Umali vs. Bacani, et al.

69 SCRA 263

FACTS:

On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown
down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could
not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime thereafter, a small boy by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, went to the place where the
broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It
was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the proximate cause of death is due to a fortuitous event?

HELD:

NO. A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part
of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.

1
Picart vs. Smith 37 Phil 809

FACTS:

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his
horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the
plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the
passing car.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Smith was guilty of negligence which gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done?

HELD:

YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge,
the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had
a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by the negligence of the
plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then place
himself in a position of greater safety.

2
Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company 59 Phil 758

FACTS:

Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first
time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge
of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to
indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. In few meters from the crossing
the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge
black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife
and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said
judgement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Manila Railroad company is liable for damages?

HELD:

YES, the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company alone,
for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of
its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on
the part of its employees — the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the
crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family, which
the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their
duties.

3
Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company 27 SCRA 674

FACTS:

Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Pampanga on
February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down
his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s
husband was injured and died as a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the
death of her husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the plaintiff can recover damages?

HELD:

NO. A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing,
and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost
immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs
and injury results. Where the accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was
not allowed to recover.

4
Culion Ice vs. Phil. Motors Corp. 55 Phil 129

FACTS:

Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses
for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine
changed from gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a
domestic corporation engaged in machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job.

Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the course
of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline and other fuel was
trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine
stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally engulfed
Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the
recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor
asserts that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not quest was negligent?

HELD:

YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do.

The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this
reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did
not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire.

But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned
from those circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the
danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert
in repairing gasoline engines on boats.

5
Vergara vs. CA 154 SCRA 564

FACTS:

A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo
truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo
Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private
respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller’s Insurance and Surety
Corporation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict?

HELD:

YES. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in
the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of
which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According
to the police report, "the cargo truck was traveling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then
it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then
another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."

6
FGU Insurance vs. CA 287 SCRA 718

FACTS:

A Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by FILCAR driven by a Danish tourist Peter Dahl-Jensen collided
with another Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by Lydia Soriano driven by Benjamin Jacildone. The accident
took place at EDSA. The car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano.
At that time, Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine driver‘s license. FGU Insurance Corporation, in view
of its contact with Soriano, paid Soriano.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, on the action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company, and
consequently, it’s insurer for fault or negligence of the car lease in driving the rented vehicle?

HELD:

NO. To sustain a claim based on Article 2176 CC, the following requisites must concur: a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by
the other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

7
Singson vs. BPI 132 Phil 597

FACTS:

Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of
P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision became final and
executory as to VillaAbrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the Villa-Abrille’s account.

The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s name and, without reading the full text, wrote
a letter for the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of the garnishment. Subsequently,
Singson issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was dishonored, and so
petitioner’s account with the latter was closed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract?

HELD:

YES. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort.

8
City of Manila vs. Meralco 52 Phil 586

FACTS:

On June 8, 1925, there occurred a collision between a car owned by Meralco and driven by Sixto
Eustaquio, and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. Eustaquio was prosecuted and found guilty of
damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was

sentenced to pay P1788.27 plus fine of P900 and costs, with subsidiary imprisonment. Not being able to
collect from the convict, the City of Manila proceeded against Meralco for subsidiary liability. Meralco set
up the defense of a good father of a family. The trial judge thought it unnecessary to present the witnesses
offered by the fiscal, and took cognizance of the records of the criminal case decision and the record in
the criminal case which convicted the motorman, all against the protest of counsel for the Manila Electric
Company.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court may rely on the records of the criminal case to render judgment on the
civil case?

HELD:

AS A GENERAL RULE, a record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action
EXCEPT by way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is that the parties and
the issues in a criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that due process must
be followed in the trial of all causes. No man or entity may be condemned without a day in court. The
Manila Electric Company was not a party at the trial of the criminal case.

9
United States vs. Barias 23 Phil 586

FACTS:

On November 2, 1911, Segundo Barias, a motorman of Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company, was driving his vehicle car along Rizal Avenue and stopped in near the intersection of Calle
Requesen Street, upon stopping, he took some passengers and looked backward presumably to take not
whether all the passengers were aboard. At that moment, Fermina Jose, a child about 3 years old, walked
or ran in front of the car. One witness testified that Barias started the car without turning his head over
the track immediately in front of the car. After which, a case was filed against him in the Trial Court of
Manila, holding him guilty of Reckless Negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is carelessness or want of ordinary care?

HELD:

YES. The place on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely populated section
of the city at about six in the morning, the time when the residents of such streets begins to move about.
Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high degree of
diligence in the performance of his duties.

Barias did not exercise that degree of diligence required of him. Having brought his car to a
standstill it was his bounden duty to keep his eyes directed to the front. It was his duty to satisfy himself
that the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the
defendant did not do, and the result of his negligence was the death of the child.

10
GAN vs. CA 165 SCRA 378

FACTS:

In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along Manila. There were two
vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the
place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction,
followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car
driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old
man who was about to cross the street. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle
suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.

Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's
decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence?

HELD:

YES. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.

11
People vs. De Los Santos 355 SCRA 415

FACTS:

Around 10:30pm, herein respondent Glenn de los Santos was asked by a friend and a fellow band
member to provide them with transportation since they were to participate in the San Miguel sponsored
Sabado Nights of the Lanzones festival. Before travelling on the highway he drank 3 bottles of beer. Glenn
was the one driving the Isuzu elf.

The guards waived at the defendant when they saw the truck fast approaching but the latter kept
going and ran over several members of the PNP who were jogging at the time. The RTC convicted Glenn
of the complex crime of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether glenn should be convicted of murder or reckless imprudence?

HELD:

Glenn should be convicted of reckless imprudence. Considering that the incident was not a
product of malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held
guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries.

12
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC 148 SCRA 353

FACTS:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was
on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation, where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.

He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were turned
off. When he switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 ½ meters
away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a curfew pass that night. There were
no lights nor were there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, front or rear

Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be used the next
morning. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it was too
late. His car smashed into the truck.

ISSUE:

Whether the collision was brought by respondent’s own negligence?

HELD:

NO. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate cause of the collision
was brought about by the way the truck was parked.

The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the truck driver's negligence.

13
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. 7 Phil 329

FACTS:

Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of Atlantic Gulf, was at work transporting
iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard. The men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. Some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's
edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught Rakes,
breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee. In two particulars, Rakes is charged
with carelessness: First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.

ISSUE:

Whether or not rakes’ contributory negligence bars him from recovering?

HELD:

NO. Article 1304 of the Austrian Code, the victim who is partly changeable with the accident shall stand
his damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he shall
share the liability equally with the person principally responsible. The principle of proportional damages
appears to be also adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code.

The Court found the theory of damages laid down in the judgment the most consistent with the history
and the principals of our law in these Islands and with its logical development.

14
Alba vs. Bulaong 101 Phil 434, 437

FACTS:

The case revolves around a claim for compensation from Dr. Bulaong, the petitioners being his
employees and their dependents. Early morning of that day, upon the specific orders of Dr. Bulaong, the
five employees were went to Bulacan to thresh palay. Suddenly, the thresher collided with a speeding bus
of the Victory Liner, Inc., thereby hitting the tractor the employees are riding. The employees were
violently thrown out. Two of them died and three of them sustained physical injuries. With that, five
separate claims were filed. Dr. Bulaong’s defenses were: (a) claimants were not his employees, but
industrial partners, (b) the injuries were not sustained in the course of employment and (c) the claims, if
any, had been extinguished by virtue of the monetary settlements which petitioners had concluded with
the Victory Liner Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether the employees can recover from dr. Bulaong despite the existence of a waiver between
them and victory liner?

HELD:

YES. The plain intent of the law is that they shall not receive payment twice for the same injuries
(from the third party and from the employer). Hence, if without suing they receive full damages from the
third party, they should be deemed to have practically made the election under the law, and should be
prevented from thereafter suing the employer. Full damages means, of course what they would have
demanded in a suit against the third party or what they would receive in a compensation as complete
settlement. Needless to say, where the injured employee is offered, by the third party, compensation
which he deems insufficient, he may reject it and thereafter litigate with such third party. Or choose
instead to complain against his employer.

15
Calalas vs. CA 332 SCRA 356

FACTS:

Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool,
at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end,
she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Igclerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This incident cause
injury to Sunga.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident which
negates petitioner’s liability?

HELD:

NO. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. The doctrine of proximate cause
is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party.
But in the case at bar, there is a preexisting relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract
of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on
Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.

16
PCIB vs CA 350 SCRA 464

FACTS:

Ford Philippines filed actions to recover from the drawee bank Citibank and collecting bank PCIB
the value of several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which were embezzled
allegedly by an organized syndicate. What prompted this action was the drawing of a check by Ford, which
it deposited to PCIB as payment and was debited from their Citibank account. It later on found out that
the payment wasn’t received by the Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not has ford the right to recover the value of the checks intended as payment to cir?

HELD:

YES. The degree of Ford’s negligence couldn’t be characterized as the proximate cause of the
injury to parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor’s confidential employee
or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the
forged paper upon the bank, doesn’t entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence
of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer

17
Picart vs. Smith 37 Phil 809

FACTS:

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his
horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the
plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the
passing car.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done?

HELD:

YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge,
the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had
a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by the negligence of the
plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then place
himself in a position of greater safety.

18
19. Del Prado vs. Meralco | 52 Phil 901

FACTS:

Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was driving the company’s street car along Hidalgo
Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did
not put the car into complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the
car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel
of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual.

ISSUE:

Whether the motorman was negligent?

HELD:

We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company
to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage.
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his
duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to
board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.

19
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad | 16 Phil 8

FACTS:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor,
a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor,
was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age. On the 30th of September,
1905 David together with his companion Manuel Claparols went to the company’s premises and found
some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They tried to break the cap with a
stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filed
with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and explosion followed causing them more or less
injuries and to the removal of the right eye of David. So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not david is entitled to damages?

HELD:

NO. The Court held that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap;
that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these
injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.

20
NAPOCOR vs. CA 161 SCRA 334

FACTS:

On August 4, 1964, ECI being a successful bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) to furnish all the tools, labor, equipment, and materials
(not furnished by the owner) and to construct the proposed 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel at Norzaragay, Bulacan
within 800 calendar days. The tunnel would be passing through the mountain, from the Ipo river, a part
of Norzaragay where the Ipo Dam of NPC is located.

On November 4, 1967, typhoon “Welming” hit Central Luzon, passing through NCP’s Angat Hydro-
electric project and Dam at Ipo, Norzaragay, Bulacan. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the
reservoir of the Angat Dam, was rising perilously at the rate of 60 cm per hour. To prevent an overflow of
water from the dam since the water level has reached danger heights, the NPC caused the opening of the
spillway gates.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the destruction and loss of the eci's equipment and facilities were due to force
majeure?

HELD:

NO. NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only
at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days
before it actually struck.

Even though the typhoon was an act of God or force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because
its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

21
LBC Air Cargo vs. CA 241 SCRA 619

FACTS:

At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki
motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about
the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to Bislig Airport. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when
he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged
from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the negligence of monterola is the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD:

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor
visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling
along the lane where he was right supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable
time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding. The SC agrees w the CA that
there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability
for damages.

22
China Airlines vs. CA 45985 1990

Facts:

Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable
business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight
with China Airlines (CAL).

Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel (Amexco), they
dropped the services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Salvador had a confirmed
booking with CAL. Lao then gave to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued previously to
Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of carriage?

HELD:

YES. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight
and on that date.

When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its
airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it constituted a breach of contract of carriage.

23
Exconde vs. Capuno L- 10134 June 29, 1957

FACTS:

Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to
run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle and
two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiiia, died as a consequence. Dante Capuno, was
found guilty of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and
Amado Ticzon. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
dante, for damages caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno?

HELD:

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
"Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody."

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First Malayan vs. CA GR 91378 June 9 1992

FACTS:

The case revolves around the determination of liability when motor vehicle registration comes
into play. Crisostomo Vitug filed a civil case against First Malayan Leasing to recover damages mainly for
physical injuries, loss of personal effects and the wreck of his car resulting from a three-car collision
involving an Isuzu cargo truck belonging to FMLFC driven by Crispin Sicat, his car and another car.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, FMLFC should be solely liable to Vitug?

HELD:

YES. The Court ruled that regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the
registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such,
directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being
considered merely as his agent.

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Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SRCA 388

FACTS:

Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract where the former hired the truck
of Gelisan for the purpose of transporting goods at the price of P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall
bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. Benito Alday,
a trucking operator, had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4,
North Harbor, to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong.

Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver
and helper at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed
his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Subsequently, plaintiff Alday saw the
truck in question on Sto. Cristo St. and he notified the Manila Police Department, and it was impounded
by the police. It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan. As a result of the impounding of the truck according
to Gelisan and that for the release of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the surety company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Gelisan being a registered owner is responsible for damages?

HELD:

YES. The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may
be caused to any of the passengers therein. It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered
by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is
not binding upon the public and third persons.

26
CARIAGA vs. LTB Co. 11037 101 PHIL 346 1960

FACTS:

Cariaga was a passenger of the LTB bus bound for Lilio, Laguna which left Manila at 1:00 pm. At
about 3:00 p.m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway
crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force
that the first six wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the body of the bus
was wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers were injured.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, LTB’s cross-claim should be granted by the trial court?

HELD:

No. The trial court relied upon the testimony of the witness for MRR who testified that the whistle
of locomotive was sounded four times — two long and two short — "as the train was approximately 300
meters from the crossing"; and that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where
Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing", while —
as the LTB itself now admits — the driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the warning.

27
KOREAN AIRLINES CO. vs. CA 114061 1994

FACTS:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific Recruiting
Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially listed as a “chance passenger”.
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs
going to the airplane, a KAL officer pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he was barred from
taking the flight. When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled.

He was unable to report for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent of
Pan Pacific was informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the
other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available, it was given to
Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
with modification on the damages awarded.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, there is already a contract of carriage between kal and lapuz to hold kal liable
for breach of contract?

HELD:

The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his
name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that
flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz
to his destination.

28
30. MCKEE vs. IAC | 114061| 1994

FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar and a Ford Escort
car driven by Jose Koh. When the northbound car was about 10m away from the southern approach of
the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Koh
blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck, he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could
do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. RTC convicted Galang.
CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable?

HELD:

YES. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

29
WASSMER vs. VELEZ 20089 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and
was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement
was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and
exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case?

HELD:

No. Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs
which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

30
CACHERO vs. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB 8721 1957

FACTS:

On December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxi driven by Gregorio Mira
Abinion. The taxicab bumped a Meralco post. The plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to the ground and
sustained slight physical injuries.

On January 6, 1953, plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant, demanding payment for the sum of
P79, 245.65 covering actual transportation and medical expenses, monetary loss, compensatory and
exemplary damages. Defendant offered to settle the case amicably, but the parties were not able to agree
on the settlement amount. Plaintiff instituted an action for damages on February 2, 1953.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, moral damages can be awarded?

HELD:

A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that his action against the defendant is predicated
on an alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him "safely and
without mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that
plaintiff used when he received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even been made a
party defendant to this case.

31
FORES vs. MIRANDA | 12163 | 1959

FACTS:

Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle
was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney
swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending that a day before the
accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the approval of the public service commission necessary for the sale of a public service
vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

HELD:

The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of
the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of
the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest;
and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of
law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the
public has a right to rely upon.

32
TAN vs. NORTHWEST AIRLINES | 135802 | 2000

FACTS:

On May 31, 1994, Priscilla Tan and Connie Tan boarded a Northwest Airlines plane in Chicago
bound to the Philippines with a stop-over at Detroit. Upon their arrival, they found out that their baggage
was missing. On June 3, they recovered the baggage and discovered that some were destroyed and soiled.
They filed an action for damages, claiming that they suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great
damage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the respondent airline is liable for moral and exemplary damages for willful
misconduct and breach of contract of carriage?

HELD:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For
willful misconduct to exist there must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an
intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a
flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct." Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was
nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed that they were motivated by malice or bad faith in
loading her baggage on another plane.

33
ALITALIA vs. IAC 71929, 1990

FACTS:

Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in the University of the Philippines and a research grantee
of the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency, was invited to take part at a meeting of the Department of
Research and Isotopes in Italy in view of her specialized knowledge in “foreign substances in food and the
agriculture environment”. She would be the second speaker on the first day of the meeting. Dr. Pablo
booked passage on petitioner Alitalia. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting, but was told
that her luggage was delayed and was in a succeeding flight from Rome to Milan. The luggage included
her materials for the presentation.

ISSUES:

Whether the Warsaw convention should be applied to limit alitalia’s liability?

HELD:

Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made liable for damages for: a. The death,
wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft
or I the course of its operations of embarking or disembarking; b. The destruction or loss of, or damage
to, any registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air; and
c. Delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods.

The convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit
his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by such default on his part as is considered
to be equivalent to willful misconduct. The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration
of the instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.

34
SALUDO vs. CA 95536 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners herein together with Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains
of petitioners’ mother to Continental Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) which booked the shipment of the
remains from Chicago to San Francisco by Trans World Airways (TWA) and from San Francisco to Manila
with Philippine Airlines (PAL).

The remains were taken to the Chicago Airport, but it turned out that there were two (2) bodies
in the said airport. Somehow the two (2) bodies were switched, and the remains of petitioners’ mother
was shipped to Mexico instead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents is liable for damages for the switching of the two caskets?

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court concluded that the switching occurred or, more accurately, was
discovered on October 27, 1976; and based on the above findings of the Court of appeals, it happened
while the cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same was place in the custody of private respondents.

It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of those persons who deliver goods
to be carried, or enter into contracts with it, and inasmuch as the freight may depend on the value of the
article to be carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value.

35
PRUDENCIADO vs. ALLIANCE 33836 1987

FACTS:

At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car
along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft Ave. in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine
Normal College Compound where she would hold classes. She claimed that she was driving her car at the
rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing Taft Ave. She stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left
and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the
same, but when she was almost at the center, near the island thereof, Leyson who was driving People's
Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance, suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car, thereby
causing physical injuries in different parts of her body.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in reducing the amount of damages?

HELD:

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission.

The Supreme Court modified its judgment insofar as the award of damages is concerned; and
respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual
damages representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages; (3)
the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.

36
LOPEZ vs. PAN AMERICAN 22415 1966

FACTS:

Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco
was made by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and company. First class tickets were issued
and paid for. The party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego to
contact the airlines regarding their accommodation. However, they were informed that there was no
accommodation for them. Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San Francisco, they were
constrained to take the tourist flight “under protest”.

ISSUES:

Whether the defendant acted in bad faith for deliberate refusal to comply with its contract to
provide first-class accommodation to the plaintiff?

HELD:

From the evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant - through its agents - first
cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from
plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class
reservations stood valid and confirmed.

At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made
plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willful-non-disclosure of the
cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not simply the erroneous
cancellation itself - is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as

37