Eminent Domain Digests

IN GENERAL

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI,

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been

rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to
extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken

place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator

must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary
period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting
it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when

the government entered and occupied the property under a
contract of lease.
NECESSITY OF TAKING
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila [G.R. No.
14355, October 31, 1919]
Facts:
The city of Manila wants to expropriate certain parcels of land
located in the district of Binondo within Block 83 of the district
for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue, Manila. Defendant,
the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila] contented that the expropriation neither necessary or
expedient because it will disturb the dead. They further argued
that if the road is to be considered as a necessity, other routes
will be available without alienating the land that they have been
using as a cemetery as adjoining and adjacent lots were offered
to the city free of charge for the planned public improvement.
According to City of Manila, they may condemn private lands
for public purpose under the Charter of City of Manila, such
being an exclusive function of the legislature and the only
function of the court is to assess the value of the land
expropriated.
Upon the issue presented, the lower court ruled in favor of the
Chinese Community of Manila stating that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the land in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the court cannot inquire into the necessity of
expropriation?

Held:
The court ruled that the power of judicial review on
expropriation is not limited to the inquiry of the existence of
law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private
lands for public purpose.
The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
and (2) that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land
must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The taking
of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state
is not a judicial question but the court is bound to interfere to
prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The general
power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations
and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts,
but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances.
The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into. The
court ruled that the cemetery is a public property and it found
no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the
City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
TAKING / DISPOSSESSION OF PROPERTY
REPUBLIC vs. ANDAYA
GR. No. 160656, June 15, 2007

FACTS: Resondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of

two parcels of land in Bading, Butuan City. This property was
subject to a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public
highways, irrigation ditcher, aqueducts, and other similar works
of the government public enterprise. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to enforce the
60-meter easement of right-of-way. The parties, however, failed
to reach an agreenent.

Petitioner Republic filed a case for an action for expropriation

and won the case. Per study by the appointed Board of
Commissioners, assigned to determine the just compensation for
the said execution, they found out that there was a discrepancy
in the description of the property. Thus, the complaint was
modified. The 60-meter wide easement representing 4,443
square meters was reduced to the now 10-meter wide easement
representing 701 square meters. The amount of just
compensation is pegged in the amount of P2,820,430.00.
Respondent demanded the amount of P11,373,405 just
compensation on the fact that the basis should have been the
remaining area of 9,679 square meters.

The court rendered a decision which was appealed by both

parties. The Republilc contested the severance of damages and
attorney’s fees while Andaya demanded just compensation for
his entire property minus the easement. He alleged tha the
easement would prevent ingress and egress to his property and
turn it in to a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the
Agusan River. As a result it would render his property unusable
and uninhabitable.
CA modified the trial court’s decision by imposing a 6% interest
on the consequential damages from the date of the writ of
possession or the actual taking and by deleting the attorney’s
fee.

ISSUE: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in

enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property, the
remaining area would be rendered unsuable and uninhabitable?

HELD: Yes the Republic is liable. “Taking” in the exercise of the

power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the
government actually deprives or dispossesses the property
owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there
is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of
his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a
taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property. True enough,
Andaya retains ownership of the said area but due to the
expropriation, the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would
deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It
would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it
into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan
River. For this reason Respondent is entitled to payment of just
compensation which must be neither more or less the monetary
equivalent of the land. Invoking the constitutional mandate no
person shall be deprived of his private property without due
process of law. Clearly, although the Republic will use only 701
square meters. It should not be liable for the 3,742 square
meters, which constitute the difference between this area of 701
square meters and the 4,43 square meters to which it is fully
entitled to use as easement, free of charge except for damages to
affected existing improvements, if any, under Section 112 of the
Public Land Act.

As a result, Republic is liable for just compensation of only the

remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest
thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
wrwit of possession or the actual taking until full payment is
made.

Wherefore the Decision of the CA is hereby affirmed with

Modification. Case remanded to the Regional Trial Court for the
determination of the final just compensation of the compensable
area consisiting of 5,937 square meters, as mentioned above.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v . HON. SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al. 464 SCRA 481 (2005)

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation
against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation
was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection
Project. A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent
ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the
lands. The RTC issued an order granting NPC‘s motion. It
appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just
compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of
land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter.
However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of
the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No.
6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-
way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al.
could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes,
subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no
use to its operations except for its transmission lines. The RTC
rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at
P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was
denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the
prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment was
subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the
lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the
rules governing fair valuation.

HELD:
In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in
evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did
it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of
Appeals found the majority report‘s valuation of P500 per square
meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals,
absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise
unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real
property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession.
The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or
limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines, as in the present case,
also falls within the ambit of the term ―expropriation.
From the Commissioner‘s report it cannot be gainsaid that
NPC‘s complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage
of transmission lines over Dilao et al.‘s property. Aside from the
actual damage done to the property traversed by the
transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity
normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably
restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made
dangerous to the occupant‘s life and limb. The determination of
just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial
function, the Court finds the commissioners‘ recommendation
of P516.66 per square
meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and
reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao
and her siblings.
Republic vs. Judge Gingoyon
G.R. No. 166429 (E)
December 19, 2005

FACTS
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of
the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003
(2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III”
entered into between the Philippine Government (Government)
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto.

The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new

international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to
operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession
period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the
agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the
promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had
already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion.
However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the
NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as
well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its
expenses in the construction of the facilities.

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3

facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite
the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport
terminal into immediate operation. The Government and
PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities.

In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation

with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of
the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it
to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3
facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited
the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government
insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all
other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep.
Act No. 8974 which does apply.

ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No.
8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case?

HELD
The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has
to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA
3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation
in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present
expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the
Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain

may be exercised by the Government.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings

intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep.
Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably
applies in instances when the national government expropriates
property “for national government infrastructure projects.”
Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government
for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule
67 continues to apply.
Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it
requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least
the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and
provides certain valuation standards or methods for the
determination of just compensation.

Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of

Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in
abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3
Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under
Section 4(c) of the law.
PUBLIC USE
67 Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada, Jr.
“airport NOT improved”
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the taking of private property
by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property
owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated. If this particular
purpose or intent is NOT initiated or NOT at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become
improper for lack of the required factual justification.

FACTS:
Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu
City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same
was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by Republic,
represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from
Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered
the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. The
CAA assured the previous owners that should the expansion be
abandoned, they will be prioritized in repurchasing the lot.
However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the
old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. It was sold to the
petitioner and have been used for commercial purposes. The
plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot since
the lot, which was expropriated for the Lahug Airport’s
improvement, was abandoned and have NOT been sold to them
. On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate
dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
respondents in the event that the property would no longer be
needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that
the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and
respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the
expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or
abandonment thereof.
RTC RULING: ruled IN FAVOR of LOZADA
CA RULING: affirmed RTC ruling
Petitioners’ argument in SC: argued that the judgment in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in
fee simple to the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Lozada has the right to repurchase their
expropriated property.
HELD: YESSSSS
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on
the supposition that the Decision in the pertinent expropriation
proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the
intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug
Airport be aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to
respondents, being its former owners. Petitioners cite, in
support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,
which declared that the Government acquires only such rights
in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the
character of its title over the properties—
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally (since they argue that the expropriation did not
stipulate that it can be repurchased by the Lozadas should the
purpose of the expropriation be abandoned because there was
NO EXPRESS STIPULATION which is against the Statute of
Frauds), either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
The Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its
entirety, wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the
Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition
that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The
condition not having materialized because the airport had been
abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to
reacquire the expropriated property.
Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held
constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the
taking of private property by the Government’s power of
eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1)
that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that
should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation
suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment
would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and
equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking
of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of
its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or
intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek
the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper
for lack of the required factual justification.
(the other parts of the decision is based on Civil Law so I think
its no longer applicable for our class)
Air transportation Office vs. Apolonio Gopuco
GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005

FACTS:
1. in 1949, the NAC informed the owners of the various
lots surrounding the Lahug Airport, including herein
respondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for
the purposes of expansion.
2. Some land owners were convinced to sell their property
on the assurance that they will be able to repurchase the same
when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others,
including Gopuco refused to do so.
3. CCA form NAC filed for an expropriation proceeding
where they were awarded the land and just compensation to be
paid in full to Apolonio Gopuco for the said land.
4. No appeal was taken from the above decision and the
judgement became final and executor.
5. In 1989, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then
President Corazon Aquino.
6. In 1990, Gopuco wrote to the Bureau of Air
Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport,
seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money
previously received by him as payment for the expropriation.
7. Gopuco filed a complaint for recovery of ownership of
his lot, but the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint.
8. Aggrieved by the holding, Gopuco appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which overturned the RTC decision.
9. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 2003,
hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON Gopuco may still recover his property which was
expropriated for public use, when such public use is abandoned.

RULING:
The answer to that question depends upon the character of the
title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to
acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the
condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the
property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when
the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted
upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street,
then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street,
it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory
provision to the contrary. . . If upon the contrary, however, the
decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title,
then of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the
effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation
proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to
a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner

Eminent domain is generally described as “the highest and most

exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may
be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the State.[32] Also often referred
to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it
is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional
gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion
over property within the state for public use or to meet a public
exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even
in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty.[33] In fact, “all separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government under this tacit agreement
or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to
individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact
idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.”[34]
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the
nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action,
the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.[35]
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that “private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”[36] This prescription is intended to provide a
safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.[37]
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the
adequacy of the compensation received have long become final.
We have also already held that the terms of that judgment
granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines.
Therefore, pursuant to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited
inReyes v. National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No.
72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49898 dated 28 February
2001, and its Resolution of 22 May 2003 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of RTC-Branch X of Cebu dated
20 May 1994 in Civil Case No. CEB-11914 is REINSTATED with
the modification that the award of exemplary damages,
litigation expenses and costs are DELETED.
Summary of Kelo v. New London
3/19/2014
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 23, 2005, in Kelo v. New
London (545 U.S. 469) that the "public use" provision of the
"takings clause" of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
permits the use of eminent domain for economic development
purposes that provide a public benefit.

Background
The case involved an economic development plan for the City of
New London, Conn., which has been in economic decline for
many decades. In 1996, the U.S. Navy closed its Undersea
Warfare Center, causing the loss of over 1,500 jobs. In 1998,
Pfizer, Inc., a large pharmaceutical company, announced plans
to build a large research facility in New London on a site
adjacent to the Fort Trumbull neighborhood. This
neighborhood has been characterized as one with a high
vacancy rate for nonresidential buildings, old buildings in poor
shape, and with fewer than half of the residential properties in
average or better condition (although the homes of the
petitioners in this case did not fall into these categories).

The nonprofit New London Development Corporation (NLDC)

was formed to help the city plan for economic development.
After the Pfizer announcement, the city council authorized
NLDC to formulate an economic development plan for 90 acres
in Fort Trumbull. The plan's stated goals were to “create a
development that would complement the facility that Pfizer was
planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues,
encourage public access to and use of the city’s waterfront, and
eventually to build momentum for the revitalization of the rest
of the city, including its downtown area."

Most people in Fort Trumbull sold their property to NLDC, but

seven did not (the voluntary sales comprised 100 of the 115
properties in the neighborhood). These landowners held 15
properties in two parcels of land being considered for
development. They filed suit claiming that the use of eminent
domain as contemplated by the plan violated the state and
federal constitutions.

The state trial court ruled in favor of the property owners as to

one parcel and in favor of NLDC with respect to the other
parcel. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court,
which ruled in favor of the NLDC on both parcels. The court
held that the economic development projects created and
implemented pursuant to the state's eminent domain statute
possess the "public" economic benefits of creating new jobs,
increasing tax and other revenues, and contributing to urban
revitalization, thereby satisfying the public use clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. The property owners appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision

The 5-4 decision recognized at the outset that the U.S.
Constitution prohibits a "taking" whose "sole purpose" is to
transfer one person's private property to another private person,
even if just compensation is paid. It emphasized, however, that
this was not the issue before the court. Rather, "The disposition
of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s
development plan serves a "public purpose." The decision went
on to stipulate that "Without exception, our cases have defined
that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments in this field." In writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens noted, in fact, that "To effectuate
this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifically
authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic
development."

The court determined that New London's economic

development plan served a "public purpose" under the "public
use" provision of the constitution. Justice Stevens noted that,
"Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need
to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their
determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify
a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.
The City has carefully formulated an economic development
plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the
community, including–but by no means limited to–new jobs
and increased tax revenue." Justice Stevens went on to write
that, "Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the
limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in
Berman [v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)], to resolve the challenges
of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in
light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves
a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment."

In response to the contention of the petitioners that "using

eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs
the boundary between public and private takings," the court
stated that, "Again, our cases foreclose this objection. Quite
simply, the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often
benefit individual private parties."

In closing, the court did not preempt additional state action:

"We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power. Indeed, many States already impose “'public use'”
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which
takings may be exercised."
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA rep.
by BARANGAY CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III,
and PATRICIA SINDAYAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007

Facts:
Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council,
petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a
Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose
Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
117674-R. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of
respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road. The
alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation
were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6.

Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most

practical and nearest way to the municipal road. Pending the
resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an
amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property.

Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property

was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of
Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner
deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and,
instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the
access road being proposed to be built across the respondents’
land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who
would purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed
out that under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the
subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the
subdivision residents.
Issues:
Whether or not the taking of the land was for a public purpose
or use.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.

In general, eminent domain is defined as “the power of the

nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of,
private property for a public use without the owner’s consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation.” It is
acknowledged as “an inherent political right, founded on a
common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of
individual members of the community to the great necessities of
the whole community.”

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by

two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation under Article
III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be
deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process
of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of “public use” and the
term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse
situations. The limited meaning attached to “public use” is “use
by the public” or “public employment,” that “a duty must
devolve on the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public
with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part
of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-
public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it
is condemned.” The more generally accepted view sees “public
use” as “public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the
industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any
considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state,
or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and labor, which
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community.” In this jurisdiction, “public use” is defined
as “whatever is beneficially employed for the community.”

It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of

expropriation cannot depend on the “numerical count of those
to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to
be benefited.” The number of people is not determinative of
whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is
exercisable in common and is not limited to particular
individuals. Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid
exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that
the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Biñan v.
Garcia, this Court explicated that expropriation ends with an
order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation.”

In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an

inherent power of sovereignty similar to police power and
taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay is
clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and other
facilities for public use and welfare.
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The
legal question in this petition, however, is whether the taking of
the land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose. A corollary issue is
whether private property can be taken by law from one person
and given to another in the guise of public purpose.

In this regard, the petition must fail.

The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public
use and with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private
property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher
good—which is public use—and can only be counterbalanced
by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of
property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and
void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable
transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well.

For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the

rights of the property owner and must perform a more thorough
and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the
expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving
complaints for condemnation, such that when a serious doubt
arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the property owner and against
the State.
JUST COMPENSATION
NPC vs Spouses Zabala (G.R. No. 173520; Del Castillo; Jan. 30,
2013)
Parties: National Power Corp., petitioner
Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon, respondents

Facts:
• On Oct. 27, 1994, NPC filed a complaint for eminent
domain against respondents.
• On Jan. 11, 1995, Spouses Zabala moved to dismiss the
complaint.
• On Dec. 4, 1997, the Commissioners submitted their
Report/Recommendation fixing the just compensation for the
use of Spouses Zabala’s property as easement of right of way at
P150 per square meter without considering the consequential
damages.
• NPC prayed in its Comment that the commissioners’
report be recommitted for the modification of the report and the
substantiation of the same with reliable and competent
documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the
time of its taking. Spouses Zabala prayed for the fixing of the
just compensation at P250 per square meter.
• On Aug. 20, 2003, the Commissioners submitted their
Final Report fixing the just compensation at P500 per square
meter.
• Spouses Zabala moved for the resolution of the case
insofar as their property was concerned. Thus, on June 28, 2004,
the RTC rendered its Partial Decision, ruling that Napocor has
the lawful authority to take for public purpose and upon
payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s
property. The RTC likewise ruled that since the spouses Zabala
were deprived of the beneficial use of their property, they are
entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it
fixed the just compensation at P150 per square meter.
• Napocor appealed to the CA. It argued that the
Commissioners’ reports upon which the RTC based the just
compensation are not supported by documentary evidence.
Napocor likewise imputed error on the part of the RTC in not
applying Section 3A of RA No. 6395 which limits its liability to
easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the
property traversed by its transmission lines.
• CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue/Held: W/N Sec. 3A of RA 6395 is applicable. | NO.

W/N the amount of P150 per square meter is supported by
documentary evidence. | NO.

Ratio:
• Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the
constitutional power of the courts to determine just
compensation.
• Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of
the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that
the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample."
• The payment of just compensation for private property
taken for public use is guaranteed by our Constitution and is
included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments
or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining
whether the right of the property owners to just compensation
has been violated. Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes
and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at
best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount
thereof.
• Since the high-tension electric current passing through
the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property
owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper
to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market
value of their property.
• The just compensation of P150 per square meter as fixed
by the RTC is not supported by evidence.
• To arrive at the just compensation, several factors must
be considered, such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost,
current market value of like properties, tax value of the
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before
these factors can be considered and given weight, they must be
supported by documentary evidence.
• The Commissioners’ November 28, 1997
Report/Recommendation is not supported by any documentary
evidence.
• On Aug. 20, 2003, the Commissioners submitted their
Final Report recommending a compensation of P500 per square
meter. But like their earlier reports, the Commissioners’ Final
Report lacks documentary support.
• A commissioners’ land valuation which is not based on
any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court.
• Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the
commissioners’ report which is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report
or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In the
case before us, in spite of the insufficient and flawed reports of
the Commissioners and Napocor’s objections thereto, the RTC
eventually adopted the same. It shrugged off Napocor’s
protestations and limited itself to the reports submitted by the
Commissioners. Insofar as just compensation is concerned, we
cannot sustain the RTC’s Partial Decision for want of
documentary support.
• Just compensation should be computed based on the fair
value of the subject property at the time of its taking or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Since in this case
the filing of the eminent domain case came ahead of the taking,
just compensation should be based on the fair market value of
spouses Zabala’s property at the time of the filing of Napocor’s
Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.

Dispositive: Case remanded for the proper determination of just

compensation.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. THE LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 217985-86 – March 21 2018 – Tijam
FACTS:
• Apo was the registered owner of a 115.2 hectare land. It
voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the
government for purposes of the CARP. Apo was referred to LBP
for the initial valuation of the subject property.
• Apo was informed that the value of the subject property
was 16.5484Php per sqm or only a total amoung ot
165,484.47Php per ha. Apo rejecter this offer.
• Meanwhile, DAR requested LBP to deposit the amount
of 3,814,053.53 as initial payment for the subject property, at
the rate of 3.3102Php per sqm.
• December 1996: TCT in the name of Apo was cancelled
and the subject property was transferred in the name of the
Republic.
• Apo then filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation with the DARAB. Unfortunately, the said case
remained pending for almost 6 years without resolution.
• Apo then filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation before the RTC, which referred it to 3
commissioners to ascertain the just, fair and reasonable value of
the prop.

COMMISIONERS: recommended the amount of 130Php per

sqm or the amount of 149,783,00Php for the entire 115.2
hectare as just compensation.
RTC: rendered a decision adopting the findings of the
commissioners.
CA: modified RTC decision. The just compensation is set at
103.33Php per sqm. There shall be 12% interest per annum on
the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from
Dec. 9, 1996, the date when the Government took the land, to
May 9 2008, the time when LBP paid the balance on the
principal amount.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the amount of 103.33 per sqm is the just
compensation for the subject property
(2) W/N the 12% interest on the unpaid just compensation
should be counted from December 9, 1996, the time of the
taking until full payment, to only until May 9 2008, the time
when LBP paid the balance on the principal amount.

HELD:
THE AMOUNT OF PHP 130.00 PER SQ M IS REASONABLE
AND JUST CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE
PROPERTY INVOLVED
RA 6657, Sec. 17. Determination ofJust Compensation. -
just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors · shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as
well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Factors for imposing the amount of 130Php per sqm:

(1) The subject property is planted with commercial
bamboos and is located almost in the heart of Tagum City.
(2) The parcel of land adjacent thereto were sold at a higher
rate, specifically from a low of 146.02Php per sqm to as high as
580Php per sqm.
(3) It is error to apply Apo Fruits Corporation v. CA (2007)
in the instant case because the subject property was not
included in the valuation by the court in the said case.
LBP IS LIABLE TO PAY LEGAL INTEREST FROM THE TIME
OF THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY UNTIL FULL
PAYMENT THEREOF
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken
for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from the time
the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
(Republic v. CA – 2002)

The award of interest is intended to compensate the property

owner for the income it would have made had it been properly
compensated for its property at the time of the taking. It is
imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which,
in effect, makes the obligation on the part of the government
one of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of the value of the
land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner.

In LBP v. PH-Agro Industrial Corporation (2017), the SC ruled

that “the requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere
deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional
compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its
subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the
legal requirements set forth by R.A. No. 6657.”
In the present case, LBP merely deposited the amount of
3,814,053.53Php as initial payment of the just compensation.
The RTC's valuation in its decision as just compensation for the
subject property is 149,783,000.27Php. There is a staggering
difference between the initial payment made by the LBP and
the amount of the just compensation due to Apo. It should be
noted that the subject property has already been taken by the
government on December 9, 1996.

Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted from

December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, the just
compensation shall earn 6% legal interest in accordance with
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005

Gist: 57 years have lapsed from the time the decision in the
subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the
Republic has not compensated the owner of the property. Just
compensation is not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment
of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered just.

FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of Lots 932 and 939 for the purpose of establishing
a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lots were
registered in the names of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. CFI
ordered the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10
as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it
was dismissed.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." In 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected
the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of
the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to
pay for the lots, the Denzons’ successors-in-interest (Francisca
Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio) filed with the
same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the
property.

CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but titles of the

said lots came with the annotation "subject to the priority of the
National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land…
". Valdehueza and Panerio were ordered to execute a deed of
sale in favor of the Republic.

On appeal, SC held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the

registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no
payment of just compensation by the Republic, but they are not
entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand
the payment of their fair market value.

In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to

respondent Lim as security for their loans. For their failure to
pay Lim despite demand, the latter had the mortgage foreclosed
and the lot was issued in his name. On 1992, Lim filed a
complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against Republic.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that Lim is
the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of
an absolute owner. CA affirmed. OSG then filed petition for
review with the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932
despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
the just compensation pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
No.

Under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution: “Private

property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” The Republic disregarded the foregoing
provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and
939. Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of
paying what was due to the landowners. The expropriation
proceedings had already become final in the late 1940s and yet,
up to now, or more than 50 years after, the Republic had not yet
paid the compensation fixed by the court while continuously
reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice
of the landowner.

The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated

shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title
from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the
Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full
payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.

The expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority

of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned

with the determination by the court of the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court
with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

When Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to

respondent in 1964, they were still the owners and their title
had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never
did.
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

Facts:

Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among

the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in
Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940.
The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation
proceedings and without their consent.

In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market

value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos
per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of
Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with damages.
Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with
valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from
the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division
reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be
based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70
per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the
members of the Division and transcendental importance of the
issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process

should be nullified

No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary

expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power,
given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack
of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the
State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to
serve the greater good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not

necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner.
What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the

property at the time of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to

receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that
the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the
time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for
the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
The owner should be compensated only for what he actually
loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the
time it is
taken.

Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this

case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and
fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such
literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by
law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies – a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law
and jurisprudence.
POWER OF LGUs
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong
G.R. No. 135087
March 14, 2000

Facts:

On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994
authorizing Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan
for the purpose of the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center. Because of Suguitan’s refusal to sell his property, the
City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with
the RTC of Pasig City. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint but was denied by the trial court. On July 28, 1998,
the court granted the assailed order of expropriation. Petitioners
assert that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance
as required by Section 19 of RA No. 7160, and not means of a
mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly
and legally exercised its power of eminent domain pursuant to
Art. 36, Rule VI of the IRR of RA No. 7160, a resolution is a
sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings
with the RTC. Respondent’s position was upheld by the trial
court.

Issue:

WON the City of Mandaluyong may validly and legally exercise

its power of eminent domain by implementing a resolution
pursuant to Art. 36, Rule VI of the IRR of RA No. 7160.

Ruling:
 The Court held that the City of Mandaluyong may enact
the necessary ordinance and institute expropriation proceedings
for as long as it has complied with all other legal requirements.
The basis for the exercise power of eminent domain by local
government unit is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Despite the
existence of legislative grant, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law. The courts
have the obligation to determine whether the expropriation
proceedings is over a particular private property, is exercised for
public use, there is payment of just compensation and there was
a valid offer made to the owner of the property but was not
accepted. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a
resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. An
ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint
with the proper court. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court states that
although the award of just compensation is indispensable, it is
the last stage of the expropriation proceedings. It cannot be
arrived without an initial finding by the court that there is a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for
public use. The reliance of the respondents to Article 36 (a),
Rule VI of the IRR, which requires only a resolution to
authorize the exercise the power of eminent domain, is
untenable. Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails
over said rule. It is unquestionable that the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule.
Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay, August 07, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of

about 20,424 square meters.
On November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing
the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was
thereafter filed on April 14, 1997 by the Municipality of Panay
(respondent) before the RTC of Roxas City.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is

not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals;
that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted against
the
incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the
supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated
have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but
their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing
the same.

RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. On October 1, 1997,

the trial court issued an Order
appointing three persons as Commissioners to ascertain the
amount of just compensation for the property. Petitioners filed a
"Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court
Appointed
Commissioners to Determine Just Compensation and for
Clarification of the Court’s Order dated
October 1, 1997" which was denied by the trial court on
November 3, 1997. MR was also denied. At CA, it dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari. It held that the petitioners were not
denied due process. MR was also denied. Hence, this present
petition.
ISSUE: WON expropriation proceeding by the local government
may proceed from a mere
resolution by its legislative body.

RULING: NO. The LGC requires that it be an ordinance.

Under Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the
power of eminent domain, it is
clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an
LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local

government unit cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution
of its lawmaking body. R.A. No.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly
requires an ordinance for the
purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of
the municipal council will not
suffice.
Ordinance vs Resolution:
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.

Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading

is necessary for an ordinance, but
not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of
all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence
from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.]
7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. x x x

In this case, as respondent’s expropriation was based merely on a

resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the
Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting
local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an
LGU’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such power.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No 47052 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Action No. V-6958 is
DISMISSED without prejudice.No costs. SO ORDERED.

*Concept of Eminent Domain:

Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public
welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such
power may be validly delegated to local government units
(LGUs), other public entities and public utilities the exercise of
such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the
scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to its control and restraints imposed through the law
conferring the power
or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no
inherent power of eminent domain.

Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated

to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The national
legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot
go against the principal’s will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a derogation of a fundamental right. It greatly affects a
landowner’s right to private property which is a constitutionally
protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement
of personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights
to life and liberty. Thus, whether such power is exercised
directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of
such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.

Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local

governments, it is still the duty
of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent
domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law.
AMOS P. FRANCIA JR., et. al. v. MUNICIPALITY OF
MERCAUAYAN

G.R. No. 170432, 24 March 2008, First Division, (Corona, J.)

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of

the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in
the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15%
of the property's fair market value based on its current tax
declaration. The law does not make the determination of a
public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of
possession.

A Complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent

Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the property of
petitioners Amos Francia, Cecilia Francia and Benjamin Francia.
The Municipality of Meycauayan seeks to use the said property
in order to establish a common public terminal for all public
utility vehicles. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the
expropriation was for public purpose and issued an Order of
Expropriation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition. It

nullified the Order of Expropriation except with regard to the
writ of possession. It upheld the decision of the RTC that in
issuance of writ of possession, prior determination of the
existence of public purpose is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prior determination of existence of public

purpose is necessary before the issuance of writ of possession

HELD:
Petition denied.

Section 19 of Republic Act 7160 provides:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may,

through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That
the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and that such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That
the local government unit may immediately take possession of
the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated; Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of
the property.

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of

the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in
the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15%
of the property's fair market value based on its current tax
declaration. The law does not make the determination of a
public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of
possession.