1. LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L.

REALTY CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS:

On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue,
Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate
Number XDN 210 (owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a
Ford Expedition bearing Plate Number LSR 917 (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by

Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was

immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment. C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver,
Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour
along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when
(Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender.

Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property. demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred
in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of
P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L.Realty) to file a Complaint for
Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC),
Quezon City. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of
Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos
asserted the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. The
MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo.

HELD:

YES, What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove
through it. Without doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic
regulation. However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory
Negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. We
cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.

Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of
negligence on the part of Ramos. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort
committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate
and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she
exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Ramos’ driver was texting
with his cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit
he knew that Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was
barricaded with barriers. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former.

** This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code: “Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.” Accordingly, there ought to be no question
on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted in the vehicular mishap.

2. CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:

Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the airport.
Several members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was
the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars
were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a
caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away.
Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the
intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of
thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end
and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his
speed and tried to avoid the collision by veering to the right but the collisionoccurred just the
same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action
for damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was
no question that defendant’s driver was negligent and liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

RULING:

The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exerciseof due diligence. The basis of
the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to
correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was
not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic
that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert.
He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure
to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even
when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s
sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn
the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It
was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to
prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

3. KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO

GR. No. 85331, August 25, 1989

FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing an old
highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso.
Witness, Atty. Conrado L. Manicad, driving a Mustang car coming from the direction Sta. Cruz and
proceeding towards the direction of Manila, testified that he stopped at the intersection to give way to
the jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked very clear that the jeepney passed through the
intersection when it collided with the KBL bus. It was also obvious that the point of impact was on the
right lane of the highway which is lane properly belonging to the former. From the testimony of the
witness, Atty. Manicad and the sketch, the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney.
Seeing the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped on the intersection began to move forward,
and for his part, Atty. Manicad gave way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which
to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The driver of the
bus chose to risk on proceeding its way, it happened that the jeepney, which had the right of way, was
about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of KBL bus. The impact clearly
indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed since after the collision, it did not stop
and it travelled for another 50 meters hitting the electric post.

ISSUE:
Whether or not KBL is liable for the damages from the collision

RULING:
Yes.
KBL is liable for the damages from the collision.
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the Kapalaran’s driver raised the legal
presumption that KBL as an employer was guilty negligence either in the selection or in the
supervision of its bus driver, where the employer is held liable for damages; it has of course a right of
recourse against its own negligent employee. The liability of the employer, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code is direct and immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. As far as the record shows, petitioner KBL was unable o rebut the presumption of
negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner is not only entirely in
order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo’s death during the pendency of this petition
during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries
sustained by him in the violent collision.

4. MENDOZA VS. SORIANO ET AL.,

GR. No. 164012, June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in
Quezon City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was
thrown five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of
impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to
the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX,
only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center where he later
died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal case
for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against Macasasa. RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner, while CA reversed the findings of the RTC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case, if so, was there sufficient legal
basis to award damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
possessed and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case. Section 19(8) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129,as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, read together with
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is the authority for this ruling. Applicable provision is read
as follows: “The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by
RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action.However, in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Petitioner was presumed negligent in
selecting and supervising the driver. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic
rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe
speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa
over speeding. The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he
was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact.
Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of
Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first
agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry.
Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for
fear of the people’s wrath. What remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to
a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
traffic regulations. However, respondent is also guilty of contributory negligence.
5. Torts and Damages

Doctrine of Imputed Negligence

JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, respondent

Facts: the accident in question occurred on 8 February

1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong
(now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC.[2] He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. [3] Trial on the civil
action ensued, and in aDecision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble
and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,
000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs. [4] Both defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto[6]. After the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[7] dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their
respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and
Gamble’s petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Añonuevo’s petition,[8]
on the other hand, was given due course,[9] and is the subject of this Decision.

In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among them:
that it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck Villagracia; [10]that Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit
Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture; [11] that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo
Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as he made the left turn into
Libertad;[12] that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made
the turn. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; [13] and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the
ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. [14]
Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made
by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no
exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of facts, [15] is not compelled to review the factual findings
of the lower courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally
binding.[16]

Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles [23]. He points out that
modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles
now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the
Code, the legislators “must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be
specifically mentioned,” yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has “inescapably become
matter of public concern” so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times.

Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument. Añonuevo points out that
Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal
ordinance.[18] Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same
ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. [19] Before this Court,
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention
instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence.[20] Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was
contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil
Code. [22] Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that
the law intended a broader coverage.

Issue: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles? [17] In the
same vein, Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any
liability for damages.

Held: What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as embodied in
Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not creates, the law.
However, since the Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185
could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.

At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from
human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and
carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than
they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the
scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term “motorized vehicles.” If Añonuevo seriously contends that the
application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such
argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it
stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data,
assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Añonuevo’s characterization of
a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than
to the present.

There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the
need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of
number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of
these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle,
which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than
non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or
damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels
that they use.

American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the
cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists. [28] While
the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to
fully discharge the duty than from the latter. [29] The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place.[30] However, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what
would be reckless or negligent.[31]

The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have
sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but
indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then be
the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative of
Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably
require.[43] To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the
municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous
circumstances of the accident.

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the
facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up
to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief
when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions
in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have
been invaded owing to the conduct of

The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established
between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam,
wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury,
or that it substantially contributed thereto.[54] Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged
negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.

Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety
violations imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that
these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the
onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him
as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracia’s own liability.

Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence. The leading case in contributory
negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf[58] clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant “in conjunction with
the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury.”[59] To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition
for its occurrence.[61]

As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that
the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment. Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no
longer claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Añonuevo
was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had
been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid
the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to
have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that Añonuevo failed to adduce proof
to that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not proven.

6. [ G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990 ]

MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. AND GUILLERMO ARANETA, PETITIONERS,

VS.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIA FAMOSO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to
recompense the private respondent for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was
killed in line of duty while in its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we are
called upon to rule today. We shall state at the outset that on both counts the petition must fail.

On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12,
a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off
to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was
declared dead on the spot.1

The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent
filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted
from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension
of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The
dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances present in this case, the Court orders as it does
hereby order the defendant Ma-ao Sugar Central thru its Manager Mr. Guillermo Y. Araneta to pay plaintiff the
following amount:

P30,000.00 - for the death of plaintiff's husband, the late Julio Famoso

P30,000.00 - for actual, exemplary and moral damages

P10,000.00 - loss of earnings for twenty (20) years

P 3,000.00 - funeral expenses

P73,000.00 - Total Damages

Less: P18,250.00 - 25% for the deceased's contributory negligence

Less: P41,367.60 - pension plaintiff and her minor children would be receiving for five (5) years from the SSS

___________

P13,382.40

Plus: P 3,000.00 - Attorney's fees and cost of this suit

___________

P16,382.40 - Total amount payable to the plaintiff

SO ORDERED.

The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it
was not negligent and therefore not liable at all.

In its own decision, the Court of Appeals2 sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory
negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent. Thus, the
respondent court declared:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by ordering the defendant-appellant to pay the plaintiff-
appellee the following amounts:

P30,000.00, for the death of Julio Famoso

P30,000.00, for actual, exemplary and moral damages

P10,000.00, for loss of earnings for twenty (20) years

P 3,000.00, for funeral expenses

P 3,000.00, for attorney's fees

P76,000.00 Total Amount

In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding
its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by
the trial court.

Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails
which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are
described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on
each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish
plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments,
was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose
Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of
derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were
reported every hour.3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such
accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is of course not acceptable. And
neither are we impressed by the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report any
defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is important is
that the petitioner should act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy
to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more the need for the
responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad tracks
and see if the fish plates were in place.

It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and that it had passed the same rails
earlier without accident. The suggestion is that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does not
necessarily mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and
detached during its first trip and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned during the return trip. But the
Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted
to the rails and could be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at
the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been been removed long
before.

At any rate, the absence of the fish plates - whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone proof of the
negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,4 thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.

The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record
shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good
condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the
brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments - which reports have not been
acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments - is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.

We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he
was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules
but could not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to
suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that
he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose.

Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the the
injury."5 It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body."6 There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso

was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of
impending danger.

The last point raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. Citing the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation,7 it argues that the respondent court erred in disauthorizing the deduction from the total
damages awarded the private respondent of the amount of P41,367.60, representing the pension to be
received by the private respondent from the Social Security System for a period of five years. The argument is
that such deduction was quite proper because of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended. This article provides
that any amount received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the Employees Compensation
Commission, whose funds are administered by the SSS, shall be exclusive of all other amounts that may
otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code and other pertinent laws.

The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension received by the heirs of a deceased employee
who was a member of the SSS at the time of his death and had regularly contributed his premiums as required
by the System. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death
benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employee who dies as a result of a
workconnected injury. Indeed, the certification from the SSS8 submitted by the petitioner is simply to the
effect that:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mrs. Herminia Vda. de Famoso is a recipient of a monthly pension from the Social Security
System arising from the death of her late husband, Julio Famoso, an SSS member with SSS No. 07-0181731.

This certification is issued to Ma-ao Sugar Central for whatever legal purpose it may serve best.

Issued this 8th day of April 1983 in Bacolod City, Philippines.

GODOFREDO S. SISON

Regional Manager

By: (SGD.) COSME Q. BERMEO, JR.

Chief, Benefits Branch

It does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of the ECC. The certification would have said
so if the pension represented the death benefits accruing to the heirs under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

This conclusion is supported by the express provision of Art. 173 as amended, which categorically states that:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability. - Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents
or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four, as amended and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government. (Emphasis supplied).

Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended, is the Social Security Law.

As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club,9 which is still controlling:

. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to which a member of the System may be
entitled under the Social Security law (Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792 and 2658) are
not the same as the compensation that may be claimed against the employer under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the member employee of social security benefits
would not wipe out or extinguish the employer's liability for the injury or illness contracted by his employee in
the course of or during the employment. It must be realized that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (or
the Civil Code, in a proper case), the employer is required to compensate the employee for the sickness or
injury arising in the course of the employment because the industry is supposed to be responsible therefore;
whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is being made because the hazard specifically covered by the
membership, and for which the employee had put up his own money, had taken place. As this Court had said:

. . . To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable
under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive the employees members of the System of the
statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contributed their money to the general common
fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation
Act accrues to the employees concerned due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a
burden on the employment itself. However, social security benefits are paid to the System's members, by
reason of their membership therein for which they contribute their money to a general common fund. . .
.

It may be added that whereas social security benefits are intended to provide insurance or protection against
the hazards or risks for which they are established, e.g., disability, sickness, old age or death, irrespective of
whether they arose from or in the course of the employment or not, the compensation receivable under the
Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the employee
or his dependents on account of the employment. (Rural Transit Employees Asso. vs. Bachrach Trans. Co., 21
SCRA 1263 [1967])

And according to Justice Jesus G. Barrera in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Social Security System:10

The philosophy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act is to make the payment of the benefits provided
for therein as a responsibility of the industry, on the ground that it is industry which should bear the resulting
death or injury to employees engaged in the said industry. On the other hand, social security sickness benefits
are not paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid to the members of the System as a matter of right,
whenever the hazards provided for in the law occurs. To deny payment of social security benefits because the
death or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive
the employees-members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they
contribute their money to the general common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the
benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees concerned, due to the
hazards involved in their employment and is made a burden on the employment itself. However, social
security benefits are paid to the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which they
contributed their money to a general common fund.
Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death sought to recover the just recompense they
need for their support. Instead of lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to frustrate their
efforts and has even come to this Court to seek our assistance in defeating their claim. That relief - and we are
happy to say this - must be withheld.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.

7. FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, August 29, 1988

Facts:
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent
to the residence of private respondents. August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed
between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was repeated several times
but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in
petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the
fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the
shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never
discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures
negative for the presence of inflammable substances. Private respondents collected
P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof. On January 23, 1975,
private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for a judgment in
their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. The Court of
First Instance renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages. A motion for
reconsideration was filed on but was denied. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on February 22, 1980. After the comment and reply were filed, the Court resolved to
deny the petition for lack of merit. However, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was granted, and the petition was given due course on September 12, 1980. After the
parties filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for decision on January 21, 1981.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case?

Held:
Yes

Ratio:
The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been
ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
In Africa, supra, where fire broke out in a Caltex service station while gasoline from a
tank truck was being unloaded into an underground storage tank through a hose and the fire
spread to and burned neighboring houses, this Court, applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, adjudged Caltex liable for the loss. The facts of the case likewise call for the
application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and
fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its
employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to
construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a
city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that
gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked
inside the shop.
And even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence.
Thus, petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall
between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the
pertinent city ordinances.

8. UNITED STATES vs MARIANO CRAME 30 Phil. 2 (March 2, 1915)

FACTS:
 In the Court of First Instance of Manila, accused-appellant Mariano Crame was
convicted for the crime of Serious Physical injuries through Reckless Negligence. The
learned trial court convicted the accused of the crime of producing serious physical injuries
by imprudenciatemeraria, setting forth as the grounds of the conviction several points
indicating negligence (i.e. The accused did not see the soldier whom he ran down until it was
too late, although the street at that point was brilliantly lighted; he did not sound his horn or
give notice of his approach in any other manner; he did not apply the brake or make any
effort whatever to stop; he was traveling on the wrong side of the street at the time of the
collision). In the defense of the accused-appellant, his counsel pointed out that neither the
chauffeur nor his companion saw the soldier at a sufficient distance, and that the soldier
appeared suddenly in front of the machine, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court is in accordance with the evidence and
the law?

HELD:
YES.

RATIO:
While it is true that the law does not draw an inference of negligence from the mere
showing that there was a collision between a man and an automobile on a public street but
that negligence must be proved, nevertheless, the Court believes it to be the rule that plaintiff,
while driving on the right-hand side of a wide road, was overtaken by an automobile which
struck the hind wheel of his wagon, establishes a case of negligence. Further, there is
no evidence in the case which shows negligence on the part of the injured soldier. The mere
fact that he was run down by an automobile doesnot signify that he was negligent. At the time
he was struck he was, speaking from the direction in which the accused was driving the
automobile at the time, on the right-hand side of the street where he had a right to be and
where the law fully protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the
accused was driving at the time of the injury. The Court regards it as clear from the record
that the accused was driving much faster than he claims he was, or else he was negligent in
not watching the street for foot passengers, or, in the handling of
his automobile. Furthermore, if he did not see the soldier until it was too late to stop, the
burden is on him to show why he did not. There is something wrong when a chauffeur runs
over a man who is in plain view of the automobile for a long distance before the point of the
accident is reached. No negligence on the part of the injured person has been shown.
Whichever way the case is looked at, whether from the viewpoint of the failure to see the
soldier in time to avoid the accident, or failure to stop or give warning by horn or whistle, it is
clear that the learned trial court was right when it held that the accused was guilty of
negligence. The judgement appealed from is affirmed.

9. Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966

FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started
w h i l e g a s o l i n e w a s being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at
the opening of thereceiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The
fire then spread to andburned several neighboring houses, including the personal
properties and effects insidethem. The owners of the houses, among them petitioners
here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation)

Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondentsh a d e x e r c i s e d d u e c a r e i n t h e p r e m i s e s a n d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e i r employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of  res ipsa
loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there
seems to be nothing definite,”  and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in
appropriate cases, “in the case atbar, however, we find no practical use for suchdocrtrine.” 

ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.

RULE:
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused
the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or
his servants andthe accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those whoh a v e i t s m a n a g e m e n t o r c o n t r o l u s e p r o p e r c a r e , i t
a f f o r d s r e a s o n a b l e e v i d e n c e , i n absence of explanation of defendant, that the
incident happened because of want of care.

The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development
Co. is applicable in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and
spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known
how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care. The report by the police officer regarding the
fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring
the contents thereof
intot h e   u n d e r g r o u n d   s t o r a g e   w h e n   t h e   f i r e   b r o k e   o u t ,   s t r e n g t h e n   t
h e   p r e s u m p t i o n   o f   negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy
district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the
area is used as a car barn for around 10 t a x i c a b s o w n e d b y B o q u i r e n ; ( 3 ) a
store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located
o n e m e t e r f r o m t h e h o l e o f t h e u n d e r g r o u n d t a n k ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e concrete
walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most and cannot prevent the
flames from leaping over it in case of fire.

Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.

10. G.R. No. 73998                 November 14, 1988

Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their
cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's
truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was
injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from
said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be
deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he
knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff
that was the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a
manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning sign.

Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting
his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the
former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which
covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to
property.  The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in the
policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.

The RTC  ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the
petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution  by putting warning signs that
their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.

Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Ruling:
Yes!

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the petitioner
placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene
lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and
further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it
did not function.  Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and
owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil
Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently,
may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming
liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has
already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as
a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. 

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that
the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle
before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe
on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be
careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any
accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of
negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The private
respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it.

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would
exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that
the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver,
there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of
diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in
maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of
proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver,
Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe
operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of
Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

11. Cayao-Lasam vs. Ramolete

FACTS:

On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner, Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam,
advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C), which she
performed on July 30, 1994. Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was
suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by other
doctors who informed her that there was a dead fetus in her womb. After which, Editha
underwent laparotomy in which she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for
hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.

Respondents alleged that Editha’s hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated

negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the
petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Editha’s womb.

Petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence. She contended that
it was Editha’s gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be discharged on July
31, 1994 after conducting the D&C Procedure on her, such discharge being against her
doctor’s advice, and her unjustified failure to return for check-up on August 5, 1994, as
directed by petitioner, that contributed to her life-threatening condition on September
16, 1994; that Editha’s hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal
pregnancy.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Petitioner was negligent;

Whether or not Petitioner’s acts are the proximate cause of Respondent’s injury

RULING:

Anent the first issue, no, the Petitioner who is a medical practitioner was not negligent.

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of

a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and
skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions,
and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a
patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which
a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure
or action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
 From the testimony of the expert witness presented, it is clear that the D&C procedure
was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care
that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with
Editha.

As regards the second issue, no, Petitioner’s performance of the D&C procedure was not the
proximate cause of Editha’s injury.

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or
omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission. Also, Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Since Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation in defiance of the petitioner’s
advice, she omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have
avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a
substantial part in bringing about her own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner
could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine
Editha’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have
prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted
in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission in
not returning for a follow-up check up was the proximate cause of her own injury and
not merely a contributory negligence on her part; she cannot recover damages from the
injury.

13. Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Balandan

FACTS:

Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City
of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine
feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was
surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of
fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface
of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor
vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could
easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the
gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8
years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the
factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while
thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning.”

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance is applicable in this case to hold the
Petitioner liable for the death of the Private Respondent’s child

RULING:

The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance states that one who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

However, American jurisprudence states that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is
not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

In the case at bar, Petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance. With this,
the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial. Hence, Petitioner is not liable for the death of Private Respondent Mario’s child.

14. Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) vs CA

FACTS:

In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon
by the code name "Gening" hit the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after
the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes,
at Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the
Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on
Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at said grocery, and
by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by
the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6
meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank
into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing
so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling
from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go
to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio
Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away. When Antonio
Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been electrocuted, he
acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes
passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant
Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the
party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the
lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off
in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The
body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer
Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag
Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M.,
he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw
grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the
ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO
Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. At about 8:10 A.M.,
Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having
learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at
the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken.
In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to
the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning
of June 29, 1967 was no longer there. On June 24, 1968, an action for damages was
instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Petitioner INELCO was negligent;

2) Whether or not the legal principle of Assumption of Risk bars Private Respondents from
recovery

RULING:

Anent the first issue, yes, Petitioner INELCO was negligent.

Electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where
persons have a right to be.

Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public. The negligence of petitioner having been shown,
it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. It was not the
typhoon which directly caused the victim's death; it was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place.

“When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt
efforts to discover and repair broken lines.” The fact is that when Engineer Antonio
Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967
on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to
the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the
INELCO office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of
Petitioner.
 As regards the second issue, no, the legal principle of Assumption of Risk does not bar Private
Respondents from recovery.

Assumption of risk is a defense in the law of torts, which bars or reduces a plaintiff's right to recovery
against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and
knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which he was participating
at the time of his or her injury.

Moreover, jurisprudence provides that if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property
of another is in peril, or when a person seeks to rescue his endangered property, he is excused
from the force of the rule (or maxim volenti non fit injuria" or “To a willing person, injury is
not done”) stating that when a person voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by
the consequences.

In the case at bar, the said maxim relied upon by Petitioner finds no application. It is imperative
to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of
a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong,
the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store
"to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, the law shall not punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury. Clearly, an emergency
was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a
place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her
way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by Petitioner's negligence.

15. MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE AND FRANCISO HISOLE

GR No. L-2075; November 29, 1949

Facts:
The case is an action for damages arising from a death caused by an animal. The complaint alleges
that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos
at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and
later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to  force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support. Plaintiff seeks to hold
defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

“The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any
damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
 The lower court ruled in favour of the defendant since it took the view that under the above-quoted
provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and
that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent
or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. 

Issue:
1. Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.

Ruling:
 The above statute names the possessor  or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it
may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one
of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code but action
under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. There being no reversible error in the order
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial situation of the
appellant.

Note: As such death is "a veritable accident of labor", labor laws should be applied rather than Art 1905 of the
Civil Code.

16. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS ROBERTO REYES
G.R. No. 154259; February 28, 2005

Facts:
Appellee (the plaintiff in the complaint before the trial court), Mr. Reyes a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, alleges
that on October 13, 1994, he was invited by Dr. Violeta Filart, an friend of several years, to join her in a party at
the Nikko Hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the Natal Day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.

During the party, Mr. Reyes was stopped at the buffet dinner by Miss Ruby Lim, the Executive
Secretary of the hotel. Lim told him to leave the party because he was not invited but the latter claimed that
he was invited by Dr. Filart but got completely ignored by the Doctor. This brought shame and humiliation to
Mr. Reyes. Not long after, he was approached by a Makati policeman and was asked him to step out of the
hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.

The lower court dismissed the complaint of Mr. Reyes as it ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the
risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. It likewise ruled that the
actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the
latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should
have talked to Mr. Reyes in private.

Issue:
Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the
party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is
solidarily liable with her.

Ruling:

As the RTC and the Court of Appeals reached irreconcilable conclusions to the facts of the case, the
Supreme Court was left with no choice but use its latent power to review such findings of facts.

The party was in a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese
national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not just disappear
into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of
the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was
aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would
naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a
glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former
boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims
ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels
personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered
him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal
and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. In fact, close enough for him to kiss.

Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years
old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work
at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say
that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts
declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity. Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart
did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages
The petition was granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The decision of
the RTC was affirmed without cost.

Note: The case discussed the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury). This refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so. However, as explained by the SC, the doctrine does not apply in this case because Nikko Hotel was
still under obligation to treat Mr. Reyes fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

17. GLAN’S PEOPLE LUMBER vs IAC, GR No. 70493, May 18, 1989

(GR No. 70493, May 18, 1989

Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, George Lim, Fabio S. Agad, Felix Lim and Paul Zacarias y Infante,
petitioners,
vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. De Calibo, Minors Royce Stephen, Joyce Joan, Janise
Marie, Jacqueline Brigitte Joceline Corazon, Juliet Geraldine, Jennifer Jill, all surnamed Calibo, represented by
their mother Cecilia A. Vda. De Calibo, respondents.)

FACTS:

In the afternoon of July 4, 1979, Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the
jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the
South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about the same time, the cargo truck, loaded
with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infante, coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards
after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided, resulting to Engr. Calibo’s death, and Roranes
and Partos to suffer physical injuries. Consequently, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged, stopped on
its wheels while the left side of the jeep was extremely damaged, had fallen on its right side on the asphalt
road a few meters to the rear of the truck.

On November 27, 1979, a case for damages was filed by the surviving spouses and children of the late Engr.
Calibo. The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding defendant Zacarias to
be negligent on the basis that “the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the
collision occurred, ‘and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he “did not drive
his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;”what is worse, “the truck
driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep;” had both
vehicles stayed in their respective lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they would have passed
“alongside of each other safely;”

The defendants prayed for the reversal of the judgment of the ICA, which it is claimed, ignored or ran counter
to established facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not ICA erred in declaring defendant Zacarias to be negligent.

RULING:
Yes. Both drivers had had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a distance of 150 meters, travelling at
approximately 30kph. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop while
the jeep was still thirty meters away when the jeep plowed into it. From these facts, the logical conclusion
emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do it while running at a speed
of 30kph.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete defense to accident liability today as it did
when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts. On the
same case, the Court decided that:

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will ben noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the party.

It is in the opinion of the Court that the evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the IAC which, for all
that appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of the deceased Engr. Calibo than
by objective appraisal of the proofs and a correct application of the law to the established facts. Compassion
for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of the love and support of a husband and father is an
entirely natural and understandable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of,
much less to influence, a just verdict in a suit at law.

18. (GR No. 80718, January 29, 1988

Feliza P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos, petitioners,
vs.
Court of Appeals and Luis Bernal, Sr., Glenia Bernal, Luis Bernal, Jr., Heirs of Marissa Bernal, namely, Gliceria
dela Cruz Bernal and Luis Bernal, Sr.)

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Said private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop on
view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. Based on the foregoing facts, the
RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. Petitioners argued that private respondents had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident of
only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners’ prior negligence should
be regarded. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190
of the Civil Code, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should be liable to damages caused to private respondents
RULING:

Yes, petitioners are liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code which states that “the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack
of necessary repairs.” Also, the Court has held that the doctrine of “last clear chance”, which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

19. PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban

GR No. 57079, September 29, 1989

Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause

FACTS

On the evening of July 30, 1968, Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street
where they resided. The jeep abruptly swerved on the inside lane then it ran over a mound of earth and fell
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered.

 PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own negligence,
and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. who should be held liable.  PLDT filed a
third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed
that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate signs.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying that the
spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.

RULING

No. The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable
to PLDT. Antonio Esteban was driving on the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane,
it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND. And if the accident did not happen because the jeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to
climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
lights which should have made him see the mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3
ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many
previous times as they live in the same area.

The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known
to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.

The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury . As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to PLDT. 

 A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must
be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any
negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the
unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-
submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even
been explained.

20. Ong vs. MCWD

FACTS

Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death
of their son, Dominador Ong. After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and
dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this
Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

Dominador Ong, 14-year old son of plaintiffs, in company with two of his brothers went to swim at the
defendant’s swimming pool. After paying the admission fee they went to one of the small pools where the
water was shallow. Later Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, his two brothers went to the bigger pool. Later another
boy in the swimming pool informed a lifeguard employed by the defendant that somebody was swimming
underwater for quite along time. The lifeguard immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved
the lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. Artificial respiration and a resuscitator were applied by
employees of the defendant upon Dominador for the purpose of reviving him. A doctor was summoned by
employees of the defendant to revive the boy but to no avail. This action was instituted by the parents of the
boy to recover damages from the defendant for the death of their son.

After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.

Issues
(1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the
damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.

Ruling

Judgment affirmed.

(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the
fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden.
Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid
danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line.
Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that
defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury
to or even death of its patrons.

(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in
violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the
lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in
order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to
impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.

21. CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ v. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHNARNEL
RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE

FACTS

Respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep
heading north on the national highway of Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He
tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the
oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death, even
with the prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. Respondents
sought to recover actual damages for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513.00 and funeral expenses in the
sum of P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

The petioners denied respondents’ allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and bumped the
vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving southward at
a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a
zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger
jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward
the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos
who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect.
Hence, respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the vehicular accident.
RULING:

Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to
act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons
were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the
opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type
jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road
or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before
proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno Valdez
was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent
man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.

On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a
defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and
other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the
circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it
until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to drive on the highway the
mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on the opposite lane and bumped the passenger jeep
driven by Benigno Valdez.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.

In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of
Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

22. VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

253 SCRA 303

Facts:

Plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue, when
she noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about one feet
away. She put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear
to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to
the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of
the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under the defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the
 middle of her thigh, with only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of the
body. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.  Her expenses totaled P147, 000
[P120,000 (confinement) + P27, 000 (artificial leg)].

Issues:

1) WON Valenzuela is guilty of “Contributory Negligence”.

2) WON Richard Li’s employer, Alexander Commercial, should be held liable.
3) WON the awarding of damages is proper.

Ruling:

1) NO. Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is

conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection. Under the emergency rule, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking
zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
flat tire and to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet
away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.

2. YES. Richard Li’s employer is liable. Under the civil law, an employer is liable for
the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis
of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater familias,
which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. Furthermore, the relationship in question is not based on
the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.

3. YES. As to the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we
are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -physical and psychological -
suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident. The damage done to her would
not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo
through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding physical and occupational therapies.
 23. CAPUNO vs. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-19331
April 30, 1965

Facts:

The case started from a vehicular collision in Pampanga on January 3, 1953, which
involved Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi, and private car driven by
Capuno. On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence. When the accused was acquitted of the charges against him, the
plaintiffs commenced a civil action for damages on September 26, 1958. However,
the lower courts dismissed the case on the ground that the action had already been
prescribed.

Issue:

WON the plaintiff’s action had already prescribed?

Ruling:

Yes, the plaintiff’s action had already prescribed as the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals based on the following doctrines:

 An action for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict must be instituted

within four years.
 An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as
to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run,
that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day
the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
 The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.

24. G. R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO TUPANG, respondents

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari made by PNR (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS) invoking
the principle of state of immunity from suit, to set aside the decision of the Appellate Court which held
petitioner PNR liable for damages for the death of Winifredo Tupang, a paying passenger who fell off
a train operated by the petitioner.
Winifredo Tupang boarded the train as paying passenger bound for Manila, the train while passing
Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did
not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead,
the train conductor, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of
the information. The police authorities of Lucena City found the lifeless body of Tupang.

Upon complaint filed by the deceased’s widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. On
appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the
utmost diligene required by ae of a common carrier.

Moving for reconsideration of the decision, the PNR raised for the first time on appeal, as a defense
the doctrine of state immunity from suit alleging that is a mere agency of the Philippine government
without distinct or separate personality of its own, and that its fund are governmental in character and,
therefore, not subject to garnishment. The motion was denied, hence, the petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the defense of state of immunity raised was proper, and whether the PNR was liable
primarily and solidarily for the death of Tupang and that there was no contributory negligence on the
part of Tupang.

Ruling:

No, the petition is devoid of merit. As the Supreme Court ruled the PNR was created under RA 4156,
as amended and has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the
Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

The petitioner though failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since the deceased opted to sit on the open
platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright
metalbar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such
contributory negligence, while exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of
the amount adjudicated as moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the decision of the appellate
court by eliminating the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively. Without costs.

25. G. R. No. L-30741 January 30, 1930

TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD., defendants-appelle

Facts:
The parents of the five-year old child, Purificacion Bernal, appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, which denied them claim for damages from J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., for the death of the child as a consequence of burns alleged to have been caused by
the fault and negligence of the defendants.

Fortunata with her daughter Purificacion came from another municipality to attend the procession of
Holy Friday held in Tacloban. After the procession, accompanied with two other persons, passed
along a public street called Gran Captain, the child Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of ther mother and friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plantm
an automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to
run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter, which at the time there was hot water in the said
gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J. V. House.

When the mother and companions, reached the child, they found her face downward in the
hot water, her clothes were immediately removed, and then covered with a garment, and she
was then taken to the provincial hospital. Despite the efforts, the child died the same night. It
was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the
contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.”

The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran
Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other
than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence.

The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants,
failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.

The trial court concluded to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due
principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from the hot
water.

Issue:

Whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiff basis recovery for damages.

Ruling:

No, the contributory negligence of the child and her mother does not operate as a bar to recovery, but
in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to
run along a few paces in  advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.

The Supreme Court ruled that death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in
permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of
passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it.
Recovery should be permitted to the mother, who the child had lived with and presumably supported
her, not the father, who had never legally recognized his child, and J. V. House be held responsible,
being the franchisee at the time of the incident.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, versus HEIRS OF NOBLE

26.
CASIONAN,

Facts

Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time
of the incident that claimed his life on June 27, 1995. He would have turned 20
years of age on November 9 of that year. Noble was originally from Cervantes,
Ilocos Sur. He worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon,
Benguet.
 
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was
regularly used by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970s,
petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69
kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines
sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight
to ten feet. 

On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were
at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to
19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole
horizontally on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor
carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail
underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work
place.
 
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the
bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing
sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble
and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard
Melchors shout for help and together they brought the body of Noble to their
camp.
 

Issues

(i) Whether the award for damages should be deleted in view of the
contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award for unearned
income, exemplary, and moral damages should be deleted for lack of factual
and legal bases.

Ruling
 
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As
established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation
of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly
maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have
touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.
 
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the
wires by attributing negligence to the victim.

The Supreme Court finds no contributory negligence on Nobles part.

 
C ontributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and
foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act
or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury.
 
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by
members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby
of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high
tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary
routine to other workers in the area.
 In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. 

From the testimony of the victims mother, it was duly established during
trial that he was earning P3,000.00 a month. To determine the compensable
amount of lost earnings, We consider (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived (life expectancy); and (2) the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the deceased.  Life expectancy is computed by
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second factor is
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the
gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of
earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x
(gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)].
 
The Supreme Court sustains the trial court computation of unearned
income of the victim. In determining the unearned income, the basic concern is to
determine the damages sustained by the heirs or dependents of the deceased
Casionan. And here, the damages consist not of the full amount of his earnings but
the support they would have received from the deceased had he not died as a
consequence of the unlawful act of the NPC. x x x The amount recoverable is not
the loss of the entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the earnings which the
heirs would have received as support. Hence, from the amount of P1,440,000.00, a
reasonable amount for the necessary expenses of Noble Casionan had he lived
would be deducted. The Court deems that 50 percent of the gross earnings of the
deceased of P1,440,000.00 should be deducted for his necessary expenses had he
lived, thus leaving the other half of about P720,000.00 as the net earnings that
would have gone for the support of his heirs. This is the unearned income of which
the heirs were deprived of.
 
Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members of the
community of Dalicno who used the trail regularly when it failed to address the
sagging high tension wires despite numerous previous requests and warnings. It
only exerted efforts to rectify the danger it posed after a death from
electrocution already occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent, warranting
the award of exemplary damages.
 
As to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of the
award. Moral damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not meant to
enrich the complainant but to enable the injured party to obtain means to
obviate the moral suffering experience.  

27. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE

TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R.
AGUILAR, respondents.

Facts
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo
are the stores branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor,
respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the
2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing
her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then
beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the
bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and
screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the
assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving
ZHIENETH from the floor.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she
was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter
communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she
sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after
the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.
Issues
 (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence; and
 (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to
private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the
store premises.

Ruling
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist
with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not
have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
The Supreme Court ruled that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no
accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to negligence.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event
before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed
by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it
is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain,
to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. The Supreme Court
therefore accord credence to Gonzales testimony on the
matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic
death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counters base.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume
that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals
and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not
durable after all. Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and
its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and
its base was not secured
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDAs waist, later to the
latters hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the childs hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable
and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from
her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was
near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon
us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did
not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

28. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE v. BITHUEL MACAS,

GR No. 161946, 2008-11-14

Facts:

Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at about 4:00 p.m., at the intersection of Buhangin
and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas, herein respondent, was
standing on the shoulder of the road. She was about two... and a half meters away from the respondent when he
was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca. Rosalinda and another unidentified
person immediately came to the respondent's rescue and told Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital.
Cimafranca... rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical Center.

Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the
name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident
happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged... that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio
Jalipa on March 28, 1994,[5] and turned over the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt to Jalipa, with
the understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim; and (2) whether the petitioner and
third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the victim.

Ruling:

The petitioner contends that the victim's negligence contributed to his own mishap. The petitioner theorizes that
if witness Rosalinda Palero, who was only two and a half meters away from the victim, was not hit by the Ford
Fiera, then the victim must have been so negligent as... to be bumped and run over by the said vehicle.

In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was
the uncemented portion of the highway.

The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired. The registered owner of any
vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause.

The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case
of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to... inconvenience or prejudice a third
party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured.

Principles:

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

29. Cuadra v. Monfort

G.R. L-24101 Sept. 30, 1970
FACTS:

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six. Their teacher
assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. Maria
Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an
earthworm and, to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned
around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part
and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation
twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days,
for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa
Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in
behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant
was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents are liable for the acts of their minor child when the act or omission of the
child is committed in the absence of the parents

RULING: NO. There is no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to
"all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the
attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence
the damage could have been prevented.

There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.

On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right
to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. The act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the
defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

30) Macario Tamargo vs Court of Appeal GR. 85044, June 3, 1992

Facts: On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In
addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted
without discernment.
Prior to incident, or on December 10, 1981, there was a petition by spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, living in the USA to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was
granted on, November 18, 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, claimed that, not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed, relying on Article 36 and 39 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.

RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed
were not indispensable parties to the action. A motion for reconsideration was filed but dismissed
for failure to compy section 4&5 of Rule 15 of Revised Rules of Court that notice of the motion
shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion;
and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal,
the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

Issue:

Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.

Held: No.

The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.

The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between
the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control as provided under Article 221 of Family Code of the
Philippines and Article 58 of of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The Supreme Court do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child, for the following reason.

1. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so
as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and
which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable.
 2. Under the Article 35 of Child and Youth Welfare Code , parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle
shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not
the adopting parents.

31) Phil Rabbit Lines Inc. vs Phil-American Forwarders Inc. G.R No. L-25142 March 25,
1975

Facts: It was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and
could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. A complaint for damages
was filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit
and Pineda.

Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not
Pineda's employer.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company
and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court
dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was
not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a
business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit
and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other
incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and
P25, respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil
personality.

Issue:

1. whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code,
embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
2. Whether or not the new factual issue could be given due course.

Held:

1. No. The term ‘manager” in Article 2180 is used in the sense of “employer”. A managerial
employee within the contemplation of the Labor Code is not a manger referred to in
 Article 2180 because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of the
employer.

2. No. It cannot be allowed in appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to
be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal because, to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party

32. PEDRO ELCANO, et.al. plaintiffs-appellants vs. REGINAL HILL, et.al. defendants-
appellees
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

FACTS: Agapito Elcano, the son of plaintiffs-appellants, Pedro Elcano, was killed by
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence. For this,
the defendant was criminally prosecuted and was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently, the
Plaintiffs, filed a complaint for recovery of damages from the defendant and his father,
Marvin Hill. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant which was first denied by the
Court of First Instance but later on granted through Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUEs:

1. WON the present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is
now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court and that section 3(c) of Rule 111, Rules of Court
is applicable;

2. WON the action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. WON the principles of Quasi-delicts, Art. 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code, are inapplicable
in the instant Case; and

4. WON the complaint states no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

RULING:

1. The Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

2. NO. the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

3. Applicable.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence.

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

4. The effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty.
Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is
not unusual. Inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

33. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

FACTS: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged breach of their
agreement to get married.  She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian
medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. They then set the
marriage after the end of the school semester.  He visited Marilou’s parents to secure their
approval of marriage. 

In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. As a result of this live-
in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the
fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant even if his attitude toward her changed
after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained
injuries. She would keep reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties
at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

                Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC.  Baksh denied the accusations but
asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and
passport.  The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. 

ISSUEs:

1. WON breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong

2. WON Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case
3. WON pari delicto applies in this case

RULING:

1. NO. The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.  The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman.  In that
instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses.  Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of
the country.

2. YES. Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.               
                Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
                Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the (Civil Code). 
                It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.  From the beginning, obviously,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.  Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life partner.  His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would
be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.  Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of
morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.  It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article
19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his
obligations. 
                No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions. 

3. NO. She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner.  Pari delicto means in equal fault.  At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. Equity often interfered for the relief
of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.

34. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993

Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan
City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She
brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks
“are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she
had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from
petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the
ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which
prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING:
Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on
quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
35. CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and
SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO
GR No. 150920, November 25, 2005

FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution
operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found
himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He started to panic so he
banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open
the window to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell
down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the CLC, the
members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that the
school was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s comfort room.
CLC, in its defense, maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence.
CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a
family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The trial court ruled
in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court of
Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.

RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to
avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob
despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the
window where Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was defective. The
architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the comfort room was
actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that
the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable
for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working
condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows
that something was wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the window,
petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds
the regular exit, the door, not functioning.

Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated
that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window
to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is
sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the
acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that
Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates
petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own
negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own
negligence.

36. FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner vs.SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA

ALMARIO, respondents.

Facts:

One in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal
action was filed against Fontanilla. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of
the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap,
as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as
there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be

imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or
a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.

Issue:

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Ruling:

YES.

Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-
delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code.

Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says,
referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it
cannot be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil
Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)

Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? The responsibility
in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not
 preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the
law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of
another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that
such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is
liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by
exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a
bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has
upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is
a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if
he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have
been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his
primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not
overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they
preferred the second remedy.

Counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability
arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to
give the importance to the latter type of civil action.To find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

37. LUIS
JOSEPH, petitioner 
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON,
JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT
Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan
City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo
Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a
cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck. While said cargo truck was proceeding
towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle. At about the
same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by
respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent
Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of
overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder
of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture
in one of his legs.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as

owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

Respondents, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid

petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason
thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from liability the following
parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.

Respondents and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of
P 7,420.61.

Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a

"Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that
respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to
respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva,
Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim
executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan
inured to the benefit of respondent Perez?

Yes.

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint,
hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based
on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is
untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true
that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.

If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law.

However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery
under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law
against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from
the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from
any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release
from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio
Perez.

#38. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio Durian filed in the RTC of Isabela an information
charging Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a driver of Rafael Reyes Trucking, with reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide and damage to property. The latter bumped into a Nissan pick-up, killing its two (2)
passengers, namely: Francisco Dy Jr. and Feliciano Balcita, the driver.

The accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. The offended-private complainants made
a reservation to file a separate civil case against the accused-driver. They also filed a complaint against Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation as employer of Tumol based on quasi delict.

The private complainants withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and instituted it along with the criminal case. The civil case against the company was, however, not withdrawn.

RTC found Dunca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and was sentenced to pay the family
for damages, while the civil case against the company was ordered dismissed.

Petitioner and accused filed a notice of appeal and the private respondents moved for the
amendment of the joint decision to hold the petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages in the event of
insolvency of the accused which was granted by the court.
 Petitioner filed a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision. However, during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to another country. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.

Finally, CA rendered the decision affirming the decision of the RTC. Petitioner then again filed a
motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the motion filed for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking can held subsidiarily liable?
HELD:

Yes, petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking is liable, but the case must be remended to the lower court to
determine the liability of the latter.

The liability of Reyes is not subsidiary since there was a separate civil action against them. If the
action is separate from the criminal case, the liability of the company is, therefore, primary and not subsidiary.

The trial court erred in dismissing the civil case and making Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable based on
criminal action. But such dismissal was not appealed (therefore final). The pronounce against Reyes is void.

Dissenting (Davide):

The court cannot decide on the civil case because it was already dismissed and such became final
when no one appealed for it. The solution should be to maintain the decision of the lower court. When the civil
case against Tumol was withdrawn, the case against Reyes Trucking was also impliedly withdrawn.

The subsidiary liability as decided by the lower court is correct.

#39. SANTOS VS. PIZARDO

FACTS:

In April 1994, driver Sibayan of Viron Transit was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was eventually convicted in December
1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by
the MCTC. In October 2000, Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris, the president
and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among others,
prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from the accrual of the cause of
action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner may still recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of
their kin?

HELD:
 Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the
crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the MCTC did not make any pronouncement as to
the latter’s civil liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron
Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict,
considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce
liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two (2) separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e. (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and, (2) independent civil
liabilities (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings.

While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

The Court held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the
duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates the controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

40. MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157,

JAN. 25, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI). While driving
his bus going to Manila, he bumped a rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent
Calaunan, because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent
filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was
cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when
the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand,
according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the
left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him.
However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay
damages to respondent.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil case?

HELD:

Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclic’s

acquittal does not affect the case. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES.  A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now
settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an
accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted
on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second
instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto
is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the
delict complained of.  As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,
same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or
that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. b.2 CULPA-CONTRACTUAL

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father
of a family shall be required.

41. GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ G.R. NO. 34840

SEPTEMBER 23, 1931

FACTS:

On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided

while attempting to pass each other on a bridge. The truck was driven by the chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by saturnine Cortez. The automobile was being operated
by Bonifacio Gutierrez, who is 18 years of age, which is owned by his parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother,
together with several other members of the Gutierrez family were accommodated therein.

The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a
fractured right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable period of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the driver of the truck and automobile are liable for damages and
indemnification due to their negligence. What are the legal obligations of the defendants?

HELD: Bonifacio Gutierrez’s obligation arises from culpa aquiliana. On the other hand,
Saturnino Cortez’s and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco’s obligation rise from culpa
contractual.

The youth Bonifacio was na incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate
of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the
son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of
his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1903 of the Civil Code, the
father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the
minor.

The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco
rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract.

42. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. CA Case Digest

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, 
February 4, 1992  GR NO. 84698

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community, while in the
premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against
PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. 

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against
them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

 
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations,
arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract. 

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis.
Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability. 

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes
ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. 

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore held
liable for his death. 

Petition denied.

43. Air France vs. Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155

FACTS: The plaintiff, Rafael Carrascoso, paid for and was issued a “First class” ticket by Air France
from Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager of Air France asked the plaintiff to
vacate his seat because a white man has a “better right” than him. At first, the plaintiff protested, but,
as things got heated up, he was asked by the other Filipinos on board to give up his seat and transfer
in the tourist class. After the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France for the embarrassment and
inconvenience he suffered. The trail court awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first class
ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.

ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for the damages to Carrascoso and on what basis

RULING: Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to
furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air
France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The Supreme Court did not give credence
to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he
will be given a first classseat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso,
there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air
France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

44. REGINO vs PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GR NO. 156109, NOV 18, 2004

FACTS:
Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her
relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics under
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. Sometime in February, PCST held a fund
raising campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the
construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at
the price of P100.00 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties
and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final examinations in
logic and statistics, her teachers disallowed her from taking the tests. Regino’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded
by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST’s policy.

As a result, Regino filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad
(PCST et al.). In her complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages, P500,000 as moral damages; at
least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s
fees. PCST et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
contending that the complaint should have been lodged with the Commission of Higher Education (CHED). The
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Aggrieved, Regino filed the present Petition on pure
questions of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCST et al. can be made liable for damages.

HELD:
Yes. PCST et al. can be made liable for damages.
In her Complaint, Regino also charged that PCST et al. “inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their
poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt,
disgrace and unworthiness”; as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her
subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The
acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and “demoralization of
unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law
state thus:

“Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”

“Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

“Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.”

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic
institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the
act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we quote:

“x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi delicts or
tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso
(124 Phil. 722; 18 SCRA 155), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court
referred to the petitionerairline’s liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is
a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that
revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: ‘x x x. When such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.’

“Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21 x x x.”

45. CALALAS vs CA, GR NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000

FACTS:
Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension seat”, a wooden
stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This incident
caused injury to Sunga.

She filed a Complaint for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage.
On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding that it
was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on
the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of carriage and not on
quasi-delict.

Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident negates
petitioner’s liability.

HELD:

No. The negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident does not negate
petitioner’s liability.

The issue in this case is one of breach of contract or culpa contractual, premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation and not of quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, which has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that Salva and his driver Verena’s liability for the damage
to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well
as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
 Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose,
and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. 

46. CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REBECCA

ESTRELLA, RACHEL FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE, INC. BATANGAS
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO AND WILFREDO DATINGUINOO

G.R. No. 147791

September 8, 2006

FACTS:

From San Pablo City, Rebecca Estrella and her granddaughter Rachel Fletcher boarded a BLTB bus (driven by
Wilfredo Datinguinoo) for Pasay City, but they did not reach their destination because a tractor-truck owned by
CDCP (driven by Espiridion Payunan), rammed the bus from behind.

As a result of the accident, both Rebecca and Rachel sustained several injuries, wounds and fractures. They
then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, alleging that both drivers were negligent in their duties and did
not obey traffic rules.

They also included the drivers’ employers – BLTB and CDCP for not exercising due diligence when it came to
the proper selection and training of their employees, and for lack of vehicle maintenance. CDCP included a
third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance Inc.

The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering BLTB and Datinguinoo jointly and severally liable to pay a
total of Php 89,254.43 as actual damages and attorney’s fees. This includes a 6% interest per annum which is
counted from the day of judicial demand (or filing of the complaint) which was pegged on February 1980.

CDCP and Payunan on the other hand are ordered to pay exemplary damages worth Php 20,000 each to Rachel
and Rebecca, with an additional Php 80,000 to Rachel as moral damages. The third-party complaint of CDCP to
Philippine Phoenix is however dropped.
CDCP raised an appeal to the CA, contending that the award of damages are excessive and unfounded since
both plaintiffs are passengers of BLTB, hence BLTB and Datinguinoo should be solely liable based on culpa
contractual.

They also appealed the RTC’s decision of dropping Philippine Phoenix from any liability, since they are entitled
to recover expenses therefrom by virtue of their insurance. The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CDCP is liable for damages.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that CDCP and Payunan are liable under quasi-delict (culpa aquilania).
However, the Supreme Court disagreed on the ruling of the lower courts regarding the commencement of the
6% legal interest rate. It should not be on the day of the filing of the complaint, but rather on the day of
judgment – which was on February 1993. This is because the amount of damages is still unknown and uncertain
unless the court renders its judgment.

In addition, the Supreme Court says that if the liabilities are still not satisfied from the time of final judgment,
the total amount will earn an additional interest rate of 12% per annum.

47. GEO. W. DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET

AL.

FACTS:

Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt
a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as
Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued
in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1248
hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to
transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and
that she had been misinformed as to its area.

Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract
to Daywalt. Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a
religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to
Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence
and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence of
other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from
conveying the entire tract.

Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced
Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and
to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalt’s claim for damages against the Recoletos was for
the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because of the interference of the
Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its
conversion into a sugar mill.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?

HELD:

No, Recoletos is not liable. The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot
become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first
a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from
Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too
remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt, neither can
the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract,
the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract.

48. NORMAN A. GAID vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On October 25, 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road near a
school. At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen
year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto)
sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road.
However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos) saw the victim or
anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.

The next thing Bongalto (eyewitness) saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney,
after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub
(Actub), who was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate,
heard a strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to
hurdle an obstacle. Dayata was then seen lying on the ground and caught in between the rear tires.
Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.

Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the
victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. Mellalos loaded the victim
on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health
Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its
doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. The attending doctor issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral
injuries as the cause of death.

Hence, petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

MTC’s DECISION
The MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held
petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters
from the point of impact. He was also scored for not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the
jeepney’s left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right.

RTC’s DECISION

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.

CA’s DECISION

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification as it found petitioner guilty
only of simple negligence resulting in homicide. CA exonerated petitioner from the charge of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time
of the accident. However, the appellate court still found him to be negligent when he failed to promptly
stop his vehicle to check what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner shall be held liable for the death of Dayata?

RULING:

Petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the same situation could have foreseen the
vehicular accident or could have stopped his vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due to the
following reasons: (1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioner’s attention was focused on the
road and the students outside the schools gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with passengers
and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his vehicle.

The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events
leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage
began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road. The
second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and
the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent. Reckless imprudence consists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason
of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act. In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two
eyewitnesses.

It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving
the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near
the jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In
Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear
tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the
jeep.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the first stage. The proximate
cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to
catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.

As to the second stage of the incident, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not
stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court
equates with negligence. Petitioner contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not see
anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the incident.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.

The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over
by the jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. The
distance of 5.70 meters is the length of space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground
and the spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection at
the scene of the accident

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim’s
death was petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

Therefore, petitioner is ACQUITTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Resulting in
Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals and of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of the MCTC of Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental.

49. DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., VS. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO
M. LIMBAGA

G.R. No. 161803

February 4, 2008

FACTS:

A Nissan van owned by the petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. was traversing along the National Highway in
Butuan City going to Surigao City. A “Joana Paula” passenger bus cruising on the opposite lane towards the
van.

In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. The prime mover suffered a tire blowout the night before so its driver parked the vehicle askew
occupying a substantial portion of the national highway. However, the parked prime mover was not equipped
with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates as required by the law, instead a banana trunk was placed as
substitute.

To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming bus swerved to the right, onto the lane
of the approaching Nissan van. When the Nissan van driver saw this, he swerved to the left to avoid the
oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime
mover. Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private respondents prime mover
owner and driver.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan van:
a) Whether or not the prime mover driver was negligent in parking the vehicle on the national highway;
b) Whether or not his negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.

HELD:

a) Yes, prime mover driver was negligent in parking the vehicle on the national highway and that he failed to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists. The prime mover driver was negligent in parking the
prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of
the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
 mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon the driver to
take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

b) Yes, the skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision. Private respondents
are liable for all the damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability
includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorists in trying to avoid
collision with the parked prime mover. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.

50. DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., VS. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO
M. LIMBAGA

G.R. No. 161803

February 4, 2008

FACTS:

A Nissan van owned by the petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. was traversing along the National Highway in
Butuan City going to Surigao City. A “Joana Paula” passenger bus cruising on the opposite lane towards the
van.

In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. The prime mover suffered a tire blowout the night before so its driver parked the vehicle askew
occupying a substantial portion of the national highway. However, the parked prime mover was not equipped
with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates as required by the law, instead a banana trunk was placed as
substitute.

To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming bus swerved to the right, onto the lane
of the approaching Nissan van. When the Nissan van driver saw this, he swerved to the left to avoid the
oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime
mover. Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private respondents prime mover
owner and driver.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan van:
c) Whether or not the prime mover driver was negligent in parking the vehicle on the national highway;
d) Whether or not his negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.

HELD:

c) Yes, prime mover driver was negligent in parking the vehicle on the national highway and that he failed to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists. The prime mover driver was negligent in parking the
prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of
the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon the driver to
take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

d) Yes, the skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision. Private respondents
are liable for all the damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability
includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorists in trying to avoid
collision with the parked prime mover. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
51. TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. January 30, 1976.

FACTS:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell
on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and
the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the
AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to
look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of
Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken
line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after
the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to the storm as a fortuitous
event
2. Whether or not the boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

RULING:
1. No, the proximate cause of the boy’s death is not due to a fortuitous event. A careful
examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With
ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case
of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown
down.
2. Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the
victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by
his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

52. Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA, ET.AL.

G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988

FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went
to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his companions
went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4
inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and
after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the
government entity in charge of the airport.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CAA was negligent

HELD:
YES, CAA was negligent. CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on
the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose
but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found
that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning, designing,
constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.

Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a
facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to
look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of
the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on
the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public.

Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff,
which although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case
of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-
overn their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of
this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably
foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of
its construction.
53. M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907

FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff
claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds,
so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in
the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a
rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the company is liable
2. Whether or not there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner

RULING:
Yes, the company is liable. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
1. First, that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
2. Second, that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the
boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail
was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen
testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in
placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.

54. ASSOCIATED BANK (Now WESTMONT BANK), petitioner,

vs. VICENTE HENRY TAN, respondent

G.R. No. 156940, December 14, 2004

Facts:
  Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the Associated Bank (AB). Sometime in
September 1990, he deposited a postdated UCPB check with the AB in the amount
of P101,000.00 issued to him by a certain Willy Cheng from Tarlac.
 On October 1, 1990, the bank record showed that his balance is P297,000, from his
original deposit of P196,000. On the same day upon the advice of the AB that the
P101,000 was already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, Tan withdrew
P240,000, leaving a balance of P57,793.45.
 On October 2, 1990, Tan deposited P50,000, leaving his balance to P107,793.45,
because he has issued several checks to his business partners amounting to
P74,357.40.
 However, the previously deposited check amounting to P101,000 was later
dishonored by the drawee bank (UCPB), which caused AB to debit said amount to
Tan’s account. Consequently, the issued checks bounced due to insufficiency of
funds, which affected Tan by lost profits and bad credit reputation.

Issue: Whether or not Associated Bank has the right to debit the account of its client for a check
deposit which was dishonored by the bank.

Ruling:

No, the AB has no right to debit the account of Tan for the deposited check which was later
on dishonored by the drawee bank.

As a general rule, a bank has a right of setoff over the deposits therein for the payment of
any withdrawals on the part of a depositor. The right of a collecting bank to debit a clients account
for the value of a dishonored check that has previously been credited has fairly been established by
jurisprudence. However, to properly invoke said right the bank should have properly exercised its role
and obligations, first as respondent’s depositary bank and second, as collecting agent for the
check in question.

AB as the depository bank must exercise the highest degree of diligence as expected, and
high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a
bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. However, AB did
not exercise that diligence required by law since it allowed the withdrawal of the face value of the
deposited check prior to its clearing. That act certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the
banking system. Such a practice is unusual, because a check is not legal tender or money, and its
value can properly be transferred to a depositors account only after the check has been cleared by
the drawee bank. Before the check shall have been cleared for deposit, the collecting bank can only
assume at its own risk -- as herein petitioner did -- that the check would be cleared and paid out.

AB as the collecting agent, provided reservations in its bank deposit slip to wit:

“In receiving items on deposit, this Bank obligates itself only as the Depositors Collecting
agent, assuming no responsibility beyond carefulness in selecting correspondents, and
 until such time as actual payments shall have come to its possession, this Bank reserves
the right to charge back to the Depositors account any amounts previously credited
whether or not the deposited item is returned. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

However, this reservation is not enough to insulate the bank from any liability. Under Article
1909 of the Civil Code, such bank could be held liable not only for fraud, but also for negligence. As a
general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or
agents within the course and scope of their employment. Due to the very nature of their business,
banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees. Jurisprudence has established that the lack of diligence of a servant is imputed
to the negligence of the employer, when the negligent or wrongful act of the former proximately
results in an injury to a third person; in this case, the depositor.

Thus, failure to properly exercise the role and obligations as the depositary bank and collecting
agent of Henry Tan, the right of setoff cannot be invoked, hence, AB has no right to debit the
account of Tan for the deposited check that was dishonored.

55. ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, petitioners

Vs. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, respondent

G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010

Facts:

 On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, son of the petitioners died due to a
gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store which is owned and operated by Jerome Jovanne
Morales, the respondent.
 During the said incident, Morales was in Manila and entrusted Aristedes Matibag and
Jason Herbolario, sales agents of the former as caretakers of the gun store.
 The bullet that killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the
gun store for repair. Said gun is stored in the drawer with keys given to the
caretakers of the gun store.
 Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on
top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, Alfred got hold of the same.
Malitbag then asked Alfred to return the gun which the latter followed and handed
the gun. However, the gun went off, the bullet hitting Alfred in the head that caused
his death.
 The petitioners filed an independent civil action for damages against respondent.

Issue: Whether or not Jerome Jovanes Morales is civilly liable for the death of Alfred Dennis
Pacis.
Ruling:

Yes, Jerome Jovanes Morales is civilly liable for the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides, to wit:

“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

Connectedly, Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. Under this provision the liability of the
employer, or any person is primary and direct.

It is ruled, that unlike the ordinary affairs of life and business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
Respondent was negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. Further, the defective gun should have been stored in a
vault.

Therefore, Morales did not exercise the degree of diligence required of a good father of
a family, thus, he shall be primarily liable for the damages caused to the petitioners since he is the
employer of the caretakers.

56. S.D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees

vs.

WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS:

On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on

Calle Real, Ermita, Manila, Philippines, when a delivery wagon belonging to William
Van Buskirk, came along the street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and
run over to carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong with a serious cut upon her
head.
Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero;

That upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines
of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the
wagon to unload the forage.

While unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached to the
delivery wagon and they ran away. The driver was thrown out from the wagon and
was unable to stop the horses resulting to a collision with the carromata.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.

ISSUE

Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?

HOLDING

No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. This is because the
occurrence that transpired therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts of
life. The prima facie case was already destroyed from the start when the defendant
presented his evidence to the court by employing all the diligence of his cochero
proving that the latter was not a negligent. Hence, it proves that the defendant is
not liable for any accusations.

RULINGS

It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the
horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. The act of defendant’s
driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts that the performance of which has not proved destructive or
injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time
that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be of themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very reason why they have been permitted
by society is that they are beneficial rather than prejudicial.

It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left
at the time of the accident. Those conditions showing of themselves that the
defendant’s cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse.
57. Ylarde, et. al. vs Aquino, et. al.
GR No. L33722, July 29, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School in Pangasinan.  Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein.  During
that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop destroyed in World War II.  Defendant decided to help clear the area so
he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton
concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried.  It was left
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito
Ylarde to complete the excavation.  Defendant left the children to level the loose soil
while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get
some rope.  It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the
stone”.  After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the
concrete block slide down.  Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall
causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days
thereafter.  The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages
against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.

Pili nala kun ha in mas bongga 

HELD:

No, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable.

As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students”.  Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
this is the general rule.  However, in case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule.  In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable.  Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable
for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give
any instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students should make sure that the
children are protected from all harm.  The excavation instructed clearly exposed the
students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education
such as school gardening, planting trees etc.  Aquino acted with fault and gross
negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead
utilized his students.  Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away
all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present
to the children.  He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.  

Held: 

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students
while in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held
liable. It was held in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,

responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable as anexception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis  'teachers' should
apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and
trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent
Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is
an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted
by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held
liable under Article 2180 of the CivilCode as the teacher-in-charge of the children for
being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. 
it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence
when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead
utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton
concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children
to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the
huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil
around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at
the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to checkon
the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causalconnection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by
themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Everything that
occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private
respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it
not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the
lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

58. Philippine Hawk Corporation vs Vivian Tan Lee

Facts:

On March 17, 1991, respondent Vivian Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while
onboard a motorcycle driven by the latter, got into an accident. The accident involved
a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine
Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. The accident
resulted to the death of Respondent’s husband and caused respondent physical
injuries. Respondent testified that she was riding in their motorcycle in tandem with
her husband. They were at a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they
were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward them,
and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside and the motorcycle as well. She lost
consciousness and was brought to a hospital where she was confined for a week while
her husband died by reason of the accident. The respondent further testified that her
husband was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station that yielded 1 Million
pesos a year in revenue and they also had a copra business which yielded an income of
P36,000.00 a year.

Margarito Avila, the driver of the petitioner bus testified that on the said occurrence,
he was driving the bus at 60 kms. Per hour. He then saw a motorcycle ran from his left
side of the highway and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the
bus and so he turned the bus to the right. He then heard a banging sound and saw the
motorcycle turned turtle. He did not stop to help out of fear for his life , but drove on
and surrendered to the police. He denied having bumped the motorcycle but further
testified that he had previously been involved in side-sweeping incidents.

Respondent Vivian Tan then filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint
against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for
damages based on quasi delict arising from the said vehicular accident.

The trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner and defendant Margarito
Avila and adjudged the latter guilty of simple negligence. The court also ordered the
defendants Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to pay respondent P
745, 575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual damages plus P 50,000.00 as
moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification in the award for damages.

Issues:

1. Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether

negligence on his part was the proximate causes of the accident, resulting in the death
of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to the respondent.

2. Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.

3. Whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper.

Ruling:

1. Yes, Margarito Avila was guilty of simple negligence which was the proximate
cause of the accident. As explained by the court, foreseeability is the fundamental test
of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a
way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realised that interest of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this
case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take
the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle,
showing that the bus driver was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit
the motorcycle and the jeep.

2. Yes, petitioner is liable to respondent for damages. As provided by the Court,

whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court upholds that
petitioner is liable to respondent since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila,
for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behaviour on
the road. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in side
sweeping incidents.

3. Yes, the damages awarded in the instant case are proper. The petitioner contends
that it was the only one that appealed the decision of the trial court with respect to
actual and moral damages; hence the CA erred in awarding other kinds of damages in
favour of respondent who did not appeal from the trial court ’s decision. Such petition
being ruled unmeritorious, the Court explained that even if the error complained of by
a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such
error may now be considered by the Court. The procedure of the Supreme Court being
the same as that of the Court of Appeals, it has been held that the latter is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if
it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case.

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for

damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when the deceased
is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage or the deceased is employed as
a daily wage worker. In this case, records show that respondents husband was earning an
annual income of 1 Million for his gasoline station as supported by a Certificate of
Creditable Income Tax Withheld. However, no documentary evidence was presented
regarding his income out of the copra business; hence, the testimony of the respondent
regarding the said income cannot be considered. In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly
awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondent’s husband, temperate damages, and
moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by the respondent in addition to the
damages awarded by the trial court to the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied and the Decision of the CA is Affirmed with
Modification.

59. Fernando vs CA

Facts:

On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market
filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer ’s Office for
the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo, and Suner Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November
26, 1975, Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before
such date, bidder Bertulano, with four other companions namely Garcia, Liagoso,
Fernando, and Fajardo were found dead inside the septic tank. The City Engineer’s
Office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank
without clearance form it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
Dr. Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the
cause of death as “asphyxia” caused by diminution of oxygen supply in the body due
to the intake of toxic gas, which, in this case was sulfide gas produced from the waste
matter inside the septic tank.

The petitioner then filed a case which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals and the said court reversed and set aside the decision
of the trail court ordering the defendant to pay compensatory and moral damages to
petitioners. Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration whereby the
CA, finding merit in the motion for reconsideration of defendant-appellee Davao City,
granted the same, reversing and setting aside its decision and then ordered that the
case be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Davao City is guilty of negligence in the present case and
whether such negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the
victims hereof

Ruling:
No, respondent Davao City is not guilty of negligence. As ruled by the court,
negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under the
law, a person who, by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. To be entitled to damages for an injury
resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove that the defendant’s negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.

In this case, petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the
laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no
warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to
neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public
 respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.

The Court does not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public respondent
had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such a negligence was
not a continuing one. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean the
septic tank, the public respondent immediately responded by taking up remedial measures
to meet the situation. It is also an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent’s
failure to re-empty the septic tank, people in the market have been using the public toilet
for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The absence of any accident
was due to the public respondent’s compliance with the sanitary and plumbing
specifications in constructing the toilet and septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the
waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was airtight.

The Court also does not agree that warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up
in the toilet since the same is not required in the construction of these facilities as testified
to by Engr. Alindada.

In view of these, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at
bar happened because the victims on their own and without authority from the public
respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic
tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, and ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risk. The Court holds that when a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled
in the particular work he attempts to do. Furthermore, there as no award yet to commence
the work on the septic tank and the victims were not the ones who won the bid.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the
victims was due to their own negligence and the petitioners cannot demand damages from
the public respondent.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

60. Bataclan vs Medina

Facts:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on
its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning,
while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began
to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and overturned. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus but four passengers could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came
about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. These men
approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It appeared that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of the passengers was the fire caused by the torches.

Ruling:
 It was held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. It is for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made by the driver and passengers, and that because it was 2:30 in morning and dark, the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. It is
natural that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What
is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They should have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. Moreover, gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear
to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

61. Manila Electric Co. vs Remoquillo

Facts:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located
on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua”
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru
that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower
end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge
of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. The said electric wire was exposed
and not insulated.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of death is Manila Electric Co.’s negligence in maintaining the wire.

Ruling:
The court held that death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and the close distance of
the media agua to the electric wire for the reason that they did not follow the authorized size of the media agua
set by the construction permit. The electric wire was in place even before the construction of the media agua.
Manila Electric Co. cannot be expected to be always on the look out for illegal constructions which reduces the
distance from buildings and electrical wires. The presence of the electrical wires was merely the remote cause of
the incident. The proximate cause being the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet. It was further held that “prior and
remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause”.

62. DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his
father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in
the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of
Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge,
impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of
a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics.

On September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon David Taylor with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine

After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces

They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground

These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power

The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.After
crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home

The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket
but with no result. They broke the cap with a stone but failed. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and
finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. David held the cap while Manuel applied a
lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to
run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. David was struck in the face
by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate
its removal by the surgeons

Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE:

Whether or not David is entitled to damages

HELD:

In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible
of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense
that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been
the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff’s own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury .We think it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the
explosion ,the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap, and that having “ contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover”.

63. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam
Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others.The
accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980.  All the victims were
riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found
petitioners driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to
private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorneys fees. Its decision was affirmed in toto  by
the Court of Appeals. It is here for a review of the appellate courts decision.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants,
Inc. (PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas.  The other
passengers were family members and friends whom they invited to an excursion to the beach after the
visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go
back to Manila.
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the
employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it
was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit
on its front portion by petitioners panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the
opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioners plant in Dasmarias, Cavite after
delivering some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney
and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.  As
a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe
and Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to
various hospitals.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the driver of the Cimarron is guilty of contributory negligence

No, the driver of the Cimarron is not guilty of contributory negligence. First of all, it has not been
shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between
the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that
the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his
vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of
petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners driver was
running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead
of it as well.

2. Whether or not the employer of the driver of the panel truck is liable

Yes, the employer is liable. No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were
conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job training and seminars reminding
employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were
done. There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of
emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs. There was even failure on the part of
defendant to present its concerned employees 204 file. All these could only mean failure on the
part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. [15] Accordingly, it behooves
employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go
beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the office manager
of petitioner in its Dasmarias plant, said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job applicants to
submit clearances from the police and the NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver
they are required to have at least two (2) years driving experience and to be holders of a
professional drivers license for at least two years. But the supposed company policies on
employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista show in what manner he supervised the
drivers to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way.

64. Mercury Drug v. Baking

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING

2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and

resolution

The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The
next day, after undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood
sugar and triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical
prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went
to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the saleslady
misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that was
what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine,
Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.

On the 3rdday of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular

accident, as his car collided with Josie Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while
driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its
impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at
the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that
what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.

Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC

rendered its decision in favor of Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING

DORMICUM

To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

 Damage suffered by plaintiff

 Fault or negligence of defendant
 Connection of cause and effect between A & B

The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety
of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise
the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. The care
required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.

            Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for
a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have verified WON the medicine she gave was what was
prescribed by Dr. Sy.

MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180

It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of the employee

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE

EMPLOYEE

 Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise; determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent
  Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee
been careful in reading the prescription; without the potent effects of
Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would fall asleep
while driving his car, resulting in a collision

AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages

65. BPI
v. Suarez Digest
G.R. No. 167750
March 15, 2010
Carpio, J.:

Facts:
1. Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings
and current account with petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime
in 1997, respondent had a client who wanted to buy several parcels
of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly with
the owners of said land. 

2. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the

former will be the one to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed
that the client would deposit money in Suarez' BPI account and
thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

3. The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check
has 3-days clearing time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which
confirmed that the said amount had been credited to his account on
that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five (5)
checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000
was also debited from his account. The checks were dishonored
despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount
has been debited from the account of the drawee. 

4. On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn

against insufficient fund) and not 'DAUD''  (drawn against
uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty but
denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence
the case filed for damages.

5. The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual,

moral, and exemplary damages. BPI appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA ruled that the bank
was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the
latter's entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence

in handling the respondent's account
1. No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring
the checks for lack of sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was
no sufficient evidence to prove that BPI conclusively confirmed the
same-day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez account.
While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy,
Suarez failed to prove his entitlement to such privilege. 

2. The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is

justified in dishonoring the checks for being drawn against
uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully impose the said
penalty charges against Suarez' account.

3. The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed

to prove that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the
erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the checks.

4. Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's

failure to exercise the diligence required as the bank's business is
deemed to be affected with public interest. The bank must at all
times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard
against injury attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part.
Suarez therefore has the right to expect a high level of care and and
diligence from BPI.