Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Alexandria Division
The United States of America, through undersigned counsel, and in accord with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, files this Position of
the United States with Respect to Sentencing in the instant case. The United States asks the Court
to impose a sentence at the high end of the properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range of 24
BACKGROUND
At a hearing before this court on September 13, 2010, Defendant JUSTIN MICHAEL
WILSON pled guilty to one count of possession and transfer of a machine gun, in violation of Title
In July 2008, Defendant was stationed in Norfolk, Virginia as a service member in the United
States Navy. Defendant also served as president of the Virginia Beach Chapter of the Mongols
Motorcycle Gang. Throughout July and August 2008, the Defendant discussed a plan to stage the
theft of his motorcycle with an undercover Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives
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(ATF) agent. The Defendant hoped that this theft would enable him to file a fraudulent claim with
his insurance company for the purportedly stolen motorcycle. The Defendant subsequently sold the
motorcycle to the undercover agent for $1,200 after the agent indicated he would disassemble it and
sell the parts. Defendant then filed a false theft report with the Fairfax County Police Department
claiming that the motorcycle had been stolen. Defendant’s plans failed though when his insurance
company informed him that his policy did not cover loss by theft.
In lieu of returning the $1,200, Defendant offered to provide the agent with an AK-47
machine gun that he had unlawfully obtained and brought into the United States from his military
service in Iraq as well as two ballistic vest panels. The undercover agent agreed to this exchange,
and on August 7, 2008, left the motorcycle in a conspicuous location in Fairfax County, Virginia,
where Fairfax County police officers recovered it and returned it to Defendant. In return, Defendant
met with the undercover agent at a location in the Eastern District of Virginia and delivered the
machine gun and two ballistic vest panels. During this transaction, the Defendant demonstrated the
automatic firing capability of the machine gun to the undercover agent by showing how the weapon
could shoot more than one round, without manual reloading, by pulling the trigger only once.
Defendant stated to the undercover agent that this weapon had been in the possession of an
individual (presumably an insurgent) who Defendant had shot and killed during his service in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. (See Attachment #1). Subsequent firearms testing determined that this
was an AK-47 rifle, 7.62x39 machine gun, that had been manufactured in Izhevsk, Russia and had
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant is responsible for the possession and transfer
of a machine gun, with an additional penalty because the machine gun was stolen (Level 20). The
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penalties are a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years, a maximum fine of $250,000, a special
assessment, and three years of supervised release. Defendant is in Criminal History I and is also
eligible for a three-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and 3E1.1(b), as he has timely
admitted his guilt. Accordingly, Defendant’s Total Offense Level is 17, for a Guideline range of 24
to 30 months.
ARGUMENT
As this Court is undoubtedly aware, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005),
the Supreme Court made clear that sentencing courts should “consult [the Sentencing] Guidelines
and take them into account when sentencing.” See also United States v. Biheiri, 356 F.Supp.2d 589,
593 (2005) (“Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in [Booker] sensibly teaches that the Sentencing
Guidelines must still be taken into account pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in fashioning an
appropriate sentence.”). The Supreme Court provided this direction to promote the sentencing goals
of Congress, namely to “‘provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
[while] avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities[.]’” Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)). The Fourth Circuit has provided the following guidance in the wake of
Booker:
A district court shall first calculate (after making the appropriate findings of fact) the
range prescribed by the guidelines. Then, the court shall consider that range as well
as other relevant factors set forth in the guidelines and those factors set forth in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) before imposing the sentence.
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, sentencing courts must consider
the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the need for the sentence “to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; [and] to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) and
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arguing that a U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) enhancement should not apply as the United States has not
demonstrated “an identifiable owner of the machine gun and the theft from that owner or some other
person in possession of that firearm.” (Def’s Mot., Nov. 18, 2010). Defendant specifically contends
that the United States has failed to identify this third party through “any pleading or discovery.” Id.
The United States disagrees with Defendant’s contention, and responds here.
whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen . . . .” See United
States v. Shore, 193 Fed. Appx. 190, 191 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)
. . . applies even if [defendant] was unaware the firearm he pled guilty to possessing was stolen”);
United States v. Hendrick, 340 F.3d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta that “[§ 2K2.1(b)(4)]
would apply to a defendant who unlawfully possessed a firearm without knowledge that the firearm
was stolen). A two-level increase is therefore warranted if this Court finds that the firearm was in
fact stolen, irrespective of Defendant’s personal knowledge. As Defendant indicates in his Motion,
the agreed upon Statement of Facts to the Plea Agreement states that the machine gun “was once in
the possession of the Iraqi Military.” (Def’s Mot.; Statement of Facts at ¶ 5). The fact that
Defendant was not aware that this weapon had come from the Iraqi military is irrelevant for §
2K2.1(b)(4)(A) purposes.
Even if Defendant argues that it is possible that the weapon was not actually “stolen” from
the Iraqi military, his argument fails. The PSR correctly states that Defendant “unlawfully obtained
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[the machine gun] and brought into the United States from his military service in Iraq.” (PSR at
p.11). Pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), the United States had previously provided to Defendant
an audio tape recording of an August 7, 2008 conversation between the undercover federal agent and
Defendant that transpired during the exchange of the machine gun, a portion of which is transcribed
in Attachment #1.1 During that transaction, Defendant stated to the undercover agent, “I told you
that the butt stock is off because I (inaudible) killed the dude was shot through the fucking butt
stock.” (See Attachment #1). There is therefore ample evidence for this Court to conclude that
Defendant shot an insurgent or other individual during his service in Iraq, and subsequently took the
Any arguments from Defendant that the machine gun was not “stolen” because it was taken
from an insurgent during combat operations are flatly wrong. While Defendant certainly had a duty
to retrieve the fallen insurgent’s machine gun, he also had a duty under the Uniformed Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and applicable military regulations to return the weapon to his superiors.
See Art. 103(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 903(a) (“all persons subject to this chapter shall . . . give
notice and turn over to the proper authority without delay all captured or abandoned property in their
possession, custody, or control); Art. 103(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 903(b) (prohibiting service
categories of weapons . . . are not authorized to be retained as war trophy firearms under this
regulation: . . . (f) machinegun . . .”); see also United States v. Mello, 36 M.J. 1067, 1067-68 (1993)
(holding that defendant had engaged in looting, as codified in Art. 103, when he retrieved, and hid,
an AK-47 assault rifle from a burnt-out Iraqi bunker). The United States believes that because
1
Several audio recordings of exchanges between the undercover agent, Defendant, and others, were made available
to Defendant prior to his guilty plea.
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Defendant’s conduct was governed by military law during his service in Iraq, the UCMJ,
corresponding regulations, and case law can aid this Court in its determination of whether this
weapon is appropriately deemed stolen. In the instant case, Defendant had a legal obligation to turn
this weapon over to the proper military authorities. When he failed to do so, he had in effect stolen
Based upon the facts present in the agreed upon Statement of Facts as well as Defendant’s
admissions to the undercover agent, this Court has more than sufficient evidence to determine that
the machine gun was stolen from either (1) the Iraqi military, (2) the insurgent who was previously
in possession of the weapon, or (3) the U.S. military. A two-level increase pursuant to §
As to the Defendant’s brief objection to the description of the insurance scheme, the United
States believes that the PSR correctly stated that Defendant, of his own volition, requested that the
undercover agent assist him in selling the motorcycle. In any event, the United States does not
believe this specific issue is particularly relevant to the current case as Defendant is charged with
the possession and transfer of a machine gun, and not insurance fraud.
II. A Sentence of 30 Months Complies with the Factors and Considerations Set
Forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The United States asks the Court to adopt the PSR’s Guidelines calculation, and the United
States addresses only the § 3553(a) factors here. As explained below, based on those factors,
notably the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need for
reasonable.
Seriousness of the offense: Defendant unlawfully transferred a machine gun from a war zone
into a suburban Virginian community. While possessing and transferring a machine gun is by its
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very nature dangerous, the circumstances surrounding this case suggest that Defendant’s actions are
particularly concerning. Defendant secretly maintained control of an enemy machine gun, contrary
to controlling military law and regulations, and smuggled it back to Virginia. While some
individuals may claim that they simply hoped to retain a “war trophy weapon” for personal reasons,
Defendant’s subsequent actions were much more sinister. Defendant not only sold this weapon, but
also two stolen ballistic vest panels to an undercover federal agent who Defendant had reason to
believe planned to commit horrific acts of violence. The Court should not overlook the fact that at
the time of the offense Defendant held a leadership position within the Mongols Motorcycle Gang.
(See PSR at ¶ 38). His affiliation with a dangerous gang further demonstrates his likely belief that
this weapon would be used for illegal, and potentially deadly, purposes.
To this latter point, Defendant suggests to the probation officer that he planned to regain
control of the machine gun during some purported, later transaction. (See PSR at ¶ 28). However,
this runs contrary to his statements to the undercover agent that “right now there’s no magazine, but
if I come across it I’ll fucking give it to you.” (See Attachment #1). It seems highly unlikely that
an individual who planned to retrieve the weapon would at the same time pledge to find ammunition
for the buyer. Even if the Court were to believe Defendant’s self-serving statement to the probation
officer, Defendant knew he would have no control over the weapon once the buyer obtained it and
he almost certainly believed that the buyer planned to use the machine gun and vest panels to
commit acts of violence. This is especially true in light of the agent’s statement to the Defendant
weeks beforehand that he wanted “to go by and spray the clubhouse with it,”(see Attachment #22),
as well as Defendant stating “cool, yeah” when the undercover agent told him “like I said, I’m going
2
Pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), the United States had previously provided to Defendant an audio tape recording
of this July 13, 2008 conversation, a portion of which is transcribed in Attachment #2.
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to keep that thing buried - - and when it needs to be brought out it will be brought out.” (See
Attachment #1). Defendant’s willingness to supply a seemingly violent confederate with a machine
gun demonstrates a complete disregard for public safety. A lengthy period of incarceration will
Need to Promote Respect for the Law: The United States does not dispute that Defendant
served his country for years in the United States Navy, including service in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
However, this service does not excuse his illegal and highly dangerous actions. During this period
of service, Defendant violated military law and then sought profit from a machine gun he had stolen
from the battlefield. Moreover, years of service in the military have apparently failed to instill in
Defendant the necessity of abiding by the law. A period of incarceration within the guidelines range
is necessary and appropriate to demonstrate to Defendant the consequences of engaging in this type
of behavior.
Need for General Deterrence: A lengthy period of incarceration will also send an important
message that individuals who seek to sell war trophy weapons in the United States will be punished.
The vast majority of military service members and civilians serving in Iraq and Afghanistan do so
at tremendous risk to safety and with great personal sacrifice. Unfortunately, a limited number of
individuals smuggle unlawfully obtained dangerous weapons into the United States. The very nature
of this smuggling is highly dangerous, as weapons are sent home unsecured with little to no
precautionary measures.
Furthermore, military and civilian officials have exerted great effort to show the international
community that the United States strives to uphold international law when carrying out operations.
Defendant’s actions not only hinder this objective, they help proliferate false images of Americans
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as marauding conquerors. A period of incarceration within the guidelines will send a critical
message that turning a profit by selling “war trophy weapons” will not be tolerated.
Lastly, the United States believes as a general matter that it is important to deter those
individuals who possess and seek to sell dangerous weapons. Irrespective of how Defendant
obtained this weapon, its very presence in Virginia is a matter of grave concern. These weapons
have a devastating impact on local communities, especially when they are sold alongside combat
gear such as the ballistic vest panels. A period of incarceration at the high end of the Guidelines will
help deter those individuals who attempt to introduce dangerous weapons into their communities.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the above-stated reasons, the United States submits that a sentence at the high
end of the Guidelines is reasonable and accounts for each of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
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Respectfully submitted,
Neil MacBride
United States Attorney
/s/
Thomas J. Krepp
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Attorney for the United States of America
United States Attorney’s Office
Justin W. Williams U.S. Attorney's Building
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Phone: 703-299-3921
Fax: 703-299-3981
Email Address: Thomas.Krepp@usdoj.gov
Case 1:10-cr-00257-LMB Document 32 Filed 11/24/10 Page 11 of 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of November, 2010, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of
such filing (NEF) to the following:
Michael S. Arif
Martin & Arif
8001 Braddock Rd
Suite 100
Springfield, VA 22151
Phone: (703) 323-1200
Email: msa323@aol.com
I also hereby certify that on November 24, 2010, I will send a true and correct copy of the
foregoing via email to:
Carla Coopwood
U.S. Probation Officer
Manassas, Virginia 20109
(703) 366-2150 (fax)
/s/
Thomas J. Krepp
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
Eastern District of Virginia
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-5794
Direct: 703-299-3921
Fax: 703-299-3980
Email: thomas.krepp@usdoj.gov
.........................
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