TRADITIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN

Why is it not a Police Power?

In Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary if DSWD, the court provided distinction between police power
and eminent domain. It stated that police power is the inherent power of the state to regulate or to
restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare. Here, the state may interfere with personal
liberty, property, and lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare, as long as
the interference is reasonable and not arbitrary. In the exercise of such police power, a property right
is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to
promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, and so payment of just
compensation is not required. The Supreme Court further gave examples of instances where there is
exercise of police power: property condemned for being noxious, and zoning ordinances prohibiting
the use of property for purposes injurous to health. Therefore, in the exercise of police power,
although the regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute
ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.

On the other hand, eminent domain is the inherent power of the state to take or appropriate private
property for public use. However, the Constitution requires that private property shall not be taken
without die process of law and the payment of just compensation. In the exercise of this power,
property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the
payment of just compensation therefor. The title and possession of the property are transferred to
the expropriating authority. Payment of just compensation is warranted because of the burden placed
on the property for the use or benefit of the public.

Furthermore, in the case of Didipio Earth-Savers Multipurpose Association v. Gozun, the Supreme
Court noted the requisites of eminent domain, which are: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Also, in the consolidated cases of Manapat v. CA, Lim v. CA, and NHA v. Loberanes, the Court has
determined the requisites for the valid exercise of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be
private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking
must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must
comply with due process of law. Commented [1]: Not sure. Hehehe. Please lang ko double
check. Thanks. :)

In our present case, DOH is entering a property located in YYY and owned by XXX. The said
property is deemed to be private in nature as presented, which satisfies the first requisite
provided for in the mentioned cases.

The second requisite given in the Didipio case is also met, as the property taken will be
permanently owned by DOH as the department will install a quarantine center for people
affected by infectious viruses, in the present case Corona Virus. This facility will be permanent in
nature as the department shall not allow uninfected civilians to inhabit the provided area due to
the nature of the problem being addressed.
DOH has the power to expropriate the said private property and this power is vested or
delegated upon them in R.A. 0000 which states that blah blah blah. In this accord, the third
requisite is duly met.

The facility that will be built in the private property is a quarantine center for infected individuals of
the infectious novel Corona virus in the Philippines. This addresses an urgent and necessary need to
contain the virus to prevent the pandemic that can possibly happen if the infected individuals will not
be quarantined. The quarantine center will be beneficial for the infected people and for the scientists
and doctors that are devising a way to cure the virus. Moreover, the facility will be of benefit to the
general public because it protects public health and welfare by preventing the spread of the virus and
protecting the people from being infected. Due to this, the fourth requisite of eminent domain is met.

Using the indicated private property will permanently deprive the private owner from using, enjoying,
and benefiting from the said land. The executive order of the DOH prohibits the private owner from
reusing the area and property because of the nature of the virus being contained in the facility. This
will clearly take away the right of the private owner to benefit and enjoy his/her property which
satisfies the fifth requisite provided in the Didipio case.

In addition to the analysis of the requisites of eminent domain, the Manila Memorial Park also noted
that the exercise of police power prohibits the use of a property that is noxious in nature to protect
public welfare. In this case, the property to be expropriated is not noxious in nature that must be
taken to destroy, but is a private property that ‘taken’ to build a facility to promote the health of the
public. Moreover, the property is taken with the payment of just compensation to the private owner
for the use of his land due to the necessity of the purpose of building the facility and the burden
placed on the property for the benefit of the public.
Jurisprudence

 Didipio Earth-Savers Multipurpose Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, 30 March 2006

SC noted the requisites of eminent domain

 Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary of DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, 3 December 2013

The Court distinguished the difference between police power and eminent domain.

 Manapat v. CA | Lim v. CA | National Housing Authority v. Loberanes, et. al., G.R. Nos.
110478, 116176, & 116491-503, 15 October 2007

- Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State, the power of eminent domain is
exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President,
administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises performing public
services.

- Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for
the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private
property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking must
be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must
comply with due process of law.

- The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for
public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is
well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for
its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and
the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for
the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of the people.