Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAPOLPPolitics & Policy1555-56232007 by the Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.?

20073514256Original ArticlesThe “ASEAN

Way”Nishikawa

The “ASEAN Way” and Asian Regional Security1

Yukiko Nishikawa
Mahidol University

This article considers a security community in Asia through looking

at the “ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] way.” It
examines the ASEAN way through dispute management tactics in
Southeast Asia and argues that from the member-states’ perceptions and
attitudes toward disputes, ASEAN’s approach is explained as a conflict
management rather than resolution style. The approach involves
limitations on ASEAN’s readiness to resolve disputes in practice as
a collective regional body. ASEAN’s approach suggests the need for
international relations theorists to consider ASEAN’s style without
being conditioned by assumptions arising out of existing theories,
recognizing the usefulness of a mode of security cooperation that reflects
the region’s particular character.

S outheast Asia has previously drawn more attention to its

economic plight or potential, rather than its political or security
characteristics. However, in recent years, the focus has increasingly
shifted toward political and security matters. This is largely because of
tensions that persist in the region, not only among the Association of
Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states, but also those in the wider
Asia-Pacific region. These include tensions between North and South
Korea, Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands, Japan and North
Korea, and China and Taiwan. Growing uncertainty over the future
U.S. security role in the region, the impact of China’s expanding power
on the regional security formula, and contentious, complex issues
around the South China Sea all increase security concerns in the
region. Moreover, a new security threat emerged in the post-
September 11 international paradigm—terrorism—also enhancing
such considerations in the region.
In practice, the security system in Asia has been predominantly
bilaterally based (Caballero-Anthony 2002, 534). However, collective
approaches to security have drawn attention in recent years. While
bilateral ties will continue, supplementary security forms seem to be at
the center of debates, which include the wider Asia-Pacific region.
Although the region had previously drawn little attention to its style

Politics & Policy, Volume 35, No. 1 (2007): 42-56. Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 43

of security cooperation, it has now forced scholars and policy makers

to examine its collective approach to security and political
cooperation. The launch of the East Asian Community illustrates
such tendencies in the region. The idea of a security community is
now becoming fashionable in contemporary Southeast and East Asian
studies.
The concept of a security community refers to “groups of states
which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and
ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the
group” (Acharya 2001, 1). Thus understood, the idea of a security
community can be illustrated, to a certain degree, by the region’s dispute
management mechanisms.2 Different approaches to regional security,
adopted in different regions, reflect differing attitudes toward disputes
and dispute management. Regional approaches to security and conflict
management in Asia have been remarkably different from those found
in other regions (Leifer 1999, 25). Examining the “Asian way” to dispute
management mirrors underlying regional processes and systems in the
region.
This article examines an aspect of the “ASEAN way” by focusing
on dispute management tactics, including the handling of both intra-
and extra-regional disputes. Although analysis might include disputes
both between and within states, this study restricts itself to intra-
regional arrangements arising out of interstate disputes in the region.
It hopes to highlight a dimension essential to considering the design of
future security architecture in the region. The study focuses on ASEAN
as this offers concrete examples of dispute management over a 30-year
period. In addition, various analyses and studies have been undertaken
on the approaches of ASEAN offering a wide variety of available views
and opinions.
The article is divided into three sections. The first explores briefly
the overall background of regional security in Southeast Asia, providing
a broad regional context on security issues. The second section focuses
on ASEAN’s approaches to dispute/conflict, putting forward theoretical
perspectives on conflict and security and examining ASEAN’s
distinctive approach toward dispute management. The third section
examines the factors characterizing the ASEAN approach to conflict,
concluding by noting the crucial requirements for the design of a future
regional community.
44 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

Regional Security in Southeast Asia

Whether in relation to geopolitical, security, or economic affairs,

Southeast Asia has often been viewed through the framework of a
realist perspective toward international relations. As realists emphasize,
the region maintains the highest respect of state sovereignty and
features struggles for power between states, each trying to maximize
their national interests.3 Competitive military modernization programs,
growth in defense expenditure, and the weakness of regional security
institutions strengthen realist arguments. This view sees the logic and
dynamics of balance-of-power competition dominating relations in the
region. Yet at the same time, this framework stands in marked contrast
to recent debates concerning the changing nature of security relations
in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
represents a new framework, based on neoliberal institutional
principles, designed to bring into being a security community in the
region (Acharya 1997; Higgot 1994; Kerr 1994). Moreover, in recent
years the constructivist view has become increasingly influential,
emphasizing the importance of identity in shaping regional security
(Garofano 2002, 504). The argument reminds us of the debate over
whether “Asian values”—or “ASEAN values”—have a role in
determining economic, political, and security arrangements. These
three distinctive views—realist, neoliberal, and constructivist—do
explain major arrangements of the ARF (506).

ASEAN Norms: Historical Legacies?

Contrary to the claim that the “ASEAN way” represents a collective
view, security arrangements in Southeast Asia have never developed
collective approaches (Simon 1998, 196). Instead, the dominant form
of security arrangement in the region has been bilateral. This suggests
that there are certain behavioral norms that define approaches to
security among Southeast Asian countries. The region’s first and
foremost principle, with perhaps the greatest influence over security and
conflict management, is protection of sovereignty. Despite important
changes in the international system during the last decade, leading to
an erosion of state sovereignty, ASEAN states have continued to
emphasize this traditional concept (Ayoob 1995). Similar to other
“Third World” countries, the experience of colonialism and imperialism
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 45

continues to provide a basis for ASEAN states to protect their

sovereignty (Busse 1999, 46-8; Caballero-Anthony 1998, 42-5; Jackson
1993).
This key norm of ASEAN states—maintaining a commitment to
the idea of state sovereignty—can be best viewed as a historical legacy
of the region. The idea of sovereignty has served as a legal framework
for states in the region and has been strictly maintained over the last 30
years. The region’s experience of colonialism and of communist
uprisings within a Cold War regional environment influenced ASEAN
states in their approach to, and compliance with, this principle. It was
therefore possible for ASEAN states, belatedly joining the international
system, to rely on state sovereignty to overcome dependency
relationships and to gain an equal status within modern international
politics (Busse 1999, 46). The principle also became a protection
against the internal and external weaknesses of ASEAN countries.
ASEAN nations have experienced difficulties in maintaining statehood
since independence, encountering problems in defending themselves
from other states while dealing with domestic challenges. The region
was also placed in a volatile position during the Cold War, facing
pressures from both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Respecting the norm of sovereignty therefore provided a degree of
protection from external threats (Busse 1999, 47; Jackson 1993) and
continues to influence the attitudes and approaches of member
countries toward regional order.
Political culture in Southeast Asia includes an inheritance from
precolonial political and social practices. Most of the precolonial
political systems developed nonformal and noncontractual
relationships (Wolters 1982). Most Southeast Asian states were, in
reality, ruled by small elite circles underpinned by patronage networks.
Despite the establishment of formal political institutions and legal
frameworks, the result was not a bureaucratic system, as personalistic
and informal patterns of rule persisted (Busse 1999, 48). As a result,
both internal and external political arrangements were based on rule by
a small number of leaders, whose successful management of personal
power relationships with local rulers (for domestic matters) and with
the small number of leaders of other states (for regional matters)
determined their country’s future direction. Indeed, public debate
surrounding policy or criticism is very rare in most Southeast Asian
46 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

polities. Given the strong reliance on personal rule, the more formal and
legalistic grounds typical of rational bureaucracies did not become
established Southeast Asian political practices.

Conflict Management Mechanisms in Southeast Asia

Conflict management (or resolution) mechanisms refer to the

processes, techniques, methods, and strategies that are applied in
order to manage or resolve a conflict (Michell 1981). A clear
distinction is made in the literature between conflict “resolution” and
“management.” Conflict resolution involves the elimination and
termination of conflict, an outcome in which fundamental differences
and grievances have been resolved. Conflict management involves the
elimination of violence or a de-escalation of hostilities in which the
cause(s) of conflict have not, however, been eliminated (Azar and
Burton 1986). Conflict management does not necessarily encompass
attempts to remove the cause(s) of conflict, although it does not deny
the possibility of addressing them. Conflict resolution is thus a more
comprehensive term, and a more ambitious concept, as it refers to
attempts to address and resolve fundamental sources of dispute.
Conflict management mechanisms include any actions or
procedures that may be utilized in the process of resolving and
managing a dispute. Traditionally, four major processes are included
in handling conflict: conflict avoidance, conflict prevention, conflict
settlement, and conflict resolution (Michell 1981, 253-79). Regional
organizations commonly employ various techniques or strategies in
order to handle disputes, such as confidence building, deterrence,
nonintervention, isolation, intermediation, community building,
assurance, and intervention. The conflict management process could
include formal institutionalized methods, informal methods (including
tacit cooperation among the parties), or a combination of the two.
In practice, different regional organizations employ distinctive
mechanisms and methods. There are several factors for regional
organizations to consider when deciding which conflict mechanism to
employ, including, for instance, the nature of the conflict and the desired
outcome sought by the organization. The choice of method (and the
scale of its involvement) would also depend on institutional capacity.
While other factors may influence the approach to be taken, one of the
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 47

critical factors is the very purpose for which the organization was
established—that is, the organization’s goals, objectives, and aspirations.
These technical factors depend largely on the feasibility of the
conflict reduction mechanisms available. Therefore the member-states’
compliance with norms and rules will influence the organization’s
perspective. At this point, the kind of customarily exercised
communication and socialization patterns among member-states has a
critical impact. Similarly, the degree of institutionalization of norms
and rules will have some importance in practice. Given the various
factors that are relevant to regional conflict management mechanisms
and considering the peculiar nature of disputes in each region, it is not
surprising that there are no clear guidelines or frameworks within which
regional organizations should work. Each regional organization
develops its own unique dispute management tactics, thereby creating
their own security formula. These reflect the nature of conflicts in the
region and the relationships, communication, and socialization
practices of each member.

Managing Disputes: The ASEAN Way

Conflict studies provide some insight into certain factors that
influence and characterize the “ASEAN way” to dispute management.
However, conflict resolution theory, by its very name, gives priority to
resolving conflicts. It is a question, however, whether ASEAN, as a
collective body, inevitably attempts to resolve conflicts on its agenda. As
noted earlier, there is a distinction between conflict “resolution” and
conflict “management.” While the former addresses the cause(s) of
conflict, the latter is less far-reaching in its approach, seeking to reduce
tensions between parties and, if possible, to break the impasse. In
general, ASEAN’s approach might be more appropriately described as
a conflict “management” style.
The territorial dispute over Sabah between the Philippines and
Malaysia provides a good example of ASEAN’s conflict management
approach.4 The dispute emerged in the 1960s and remains unresolved.
For this reason, many cite the dispute as an example of ASEAN’s
weakness, of its failure as a regional organization to resolve disputes. 5
In fact, ASEAN has not directly taken a lead to resolve the dispute. It
has played a role instead, however, in reducing tension between the
parties. The principles enshrined within ASEAN, such as “restraint”
48 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

and “respect,” reduced the possibility of all-out military confrontation

(Caballero-Anthony 1998, 53-4). Although ASEAN has never taken a
lead in addressing the fundamental issues in dispute between the parties,
it contributed to a de-escalation in hostilities. As a result, open warfare
between the Philippines and Malaysia was avoided. It was Indonesia
that undertook action in the Sabah case. Yet even as a third party,
Indonesia attempted to bring the Philippines and Malaysia to agree to
a cooling-off period rather than attempting to resolve the conflict.
Indonesia’s efforts also reflected a management approach to conflict.
The ASEAN region has had—and still has—a number of disputes,
yet it has experienced only a few instances of open warfare. ASEAN
has been successful in managing disputes in the region, reducing tension
and the potential for violence, and maintaining a certain level of
regional order.
ASEAN’s principles and norms clarify why conflict management
is the more appropriate and predictable approach to be taken. The
management style removes the likelihood of member-states intervening
in disputes (and infringing on sovereignty) in order to address critical
issues. For third parties, a conflict resolution approach requires all-out
intervention to identify and address problems between parties. The
management approach does not necessarily oblige third parties to
undertake interventions affecting critical issues. Similarly, a conflict
resolution approach necessitates that the parties face one another and
discuss the fundamental causes of conflict. In contrast, the conflict
management style allows less formal progress to be made without
forcing the parties to confront each other. This approach suits the
practices of ASEAN and the preferences of its member-states. Thus, in
principle, conflict management seems better suited to the informal and
nonconfrontational approach of ASEAN.
The only attempt by ASEAN to provide a formal mechanism to
handle disputes was in its Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (1976).
Here the relevant clauses include a commitment to the “settlement of
differences or disputes by peaceful means” and the “renunciation of
threat or use of force.” It is significant, however, that even though Article
14 of the treaty provides for a “High Council” to be established, it
has yet to be constituted (Caballero-Anthony 1998, 49). The High
Council is empowered by the Treaty “to recommend to the parties in
dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good office, mediation,
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 49

inquiry or conciliation.” The treaty thus envisages that ASEAN would

not employ typical conflict resolution methods, which utilize third
parties to address critical issues in a more confrontational manner.
Evaluations of ASEAN’s role and capability in handling disputes
vary considerably.6 These differing assessments are partially explained
by the distinction between “resolution” and “management.” ASEAN
can play a vital role in setting forth a common view and approach. Its
limitations are highlighted in relation to settling conflicts, where the
organization does not take any tangible action. There are, in other
words, different ideas—different values—concerning how to deal with
conflict. The ASEAN perspective toward conflict is reflected in the way
in which ASEAN handles disputes—through management rather than
confrontation.
Although regional approaches to security may assume a collective
attempt by regional organizations to prevent, manage, and resolve
conflict, the ASEAN way seems to take an alternative form. In many
conflict situations, it acts as an umbrella body for individual (bilateral,
trilateral, or quadripartite) attempts among member states to manage
disputes, rather than acting as a firm collective body that undertakes
and imposes collective action. The role played by ASEAN during
disputes is often to act as a forum for consensus building, providing an
opportunity for members to convey their attitudes toward disputes that
have developed on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.
There are considerable differences in the economic and political
interests of ASEAN countries (Acharya 1997, 323; Ba 1997, 636). 7 The
region’s diversity of cultural, economic, and political interests inhibits
efforts to develop an effective multilateral approach to conflict, one that
requires a strategic consensus. As most interstate disputes in the region
have an economic basis,8 it would be appropriate for bilateral
mechanisms and processes to be instituted to address security concerns
between member-states (Caballero-Anthony 1998, 47). As a result,
ASEAN (as an organizational entity) has not been expected to resolve
any conflict (Caballero-Anthony 2002, 534).9 ASEAN’s role has been
restricted by bilaterally developed relations between member-states.
Although ASEAN often expresses its concerns collectively through
formal declarations, as in the dispute over the Spratly Islands, 10 it
has not taken any action to resolve matters, even when the conflict
is between member-states within ASEAN. In practice, individual
50 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

countries have initiated discussions with ASEAN assisting by helping

to develop common positions. Individual countries have encouraged
further moves. It was Indonesia, for instance, that broke the impasse in
both the Sabah and Spratly Islands disputes. During the Indonesia–
Singapore Crisis of 1968, Malaysia attempted to reduce the tension.
ASEAN’s direct role in conflict management has therefore been limited.
Even so, as a regional organization, ASEAN’s common principles and
norms have been central in guiding individual state’s methods and
approaches to the handling of disputes. The principles of ASEAN
include consensus, consultation, informality, and nonconfrontational
approaches, and these have assisted in maintaining a degree of stability
in the region, often in circumstances where matters might otherwise
have escalated. In this sense, although the major principles and norms
of ASEAN guide the attitudes and approaches of members toward
conflicts, the individual actions taken by states during conflicts enhance
existing regional norms and contribute to the formation and
strengthening of other, related principles.
These two points emphasize that although discussions of regional
security management often begin with the assumption that regional
organizations undertake collective conflict resolution activity, ASEAN’s
approach cannot be fully understood on that basis. ASEAN’s approach
is better explained, in certain situations, through a different or
alternative analytical foundation. This is partly because perceptions and
attitudes toward conflict seem to be different from those employed in
other regions. It leads to the question of whether countries in the region
recognize that their own approach involves particular methods suitable
for conflicts to be approached in a distinctive “ASEAN way.”

The “ASEAN Way”: What Matters in a Globalizing World?

As noted, the ASEAN approach to conflict has been based on

certain principles, among them consensus, consultation, an informal
and bilateral style, and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other
members. These norms underpin the “ASEAN way” of dispute
management.
Two fundamental areas of action characterize the “ASEAN way”
of handling disputes. Its principles, norms, and codes of conduct are
identified, first, in its interstate behavior, and second, in its decision-
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 51

making processes. The primary guiding principle for interstate behavior

is nonintervention. For its decision-making processes, there are
principles of consensus and consultation. These values define the
“ASEAN way” to dispute management.
These two approaches reinforce one another. Consensus and
consultation styles make it possible to avoid intervening on critical
issues: for example, the basic causes of conflict. Similarly, a commitment
to nonintervention requires consultation and consensus. A prominent
feature of ASEAN is that it retains these principles on the basis of a
shared understanding among the members. Countries in the region can
comply with these principles without their being codified or formally
promulgated. For ASEAN, the “process” is important as it is intended
to offer enough time for member-states to reconcile their differences and
allow ASEAN to develop a shared view.
Regional security arrangements have undergone gradual changes in
recent years, providing a changed institutional environment in which
ASEAN’s management of disputes and security threats in Southeast
Asia might interact. Security designs in the region have gradually
expanded to include the wider Asia-Pacific region, as in the ARF, and
in ideas of establishing an East Asian Community. These developments
reflect contextual changes and weaknesses within ASEAN’s approach,
particularly as it relates to the management of disputes and security
threats.

The “ASEAN Way” in the Contemporary World

The ASEAN approach to conflict is vulnerable in extra-regional
relations, as a more proactive and resolution-based approach, one that
justifies intervention in order to resolve conflicts, has become more
dominant in contemporary international relations. The ASEAN
approach is also vulnerable in cases of intrastate conflict in which the
wider international community may see a need for external intervention.
This was the case, for instance, in East Timor, as a “domestic” dispute
(from the Indonesian perspective) came to be seen as an international
issue in which Indonesia’s views concerning its sovereignty and
territorial integrity were superseded by wider concerns. Despite a long-
standing awareness of such “internal” disputes, regional initiatives and
actions to manage or resolve them have been very limited. This partially
explains why the region seems now to require another body (such as the
52 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

ARF) that includes other outside powers. It is clear that ASEAN’s

weakness contributed to a search for alternative or additional
approaches to conflict and security management in the region.
Rapid regional changes within recent years confirm that the
vulnerability of ASEAN states is increasing, with security threats
stemming from terrorism as well as from increasingly violent intrastate
(domestic) conflicts. There are several prolonged disputes in the region,
with the situation in Myanmar (Burma) receiving at least intermittent
international concern. Current security threats in the region require
collective approaches consistent with the contemporary international
security paradigm. An increasingly cooperative approach toward
security in the region seems appropriate.
Yet as ASEAN works closely with other states on security
management in the region, its emphasis on its own “ASEAN way” may
be increased.11 It will then face a dilemma between its own approach—
not always effective—and realities in the region that urgently require
comprehensive and practical steps to be taken. There is a gap between
ASEAN’s current approach of maintaining a certain level of regional
order and the call for real actions. This reflects regional and global
difficulties, with ongoing disputes, growing instability, and the growth
of cross-border security threats. The challenge for ASEAN is to find a
practical way of reconciling the gap, preserving its values—“the
ASEAN way”—while enabling practical measures to be taken: in short,
finding a bridge between wider international principles and regionally
developed systems and perspectives.

Conclusion

In current Southeast Asian and Asian studies, whether in economic,

political, or security spheres, the idea of an “Asian way” and of an
“ASEAN way” has gained a place in the analysis of contemporary
events. The idea of the “Asian way” and of the “ASEAN way” was
widely acknowledged as explaining economic success in the region
(Inoguchi and Newman 1997). Likewise, various claims regarding the
“Asian” and the “ASEAN way” of security management seem to have
gained acceptance among Asian leaders.
This study considered the “ASEAN way” of dealing with conflict
by emphasizing the distinction between “conflict management” and
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 53

“conflict resolution” employed in conflict studies. The “ASEAN way”

was examined by noting how ASEAN deals with disputes as a regional
organization. ASEAN’s approach could be best explained as one of
conflict “management” consistent with the organization’s principles
and norms, including an emphasis on dialogue, quiet diplomacy,
an avoidance of confrontation, minimal institutionalisation, and
noninterference. Although a collective body, ASEAN’s role during
disputes has been limited to discerning, shaping, and articulating shared
views and understandings, with initiatives for action often being taken
by individual member-states. ASEAN enhances an awareness of
interdependence among its members, increasing their willingness to
forgo individualism by seeking each other’s advice and concerns
(Caballero-Anthony 1998, 54). Ultimately, the success of these
initiatives, whether by individual states or more collectively under the
auspices of ASEAN itself, depends upon shared understandings among
member-states: a common outlook in which ASEAN’s role should not
be underestimated.
These conclusions highlight the distinctiveness of ASEAN’s
approaches to regional conflict. The “ASEAN way” of dealing with
disputes within the region is passive and reactive, requiring time in
which consensus can be achieved. Some characteristics of the “ASEAN
way” are in contrast with the general conflict resolution approach and
the more activist approach preferred by some regional organizations
and nongovernment bodies. However, the “ASEAN way” does not
always conflict with non-ASEAN approaches.
Regional security and dispute management systems and strategies
are relevant to changes in regional security architecture in the future.
Although the establishment of the ARF has increased expectations for
more effective and concrete security management in the region, this
largely depends upon how tangible the approach established to handle
disputes or security threats will be. Similarly, while support for a
regional community such as the East Asian Community has become
fashionable, its future will depend on whether the region can make
effective use of existing Asian and ASEAN approaches to conflict.
These approaches, informal and low-key, do not appear to be well
understood or appreciated. Although countries in the region emphasize
an “Asian way,” the region has not developed its own discourse,
theories, and frameworks of conflict management and resolution, ones
54 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 1

based upon the foundations and assumptions of an “Asian way.” This

may be crucial in order to establish practical methods for action. It may
be that the “ASEAN way” to security lacks the very terms for
expressing its own approach. There is, therefore, an urgent need for the
region to review its perspective to regional security without being
constrained by assumptions made in the existing literature. Such an
effort will be relevant to formation of a regional security architecture
suitable for any future regional community that encompasses ASEAN
states.

Notes
1
This article is a revised version of a paper presented to the international workshop on “Asian
Values and Regional Community Building in the Globalizing World” held in Kobe on November
27-28, 2004.
2
The terms “dispute” and “conflict” are used interchangeably in this article. Although some
distinguish the use of these terms, in this article they are employed synonymously except in specific
cases.
3
For overall realist perspectives, see, for example, Baylis and Smith (1997), chapter 6.
4
For details of the Sabah dispute, see Caballero-Anthony (1998, 53-5).
5
Regarding this point, Caballero-Anthony observes that “in ASEAN’s history as a corporate,
inter-state organization, it has not resolved any regional conflict.” See Caballero-Anthony (2002,
534).
6
For a positive view of ASEAN’s role in security issues, see Narine (1998), and Snitwongse (1998);
for a critical view, see Caballero-Anthony (2002), and Leifer (1999).
7
Regarding the region’s diversity, Ba (1997, 636) states: “Southeast Asia is far more
heterogeneous than homogeneous and boasts a host of different religions, cultures, ethnicities
and languages.”
8
Major types of disputes in the region are border, water boundary, and territorial, which may be
broadly defined as economic-related disputes. See Azar and Burton (1986).
9
Caballero-Anthony (2002) notes as two examples: border disputes between Malaysia and
Thailand, and between Malaysia and Indonesia.
10
Such was the case at the Manila Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in July 1992.
11
In fact, some argue that the idea of an “ASEAN way” has been developed by encountering
external approaches. See Inoguchi and Newman (1997).
Nishikawa The “ASEAN Way” 55

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