Doctrines/Provisions included:

Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of
the cause. (102)
compared with
Art. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition. (5a, Act 2710)
Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one
year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within
the territory of this Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.

Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against his wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio
Bondoc, for cohabiting and having sexual intercourse during the period from 1946 – March 1947.
Dalmacio knows that his co-defendant is a married woman.

The defendant wife entered a plea of guilty. In September 1948, Andres filed another complaint for
adultery committed from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948.

Defendants filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether or not there was double jeopardy.

Held:
No. Adultery is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the
moment of the carnal union.

Doctrines/Provisions included in these cases:

Family Code 58-60

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation
of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.

R.A. 9262 Sec.19 and Sec.33

Sec. 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is
alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and
other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order
filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
Sec. 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application
for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a
protection order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection
under this Act. Sec. 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sec.s 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under this Act.

AM no. 02-11-11-SC. March 4,2003

LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VI and EMMA BENITEZ ARANETA, Respondents.

Facts:
Luis Araneta filed an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife Emma. After
the issues were joined, Emma filed an omnibus petition, supported by her Affidavit, to secure custody of
their three minor children, a monthly support for herself and said children, the return of her passport, to
enjoin Luis from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. Luis opposed the petition,
denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Emma had abandoned the children. He prayed
that the parties be required to submit their respective evidence.

Judge Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to Emma and a
monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as
attorney’s fees. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Luis filed a petition for certiorari
against said order and for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to require the parties to submit
evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Luis’ request that evidence be allowed to be introduced
on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.” (now Art 58, Family Code)

Issue:
Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months
from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on an omnibus petition for support and
custody?

Held:

It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to
make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in
court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed
the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary
to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the
circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these
should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts
close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand
and given effect by reconciling them if necessary.

“The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word
means. To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition — construe it with
reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not
in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intend. Consequently, each part of
section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.”
(Southerland, Statutory Construction section 4703, pp. 336-337.)

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does
not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the
cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare
and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may
determine which is best for their custody.

The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered
to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The
court’s order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and

EDUARDO C. PACETE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents.

Facts:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the CFI of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer and in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of which, among other things, decreed the legal
separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null
and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.

Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband
Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation and accounting and
separation of property. She averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 and they had a
child named Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita
de la Concepcion. She and Pacete acquired vast property that he fraudulently placed the several pieces
of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other
“dummies;”

After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly asked the court for extension of filing for an
answer which eventually resulted to being declared in default. Five months after the petition was filed
the court granted the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared the properties in question
as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court
also nullified his marriage to Clarita.

Issue:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in deciding the case.

Held:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The decision of the lower court was nullified.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.
SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

Facts:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are
not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife
to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered
that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished
her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised
his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

Issue:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
Family Code.

Held:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article
48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or
through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based
on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the
second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
 LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental and CLEMEN G. RAMOS, respondents.

Facts:
Lucy filed a case for legal separation against Clemente on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by
him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the
administration and management of Clemente. Clemente opposed the motion based on Article 103 of
the Civil Code which provides: "An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition” (now Art 58, Family Code). He manifested that if the
motion were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim.
Judge Vamenta granted the motion of Clemente and suspended the hearing of the petition for a writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction. Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months
from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit?

Held:
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction
prior to the expiration of the six-month period.

The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the
parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set
forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it
may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except
in accordance with the orders of the court." (now Art. 61, Family Code)

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile
be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and
an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: It is conceded that the
period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only
fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to
give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances.
(Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their
eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

DIEGO DE LA VIÑA, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, as Auxiliary Judge of First Instance, and NARCISA GEOPANO, respondents

Facts:
The purpose of the action is to obtain an order declaring: (a) That the respondent (Villareal) hasno
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain action for divorce instituted by Narcisa Geopano against
herhusband; (b) That the said respondent judge has exceeded his power and authority in
issuing apreliminary injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting him from alienating or
encumbering any partof the conjugal property during the pendency of the action; and (c) That all
proceedings theretofore had insaid court were null and void. Narcisa Gepano filed a complaint (dated
Sept 17, 1917) against Dela Vina,they were married in the year 1888 in Negros Oriental, lived together,
and had nine children. They hadalso acquired property, real and personal (P300,000) all of which are
under the administration of DelaVina. Since 1913 the defendant had been committing acts of adultery
with an Ana Calog, sustaining illicitrelations with her and having her as his concubine. Because of this
Dela Vina ejected Narcisa from theirconjugal home. The Narcisa had no means of support and was living
only at the expense of one of herdaughters. She was praying for: (1) Decree of divorce; (2) Partition of
the conjugal property; (3) Alimonypendent lite in the sum of P400 per month; and (4) That a preliminary
injunction be issued against DelaVina restraining and prohibiting from alienating or encumbering the
property which belonged to theirconjugal partnership. Dela Vina opposed the said motion—demurred
the complaint upon the ground thatthe court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, nor
over his person. The Trial Courtoverruled the his demurrer, and granted the preliminary injunction
prayed for by the Narcissa. Dela Vinacontents that the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction: he was a resident
of Negros Oriental and Narcisa hismust also be considered resident of the same province—the domicile
of the husband is the domicile ofwife (according to law); she could not acquire a residence in Iloilo
before the marriage between her andthe defendant was legally dissolved. He asserts that husband is the
manager of the conjugal partnership—empowered to alienate and encumber the conjugal property
without the consent of wife— therefore noright of hers was violated.

Issues:
1) May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of herhusband
during the existence of the marriage?
2) In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against herhusband (in which the partition of the
conjugal property is also prayed for) may the wife obtain apreliminary injunction against the
husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumberingany part of their conjugal
property during the pendency of the action?
 Held:
Petition is DENIED.

1) The general principle, is that the domicile of husband is domicile of wife (theoretic identity of
personand of interest) but this is not an absolute rule though, just a presumption a. The wife may
acquireanother and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of husband
and wife isdissolved as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings or where the husband has given
cause fordivorce; or where there is separation of the parties by agreement or a permanent separation
due todesertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the
husband; orwhere there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband’s domicile b.
The maxim thatthe domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife cannot be applied to oust the
court of its jurisdictionc. When the tacit consent of the husband and other circumstances justify it, for
the purpose of determiningjurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should be considered as
her domicile where her rightmay be exercised in accordance with art 63. d. Furthermore, in this case
there is no longer an identity ofpersons and of interest between the husband and the wife—therefore,
the law allowed her to acquire aseparate residence.

2) Sec 164 of Act no 190: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established that: a)
Plaintiffis entitled to the relief demanded b) The commission or continuance of some act complained of
during thelitigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff c) Defendant is doing or threatens—
some actprobably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights The husband should not injure but promote the
interest of thewife—when the harmonious relationship ceases, and the wife seeks to dissolve the
marriage and topartition conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to protect the interests of
the wife that thehusband’s power of administration be curtailed during the pendency of the action. In
this case the rightthe plaintiff is seeking after is not the right to administer the conjugal property but the
RIGHT TO SHAREin the conjugal partnership. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both
preventive and mandatory, isa logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon the
CFIs as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction both legal and equitable. In an
action for divorce brought by thewife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal
property is also prayed for, the wife mayobtain a preliminary injunction against the husband prohibiting
the latter from alienating or encumberingany part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the
action. CFI judge had jurisdiction to hear anddetermine the action for divorce and he did not exceed his
power and authority in issuing the preliminaryinjunction against the defendant.