Institutional and

policy influences
The institutional and policy context influenced why
community planning and neighbourhood recovery
projects were instigated, what they were trying to
achieve and how they were executed.

3.1 Institutional and policy

factors
There were different visions for neighbourhood
recovery and the future of the city
After the earthquake, there was broad consensus that
the 2010 earthquake was a particularly urban crisis.
However, there was less agreement on urban recovery
strategies. Government officials, Haitian civil society and
assistance agencies had diverging and often conflicting
perspectives on the future of informal neighbourhoods.
Among other views, they viewed recovery as an
opportunity to:
• Clear illegal slums, which are a blight on the city
• Prevent people from rebuilding on highly vulnerable
sites
• Encourage people to move (back) to secondary cities,
decongesting the capital
• Develop new, well-planned cities and satellite suburbs
• Rebuild the neighbourhoods with adequate
infrastructure and quality housing, and
• Accelerate legal reform and regularise the status of
informal neighbourhoods.
Coordination with and between authorities
was not systematic
Neighbourhood recovery programmes are multisectoral and may have local- and city-level implications.
Organisations found themselves coordinating with
a wide range of government agencies for guidance,
approval or reporting, including: MTPTC, MPCE,
CIAT, MICT, UCLBP, DINEPA,5 CNIGS, BMPAD,
as well as local authorities and elected officials.
Government lead or focal agency roles in relation to
guiding neighbourhood projects varied according
to institutional funding arrangements. Although the
HNRSP aimed to strengthen and simplify coordination
between the government and organisations operating in
neighbourhoods, it could not encompass all authorities
or establish consensus between authorities with
diverging views on recovery.
5 DINEPA is the Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement/National Agency for Potable Water and Sanitation.
Learning from community pLanning foLLowing the 2010 haiti earthquake
28 www.iied.org
Informal neighbourhoods operated outside of
urban regulatory systems
Before the earthquake, most residents did not
participate in a formal land system with official titles or
cadastre. Areas were developed without adherence
to planning regulations. Properties were built without
permits or adherence to construction standards.
Their functioning outside of state regulations and
mechanisms was arguably among the reasons informal
neighbourhoods were so prevalent, rapidly built and
effective in accommodating the population. But this
deficit of state engagement also contributed to deficits
in infrastructure and services for communities and
tax revenues for government. After the earthquake,
regulatory issues ranging from extra-legal status to
appropriate planning and construction standards
and enforcement affected reconstruction of
those neighbourhoods.
Housing was a priority after the earthquake,
but the housing sector was institutionally weak
The impact of the earthquake was, to a large extent,
measured by the number of homes that were damaged
or destroyed and the number of homeless families in
camps. Emptying camps and rebuilding houses became
key performance indicators for government and donors
and in media reporting, helping make (re)housing the
driver of neighbourhood recovery policies.
One-and-a-half million people displaced in urban camps
highlighted underlying weaknesses in urban housing
policies. No pre-earthquake government agency had
the necessary experience in housing policy to assume
responsibility for planning or coordination of housing
recovery and Haiti’s government struggled to establish
a consensus on the role of the state in housing. The
UCLBP clarified housing reconstruction policies from
2012 onwards. But this was not in time to marshal all
the housing stakeholders and resources; nor did the unit
have the ability to do so.
Although coverage and a collective response
guided emergency shelter activities, these were
not determining factors in the recovery
Aiming to provide basic assistance to the maximum
number of affected people and areas, the emergency
shelter response achieved practically full coverage
by coordinating the organisations involved and
resources available. But assistance for reconstruction
subsequently retreated into selected areas, with marked
differences in levels of funding and activities between
neighbourhoods. This left some areas without any
support despite clear needs. Respondents and project
reports and documentation cited several reasons for this
shift, including:
• Reconstruction needs that were too vast for
assistance to cover all affected areas
• Inadequate funds available for reconstruction — far
lower than emergency phase funds
• No clear overview on available funding amounts
or timing
• Possibility of filling gaps later when funds became
available
• Pressure to deliver tangible results that resulted
in organisations concentrating their efforts and
resources
• Commitments made in some neighbourhoods during
the emergency phase or in planning that required all
available resources
• A lack of measurable and visible results — or results
within a recovery timeframe — from investing in
institutional support, training or other support
activities, and
• Organisations being liable for the funds they provided,
which meant they could not finance or contribute to
works that did not meet standards — so they favoured
smaller outputs at high standard over larger outputs at
inadequate standard.
Unlike in the shelter response, there was no
effective coordination mechanism to promote
collective responsibility for coverage of assistance