact,
admitted that he is withdrawing from the case due to conflict of interest. Tulio likewise denied
that he meant to defraud and deprive his siblings of their shares. He asserted that it was
actually Atty. Buhangin who drafted, prepared and even notarized the deed of waiver of rights,
thus, if he knew the same to be fraudulent, why then would he prepare and even notarize the
same.

To prove that he had, in fact, engaged the legal services of Atty. Buhangin for his own benefit
and personal interest, Tulio submitted the correspondences made and prepared by Atty.
Buhangin prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 4866-R addressed to Rebecca F. Patacsil
which were dated August 29, 2000 and October 16, 2000, respectively. Thus, Tulio maintains
that Atty. Buhangin violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he acted as counsel for his siblings in Civil Case No. 6185-R.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Buhangin to have violated not only
his lawyer's oath but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be
meted the penalty of suspension for two (2) months.

The IBP-CBD found Atty. Buhangin guilty of violating the rule on conflict of interest since it
believed that in Civil Case No. 4866-R, there was indeed an attorney-client relationship existing
between Tulio and Atty. Buhangin, and not between the latter and the heirs of Angeline Tulio. It
further held that when Atty. Buhangin filed a complaint against Tulio in representation of his
other siblings over legal matters which the former entrusted to him, he clearly violated the trust
and confidence reposed to him by his client.

In a Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-599 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

No motion for reconsideration has been filed by either party.

RULING

We concur with the findings of the IBP-CBD except as to the imposable penalty.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.8

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,9 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

Hornilla case provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing
parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one
party to the latter's opponent in the same case, as in this case.

Atty. Buhangin's allegation that he represents for and in behalf of the Heirs of Angeline Tulio
and not personal or exclusive to complainant cannot be given any credence. First, Atty.
Buhangin himself admitted in his Motion to Withdraw that he was withdrawing his appearance in
Civil Case No. 6185 against Tulio due to conflict of interest. Secondly, it cannot be denied that
there was an exclusive attorney-client relationship between Tulio and Atty. Buhangin as
evidenced by the demand letters which Atty. Buhangin prepared specifically as counsel of
Tulio. Thirdly, as correctly observed by the IBP, other than his bare assertion that he was
representing the estate and the Heirs of Angeline Tulio, Atty. Buhangin failed to satisfactorily
show any circumstance that he was actually representing the Heirs of Angeline Tulio and not
solely for Tulio.

Also, we take note that in both Civil Case No. 4866-R (Heirs of Angeline S. Tulio represented by
Arthur S. Tulio vs. Heirs of Artemio Patacsil) and Civil Case No. 6185-R (Deogracias S. Tulio,
et. al. vs. Arthur Tulio), the subject property under dispute, particularly TCT No. T-67145, is one
and the same. This is also the same subject property of the Deed of Waiver of Rights which the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6185-R have executed and signed in favor of Tulio, which Atty.
Buhangin later on used against Tulio. Clearly, the series of Atty. Buhangin's actions in protecting
the rights and interest of Tulio over the subject property before and after the filing of Civil Case
No. 4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of Waiver of Rights in favor of Tulio runs counter
and in conflict to his subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 6185-R and his imputation of fraud
against Tulio. There is no question that Atty. Buhangin took an inconsistent position when he
filed Civil Case No. 61 85-R against Tulio whom he has defended and protected as client in the
past. Even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if he has acted in good
faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests, it is still in violation of the rule of
conflict of interest.

Atty. Buhangin's subsequent withdrawal of his appearance as counsel in Civil Case No. 6185-R
came too late as by the mere filing of the complaint against Tulio, it manifested his disloyalty
and infidelity to Tulio as his client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith
and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.11

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest
and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.12

Likewise, Atty. Buhangin's conduct in the course of the proceedings before the IBP is also a
matter of concern. Despite due notices, he failed to attend all the mandatory conferences set by
the IBP. He also ignored the IBP's directive to file his position paper. Indubitably, because of
Atty. Buhangin's refusal to comply with the orders and directives of the IBP, the case which was
filed in 2006 dragged on for several years. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon
every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.

In Ngayan v. Atty. Tugade,13 we ruled that [a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against
him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Atty. Buhangin's failure to submit his position paper without any valid explanation is enough
reason to make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful
directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof, but more so because IBP is the
Court-designated investigator of this case.14 As an officer of the Court, respondent is expected
to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP.15

We would have merely affirmed the recommended penalty by the IBP-CBD on Atty.
Buhangin, i.e., suspension from the practice of law for two (2) months. However, considering
that aside from his violation of the rule on conflict of interest, he has also shown wanton
disregard of the IBP's orders which caused undue delay in the resolution of this case and we
deemed it appropriate to modify and increase the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law from two (2) months to six (6) months.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held GUILTY of representing

conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Buhangin's personal record. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013

VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA,

CELEDONIO ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a consolidated administrative complaint against herein respondent, Angelita
Villarin, for allegedly harassing complainants through the demand letters he sent to them.

The facts are as follows:

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision
against the subdivision's owner and developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto
Bassig.
In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the respondents
therein to accept the payments of the buyers under the old purchase price. These buyers
included some of the complainants in the instant case, to wit: Florentina Lander, Celedonio
Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin.

The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer
Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the
buyers to vacate the property.

Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and
executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.1 It was at this point that
respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence Realty.2 Specifically,
he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution3 for
being null and void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons
on his client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB.4

On 4 December 2003, respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.5 In all of these
letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence
Realty within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action against them.

True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Trinidad,6 Lander,7 Casubuan8 and
Mendoza.9 Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against
respondent.10 A month after, Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against
respondent.11

As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)12 and affirmed by its Board of
Governors,13 complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that the demand
letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that
the letters also contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the subdivision lots.

Considering that these two actions were related, Villarin moved for the consolidation of the
administrative cases, and his motion was granted by the IBP commissioner.14

In his Position Paper,15 Villarin denied the allegations of harassment and claimed that no malice
attended the sending of the demand letters. He narrated that when he inquired at the HLURB,
he was informed that his client did not receive a summons pertinent to the Complaint for specific
damages. With this information, he formed the conclusion that the HLURB Decision was void
and not binding on Purence Realty. Since his client was the lawful owner of the property,
respondent issued the ejectment letters, which were indispensable in an action for unlawful
detainer. Moreover, he insisted that the addressees of the letters were different from the
complainants who had filed the case with the HLURB.

Hence, the pertinent issue in this consolidated case is whether respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for sending the demand letters despite a final and executory HLURB
Decision directing, not the ejectment of complainants, but the payment of the purchase price of
the lots by the subdivision buyers.

Prefatorily, this Court affirms the factual finding of the IBP16 that of complainants herein, only
Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin were listed as the
subdivision lot buyers who were parties to the HLURB case; and that Verleen Trinidad, Wally
Casubuan and Minerva Mendoza were non-parties who could not claim any right pursuant to
the Decision in that case.

Proceeding to the contested demand letters, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP board of
governors that the issuance thereof was not malicious.17 According to its Report,18 respondent
counsel merely acted on his legal theory that the HLURB Decision was not binding on his client,
since it had not received the summons. Espousing the belief that the proceedings in the HLURB
were void, Villarin pursued the issuance of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment case
he would later on file to protect the property rights of his client.
As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of his client
with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.19 This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense20 – including the institution of an ejectment
case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, we held that in
the full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that
they may displease the general public.21

Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall
perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law.22 They should only make such defense
only when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law.23 In this case, respondent’s
act of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally
sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an
action for ejectment.24 Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the
Code,25 just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.

Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error.1âwphi1 The factual findings of the IBP
board of governors reveal that in his demand letter, he brazenly typified one of the
complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal occupant. However, this description is the exact
opposite of the truth, since the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her
as a subdivision lot buyer who had a right to complete her payments in order to occupy her
property. Respondent is very much aware of this ruling when he filed an Omnibus Motion to set
aside the HLURB Decision and the appurtenant Writ of Execution.

Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the HLURB
Decision, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with
fairness and honesty. What he does is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any
document that they know is false.26

Considering the present circumstances, we agree with the 14 May 2011 Resolution of the IBP
board of governors that the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning is appropriate. Notably, no
motion for reconsideration27 was filed by either of the parties. Thus, by virtue of the rules for
disbarment of attorneys, the case is deemed terminated.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin

is REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 9612 : March 13, 2013

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant, v. MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to
his client regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as
a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and
diligence.

Antecedents

In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito
M. Millo with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the
transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty.
Millo to handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her
niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;1 that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00
for the transfer of title2 and P10,000.00 for the adoption case;3 that Atty. Millo thereafter
repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to
complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains
tax for the property had been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the
country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty.
Millo insisted that he had already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the
supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only
after he stormed out of Atty. Millo's office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty.
Millo then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued
penalties.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the
Tarlac office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two
years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo made him and his wife believe that an interview with
the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14, 1995, but when they arrived at the
Tarlac DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been scheduled; that
adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching
home in Quezon City when he received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been
scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo
could not be found; and that they learned after an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac
that Atty. Millo had requested the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their
knowledge.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative
complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for
disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of P15,643.75
representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00
given for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his
attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wife's absence from the country.

On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer.6 Although an extension of the
period to file was granted at his instance,7 he filed no answer in the end.8 He did not also appear
at the hearings despite due notice.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The
proceedings were held in abeyance to await the appropriate motion from Johnny's
counsel.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to
write to the President of the IBP on October 28, 1998.11 It was only on April 2, 2001, however,
that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on June 29,
2001.12 At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a representative, and presented a
manifestation/motion,13 whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella
would be withdrawing the complaint against him.

On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes,
deemed the case submitted for resolution.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had
been meanwhile transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty.
Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for six months.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011,16 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to
two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to return the amount of P16,000.00, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito
Millo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months and is
ordered to return the amount of P16,000.00 to complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly
believed that Abella had already caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death;
that he had already caused the preparation of the documents necessary for the transfer of the
certificate of title, and had also returned the P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the adoption case
had been finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost contact with Johnny and Abella who
resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella's brother, could have confirmed that the charge
had arisen from a simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the
complaint, except that Daquis had meanwhile died in November
2011.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millo's motion for
reconsideration.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruling

We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients'
interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the
clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as
his clients' interests may require.19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Atty. Millo's acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend
to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship
between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and
efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required
him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients
about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax,
rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of
him, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any
respondent attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and
even ignored it for a long period of time. Despite being given several opportunities to do so,
Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby forfeited his right and chance to
reasonably explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had the complaint been
untrue and unfair, it would have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably.
Indeed, a refutation was the requisite response from any worthy and blameless respondent
lawyer. His belated and terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had
emanated from a mere "misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the
charge against him, which omission indicated that the complaint had substance. It mattered little
now that he had in the meantime returned the amount of P14,000.00 to the clients, and that the
application for adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court. Such events, being not
only post facto, but also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not obliterate his liability
based on the neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he
must now learn is that he could not ignore without consequences the liberal opportunity the
Court and the IBP allowed him to justify his neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients'
concerns. Towards him the Court now stays its hand of leniency, lest the Court be unfairly seen
as too willing to forego the exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept as he
had been towards his clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the
charges granted to him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both
Johnny and Abella, being residents in Canada, would have already lost interest in prosecuting it,
or, as happened here, would have already departed this world and be no longer able to rebut
whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the Court is not about to
condone such selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed
that an attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an
explanation, and should meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.20 The obvious
reason for the requirement is that an attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still
maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all times.

Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled
hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP's orders requiring his
attendance in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect for
the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer,
because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are
expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted
authorities.21 Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,22 the Court saw the respondent attorney's odious
practice of repeatedly and apparently deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings as
his means of wiggling out from the duty to explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millo's
disregard is justified. Indeed, he thereby manifested evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member
of the Legal profession should nurture in himself.

Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the
assurances of Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him,
however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save the day for himself. He
ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension or disbarment
based on an attorney's professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to
dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed
regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even
entirely ignore the withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally
determine whether the charge of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the
record.23 This approach bespeaks the Court's consistent view that the Legal Profession is not
only a lofty and noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.

Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants
are the plaintiffs and the respondent attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private
interests nor afford redress for private grievances. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called to answer for
every misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The complainant or any other person
who has brought the attorney's misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months
as the penalty to be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the
penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given
a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice
of law because he had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest.25 He should somehow
be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and
Abella, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer
and in his trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no
place in the heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for
money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion. Under the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the
condign and commensurate penalty for him.

The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title.
Although he ought also to refund the amount of P15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late
payment of the capital gains tax, the Court cannot order him to refund that amount because it is
not a collection agency.26 The Court may only direct the repayment of attorneys fees received
on the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient service to the client.
Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption
case, plus interest of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath;
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from notice, with
the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely;
ORDERS him to return to the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the
sum of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of
his compliance within thirty days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Marcelito M. Millo's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-

MARGALLO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of
their clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without
need for reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to
their client that they will manage the case as if it were their own. The relationship between an
attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the
lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The
professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,

terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it
appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the
Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its
delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo
had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5cralawred

In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he
engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled
“Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.”7 The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8cralawred

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral
from a friend of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services
on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of
attorney’s fees.10 It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per
court appearance.11cralawred

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12
Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the
Court of Appeals.13cralawred

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in
2008.14 On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s
Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one
prepared.15cralawred

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief.
Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the
brief.16cralawred

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there
was still no word from the Court of Appeals.17cralawred

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied.18 She
told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation
with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they
could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been
promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.20cralawred

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed
on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.21cralawred

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued
that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per
hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they
only had a 50% chance of winning the case.23 She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the
controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of
Ramirez had begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her
for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March
2009, he merely told her that he had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of
the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because
her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her
contacts.26cralawred

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared
despite Atty. Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July
22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were directed to submit their position
papers.29cralawred

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her
actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt
with more severely.30 This was based on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the
reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer
wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her
client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss
of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.32cralawred

In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a
stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the Resolution
dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration
and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2)
years.35cralawred

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court.36 She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client.
She also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against her.37cralawred

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition for
Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion.
Atty. Margallo filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.

This court’s ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and confidence.”41
Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases
entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to
represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the client
or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and attention
remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.42cralawred

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.cralawlawlibrary

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify
his absence in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted
for resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse
ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal.
This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily,
a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.

....

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se
a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
cralawlawlibrary

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to
act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There
was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that
she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is
contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons,
she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their
authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is
information assymetry between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts
and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers

are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is
not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal
provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies
of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between
the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and
remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually
does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers
the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In
some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client,
therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it
is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we
observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a
period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found
guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.
Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the
pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer
who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in
court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant
Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that
we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be
no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.46 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended
penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-
year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a
current need in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
ensure a higher ethical standard for its members’ conduct is laudable. The negligence of
respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014
is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE,*Complainant, v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant
Eduardo A. Maglente (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against
respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return
the amount of P48,000.00 that he received from the former.

The Facts

Complainant, as President of “Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III,

Incorporated” (Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose
of filing a case in order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members
of Samahan.2 In connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00
intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written
acknowledgment executed by respondent himself.3 Despite the payment, respondent failed to
file an action in court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was
not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court.4Thus, complainant asked for the return of the
money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more
money.5 Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the
aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was not his money in the first
place.6 Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full
amount he had paid to respondent.

In his defense,7 respondent denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had
already prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered
through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was
quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who
undertook to raise the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case
was filed against him.8

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a
warning that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to
account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.10

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly received the amount of
P48,000.00 from complainant, which was intended to answer for the filing fees of a case he was
supposed to file for the Samahan, but which he failed to do so.11 In this relation, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that had respondent prepared the complaint and
performed research works, as he claimed, then he could have kept a reasonable amount for his
effort under the doctrine of quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he could not present any proof in
this respect.12

In a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty
from Censure to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. Aggrieved,
respondent moved for reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated
May 3, 2014.
 The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for the acts complained of.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP, except as
tothe penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to
serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect
of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR,17 which
reads:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to
answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not
enough to fully pay the filing fees.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated
demands, viz.:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client.18 A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity,19 as in
this case.

Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment,20 and
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.

Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed.

Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and,
at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking
under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the
latter.22 Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who
failed to render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for
such purpose.24 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted
with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of
P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the
claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.”25 Since the aforesaid
amount was intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the lawyer-client
relationship between complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to be in
order.26

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of

violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the

amount of P48,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.