Middle Class Politics: Case of

Anti-Reservation Agitations in Gujarat

Ghanshyam Shah
The middle class has grown in size disproportionately with economic growth in Gujarat. While their aspirations
have risen, They are unable to satisfy their needs and maintain the traditional status, and therefore experience
a strong sense of deprivation. This is especially true of the upper and middle caste members who are jealous
of the new entrants from the traditionally low castes. The two anti-reservation agitations in Gujarat were essentially
struggles within the middle class—between the upper and middle caste members on the one hand and the new
low caste entrants on the other. In these agitations they have had the backing of the capitalist class with which
they have strong ideological and social links. They control the media and the educational institutions and dominate
the bureaucracy and the police.
Reservations were first introduced by the political elite only as a means of catching votes and of diffusing the
aspirations of the deprived classes. But lacking any perspective of social transformation, the concept of reservation
has been reduced to a mere political gimmick.

T H O U G H reservations for scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes and other backward classess
have been accepted by most of the states of
India, Gujarat is one of the few states which
experienced long-drawn anti-reservation
agitations twice between 1980 and 1985. The
first one was against the 'other backward
castes' (OBC) though the scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes (SC and ST) were also
its target. Both these agitations were led by
the dominant section of the middle class
belonging to upper and middle castes. By
and large they succeeded in their objectives
as the government conceded their demands.
As a consequence, the economic interests of
the SC, the ST and the OBC in general and
their middle class in particular were under-
mined. Though this raises a number of ques-
tions we shall deal with only two of them
in this paper. Why did the government not
remain firm in protecting the measures
which have been enacted for the benefit of
deprived sections of society? Why could not
the SC, the ST and the OBC, who together
constitute more than 50 per cent of the
population, fight effectively against a small
section constituting less than 20 per cent of
the population?
The middle class which we have mention-
ed above is a class between labour and
capital. It neither directly owns the means
of production that pumps out the surplus
generated by wage labour power nor does
it, by its own labour, produce the surplus
having use value and exchange value.
Broadly speaking, this class consists of the
petty-bourgeoise and the white-collar
workers. The former are either self-employed
or involved in the distribution of com-
modities and the latter are non-manual
office workers, supervisors and profes-
sionals. Thus, in terms of occupations, shop-
keepers, salesmen, brokers, government and
non-government office-workers, writers and
teachers, self-employed professionals such as
engineers, pleaders, doctors, etc, constitute
the middle class. Most of these occupations
require at least some degree of formal
education.
This middle class is primarily a product
of capitalist development as well as expan-
sion of the functions of the state in the 19th
and the 20th centuries. Though the petty-
bourgeoise and the managers did exist in pre-
capitalist society, they constituted a tiny
class. Industrial development and expansion
of the market requires not only a larger
managerial class than the earlier period but
also impels the state to shoulder the respon-
sibilities of monitoring market-competition
and resolving the contradictions of capitalist
development. Consequently, the state also
requires a managerial class. Formal educa-
tion contributes to the development of this
class.
II
G r o w t h o f M i d d l e Class d u r i n g
Pre-Independence Period
Formal education as we understand it
today, with western orientation, was intro-
duced in India by the British government
primarily to recruit and train managers—
supervisors and clerks—to run the admini-
stration. The British government sponsored
the Bombay Education Society in 1815 to im-
part education to the children of European
officers serving in the East India Company.
Later, the Native School Book and School
Society came into existence in 1823, which
was renamed the Bombay Native Education
Society in 1827. For higher education, the
Elphinstone college and high school came
into existence in 1834. By 1841, 27 schools
started functioning in Gujarat; and their
numbers increased after 1854 as the govern-
ment recognised the role of private enterprise
in running schools staffed by Indians. The
Gujarat college was set up in Ahmedabad
by the local elite in 1882 to prepare Gujarati
administrators for the region. High school
and college education facilities were availed
of during the first fifty years by those who
had the tradition of working in the admini-
stration—in management and collection of
revenue for the state—-and merchants and
traders. As many as 65 per cent of the
parents of the students studying in arts col-
leges in Bombay presidency in 1881-82 were
government servants, clerks in private firms
and professionals; 15 per cent of the parents
were merchants or teachers; only 5 per cent
of the parents were either cultivators or
zamindars.1 Thus higher education was
primarily confined to the two upper
castes—vanias and brahmins—whose
members were merchants, moneylenders and
administrators in the native states and who
had a tradition of learning.
A section of vanias and parsis were the
first immigrants to Bombay from the end of
the 17th century onwards. They collaborated
with the British in various spheres such as
comprador trade, export of opium, credit,
ship building, etc, in the first half of the 19th
century. Some of them were also shroffs and
brokers. During this period, the brahmins
were writers, ministers and counsellors to the
rulers; and administrators of different ranks
in the native states. It should be mentioned
that with the guidance of British officers,
Ranchhodlal, a nagar brahmin who was an
ex-government servant started the first textile
mill in Ahmedabad in 1861. In south Gu-
jarat, the anavil brahmins were landlords
and revenue officers who controlled the
village economy. Thus, these two castes—
the vanias and the brahmins—almost mono-
polised higher education till the turn of the
19th century. Among hindus, as many as 90
per cent of college students in Gujarat were
brahmins and vanias in 1881.:
During this period, the kanbis—later on
known as patidars—were slowly rising
economically and politically. The kanbis of
central Gujarat, who were a land-owning
class rose to a position of dominance dur-
ing the period of maratha rule. The British
rulers encouraged them to develop commer-
cial agriculture. They were also persuaded
to take up plots in relatively backward areas.
With state backing, enterprising kanbi
cultivators drove out the local inhabitants
mostly the kolis and the tribals in the jungle
or hills or converted them into agricultural
labourers, though this did not happen

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Economic and Political Weekly Vol XXII, Nos 19, 20 and 21
Annual Number May 1987
without conflict. There was confrontation
between the kolis and the patidars in cen-
tral Gujarat. The development of transport
facilities and the improved law and order
situation under the British raj encouraged
the cultivators to expand cash crop.
Moreover, the American Civil War between
1860-65 boosted the prosperity of the
wealthy patidar cultivators, as prices of
cotton shot up. Though the boom ended in
1865, trading of cotton continued due to the
demand from the British textile factories in
England. The market oriented agriculture
helped the patidars, particularly those
residing in central Gujarat, to improve their
economic condition. A few of them began
to enter trade and industry. Their reference
group was the vanias and the brahmins.
They also started educating themselves by
the last quarter of the 19th century; and their
progress was phenomenal. In 1901, 35 per
cent of the brahmins and 44 per cent of the
vanias as against only 1 per cent of the kolis
and the kanbis each were literate. Only 30
kanbis and 2 kolis, as against 3,306 vanias
out of a sample of one lakh were literate in
English. 3 The kanbis made incredible pro-
gress during the thirty years since 1901—31
per cent of them were literate in 1931. The
number of literates in vernacular as well as
in English among the brahmins and the
vanias was far greater in 1921 than that
among the other castes. Next to them were
the ganchis. Though ganchis occupy a low
status in the caste hierarchy, they were pet-
ty shop-keepers in urban areas. As o i l -
pressers in towns and large villages, their
economic activities were linked with the
market for selling edible o i l produced by
them. Leva and kadva kanbis were also
ahead of the other castes. The untouchable
castes such as the bhangis and the dheds as
well as the tribals such as the chodhras and
the dhodias had just started taking to educa-
tion in the twenties.
However, the rajputs and the kolis were
considered less important castes by the 1921
census officer as far as education was con-
cerned. The rajputs as a caste, unlike the
vanias, the brahmins and the patidars, did
not make significant use of educational op-
portunities before Independence despite
their higher social status. The rajputs formed
a part of the traditional ruling class. A small
section of them held position of power as
rajahs, nawabs, thakors or chieftains while
the rest were their dependents who were
either in the army or intermediaries between
the tillers and rulers collecting revenue on
behalf of the rulers from the cultivators.
Some rajputs received a number of villages
as bakshish from the rulers for rendering
military services, whereas some others for-
cibly seized some areas by waging war with
the rulers. In order to maintain law and
order the British government took several
measures to regulate the activities of the
rajput rulers and their subordinates and
regularised the collection of revenue. Their
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power was considerably reduced in the
mid-19th century. Moreover, the British
jgovernment took steps which weakened the
traditional ties between the native rulers and
their relatives as well as caste-mates. The
rulers and their family members were en-
couraged to take training in England to
adopt aristocratic behaviour which differed
markedly from the behaviour of other
members of their lineage and the peasantry.
The Raj Kumar college was opened in 1870
in Rakot to impart special training to the
sons and daughters of the princes. Com-
monner rajputs had no means to pursue
education in such institutions. Hence, unlike
the vanias and the brahmins, the rajputs
were divided into very sharp strata—one a
very tiny section received western education
in India or abroad and the other, a very large
stratum who were deprived of it. The former
were rulers of the native states, zamindars,
talukadars, girasdars who were collecting
taxes from the tillers. Among those who
received education, a handful opted forposi-
tions in administration or ventured into
business and industry either as entrepreneurs
or investors, whereas many continued to lead
an aristocratic life, considering a career in
business or industry below their status. The
latter eulogised their past as rulers but
worked as cultivators and labourers. As
cultivators they preferred supervisory roles
unless forced to put in physical labour for
survival, and did not take any interest in the
development of agriculture.
The kolis, numerically the largest caste in
Gujarat, constitute around 24 per cent of the
population. Like the patidars they are spread
throughout the state and divided into several
distinct social groups. Some of the impor-
tant divisions among them are: chunvaliyas,
khants, thakardas, bareeyas, patanvadiyas,
talabadas, dharalas, matias, gulams, etc. The
kolis of Saurashtra and central Gujarat were
mainly agricultural labourers. They lost their
land to the rajputs in Saurashtra and the
patidars in Gujarat. In south Gujarat they
were cultivators as well as agricultural
labourers. The kolis of south Gujarat were
also skilled ship-builders and sailors who
travelled to foreign countries to transport
goods. It should be mentioned that quite a
few of them emigrated to Britain, Fiji and
New Zealand by the turn of this century in
search of wealth. A few kolis of south
Gujarat started taking education and hence
got government employment'.4 However, the
kolis of central and north Gujarat, and
Saurashtra were generally not in a position
to take advantage of educational oppor-
tunities. However, the kolis of north and cen-
tral Gujarat followed the path of sanskritisa-
tion and called themselves kshatriyas.
The ex-untouchables or anti-sudras
occupy the lowest position in the caste
hierarchy. The chamars (cobblers) and the
vankars (weavers), two jatis among the
various jatis of the anti-sudras, pursued
skilled occupations, though their social posi-
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
tion was low. W i t h the coming of the textile
industries, the vankars started emigrating to
urban areas as textile labourers. Having
settled in urban area and earning steady
regular income, they started educating their
children. It may be mentioned here that
Sayajirao Gaekwad ( I I I ) of Baroda state
started schools and hostels in the last quarter
of the 19th century for students coming from
the untouchable castes. The number of
schools increased from 22 in 1896 to 221 in
1921.5 He also encouraged such students by
offering scholarships for higher studies. The
Gaekwad territory included part of present-
day south Gujarat (Navsari area), north
Gujarat (Mehsana and Patan) and Saurashtra
(Amreli) where hostel-cum-school for
antyaja students were functioning. Moreover,
Baroda state also sponsored co-operative
societies for antyajas, so that weavers
and cobblers could get financial support to
buy raw materials for their business and
become self-employed. 6
The tribals who constitute 14 per cent of
the state population were also encouraged
to take to education by Sayajirao Gael;wad,
the British government and after 1920 by
Gandhian workers. By the 1930s a few
received education but that was confined to
the primary level. Thanks to the problems
of dialects, isolation and overall poverty,
progress in education among the tribals was
very low. In the 1931 Census, only 0.58 per
cent of the tribals were literate. From among
the few who received education upto
primary and secondary level, some became
teachers in primary schools; and accoun-
tants and clerks in schools, and ashrams run
by the Gandhians. 7 Their number was very
insignificant.
The position of various castes had slightly
changed by the 1940s as far as education is
concerned. In the last century, higher educa-
tion was largely monopolised by two upper
castes—the brahmins and the vanias. The
patidars, constituting the middle caste, made
phenomenal progress in the first four
decades of this century. Slowly, some of the
artisan castes as well as untouchables whose
skills were in demand in the market began
to take to education, though their progress
was at snail pace. Besides their lower
economic position, their low social position
was also an obstacle to their rise. They were
looked down upon by the members of up-
per castes when they began to take higher
education. The position of antyajas was
worse, though not helpless. For instance,
when a vankar boy was admitted in the high
school at Vadodara in 1913, upper caste
teachers and students protested and went on
, strike. But the Maharaja of Baroda who was
committed to promoting education among
the deprived groups declared that all those
teachers and students who opposed the
admission of the antyaja boy would be
dismissed. Consequently the strike was
withdrawn. 8 Thus, there is an element of
truth in the observations of L J Sedjwick,
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
the superintendent of census operations,
1921 when he said, "Indian children are born
into the world with unequal chances of
receiving instruction, and thereby passing
into a higher plane of civilisation... The in-
equalities exhibited by the figures of literates
from caste to caste are emphatically not pro-
portionate to the capacity of the particular
castes to receive instruction but are due in
the main to the peculiar structure of hindu
society, which keeps all castes at a definite
and unalterable social and economic level."9
Without doubting the validity of the above
statement, one should mention that the posi-
tion of castes were not absolutely unalterable
even in the 1920s as Sedjwick thought. Some
members of the artisan and lower castes who
owned the means of production or had
marketable skills and who received en-
couragement and protection from the state,
could improve economic condition and suc-
cessfully altered their social status.
EDUCATION, W H I T E COLLAR
EMPLOYMENT AND CASTE ASSOCIATIONS
Those who received higher education
entered the white collar profession either in
the government or the private sector; or
started their business as self- employed pro-
fessionals with financial support for initial
investment available from the parental pro-
perty, or loan from relatives or the state. The
majority of Gujarati hindu civil servants in
the Bombay presidency in 1940 were
brahmins and vanias, their percentage being
37 and 31 respectively. Further 18 and 11 per
cent of the posts of civil servants were hold
by the patidars and the rajputs respectively.10
One finds more or less the same pattern in
the western Indian states in 1940. Among the
503 government employees of different
ranks, three-fourths were the brahmins and
the vanias, i e, 44 and 30 per cent respec-
tively.11 The position of the patidars was
lower and the position of the rajputs was
higher in the princely states than in the
Bombay presidency. Only two per cent of the
patidars and 5 per cent of the rajputs held
government positions and 8 per cent of the
government employees at different levels
belonged to the artisan castes. In Baroda
state, the ruler Sayajirao Gaekwad gave
special preference to antyaja boys by relax-
ing rules concerning qualifications for
government jobs. Consequently there were
1513 government employees including peons
and watchmen who belonged to the antyaja
castes in 1934-35.12 On the eve of in-
dependence, an overwhelming number of
government employees in Gujarat both in
Bombay presidency and native states
belonged to the brahmin and the vaniya
castes. The patidars, the rajputs, the artisan
castes and the antyaja castes alongwith the
muslims and the parsis also entered the mid-
dle class. Among them the patidars con-
stituted the single largest group particular-
ly in the Bombay presidency. Government
employees coming from other backward
castes and tribes were few in number.
Some members of the middle class com-
ing from the brahmin and the vania caste
who were either educated white collar
employees, professionals or petty-bourgeoise
took the initiative in forming caste associa-
tions in Bombay in the last century The
association of the bhatiyas and audichya
brahmins were some of the early organisa-
tions. These caste associations were wider
in scope and coverage than the traditional
jati panchayats. They were primarily aimed
at providing mutual help and support in the
cosmopolitan cities, and promoting educa-
tion among the caste brethren. The number
of such caste associations increased from the
beginning of this century. Most of these
associations undertook welfare activities for
the caste members. They helped each other
in promoting business and giving employ-
ment in private and public sectors. They
published caste journals. The caste associa-
tion of the patidars was formed by a teacher
in 1908 who was interested in the freedom
struggle. This caste association had a twin
purpose: to promote education among the
caste members and to mobilise them in the
freedom struggle.13 The kolis of south
Gujarat also formed a caste association in
the 1910s which started hostels for the
students of the koli caste in Navsari.14
Similarly, the rajputs of central Guja'at
started their caste organisations.
The educated antyajas (scheduled castes),
formed the Dalit Harijan Samaj (DHS) in
1925 for promoting education and economic
activities among their caste brethren in
securing equal rights for the depressed
classes. The organisation was formed to
counter Bahishrit Hitakarina Sabha of
Ambedkar in Maharashtra. It accepted the
hindu brahminical ideology as advocated by
Gandhi. This organisation was used by Con-
gress leaders against Ambedkar in the 1920s
and the 1930s. It strongly opposed the com-
munal award of the British government in
1932, and supported Gandhi. The DHS op-
posed Ambedkar's move for religious con-
version in the 1930s. It appealed to caste
members, "you are hindus, your ancestors
were hindus.. . you should remember that
all hindus are not fanatical. .. It would be
a cowardly act if you leave the heritage of
your ancestors which they maintained during
the crisis- .. By remaining hindu you would
be useful to your caste, your future genera-
tion and your nation.' 15 Notwithstanding
such efforts, quite a few antyajas from
Vadodara and Kheda districts became chris-
tians, thanks to the activities of christian
missionaries. As a consequence of the all-
India dalit movement under the militant
leadership of Ambedkar, the struggle for
temple entry and Gandhi's efforts in pro-
moting the cause of untouchables on the one
hand and industrial growth in Gujarat which
needed labour power on the other, led at
Annual Number May 1987
least some of the antyajas of Gujarat
becoming assertive and they demanded
political and economic opportunities.
However, the number of politically active
antyajas was small, and was confined to the
urban areas of Ahmedabad, Mehsarla,
Kheda, and Vadodara districts.
The brahmins and the vanias who were the
first to form the middle class to some extent
resisted the entry of the Patidars in their
class. They ridiculed and looked down upon
them. Sometimes they openly expressed their
contempt for the patidars who, they felt,
were polluting their culture'. However, the
resistance was not very strong partly because
the patidars were well-off and partly because
the patidars became a political force by the
beginning of this century, The gap between
the life styles and social values of the rising
patidars of mainland Gujarat and the Vanias
and the brahmins was marginal. Moreover,
at that time the competition for government
jobs was not severe.
The patidars joined hands with the
brahmins and the vanias in opposing the rise
of the untouchables. First they tried to pre-
vent the untouchables from getting educa-
tion and new economic opportunities.
Gandhi himself did not succeed in per-
suading them to provide education to the un-
touchable boys and girls. There was no
economic compulsion on the part of the
upper castes to give concessions to the hari-
jans. And, Gandhi did not resort to political
action forcing the former to accept the un-
touchables in their fold. Moral entreaties had
only marginal success whenever caste-class
interests were involved.
Ill
Government Policy and Game of
Power Elite
The constituent assembly which framed
the reservation policy for scheduled castes
and tribes was dominated by the Congress
party. An overwhelming propertiate
members of the Constituent Assembly both
from the Congress as well as the main op-
position parties belonged to upper castes
which formed the middle class and the
landed gentry. Till independence, the Con-
gress had not evolved any ideological frame-
work for the integration of the tribals and
scheduled castes with the mainstream. 16 It
followed certain set formulae depending
upon political exigencies from time to time
for winning the support of the SC and
tribals for the freedom struggle. The sub-
continent was divided into India and
Pakistan in 1947 as the ltaders of the muslim
minority succeeded in creating a feeling
among their followers that they would lose
their identity in independent India under the
dominance of hindus who constituted
majority. Some of the tribes in the north-
east frontier regions expressed similar ap-
prehensions. The tribal political leaders of
AN-157
Annual Number May 1987
Chhotanagpur. region in Bihar were also
demanding separate electorate for the tribals.
At the same time, SCs were also demanding
separate electorates for them under the
leadership of Ambedkar. Thus, pressure was
mounted on the Congress party to give a
'fair deal' to minorities and deprived sec-
tions so that they achieve socio-economic
equality and thus become a part of the
mainstream. As a result of these pressures
on the one hand and the necessity of
shouldering responsibilities to build the
nation-state on the other, the Congress felt
a need for formulating a well-defined policy
for the welfare and development of the
scheduled castes and tribes, so that an
egalitarian society could be built. Some of
the leading dominant Congress leaders were
not casteists or communalists nor were they
consciously persuing the interests of any par-
ticular class. They ardently believed in
the necessity of building a 'secular' and
'egalitarian' society. Their objectives were
enshrined in the constitution and they suc-
ceeded in making certain provisions in the
constitution for providing protective reser-
vations to scheduled castes and tribes for
their development. The rank-and-file of the
party were not as enthusiastic as the leaders
about the reservations. In fact, a few of them
expressed dissenting voices in the constituent
assembly itself. The bureaucracy, an over-
whelming majority of whose members
belonged to the upper castes on the eve of
independence was also not committed to the
policy reservations. The position of the op-
position parties was also not significantly
different from that of the Congress in this
matter But at the same time, all of them felt
a need to support this policy, as no political
elite can afford to ignore "the support of
sizeable sections of society in electoral
politics; and the policy did not adversely af-
fect the interests of the upper castes occu-
pying position in bureaucracy at that
moment. Moreover, ideologically the
bureaucracy which inherited the British
legacy did not want to give up the notion
of being the.'most obedient servant' of the
state. They therefore, preferred to pose
themselves as 'neutrals'.
However, the neutrality was and is so fee-
ble and fragile that more often than not most
of the bureaucrats easily succumbed to class
and caste pressures. By now it has become
quite clear that bureaucracy and the rank-
and-file of the political parties sabotaged the
extension of the policy whenever possible,
and/or displayed no enthusiasm in imple-
menting it. The reports of the commissioner
of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes pro-
vide sufficient evidence year after year ex-
posing the prejudices .of the-recruiting
authorities against SC and ST candidates.
Every year the number of reserved posts were
not filled under the excuse that qualified
SC/ST candidates were not available, despite
the facts to the contrary. In course of time
such unfilled posts were dereserved. The bias
AN-158
of the departmental heads often blocked the
chances of promotion of SC/ST candidates.
The ministry of home affairs issued an office
memorandum in 1968 asking departments
to grant certain concessions to the SC/ST
candidates in the matter of promotion. But
many departments did not comply with the
memo. In Gujarat, the reservation policy for
SC and ST for Class I and II were ignored
till the mid-sixties and there was no reser-
vation in the promotion to Class I and II
posts. A government resolution (GR) was
passed in 1969 stipulating the reservation of
five and ten per cent of the posts for
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in
Class 1 and Class II respectively, and 7 per
cent and 14 per cent in Class I I I and IV. It
may be noted that even in 1969 the reserva-
tion of Class I and Class II posts did not
correspond to their population. Thus, the
constitutional guarantees were not satisfac-
torily observed even in issuing executive
orders till the very end of 1960s.
Marc Galanter's observations in the 1960s
regarding anti-untouchability policy and
measures were also applicable to the reser-
vation policy and measures for recruitment
to government posts. He observed:
The present situation, then, is characterised
by a wide gap between the law on the books
and the law in operation. As in many other
areas the government's commitment to
change greatly outruns its power to effect it.
This disparity between aspiration and per-
formance, between great commitments of
principle and smalt deployment of resources,
itself transforms the symbolic as well as the
practical uses of anti-disabilities legislation.
Symbolically it blurs what the government's
commitment is. The law's equivocation is
institutionalised: in the ceremonial character
that attends the admission to untouchables
to many facilities; in the fact that anti-
disabilities measures become leverage for
increasing separate facilities for un-
touchables; and, generally, in the law's
provision of remedies without relieving
the dependence which prevents them from
being used.17
By the mid-sixties, the political situation
had changed in the country. Mass upsurges
in urban and rural areas demanding land
distribution and higher wages agitation
against price rise, etc, dominated the political
scene. The Congress lost power for the first
time in many states in the 1967 elections; and
if split into two in 1969: the Congress(0) and
the Congress(I). The Garibi Hatao slogan
and radical stance of the Congress(I) made
magical impact on the poor in the 1971 Lok
Sabha elections. In order to counter the
Congress(I) the Congress(O) which was in
power in Gujarat introduced the reservations
for SC and ST in proportion to their popula-
tion in the state, that is, 7 and 14 per cent
respectively at all levels from Class I to Class
IV frosts in December 1971. A n d , comply-
i n g with the repeated recommendations of
the commissioner for scheduled castes and
tribes, the Gujarat government introduced
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
a roster system in all classes in proportion
to their population. This was "to avoid
uncertainty about when, on which post, at
which stage, reserved seat should be filled".
A l l the departments were asked to maintain
register containing the roster. However, a
number of departments did not maintain the
register and roster was not followed in
promotion. SC/ST political leaders and
employees pressurised the government for
clarifying the 1971 GR regarding promotion.
Consequently, the government issued a
number of GRs in 1976 specifying a number
of posts and procedures to be followed for
promotion.
There is severe competition for admission
to engineering and medical courses, as
medical and engineering graduates are in
demand in employment market and as pro-
fessionals they get lucrative practice.
Naturally, SC/ST students find it difficult
to compete with upper caste students for
these courses. But there was no reservation
of seats for SC/ST i n these courses till the
end of the 1960s. The A l l India Council for
Technical Education recommended in 1971
to the state governments and various
engineering colleges that 20 per cent of the
seats be reserved for SC candidates and 5
per cent for ST candidates. But this recom-
mendation was not implemented, according
to the Elaya Perumal Committee, The com-
missioner for SC and ST advised that the
recommendation for reservation for SC/ST
candidates in engineering colleges should be
implemented without fail. Reservation for
SC/ST students was introduced in various
engineering and medical colleges of Gujarat
in the early seventies.
RESERVATIONS OF BACKWARD CASTES
There was no significant backward caste
or non-brahmin movement in Gujarat till the
1940s like those witnessed in Maharashtra,
Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
The freedom movement in Gujarat was
dominated by the brahmins, the vaniyas and
the patidars—the upper and middle castes.
Though the rajputs belong to upper castes,
a majority of them were very poor and a
small section which was very well-off were
princely rulers or landlords. The poor
rajputs were out of the mainstream of
political activities and the rich rajputs
with feudal interests, generally supported
the British government against the Con-
gress party. The upper and middle castes
dominated all the major political parties of
Gujarat.
At the dawn of independence, the political
leaders of the majority parties were divided
in their attitude to secularism. Certain con-
servatives had either no faith in secularism
or they equated secularism with the state
dominated by the hindus. For them the term
hindu and India were synonymous. They
were conscious of not only of the fact that
they belonged to upper castes, but they also
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
subscribed the cannon of discrimination on
the basis of birth. For them the principles
of purity and pollution were necessary for
social development. They had vested interest
in maintaining status quo. Some of them
openly advocated the above principles and
others were the silent supporters of these
principles though occasionally they used to
speak against caste and communalism in
public with the object of winning popular
support for realising their political ambition.
The liberal or secularist leaders accepted the
notion of 'democracy' and 'secularism'.
Under Gandhi's influence they did not feel
it was necessary to challenge the caste system
perse at the ideological level. However, they
did not justify the functional aspect of the
caste system thanks to their western educa-
tion, acceptance of the democratic political
system and their quest for building 'modern'
India. Their attitude towards caste was am-
bivalent. These latter leaders were at the
helm of the Congress party.
The Congress party was relatively well-
organised in Gujarat during the 1950s. It had
well-formed district and taluka committees
with active Congressmen who had worked
for many years in the freedom movement.
The opposition parties were organisationally
weak and had localised pockets of influence.
The Congress party selected most of its can-
didates for the 1952 elections from those
who had participated in party work and the
freedom movement. Since an overwhelming
number of the office bearers at state and
district levels belonged to the upper and
middle castes, they offered the party tickets
to those whom they knew well as party
workers and who also happened to be their
caste fellows. In this situation, aspirants
coming from low castes had no chance of
winning support of influential political
bosses. By this time, the Gujarat kshatriya
Sabha (GKS) the caste organisation, started
by Rajput political leaders included the
rajputs and the kolis in its fold, and called
them the kshatriyas. Its area of influence was
central and north Gujarat The sabha asserted
that a large number of the kshatriyas should
be given Congress tickets. The top Congress
leaders who were secularist considered the
demand of the GKS as 'communal', because
it was put forward by a caste association.
However, six of the party candidates were
kshatriyas; of them four were party members
of long standing. A top leader of the GKS
who was until then not a party member, got
the Congress ticket, not because the Con-
gress succumbed to the pressure of GKS, but
because the party wanted a strong candidate
to defeat the leader of the opposition par-
ty, i e, the Khedut Sangh, who was a patidar
from central Gujarat. The constituency from
which he contested had a predominantly
bareeya (kolis) kshatriya population. He was
preferred as a matter of political exigency,
as he was expected to defeat an influential
leader of the opposition party dominated by
the patidars. The conservative party leaders
belonging to the dominant castes considered
the entry of the kshatriyas as a threat to their
power. They, therefore, branded the kshtriyas
as "communal' and did not share power with
them within the party. This situation con-
tinued for a decade. The Congress accom-
modated a few kshatriyas more as can-
didates and used them to.attract votes. But
the party functionaries were unwilling to ac-
commodate them within the party. The rank-
and-file of the party tried to prevent the ex-
pansion of the social base of the party.
By the end of the 1950s, the Swatantra
party emerged as the political, all-India right
wing, anti-Congress party. The leader of the
Swatantra party in Gujarat evolved a
strategy popularly called PKSHA; that is
party. It is acronym of a Gujarati word in
which P stands for patidar and KSHA
stands for the kshatriya. This means the par-
ty of the patidars and the kshatriyas. The
leading GKS leaders left the Congress and
joined the Swatantra party. The party gave
a free hand to the Gujarat kshatriya Sabha
to select kshatriya candidates, whose number
was fixed. The sabha appealed to all the
kshatriya leaders who were members or
office-bearers of the Congress or any other
party to resign from their parties and to
strengthen the Swatantra party by joining. 18
The Congress lost a majority of the
assembly seats in 1962 for the first time from
central Gujarat, the stronghold of the GKS.
The party then realised that it could no
longer take the support of the kshatriya
masses for granted. Therefore, after 1962,
the party became more liberal than even in
offering political positions to kshatriya
leaders. As the GKS was allied with the
Swatantra party, the Congress recruited local
influential kshatriyas to the party. It spon-
sored a parallel kshtriya organisation, parti-
cularly of the koli kshatriyas at several places
such as the Kshatriya Sabha Mandal in
Kheda; the Thakor Mandal in Ahmedabad,
etc, and attacked the GKS at its most
vulnerable point, i e, at the point of the
socio-economic cleavage between the rajputs
and the kolis. As against 7 in 1962, 15
kshatriyas from central and north Gujarat
were given the assembly tickets by the Con-
gress party in 1967 elections. Two out of 23
parliamentary seats were also allotted to
them. However, as everywhere in the coun-
try the Congress failed to repeat its earlier
performance in 1967 elections. Its votes and
seats in the assembly declined, though it
secured a majority of seats and was thus
enabled to form the government. As the
Congress majority in the assembly was
marginal, the Swatantra party made unsuc-
cessful efforts to win over some Congress
members to topple the government. However,
the alliance between the kshatriyas and the
patidars within the Swatantra party did not
continue for a long. The kshatriya leaders
left the Swatantra party and joined first the
Congress(O) and then the Congress(I). They
then split, both horizontally and vertically.
Annual Number May 1987
Two top leaders of the sabha--Narendrasinh
Mahida and Natwarsinh Solanki were in two
different parties in 1971 Lok Sabha elections.
Moreover, the cleavage between the rajputs
and the kolis became very sharp thus
adversely affecting the bargaining power'of
the GKS. The GKS leaders were worried
about how to resolve the contradictions which
were emerging in their own organisation.
During this time, Indira Gandhi who split
the Congress party was evolving strategies
to win over popular votes. She concentrated
on OBC and SC-ST votes. As Narendrasinh
Mahida—the Congress(I) candidate lost the
Lok Sabha elections from Anand consti-
tuency of Kheda district to Pravinsinh
Solanki, a Son of Natwarsinh Solanki of the
Congress(O), Indira Gandhi realised the
strength of Solanki who was the president
of GKS. In order to win him over in the
assembly elections which immediately
followed the Lok Sabha poll,she set her per-
sonal emissary to the GKS seeking their sup-
port in the elections. She promised that the
Congress(I) government would form the
Backward Class Commission which would
consider the kshatriyas as backward so that
they could get reservations in government
jobs and in admission to educational institu-
tions. It should be mentioned that the GKS
had submitted a memorandum to the
Backward Class Commission in 1954-55
demanding that the kshatriyas of Gujarat
should be considered as 'backward'.
Therefore, Indira Gandhi's offer was attrac-
tive. Some of the GKS leaders who were at
that time in the Congress(O) used this offer
to pressurise the Congress(O) government to
secure a similar deal. As a result, the Con-
gress^) government formed the backward
class panel under the chairmanship of
Natvarsinh Solanki in 1971.19 But before
the panel started working, the Congress(O)
lost power and the Congress(I) won a
majority of seats in the assembly in the 1972
elections. Some of the leading office bearers
of the GKS including Natvarsinh Solanki
who contested on the Congress(O) ticket also
suffeped defeat. The Congress(I) government
kept its promise by appointing the Socially
and Educationally Backward Class (SEBC)
commission under the chairmanship of
justice Baxi in August 1972. The commis-
sion was asked to "identify socially and
educationally backward castes, races or
tribes who deserve of special treatment and
grants of special concessions similar to those
being granted to the SC and ST". The com-
mission was asked to submit its report in six
months' time. But the administration,
dominated by the upper castes did not take
the appointment of the commission seriously.
The government took four months to ap-
point a secretary to the commission and
eight months to provide the staff which was
insufficient. It should be noted that the com-
mission was not adequately staffed even two-
and-a-half years after its appointment. The
president of GKS who was then with the
AN-159
Annual Number May 1987
Congress(O) opposed the 'terms of refe-
rences' of the commission, and asked the
kshatriyas to boycott it. It was feared that
if caste became a criterion for determining
'backwardness' the rajputs who belonged to
the upper castes would be excluded from
receiving the benefits of reservations,20 This
would also accelerate the process of divisions
among the kshatriyas between the rajputs
and the bareeyas which the sabha could i l l
afford. The GKS did not make any represen-
tation to the commission. However, the com-
mission submitted its report in 1976 when
the Congress party was in power. It iden-
tified 82 castes/communities as 'backward'.
Out of these 82 castes, 65 per cent of the
castes belong to different segments of the
kolis. Almost all of the kolis and the sareeya
jatis from south central and north Gujarat
and Saurashtra were included in the category
of the 'backward'. The commission recom-
mended among others, that 10 per cent of
the seats for admission to medical and
engineering colleges be reserved for 82
castes/communities (OBC). As for state
government services, it recommended that
10 per cent of the seats be reserved in class
I I I and class IV and 5 per cent of seats be
reserved in Class I and Class I I .
The GKS opposed the recommendations
of the commission. It alleged that the com-
mission had divided economically poor per-
sons on the basis of castes. The GKS argued
that only those who are economically poor,
irrespective of caste and creed, should be
considered backward. "The Kshatriya Sabha
demands that caste, community and religion
should not be the criteria to determine
backwardness in formation of socialist
state... Any one whose income is below the
limit of income tax no matter of which caste
he has—be kshatriya, patidar, vaniya,
brahmin, harijan, adivasi, etc—should be
considered backward. One becomes back-
ward because of one's limited economic
income.''21 Because of the government's
reservation policy, Natvarsinh Solanki
argued in one of the editorials of the
Kshatriya Bandhu, the official journal of the
GKS, either the adivasis, harijans and
backward castes or those who are very rich
get admission in professional colleges like
medicine, engineering or other technical
courses. One finds a similar situation in
government jobs, with as many as 20 to 25
per cent of government posts occupied by
the backward castes. Hence, the economically
poor persons were left out. Needless to say,
Natvarsinh Solanki was arguing the case for
the economically poor families of the up-
per castes in general and rajputs in particular
without specifying them.
The recommendations of the Baxi Com-
mission were accepted by the government of
the Janata party in 1978. Like the Con-
gress(I) the feaders of the Janata party were
initially not keen on implementing the
recommendations; but they accepted them
out of political considerations as a means
AN-160
of wooing the backward castes in elections.
W i t h the acceptance of the report, the total
reservation for SC, ST and OBE taken
together came to 31 per cent, in educational
institutions and state services in Gujarat.
The kshatriya sabha opposed the decision
of the government and repeated its argu-
ments in favour of economic criteria for
determining backwardness. The spokesmen
of the sabha argued that because of the
reservation, except 82 castes/communities,
poor brahmins, rajputs, patidar, muslims,
etc, who barely survive would remain as they
were. On the other hand, it was ridiculous
to keep 10 per cent seats reserved for admis-
sion to medical and engineering 'colleges for
the so called 'backward' castes which do not
have even 5 per cent literacy. As they would
not be able to take advantage of the reserved
quota, the seats would be dereserved and this
would benefit the 'vested interests'.22 The
leaders alleged that the government had ac-,
cepted the report only with an eye on the
elections. They only wanted to win over
backward caste votes. However, some of the
castes which were left out by the Baxi com-
mission as non-backward, demanded afteT
1978 that they should also be considered as
backward because of their poor economic
condition and low social status. The Con-
gress (I) government headed by Madhavsinh
Solanki, a kshatriya, appointed a second
commission in 1981 "to consider, (whether)
there were any other castes/communities/
classes which fell in the category of socially
and educationally backward classes!' Justice
C V Rane was its chairman. The terms of
reference of the commission were the same
as those of the Baxi Commission but the
GKS did riot oppose it at that time because
its leaders were ML As or MPs of the Con-
grcss(I) and they claimed that the chief
minister belonged to their caste. This time
the Sabha changed its strategy. Its earlier de-
mand for economic criteria for determining
backwardness was dropped altogether.
Instead, the GKS now demanded that all the
kshatriyas should be considered as back-
ward, because they are economically back-
ward and the various castes of the kshatriyas
share common culture and similar social
customs.23 It overtly pleaded the case for
rajputs, as patanvadiyas, bareeyas, khants,
kolis, etc, were already recognised as
backward by the Baxi Commission. The
sabha argued that it was a wrong notion that
the rajputs were better off than the other
kshatriyas,, that is, the kolis. "Rajput,
karadiya raj put, nadoda rajput, hati rajput,
bareeya, thakor, koli, mer and such other
small and big sub-castes belong to the same
community. They have social and blood rela-
tionships. Their life style is the same.
They have similar virtues, vices and other
characteristics. They have similar social
customs related to marriage and death...
Their position in education is also the same
Only a handful of persons from these castes
(by implication rajputs) have higher educa-
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
tion. We, therefore, demand that all the sub-
castes of the kshatriyas should be considered
as a part of the same chain. It was unjust
on the part of the Baxi Commission to con-
sider only some sections of the kshatriyas
as backward and ignore the others. Small
and big castes of the kshatriyas belong to
the.same chain therefore whole kshatriya
c o m m u n i t y should be treated as
backward" 24 It further asserted that it
would be unjust to divide the kshatriya com-
munity which has 40 per cent population of
the state.25 "Besides rajputs, number of
brahmins, artisan and some other inter-
mediate castes including patidars made
representations to the Rane commission.
Most of the brahmin representatives pleaded
that they should be treated as 'socially
backward' because of their priestly occupa-
tion which gives them low income, Other
brahmins and a patidar, like the GKS argued
that the economically poor, irrespective of
their caste, should be treated as backward
and given the benefits of reservation.
Representatives of brahmins from Saurashtra
argued that although a few brahmins were
doctors, lawyers, and officers, it would be
erroneous to say that the brahmins as a
samaj, i e, community, were socially and
educationally advanced, I have to say only
one thing that backwardness should be
decided on the basis of economic condition.
Middle class is very much oppressed,
therefore only economic criteria should be
considered for backwardness and caste
should not be taken into consideration...
Socially we are not backward.' 26 A large
number of delegations from various artisan
castes, particularly suthar, luhar, darji and
bhavsar pressed their case to be considered
as 'socially and educationally backward'.
Rane Commission submitted its report in
October 1983. It rejected caste as a measure-
ment of backwardness on two counts. One,
the traditional caste system has broken down
and contractual relationships between in-
dividuals have emerged. Second, if the state
accepts caste as the basis for backwardness,
it legitimises the caste system which con-
tradicts secular principles. The commission
adopted economic criteria, i e, occupation
to determine backwardness. It identified 63
occupations as backward; and recommended
28 per cent reservations for them in state
government jobs and admissions in medical
and engineering institutions.
The Congress(I) government maintained
conspicuous silence over the recommenda-
tions of the Rane Commission. The salient
features of the report were published in the
press with the connivance of a minister. The
press, dominated by the middle class com-
posed of upper and middle castes welcomed
the recommendations as 'secular' and 'sen-
sible'. One of the members of the commis-
sion published a long article in July 1984
criticising the Mandal Commission and ad-
vocated economic criteria for determining.
backwardness. The article was discussed by
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
sociologists in the A l l India Sociological
Conference held at Surat in December 1984.
The central argument of the article was
strongly criticised by a group of sociologists,
but the press reported that the sociologists
advocated 'economic criteria' for determin-
ing backwardness. Dissident sociologists sent
their protest to the press which the latter
ignored completely, 27 No counter argument
to the economic criteria was made by the
congressite intellectuals, though some of the
backward caste leaders criticised the recom-
mendations of the commission.
Meanwhile, the struggle for power bet-
ween the two leading Congress(l) politicians
Madhavsinh Solanki and Jinabhai Daraji
became intensified within the party. Though
the former belonged to the backward caste,
he refrained from identifying himself as a
caste leader except at the local level. He had
dissociated himself from the Kshatriya
Sabha in 1956. Jinabhai Daraji hailing as he
does from an artisan caste had -been voci
ferous in criticism of the high castes for more
than two decades. He was championed the
cause of the tribals, the dalits and the
backward castes within and outside the Con-
gress party. In order to counter him within
the Congress(I) and to win the votes of the
backward castes in the elections, Madhavsinh
declared a rise in the quota of reservations
for backward castes from 10 to 28 per cent
in January 1985; just two months before the
polls. The cabinet used the Rane Commis-
sion report to raise the quota for reservation.
At the same time, it rejected the main recom-
mendations of the commission for using 'in-
come and occupation' as criteria for deter-
mining backwardness on the ground that the
commission had gone beyond its terms and
reference. The Rane Commission was not
asked to decide the criteria for backward-
ness; it was asked to "supplement and com-
plement the 82 castes which were identified
by the Baxi Commission as OBCs", argued
the government spokesmen. The government
appointed a one-man committee to identity
castes/communities other than the 82 castes
as backward and asked it to submit its report
within 15 days.
The dissidents within the Congress had no
choice but to hail the government's decision.
The press and the middle class intellectuals
raised protest against the government's an-
nouncement and dubbed it as a political ploy
to win over backward caste votes. The GKS
leaders realised that the rajputs would have
no chance of being teated as 'backward';
it, therefore, again demanded that only
economic criteria should be used to deter-
mine backwardness. Thus, in the seventies
and eighties the GKS demanded that either
all the kshatriyas be treated as backward, or
backwardness be measured by economic
criteria. By implication, its demand was that
poor rajputs should get the advantage of
reservations. Other upper and middle caste
leaders and most of the intellectuals belong-
ing to the middle class also advocated
economic criteria for determining 'back-
wardness'; thereby serving the economic in-
terests of their caste members.
Neither the Janata nor the Congress(l)
government seriously implemented the reser-
vation policy for the OBC. Though the
government constituted the Backward
Class Board in 1978 for implementing:
various welfare programmes to improve the
economic conditions of the OBC, the board
has so far not been armed with adequate
power and financial resources. A number of
reserved seats meant for the OBC candidates
have either remained vacant or have been
converted into non-reserved seats under one
or another pretext by the officers belonging
to the upper castes. So much so that in cer-
tain cases OBC candidates require to have
more marks for reserved seats than the
marks of the non OBC candidates.28 OBC
leaders have drawn the attention of the
government to such anomalies which defeat
the purpose of the reservation. But their
complaint has remained unattended.
Politicians—MLAs, MPs and members of
the jilla panchayats from among the OBCs
find themselves helpless. The young educated
persons from the OBC get frustrated without
employment. They were, therefore, not very
much excited by the government's announce
ment for rising their reserved quota. They
felt that the government was least interested
in implementing its policy and programmes.
IV
Changing Nature of Middle Class
and Anti-Reservation Agitations
EDUCATED UNEMPLOYMENT
The growth in size of the middle class in
post-independent India, is not the result of
the capitalist development alone. The educa-
tion system, managed primarily by the state,
trains personnel for professional and
managerial jobs. Though the capitalist class
has overall dominance, it does not have ab-
solute control over the state so that it can
open or close educational institutions at its
sweet will. Moreover, in course of time
education has been perceived by a large
number of people belonging to the middle
and working classes and middle and poor
peasants as a means of improving their
economic condition and status. Hence, all
those who can afford, aspire to provide
higher education to their children. Though
the middle class political leaders and
bureaucrats collaborate with the capitalist
class, they cannot ignore popular demand
for education. Literacy has increased from
31 per cent in 1961 to 44 per cent in 1981
in Gujarat. The number of high schools and
colleges has increased from 1,099 to 3,153
and 102 to 371 respectively between 1961 and
1981..During the sixties, the peasants who
improved their economic condition, thanks
to capitalist agricultual development, began
establishing colleges in rural areas. Conse-
Annual Number May 1987
quently, a large number of colleges have
come into existence in moffussil areas. The
number of college students has risen more
than three times from 50,000 to 1,80,000
during this period. 29 The caste composition
of the students has changed since indepen-
dence. Patidars and various artisan castes
have entered the education arena in a big
way. SC and ST students have also started
seeking education, though their number has
been comparatively small,
A majority of these students, irrespective
of the class background of their parents,
aspire to either get white-collar jobs or to
become self-employed professionals. A few,
coming from the well-off strata join the
firms of their parents or aspire to start
business or an industry on their own.
In comparison to other states of the coun-
try, Gujarat can be called an industrially
developed region. There were 9,722 factories,
that is, 12 per cent of the total factories in
the country, registered under the Factories
Act, 1976-77. They generated Rs 3,531 crore
output, and accounted for 10 per cent of the
output of the country. In terms of capital
income generated in manufacturing activity,
Gujarat stands next to Maharashtra. In
1976-77, Gujarat generated Rs 322 per capita
income as against Rs 194 all India average.
Among the 200 top giant industries of India,
24 are located in Gujarat. However, despite
these impressive figures, the average annual
rate of growth of industrial production is 5
per cent which is also the all India growth
rate. In the context of the country's popula-
tion growth, India's industrial growth rate
is not only far behind that of the developed
countries; it is also lagging behind that of
some of the developing countries, In 1950,
in terms of the national income generated
in the industrial sector, India ranked 10th.
It slipped to the 23rd position in 1979. In
Comparison, in South Korea which is slightly
larger than Gujarat in terms of population,
the annual growth rate of industrial produc-
tion is four times that of Gujarat. Similarly
Taiwan, which is about half the size of
Gujarat, boasts of a growth rate which is
three times that of Gujarat. 30 Thus, the i n -
dustrial growth of Gujarat though better
than many other Indian states is as low as
of the country as a whole, hence it is unable
to cope with the rising expectations of the
masses. It may also be mentioned that per-
sons from outside the state were recruited
for managing some large industrial projects
of the public sector for a variety of reasons.
Hence, all available positions in industries
have not gone to Gujaratis. Further, quite
a number of non-Gujaratis particularly from
Punjab and Rajasthan started business and
industry in Gujarat resulted into cut-throat
competition in business and industry, mak-
ing it difficult for small investors to survive.
Thus, the rate and nature of industrial
development have failed to absorb a large
section of the educated Gujarati youths
belonging to upper and middle castes of the
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Annual Number May 1987 ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY

AN-162
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
middle class.
As industrial growth has not succeeded in
reducing inequality, the state has expanded
its activities by undertaking welfare pro-
grammes with a view to generate employ-
ment in secondary and tertiary sectors. This
has also led to an in crease in administrative
personnel. The number of state government
employees has increased almost four times
from 1,06,009 in 1960 to 4,43,952 in 1980.
But all those who receive high school and
college level education fail to get white-collar
jobs in industrial sector or in administrative
posts. As elsewhere in the country, un-
employment has increased in Gujarat. Bet-
ween 1971 and 1982, the number of un-
employed persons registered at the employ-
ment exchange has increased more than three
times—from 1,50,000 in 1970 to 5,21,000 in
1982. Among the unemployed persons as
many as 58 per cent, that is, 3,11,000 are
educated.51 A decade before, 49 per cent of
the unemployed persons were educated. The
middle class of the upper and middle castes
was obviously adversely affected by the rise
in educated unemployment. Their oppor-
tunities for white-collar jobs are further cur-
tailed as SC and ST have taken increasing
advantage offered by reservation. For in-
stance, the proportion of SC and ST in class
HI positions increased from 4.8 and 4.4 per
cent respectively in 1972 to 10.7 and 8.9 per
cent respectively in the state government ad-
ministration in 1978. One finds a similar rise
in class I and class I I . As a result, there are
more than a thousand clerks/typists
coming from : he SC and the ST At least one
person from either of these communities is
found in most government departments.
Their presence as colleagues against whom
the high castes have centuries-old prejudices,
as well as their relatively quick chance for
promotion thanks to the roster sytem, upset
the upper and middle caste employees who
are intoxicated by their own sense of
superiority. Further, the 10 per cent reser-
vation for the 82 caste/community groups
introduced in 1978 has further reduced the
chances of the middle class of the upper and
middle castes securing government posts.
Besides the growth in education, urbanisa-
tion has increased in Gujarat during the last
four decades—31 per cent of its population,
as against 23.7 per cent of India's popula-
tion live in 255 towns and other urban ag-
glomerations. As a result, the size of urban
middle class engaged in white-collar jobs in
public and private sectors, petty business and
small scale industries has enlarged con-
siderably during the last two decades.
RISING EXPECTATIONS
The persons from middle class of the up-
per and middle castes live in poles, closed
neighbourhoods surrounded by persons of
almost similar social status, or in recently
constructed housing societies outside the old
residential towns. Though these housing
societies are outside the old cities, they have
continued to maintain caste cultures by and
large. The names of some of the societies
bear the label of their castes. Thus despite
the changes in occupational pattern, tradi-
tional ties have continued in urban areas. At
the same time, they are fired by high expec-
tations. Many members of the middle class
from upper and middle castes owning small
industries dream of becoming Sarabhais,
Mafatlafc, Birlas or Tfctas. The traditional
ethical values which were supposed to be
observed by the business communities are
no longer respected by the new generation
of small and big entrepreneurs. Generation
of black money by smuggling, trading in
illicit liquor and drugs, and non-payment of
taxes contribute to the accumulation of
illegal wealth, Moreover, quite a large
number of educated persons from the domi-
nant castes of the middle class have
emigrated to America for further education
and then for jobs. And the number of
patidars who emigrated to Africa in the
second quarter of this century for business,
moved on to England and America in the
sixties and seventies. They called their
relatives to settle in America. These
emigrants have become the reference group
of the middle class in Gujarat. The young
entrepreneurs went to accumulate huge
wealth by hook or by crook in the shortest
possible time; of course, only a few of them
succeed in the race. The members of the
lower middle class whose number is very
large aspire to make their sons and daughters
doctors, engineers, high ranking officers or
proprietors of industries. A clerk desires to
have a colour television, a cassette player, a
refrigerator, a scooter, a fan, a sofa-set, etc,
because his neighbour or his relatives possess
these things. For him, these are status sym-
bols. But economic conditions being what
they are, members of the lower middle class
can hardly afford such luxuries. This leads
him to complain against industrialists and
businessmen as welt as the labourers. His
feelings can be summed up in the following
words: "slum dwellers do not have to satisfy
many needs, and they do not have to observe
a certain life style. Whereas rich persons have
no problems.. . But we of the middle class
have small means and we have to maintain
our status; which is difficult with the low
income. We cannot do manual work like
backward caste persons. We are therefore
sandwiched between the affluent and the
poor!' Thus the sense of 'relative depriva-
tion' as well as a set of norms dictated by
his caste status generate a feeling of resent-
ment among the members of the upper and
middle caste of the middle class against the
rising status of backward castes.
SC AND ST MIDDLE CLASS
Though educated SC and ST boys and
girls got government office jobs in larger
numbers in the seventies than in the earlier
Annual Number May 1987
period, their number was not in proportion
to the number of educated persons which
went on rising every year. The numbers of
the educated unemployed SC and ST seem
to have increased in the same proportion as
the numbers of unemployed members of
higher castes, Moreover, educated persons
coming from the SC/ST have a negligible
chance of securing white-collar jobs in the
private sector because of the strong caste
prejudices of the employers, who invariably
belong to upper castes. Young educated SC
youths, particularly those who have been
brought up in urban areas and whose fathers
were employed in industry or government,
started facing unemployment and experien-
cing discrimination in securing jobs or work-
ing in offices. They started ventilating their
grievances and began to get organised. One
of their organisations was Dalit Panther
which came into existence in 1973. Unlike
the earlier Harijan organisations in Gujarat,
the Dalit Panther started questioning the
legitimacy of the caste system, and the domi-
nant caste culture. Their writings—both in
form and the content—disturbed the tradi-
tional writers and the press. Dalit literature
has been ignored by the dominant literary
circles or considered as trivial. Young SC
leaders are frustrated but militant. They
assert their rights, demanding a larger quota
of reservation for admission to professional
courses, greater number of scholarships and
reserved seats in government and semi-
government organisations.
Upper caste members of the middle class
take these demands as a threat to their
dominance. They increasingly become in-
tolerant towards militant and assertive SC
youths. Even persons having liberal and
Gandhian outlook also believe that the Hari-
jans should not assert their rights howsoever
legitimate they may be. The attitude is 'we
will give, but they should not demand*.
ANTI-RESERVATION AGITATIONS OF 1981
The village of Jetalpur, which is at the
distance of 15 km from Ahmedabad was one
of the starting points of the agitation in
January 1981. Some educated SC youths
associated with the Dalit Panthers of
Ahmedabad started organising SC agri-
cultural labourers of Jetalpur from 1978.
Before they began their activities the dalits
of the village had formed their co-operative
farming society and demanded a part of the
village gochar (grazing land) for cultivation.
They approached the government and
secured the land in 1975. But before the end
of the year, the village sarpanch handed over
that land to the forest department. The
department removed the crops planted by
the dalits and planted saplings. In retalia-
tion, the dalits removed the saplings. Con-
sequently, the panchayat dominated by the
patidars filed a suit in the court against the
SC youths. But the SC youths were acquit-
ted by the court in 1977. Since then, sporadic
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clashes between patidars and dalits have
become the order of the day.
In order to teach a lesson to the dalits,
some patidar youths mercilessly beat up
Sakrabhai, a young dalit leader and later he
was burnt to death on December 25, 1980.
Leaders of the Dalit Panther organisation
of Ahmedabad rushed to Jetalpur and took
possession of the body of the injured and
half-burnt Sakrabhai. With the help of the
police he was taken to the civil hospital,
Ahmedabad where his dying declaration was
recorded. A huge funeral procession was
organised the next day by the Dalit Panthers.
They organised a public meeting in Jetalpur
to mourn the death of Sakrabhai. It was at-
tended by a large number of dalits from
Ahmedabad. This led to clashes between the
dalits and the patidars which provoked the
latter further. Ten persons of patidars were
arrested from Jetalpur as they were alleged
to have murdered Sakrabhai. This added fuel
to fire. Patidars and other caste hindus
declared social boycott of the SCs, denying
them daily work as well as provisions and
other essential commodities. The dalit basti,
i e, settlement, in the village of Lali in
Mehmadabad taluka of Kheda district near
Ahmedabad was attacked by caste hindus in
the last week of December following the
Jetalpur incident. 32
At about the same time, the medical
students of the B J Medical College,
Ahmedabad, launched an agitation against
reserved seats for SC candidates in the
pathology department. It may be mentioned
that some students of this college had filed
a case in the Gujarat High Court in
November 1979 against the carry-forward,
roster and interchangeability system of
reserved seats. They lost the case in the court;
and therefore, resorted to direct action.
Medical college students in Ahmedabad,
Vadodara, and Jamnagar went on a day's
token strike on January 12 demanding aboli-
tion of reservation system for SC and ST
candidates for post-graduate studies. Junior
doctors of these colleges declared their sup-
port for the students. About 1,000 students
took out a procession in Ahmedabad and
burnt an effigy of the "reservation policy".
They garlanded the statue of Mahatma
Gandhi at the inome-tax crossing and took
an oath to continue their agitation till the
reservation system was abolished. 31 The
Surat Medical College observed a strike on
the following day, on January 13. After four
days, student representatives of medical col-
.eges in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Jamnagar
and Surat met the education minister, and
the minister for health and demanded the
scrapping of the reservation system for the
posts of housemen and registrars. They
demanded that the system of reservation
should be done away with as it encouraged
mediocrity and hence was dangerous for the
future of their profession. A doctor declared,
" I n the civil hospital, Ahmedabad, 65 posts
for fresh housemen have been advertised,
out of which 27 are reserved for SC/ST can-
didates, which comes to approximately 41
per cent of the total posts... Is this fair
when other students having good number of
marks and competency in the subject are
denied opportunity because we do not
belong to SC/ST? The government may
reserve jobs but not in higher studies. This
is to discount for highly professional
knowledge!'34 Some other doctors asserted
that SC/ST students were misusing the
facilities given to them. These students were
not interested in studies. They lived in
sophistication and snobbery, the high caste
doctors argued. They moved about in cheap
attires with a cigarette between their lips. " I t
is they who find enough time and money to
gamble in their hostel rooms. It is they who
can afford to send some money home after
utilising a part of their scholarships for a
standard of living which is higher than some
of the poor medicos who by misfortune
could not be born in SC or ST family!' 35
Such observations, needless to say, were
based on isolated individual cases. They were
prejudicial. Publication of these views in ver-
nacular and English newspapers gave them
credibility. Counter views did not find place
in the newspaper columns. Hence, one-sided
observations not only strengthened the pre-
judices of the upper and middle castes
against the SC and ST, but they also boosted
spurious morality for those who were
organising the agitation.
The students warned that if the govern-
ment sat over their demands, they would
intensify their agitation. The president of the
state unit of the Dalit Panther replied that
if the government accepted the demands of
the high caste students, the Dalit Panthers
would launch an agitation. Another dalit
leader declared that the SCs would not
tolerate any injustice to them and would not
hesitate to launch a counter-agitation.
However, the state government decided to
abolish the 'carry forward' system in the
reservation of seals for SC and ST in post-
graduate studies in medicine. The chief
minister, Madhavsinh Solanki, said that in
professions like medicine and teaching, merit
could not be totally ignored. It would affect
the progress of the future generation if the
posts were filled in on a caste and com-
munity basis. Some of the Congress
members supported the government stand
and challenged "the champions of the SC
and ST for demanding more reservations for
the backward classes". The rift within the
Congress(I) became evident from the fact
that some M L A s belonging to the OBC said
in the party meeting that the 82 communities
declared as backward by the Baxi Commis-
sion constituted nearly 40 per cent of
population but they were given only 5 per
cent reservation while the SC and ST who
were only 20 per cent of the population
wanted to grab more than 20 per cent of the
seats in post-graduate studies in medicine.36
Medical students, once again went on a
Annual Number May 1987
token strike in January 1985, to press their
demand for the abolition of the reservation
system for post-graduate seats in medical
colleges. This time, the interns and resident
doctors of the government hospitals also
joined the strike. And, the undergraduate
students declared an indefinite strike till their
demands were met. The agitation slowly
gathered momentum and on January 24
caste hindus and SC students came to blows.
Some SC students were beaten up and a
public transport bus was set on fire, Students
of the non-medical colleges joined the strike,
supporting the demand of the medical
students. The government conceded the
demand for abolition of interchangeability,
but the students were not satisfied as they
wanted abolition of all reservations.
Ahmedabad was engulfed by the riots. On
January 28, the four medical colleges of the
state were closed for the next six months.
The striking junior doctors and interns
were served show cause notices asking why
their services should not be terminated. But
this had little effect.
Other cities of Gujarat—Vadodara, Rajkot
and Surat, and a number of small and big
towns declared bandhs, organised proces-
sions, burnt effigies either of 'reservation
policy' or of the chief minister and damaged
public property such as buses, street lights,
post offices, banks and railway stations.
Dalit hastis were set on fire at several places
in Ahmedabad and in other towns. The
police resorted to lathi charge, tear gas or
firing to disperse mobs to prevent them from
looting and rioting. In order to keep up the
tempo of the agitation anti-reservation com-
mittees at local levels were formed. Each one
of them announced some programme or
other which kept the agitation going. The
SC youths organised counter programmes
in some towns. Consequently, clashes con-
tinued unabated in February.
The SC textile workers in the spinning
and carding departments struck work on
February 24 and 25 protesting against the
anti-reservation agitation. In retaliation, the
caste hindu including the OBC workers
struck work for four days. In the beginning
of March, the state government employees
also joined the fray They gave a call for
'karmachari bandh' on March 2, and
demanded the abolition of reservation and
roster system. About 70 per cent of the
employees went on mass casual leave in sup-
port of the anti-reservation agitation.
Another call for a strike was given in the
third week of March.
The agitation spread Ho rural areas
particularly in Kheda, Ahmedabad and
Mehsana districts. In several villages the
dalit bastis were set on fire and at a few
places militant SC youths were beaten up.
Though the dalits received protection from
the backward castes in a few villages, such
cases were an exception, not a rule. In fact,
at several places upper castes succeeded in
instigating the backward castes against the
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SCs. The dalits were terrorised and they
migrated to the neighbouring towns.
Though the non-Congress non-left parties
did not openly support the agitation,
because they wanted to keep up a pro-poor
posture, many of their rank and file
members did. Some of them wanted to
'repeat' the Navnirman movement which led
to the fall of the Congress ministry in 1974.
Gandhian Sarvoday workers either kept
silent or made ambiguous statements.37
College and university teachers also sup-
ported the agitation and pleaded for 'effi-
ciency' and merit. They and popular writers
repeatedly said that they were not against the
SCs and backward castes and the govern-
ment should provide them facilities for
studies. But merit and efficiency should not
be sacrificed. SC and ST candidates should
secure positions through competition; other-
wise they would continue to depend an the
state and develop an inferiority complex.
Some others argued that the benefits of the
reservation were procured only by certain
groups of SC and ST and they did not per-
colate downwards. Therefore, according to
them the objectives of the reservations have
been defeated. Some others pleaded that the
poor of the upper caste should not be
deprived of the benefits, because they were
born in vania-brahmin or patidar families.
This argument had a very wide appeal and
many pro-poor political activists and
intellectuals also started saying that there ts
at least some point in the demands of the
medical students. One of the staunch pro-
poor and pro-backward caste leaders,
Jinabhai Daraji, a former GPCC(I) presi-
dent said that while the Congress(I) could
not compromise on the total abolition of the
reservation issue, the government should
take steps to reserve at least 10 per cent of
seats for the economically backward ir-
respective of castes.18
The vernacular as well as the English press
was also sympathetic to the demands of the
students. The former was more open and
strongly biased than the English press. Many
of the Gujarati newspapers distorted news
in favour of the upper and middle castes and
sometimes either fabricated or wrote stories
on the basis of rumours against the harijans.
For instance, the Gujarat Samachar printed
on February 5 a news item that the harijans
had attacked the Ved Mandir in Ahmedabad.
In fact, there was no attack on the temple;
and the temple manhant, i e, priest issued a
denial of the press report which was not
printed by the newspaper. Similarly, a false
report regarding the attack on the Jain tem-
ple in Rajpur area was published which in-
tensified the attack against the SCs, The
reporting used to give the impression that
dalit mobs were mofesting upper caste
women. 39 The press became a party to
rumour mongering. The fact finding commit-
tee of PUCL observed: "The attitude of the
press is simply a reflection of the fact that
the ownership of the newspapers is largely
with the higher castes. Formerly certain stan-
dards of professionalism used to check bla-
tant partisanship, but it is now increasingly
the trend to not only take sides, but to distort
facts that support the side the paper has
taken!'40
The police which was responsible for pro-
tecting the victims, in this case the SCs, more
often than not failed in its duty. It arrived
at the trouble spots long after the bastis were
set on fire or dalits were beaten. This hap-
pened in several cases despite the fact that the
police received advance information about
place and time of the attacks. Even a casual
analysis of the events involving clashes bet-
ween the SCs and the patidars in urban and
rural areas, reveals the partisan role of the
police in the riots. The unions of the police
inspectors, sub-inspectors and constables
passed a resolution stating that reservation
as a policy should be scrapped and that the
carry forward system and roster system
abolished. Needless to mention that an over-
whelming majority of the police inspectors
and sub-inspectors belong to upper and mid-
dle castes—brahmins, rajputs and patidars.
Out of 51? police inspectors in the state in
1980, only four were from SC and two were
ST.41
On the other hand, the SC and ST were
not united and OBCs were by and large in-
different to the agitation. As the ST middle
class is still very small, and the number of
ST students in medical colleges is insignifi-
cant, they were inactive in the course of
agitation as if it had no effect on them.
Moreover, STs are concentrated in certain
districts, caste hindus being in a minority in
these areas did not dare to attack them. In
contrast, the SC population is scattered and
invariably in a minority in the villages.
Hence, they were more vulnerable. The SC
leaders could not mobilise the ST and OBC.
In fact, they did not have any following
among the all castes of SC. Their area of
influence was limited to their own caste and
area. A majority of the SCs who are very
poor and whose children have hardly taken
high school education, could not relate
themselves to the problems of the educated
dalit students who have become part of its
middle class in their life style. The sweepers,
scavangers, cobblers, etc, of the urban and
rural area did not find much in common
with the middle class dalits. They, therefore,
refrained from participating in the agitation
except when they were attacked by the caste
hindus. Thus, in terms of numbers, dalits
who were actively involved in the counter
agitation were very small in number and
mostly confined to large cities.
The late prime minister, Indira Gandhi,
intervened in the situation. She sent her
emissary, Jaisukhlal Hathi in the last week
of March for talks with the students. She
invited the students as well as the chief
minister to Delhi for negotiations. After
several rounds of talks in Delhi and then in
Ahmedabad, both the parties signed a 12
Annual Number May 1987
point accord on April 13 1981. Besides aboli-
tion of 'interehangeability' and 'carry for-
ward 1 which the government had accepted
in early January, the government agreed to
increase additional non-reserved seats
against the number of reserved seats claimed
by SC, ST and other backward caste students.
The medical colleges were reopened and
notices against junior doctors were with-
drawn. Thus after more than 103 days the
anti-reservation agitation came to a halt.
Some members of the anti-reservation com-
mittee, however, declared that their 'fight'
against abolition of the reservation system
from all walks of life would continue. But
by that time the capacity of the middle class
for the agitation was exhausted. Students
were not in a mood to lose one year of study.
The petty-bourgcoise which often provided
financial support to the agitators were
adversely affected by the prolonged curfews
in the cities as their business was affected.
Therefore, they withdrew their support and
pressurised the students into negotiations
and be satisfied with whatever they could get
and wait for another opportunity to strike
back.
T H E S E C O N D A G I T A T I O N o r 1985
Another opportunity came in 1985 as the
government raised the reservation of seats
for OBC from 10 per cent to 28 per cent.
There was no public statement from any
quarter to hail the government decision.
Neither the dalit leaders nor radical groups
which actively opposed the anti-reservation
agitation in 1981 came forward in support
of the decision because by that time the chief
minister, Madhavsinh Solanki, had lost
credibility as the protector of dalit interests.
He alienated them and depended on populist
politics with the support of coterie. His
erstwhile supporters within and outside the
party also looked at the government deci-
sion as a political gimmick. On the other
hand, middle class intellectuals and the press
sharply criticised the decision. Not a single
English or vernacular daily newspaper
supported the decision. The opinion was
almost unanimous that it was cynical ploy
to win over the votes of backward castes. It
was observed that Madhavsinh Solanki was
keen "to dangle the carrot to as many votes
as possible!'42 Some of the articulate per-
sons from the middle class criticised the
government decision in strongly worded
statements. One of them said, 'The un-
imaginative, unjust, improper and in-
equitable policy of reservation in jobs should
be abolished. A large number of qualified
students are denied jobs and admission only
because they are caste hindus!'43 Such reser-
vation would produce "dull, inefficient and
lazy medicos and technocrats!'44 As in 1981,
the arguments for merit and efficiency were
advanced by middle class writers. They had
no answer when it was asked whether all
those who obtained jobs supposedly by com-
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E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
petition were really selected on merit and
were all efficient? They evaded the answer
when they were sharply asked, " D i d they
care for merit when they appointed someone
or when they wrote chits to their friends for
favour for someone? A few openly stated
that they were against the SCs and back-
wards. They argued that those persons could
work on farms as they had habit of doing
that work, but where would brahmins and
vanias go who were traditionally in white-
collar jobs and knew no other skills?
Sophisticated persons argued that they were
not against backward classes, they were
against a reservation policy- They said,
"Nobody opposes the government when it
provides free education, special coaching
classes, free hostels and financial help by
way of scholarships for the economically
backward classes to bring them on a par
with the affluent sections of society!' They
proclaimed that the motto of society should
be sarve Janah sukhino bhavantu, i e, let all
be happy,45 implying that the reservation
policy was providing happiness only to a few
and a large number of people were deprived
of benefits due to them. Such statements
were building up an atmosphere against the
hike in the reservation quota and several
people began to feel that something should
be done. Some were wondering why the
students were silent.
The initiative eventually came from the
engineering students of M o r b i college in
Saurashtra who were also responsible for
beginning the Navnirrnan movement in
1974. They boycotted the classes on February
11, 1985 protesting against keeping 49 per
cent of seats reserved for backward classes.
The news appeared in the press the next day
and students of Ahmedabad felt that they
should also take up the issue. This was the
time when preliminary examinations in the
colleges were to be conducted; and there has
been always a group of students who want
to postpone examination on one pretext or
another. They found the reservation issue a
god-given chance to attain their objective.
Students organised a procession on February
17 protesting against the government's deci-
sion. Like 1981, they garlanded the statue of
Mahatma Gandhi and took the oath that
they would not suspend their agitations till
the state government agreed to abolish reser-
vations. Colleges remained closed and
students boycotted their preliminary ex-
amination. Students decided to intensify the
agitation and gave a call for an indefinite
strike in schools from February 20. Thirty
colleges promptly postponed examinations
and teaching was suspended in all colleges.
The teachers, guardians and the press gave
moral support to the students. The students
from different colleges in different parts of
the state extended their support to the call
of the Ahmedabad students' Action Com-
mittee. About 85 students from Bhavnagar
and Junagadh were arrested by the police for
violating prohibitory orders. Students
and police clashed in Ahmedabad. The
Ahmedabad students formed A l l Gujarat
Educational Reform Agitation Committee
(AGERAC). Under its banner, the students
of Ahmedabad organised a procession and
public meeting on February 21. Sporadic in-
cidents of violence occurred in Ahmedabad
and other cities. Gujarat university closed
colleges for an indefinite period to avoid ten-
sion on the campus. But this move did not
work.
The AGERAC gave a call for Gujarat
bandh which received partial response.
Junior doctors of the civil hospital sup-
ported the agitation and abstained from
duty. So did the lawyers at the city small
causes courts. The president of the state unit
of the Janata party criticised the government
for increasing the reservation percentages.
Unlike 1981, no public figure came out to
counter the agitation, Dalit leaders were
silent, as were other pro-poor and pro-
reservation non-party activists. The Gujarat
High Court issued a stay order on the rise
in reservation quota. The prime minister
declared that reservation policy would be
reviewed after the assembly elections which
were to be in early March. Rajiv Gandhi
said, "The whole thing about the reserva-
tion is getting a little out of hand; it has to
be reviewed!' The middle class of Gujarat
read Rajiv Gandhi's statement as a form of
moral support. The government spokesman
declared that the government had not issued
any 'government resolution' to give effect to
the decision of cabinet regarding raising the
quota due to 'various complications'. He
said that even with the 31 per cent reserva-
tion at present for SC, ST and OBC, the ac-
tual utilisation had ranged from 11.60 to
17.40 per cent in various courses. This
showed that 83 per cent to 88 per cent of
the seats were available to general candidates
on merit despite the reservation. 4 6
Therefore, the agitation was uncalled for, he
implied. But neither he nor any Congress
leader answered the question: if the use of
the reservation quota was low, what was the
urgent need to increase the quota? The
political parties were not interested in the
agitation at the stage as they were busy
preparing for elections. The AGERAC
declared on March 3 the postponement of
the reservation stir till March 6 to ensure
peace during the assembly election.
The government beat a retreat by announ-
cing on March 6 that it had postponed rais-
ing the reservation quota for SEBC for a
year. This had no effect on the students.
Student representatives from different parts
of the state met in Ahmedabad on March !0
and decided to intensify the agitation. A call
for Gujarat bandh on March 18 was given.
The bandh triggered off violence in different
parts of the state, During the day, the events
of violence were of a minor nature, such as
throwing stones on public buses, clash bet-
ween police and students, etc Such incidents
took place in Surat and towns of Saurashtra
Annual Number May 1987
to a greater extent than in Ahmedabad.
But the situation changed suddenly in
Ahmedabad that night. Communal riots
between hindus and muslims erupted in
Dariyapur and Kalupui areas of Ahmedabad;
and by midnight they spread to other parts
of the city. Arson, looting and killing con-
tinued throughout the night. The army
was called in. The parents organisation,
Ahmedabad Wali Mandal, which came into
existence a few days before to support the
anti-reservation agitation, announced
suspension of the agitation for two days in
view of the communal riots. But, communal
violence continued for four days. Why and
how the communal riots erupted is a puzzle.
Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that
certain areas of Ahmedabad have been com-
munally sensitive for many years and there
were incidents of communal riots in
Ahmedabad in January before the anti-
reservation agitation was launched. By the
time Ahmedabad returned to normal, com-
munal riots had began in Vadodara, which
is another riot-prone city. In the middle of
A p r i l , Ahmedabad again witnessed com-
munal riots for several days. Ahmedabad
and Vadodara took their turn one after
another in communal violence. Surat took
its turn after Vadodara though disturbances
were not communal. Rajkot took its turn
after Surat. Thus violence continued in the
cities during A p r i l and May.
Though the student leaders and the of-
fice bearers of the Wali Mandal declared
repeatedly that they had nothing to do with
communal riots, their programmes against
reservations continued. In order to pacify the
agitationalists, the government announced
in early April that it would appoint a high
power committee or commission to look into
the reservation issue. It promised the
students that the government would not in-
crease the reservation for SEBC till the
report of the commission was submitted. But
this had no effect. And other sections of the
middle class joined the agitation. The junior
doctors went on strike, supporting the
demands of the students. Lawyers abstained
from work in protest against police excesses.
By the end of A p r i l the state government
employees joined the fray demanding aboli-
tion of the roster system. Employees of the
panchayats followed them soon after,
paralysing the functioning of the state in
May and June. More than 150 business
organisations of Ahmedabad such as cloth
merchants, foodgrain dealers, dealers in
books and stationeries, edible oil, spices,
electrical appliances, radio and television,
laundary owners, footwear dealers, bullion
merchants, etc, observed a bandh for five
days beginning from June 5, in protest
against the government's failure to protect
the life and property of the citizens.
But caste and communal violence con-
tinued with intermittent normalcy through-
out June and mid-July, Ahmedabad and
Vadodara were the worst affected areas,
AN-169
Annual Number May 1987
though incidents of clashes between.hindus
and muslims between caste hindu agitators
and police took place in many other cities
and towns of Gujarat. On the directive of
the prime minister, Madhavsinh Solanki
resigned on July 6 and Amarsinh Chaudhari,
belonging to ST became the chief minister.
For the time being there was a brief period
of normalcy. J F Rebeiro was appointed as
the director general of police to curb com-
munal violence. C o m m u n a l violence
renewed in Vadodara and Ahmedabad in
mid-July; the government took stern action
and arrested some of the agent provocateurs
wielding enormous influence in its own
party. Rebeiro prevented political inter-
ference in handling the situation.
The anti-reservation agitation continued
nonetheless. The strike of state government
and Ahmedabad city municipal corporation
employees against the roster system was on.
In order to intensify the agitation, the-Akhil
Gujarat Vali Mahamandal (AGVM) and
Navrachna Samiti (NS) gave a call for 'jail
bharo', i e, courting arrest from July 19. And
the student leaders became active. The state
government appointed two cabinet sub-
committees to go into the question of reser-
vation and roster system on July 16. The
committees started negotiations with the
leaders of the agitation. An accord was
arrived on July 19, Accordingly the govern-
ment agreed not only to the abolition of the
18 per cent hike in reservation quota, but it
also agreed to review by the end of 1987 the
existing 10 per cent reservation for the OBC
which expires in March 1988. The A G V M
and NS withdrew the five-month-old anti-
reservation stir. However, a small faction of
the student leaders walked out of the
negotiation meeting and disapproved ot the
accord. They declared that they would con-
tinue the agitation for the abolition of reser-
vation for the OBC. However, their call for
Vadodara bandh on July 21 and Ahmedabad
bandh on July 22 failed to evoke any
response. Similarly, a call for Gujarat bandh
on July 27 given by the striking government
employees received partial response, though
they organised a massive rally of the staff
on the previous day. However, the govern-
ment initiated negotiations with the splinter
group and reached an agreement in which
the students gave up their demand for the
immediate abolition of the reservation for
OBC. On the other hand, the government
agreed to make representation before the
proposed commission to review the imple-
mentation of the Baxi Commission recom-
mendations that economic criteria should be
considered as one of the yardsticks of caste-
based reservations. The cabinet panel also
agreed to the demand of the agitators that
administrative measures be initiated to give
preference to 'Gujaratis' in Class I I I and IV
services of statutory boards and corpora-
tions. Consequently, the rebel students called
off the stir on July 30,
But the strike of the government
AN-170
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
employees against the roster system con-
tinued. However, the strike of the municipal
employees slowly petered out and the
Municipal Karmachari Hit Raksak Samiti
withdrew the 47-day-old strike on August 3.
They achieved one thing. The municipal ad-
ministration agreed to implement any deci-
sion by the state government with regard to
the roster system. The vacuum created by the
municipal employees in the agitation was
filled up by the employees of the Gujarat
Electricity Board who went on strike on
August 6 demanding, alongwith other
things, abolition of the roster system. On
August 18, the government and the leaders
of the government and panchayat employees
signed the accord and the 73-day-old strike
came to an end. Though the government did
not abolish the roster system, it gave certain
concessions to the non SC-ST employees.
The government agreed to give retrospective
effect from March 24, 1981 in considering
the cases of 'hardships' to the non SC-ST
employees in promotion. A l l such cases
would be considered on a one-to-one ratio
and would be given notional promotion
from the retrospective date when they were
deemed to have been promoted. Further-
more, in cases where the SC employees had
already gained more than 8 per cent promo-
tions in their cadres, their further roster pro-
motions would be frozen and they would
have to wait for the next promotions till the
employees superseded get their turns of
promotion.
ROLE OF POLICE AND PRESS
The police and the press played out the
same role that they did during the 1981 agita-
tion. They were partial and sympathetic to
the cause of the agitators. Certain
newspapers twisted some news items and
suppressed others, played photographic
tricks to highlight certain aspects of the
agitations, carried accounts of events which
had never occurred and became a party to
the attempts to portray rumours as facts.
Some newspapers claimed the credit for
ousting Madhavsinh Solanki and openly
declared that no Chief Minister could hold
power for long without their support.
W H Y OBC FAILED TO COUNTER
AGITATION?
None of the backward castes could
counter effectively the anti-reservation agita-
tion. Two weeks after the government an-
nounced its decis;on to postpone the increase
in the reservation seats for one year, the Baxi
Panch Action Committee (BPAC) was form-
ed on March 30 to defend the reservation
for SEBC. Unlike the 1981 agitation, the in-
itiative this time came from the ruling fac-
tion of the Congress party rather than the
various caste organisations or secular pro-
reservation groups. The BPAC gave a press
statement urging the government to imple-
ment the reservation policy immediately in-
stead of keeping it in abeyance for one year.
The Anamat Andolan Pratikar Manch
( A A P M ) , i e, a platform to counter the anti-
reservation movement was formed which an-
nounce in early A p r i l that they would start
a counter agitation. The anti-reservation
agitators became alarmed as they knew that
if OBC which have a large numerical
strength, start counter agitation, they were
bound to fail. Therefore, they immediately
announced that their agitation was not
against the backward classes or weaker sec-
tions of society. They accused the govern-
ment of inciting backward class students to
attack the agitators. The upper caste
agitators were aware of the numerical
strength of the deprived castes, therefore
they wanted to avoid encounter with
backward castes wherever the latter were in
majority. They isolated SC-ST from the
OBC, with an argument that their agitation
was against the hike in reservation for the
OBC. Since the OBC constitute a majority
in rural areas the 1985 agitation was kept out
from the rural areas. Whereas the 1981 agita-
tion spread to rural areas where the SCs were
in minority; but even at that time it did not
spread to the tribal areas where the STs were
in majority
The pro-reservationists formed the
counter agitation committees in various
cities. However, SC-ST leaders initially kept
themselves aloof or were indifferent to the
pro-reservation committees because they
thought, or they were told by the leaders of
the agitation that their struggle was against
OBC rather than SC and ST; and they
reminded themselves of the fact that the
OBCs had not supported them in the 1981
agitation. However, when the dalit bastis
were attacked in Ahmedabad, SC-ST leaders
became alarmed and began to extend their
support to the pro-reservation committees.
These committees organised certain sym-
bolic programmes like relay fast, but did not
mobilise OBC and SC-ST. In fact, they were
prevented from doing so by those who were
in power because the Congress(I) leaders
feared that mobilisation of backward castes
would lead to confrontation and clashes bet-
ween middle castes on the one hand and
OBC and SC-ST on the other. Such clashes
would paralyse law and order machinery
which no government can tolerate. Moreover,
there was no unity among the various SC,
ST and other backward castes. And, the
leaders of these castes who had gained
middle class status had become distanced
from their own castes. They were respected
but their leadership was not accepted. In
order to seek support of SC-ST and OBC
members, a few of the leaders visited villages
but they did not receive any encouraging
response. They became frustrated and com-
plained: "Our caste members are illiterate,
ignorant and poor. They do not understand
the importance of the reservation!' Members
of these deprived groups have their own ra-
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
tionale They listen to and also vote for the
educated and well-connected persons of their
caste during elections because they are
members of the same caste, while other can-
didates (in the case of non-reserved consti-
tuencies) came from other castes. However,
on the issue of a counter agitation to
preserve reservations, they did not identify
themselves with the leaders. These leaders
who have become a part of the middle class
rarely visit their constituencies. Their style
of life sets them apart from their fellow
members. Moreover, the mass of the deprived
groups feel that they are so poor that neither
they nor their children have any possibility
of getting advantage from reservations. They
felt that the leaders were fighting the bat-
tles to strengthen the interests of the better-
off stratum rather than the majority of the
members of the castes who were poor.
However, they were compelled to join hands
with the members of the educated middle
class of their own castes when they were cor-
nered and attacked.
As mentioned, the Gujarat Kshatriya
Sabha dominated by rajputs was not in
favour of caste based reservation, therefore
it did not openly support the government's
decision about the hike in the reservation
quota. But at the same time it did not sup-
port the agitation because the leaders of
GKS were in the Congress party and were
supporters of Madhavsinh Solanki. During
the last stage of the agitation, the GKS
organised a meeting opposing the agitation
attended by less than 300 persons. The
meeting was given disproportionate publicity
by the vernacular press to support their
allegation that the kshatriya leaders were
preaching violence and communalism. In
fact, the GKS leaders were mainly interested
in protecting the interest of Madhavsinh
Solanki rather than in a reservation policy
for the backward castes. Later, the GKS
criticised some of the pro-reservationalist
Congress leaders who began to collect
signatures from backward caste members
demanding the implementation of the
government's decision for raising the quota
of reservation for OBC.
The backward castes are scattered
throughout the state. There are many
demographic, socio-cultural and economic
differentiations among different castes/com-
munities and within many of the jatis. Some
castes among the 82 caste/communities are
very small and localised. Others have a large
number of members, but reside in different
parts of the state. For instance, the bhalia
and talabada kolis: the former live in
Vadodara district alone, whereas the latter
are spread over the whole of Gujarat. Some
of the groups following the process of
sanskritisation proclaimed that they were
kshatriyas or patidars. This led them to
the performance of religious rituals and
ceremonies which strengthened the social
order dominated by Brahiminical ideology.
As a result they were repeatedly advised to
maintain the varna system and preserve their
dharma to enable them to claim higher
social status. Hence, in order to preserve
their identity they distanced themselves from
and look down upon those who are below
them. Their anti-muslim and anti-dalit
stance creates obstacles in the path of achiev-
ing the unity of the deprived sections of
society. Some of the castes are relatively bet-
ter off than others. Though many of the
groups have less than 5 per cent literacy but
talabada kolis of south Gujarat, and gola
rana of urban areas have a higher rate of
literacy.
Heterogeneity within some of the groups
bearing common caste nomenclature is also
very noticeable. For instance, the kolis who
constitute a single largest caste cluster
among the backward castes, are divided
among themselves in socio-cultural and
economic matters. The kolis of central
Gujarat aspire to be kshatriyas, whereas the
kolis of south Gujarat call themselves patels
and the kolis of Saurashtra content them-
selves with calling themselves kolis. For the
kolis of central Gujarat, patidars have been
their enemies for the last two centuries; the
reason being that the patidars grabbed their
land and have been exploiting their labour.
But the kolis of Saurashlra had similar an-
tagonistic relationships with the rajputs and
not with the patidars. This is the reason why
the kolis of different parts of Gujarat never
supported the GKS despite its strencous ef-
forts to win their alliance.
Except the GKS, no other group has made
any attempt to unite the various backward
castes of Gujarat. There has been no
backward caste or anti-brahmin movement
in Gujarat similar to those that arose in
Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra; hence sym-
bols and idioms that could have provided
common identity to the backward castes are
wanting in Gujarat. The GKS which tried
to unite at least the kolis and rajputs did so
to serve their narrow and immediate political
interests. The functionaries of the GKS were
interested in capturing political offices for
themselves and their close supporters rather
than transforming the socio-economic con-
ditions of the kolis. The GKS has remained
after almost of 40 years of its existence a
raj put-dominated organisation. It has never
taken up issues affecting the kolis with as
much vigour and enthusiasm as it did over
the issues affecting the rajputs. It has not
hailed the fact that the kolis got the benefits
of reservation! Its grouse was that the rajput
would not get similar benefits.
The middle class that emerged from the
OBC during the last four decades is rela-
tively very small in comparison with the up-
per and middle caste members of the mid-
dle class. Besides castes and community
based divisions among the OBC middle class
there are also two sharp factions among
them in regard to the issue of reservation.
One faction supports the reservation and
another is not in its favour. The leaders of
Annual Number May 1987
the pro-reservation faction are either
political power brokers or government
employees. The former do not have much
credibility among their brethren as their
motives are suspect. And the latter do not
have roots in their caste because of their dif-
ferent life style. The second group is small
and its primary concern is to secure social
status rather than political offices. They
therefore, dislike calling themselves back-
ward*. Over a course of time, they have im-
bibed the values of the brahmin-vania
middle class. Individually they have not suf-
fered because of their caste status. They have
developed prejudices against the SC and ST;
therefore they do not wish to get identified
with them. One of the kolis said that he did
not believe in the reservation for the kolis
because that would identify them as back-
ward and bracket them with SC and ST.
Another koli of south Gujarat said that there
was one doctor from his caste in 1951; now
there arc several. "When we are able to get
positions on our merit why should we beg
from the government?" 47 Some of the
government servants coming from the koli
caste opposed the roster system because the
system was applicable only to the SC and
ST; consequently their chances for promo-
tion were adversely affected.
Thus, the anti-reservation movement of
the 1985 succeeded, because the government
which raised the quota was not sincere about
implementing its new policy. It was a half-
hearted political measure. The police and the
bureaucracy, the major organs of the state,
were sympathetic to the anti-reservation
agitation. The state government, panchayats,
municipalities, universities and Gujarat Elec-
tricity Board Employees dominated by the
upper and middle castes launched strikes
lasting for 1 day to more than 100 days in
support of the demands raised by the
agitators. The press and the intellectuals—
professors, teachers, literary personalities
and free-lance writers—justified the
demands of the agitators. On the other
hand, a vast majority of the OBC, SC and
ST were divided and they were ignorant
about the government policy. There was no
organisation and leadership which could
unite and mobilise them. A n d the middle
class arising from these castes was small and
was again divided on the issues of the roster,
whereas, the vast majority of the members
of these castes are so poor that they do not
envisage any chance of receiving the benefits
from the reservation policy in the foreseeable
future.
V
Overview
The middle class has grown in size
disproportionate to the economic growth of
the region. This has resulted in a steep rise
in educated unemployment and consequent
expansion of the lumpen crowd in urban
areas. The lumpens have social ties with the
AN-171
Annual Number May 1987
middle class on the one hand and the under-
world on the other. Their services have been
used by politicians for underhand activities
in electoral politics and settling scores for
personal or political purposes. Aspirations
for the possession of conspicuous consump-
tion items as status symbols are growing
among members of the middle class. But
most of them are unable to find the
wherewithal to satisfy their basic needs and
maintain their traditional status. They
therefore, have a strong feeling of depriva-
tion. This is felt most amongst the upper and
middle caste members who dominate the
middle class. They are jealous of the new en-
trants from the traditionally low castes in the
middle class. Today, they arc vulnerable to
reactionary forces such as caste, religion,
region and language.
The two anti-reservation agitations in
Gujarat were essentially struggle within the
middle class. There were fights between the
upper and middle class members, on the one
hand and the new entrants from the low
castes on the other. The fights were not bet-
ween the two equals. The upper and middle
castes not only enjoy dominance but also
have a larger numerical strength within the
middle class than the low castes. The former
possess not only large resources of their own,
but they also have the backing of the
capitalist class, as social and ideological
links between the two are fairly strong. They
control the media and educational institu-
tions, which a re-the sources of ideological
penetration in society. They dominate the
bureaucracy and police who supported the
agitations directly as well as indirectly by
flouting the orders of the executive heads.
The political elite introduced reservations
first for the SC and ST, and later for the
OBC for political exigency to catch votes as
wel! as to diffuse the rising aspirations of
the deprived classes. There is neither any
perspective nor desire to use the reservation
as a device for social transformation even
of a limited nature within the existing
system, it has been reduced to a mere
political gimmic for electoral purposes. And,
even for that, the power elite do not have the
political accumen to stand by the decisions
against pressures from the dominant castes
and classes. One fears that whatever little the
OBC has got by way of reservation will soon
be lost. Recent events of Gujarat suggest that
it is almost impossible to unite all the
deprived castes for any mass struggle on
caste line to protect their rights. They are not
only divided into several high and low status
groups among themselves; but also continue
to subscribe the Brahminical ideology which
is rejuvenating recently in different forms in
Gujarat.
Notes
[This is a revised version of the paper presented
in the International Seminar on Gujarat
Society, organised by the Centre for Social
AN-172
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
Studies, Surat in December 1986.1 am thankful I P Desai for allowing me to read various
to ail the participants of the Seminar, par- documents of the commission for this
ticularly David Hardiman and Amit Mitra of study.
the CSS for their comments, I specially thank 27 See I P Desai, 'Should 'Caste be the Basis
Arjun Patel for interviewing some of the koli for Recognising the Backwardness', EPW,
elite for me to know their views on the reser- July 14, 1984, and my reply to him, 'Caste,
vation issues.] Class and Reservation', EPW, January 19,
1985.
1 Anil Seal, 'The Emergence of Indian 28 See for instance an advertisement issued
Nationalism; Competition and Collabora-
by the Collector of Surendranagar dis-
tion in the Later Nineteenth Century", trict, published in Gujarat Samachar
London, Cambridge University Press, 1968. (Ahmedabad), August 26, 1986.
2 Ibid. 29 "Statistical Atlas of Gujarat", Vol I I ,
3 "Census of India, 1901, Bombay Presi- Gandhinagar, Bureau of Economics and
dency", Bombay, Government Central Statistics, 1984.
Press, 1902.
30 Narottam Shah, "Some Facets of Industrial
4 Tulsibhai Vadav (ed), "Bharatni Prachin Development of Gujarat", Bombay, Centre
Praja Koli Komano Itihasik Parichaya" for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1979.
(Gujarati), Bhavnagar, Prakashan Samiti 31 Narottam Shah, "Basic Statistics Relating
Samasta Koli Samaj, revised edition, 1981. to the Indian Economy", Bombay, Centre
5 Nagajibhai Arya, "Adhya Antya joddharak for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1981.
Rajavi" (Gujarati), Vadodara, by the 32 The Times of India, January 1, 1981.
author, 1935. 33 Ibid, January 2, 1981.
6 Ibid. 34 Ibid, January 13, 1981.
7 I P Desai, 'The Vedchhi Movement: A
35 Ibid, January 28, 1981.
Sociological Study' in I P Desai and 36 Ibid, January 20, 1981.
Banwartlal Choudhry, "History of Rural
37 ibid, March 2, 1981.
Development in Modern India", Vol I I , New
38 Ibid, March 2, 1981.
Delhi, Index India, 1977.
39 Committee for the Protection of Demo-
8 Ghanshyam Shah, "Politics of Scheduled cratic Rights, "The Gujarat Agitation and
Castes and Tribes", Bombay, Vora and Co Reservations", Bombay, 1981.
Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1975. 40 Ibid.
9 "Census of India, 1921, Vol V I I I , Bombay 41 Ibid.
Presidency Part I I " , Bombay, Government 42 The Times of India, January 17, 1985.
Central Press, 1922. 43 Ibid, January 19, 1985.
10 Computed on the basis of the information 44 Ibid, January 23, 1985.
given in the "Combined Civil List for India 45 Ibid, January 24, 1985.
and Burma'', No !31 (Lahore), January- 46 Ibid, March 3, 1985.
March. 1940.
47 This is based from various interviews of the
11 "Western India States Agency Civil Li.»t koli elite taken by Arjun Patel for his doc-
Parts I - X I V " Rajkot, Western India States torate study.
Agency, 1940.
12 N Arya, op cit.
13 Anil Bhatt, 'Caste and Political Mobilisa-
tion in Gujarat District' in "Caste in Indian
Politics" (ed), Rajni Kothari, Delhi, Orient
Longman, 1970.
14 See Arjun Patel, "Caste in Changing Situa-
tion, Kolis of Gujarat" (in preparation),
Surat, Centre for Social Studies, 1986.
15 Ghanshyam Shah, op cit.
16 Ghanshyam Shah, The Congress and the
Deprived Communities' in Ram Joshi and
R K Hebsur (eds), "Social Intervention for
Justice", Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1987.
17 Marc Galanter, 'The Abolition of Dis-
abilities—Untouchability and the Law' in
Michael Mahar (ed), "The Untouchability
in Contemporary India", Arozona, The
University of Arizona Press, 1972.
18 Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Association and
Political Process in Gujarat", Bombay,
Popular Prakashan, 1975.
19 "Kshatriya Bandhu" July 16, 1985.
20 Ibid, February 1, 1978.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid, November I, 1982.
24 Ibid, August 16, 1983.
25 ibid.
26 This information is based on the memo-
randa submitted by different caste leaders
to the Rane Commission. I thank late
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY Annual Number May 1987
Annual Number May 1987 Regd No M H-By/South-325