#4 CUSTODIO v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 96027-28. March 08, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquinos security detail upon his
arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with
several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator
Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at
the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who
was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.

Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However,
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified
said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases.

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision, Sandiganbayan, found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both
Criminal Cases.

Petitioners, assisted by PAO, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask
the Court to allow the re- opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof. Jerome
B. Bailen, a forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe
M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights
and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant. Their
report essentially concludes that it was not possible based on the forensic study of the evidence in
the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service
stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he was walking on the airport
tarmac. This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno,
the security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter.

Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence in the double
murder case constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under
Rule 121 of Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE:

Should the case be re-opened based on the alleged new evidence found by the forensic group?

HELD:

NO. Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be
shown:

1. that the evidence was discovered after trial;

2. that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
3. that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
4. the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed
to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical
evidence during the trial of the double murder case.

It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial
evidence proffered during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said
evidence. These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that
prevented the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but
Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any
new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with
the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other forensic experts at
the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample opportunity
for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided. A reading of the Sandiganbayan
decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the court of the forensic evidence presented
during the trial:

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the head and
caused the death of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory ought to be the
findings during the autopsy. The prosecutor in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, NBI Medico-Legal
Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36 that the trajectory of the gunshot,
the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region, left, below the external
auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior portion of the mandible, was forward,
downward and medially.

XXX

he downward trajectory of the bullet having been established; it stands to reason that the gun used
in shooting the Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound of entrance at the
back of the head of the Senator. This is consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the
effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at the upper step of the stairs, the second
or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the military soldiers bringing him were at
the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that
the shooting of Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion
derived from the fact that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the
service door and was led down the bridge stairs.

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense
during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently
sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution
which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.

Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. Also, new trial will not be granted if the new
evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
.
#9 Strategic Alliance vs. Radstock Securities
G.R. No. 178158, December 04, 2009

FACTS:

Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was incorporated in 1966. It was
granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Tollways
and Metro Manila Expressway.

CDCP Mining Corporation, an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation
of Japan. A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans although there was no CDCP Board
Resolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of guarantee.

CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned
and managed. Later on, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned 90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under
private ownership.

Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.

PNCC Board passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni.

Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for the Marubeni
loans.

Later, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities Limited (Radstock), a foreign
corporation. Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC. PNCC and Radstock
entered into a Compromise Agreement. Under this agreement, PNCC shall pay Radstock the
reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00 from P17,040,843,968.00

To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to:

1. "assign to a third-party assignee to be designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the
listed real properties of PNCC;

2. issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC; and

3. assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the gross
toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporation.

Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for reconsideration. STRADEC

alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National Government’s shares, receivables,
securities and interests in PNCC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC (Board?) and Radstock is valid

HELD:

NO

Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. As a foreign corporation,
with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the
Philippines
.
Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands and transfer rights to
ownership of lands in the Philippines
DOCTRINE:

In this jurisdiction, the members of the board of directors have a three- fold duty:
1. duty of obedience;
2. duty of diligence; and
3. duty of loyalty.

Accordingly, the members of the board of directors

•
(1) shall direct the affairs of the corporation only in accordance with the purposes for
which it was organized;
•
(2) shall not willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing
the affairs of the corporation; and
•
(3) shall not acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors
or trustees.
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of
the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages on the theory that:

(1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of
public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power;

(2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board
member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants;

(3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of
public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right
and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ;

(4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals,
disbursements and questionable use of government funds; and

(5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez
in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars,
alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as

(a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit,

(b) as a private individual, and
(c) in both capacities,

in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular
acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff
furnish him the particulars sought therein.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution,
dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to
prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant
in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming
that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed
resolutions.

HELD:

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law
and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts
which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of
the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts.

The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived
to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed himself
to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or
policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting,
issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does
not state which corporation’s petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee
and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the complaint,
which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the
complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely
articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without
the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner cannot
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material
facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in
fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues
at the trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition
is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are ordered
to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise,
respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-
mentioned civil case.
DE GALA v. DE GALA
G.R. No. 15756 February 15, 1922

FACTS:

An action was commenced to compel defendant Pedro to recognize the plaintiff Sinforoso as his
natural son. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff Sinforoso had been in the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father and his father’s family.

The defendant interposed a general denial. Josefa Alabastro is the widow and Generoso is the
legitimate son of Pedro (so he is the half-brother of Sinforoso).

CFI Tayabas dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the SC. However, while this appeal was
pending, the father died, and the widow and half-brother were substituted as defendants. In the appeal,
appellant (plaintiff) Sinforoso alleges that the CFI committed an error in not admitting his Exhibit C in
evidence. Exhibit C is a transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the trial of an election
protest case (Nadres vs. Javier) in the CFI of Tayabas,2 years before the trial of the present case.

During that trial, Generoso, the said only legitimate son, testifying as a witness, declared in open
court that Sinforoso, was his brother.

The defendant objected to its admission because it was “impertinent.” CFI sustained the
objection, stating that, in the first place,Generoso was not an interested party in this case, and also, the
mere fact that Generoso declared that Sinforoso was his brother would not entitle Sinforoso to be
recognized as a natural son of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Was Exhibit C impertinent?

HELD:

No, it is not impertinent.

Exhibit C is related to topic in outline:

Generoso’s spontaneous admission, publicly made, in open court, cannot be said to be "impertinent" for
the purpose of proving the plaintiff’s claim because that admission was a "conduct" which tends to confirm
the status claimed by the alleged natural child. Neither can it be said that the said only legitimate was not
an interested party in this case because he is a forced heir of the defendant, and his recognition of the
plaintiff as a natural son would diminish his hereditary rights. While it is true that such admission would not,
of itself, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition by the defendant as his natural child,
it should have been admitted in evidence as a factum probans, which would help to establish the factum
probandum — the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. Such status cannot be proved
by a single specific act or conduct of the defendant or of his family. It must be proved by showing a series
of acts, conduct, and circumstances indicative of the intention of the father to acknowledge his alleged
natural child. Hence, to reject evidence of a single act, conduct, or circumstance as being insufficient to
prove the status claimed, would be to prevent the claimant from proving it at all.

Not related to topic in outline:

However, considering that the plaintiff was born in 1879, before the adoption of the Civil Code, the
provisions of la Ley de Toro may govern in the solution of the question of recognition.

Under la Ley de Toro, a natural child might be recognized tacitly, and the recognition was open to such
proof as would support the fact in an ordinary action. It will be found upon an examination of the facts
hereinafter stated, that the defendant not only made a tacit, but a express recognition of the plaintiff as his
natural child, both before and after the adoption of the Civil Code (year 1879). If acts of recognition took
place before the adoption of the Civil Code, and if they were sufficient under the prior law to constitute a
recognition, then the defendant cannot require the proof of recognition prescribed by the new law (Civil
Code).

Several instances prove recognition by the father:

1. During plaintiff’s infancy and childhood, he lived with his mother in the same barrio of the
defendant.
2. The defendant not only frequented the house where the plaintiff lived, but provided sustenance
for both the mother and the plaintiff, giving them rice out of his camarin.
3. Defendant sent the plaintiff to a school and paid for his instruction.
4. While in school, the plaintiff was enrolled under the name of "Sinforoso Dimatulac," but was
known and called by his classmates and others by "Sinforoso de Gala." When he became old enough to
know that his father's surname was not Dimatulac but "De Gala," he adopted the “de Gala” surname, with
the acquiescence of the defendant.
5. Defendant continued to give the plaintiff money and had a house built for the plaintiff, and also
gave him a parcel of land to cultivate as his own
6. Plaintiff always addressed the defendant as "father" (tatay), in public as well as in private, to
which address the defendant responded.
7. Plaintiff used to kiss defendant's hand after the evening prayers and sat at the table with
defendant and his family frequently
14 AGUENZA v. METROBANK
GR NO 74336 April 7, 1997

FACTS:

The Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a Board Resolution, authorized Arguenza and Arrieta jointly
to apply for and open credit lines with Metrobank. Later Arrieta and Lilia, bookkeeper of Intertrade, obtained
a loan from Metrobank where they executed a promissory note where they promised to pay said amount,
jointly and severally. When Arrieta and Lilia defaulted Metrobank sued Intertrade. Intertrade denied liability.

RTC: Promissory Note is the responsibility only of defendant Arieta and Perez

IAC (CA): THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENTS VITALIADO
ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE THEREON UNDER THE 'CONTINUING SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT' DATED 4
MARCH 1977.

Reason: The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial court's absolution of
petitioner is its finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez were admitted by
Intertrade to be its own obligation.

ISSUE:

WON the admissions contained in a pleading of are conclusive as against the pleader

HELD: (SC)

We find and we so rule that there is neither factual nor legal basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate
Court.

First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader"[6] is not an absolute and inflexible rule and is subject to exceptions. Rule
129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides:

"Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." (Underlining supplied)

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing
that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in
which the admission was made to appear or the admission was taken out of context."[8]

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in appreciating the
"Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful
study of the responsive pleading filed by Atty. Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal
that there was neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the
general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was
taken out of context and no admission was made at all.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the responsive pleading did contain the aforesaid admission of
corporate liability, the same may not still be given effect at all. As correctly found by the trial court, the
alleged admission made in the answer by the counsel for Intertrade was "without any enabling act or
attendant ratification of corporate act," as would authorize or even ratify such admission. In the absence of
such ratification or authority, such admission does not bind the corporation.