CONSTI CASES #9 (CITIZENSHIP)
– The procedure prescribed for naturalization
1. Commonwealth Act No. 63
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any
manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service
to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in,
the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country,
he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country,
she acquires his nationality.1
The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen from one of
the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries or from the United Kingdom shall not produce loss or
forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired.2
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be reacquired:
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act
Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,3
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the
marital status;4 and
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided, That the qualifications and special
qualifications prescribed in section three and four of said Act shall not be required: And provided, further,
(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months
before he applies for naturalization;
(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth6of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.
Section 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of this Act.
Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished
by the Solicitor General, subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 21, 1936.
2. Commonwealth Act No. 473
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS
NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become
a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must
have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of the last
preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following
qualifications:
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Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
Being married to a Filipino woman;
Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the
exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or
industry for a period of not less than two years;
Having been born in the Philippines.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas;
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war;
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the
applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice4 a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal
description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if
any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a
certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has
enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education5 of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and
have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years
or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the
applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with
respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.6
Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent
court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his
present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and
the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate
date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the
ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he
is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of
section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting
and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person
of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall
also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the
hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least one
year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the petition.
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the
court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and
in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said
petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where
said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place
of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his
petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of
the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the
naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of Justice,8 the
Provincial Inspector9 of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace10 of the municipality
wherein the petitioner resides.
Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any election. The hearing
shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall
appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the
hearing, the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and
none of the disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall order the
proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization certificate in the proper civil
registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand seven hundred and fifty-three.12
Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the Supreme
Court.13
Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after the date on
which the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal, the decision of the court has
been confirmed by the Supreme Court,14 and the said decision has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the
petition shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The
file number of the petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in
the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstances of the person naturalized, the dates on which his
declaration of intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting the petition, and the name of the judge
who rendered the decision. A photograph of the petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted
the petition, must be affixed to the certificate.
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath:
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"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this
time I am a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth15of the
Philippines; [and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;16 and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
"So help me God."
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall keep two books; one in which the petition and declarations of
intention shall be recorded in chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof from the filing of the petition to the
final issuance of the naturalization certificate; and another, which shall be a record of naturalization certificates each
page of which shall have a duplicate which shall be duly attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.
Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First Instance shall charge as fees for recording a petition for naturalization
and for the proceedings in connection therewith, including the issuance of the certificate, the sum of thirty pesos.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each appeal and for the services rendered by him in connection
therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the
parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen,
unless one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
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the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A
certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the
Department of the Interior20 and the Bureau of Justice.21
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the Constitutional
or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.
Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or
cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying,
changing or altering a naturalization certificate for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be
used by another person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case that the person convicted is a
naturalized citizen his certificate of naturalization and the registration of the same in the proper civil registry shall be
ordered cancelled.
Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense implying a violation of the
provisions of this Act, unless the information or complaint is filed within five years from the detection or discovery of the
commission of said offense.
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper
enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this
Act shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor-General, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by Act Numbered
Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled "The Naturalization Law", is repealed: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall
be construed to affect any prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal,
done or existing before the taking effect of this Act, but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts,
things, or matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and effect.
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This Act shall take effect on its approval.
3. Republic Act No. 2630
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST
SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4. Presidential Decree No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO
ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship
unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said Constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their
citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: 1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which
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they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate
forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
5. Republic Act No. 8171
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the
applicant
is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon for the
predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurablecontagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Signed: October 23, 1995
6. Republic Act No. 9139
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY ADMINISTRATIVE
NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and integration of aliens into its
territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated
by national security and interest.
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits
of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must
have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private
educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to
any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them
in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income
sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their
profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with
the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and
signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the
petition, and setting forth the following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and their residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the date
and place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of his/her spouse; and if
his marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage and the court which granted the same;
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(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act;
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce
absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the country of which the applicant is a
citizen or subject.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate;
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native born certificate of
residence;
(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death certificate of his
spouse, if widowed, or the court decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;
(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien certificate of registration or native born
certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's minor children, wherever applicable;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and sworn statements on the good moral character of the petitioner
by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good reputation in his/her place of residence stating that they have personally
known the petitioner for at least a period of ten (10) years and that said petitioner has in their own opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and that he/she is
not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the schools he attended in the Philippines. Should the
petitioner have minor children, a certification that his children are enrolled in a school where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and are part of the curriculum; and
(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past three (3) years.
Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There shall be constituted a Special Committee on Naturalization herein
referred to as the "Committee", with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his
representative, and the National Security Adviser, as members, with the power to approve, deny or reject applications
for naturalization as provided in this Act.
The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to consider applications for naturalization. For this purpose, the
chairman and members shall receive an honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and One thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting attended.
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may file an application for naturalization with the secretariat of the
Special Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition
shall be stamped to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine whether the petition is complete in substance and in form. If such
petition is complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition indicating the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area. The
Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil
registrar of the petitioner's place of residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and its
supporting documents. These agencies shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their
buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the petition, submit to the
Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material
information which might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the agencies
which were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes in later,
the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material information it has received pertaining to the petition,
and may, for the purpose call the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition
and its annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its
annexes.
If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to
answer, explain or refute the information.
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and henceforth,
notify the petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same.
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
notice of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition
and Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
forthwith, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the
petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required naturalization
processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance
within said period of time, the approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.
Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his oath of allegiance as
required in the preceding section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to the proper local civil registrar.
Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien certificates of registration of the applicant.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization
in cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may file a
petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing
fee of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as
follows: Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her
petition for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for
cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel certificates of
naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:
(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or
misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition for
naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of naturalization
shall be cancelled;
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship by virtue of his
naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence
in a foreign country, that individual's certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
5
revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2)
years in any foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside therein;
(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be used as a dummy
in violation of any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked; and
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security,
the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make an express
renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Special Committee or its duly authorized
representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the records of his application for citizenship.
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause or aid any person to
do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a
naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same
may be used by another person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that the person convicted is
a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered
cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar may, within
two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the acquisition of the Philippine citizenship: Provided, That
the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act and subject to the
requirements of existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the filing fee to
be paid by the applicants pursuant to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the Philippines Law Center and
another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for the publication of the Journal of the House of Representatives.
Said amount shall be treated as receipts automatically appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby authorized to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be needed for the proper implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations contrary to or
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
part, section or provision not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
7. Republic Act No. 9225
August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they
are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section
or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
6

8. Reyes vs. COMELEC, et al. [G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a
petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the
ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status,
residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of
office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Discussion:
Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members
of House of Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that
she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the
COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this
case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to
conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from
January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-
born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in
the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented
therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May
2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of
which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an
American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and
the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized
American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on
2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006,
Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in
which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17
July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6)
Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
7
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No.
9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of
which he was naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident
of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007.
It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the
COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of
discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's
Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to
prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched
rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds
no merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time
he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine
citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the
election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to
the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green
card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of
any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified
under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence
of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act
No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the
law to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that
he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already
found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his
claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
10. Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al. [G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013]
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated
5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the
COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
8
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights
and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the
10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum
a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21
April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that
Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned
to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that
Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to
15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado
is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support
his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind
eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
9
The Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the
Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used
his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a
Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy
and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say
that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is
not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is
no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are
not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to
repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation.
Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This
then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one
of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be
lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said
principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to
be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant
case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his
use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his
Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification
requirements regarding his citizenship.
10
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election
against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of
votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To
apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and
when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite
his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado
is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that
the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in
the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling
of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had
therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
11
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation
of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14
April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would
be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he
took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election
or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
12
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.Paredes45which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and
its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an
ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible
in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election
absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case
the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have
received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court
issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of
holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails
entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is
confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest"
in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction
to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the
election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his
stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect;
and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised
some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a
mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots
and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received
the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had
the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not
only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to
run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
13
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of
the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We
said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and
Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a
way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that
sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the
petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data
wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will
cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy.
When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who
are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to
the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer
to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and
after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an
American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although
made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February
2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any
14
local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,
Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the
Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative
in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No.
63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath
of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
TABASA VS COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 125793, AUGUST 29, 2006 (CASE DIGEST)
Facts:
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was 7 years old, his father Rodolfo Tabasa,
became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization, Joevani Tabasa acquired the citizenship of
his father. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in August 1995 and was admitted as “balikbayan” for one year. Petitioner
was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of BID on May 23, 1996 in Aklan and was brought to BID Detention
Center, Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Donato and on the same day, petitioner was accused of violating
Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner’s passport was revoked by the US
Department of State. Hence, respondent (petitioner Tabasa) is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be
summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53.
Petitioner’s passport was revoked due to federal charges filed against him. Federal charges are as follows:
In possession of a firearm and one count of sexual battery (all in violation of the California Penal Code)
Upon revocation of petitioner’s passport, he loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus. That he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of
arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no
notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change
of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13,
paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to
his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed the petition, he was 35 years old.
Tabasa then filed a supplementary petition alleging that he has acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with RA 8171 and because he is now a Filipino citizen, he can no longer be deported.
CA denied the petition on the grounds that he had only acquired citizenship to escape from the federal charges filed
against him by the US and that he has not successfully acquired citizenship because he does not fall under any of the
requirements under RA 8171.
Issue:
WON petitioner has the privilege reacquire Filipino citizenship through RA 8171.
Ruling:
Petition is not meritorious.
15
RA 8171 provides repatriation to two classes of persons:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner does not fall under RA 8171 because what is referred in the second class of persons privileged with
repatriation refers to his father.Even if the Court would concede that petitioner can avail the benefit of RA 8171, he
failed to follow procedure for reacquisition.
Procedure for reacquisition through repatriation is as follows:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-
General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they
shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity . — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
Petitioner only took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines then executed an affidavit of
repatriation which he registered together with his birth certificate with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila. The said office issued him a certificate of such registration.
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election,
reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for
under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.
Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same
article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual
citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
FACTS:
Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, which accords to such
applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United
States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right
to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The
same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s
registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would
likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise absentee voting; the one-year
residency requirement should be fulfilled.
HELD:
RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d)
of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and
qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is “recognized as such in the host country” because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she
executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent
expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be
entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if
actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners
now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A.
9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right
of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible
all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them
qualified as voters for the first time.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the
passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee
voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.
Valles vs. COMELEC
CITIZENSHIP: Jus Sanguinis - a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth
16

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at
the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since
then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she
ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was
born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA
04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on
26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for
a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR
161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term
"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them
on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father
of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence
by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.
Cabiling vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother. They were all raised,
have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of
Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they
claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to
have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers persons to become
naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
RULING:
17
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts
peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a
century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra Batu(i)gas
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization, Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that granted the Petition
for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that
she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative
trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the
Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then practiced her teaching
profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have five
children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on
in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns
and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought
parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to become a naturalized
citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or
administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso factoPhilippine citizens
and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no
sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was presented to
establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately
proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are
Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to
maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court
will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the
requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of
Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
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On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went
home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents
cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banccancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for
Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of
Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935
Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe
presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.

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