EN BANC

[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.

SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson
and petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 an Act which further defines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 against them on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. They further argued that if the case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan, their right to procedural due process would violate as they could no
longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under
RA 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
The Court ruled that the challengers of Section 4 and 7 of RA 8249 failed to rebut
the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions.
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. Since it is within the power of the Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7
placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Moreover,
petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of RA 8249 is incorrect.
The same contention had already been rejected by the Court considering that the right
to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto law. RA 8249 pertains only to matters f procedure, and
being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex pose
facto law.
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the Court ruled that for failure to show in the
amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, the constitutionality of
Sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249 is sustained and the Addendum to the March 5, 1997
resolution of the Sandiganbayan is reversed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; SANDIGANBAYAN; REQUISITES TO FALL UNDER ITS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b)R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d)Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), or (e)other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT DETERMINES THE SANDIGANBAYANS JURISDICTION IS THE OFFICIAL
POSITION OR RANK OF THE OFFENDER. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code,
the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of
R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section
4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer
as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; DEFINED; REPUBLIC ACT 8249 NOT AN EX POST
FACTO LAW. Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In
Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing
of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. (e)
every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate civil
rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful; (g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Ex
 post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606
as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statue, i.e. one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT TO APPEAL IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT BUT
STATUTORY IN NATURE THAT CAN BE REGULATED BY LAW. Petitioners and intervenors
contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected
by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to
matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an
ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still
has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.
5. ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN; JURISDICTION; DEFINED; SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT 8249
REQUIRES THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED MUST BE COMMITTED BY THE OFFENDER IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER IT. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction
over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. l8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction
over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases
committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new [1987] Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
BY THE ACCUSED PUBLIC OFFICER IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN. The stringent requirement that the
charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the
discharge of the accuseds official duties. In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled: It is an elementary rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
evidence after trial. In (People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), where the amended information
alleged Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
 and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and x x x special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed,
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed
the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and
acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in
consequence thereof. We held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office,
besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the accused. Unlike in Montejo the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested
and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum
of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they spot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. In the
aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public
office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Fortun Narvasa Salazar for petitioner.
Chavez Laureta Associates for petitioners-intervenors.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus.Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs,
are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in
a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-
intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with
a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the
Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-
six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) informations for murder [2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division,
while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, [3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the
accused[6] was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the
cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner
and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue
of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House
Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 [12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 [13]. The law is
entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February
25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying
the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it,
but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting,
the Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already
done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxxxxxxxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest
has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous
vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try
and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section
7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were
in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his
right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that
trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
23057 to procedural due process

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act
No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in
the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be
violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in
support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying
that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
 This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with
those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the
present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known

as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provision in Article XI, Section 4:

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 [21] created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,
[24]
P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments
introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:

SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.

x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:

SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high
rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and

employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.

xxxxxxxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
 Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word
accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at
loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not theSandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the
Subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has
the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court
except in certain cases,[29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), [30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and
(e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph
b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b
and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to
equal protection of the law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Balelengcases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of
an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus,
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
 (1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class, [35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the
law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. [36] In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their
respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, [37] it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that
it shall apply to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened
that theKuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases
where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the
new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had
expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner
further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word principal in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.
[39]
R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of theSandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
 Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right
to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. [43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. [46] R.A. 8249
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
[48]
R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been rejected by the court several times [50] considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a
penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. [52] Moreover, the law did not alter
the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
 In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court
still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of
the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it defines
theSandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have
to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title[57] is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally interpreted and
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. [59] The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No.
8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is
the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case
against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case.Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information, [61] and not by the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section
4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. [65] This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates:

SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.(Emphasis
supplied)

As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained
in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]

The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such
a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense,
and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him
as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
[70]

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show theintimate relation/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:
 AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G.
DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO
B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime
of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon

City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO,
SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein asaccessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY TO LAW

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It
is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among
others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the
victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests
were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by
the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests
and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is
the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation
to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would
show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision
and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan
City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated
Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not
held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the
crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.

Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and
then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege
that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented
by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged,
in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004]

1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 2LT.

RYAN H. QUISAI, TSG. ELMER D. COLON, CAPT. JULIUS W.
ESPORO, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. GIL P. LOZADA, SGT.
RAYMUND DUMAGO and PFC. REGIE A.
ALAGABAN, petitioners, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), B.GEN.
MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as Judge Advocate General
(JAG) of the AFP, and OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
AUTHORITY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 162341. October 25, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS

OF CPT. RUPERTO L. REASO, LTSG. NORBERTO E. SANTIAGO,
1LT. DANNY C. CANAVERAL, 1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT.
EMERSON L. MARGATE, 1LT. JEFFREY GAUGUIRAN, LTJG.
CEFERINO CHECA, LTJG. MARCO ANGELO J. ANCHETA, LTJG.
ELMER TORRIADO, LTJG. RONALD A. GALICIA, 2LT. LAUREFEL
P. DABALES, 2LT. MARY JAMES A. TAYABAN, 2LT. JASON P.
PANALIGAN, 2LT. RYAN QUISAI, 2LT. NESTOR JASON CAMBA,
2LT. ARCHIBALD RANEL, 2LT. RESINO S. ORTEZA, 2LT. NOEL F.
TOMENGLAY, 2LT. LEOPOLDO APELLANES, JR., 2LT.
JONATHAN D. COSTALES, 2LT. OSWALD IAN DIRA, 2LT.
SAMSUDIN T. LINTONGAN, 2LT. ALQUIN CANSON, 2LT.
JUNIBERT S. TUBO, 2LT. EDWIN DUETAO, 2LT. MARK P.
DAMASO, 2LT. JIOVANNI PALLIAN, 2LT. EDGARDO AGUILAR,
2LT. NORMAN SPENCER, 2LT. LARRY S. CENDANA, 2LT.
AVELINO SAHLI, 2LT. LEXINGTON ALONZO, 2LT. FILMORE
RULL, ENS. VICTOR ODULLO, ENS. IAN LUIS BADECAO, ENS.
RONALD E. DISO, ENS. ARJOHN ELUMBA, ENS. BRIAN
BABANG, ENS. ANTONIO BOSCH, ENS. TED CEREZO, ENS.
HAROLD DAVE PRE, ENS. JEFFREY BANGSA, ENS. JONAH
ARUGAY, ENS. JONATHAN J. ADLAWAN, ENS. EMERSON
ROSALES, ENS. ELMER CRUZ, ENS. REX P. CALLANO, ENS.
JUVENAL AZURIN, ENS. LYLE ROSOS, ENS. CESAR CARMEL
TAMBA, CPO. LEONIDO FERNIN, EM3 RONNIE GUMIA, PO3
ROULEX MAGISA, TSG. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD, SSG.
NORBERTO MARTINEZ, SSG. BERTING CABANA, SSG. JOERY
ROJO, PO2 EDWARD ABUAC, SSG. LEO GAPAYAO, SSG.
ROMAR ARQUERO, SSG. RALLON BEBASA, SSG. LORENZO
GLORIOSO, SSG. NOEL AGGALUT, SSG. PHILIP VITALES, SSG.
FRANCISCO BOSI, JR., SSG. BONIFACIO BARRION, SSG.
RUBEN SORIANO, SSG. RONALD REYES, SSG. WILFREDO
LEAL, SSG. GUILLERMO LAVITORES, SGT. ALFREDO
ALEGADO, JR., SGT. GREGORIO SANDAGON, SGT. JIGGER
PACULBA SGT. JOJO ABANDO, SGT. JUANITO JILBURY, SGT.
ERIC CASTINO, SGT. ANTONIO CARABATA, SGT.REYNANTE
DANTE ESCATRON, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. JERAN
TABUJARA, SGT. RESTITUTO DEBORJA, SGT. NILO ENASO,
SGT. JULIUS WESFIRO, SGT. ROLDAN ANDO, SGT. LORENZO
CARRANZA, SGT. DANTE SANTOS, SGT. WALTER
MANALANSAN, SGT. JUDE ARQUISOLA, SGT. HERMAN LINDE,
SGT. ALEXANDER SICAT, SGT. FLORANTE ROSETTE, SGT.
ROMELO SY, SGT. JOEY MEMBREVE, SGT. ADONIS PRADO,
PO3 JESSMAR LANDONG, PO3 ROBERTO TRIPULCA, PO3
SONNY MADARANG, PO3 RHOMMEL LORETE, PO3
CARISTOFEIL TIKTIK, PO3 RENATO BUSTILLO, PO3 JERRY
ASUNCION, PO3 LUDIVICO CLEMENTE, CPL. REY RUBIOS,
CPL. EMMANUEL TIRADOR, CPL. OLIVER COMBAUCER, CPL.
JOEL ABAYA, CPL. RANDEL CENO, CPL. RONALD RETUTA,
CPL. JULIUS TANALLON, CPL. FILOMENO RAMIREZ, CPL.
JIGGER ALAMEDA, CPL. RAYMUND DUMAGAO, CPL. EDGAR
VELASCO, CPL. RAMONCITO TAMPON, SN1 ALLAN DULAP, SN1
JERRY REGALARIO, SN1 JOEL MASENAS, SN1 JONATHAN
PEREZ, S1HM ROMUALDO GANANCIAL, SN1 ROEL GADON,
F1EM GARY PAYOS, SN1 ZANDRIX GACU, SN1 ROMMEL
ANONUEVO, SN1 WILLIAM ABLITER, SN1 GERMINIO
FERNANDEZ, SN1 ARNEL CAPUNO, SN1 CLEOFAS PAMIENTA,
S1HM TIMOTEO ABARRACOSO, S1CD GERARDO
DEDICATORIA, SN1 LEONOR FORTE, JR., CPL. JEOBAL
GONZALES, CPL. ALADIN GOMEZ, CPL. HARDY GLAGARA,
CPL. CESAR A. PADILLA, CPL. JERSON ALABATA, CPL. OLIVER
GERIO, CPL. TEDDY ANTONIO, CPL. DENNIS LOPEZ, CPL. RUEL
MOLINA, CPL. ALVIN CELESTINO, CPL. BENJAMIN
RAMBOYONG, JR., CPL. GERRY CALINGACION, CPL.
ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, CPL. JONATHAN DAGOHOY, CPL.
CLECARTE DAHAN, CPL. RAYMOND PASTRETA, CPL.
LORENZO BIAO, CPL. ALEX PENA, CPL. ROGUN OLIVIDO, CPL.
MONCHITO LUSTERIO, CPL. GEORGE GANADOS, CPL.
MICHAEL BALISTA, PVT. 1ST CLASS MAXINIAR BALANAY, PVT.
1ST CLASS BONIFACIO CAOALO, PVT. 1ST CLASS REGGIE
ALAGABAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ANGELO MARQUEZ, PVT. 1ST
CLASS JOHN GAIHAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS MARCIAL CAISA, PVT.
1ST CLASS CARLOS FILLIOS, PVT. 1ST CLASS PATROCENIO
PATENO, PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLLY BERNAL, PVT. 1ST CLASS
NOVIDA RUIZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS MELCHOR ALOOS, PVT.
1ST CLASS JOEL MALALAY, PVT. 1ST CLASS JULIETO BANAS,
JR., PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLAND BANAAG, PVT. 1ST CLASS NIXON
MAGALLIS, PVT. 1ST CLASS RICHARD LARCE, PVT. 1ST CLASS
SINDY BONOTAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ARNOLD PULPULAAN, PVT.
1ST CLASS ABRAHAM APOSTOL, PFC. CHARLES AGNER,
S2RM JULIUS CEAZAR ALFUENTE, PFC. EDILON ANDALEON,
PFC. RONALDO BAYOS, PFC. MARCIAL BAYSA, S2EM
ABRAHAM BILLONES, CPL. ABNER BIRAL, PFC. JEFFREY
BOLALIN, SN2 JEFFREY BONCACAS, 1LT PATRICIO
BUMIDANG, JR., S2BM JOSEPH BUSCATO, CPT. EINSTEIN
CALAOA, JR., PFC. EDWIN CANETE, SN2 EZRA JERRY
CARUMBA, S2PH GLENN CARUMBA, SGT. ARIMATEO B.
CEDENO, SN2 ALEX CHAN, PO3 COCARI GONZALES, FN2 ALEX
DEL CALLE, PFC. HANZEL DELA TORRE, SN2 SONNY DELA
VEGA, PFC. JOSE DEMONTEVERDE, 1LT. JOSE ENRICO M.
DINGLE, PFC. ALADINO DOGOMEO, ENS. DENNIS DONGA, PFC.
RUEL ESPINILLA, PFC. RODRIGO FERNANDEZ, SN2 JULIUS
GARCIA, SGT. ALLAN INOCENCIO, TSQ. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD,
PFC. JERSON LABILLES, CPL. DANILO LAGRIMAS, SN2 ALLAN
LEONOR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER LO, S2BM JERIC LORENA,
S2DP ANGELITO LOYLOY, PFC. LUIS NOVIDA, SN2 EMMANUEL
LUMACANG, CPL. RIZAL MANIMTIM, PFC. GALIB MOHAMMAD,
SSG. GIL MONTOJO, PFC. BENJAMIN NANGGAN, PFC. ARNOLD
NIALLA, SN2 FERNANDO PACARDO, SGT. JOVITO PACLEB,
 PFC. CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, LTJG. JENNIFER PILI, PFC.
CARLOS PILLOS, PFC. JOCIL REGULACION, S2DC GARY
REYES, S2EM VALENTIN SAMAR, LT/SG. NORBERTO
SANTIAGO, JR., FN2 FRANCISCO SEVILLA, JR., SN2 MIKE
SOLAR, SN2 ROMMEL SOLIS, PFC. JOJIT SORIANO, CPT.
EDMAR B. SORIOSO, SSG. JUAN TUQUIB, SN2 JOEL TYBACO,
S1BM RONALDO URBANO, S2HM EDGAR VASQUEZ, SGT.
IGNACIO VIGAR, ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, petitioner, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, BRIG. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., as AFP Judge Advocate General, and ALL
PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR STEAD AND UNDER THEIR
AUTHORITY, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR, J.:

Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the
General Court-Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with
violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in
connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.
In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this Court a Petition
for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment
Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the
[1]

AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said commitment order, all
the Major Service Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take custodial responsibility of all the
military personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny belonging to their respective
commands. This included all the junior officers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to
as Capt. Reaso, et al.) who are subject of the instant petition for habeas corpus. The
[2]

commitment order, however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, LtSG.
James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo
O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon would remain under the custody of the Chief
of the ISAFP. [3]

In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et al.),
seven of the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the General Court-
Martial from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for alleged
violations of the Articles of War.
 Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya who, as
Chief of Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control over all the members and
agencies of the AFP, and Brigadier General Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP and officer in command of the Judge Advocate General Office
(JAGO), the agency of the AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings.

Background [4]

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP the Philippine Armys Scout Rangers
and the Philippine Navys Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises
of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the
Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building
and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.
The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a
small number of junior officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were
later identified as including Navy LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine Capt.
Gary Alejano.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement
through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood
to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Among those grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms
and ammunition to the enemies of the State, the bombings in Davao City which were
allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain
more military assistance from the United States government, and the micro-
management in the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command
and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration.
Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their
positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a state of rebellion and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting
down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating
their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and later,
indefinitely.
In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the
Government team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between
the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the
occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were
out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
 The Filing of Charges

Under the Information dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court
[5]

(RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers
who took part in the Oakwood Incident with violation of Article 134-A (coup detat) of the
Revised Penal Code. Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. (G.R.
[6]

No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso,
et al. (G.R. No. 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al.,
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by
Judge Romeo F. Barza.
On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial
court:

1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and

2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of
the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against
the 316 other accused. [7]

While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated
October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup detat against only 31 of the original
[8]

321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of
evidence.
Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its
Order dated November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended Information dated October
[9] [10]

30, 2003 charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup detat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Only the following were charged under
[11]

the Amended Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO, LTSG. ANTONIO F.

TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG. JAMES A. LAYUG, CPT. LAURENCE
LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT. GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, CPT.
ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO, JR., CPT. JOHN P. ANDRES,
CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT. FLORENTINO B. SOMERA, 1LT. CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS,
1LT. SONNY S. SARMIENTO, 1LT. AUDIE S. TOCLOY, 1LT. VON RIO TAYAB, 1LT.
REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R. SAN JUAN, 1LT. WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON,
1LT. NATHANIEL N. RABONZA, 2LT. KRISTOFFER BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT. JONNEL P.
SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S. PASCUA, 1LT. FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG.
MANUEL G. CABOCHAN, LTSG. EUGENE LOUIE GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G.
TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S. PASCUA, JR., ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, PO3
JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR GONZALES, and several JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES. Further, the said Order expressly stated that the case against the other 290
accused, including petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the
petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another Order dated
November 18, 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment orders against those 31
accused charged under the Amended Information and set their arraignment.
Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped
as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were charged before the General Court-
Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the
Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer). On the
[12]

other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained charged under the
Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for violations of the
Articles of War.
Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of
Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the
original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148)
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the Orders dated November 14 and

18, 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza, the Omnibus Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over
all charges filed before the Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and 2)
Implement the August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the prosecution to produce
evidence to establish probable cause are hereby considered MOOT AND ACADEMIC
and, lastly, all charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in
the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in
the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, but
rather absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. [13]

In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court-Martial set on
March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of
War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident.
The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
162318, this Court, in the Resolution dated March 16, 2004, directed the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition.
[14]

The Petitioners Case

In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the petitioners
advance the following arguments:
 I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND THE GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES
BECAUSE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT
THE OFFENSES ARE NOT SERVICE-RELATED AND ARE PROPERLY WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVILIAN COURTS;[15] and
II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER DETAIN THE JUNIOR
OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS THE CHARGES FOR COUP DETAT
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
EVIDENCE UPON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.[16]
Citing Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7055, the petitioners theorize that since the
[17] [18]

RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared that the
offenses for which all the accused were charged were not service-connected, but
absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the General Court-Martial no
longer has jurisdiction over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO
have no authority to constitute the General Court-Martial, to charge and prosecute the
petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with
the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is
no longer any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order dated
August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the charge against them
for coup detat had already been dismissed.
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be enjoined from
constituting the General Court-Martial and from further proceeding with the court-martial
of the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection
with the Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the petitioner prays
that the respondents be ordered to explain why the detained junior officers and enlisted
men subject of the petition for habeas corpus should not be released without delay.

The Respondents Arguments

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to
dismiss the petitions. The respondents contend that the Order dated February 11, 2004
promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and
declared that the charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the
Amended Information, were not service-connected, is null and void. They aver that at
the time that the said motion was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784
as the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order
dated November 14, 2003. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer
had any personality to pursue the Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the
petitioners were not real parties in interest at the time that their Omnibus Motion was
resolved by the RTC (Branch 148).
 The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not given an
opportunity to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion. Worse, they were not even
given a copy of the Order dated February 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be
enforced against the respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.
The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the February 11, 2004
Order as it declared, on one hand, that the charges filed before the court-martial were
not service-connected, but on the other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion was
moot and academic. According to the respondents, these two pronouncements cannot
stand side by side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic, because the
accused who filed the same were no longer being charged with coup detat under the
Amended Information, then the trial court did not have any authority to further resolve
and grant the same Omnibus Motion.
The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et
al. were not being charged with coup detat under the Amended Information, the trial
court could not make a finding that the charges filed against them before the General
Court-Martial were in furtherance of coup detat. For this reason, the declaration
contained in the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2004 Order - that charges filed
against the accused before the court-martial were not service-connected - cannot be
given effect.
Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents vigorously assert
that the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. filed with the
General Court-Martial, i.e., violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are, in
fact, among those declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of this
provision. This means that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the same being properly cognizable by the General Court-Martial. Thus, the
RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its
February 11, 2004 Order that the charges against those accused before the General
Court-Martial were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime
of coup detat. Said pronouncement is allegedly null and void.
The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping. Apparently, a
similar petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition with injunction and prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order) had been filed by the petitioners co-accused
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case was resolved
against the petitioners therein.
The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue

The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
 The Courts Ruling

We rule in the negative.

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC
(Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all
charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but
absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot be given effect. For
reasons which shall be discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The trial courts declaration was
made when the Omnibus Motion
had already been rendered moot
and academic with respect to
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. by reason of the
dismissal of the charge of coup
detat against them
The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus
Motion, which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, acquire jurisdiction over all the
charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. The said
Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under
the Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was subsequently
superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31
were charged with the crime of coup detat. In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC
(Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290
accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said
Order became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been
filed by any of the parties.
Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on
February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November
14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which
only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed,
including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., because they were no longer
parties to the case. This was conceded by the RTC (Branch 148) itself as it stated in the
body of its February 11, 2004 Order that:

Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the
movants first concern in their omnibus motion, i.e., assume jurisdiction over all
charges filed before military courts in accordance with R.A. 7055, has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the Order dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the
case against TSg. Leonel M. Alnas, TSg. Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno,
et al. and finding probable cause in the Order dated November 18, 2003 against
accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, et al., issued by
Judge Barza.

In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case
against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over
all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the
Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the
prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused. [19]

Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC (Branch 148) held
that the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. And yet, in the same
dispositive portion, the RTC (Branch 148) still proceeded to declare in the last clause
thereof that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included
in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in
the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, on its
perception that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were
committed in furtherance of coup detat; hence, absorbed by the latter crime.
As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed,
there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot
and academic. Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no further relief could
be granted to them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly
considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. And in the
same manner that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the
court, any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 are no longer
[20]

binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself
recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that in view of the Order of
Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused,
the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the
military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003
of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or
by any of the accused. [21]

Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with
coup detat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the
charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-
connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made
by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Such declaration was made by the
RTC (Branch 148) in violation of
Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject
to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units,
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special
penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons,
shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be
tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes
or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those

defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
laws, or local government ordinances.

The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are
considered service-connected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No. 408
(CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the
Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property. Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or
Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to
Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97 General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction
over the foregoing offenses. The following deliberations in the Senate on Senate Bill No.
1468, which, upon consolidation with House Bill No. 31130, subsequently became Rep.
Act No. 7055, are instructive:

Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but this will have to
be on page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be another paragraph, but still
within Section 1. This is to propose a definition of what service-connected means,
because this appears on line 8. My proposal is the following:

SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN THOSE COMMITTED BY

MILITARY PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO THE LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR
SUPERIOR OFFICER OR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY
EXERCISE OR MISSION.

I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion as to what service-connected

offense means. Please note that service-connected offense, under this bill, remains
within the jurisdiction of military tribunals.

So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President.

Senator Taada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this
amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be
under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following
amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS
SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE
LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75,
ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97,
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.

This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected

offenses or crimes would be.

The President. What will happen to the definition of service-connected offense

already put forward by Senator Shahani?

Senator Taada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I
have mentioned in the Articles of War.

SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION

The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I
will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. [There was none.]

It was 5:02 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION

At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Taada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my

amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and style.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is approved. [22]

In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Taada, the principal sponsor of SB No.
1468, emphasized:

Senator Taada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by

persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which
are service-related or connected. And we specified which would be considered
service-related or connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408. [23]

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts
of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and
Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service-connected
crimes or offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred
[24]

only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the
[25]

parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the
parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts. Once vested by law on a
[26]

particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of
a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative
enactment which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts. [27]

In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot
divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of
Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior
Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as
service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same
provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that violations
of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance
of coup detatand, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a
reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup
detat against the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them.
The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against the
petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the petitioners committed the
violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup
detat.
In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the RTC
(Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. [28]
 At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better perspective the
raison detre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, jurisdiction over offenses
punishable under CA 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, committed by
persons subject to military law was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 1822,
1850 and 1852. These presidential decrees transferred from the civil courts to the
[29] [30] [31]

military courts jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the AFP, the
former Philippine Constabulary, the former Integrated National Police, including firemen,
jail guards and all persons subject to military law.
In 1991, after a series of failed coup detats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was enacted. In his
sponsorship speech, Senator Taada explained the intendment of the law, thus:

Senator Taada. The long and horrible nightmare of the past continues to haunt us to
this present day. Its vestiges remain instituted in our legal and judicial system.
Draconian decrees which served to prolong the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule
our new-found lives. Two of these decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and
Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, remain intact as laws, in spite of the fact
that four years have passed since we regained our democratic freedom.

The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated in the case of Olaguer vs.
Military Commission No. 34 that the greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of
human memory.

PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses committed by members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the Integrated National
Police, including firemen and jail guards, and all persons subject to military law
exclusively triable by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction over common crimes
rightly belongs to civil courts.

Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military. Likewise, Article VIII, Section 1 declares that the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National Defense, (146 Supreme Court
Reports Annotated, page 406), the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Gutierrez
declared:

The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes at a time when all
civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest
chapters in the history of the Philippine Judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military
tribunals ... the many judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence and self-respect will require plenty of time
and determined efforts to cure.

The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong to them is only
a beginning.

...

Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning,
military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal
offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. ... [32]

Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to
the civilian courts the jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within
their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated
by the Articles of War.

Conclusion

The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341)
prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
[33]

released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The term court
[34]

necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al.,
as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003
issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of
[35]

War.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
which they have not been vested by law. As earlier discussed, the General Court-
[36]

Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al.
under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from
exercising its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Azcuna, J., on leave.

[1]
Rollo, p. 18. (G.R. No. 162341)
[2]
On August 19, 2004, Capt. Ruperto L. Reaso filed with this Court a Motion to Withdraw as One of the
Petitioners in G.R. No. 162341 and prayed that the law office of Atty. Pulido be enjoined from
representing him.
[3]
Rollo, p. 18. (G.R. No. 162341)
[4]
The narration of the events that transpired on July 27, 2003 is largely taken from THE REPORT OF
THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION dated October 15, 2003. The Fact-Finding Commission,
headed by Retired Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, was created under
Administrative Order No. 78 dated July 30, 2003 of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
investigate the Oakwood Incident.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 18-29. (G.R. No. 162318)
[6]
The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about July 27, 2003 or on dates prior and subsequent thereto, in Makati City, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and swiftly attack and seize by
means of intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth the Ayala Center, particularly Oakwood Premier
Hotel and its immediate vicinity, a facility needed for the exercise and continued possession of
power, and directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, rise
publicly and take arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, demanding the
resignation of the President and members of her official cabinet and top officials of the AFP and
Philippine National Police, for the purpose of seizing and diminishing state power.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[7]
Rollo, p. 100. (G.R. No. 162318)
[8]
ART. 134-A. Coup detat How committed. The crime of coup detat is a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of
the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks,
public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power,
singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons,
belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without
civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As added
by RA No. 6968, 86 OG 52, p. 9864 [1990].)
[9]
Rollo, pp. 63-66. (G.R. No. 162318)
[10]
Id. at 57-62.
[11]
The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about July 27, 2003, and on dates prior and subsequent thereto, in Makati City, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), together with several John Does and
Jane Does, conspiring, conniving, confederating and mutually helping one another, each
committing individual acts toward a common design or purpose of committing coup detat, by did
then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously plan, orchestrate, recruit, instigate,
mobilize, deploy and execute said common design or purpose of committing coup detat, swiftly
 attack and seize by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth the facilities of the
Ayala Center, particularly Oakwood Premier Hotel and its immediate vicinity, for the exercise and
continued possession of power, directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of
the Philippines, by did then and there, withdraw support and demand the resignation of
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and members of her official cabinet and top
officials of the AFP and the Philippine National Police, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing
state power.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 31-51. (G.R. No. 162318)
[13]
Id. at 70.
[14]
Id. at 72.
[15]
Petition in G.R. No. 162318, p. 7; Petition in G.R. 162341, p. 11.
[16]
Petition in G.R. No. 162341, p. 13.
[17]
Infra.
[18]
An Act to Strengthen Civilian Supremacy Over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction Over Certain Offense Involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Other Persons Subject to Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police,
Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 68-69. (G.R. No. 162318)
[20]
Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 301 (2002).
[21]
Supra at 19.
[22]
Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 122, May 21, 1990, p. 837.
[23]
Id. at 839.
[24]
Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. v. Panlilio, 411 SCRA 142 (2003).
[25]
Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333 (2000).
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 279 (1990).
[28]
See People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000).
[29]
Providing for the Trial by Courts-Martial of Members of the Armed Forces Charged with Offenses
Related to the Performance of their Duties (January 16, 1981).
[30]
Providing for the Trial by Courts-Martial of Members of the Integrated National Police and Further
Defining the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial over Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(October 4, 1982).
[31]
Amending Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850 (September 5, 1984).
[32]
Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 116, May 9, 1990, pp. 670-671.
[33]
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 (2003).
[34]
Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 (2000).
[35]
The provision reads:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a
serious offense under these articles shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances
 may require; but when charged with a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be
placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this article shall
thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by
proper authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks his arrest or who escapes from confinement,
whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority, shall be
dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and any
other person subject of the military law who escapes from confinement or who breaks his arrest,
whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority, shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
[36]
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490 (1996).

G.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990

LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER and ANTHONY PERSI, Respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners would have us reverse and set aside the decision
rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on August 22, 1989, in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932, entitled
"Loida Shauf and Jacob Shauf, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi,
Defendants-Appellants,"1 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for damages filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LVI, Angeles City, in Civil Case No. 2783 thereof, and its subsequent resolution
denying petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.

As found by respondent court,2 Clark Air Base is one of the bases established and maintained by the
United States by authority of the agreement between the Philippines and the United States
concerning military bases which entered into force on March 26, 1947.

The Third Combat Support Group, a unit of Clark Air Base, maintains a Central Civilian Personnel
Office (CCPO) charged with the responsibility for civilian personnel management and administration.
It is through its civilian personnel officer that the base commander is responsible for direction and
administration of civilian personnel program, including advising management and operating officials
on civilian personnel matters. Acting for the commander, the civilian personnel officer is the
administrative official in charge of the activities of the CCPO, and the commander relies on him to
carry out all aspects of the civilian personnel program. The CCPO personnel program encompasses
placement and staffing, position management and classification.

The Third Combat Support Group also maintains an Education Branch, Personnel Division, which
provides an education program for military personnel, U.S. civilian employees, and adult
dependents, assigned or attached to Clark Air Base. Its head, the education director, is responsible
directly to the base director of personnel for administering the education services program for Clark
Air Base. In this capacity, and within broad agency policies, is delegated to him the full responsibility
and authority for the technical, administrative and management functions of the program. As part of
his duties, the education director provides complete academic and vocational guidance for military
dependents, including counseling, testing and test interpretation. During the time material to the
complaint, private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian personnel officer, while private respondent
Anthony Persi was education director.3

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS17109, in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. As found by the trial
court, she received a Master of Arts degree from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and
has completed 34 semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science; she has also completed all course work in human behavior and counseling
psychology for a doctoral degree; she is a civil service eligible; and, more importantly, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately
four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. 4

By reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex. The controversy was investigated by one Rudolph Duncan, an
appeals and grievance examiner assigned to the Office of Civilian Personnel Operations, Appellate
Division, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. and what follows are taken from his findings embodied in a
report duly submitted by him to the Equal Opportunity Officer on February 22, 1977.5

On or about October 1976, the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, became vacant in the
Base Education Office, Clark Air Base. A standard Form 52 was submitted to the Civilian Personnel
Office to fill said position. The Civilian Personnel Division took immediate steps to fill the position by
advertisement in the Clark Air Base Daily Bulletin #205 dated October 21, 1976. As a result of the
advertisement, one application was received by the Civilian Personnel Office and two applications
were retrieved from the applicants supply file in the Civilian Personnel Office. These applications
were that of Mrs. Jean Hollenshead, an employee of the DOD Schools at Clark Air Base, Mrs. Lydia
B. Gaillard, an unemployed dependent, and Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf. All three applications were
reviewed and their experiences were considered qualifying for the advertised position.

On November 11, 1976, the application of Loida Q. Shauf was referred to Mr. Anthony Persi, with the
applications of Mrs. Jean Hollenshead and Mrs. Lydia Gaillard, to be considered for the position of
Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, Mr. Persi, after review of the applications, stated that upon
screening the applications he concluded that two applicants had what he considered minimum
qualifications for the position. The two applicants were Mrs. Hollenshead and Mrs. Gaillard. In the
case of Loida Q. Shauf, Mr. Persi felt that her application was quite complete except for a reply to an
inquiry form attached to the application. This inquiry form stated that the National Personnel Records
Center, St. Louis, Missouri, was unable to find an official personnel folder for Loida Q. Shauf. Mr.
Persi said that as a result of the National Personnel Records Center, GSA, not being able to find any
records on Loida Q. Shauf, this raised some questions in his mind as to the validity of her work
experience. As a result of his reservations on Loida Q. Shauf’s work experience and his conclusions
that the two other applications listed minimum qualifications, Mr. Persi decided to solicit additional
names for consideration.

Subsequently in his correspondence dated November 12, 1976, Mr. Persi returned the three
applications to the Civilian Personnel Office without a selection decision. Mr. Persi also requested in
his correspondence that the Civilian Personnel Office initiate immediate inquiry to the Central
Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO) for the submission of a list of highly qualified
candidates. He further stated in his correspondence that the three applicants who had indicated an
interest would be considered with the CORRO input for selection.
As a result of Mr. Persi’s request, an AF Form 1188 "Oversea Civilian Personnel Request" was
submitted to CORRO on November 12, 1976. This request in fact asked for one Guidance
Counselor, GS 1710-9. The form listed the fact that local candidates are available. However, instead
of getting a list of candidates for consideration, Mr. Persi was informed by CORRO, through the
Civilian Personnel Office in their December 15, 1976 message that a Mr. Edward B. Isakson from
Loring AFB, Maine, was selected for the position. Mr. Persi stated, when informed of CORRO’s
selection, that he had heard of Mr. Isakson and, from what he had heard, Mr. Isakson was highly
qualified for the position; therefore, he wished to have the selection stand. This statement was
denied by Mr. Persi. Mr. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 24, 1977. 6

Said examiner, however, also stated in his findings that, by reason of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s
credentials which he recited therein, she is and was at the time of the vacancy, 7 highly qualified for
the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9. In connection with said complaint, a Notice of
Proposed Disposition of Discrimination Complaint, dated May 16, 1977, 8 was served upon petitioner
Loida Q. Shauf stating that because the individual selected did not meet the criteria of the
qualification requirements, it was recommended "that an overhire GS 1710-9 Assistant Education
Advisor position be established for a 180 day period. x x x. The position should be advertised for
local procurement on a best qualified basis with the stipulation that if a vacancy occurs in a
permanent GS 1710-9 position the selectee would automatically be selected to fill the vacancy. If a
position is not vacated in the 180 day period the temporary overhire would be released but would be
selected to fill a future vacancy if the selectee is available."

During that time, private respondents already knew that a permanent GS 1710-9 position would
shortly be vacant, that is, the position of Mrs. Mary Abalateo whose appointment was to expire on
August 6, 1977 and this was exactly what private respondent Detwiler had in mind when he denied
on June 27, 1977 Mrs. Abalateo’s request for extension of March 31, 1977. However, private
respondents deny that Col. Charles J. Corey represented to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf that she would
be appointed to the overhire position and to a permanent GS 1710-9 position as soon as it became
vacant, which allegedly prompted the latter to accept the proposed disposition.

Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied
by Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler. 9

Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson.
Thereafter, said commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent
Detwiler,10 finding Edward Isakson not qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9,
and requesting that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to
place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf avers that said
recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that Isakson continued to occupy
said position of guidance counselor.

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a
hearing on her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978
before the U.S. Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base.11

Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a
complaint for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony
Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783,
for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her
application for the GS 1710-9 position.
Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with
the powers vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are
immune from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.

Consequently, private respondents filed an Answer reiterating the issue of jurisdiction and
alleging, inter alia, that defendant Persi’s request to Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office
(CORRO) was not for appointment of a person to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9,
but for referrals whom defendant Persi would consider together with local candidates for the position;
that the extension of the employment of Mrs. Abalato was in accordance with applicable regulation
and was not related to plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s discrimination complaint; that the decision was a
joint decision of management and CCPO reached at a meeting on June 29, 1977 and based on a
letter of the deputy director of civilian personnel, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, dated June 15,
1977; and that the ruling was made known to and amplified by the director and the deputy director of
civilian personnel in letters to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf dated August 30, 1977 and September 19,
1977.

The parties submitted a Partial Stipulation of Facts in the court a quo providing, in part, as follows:

a) In October 1976, the position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9, at Clark Air Base was
vacant;

b) Plaintiff Loida Q, Shauf, a qualified dependent locally available, was among those who
applied for said vacant position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9;

c) Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf at the time she filed her aforesaid application was qualified for the
position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9;

d) Civilian Personnel Office accomplished and forwarded to CORRO an AF Form 1188

covering the position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9, applied for by plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf;

e) U.S. Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) No. 1400.23 under Policy and
Procedures provides that-

"Where qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense are
locally available for appointment to positions in foreign areas which are designated for U.S. citizen
occupancy and for which recruitment outside the current work force is appropriate, appointment to
the position will be limited to such dependents unless precluded by treaties or other agreements
which provide for preferential treatment for local nationals."

And Air Force Regulation 40-301 dated 12 May 1976 in par. 2 c (1) thereof provides that-

"c. Selection or Referral of Eligible Applicants From the 50 States:

(1)CORRO makes selection, except as provided in (3) below, for oversea positions of
Grades GS-11 and below (and wage grade equivalents) for which it has received an AF
Form 1188, and for higher grade positions if requested by the oversea activity." 12
Likewise, a Supplement to Partial Stipulation of Facts was filed by the parties on October 6, 1978,
which reads:

1. Under date of 30 September 1978, plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf through her counsel, Quasha Asperilla
Ancheta Valmonte Peña & Marcos, lodged an appeal before the Civil Service Commission, Appeals
Review Board, from the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force dated 1 September 1978 affirming
the EEO Complaints Examiner’s Findings and Recommended Decision in the Discrimination
Complaint of Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF 071380181 dated 3 July 1978, x x x;

2. The aforesaid appeal has not been decided up to now by the Civil Service Commission, Appeals
Review Board; and

3. Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf has not instituted any action before any federal district court of the United
States impugning the validity of the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force dated 1 September
1978 affirming the EEO Complaints Examiner’s Findings and Recommended Decision in the
Discrimination Complaint of Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF 071380181 dated 3 July 1978. 13

Thereafter, on March 8, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiffs:

1) The amount $39,662.49 as actual damages or its equivalent in Philippine pesos in

October 1976 as reported by the Central Bank of the Philippines or any authorized agency of
the Government;

2) The amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;

3) Twenty (20%) percent of $39,662.49 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos in October 1976
as reported by the Central Bank of the Philippines or any authorized agency of the
Government, as attorney’s gees, and;

4) Cost(s) of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

Both parties appealed from the aforecited decision to respondent Court of Appeals.

In their appeal, plaintiffs-appellants (herein petitioners) raised the following assignment of errors:

1. Lower court gravely erred in holding that the actual and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees may be paid in Philippine Pesos based on the exchange rate prevailing
during October 1976 as determined by the Central Bank;

2. Lower court gravely erred in limiting the amount of moral and exemplary damages
recoverable by plaintiff to P100,000.00 15

On the other hand, defendants-appellants (private respondents herein) argued that:

 1. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendants-
appellants, as officers/officials of the United States Armed Forces, are immune from suit for
acts done or statements made by them in the performance of their official governmental
functions in accordance with the powers possessed by them under the Philippine-American
Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended;

2. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for a) non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies; and b) lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case in
view of the exclusive jurisdiction of an appropriate U.S. District Court over an appeal from an
agency decision on a complaint of discrimination under the U.S. Federal Law on Equality of
opportunity for civilian employees;

3. The trial court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as guidance counselor by the defendants-appellants on account of her six
(female), color (brown), and national origin (Filipino by birth) and that the trial court erred in
awarding damages to plaintiffs-appellants.16

As stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
dismissed herein petitioners’complaint and denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition, on the basis of he following grounds:

The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with
law and/or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. Respondent court committed grave
error in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint and-

(a) in holding that private respondents are immune from suit for discriminatory acts
performed without or in excess of, their authority as officers of the U.S. Armed Forces;

(b) for applying the doctrine of state immunity from suit when it is clear that the suit is not
against the U.S. Government or its Armed Forces; and

(c) for failing to recognize the fact that the instant action is a pure and simple case for
damages based on the discriminatory and malicious acts committed by private respondents
in their individual capacity who by force of circumstance and accident are officers of the U.S.
Armed Forces, against petitioner Loida Shauf solely on account of the latter’s sex (female),
color (brown), and national origin (Filipino).17

Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory
acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United States
Government which would require its consent.

Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial
review by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of
the U.S. Air Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents
while administering the civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a
governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the United States,
as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the immunity of the officials of the United
States armed forces for acts committed in the performance of their official functions pursuant to the
grant to the United States armed forces of rights, power and authority within the bases under the
Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the rule allowing suits against public officers
and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and criminal acts is a rule of domestic law, not of
international law. It applies to cases involving the relations between private suitors and their
government or state, not the relations between one government and another from which springs the
doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3,
of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to
manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. 18

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has been formally impleaded.19 It must be noted, however, that the rule is not also
all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As we clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar
in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. Vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.:20 "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have,
is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent."21 The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.22

In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al.,23 it was ruled that:

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner,
as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken
by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

Also, in animos, et al. Vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al.,24 we held that:

"x x x it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded
against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately
be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be
instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public
funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. x x x.

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit
will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 25

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no
exception to this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. Vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante, 26 we
declared:

It bears stressing at this point that the above observation do not confer on the United States of
America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have
acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

II. The court below, in finding that private respondents are guilty of discriminating against petitioner
Loida Q. Shauf on account of her sex, color and origin, categorically emphasized that:

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs’ complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.

She is a female, brown in color and a Filipino by origin, although married to an American who is a
member of the United States Air Force. She is qualified for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor in the office of the education director at Clark Air Base. She received a Master of Arts
Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours
in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed
all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil
service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base
at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in
1976.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the
application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward
B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

In defending his act, defendant Persi gave as his excuse that there was a question in his mind
regarding validity of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s work experience because of lack of record. But his
assertion is belied by the fact that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf had previously been employed as
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base in 1971 and this would have come out if defendant Persi
had taken the trouble of interviewing her. Nor can defendant free himself from any blame for the non-
appointment of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf by claiming that it was CORRO that appointed Edward B.
Isakson. This would not have happened if defendant Persi adhered to the regulation that limits the
appointment to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS-1710-9 to qualified dependents of military
personnel of the Department of Defense who are locally available like the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf.
He should not have referred the matter to CORRO. Furthermore, defendant Persi should have
protested the appointment of Edward B. Isakson who was ineligible for the position. He, however,
remained silent because he was satisfied with the appointment.

Likewise, the acts of the defendant Detwiler in rejecting the appointment of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf
were undoubtedly discriminatory.

Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf twice applied for the position of Guidance Counselor sometime in 1975 and
in October 1978. Although she was qualified for the postision, her appointment was rejected ny the
defendant Detwiler. The two who were appointed, a certain Petrucci and Edward B. Isakson, were
ordered removed by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Instead of replacing Petrucci with the
plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, the defendant Detwiler had the position vacated by Petrucci abolished. And
in the case of Edward Isakson, the defendant Detwiler ignored the order of the U.S. Civil Service
Commission to have him removed according to the testimony of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf.

In connection with her complaint against the defendants, plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was presented a
Notice of Proposed Disposition of her Discrimination Complaint by Col. Charles J. Corey, Vice
Commander, Third Combat Support Group, Clark Air Base, which would entitle her to a temporary
appointment as Guidance Counselor with the implied assurance that she would be appointed in a
permanent capacity in the event of a vacancy.

At the time of the issuance of said Notice, defendants knew that there would be a vacancy in a
permanent position as Guidance Counselor occupied by Mrs. Mary Abalateo and it was understood
between Col. Corey and plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf that this position would be reserved for her.
Knowing this arrangement, defendant Detwiler rejected the request for extension of services of Mrs.
Mary Abalateo. However, after plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf consented to the terms of the Notice of
Proposed Disposition of her Discrimination Complaint, defendant Detwiler extended the services of
Mrs. Mary Abalateo indefinitely. This act barred plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf from applying for the position
of Mrs. Mary Abalateo.

To rebut the evidence of the plaintiffs, defendant cited the findings and conclusions of Mr. Rudolph
Duncan, who was appointed to investigate plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s complaint for discrimination and
Col. Charles J. Corey, Vice Commander, Third Combat Support Group that defendants were not
guilty of Discrimination.

It is pointed out, however, that Mr. Rudolph Duncan found plaintiff loida Q. Shauf to be highly
qualified for the position of Guidance Counselor at the GS-1710-9 level and that management
should have hired a local applicant. While Col. Corey characterized the act of defendant Persi as
sloppy and recommend that he be reprimanded. In any event their findings and conclusions are not
binding with this Court.

To blunt the accusation of discrimination against them, defendants maintained that the extension of
the appointment of Mrs. Mary Abalateo was a joint decision of management and Central Civilian
Personnel Office, Clark Air Base. Nonetheless, having earlier rejected by himself the request for
extension of the services of Mrs. Mary Abalateo, defendant Detwiler should not have concurred to
such an extension as the reversal of his stand gave added substance to the charge of discrimination
against him.

To further disprove the charge that the defendants discriminated against plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf for
her non-appointment as Guidance Counselor on account of her being a Filipino and a female,
counsel for the defendants cited the following: (1) that Mrs. Mary Abalateo whose appointment was
extended by the defendant Detwiler is likewise a female and a Filipino by origin; (2) that there are
Filipinos employed in the office of the defendant Persi; and (3) that there were two other women who
applied in 1976 with the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf for the position of Guidance Counselor.

The contention of the defendants based on the allegations enumerated in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
preceding paragraph is without merit as there is no evidence to show that Mrs. Mary Abalateo and
the Filipinos in the office of the defendant Persi were appointed by the defendants. Moreover, faced
with a choice between plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf or Mrs. Mary Abalateo, it was to be expected that
defendant Detwiler chose to retain Mrs. Mary Abalateo as Guidance Counselor in retaliation for the
complaint of discrimination filed against him by plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf. Finally, as to the contention
based on the allegation in No. 3 of the preceding paragraph that there were two other women
applicants in 1976 with plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, the record reveals that they had minimum
qualifications unlike plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf who was highly qualified. 27

Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons. 28 Absent any
substancial proof, therefore, that the trial court’s decision was grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be
so because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly appreciate
the respective parties’ evidence as they were presented. 29

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive
conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of
discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. His conclusion on the matter is
sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. We are thus constrained to uphold his findings of
fact.

Respondent Court of Appeals, in its questioned decision, states that private respondents did, in fact,
discriminate against petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. However, it deemed such acts insufficient to prevent
an application of the doctrine of state immunity, contrary to the findings made by the trial court. It
reasons out that "the parties invoked are all American citizens (although plaintiff is a Filipina by
origin) and the appointment of personnel inside the base is clearly a sovereign act of the United
States. This is an internal affair in which we cannot interfere without having to touch some delicate
constitutional issues."30 In other words, it believes that the alleged discriminatory acts are not so
grave in character as would justify the award of damages.

In view of the apparent discrepancy between the findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals and
the trial court, we are tasked to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based
on the record. A consideration of the evidence presented supports our view that the court a quo was
correct in holding herein private respondents personally liable and in ordering the indemnification of
petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. The records are clear that even prior to the filing of the complaint in this
case, there were various reports and communications issued on the matter which, while they make
no categorical statement of the private respondents’ liability, nevertheless admit of facts from which
the intent of private respondents to discriminate against Loida Q. Shauf is easily discernible. Witness
the following pertinent excerpts from the documents extant in the folder of Plaintiff’s Exhibits:

1. Notice of Proposed Disposition of Discrimination Complaint, dated May 16, 1977 (Exhibit "G").

B. Mr. Anthony Persi was totally inept in the recruitment practices employed in attempting on fill the
GS 1710-9 Assistant Education applicable DOD regulations. In addition, he failed to conduct an
interview of qualified personnel in the local environment and when the qualifications of the
complainant (sic) were questioned by Mr. Persi he did not request a review by the CCPO nor request
an interview with the complainant (sic). Mr. Persi failed to follow Department of Defense Instructions
Number 1400.23, under Policy and Procedures which states-"Where qualified dependents of military
or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense are locally available for appointment to positions
in foreign areas which are designated for US citizen occupancy and for which recruitment outside
the current work force is appropriate, appointment to the positions will be limited to such dependents
unless precluded by treaties or other agreements which provide for preferential treatment for local
nationals." Attachment to Air Force Supplement to FFM 213.2106 (b) (6) lists the positions of
Guidance Counsellor, GS 1710-9, as positions to be filled by locally available dependents. An added
point is the lack of qualifications of the individual selected for the GS 1710-9 positions as outlined
under X-118 Civil Service Handbook. x x x31
2. Letter of the Director of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, San Francisco Region, dated October
27, 1977, addressed to Mr. Don Detwiler, concerning Mr. Edward B. Isakson whose file was
reviewed by the Commission (Exhibit "K").

The position of Guidance Counsellor is one for which the Commission has established a mandatory
education requirement that may not be waived. An individual may not be assigned to such a position
without meeting the minimum qualification requirements. The requirements, as given in Handbook X-
118, are completion of all academic requirements for a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college
or university and successful completion of a teacher education program under an "approved
program" or successful completion of required kinds of courses.

On review of his record, we find that Mr. Isakson has a bachelor’s degree but he does not show
completion of a teacher education program. To qualify for Guidance Counselor on the basis of
coursework and semester hour credit, he would need to have 24 semester hours in Education and
12 semester hours in a combination of Psychology and Guidance subjects directly related to
education. We do not find that he meets these requirements.

xxx

We can appreciate the fact that Mr. Isakson may be working toward meeting the Guidance
Counselor requirements. Nonetheless, he does not appear to meet them at this time. We must,
therefore, request that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to
place him in a position for which he qualifies. 32

3. Letter of the Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of the Airforce addressed to Mr. Detwiler,
dated January 25, 1977 (Exhibit "L").

1. The attached memo from Captain John Vento of this office is forwarded for your review
and any action you deem appropriate. I concur with his conclusion that there is no evidence
of sex or ethnic bias in this matter. I also concur, however, that there were certain
irregularities in the handling of this selection.

xxx

3. Considering the above, it is most unfortunate that the filing of this latest Guidance
Counselor vacancy was not handled wholly in accordance with prescribed policies and
regulations. This is not to suggest that Mrs. Shauf should necessarily have been hired. But,
she and other qualified candidates should have been given the consideration to which they
were entitled. (At no time now or in the past have Mrs. Shauf’s qualifications ever been
questioned.) Had that happened and management chose to select some qualified candidate
other than Mrs. Shauf, there would be no basis for her complaint.

4. It is my understanding that Mrs. Shauf has filed a formal EEO complaint. While I am
convinced that there was no discrimination in this case, my experience with EEO complaints
teaches me that, if Civil Service Commission finds that nonselection resulted from any kind
of management malpractice, it is prone to brand it as a "discriminatory practice." This usually
results in a remedial order which can often be distasteful to management. x x x. 33

The initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case or discrimination. Once the
discriminatory act is proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
undiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection. 34 Any such justification is wanting in the case at
bar, despite the prima facie case for petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. Private respondents’ defense is
based purely on outright denials which are insufficient to discharge theonus probandi imposed upon
them. They equally rely on the assertion that they are immune from suit by reason of their official
functions. As correctly pointed out by petitioners in their Memorandum, the mere invocation by
private respondents of the official character of their duties cannot shield them from liability especially
when the same were clearly done beyond the scope of their authority, again citing
the Guinto, case, supra:

The other petitioners in the case before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official
functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The
charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are
imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is
not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

III. Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973
Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.

Under the Constitution of the United States, the assurance of equality in employment and work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed is also given by the equal protection clause of the Bill
of Rights. The 14th Amendment, in declaring that no state shall deprive a person of his life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws, undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary spoliation of property,
but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the
enjoyment of their personal and civil rights, and that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue
their happiness ands acquire and enjoy property. It extends its protection to all persons without
regard to race, color, or class. It means equality of opportunity to all in like circumstances. 35

The words "life, liberty, and property" as used in constitutions are representative terms and are
intended to cover every right to which a member of the body politic in entitled under the law. These
terms include the right of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemption
from arbitrary arrests, the right to freely buy and sell as others may, the right to labor, to contract, to
terminate contracts, to acquire property, and the right to all our liberties, personal, civil and political-in
short, all that makes life worth living.36

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of
have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living
which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable.

While we recognize petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s entitlement to an award of moral damages, we

however find no justification for the award of actual or compensatory damages, based on her
supposedly unearned income from March, 1975 up to April, 1978 in the total amount of $39,662.49,
as erroneously granted by the trial court.

Evidence that the plaintiff could have bettered her position had it not been for the defendants’
wrongful act cannot serve as basis for an award of damages, because it is highly
speculative.37 Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s claim is merely premised on the possibility that had she
been employed, she would have earned said amount. But, the undeniable fact remains that she was
never so employed. Petitioner never acquired any vested right to the salaries pertaining to the
position of GS 1710-9 to which she was never appointed. Damages which are merely possible are
speculative.38 In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages is
erroneous.39 Consequently, the award of actual damages made by the trial court should be deleted.
Attorney’s fees, however, may be granted and we believe that an award thereof in the sum of
P20,000.00 is reasonable under the circumstances. 1âwphi1

IV. Finally, private respondents postulate that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her
remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees,
which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a
foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In a letter of the Department of the Air Force in Washington, D.C., dated September 1, 1978 and
addressed to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, 40 the appeal rights of the latter from the Air Force decision
were enumerated as follows:

-You may appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 calendar days of receipt of the
decision. Your appeal should be addressed to the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review
Board, 1990 E Street, N.Q., Washington, D.C. 20415. The appeal and any representation in
support thereof must be submitted in duplicate.

-In lieu of an appeal to the Commission you may file a civil action in an appropriate U.S.
District Court within 30 days of receipt of the decision.

-If you elect to appeal to the Commission’s Appeals Review Board, you may file a civil action
in a U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the Commission’s final decision.

-A civil action may also be filed anytime after 180 days of the date of initial appeal to the
Commission, if a final decision has not been rendered.

As earlier noted, in a Supplement to Partial Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties on October 6,
1978, it was manifested to the trial court that an appeal was lodged by counsel for petitioners on
September 30, 1978 before the Civil Service Commission. Appeals Review Board from the decision
of the Secretary of the Air Force in the discrimination case filed by petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF
071380181. Said appeal has not been decided up to now.

Furthermore, it is basic that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. The term "may," as used
in adjective rules, is only permissive and not mandatory, and we see no reason why the so-called
rules on the above procedural options communicated to said petitioner should depart from this
fundamental . petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of
plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance
and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine
courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of
private respondents on that score.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED,
jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
and for attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:

The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he
"carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that
"he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."

The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the more than
one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the
complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the
unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated
one charge from the other and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause
concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.

The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:

The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month
(stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief
of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went
abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near
the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The
sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger
sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which the sack
mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely
and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in
Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and
voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been
searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit
A.

It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly
constitute thecorpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was
the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department
of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually
sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen
after the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels,
pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important as
evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:
itc-alf

FISCAL. What is it?

WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent
and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his
possession to sell.

On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it refers to
a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given
this testimony, to wit:

FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?

WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a
sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the
steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.

The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence,
and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be
stricken out.

The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B,
and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English
nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that
he had them in his possession.

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the
presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because
the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the
vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for
each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera
Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had
tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500;
that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his,
and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80
cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong,
and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to
try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion
of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view
of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch
as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the
principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being
taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
released from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of
the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court. lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found:
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that
said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the
present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by
the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively,
we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of
any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
 In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of
the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
 actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342;
Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
 If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he
visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
theAudiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated
that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
 condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.