11) Cebu Salvage Corporation vs. Philippine Home Assurance Corporation

04/02/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 512
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 667

Cebu Salvage Corporation vs. Philippine Home Assurance
Corporation
*
G.R. No. 150403. January 25, 2007.
CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondent.
Common Carriers; From the nature of their business and for

reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to
the circumstances of each case.—There is no dispute that
petitioner was a common carrier. At the time of the loss of the
cargo, it was engaged in the business of carrying and transporting
goods by water, for compensation, and offered its services to the
public. From the nature
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Corporation
of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers

are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they
transport according to the circumstances of each case. In the
event of loss of the goods, common carriers are responsible, unless
they can prove that this was brought about by the causes specified
in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. In all other cases, common
carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017010dda0fc7ba40b8d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/11
Same; The fact that a carrier does not own the vessel it uses to
consummate the contract of carriage does not negate its character
and duties as a common carrier.—Petitioner was the one which
contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had
control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings
with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact
that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the
contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a
common carrier. The MCCII (respondent’s subrogor) could not be
reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels
which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it
is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to
enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should
be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is. In fact,
in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated petitioner as
the “owner/operator” of the vessel.
Same; Bills of Lading; While it is true that a bill of lading

may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties, it cannot
prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that the
carrier and the charterer executed.—The bill of lading was merely
a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had
been received for transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as
in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS. This is
consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with
ALS. While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the
contract of carriage between the parties, it cannot prevail over the
express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner
executed: [I]n cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a
carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter
party, and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading,
“the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as
document of title passing the property of the goods, but not as
varying the contract between the charterer and the shi-
669
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 669

Corporation
powner.” The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and

not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for
the contract is the Charter Party, and is the law between the
parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that
these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy.
Same; The fact that the parties stipulated that the cargo
insurance was for the charterer’s account does not exculpate the
carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage—it
simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the
goods insured.—Petitioner asserts that MCCII should be held
liable for its own loss since the voyage charter stipulated that
cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account. This deserves
scant consideration. This simply meant that the charterer would
take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the
carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The
law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary to
public policy.
Same; To permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility

for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging
nonownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate
from the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence.—The idea
proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous, it is also
dangerous. It says that a carrier that enters into a contract of
carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own
the vessel it chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet
petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement
for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its
responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport (by the
expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed)
would radically derogate from the carrier’ duty of extraordinary
diligence. It would also open the door to collusion between the
carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of
liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to
answer for the resulting damages.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel G. Maranga for petitioner.
Arturo Carlos Astorga II for respondent.
670

Corporation
Espina & Yumul-Espina for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
May a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting

from the sinking of a ship it does not own?
This is the issue presented for the1 Court’s resolution in
this petition for review
2
on certiorari assailing the March
3
16, 2001 decision and September 17, 2001 resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 40473 4
which
in turn affirmed the December 27, 1989 decision of the
Regional5 Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145, Makati, Metro
Manila.
The pertinent facts follow.
On November 12, 1984, petitioner Cebu Salvage
Corporation (as carrier) and Maria Cristina Chemicals
Industries, Inc.
6
[MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a
voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100
metric7 tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu
Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and
discharge at Tagoloan,8 Misamis Oriental to consignee
Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.
Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984,
petitioner received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica
quartz on
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona (retired) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos
(retired) of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 34-46.
3 Id., pp. 32-33.
4 RTC Records, pp. 414-419.
5 Now, Makati City.
6 MCCII was represented by its marketing manager Tessie Cu while
petitioner was represented by its operations manager Eduardo Y. Romeo;
Rollo, p. 24.
7 Originally, the vessels named were M/T Seebees IV and M/T Shirley
but these were erased (a line put over the words) and replaced with M/T
Espiritu Santo; RTC Records, p. 5.
8 Id., pp. 5-6; Rollo, p. 24 and Records, pp. 70-71, 414.
671
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 671

Corporation
board the M/T Espiritu 9

Santo which left Ayungon for
Tagoloan the next day. The shipment never reached its
destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santo sank
in the afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol,
10
Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of the cargo.
MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its
insurer, respondent
11
Philippine Home Assurance
Corporation. Respondent paid the claim in the amount of 12
P211,500 and was subrogated to the 13
rights of MCCII.
Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC against petitioner for
reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. It ordered petitioner to pay respondent
P211,500 plus legal interest, attorney’s fees equivalent to
25% of the award and costs of suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner and MCCII entered into a “voyage charter,”
also known as a contract of affreightment wherein the ship
was leased for a single voyage for the conveyance
14
of goods,
in consideration of the payment of freight. Under a voyage
charter, the shipowner retains the possession, command
and navigation of the ship, the charterer or freighter
merely having use of the 15
space in the vessel in return for
his payment of freight. An owner who retains possession
of the ship remains
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

10 Records, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25.
11 Under marine risk note no. FD-14331; Id.
12 Id.
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. 11915. Judge Job B. Madayag, Branch
145, RTC of Makati.
14 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 374 Phil. 325, 333;
315 SCRA 709, 716-717 (1999). Citations omitted.
15 Puromines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91228, 22 March 1993,
220 SCRA 281, 288, citing US v. Shea, 152 US 178, 38 Led 403, 14 S ct
579.
672

Corporation
liable as carrier and must answer for 16loss or non-delivery of

the goods received for transportation.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it affirmed the
RTC finding that the voyage charter17 it entered into with
MCCII was a contract of carriage. It insists that the
agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII
hired the
18
vessel from its owner, ALS Timber Enterprises
(ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo,
petitioner did not have control19
and supervision over the
vessel, its master and crew. Thus, it could not be held
liable for the loss of the shipment caused by the sinking of
a ship it did not own.
We disagree.
Based on the agreement signed by the parties and the
testimony of petitioner’s operations manager, it is clear
that it was a contract of carriage petitioner signed with
MCCII. It actively negotiated and solicited MCCII’s
account, offered its services to ship the silica quartz and
proposed to utilize the M/T Espiritu Santo in lieu of the
M/T Seebees or the M/T Shirley (as previously agreed upon
in the20 voyage charter) since these vessels had broken
down.
There is no dispute that petitioner was a common
carrier. At the time of the loss of the cargo, it was engaged
in the business of carrying and transporting goods by
water, 21for compensation, and offered its services to the
public.
_______________
16 Id., p. 289.
17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. A contract of carriage is a contract by which the
carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger or goods
to his/her/its destination. A voyage charter is a type of contract of carriage
of goods wherein the owner of the ship leases the whole or part of the ship
to another for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in
consideration of the payment of freight.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id., p. 26.
21 Civil Code, Article 1732.
673
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 673

Corporation
From the nature of their business and for reasons of public

policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence over the goods they 22
transport according to the
circumstances of each case. In the event of loss of the
goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can
prove that this was brought about by 23
the causes specified
in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. In all other cases,
common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless24
they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence.
Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for
the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it
would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it
represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that it did
not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the
contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties
as a common carrier. The MCCII (respondent’s subrogor)
could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the
ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to
utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often
impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of
action under a contract of carriage if it should be required
to know who the actual owner of
_______________
22 Id., Article 1733.

23 Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of
the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or

calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
24 Article 1735, Civil Code.
674

Corporation
25
25
the vessel is. In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself
denominated
26
petitioner as the “owner/operator” of the
vessel.
Petitioner next contends that if there was a contract of
carriage, then it was between MCCII
27
and ALS as evidenced
by the bill of lading ALS issued.
Again, we disagree.
The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to
evidence the fact that the goods had been received for
transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as 28in fact it
was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS. This is
consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract
directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of lading may
29
serve as the contract of carriage between the parties, it
cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage
charter that MCCII and petitioner executed:
“[I]n cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier

covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party, and
the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, “the bill of
lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as document of
title passing the property of the goods, but not as varying the
contract between the charterer and the shipowner.” The Bill of
Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and not the contract of
carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for the contract is the
Charter Party, and is the law between the parties who are bound
by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary
30
to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.”
_______________
25 See Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70876, 19

July 1990, 187 SCRA 547, 553, citations omitted.
26 RTC Records, p. 5.
27 Rollo, p. 17.
28 RTC Records, p. 70.
29 Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 925,
932-933; 286 SCRA 257, 263 (1998).
30 National Union Fire Insurance Company Of Pittsburg v. Stolt-
Nielsen Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 87958, 26 April 1990, 184 SCRA 682,
688-689, citations omitted.
675
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 675

Corporation
Finally, petitioner asserts that MCCII should be held liable

for its own loss since the voyage charter stipulated that
cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account.31 This
deserves scant consideration. This simply meant that the
charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It
could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach
of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits
32
it and
condemns it as unjust and contrary to public policy.
To summarize, a contract of carriage of goods was shown
to exist; the cargo was loaded on board the vessel; loss or
nondelivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner failed
to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent
such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force
majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of
affreightment, the carrier was answerable
33
for the loss of
the goods received for transportation.
The idea proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous,
it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that enters into a
contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper
if it does not own the vessel it chooses to use. MCCII never
dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII
should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to
permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the
goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging
nonownership of the vessel it employed) would radically
derogate from the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence.
It would
_______________
31Rollo, pp. 17-18; RTC Records, p. 5.

32 Article 1745 of the Civil Code states:
Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable,

unjust and contrary to public policy:
(1)That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;
(2)That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods;
x x x x x x x x x
33Supra note 15, at pp. 288-289.
676

Corporation
also open the door to collusion between the carrier and the
supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from
the carrier to one without any34 financial capability to
answer for the resulting damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them, and this liability lasts from the
time goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until the
same are delivered actually or constructively by the carrier
to the person who has a right to receive them. (Sarkies
Tours Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 58
[1997])
The Warsaw Convention should be deemed a limit of
liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or
injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property
or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or
otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is
otherwise no special or extraordinary form or resulting
injury. (Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 408 [1998])
——o0o——
_______________
34 Supra note 25, at p. 554.
677
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04/02/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 512

VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 667

CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

Common Carriers; From the nature of their business and for

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cebu Salvage Corporation vs. Philippine Home Assurance

of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers

Same; Bills of Lading; While it is true that a bill of lading

VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 669

Cebu Salvage Corporation vs. Philippine Home Assurance

powner.” The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and

Same; To permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Espina & Yumul-Espina for respondent.

May a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 671

board the M/T Espiritu 9

9 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

liable as carrier and must answer for 16loss or non-delivery of

VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 673

From the nature of their business and for reasons of public

22 Id., Article 1733.

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or

24 Article 1735, Civil Code.

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“[I]n cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier

25 See Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70876, 19

VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007 675

Finally, petitioner asserts that MCCII should be held liable

31Rollo, pp. 17-18; RTC Records, p. 5.

Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable,

33Supra note 15, at pp. 288-289.

676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Notes.—Common carriers, from the nature of their

34 Supra note 25, at p. 554.

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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