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 WT'T' .PER FECT I MPLE M ENTATION' tS UNATTA IN A B LE

some.societics, the which_have the power to veto them.

Why 'perfect :1,gi-*:1"*_:*
ov:rcome._!h:m
-mititary)
obvious and rhere is tittle rt it ,or"i"irir"L^
except in their capacity
*"
;t';;r"rl",
These
o"
"
such possibilitics are bome in mind'during,h;", "d"ir.;, ,no
implementation' is Thal adequate time and
p.llq"#k;;;;;:.
progi;ir-"- '"'
r6rrL"'u resources ore made available to
sufficienr
unattainable h"
This condition panly overlaps the-fint, in that
it often comes within the
category of cxtemal constraints-. Ho.wever, policies
or potitically *t r"i lr.
iipi.rrry
feasible may still fait to i.". ,,",.J i-n,l;,;;*.
Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn. @mmon reason is lhat too much is-cxpeded ""t too soon,
attitudes or behayiour arc involved (ar, f",
op."i"itylrrt.n"
discriminatory ittitudcs towards "i"ipf.,-i"'"ifi-oi. ro "tt..
tti
pr,ni*rri'"r'.."i"-rritilul"ol.
Another reason is rhar potiticians sor.iiri", *iir
ir. p"i'A'jlnli"ou, no,
Why 'perfect imptementation' is unattainable the -means', so rhar ixpcndirurc rcstrictions ]n"y..,rri. l'-.,",u,ory
prograrnme of adequate rcsourccs. T}is
happcnej in tte Jase or rl.
so difficult?" Gunn 1974 Conrror of po urion Aa, sincc
I. . .l In an article entitled'Why is implcmentation ir -i"l?;;; ," ,r,.
ii;iii;;;;" Hood's analvsis 1tizo1 ana those o( Prcssman and
(ler7)'
public sccor which denied local. aurhorirics
,"ri"i""i'n ""iuiji
,ipp",",
ivil'a-JvJ; (rs?r), euioni 119i61, Kau{man (lsr/l)'. B^ardach 'rnrrJ
. rhe. additional staff needed to implemcni-the'e".'e "i, ,l**n
and t976) to problem ariscs when soeciat tunds arc
V"n f'fct"t and Van Hom (tgZS), ana King (1975 ProYide
to ,"J" o'i"'rio-n ,iJu__
;;ii;;" a shon guide to some of the rcarcns why' according Programme, bur have to bc socnr wirhin """i1"-uL,
un."rtiriiJtf
pion."ring *riters,;ny statc of'perfect implcmentation'
was likely faster rhan.the pm€rammc "n ,,r",
in... .n
i.' iJ-'tl"Jri un"t,"in"bl" in practie' Likc Hood again' Gunn
.
lo rcatizr rhar money is not""n "ri"iry
a rcsourcc "uroriii"rli,r;r"r'il""*
i" irr.lr Uui oniy :ii.iJ,, *i,rl
or
this context was an analytical c'nccpt which ao purchase real ,esourccs, and
emphasized thit 'pcrfcction'in .71 "
there rn"V U. O.t"ur. ;n ,t i,
iioJu' una not. in thc colloquiat sense of thc term' an 'id€al' to be .I convcrsion proocss- The fear of having ro
retum ir,.i"nrp.-"i ilnln,
achieved. ln other words, no prescriptive model was -offercd .and' tunding ar rhe end of rhc finan"iar ycai.orren
iiaa'i'i"iii".?g."?i;1,i". "r
perfect irflPlemcntatron - ffurry of crpcnditure, somctimcs on rclativcty
indeed, several of the logical preconditions of triviat itemsletr..pa to"
r"ltt 1.tf* .U.dicni' or-'pcrfcct control'- werc identffied as being persuade financc offioers to allor
^ and
ioratly Politiellyquitc unacreptable as wcll as unattainable in a nexr nnanciar v*, tlrry-il ff":f;::::lTl,,,H::::t l:?;
"i"thcv
quitc timired in whar to o""r-;;;;;;
pluralist democracy.
What; then, are thes€ prcconditions which would havc
to bc satisficd "n do
effectivc imprementation. Ttey can onty """;;;;t
advise poriticians
.,*"
why are they unlikely lead times which may be invotved b"f"r;; about the
if perfect implernentatlon wcre to be achieved and
plan the annual cash flow to ar
p."g;"i;; ;ilil;:rt,,
to be achieved in Practice? *. *,"
anticipatc ur*r i" ;"-"::'1";:1,ili'ff 1,"fli"J,.11
aSency do not impose ""y "ei.
tAThe circumttances erternal to the imPlemenling That the required combination
" crippling constoins The third condition follows on;atura y
ol resources is actually available
i#. o6rt""to lo imolemeniation are outside thcand control of adrninistra- from thc second, namelv that
tors because lhey are exrernal lo the poticy the imPlemcnting there must nor only be consrraints
in tenns of overaii;;ilffiJ,
asencv. Sucir obstacles may be physicat' as when an
-agricultural
that,
.at cach sage in thc implemenration Or,r*.., ,i. "tso 'rrrLjn".
*, drought or discase' or.thev ma1,be political combination of resources musr acualty
bc avariru. ri pr*f.l',ir.* L
;?;;;;*;; i. back bv
to achicve It are often a 'boftlencck' which oern
in ihat cither the Policy or the rneasures needed

"""t"p,"ui"
a interesti lsuch as party activists' trade unions' or' in manpower. una. .quip,""nt,
.o @nstrucr. an cmergency landing*rrip
;ffi :';r.3;,:#T*i:,llhliillifJ;
ior ttre RnF, ;;;;
Analysb for thc Real World of th6e is detayed and as a resutithe ;"r";"r.
F om B. W. Hogwood and L' A' Gunn' Policy irol*, * *rii. i. * irii. o"
(1984), Orford: Oxford Univcrsily Prcss' "
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 IMsLEMENTATION
WHY .PERFECT TM PLEM ENTATTON' IS UNATTAINAA
L€
.Q\That dependency relatiorships arc minimal Houiing Association, Manpower Scrvices Commission,
vThis condition of 'perfect implcmcntation' rcquires that therc i! a lingle
--- Rqtionat Council. Gty of Glasgow Oistrict Councit,-aiJ'
Strathclyde
implementing agency which n€cd not depend on other agc-cies for puDtrc bodres _ as well as community groups,
r.J.."t ort.,
success, or if other agencies must be involved, that the deftndency selvcs, and the privale businesscs and invlrors
the inhabihnts them_
relationships are minimal in numbcr and imPortancc. Where' aiiroften who, ii i.iop.o, *iff U.
attracted to the regeneratcd area. Thc question of wheth".'GEAR
the case in practice, inrplementation r€quires not only a complex series p€rtial succ€ss .mutually i.
of ev€nts and tinkages (see [abovcl) but also agreement at eagh event
story or a. non_cffective group oi o.g;nisations,"
p'l! and Moncy, re82) is thc ,ubj; ;i
*,i""o.u"t. in
among a large number of participants, then rhe probabil$r. - of a !9T!h,.
poin.s, impatieocc.with thc probtems of working
ru..."rful or1""n predictiblc outcome must be funher ii:ducca. ' ].f_,,11o;_11 T".rat
wlrn so targe a group of organizations has led
" argu€ that'Adiiing ihe number of n!".ssaty
Pressman and Wildavsky to suggestions that an
Urb.an Developmenr Corporation (similar to tt
clearanccs involved in decision points lhroughout the historLof the or" ini.tuli to eng_
t1!.) _misfrr provide a morc cffecrivc u"si, r". ,"!"i"."tinfcrrrgo*t
program will give an idea of the lask involved in sccuring implementa- declining Easr End.
tion.' (A decbion point will be rcached cach time an act of agreement
has to be registered for the Programmc to continue, and clcaranEe is the Thar ftcrc- is undentanding of,
nanre given to each iostance in which a seParatc participaot is r,equired 17,) rrd ogrrr^rn on. cbicctives
lne requrrcmcnt here is that.thcrc should bc cotnilct"
to give his conscnt.) By a proccss of simple arithmctical calc-ulation' - of, and agreement on, .hc objccrivcs ro bc
understanding
Pressman and Wildavsky show that, even if there is a high chlnce of . "cil;;;:-"Jih",
conditions should persisr throughout rtrc imptmlntatio"
,h.r.
obtaining a clearancc from a singlc particiPant at a given decisioi:point' shoutd. perhaps repear rhar rhis .rcquircment, fr*.... 1w"
whcn all the probabilitics arc multiplied togcther thc ovcrall ch4qces of .pcrfca k ;;it; 'reis or the
slcndcr.
ideat-rype model of implcminarion,, no jrJjftJi'_ t", I"o
ruoi* -" citremcly , .
' ,: descriptivc - modet ij offcrcd ai rhis poinr.)
Such calc'rlations arc a littlc mislcading since, as Bowen (1982)eo,i4!s
,[.., m" thcory of planning- is.. rcptctc iith ."f"r"n"". ro objertives
.
.l
if
out, the chanccs of succcss arc considcrably improved thlrc are whi.!, we arc rotd by managcrialist *.it"", st ouiJ
rep€ated attempts at s€curing agrccmcnt at tricky decision f,nints, spccific, and preferably qu.n--tificd, undcaiol,
u"ii."ii'o"nn"o,
conc€ntration of resourccs on difficuh clcaranccs, parallel attcmPts to the organiz:rion, muruallv ccmpatibte anU ""0 "jr"J.i-"gr,"*
achieve simila,' results by differcnt routcs, and the beginning of a ' t' blueprint against which aciuat programmes
supponuJ,
'* proriO" ,
"rrA- i{qwever,
'bandwagon' cffect (sc€ also Bardacb, L977,242'-3). Further, Prqssman l can monitored.
[. . .l m*t ;esearch studics sugg6t that, in rcal life, lhe objectives
and WilJavsky's calculation was bascd on an 'all'or-nothing' conc€pt of organiz:tions or_ programmes arJoft"n aiin"_,rir of
ro iJ"ntfr'o-r"Sir.t
a favourable outcome at each decision point, whcreas the chaEces of vague and- evasive acrms. Evco .official, in
partial succcss might well bc highcr' That bcing said, it still scems- likely msy noa bc compatiblc with onc anothcr,
objectives, *ii"* ir"y "a
"*i.,,
rf," po..i-Uiiil oi-nni"t
ihat the greater rhe number of clcaranccs rcquircd among other bdies or confirsion is incrcased whcn professional "nio.
in implemcntation, thc lower will be thc of full groui i-fif.r","
involved chances i
*1, r*l 'unofficial' goals witnrn a pregramme.",'f,!.
Official obiecrives are
implcmentation. :- oncn poorly. understood, perhapc becausc
It is not only in a federalsystcm such as the USA that progrtmmes and outwards from hcadquaners
communications io*n*"ro"
inidequatc. er."if .Ul.ri"",
can become overextended in tcrms of both causal chains and numbers of have initialry been underst-'od and-arc
agrccd, it does not folorv that this
participating agencies. Anthony King (1976) argucs that the caPacity of state of affairs wiu persisr throughoui rhe
tifetime ;; ,h;';..;...,
tsritish government to deal with its problcms is diminishing becaub'the s-r_[ce goals are susccptible to
su€lss|on, multiplication, expa,rsion, and
number of depcndency relationships in which government is involved displacement. Ariy of rhese r"na"n.io *ilr
has increased substantiaily'. Thus it is nowada)E relatively rare for tlon -'i;il;;;lh. fi;],;rn.","-
_process and even - in thc eyes ol top managem€nt _.subven, it.
implementation of a public Programmc to involvc only a Sovernment
lfirl *".= rhar apparcnr .imilemenraiion tuiiirr..;'."" '"-rJrn r.o.
depaflment on ttre one hand and a group of affected c;tizens on the reatures of other stages in the poiicy process.
oaher. tnstead there is likely to be an intcrvelllgietwork of local '
authoriaies, boards and commissions, voluntary associations, and olga- ,fk" *" spccif.ed. h
nized groups. An cxample of multi-stage, multi'agency implementation
T!. the coadition
Here l!!y is that conect seguence
ifl moving towards agreed objectives rt is
is the Glasgow Eastern Area Rencwal (GEAR) project, involving as it possibte to specify, in conrplcte detair-ano
perrecGiui"*li" ,_*, a
does rhe Scottish Office, Scottish Dcvelopment Agency, Scottish SPecial bc perfbrmed by each panicipant. The difficuttieJ
oi-acii;",^,.
 IIIPLEMENTATTON
:".dit]9t of perfecr implemeotation are obvious. Also ir is surely
desirable as well as inevitablc that there should be some room foi
discretion and improvisation in cven the most carefully planned pro_
gramme- But techniques such as nctwork planning and conirot . -l-c.n
[.
at lcast provide a framework within which projccrs can be planned and
implementation conrrollcd, by identifying rhe tasks to bc acromplished,
the relationships betwcen thesc tasks and the logical sequcncc in which
they should be performed. Thcre remain, of coune, ihe managerial
problems of actually ensuring that tasks are pcrformed corrcctly and on
time and of taking appropriatc remcdial action if thcy are not.
ril
r$ That thcre is pcrlect communication and co-ordination
The precondition hcrc is lhat there would have to be pcrfca com-
munication among and coordination of the various clcmenls or agcncies
involved in rhe programmc. Hood (1976) argucs thar for p€rfecl
implementation to bc achicvcd it would be neccssarv to have a
completcly unitary administrativc system .like a huge army with a
- free
glngle line of authoriry' - with no compartmenralism oiconffia wirhin.
He is not, of course, advocating such a s)6lem. Even 10 statc this
condition of pcrfcct coordination is lo knorp that, lcaving aside
quGlions of dcsirability. its atrainment would bc all but impossible
within and among rcal-lifc organizations whicfi are charactcrizcd by
departmcntalism, profcssionalism, and thc activitiG of many groups
with thcir own valucs, goals, and inleresG to protect.
C.ommunicaticrn has'an imponant contribu{ion to ."k. ro
ordination and to implcmcntation gcnerallv. Howevcr, pcrfe.t c.rm_ --,1'
munication is as unaflainable a condition as most of thc othes wc have
examined. Whilc managcmcnt information systems (MtS) can assist in
matching information flow to nccds, lhcy cannot cnsurc that the
resulting data, advice, an<i instructions arc undcrstood as irtendcd bv j
the senders, or indeeC, understood at all. Ccordination is not. of j
course, sirnply a matter of comrnunicating information or of setting up
. suitable adrninistrative structurcs, but involvcs the cxercise of powei,
and this lcads to lhe final condition for perfect impl€mentation.
Thot those in authority ean demand and obtain pc(cct compliartce
! Hood's phrasc is'pcrfect obediencc' and he cxpands it to mean.no
resistance to clmmands at any point in (he administrative slatem'. If
there were any potential for rcsistancc it wor:ld be identifieC (io Hood's
modei of'perfect administraticn') by the systcm's .pcrfcct iniormation'
and forestalled by its .p€rfect control'. In other words. the final and
perhaps lcast attainable condition of p€rfect implementation is that
those'in authori:y'are also thosc .in power'and ihat they are able to
secure total and immediate corrrpliance from others (both intcrnal and
WHY.,PERFECT IMPLEMENTATTON' IS UNATTAINAALE
245
exterllal ao (h_e agency) whosc conscna and co-operation are required
for
the stcccss of the programme. In praaice, within an agency tirere may
be @mpartmcntalism, ber,veen agencies there may be tnflicrs of
interest- and status disputcs, and those with the foimal aurhority
to
demand co-operation may lack the power to back up fhese dcmands
or
ttle- wrfl to cxercise it. Every administrative practitioner knows
how
difncult it would be to achieve the condition of pcrfect compliance.
Most of us would add that wc would not want to live or work in suctr
a
system.
When implementation involves, as it sometimes does, innovation and
the. management of changc - with major dcparturcs from prcvious
policies and practices - therc rvill be piniculiAy high probatility
ot
suspicion, recalcitrancc, or outright rcsistancc frori affLJO individuals,
groups, and inrere;rs, esiccially if insufficient timc has bccn Jlowed
for
cxptanauon and @nsultation or if any prcvious cxpcricnce ofchange
has
been unfortunate. We cannot (and should lot) hopc cver to bc
from such resistancc, but we can learn a good deal about its nature and
about thc rcsponses open to adminisrrators from the study of individual,
group, organizational, and political bchaviour. Thus thi psydrologist,
sociologis, and political scicntist havc at lc:st as muclr to Lntribute to
our undcrstanding of implcmcntation as have thc prcgrammc designcr,
nctwork planncr, and information systens analyst.-[. l.]
A'topdown' perspective?
Thc language, ooncepts, and approach cmploycd to this point would be
rcgarded 6y some more rccent writers on implementation _ or, in rhcir
laoguage, the poliry-action relationship' - as biased and limiting-
Barrett and Fudge (1981) argue that much of the literature to which we
have so far made feferer.ce demonstratcs a .managerial' pcrspective.
refleding a 'policy-centred' or .top-down' view in w-hich implementers
are seen as 'ageots' o( thosc who claim to make poticy. They irguc rhat:
ra(hcr than trc.ting implcmc[(atioo as thc transmission of policy ioto a scrics
of conscquen(ial actions, thc policy-ac-tion rclationship ncc4s to bc rcgarded
as a proccss of intcraction and ocgotiation, taking placc ovcr timc. bJrwccn
thosc sceking to pur policy into cffcct and al|osc upon *hom action depcnds.
F-rom our previous comments on thc interdependencc of p<rlicy_making
and implementation, on the soope for officials to initiatc and inflrrcnce
policy, and on tlle limits to centrally imposed objectives, co_ordinatioo,
and demanG for compliance, it will be obvious that we can aeree wath
muclr of the above statement as a dcsciption of what happcis in real
 246
IMPLEM€NTATION WH i, .PERFECT t MPLE M ENTATT oN. t5 UNATTAI NA B LE

life. We also agree - indeed' is there Snyone who does not?-

on the road;ds€rs, local authoritics, and lhe
ccntral government such queslions
iroon"n"" of Jnderstanding lhe contribution to 'the comPlexity- €lhe as.w,!bn, how, and wherhcr the changeover
s-h"riJ il; ;;j"'
*ii., oro""tt' of 'environmlnral, politiel' and organizatioral' fac*ors' We do not disagree with Barrett and Fudge
when ,f,.ylrir.,tr,
lf'ur, in t""t ing to criticize some at least of thc so-called ''oP{gwn' many occasions .lower
levet acrors rake.deci;ons which-lffei;iy
on
rmit
wriaers, Barrelt-and Fudgc are creating a slraw man and rcmefues hierarchical influence, Dre-emDt top decision_making,
..-"ii.r'..p"lf_
appear'to confuse ideal-type modcls of P€rfect imPlcmentation
wlh a cies"', bur wc find it difhcutt to r
''-Barrctt or pr€scriptivc model.
normative i- 119,1irreir..*;.r"e;;';;*T,Ti,T::':#.1Ti,,"r:T;'if ,
and'Fudge themselves oftcn s€em to drift between descriifive' actron @ntinuum.. Implementation
must inuotue
argument' Hierarchy and the 'chai6- of ' fro"e.a oflni"J""uon
and prcscriptive ityles of D€tween organizations, lhe me "
.or*"nO' are clearly out of fivour and the term 'topdown' is qsed ''"rue.,p.oioti*;,; o;.H[H,""t#:"1",H"*;.*o,.ff I
vi(ually as an cPithet throughout' They ap-par not. only.to stJue advocaring the policy. Much of rhis inr".""tlon on'"ii"ii"uro ,"*.
,J.i"t,iu, aaively to dislikc any suggcstions that 'politics and adminis- placc before poricy formurarion (c.g.
in the r.r.
trltion' might bc viewed as separate. though such an argumcnt
hafrhe authoriry associations bv central
lon"rnrn"ni "r
a"pirn;r,"r,
-"r"i"iti'.i';;*rn
,.."r
administr'{ion, but also' more (hcrc is no goarantee that
cuiious cfflct of not only politicizing such.prior consulration will projuce
*orrvinelv, of dc-politicizing Therc is, of course, an impodant consent. whilc attempr will subsequently 'iyt prior
Politics- u" i"a.
ofiu.Aap bctwcen politics and administration but thcrc arc also local authorilies and oihers .u1rcn whom "'"-"""i'"i"*a
aaion deperrds,,to-.Jif,
"r."
morc substantial areas of rclatively indcpcndent functioning
which are redirect rhe policy\ rhrusr, rhere are
""a
worth prcscrving, both analytically and in practice' i" constitutional limits _ ro how far such
surety timit! -ii ""fr'["ri
p"rr_f"girt",i"" ,"i..i,i"'"O_ ""0
tf pr'cssca, *J tutt pl""d guilty to a measure of sympathy witlflhe. . mishiog shoutd bc rakcn. Fina[v. wc wouia
argrie rt"r ttZ
,.ot'"*" "ii*, iioniy Ln m"gt*nds that lthosc sccking to put pott3. are co'nccmcd
f.Jpuu"
pi""*li *ii',*",i"i&rr,y,
inio cffcct'are usuatty clcctcd whilc'thosc upon Y'iom aclion d:ryn$. - ffiSq:l?"?:arysis
are not, at least in ihc casc of civil servants and the staff.bf
h93ltb
lr"i."r, nurion"lized industrics, etc. tn the case of local authoritics'-Qf '-
couricils' Referens
-u*. *. have competing democratic lcgitimacics. since local
ualch ' ^lI
too, arc clected, and we necd not elaboratc uPon thc controvcrsy
unusually i Bardact. E (1977), Th< Imokmcat
has bcen created in thc cady 1980s by ccntral Eovcmxrcnt's
asscrtivc attitudc towards' and attcmPts to cxcrcisc dominancc
oler' gT,il-#,:iif;'ffi :s,1itr;ft lift";*;;Hi'Ir
local authorities' Even in thc casc of ccntraHocal rclations' howcrcr' dundancy? .{ *a-i"pp'.j[,1J
we find it difficult 10 see why thc vicvr from thc toP is ncccssarilyfcss tioa, @, pp. 56-72.
"Tffirrgffil,.'?;nxiffij::
valid than that from other levcls. Of course. anycnc can thinl( of i Bowcr, E. R. 09g2), "Thc prcssnnarMldavsky
paradox" lournal of Public
. favourirc examples of national policics so mldnceivcd .that they I Poric',,2,l--a,.
J.."ru"d to Ue stinea at birth and we havc alrcady indicatcd our Yiew ; Eaioni. A. (196), Socia! probknc. hgtcwood
Oitrs, NJ, prcnricc Halt-
poliCies: Guon, L (1978),.why is imolcmcntatioi
ihat 'implementation failures' can often bc traced to inadequatc ' so amit zl','il*i)Eiii,*,". .
view looks Covca44n1.
Choose'different examples, however' and the 'bottom-up' Hood, C. C. (1976), Thc Umis ol Admihb.rarion.
lcss attractive. If a Home Secretary is committed to bettcr relat!915- Kaufman,. (rer), london, Wilcv.
tetwecn Policemen and black youths, should we view with "qYlntTty
H. Thc Uni' il o,8,"irri";;i A;;;:,er"'i'#", rrn,".^,.
ty of Alabama press
the penistencc of 'street level'police attitudG and actions which are Kiog, A. (f975). .Overload: Drobl
P.wtcms of govcming in the tgzos'. Poiitical
ooenlv racist? If thc central health departments were to take a strong€r siudiq,i,;;'. rni;;-"
ti'n" on ttre need for preventive medicine, wotrld it not be a mattcr
of ;iing,a. (f 96), .Thc problcm of ove ..toad,,
legitimate concern if many clinicians and health authorities 'ontinued to _ a Govcm?,l,ondon, BBC publicatrons. in Wh, is Birain becomiaR Harder
diTea resources towards 'i\eroic' medicine which' in tcrms of lives saved rrcssraan, J. l. and A. Wildavskv (t!
. . fi3), Implementarroa, Berkelcy.
(anJ rhc qualitv of some of those lives), often seem less than good of Califomia press. Universrty
Van Mctcr, D. anC C. E- Van
value? lf Parliament decided to move from left-hand to right-hand drive Horn (t975). .The policy implemcnurron
prcccss, a conccptual framework,,
on our roads, would we be happy to leave to 'ncgotiation' between Admiaailtlon o"a,sniity: ;?;.-"