HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SOCIOLOGY PROJECT

TOPIC : “Comte’s Theory of Scientific Morality &

. Religion of Humanity; An Analysis”

Date of Submission : 18.03.2019

Submitted To :
Dr. Uttam Kumar Panda
( Faculty of Sociology )

Submitted By :
Anshu Sharma
Semester II(A)
B.A. LLB (hons)
Roll No. 22
 I

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research work titled “ Comte’s Scientific Theory of Morality and
Religion of Humanity; An Analysis ” is my own work and represents my own ideas, and
where others’ ideas or words have been included, I have adequately cited and referenced the
original sources. I also declare that I have adhered to all principles of academic honesty and
integrity and have not misrepresented or fabricated or falsified any idea/data/fact/source in
my submission.

Anshu Sharma

B.A.LL.B (Hons.)

Semester-II(A)

Roll No.-22
 II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I, Anshu Sharma, feel highly elated to work on the topic “Comte’s Scientific Theory of
Morality and Religion of Humanity; an analysis ”. The practical realization of this project
has obligated the assistance of many persons. I express my deepest regard and gratitude for
Dr. Uttam Kumar Panda. His consistent supervision, constant inspiration and invaluable
guidance have been of immense help in understanding and carrying out the nuances of the
project report. I would like to thank my family and friends without whose support and
encouragement, this project would not have been a reality. I take this opportunity to also
thank the University and the Vice Chancellor Sir for providing extensive database resources
in the Library and through Internet. I would be grateful to receive comments and suggestions
to further improve this project report.

Anshu Sharama
Semester II(A)
B.A. LLB (hons)
Roll No. 22
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TABLE OF CONTENT

 ………………………………………………… …………….1
 …………………………………………………………………….1
 …………………………………………………….
 Chapter-1 : Introduction ……………………………………………………………
 Chapter -2 : Review of literature
 Chapter-3 : Objectives of study
 Chapter -4 : Research methodology
 Chapter-5: Social Stratification
 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………..
 References ……………………………………………………………..
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Chapter 1
Introduction

As the founder of sociology, positivism, and history of science, Isadore Auguste François
Comte (1798-1857) was arguably one of the most important nineteenth-century French
philosophers. Scholars have tended to believe that Comte’s writing falls into two
distinguishable phases, which we might call scientific and Messianic. In the first, initiated in
a series of programmatic essays in the 1820s and culminating in the Course de philosophie
positive (1830-42), he presented his new science of sociology and a plan for the intellectual,
moral, and political reconstruction of Europe in general but France in particular.1 It is with
the second phase that we see the emergence of a new religion: Religion of Humanity.
Comte’s ideas regarding this phase are embodied in the System of Positive Polity (1851-54).
While considerable attention has been given to the first phase, the second one has been
treated only superficially. Capable people are smashing the powerless. The crushed are
conning against the solid. It was obvious for Comte that there was rebellion in each area of
social life in the public arena. Although the problem is a multifaceted one, the question to
which this article hopes to find a possible answer is a very specific one, namely: What
was/were the motive or motives that led Comte constitute a new religion? In pursuing the
subject, I will argue that Comte was the child of his society and culture, and his ideas were
shaped by the conditions in which he lived. The so-called Religion of Humanity was not a
“biographical accident” but the inevitable result of the conditions that surrounded him.

Auguste Comte, a long-time assistant of St. Simon’s, shared his belief in the need to let
science operate as the guiding principle of social organisation. Otherwise Comte was a
conservative. Like St. Simon, he believed in an organic, evolutionary process of social
change. It was Comte who coined the notion of positivism, the sovereignty of positive
(proven, confirmed) scientific fact against superstition and prejudice. But its key objective
was politically conservative nonetheless: positivism in Comte’s view was ‘the only guarantee
against the communist invasion’ (quoted in Therborn, 1976: 224)

In order to create a new social consensus, Comte wished first to observe the society. His
observations eventually led him to believe that a certain type of society was dying; another
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was being born in his eyes. The dying type was characterized by two adjectives: theological
and military. Medieval society was united by transcendent faith as expounded by the Catholic
Church. In “Considerations On the Spiritual Power” he states that: The decline of theological
philosophy and the corresponding spiritual power has left society without any moral
discipline. Individuals with the best of purposes are continually weakening the efforts of each
other. Powerful persons are crushing the weak. The defeated are conning against the strong.
It was apparent for Comte that there was anarchy in every domain of social life in society.
But the question still remains: What was/were the cause/causes of this anarchy? The possible
answer to this question can be found in one of his earlier writings, “Philosophical
Considerations On the Sciences and Savants,” as follows: ...Society, regarded from a moral
point of view, is in a condition of real profound anarchy, acknowledged by all observers,
whatever may be their speculative opinions. This anarchy results, in the last resort, from the
absence of any preponderating system, capable of uniting all minds in a communion of ideas.
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Chapter 2
Review Of Literature

Waluchow, Wilfrid J. (1994). _Inclusive Legal Positivism_. Oxford University

Press
Amidst the inevitable decline of the theological and military system, men became conscious
of the movement of society, which had now advanced through so many phases; and the
notion of Progress as a distinctive feature of Humanity became admitted. Still the conception
of Humanity as the basis for a new synthesis was impossible until the crisis of the French
Revolution. That crisis on the one hand proved the urgent necessity for social regeneration,
and on the other gave birth to the only philosophy capable of effecting it. Thus our
consciousness of the new Great Being has advanced co-extensively with its growth. Our
present conception of it is as much the measure of our social progress as it is the summary of
Positive knowledge.

Alexy Robert, (2002). The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal

Positivism. Oxford University Press UK.
The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law
independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first,
conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative
reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument
alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law and morality,
and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments
together support a non positivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua
comprehensive theory of law.

David Gartrell (1990), Positivism in Sociological Practice, Cambridge University

Press
Positivism is no stranger to controversy, least of all in sociology, where its viability has been
the subject of a long-running debate among theorists of different stripes. Yet the question
remains to what degree sociological practitioners continue to find positivism to be persuasive.
This question is approached through a content analysis of 176 randomly selected articles
published in the late 1960s and the late 1980s in the official journals of the American,
Canadian, Scandinavian and British sociological associations. Using an index based on seven
elements of positivism that were characteristic of the “theory construction” movement of the
late 1960s, the authors found both persistence and change. The results raise questions about
the relationship between the realms of theory and practice in sociology and whether
sociologists' philosophies of science reflect what practitioners actually do in their sociological
work.
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Robin le Poidevin(1998), Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method,

and Evidence, Royal Institute of Philosophy
The whole topic of faith and reason can keep to well-trodden paths. Indeed he, himself, has
written on the subject before. Yet there is much of interest in this book, and many important
topics are covered, such as the connection between belief and the will, the meaningfulness
and testability of theories, to the 'anything goes' methodological anarchy of relativism. Yet,
despite their differences, positivism and relativism share a number of assumptions-
assumptions which, though well-entrenched, are deeply suspicious.

Jonathan H. Turner(1993). Classical Sociological Theory : A Positivist

Perspective. Wadsworth Publishing,
The theme of this collection of articles by Jonathan Turner is that Science of Morality can be
a true science, and it can develop abstract laws explaining the operative dynamics of the
social universe. Rather that blindly worshipping sociology's masters, however, Turner
attempts to reinvent sociology as a science that learns the valuable lessons of classical theory
and then moves on.

William D. Raat(1987), RELIGION OF HUMANITY, Department of History

Moorhead State College Minnesota

In 1817, Henri de Saint-Simon won the nineteen-year-old Auguste Comte over to his views
concerning the lamentable condition of post-revolutionary French society and the necessity
for a radical scheme of reform, and it was during the political turmoil of the second quarter
of the nineteenth century that Comte, intending to reorder chants and the intellectual elites,
the positivist philosophers who were also considered priests of learning and wisdom. The role
of the clergy was basically an educational one. They were to advise the capitalists and public
functionaries on the fine art of scientific management in economy and politics. Through
friendly persuasion and the force of example they would act as a check upon tyranny and
misgovernment. The power of the clergy also reached into the individual household where
women and children were instructed in the truths of scientific morality. The spiritual leaders
not only served society in particular, but also dedicated themselves to the Grand Being or
Humanity itself. Within the ranks of the spiritual authority there was to be a single High
Priest of Humanity (akin to the pope of Catholicism) who would have total control over the
rest of the clergy and whose prime intellect would be used for the general good. At least to
the orthodox disciples of Comte this High Priest of Humanity was obviously Completed.

Ben Agger(1991),Critical Theory, Post structuralism, Postmodernism: Their

Sociological Relevance, Department of Sociology, State University of New York
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This article examines the main theoretical contributions of critical theory, poststructuralism
and postmodernism. It is argued that these three theories offer related perspectives on the
shortcomings of positivism as well as new ways to theorize and study contemporary
societies. Empirical and conceptual applications of these perspectives in sociological
research are discussed. Some of these applications include work in the sociology of
deviance, gender, media and culture.

James H. Billington, The Intelligentsia and the Religion of Humanity, The

American Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 4

Shortly before his death, Auguste Comte, regarded by many as the most rational and
progressive thinker in Europe, amazed friend and foe alike by addressing two flattering
letters to Czar Nicholas I of Russia, the recognized leader of reaction and obscurantism.
Comte appealed to the Czar to be the first to accept his new "System of Positive Politics,"
insisting that Russia's very insulation gave it a unique potential for bypassing the atomized
parliamentary stage of Western European development and adopting directly an integrating
new religion of humanity. The incongruity of the situation was illustrated by the fact that
the recipient had not yet even adopted the Gregorian calendar.

Gladys Bryson (1936), Early English Positivists and the Religion of Humanity,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 3

It is, of course, a trite remark-and one made more frequently by sociologists than by their
gibing critics- that sociology has not yet come to that development which commands from
its adherents wholehearted agreement as to the objectives to be aimed at, the field to be
limited, and the methods to be used. Not only is this lack of unanimity characteristic of the
science as a whole, when viewed apart from national boundaries, but even within each
country there is still to be found great diversity of opinion as to the major concepts and
abstractions of this field of inquiry. England seems to offer the one exception. It is not that
English sociologists have consciously developed an agreement and so are working as a
unified group for the advancement of their science, for they seem to be less aware of
disagreement and of the controversial aspects of the situation than most workers in the
field. It is rather that there seems to be a fairly general acceptance of the idea that there is
something called a sociological point of view which can be applied to economics,
anthropology, religion, or what not, but that point of view is infinitely elastic and does not
cry to be defined nor elaborated into a separate discipline.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The Research conducted is Descriptive and Analytical in nature. Books & other references
(including various websites) as guided by faculty of Sociology were primarily helpful for the
completion of this project. Footnotes have been provided wherever necessary.

OBJECTIVES
The Project seeks to answer the following questions-

1. What is meant by Society and its function and basis?

2. What are the characteristics and structure of Society?
3. What is the concept of Society in India and its changing aspects?
4. What are the different approaches of study of Indian Society ?
5. To know about the Social Stratification.
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Chapter 5
The Formative Years: The Collaboration and the Early Writings

The early writings remain the required starting point for everyone who wishes to understand
the goal that Comte incessantly pursued. It is not without reason that on the first page of
the SystemComte applied to himself Alfred de Vigny's words: ‘What is a great life? A
thought of youth, executed by mature age.’ His formative years were dominated by his
relationship with Saint-Simon. When meeting him in 1817, Comte, like his fellow students at
the École Polytechnique, had just been dismissed by Louis XVIII and was therefore looking
for a job. He even thought of emigrating to the United States to teach at a school that
Jefferson was planning to open and which was to be modeled on the École Polytechnique.
The École Polytechnique, whose faculty included the likes of Arago, Laplace, Cauchy, and
Poisson, had been for Comte what the Evangelisches Stift in Tübingen had been for Hegel.
There, he got an education in science that was second to none in all of Europe; it left a
permanent imprint on him. But he was equally a typical representative of the generation of
Tocqueville and Guizot that saw itself confronted with the question of how to stop the
Revolution after the collapse of the Empire. ‘How,’ as Comte would put it in 1848, ‘does one
reorganize human life, irrespectively of God and king’? (1851, v. 1, 127; E., v. 1, 100) It is
from this perspective that his profound hostility towards classical political philosophy —
philosophy that we continue to respect today— has to be understood. With its insistence on
freedom of conscience and on the sovereignty of the people (souveraineté populaire), the
revolutionary doctrine had no other function than to destroy the Ancien Régime (founded on
papal authority and monarchy by divine right). But in that task it had now succeeded. The
moment had come for reconstruction, and it was hard to see how these weapons could be of
use in such work.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the young Comte turned to Saint-Simon.
The latter, taking advantage of the relative freedom of the press granted by Louis XVIII,
published more and more pamphlets and magazines, and therefore needed a collaborator.
Comte took over three ideas from the complex thought of Saint-Simon:
 3

1. The contrast between organic and critical periods in history, of which the Revolution
had just provided an example.

2. The idea of industrial society. In 1817, under the influence, notably, of B. Constant
and J.-B. Say, Saint-Simon had turned himself into an apostle of industry. As an
attentive observer of the industrial revolution that was going on before his eyes, he
understood that it would completely change all existing social relations. Heretofore,
we had lived in military societies: man acted on man, and power belonged to the
warrior class. Henceforth, trade would replace war, and man would mainly concern
himself with acting on nature. Comte drew the quite mistaken conclusion that the era
of wars was over (Aron 1957).

3. The idea of spiritual power. This is Comte's most obvious debt to Saint-Simon. The
theme was present from the first work by Saint-Simon (Letters from an Inhabitant of
Geneva to his Contemporaries, 1803) to the last (The New Christianity, 1825). It
resulted from an observation and a conviction. Saint-Simon observed the role of
science in modern society: he suggested, for example, that public funds be made
available to finance scientific research. He was also convinced of the religious nature
of social cohesion and, therefore, of the need for a priestly class in charge of
maintaining it.

4. This belief led him to the idea of a science of social organization, linking these two
components: religion would become an application of science, permitting enlightened
men to govern the ignorant. So, instead of trying to destroy every form of religious
life, one should entrust to the learned the spiritual power left weakened by the decline
of traditional religions. It is also within this framework that the text he wrote in 1814
on the reorganization of European society has to be understood: handling international
relations are one of the main attributes of spiritual power, as shown by the medieval
papacy.

Comte quickly assimilated what Saint-Simon had to offer him. But Comte aspired to free
himself of a tutelage that weighed ever heavier on him, as he found the unmethodical and
fickle mind of the self-taught, philanthropic aristocrat barely tolerable. The break occurred in
1824, occasioned by a shorter work of Comte that would prove to be fundamental. Aware of
already possessing the main ideas of his own philosophy, Comte accused his teacher of trying
to appropriate his work and furthermore, he pointed out that he had not contented himself
 4

with giving a systematic form to borrowed concepts. The Philosophical Considerations on

the Sciences and the Scientists (1825) contains the first and classical formulations of the two
cornerstones of positivism: the law of the three stages, and the classification of the sciences.
The Considerations on Spiritual Power that followed some months later presents dogmatism
as the normal state of the human mind. It is not difficult to find behind that statement, which
may seem outrageous to us, the anti-Cartesianism that Comte shares with Peirce and that
brings their philosophies closer to one another. As the mind spontaneously stays with what
seems true to it, the irritation of doubt ceases when belief is fixed; what is in need of
justification, one might say, is not the belief but the doubt. Thus the concept of positive faith
is brought out, that is to say, the necessity of a social theory of belief and its correlate, the
logical theory of authority.

In the year 1826 two noteworthy occasions occur. To begin with, Comte's program was
reshaped. The primary System of 1822 was unfinished, and composing the rest of the part
was one of Comte's needs. In any case, in 1826 he put off that venture for an uncertain
period. To give a more strong base to the sociology and its subsequent positive country, he
chose first to experience the entire of positive information again and to start a course on
positive theory. It ought to be remembered that the Course does not have a place with
Comte's underlying project and that it initially was implied as an enclosure, or prelude, that
should take a couple of years at most. The second significant occasion of 1826, the acclaimed
'cerebral emergency's which happened promptly after the opening address of the course
constrained Comte to stop his open lessons; yet it additionally had longstanding impacts.
Consequently it is standard to state that Comte got open affirmation just belatedly: in 1842,
with the principal letter from Mill, and in 1844, with the articles of Littré in Le National. In
any case, that sums to overlooking that in 1826 Comte was an outstanding identity in the
scholarly circles of Paris. Guizot and Lamennais held him in high regard. The Course's
participation list included prestigious names, for example, A. von Humboldt, Arago,
Broussais or Fourier. Process, who had gone by Saint-Simon in 1820–21, was profoundly
awed by the main System, which one of Comte's students had acquainted him with in 1829
(Mill 1963, v. 12, 34). At last, despite the fact that Comte had broken with Saint-Simon, the
overall population considered him to be one of the ace's most legitimate representatives. This
earned him the fairly curious enmity of the Saint-Simonians: they, with couple of
exemptions, had the unmistakable normal for never having by and by known the one they
called 'the father', while Comte had been on private terms with him. Be that as it may, the
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cerebral emergency made Comte not able to exploit the high respect he delighted in: he
vanished from general society scene until 1844.

CHAPTER 6
The Theory of Morality and The Complete Positivism

Soon after finishing the Course, Comte returned to his initial project and began outlining
the System of Positive Polity. The Discourse on the Positive Spirit, which had served as the
preface to the Philosophical Treatise on Popular Astronomy (1844), had already emphasized
the social purpose of positivism and its aptitude to replace theology in politics and morality.
But his encounter with Clotilde de Vaux would turn his life upside down and give Comte's
second career an unexpected twist.

6.1 The Mind as a Servant of the Heart

After Clotilde's death in 1846, positivism was transformed into “complete positivism”, which
is ‘continuous dominance of the heart’ (la prépondérance continue du Coeur). ‘We tire of
thinking and even of acting; we never tire of loving’, as the dedication to the System put it.
Positivism transformed science into philosophy; complete positivism now transforms
philosophy into religion. The question wether such a move is consistent with Comte's former
ideas and more generaly with positivism was asked very early. Mill and Littré answered
negatively and complete positivism was never very popular.

The change of theory into religion does not yield a religion of science on the grounds that,
having beat advanced preferences, Comte now unhesitatingly positions workmanship above
science. Since the separation with the scholastic world was finished, the positivists put their
trusts on a partnership with ladies and proletarians. Comte (who after Clotilde's passing
fanatically, even religiously, gave himself to her) saved an unequivocal part in the positive
time for ladies. Be that as it may, this part of his work is hard to acknowledge for a
contemporary peruser, specifically on the grounds that it includes the idealistic thought of the
virgin mother, which implies parthenogenesis for people. With respect to the proletarians, he
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considered them to be unconstrained positivists, similarly as the positivists were precise

proletarians!

The mind, then, is not destined to rule but to serve, not, however, as the slave of the heart, but
as its servant (Bourdeau 2000). Science thus retains an essential function. The dominance of
the heart is founded biologically in the ‘positive classification of the eighteen internal
functions of the brain, or systematic view of the soul’ (1851, v. 1, 726; E., v. 1, 594–95). The
cerebral table distinguishes ten affective forces, five intellectual functions, and three practical
qualities; these correspond to the heart, mind, and character, respectively. The functions
being ordered according to increasing energy and decreasing dignity, the dominance of the
heart can be considered a datum from positive biology. This classification is indispensable for
an understanding of the System. It should be mentioned in passing that it shows that the
exclusion of psychology does not at all have the meaning usually given to it: Comte had
never refused to study man's higher functions, be they intellectual or moral, but for him this
belongs to biology (the classification is sometimes also referred to as the ‘cerebral table’),
and so does not require the creation of a new science (1830 (45)). Historically, the conception
of the System began with this table, of which different versions were elaborated in succession
from 1846. Conceptually, it is the first application of the subjective method, understood as
feedback from sociology to the sciences that precede it, starting with the nearest. In this way,
the sociologist helps the biologist define the cerebral functions, a task in which, most often,
the biologist simply takes up again the divisions of folk psychology. Later, in what has
become known as the ‘letters on illness’, Comte likewise proposes a sociological definition of
the brain, as the organ through which dead people act on living ones.

6.2 Positive Politics

Today, we are no longer used to associate positivism and politics. However, the later was
present from the outset, when Comte served as secretary of Saint-Simon, and it was quite
influencial at the end of the nineteenth century. The two main tenets of positive politics are :
there is no society without government; the proper functioning of society requires a spiritual
power independent from the temporal power.

The first principle has two sides. A negative one: it expresses Comte's lack of interest in the
concept of State. A positive one : in order to understand why there must be a government, we
have to consider how social life works. Surprisingly, Comte's starting point is the same as
Hayek's, namely the existence of a spontaneous order. The title of the fiftieth lesson of
 7

the Course reads: Social statics, or theory of spontaneous order of human society. But, for
positivism, spontaneous order covers all natural phenomena and is moreover neither perfect
nor immutable. In general, human action aims to substitute for this natural order an artificial
one, more in line with our desires. Government action is only a special case, applied to the
spontaneous order intrinsic to human society, which is determined by division of labor. The
increasing specialization which accompanied it, even if it is the sine qua non condition of
progress, threatens the cohesion of society. That is why a government is needed: its function
is ‘to check the disorganizing and to foster the converging tendencies’ of the agents (1852,
205; E. 277).

As to second standard, one more often than not recalls just the possibility of otherworldly
power yet such a power can be seen just in its connection to transient power: by nature it is a
directing force, which presupposes the presence of a fleeting force, which interestingly does
not presuppose the presence of a profound power. Moreover, Comte unequivocally can't help
contradicting authentic realism : it is thoughts that lead the world, as in there is no reasonable
social request without an insignificant agreement on the rule that represent life in the public
eye. At first, Comte planed to endow this new otherworldly energy to researchers, since he
saw science not just as the objective reason for our activity upon nature, additionally as the
profound premise of social request.

Since at least half a century, positive politics is discarded as reactionary and totalitarian and it
is true that, in many respects, Comte was resolutely anti modern but, specially in his later
writings, he also held ideas which sound amazingly in keeping with contemporary concerns.
For instance, he had an acute feeling for the way humanity is dependent on astronomical
conditions: assume small changes in the elliptical orbit of Earth, in the inclination of Ecliptic,
and life, at least life as we know it, would have been impossible. Humanity, the proper study
of sociology, is closely connected to the Earth, the human planet, ‘with ist two liquid
envelopes’. In spite of the Copernican revolution, Earth remains for each of us the firm,
unshakable ground upon which everything stands. See for instance what he says about
fatherland and the way ‘the Tent, the Car or the Ship are to the nomad family a sort of
moveable Country, connecting the Family or the Horde with its material basis, as with us the
gypsy in his van’ (1851, v. 2 285, E. 2 237). Politics is grounded in geopolitics,
where geo retains its etymological meaning, Gaia, and where Earth is understood as a planet
in the solar system. This cosmic character of positive politics helps to understand what could
appear as an inconsistency. After 1851, Comte proposed to break down France into nineteen ‘
 8

intendances’. Such a suggestion is quite puzzling, being incompatible with the received view,
according to which he was a supporter of centralisation, but, as soon as we take account of
the distinction between temporal and spiritual power, the inconsistency disappears.
According to the kind of power we are considering, the situation changes totally.
Centralisation applies just to otherworldly power (Comte had plainly as a main priority the
Papacy) and transient power is by nature nearby. There is a considerable measure of sections
where the relationship is unmistakably expressed. This takes after from the way that the
psyche does not know limits; an otherworldly power must choose the option to be catholic,
that is, all inclusive. Its space is the planet Earth.

From this, we have no less than two results. The first is a solid enthusiasm for European
reproduction, a political need in the vicinity of 1815 and 1820, yet not any longer in 1850,
after the triumph of patriotism. The second one is the acknowledgment that States as we
probably am aware them are a chronicled item, which did not exist befor 1500, and there is
no motivation to trust that they will exist for ever. Subsequently his proposition to separate
France into nineteen 'intendances': the augmentation of fleeting force is not permitted to go
past regions like Belgium or Corsica. Atheism is a very imperfect form of emancipation; for
its tendency is to prolong the metaphysical stage indefinitely, by continuing to seek for new
solutions of Theological problems.
 9

.
CHAPTER 7
Beyond Atheism

Positivists are, strictly speaking, neither atheists nor are they agnostics. Scientists focus on
facts (on statements they can prove with observations) and that is a work in which they
neither run into a sphere of transcendence, a field that can supposedly never be observed, nor
does this work ever require them to state that there is no God or that one cannot observe God.
Positivists explore phenomena. They observe and describe regularities. They make
predictions on the basis of these regularities. They observe how things happen, not why, so
Comte in his famous passage on atheism.
Atheism is, strictly speaking, a dysfunctional field of thought, deeply rooted in theological th
ought. The old proofs of God’s existence are now obsolete, the debate proposed by modern
atheists is a theological reversal with a production of proofs and indications of his non-
existence. The result is stagnation — most visibly in the field of Marxist revolutionary
politics where atheism becomes just another dogma to be protected by the revolution.
Positivism is a position of pragmatism. The positivist’s question is: what will come after
atheism and agnosticism. What is the knowledge we have? How do we actually want to live?
This might look like atheism, because it excludes God from all further thought. It is otherwise
a position in need of a new differentiation which Comte is eager to make in his General View
on Positivism (1848, published again in the first volume of his System of Positive Polity in
1851). We have to confront the “Error of identifying Positivism with Atheism, Materialism,
Fatalism, or Optimism. Atheism, like Theology discusses insoluble mysteries”. Positivism is
looking for positive knowledge:
I have now described the general spirit of Positivism. But there are two or three points on
which some further explanation is necessary, as they are the source of misapprehensions too
common and too serious to be disregarded. Of course I only concern myself with such
objections as are made in good faith.

The fact of entire freedom from theological belief being necessary before the Positive state
can be perfectly attained, has induced superficial observers to confound Positivism with a
state of pure negation. Now this state was at one time, and that even so recently as the last
century, favourable to progress; but at present in those who unfortunately still remain in it, it
is a radical obstacle to all sound social and even intellectual organization. I have long ago
 10

repudiated all philosophical or historical connexion between Positivism and what is called
Atheism. But it is desirable to expose the error somewhat more clearly.

Atheism, even from the intellectual point of view, is a very imperfect form of emancipation;
for its tendency is to prolong the metaphysical stage indefinitely, by continuing to seek for
new solutions of Theological problems, instead of setting aside all inaccessible researches on
the ground of their utter inutility. The true Positive spirit consists in substituting the study of
the invariable Laws of phenomena for that of their so-called Causes, whether proximate or
primary; in a word, in studying the How instead of the Why. Now this is wholly incompatible
with the ambitious and visionary attempts of Atheism to explain the formation of the
Universe, the origin of animal life, etc. The Positivist comparing the various phases of human
speculation, looks upon these scientific chimeras as far less valuable even from the
intellectual point of view than the first spontaneous inspirations of primeval times. The
principle of Theology is to explain everything by supernatural Wills. That principle can never
be set aside until we acknowledge the search for Causes to be beyond our reach, and limit
ourselves to the knowledge of Laws. As long as men persist in attempting to answer the
insoluble questions which occupied the attention of the childhood of our race, by far the more
rational plan is to do as was done then, that is, simply to give free play to the imagination.
These spontaneous beliefs have gradually fallen into disuse, not because they have been
disproved, but because mankind has become more enlightened as to its wants and the scope
of its powers, and has gradually given an entirely new direction to its speculative efforts. If
we insist upon penetrating the unattainable mystery of the essential Cause that produces
phenomena, there is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed from Wills
dwelling in them or outside them; an hypothesis which assimilates them to the effect
produced by the desires which exist within ourselves. Were it not for the pride induced by
metaphysical and scientific studies, it would be inconceivable that any atheist, modern or
ancient, should have believed that his vague hypotheses on such a subject were preferable to
this direct mode of explanation. And it was the only mode which really satisfied the reason,
until men began to see the utter inanity and inutility of all search for absolute truth. The Order
of Nature is doubtless very imperfect in every respect; but its production is far more
compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent Will than with that of a blind mechanism.
Persistent atheists therefore would seem to be most illogical of theologist : because they
occupy themselves with theological problems, and yet reject the only appropriate method of
handling them. But the fact is that pure Atheism even in the present day is very rare. What is
 11

called Atheism is usually a phase of Pantheism, which is really nothing but a relapse
disguised under learned terms, into a vague and abstract form of Fetishism. And it is not
impossible that it may lead to the reproduction in one form or other of every theological
phase as soon as the check which modern society still imposes on metaphysical extravagance
has become somewhat weakened. The selection of such hypotheses as a tasteful arrangement
of conviction, shows an exceptionally overstated or rather bogus perspective of scholarly
prerequisites, and an extremely inadequate acknowledgment of good and social needs. It is
for the most part associated with the visionary yet fiendish inclinations of aggressive
masterminds to maintain what they call the realm of Reason. In the ethical circle it shapes a
kind of reason for the corrupting paradoxes of cutting edge metaphysicians with regards to
the supreme prevalence of self-intrigue. Politically, its propensity is to boundless
prolongation of the progressive position: its soul is that of visually impaired disdain to the
past: and it opposes all endeavours to clarify it on Positive standards, with a perspective of
unveiling what's to come. Secularism, along these lines, is not liable to prompt to Positivism
aside from in the individuals who go through it quickly as the last and most short-lived of
magical stages. Furthermore, the wide dispersion of the logical soul in the present day makes
this entry so natural that to touch base at development without finishing it, is an indication of
a specific mental shortcoming, which is regularly associated with good inadequacy, and is
exceptionally incongruent with Positivism. Invalidation offers however a weak and
problematic reason for union: and mistrust in Monotheism is of itself no better confirmation
of a mind fit to think about the inquiries of the day than doubt in Polytheism or Fetishism,
which nobody would keep up to be a satisfactory ground for asserting scholarly sensitivity.
The sceptical stage in fact was not by any stretch of the imagination essential, aside from the
revolutionists of the most recent century who led the pack in the development towards radical
recovery of society. The need has as of now stopped; for the rotted state of the old framework
makes the need of recovery discernable to all. . Determination in turmoil, and Atheism is the
most trademark manifestation of political agitation, is a temper of mind more horrible to the
natural soul, which should at this point to have built up its impact, than earnest attachment to
the old structures. This last is obviously obstructive: yet at any rate it doesn't upset us from
settling our consideration upon the immense social issue. In fact it helps us to do as such: in
light of the fact that it constrains the new reasoning to toss aside every weapon of assault
against the more seasoned confidence with the exception of its own higher limit of fulfilling
our good and social needs. In any case, in the Atheism kept up by numerous metaphysicians
and logical men of the present day, Positivism, rather than wholesome competition of this
 12

kind, will meet with only infertile resistance. Hostile to philosophical accordingly men might
be, they feel unmixed offensiveness for any endeavours at social recovery, despite the fact
that their endeavours in the most recent century had to some degree arranged the route for it.
Far, then, from numbering upon their support, Positivists must hope to discover them
antagonistic: in spite of the fact that from the confusion of their conclusions it won't be hard
to recover those of them whose mistakes are not basically because of pride.

7.1 Ethics and Sociology

Positivism affirmed early its desire to build an ethical precept that owes nothing to the
otherworldly. In the event that we require a profound power, it is on account of social
inquiries are frequently moral as opposed to political. The changes of society must be made
in a decided request: one needs to change thoughts, then ethics (les moeurs; the word is hard
to decipher: it is something like methods for acting, propensities, les us et coutumes), and at
exactly that point establishments. Be that as it may, with the System, the ethical tenet
(morals) changes status and turns into a science, whose errand is to stretch out human science
keeping in mind the end goal to consider singular wonders, specifically full of feeling ones.

The terms of the problem as well as its solution are given by a saying to be found in the
margin of the cerebral table: “Act from affection and think in order to act” (1851, v. 1, 726;
E., v. 1, 594). The first part of this “systematic verse” is guaranteed by the dominance of the
heart; but, among the ten “affective forces”, the first seven correspond to egoism, the final
three to altruism. The whole question is knowing which ones would prevail, those of
“personality” or those of “sociability”. While it is important to acknowledge the innateness of
the sympathetic instincts, one is forced to admit their native weakness: the supremacy of the
egoistic tendencies is so clear that it is itself one of the most striking traits in our nature. The
great human problem is to reverse the natural order and to teach ourselves to live for others.

The solution consists in ‘regulating the inside through the outside’ and depends, as a
consequence, on a good use of the mind. The only way in which altruism can win, is to ally
itself with the mind, to make it its servant and not its slave. The heart, without the light of
reason, is blind. Left to itself, affectivity is characterized by its inconsistency and instability.
That is why the inside has to be regulated, that is, disciplined. And this task is assigned to the
outside, because exterior reality is the best of regulators. Whatever its own defects may be,
the order that science discloses in nature is, by its indifference to our desires, a source of
 13

discipline. The recognition of an unchanging external order thus becomes ‘the objective base
of true human wisdom’, and ‘in the obligation to conform themselves to it’ our affections find
‘a source of fixedness appropriate for controlling their spontaneous capriciousness, and a
direct stimulation to the dominance of the sympathetic instincts’ (1851, v. 1, 322). Science
now finds itself vested with a moral function; but that also means that ‘thoughts must be
systematized before feelings’ (1851, v. 1, 21) and that, if moral ascendancy is the primary
attribute of the spiritual power, that power would not be able to carry out its duties without
the aid of a superior intellect.

While developing a science of morals founded on moral doctrine, Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl
were heavily dependent upon this aspect of the System. Like the word ‘sociology’, the word
‘altruism’ was coined by Comte. Being deeply aware of what man and animals have in
common, Comte was close to what is known today as ‘evolutionary ethics’: he saw
cooperation between men as continuous with phenomena of which biology gives us further
examples. The same interest in biology led him to link medicine to moral doctrine and even
to religion. In our modern societies, the study of the human being ‘is now irrationally
parcelled out amongst three classes of thinkers: the Physicians, who study only the body; the
Philosophers, who imagine to study the mind; and the Priests, who specially study the heart’
(1852, v. 2, 437; E., v. 2, 356). To remedy this and to respect the unity of our nature, he
proposed giving the new clergy a role in medicine, considering for example that there is no
better endorsement of a rule of hygiene than a religious decree. Before dying, he still had the
time to outline, in his letters to Audiffrent, the rudiments of a sociological theory of diseases.
 14

Chapter 8
The Religion of Humanity
The System's subtitle is Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of Humanity. While the
different forms of deism preserve the idea of God and dissolve religion into a vague
religiosity, Comte proposes exactly the contrary: a religion with neither God nor the
supernatural. His project had little success; he even accomplished a tour de force by uniting
both believers and non-believers against him. The many ridiculous details of Comte's religion
made the task of his opponents even easier. But this aspect of Comte's thought deserves better
than the discredit into which it has fallen.

Comte defines religion as ‘the state of complete harmony peculiar to human life when all the
parts of Life are ordered in their natural relations to each other’. Comte also defines religion
as a consensus, analogous to what health is for the body. Religion has two functions,
according to the point of view from which one considers existence: in its moral function,
religion should govern each individual; in its political function, it should unite all individuals.
Religion also has three components, corresponding to the threefold division of the cerebral
table: doctrine, worship, and moral rule (discipline). Comte's discussion is mainly about the
first two. If one considers the first to be related to faith and the second to love, their relation
takes two forms: ‘Love comes first and leads us to the faith, so long as the growth is
spontaneous; but when it becomes systematic, then the belief is constructed in order to
regulate the action of love’ (1852, v. 2, 152) first, Comte had followed the traditional order
and presented doctrine before worship, but he soon gave priority to worship, and saw this
change as a considerable step forward.

In the positivist religion, love, precept and good administer all have a similar protest, in
particular Humanity, which must be adored, known, and served. As of now the General
Conclusions of the Course contrasted the idea of Humanity with that of God, insisting the
ethical predominance of the previous. Be that as it may, just in 1847 does Comte make the
substitution expressly; sociological amalgamation comes to supplant philosophical union.
Enrollment of Humanity is sociological, not natural. With a specific end goal to have a place
with what is characterized as the consistent entire of joined creatures — Comte's expression
for (predominantly human) creatures who have a tendency to concur — one must be
deserving of it. All 'makers of compost' are rejected; then again, creatures that have rendered
 15

critical administrations can be incorporated. Entirely, it is to humanism that one ought to turn
for information of the laws of the human request in any case, as the last science summarizes
all others, it is the entire exhaustive scale (échelle ; it is the aftereffect of the characterization
of sciences), that constitutes the teaching of the new religion, which in this manner gets to be
distinctly shown and is did not uncover anymore or propelled.

The principal novelty of Comte's religion therefore resides in worship, which is both private
(taking place within the family) and public. The positivists set up a whole system of prayers,
hymns, and sacraments (Wright 1986). As these were all largely inspired by Catholic
worship, it was said that it was ‘catholicism without Christ’, to which the positivists replied
that it was ‘catholicism plus science’. The best known and most original aspects of Comte's
religion are found in its public worship, and in the positivist liturgical calendar. As Humanity
consists more of dead than living beings, positivism designed a whole system of
commemorations, which were to develop the sense of Humanity's historical continuity. Thus,
the worship of Humanity takes is the worship of great men. Unlike the French revolutionary
calendar, which followed the rhythm of the seasons, the positivist calendar takes its
motivation from history and pays reverence to incredible men from all countries and all
circumstances.

The desire to keep up the qualification amongst fleeting and profound forces drove Comte
and his adherents to request the partition of Church and State. It has been seen less regularly,
nonetheless, that the two types of force remain in varying relations to space. The religious
society is by its temperament catholic, in the feeling of all inclusive, and consequently has no
limits other than those of the planet; the surface of a State takes care of various requests,
which force rather strict geographic points of confinement. The complexity between French
political history and English political history, which was a typical place in Comte's chance
(see for example Tocqueville or Guizot; it is now present in Montesquieu and Voltaire)
shows the point : there is no partition of Church and State in Great Britain, in that feeling that
the Queen is additionally the leader of the Anglican Church. By the by, its principle
application is identified with the issue: centralization against nearby powers, which is another
part of the spatial measurement of legislative issues. Of the two political models always stood
up to in the Course, Comte unmistakably lean towards the French one. Its trademark
cooperation of the government with the general population against the nobility was joined by
a centralization that the Revolution mollified itself with solidifying. One might therefore be
 16

led to believe that Comte was a partisan of centralized political (that is: temporal) power,
whereas the contrary was in fact the case, as he proposed to divide France into seventeen
administrative regions, more or less equivalent to the old provinces (1851, v. 4, 421; Vernon
1984). Centralization applies only to the spiritual power.

8.1 Different Aspects of Humanity

The replacement of God with Humanity has implications in the arts and in the sciences. God
was absolute, but transcendent, not be be reached with empirical research. Humanity is
entirely relative, something we will experience differently wherever we realise that we are
part of it, a mere fragmented concept, if we dare the radical thought. It is on the other hand
most real. We experience it as a life-saver, it is physical in all its institutions. It has a past, a
present, and a future. It is developing and vulnerable. All the sciences are subservient to this
entity.

What we get here is a social, a historical, and a self-reflexive turn: The sciences explore
humanity — and are themselves perhaps the most interesting historical achievement mankind
has brought forth. We will experience ourselves as independent as observers, but the concepts
we entertain, the languages we speak where we discuss the history of mankind, are social, are
the product of the very entity we are exploring.

The concept of humanity had to grow in a constant widening of our historical an social
awareness. Monotheism and nationalism gave rise to more powerful concepts of collectives
before the sciences arrived at the modern concept of humanity and its longer history. This is
the field of Comte’s “three stage model” of the intellectual and social developments of
mankind with its identification of different mental settings from fetishism over monotheism
to scientific understanding. All modern sciences are inevitably concerned with humanity.
Some explore the “statical” aspects that create our living conditions (like mathematics,
physics, or biology), others the “dynamical” aspects (of mankind and its historical and social
developments), so the differentiation that eventually paved the way towards our present
differentiation between natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities:

With such a mission, Science secures a place of unparalleled significance, as the sole means
through which we come to know the nature and states of this Great Being, the love of whom
 17

ought to be the unmistakable component of our entire life. For this extremely imperative
information, the investigation of Sociology would appear to suffice: yet Sociology itself
relies on preparatory review, first of the external world, in which the moves of Humanity
make place; and furthermore, of Man, the individual specialist.

The protest of Positivist love dislike that of religious devotees a flat out, detached, vast
Being, whose presence concedes to no exhibition, or correlation with anything genuine. The
confirmation of the Being here put forth is unconstrained, and is covered in no secret. Before
we can acclaim, love, and serve Humanity as we should, we should know something of the
laws which oversee her reality, a presence more muddled than some other of which we are
mindful.

8.1.1 Statical Aspects of Humanity

What's more, by temperance of this multifaceted nature, Humanity has the traits of
imperativeness in a higher degree than some other association; that is to state, there is without
a moment's delay more close congruity of the segment components, and more entire
subordination to the outer world. Huge similar to the greatness of this living being measured
both in Time and Space, yet each of its parts deliberately analyzed will demonstrate the
general agreement of the entirety. In the meantime it is more needy than some other upon the
states of the external world; as it were, upon the aggregate of the laws that manage mediocre
wonders. Like other crucial living beings, it submits to numerical, galactic, physical,
synthetic, and natural conditions; and, notwithstanding these, is liable to exceptional laws of
Sociology with which bring down life forms are not concerned. Be that as it may, as a further
consequence of its higher multifaceted nature it responds upon the world all the more
capably; and is in fact in a genuine sense its boss. Experimentally characterized, then, it is
really the Supreme Being: the Being who shows minus all potential limitations degree all the
most noteworthy properties of life. But there is yet another feature peculiar to Humanity, and
one of primary importance. That feature is, that the elements of which she is composed must
always have an independent existence. In other organisms the parts have no existence when
severed from the whole; but this, the greatest of all organisms, is made up of lives which can
really be separated. There is, as we have seen, harmony of parts as well as independence, but
the last of these conditions is as indispensable as the first. Humanity would cease to be
superior to other beings were it possible for her elements to become inseparable. The two
conditions are equally necessary: but the difficulty of reconciling them is so great as to
 18

account at once for the slowness with which this highest of all organisms has been developed.
It must not, however, be supposed that the new Supreme Being is, like the old, merely a
subjective result of our powers of abstraction. Its existence is revealed to us, on the contrary,
by close investigation of objective fact. Man indeed, as an individual, cannot properly be said
to exist, except in the exaggerated abstractions of modern metaphysicians. Existence in the
true sense can only be predicated of Humanity; although the complexity of her nature
prevented men from forming a systematic conception of it, until the necessary stages of
scientific initiation had been passed. Bearing this conclusion in mind, we shall be able now to
distinguish in Humanity two distinct orders of functions: those by which she acts upon the
world, and those which bind together her component parts. Humanity cannot herself act
otherwise than by her separable members; but the efficiency of these members depends upon
their working in co-operation, whether instinctively or with design. We find, then, external
functions relating principally to the material existence of this organism; and internal functions
by which its movable elements are combined. This distinction is but an application of the
great theory, due to Bichat’s genius, of the distinction between the life of nutrition and the
life of relation which we find in the individual organism. Philosophically it is the source from
which we derive the great social principle of separation of spiritual from temporal power. The
temporal power governs: it originates in the personal instincts, and it stimulates activity. On it
depends social Order. The spiritual power can only moderate: it is the exponent of our social
instincts, and it promotes co-operation, which is the guarantee of Progress. Of these functions
of Humanity the first corresponds to the function of nutrition, the second to that of
innervation in the individual organism.

8.1.2 Dynamical Aspects

Having now viewed our subject statically, we may come to its dynamical aspect; reserving
more detailed discussion for the third volume of this treatise, which deals with my
fundamental theory of human development. The Great Being whom we worship is not
immutable any more than it is absolute. Its nature is relative; and, as such, is eminently
capable of growth. In a word it is the most vital of all living beings known to us. It extends
and becomes more complex by the continuous successions of generations. But in its
progressive changes as well as in its permanent functions, it is subject to invariable laws. And
these laws considered, as we may now consider them, as a whole, form a more sublime object
of contemplation than the solemn inaction of the old Supreme Being, whose existence was
passive except when interrupted by acts of arbitrary and unintelligible volition. Thus it is only
 19

by Positive science that we can appreciate this highest of all destinies to which all the
fatalities of individual life are subordinate. It is with this as with subjects of minor
importance: systematic study of the Past is necessary in order to determine the Future, and so
explain the tendencies of the Present. Let us then pass from the conception of Humanity as
fully developed, to the history of its rise and progress; a history in which all other modes of
progress are included. In ancient times the conception was incompatible with the theological
spirit and also with the military character of society, which involved the slavery of the
productive classes. The feeling of Patriotism, restricted as it was at first, was the only prelude
then possible to the recognition of Humanity. From this narrow nationality there arose in the
Middle Ages the feeling of universal brotherhood, as soon as military life had entered on its
defensive phase, and all supernatural creeds had spontaneously merged into a monotheistic
form common to the whole West. The growth of Chivalry, and the attempt made to effect a
permanent separation of the two social powers, announced already the subordination of
Politics to Morals, and thus showed that the conception of Humanity was in direct course of
preparation. But the unreal and anti-social nature of the mediaeval creed, and the military and
aristocratic character of feudal society, made it impossible to go very far in this direction. The
abolition of personal slavery was the most essential result of this important period. Society
could now assume its industrial character; and feelings of fraternity were encouraged by
modes of life in which all classes alike participated. Meanwhile, the growth of the Positive
spirit was proceeding, and preparing the way for the establishment of Social Science, by
which alone all other Positive studies should be systematized. This being done, the
conception of the Great Being became possible. It was with reference to subjects of a
speculative and scientific nature that the conception first arose in a distinct shape. As early as
two centuries ago, Pascal spoke of the human race as one Man. [The whole succession of
men during the course of so many centuries should be considered as one Man ever living and
constantly learning.] Amidst the inevitable decline of the theological and military system,
men became conscious of the movement of society, which had now advanced through so
many phases; and the notion of Progress as a distinctive feature of Humanity became
admitted. Still the conception of Humanity as the basis for a new synthesis was impossible
until the crisis of the French Revolution. That crisis on the one hand proved the urgent
necessity for social regeneration, and on the other gave birth to the only philosophy capable
of effecting it. Thus our consciousness of the new Great Being has advanced co-extensively
with its growth. Our present conception of it is as much the measure of our social progress as
it is the summary of Positive knowledge.
 20

9. Major Findings
When Comte turned to the science of society, he had just isolated himself intellectually by
adopting the regime of "cerebral hygiene" and was obsessed by his own originality. Whereas
heretofore he had merely evaluated and systematized the natural sciences, now he was
establishing an entirely new "order of scientific conceptions."
1 He inveighed against those who had employed and misused the terms "social physics" and
"positive philosophy," which he claimed to have coined seventeen years before. Overlooking
the fact that Saint- Simon had used the term "positive philosophy" in his essays written
during the Empire, Comte vaguely accused him and his disciples of taking ideas from "his
writings, his lessons, and .. . his conversations."
2 Comte claimed that his superiority to these and other transgressors was due to his scientific
education, which had permitted him to discover the "fundamental principle and rational
system" of the doctrine that would solve the philosophical dilemma of the day.
3 Comte emphasized that his goal in these lessons was purely theoretical because the main
problem of social reorganization was one of logic. The primary need of his era was for a
rational, coherent theory that could become the basis of a moral reorganization, which would
then direct the political reorganization. Thus despite his denials, Comte was thoroughly
preoccupied by politics in these lessons. His activist, radical purpose is evident in his
statement that positive philosophy aimed to "seize finally the spiritual government of
humanity" in order to create social and political harmony.
4 His revival of the word "spiritual," a term that had disappeared from his pre- ceding, purely
scientific volumes, shows that he was returning to the "first inspirations" of his "youth."5 The
main principle of Comte's social physics was that order and progress were inseparable. "Real
order" could not be established unless it was "fully compatible with progress," and "great
progress" could not occur unless it led to the "evident consolidation of order."

5 He based his argument on a biological analogy: "Order and progress must be as rigorously
indivisible in social physics as the ideas of organization and life are in biology, whence . . .
they obviously de- rive." Assuming that society was similar to an organism, Comte thus
extended Blainville's biological distinction between statics and dynamics to society in order
to give his principle a scientific aura.

6 Throughout the last three volumes on the science of society, he sought to emphasize the
scientific tone of his commentary by using biological terms, such as "social illness,"
"pathological case," and "chronic epidemic," to characterize French society.6 Since 1822,
when he wrote the fundamental opuscule, Comte had prided himself on having united the
scientific and political points of view. Comte also used both scientific and political arguments
to bolster his case for the opportunities of his new philosophy.
 21

10. Conclusion.

The concept of humanity had to grow in a constant widening of our historical an social
awareness. Monotheism and nationalism gave rise to more powerful concepts of collectives
before the sciences arrived at the modern concept of humanity and its longer history. In a
word it is the most vital of all living beings known to us. It extends and becomes more
complex by the continuous successions of generations. In the midst of the unavoidable decay
of the philosophical and military framework, men got to be distinctly aware of the
development of society, which had now progressed through such a large number of stages.
That emergency from one perspective demonstrated the critical need for social recovery, and
on the other brought forth the main theory equipped for affecting it. Along these lines our
cognizance of the new Great Being has propelled co-widely with its development. In any
case, the incredible and hostile to social nature of the medieval belief, and the military and
privileged character of primitive society, made it difficult to go exceptionally far in this
bearing. The annulment of individual bondage was the most fundamental aftereffect of this
essential period. Society could now expect its mechanical character; and sentiments of crew
were energized by methods of life in which all classes alike took an interest. Then, the
development of the Positive soul was continuing, and setting up the path for the foundation of
Social Science, by which alone all other Positive reviews ought to be systematizedand the
notion of Progress as a distinctive feature of Humanity became admitted. Still the conception
of Humanity as the basis for a new synthesis was impossible until the crisis of the French
Revolution. With such a mission, Science secures a place of unparalleled significance, as the
sole means through which we come to know the nature and states of this Great Being, the
love of whom ought to be the unmistakable component of our entire life. Huge similar to the
greatness of this living being measured both in Time and Space, yet each of its parts
deliberately analyzed will demonstrate the general agreement of the entirety. With a
particular ultimate objective to have a place with what is portrayed as the predictable whole
of joined animals — Comte's demeanour for (overwhelmingly human) animals who tend to
agree — one must merit of it. All 'producers of manure' are rejected; on the other hand,
animals that have rendered basic organizations can be consolidated
 22

10. References