The Kerry-Lugar Bill –

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009

A New Strategy for Pakistan
by Josh Mador, The Eurasia Center
Words and labels routinely used to characterize Pakistan’s political situation
would be that it is “corrupt”, “unstable”, “a failed state”, and “ungovernable”
among other not so endearing descriptions. More disheartening is that the
situation in Pakistan seems as if it is deteriorating. This is due to a number of
reasons, including economic instability already exasperating abysmal poverty
levels, non-state actors working against the state and political deadlock coming
from shady old time politicians.1 All of these factors add to instability which
should be a major concern for the United States as Pakistan has a nuclear
arsenal and is a major source of violent Islamic radicalism.2 While the U.S. since
the Zia days has opted for stability in Pakistan by bolstering the military through
aid, this has been an insufficient strategy.

The problems affecting Pakistan run throughout its society and can not simply be
solved by having more Pakistani soldiers with bigger guns, (chances are they
would be faced towards India anyways) as has been the solution for most of the
U.S. and Pakistan’s relationship.3 A change has become necessary as both the
army and civilian government have come under increasing attack from militant
organizations they used to have close partnerships with.4 Recently the Kerry-
Lugar bill or officially known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009 was passed which gives an unprecedented 1.5 billion dollars a year for five
years in non-military aid to Pakistan.5 While much has been said about what
additional steps need to be taken to ensure success in the region, I argue that the
Kerry-Lugar bill is a good piece of legislation that seeks to utilize soft power to

1
(Nelson)
2
(Robert B. Oakley)
3
(Adamski)
4
(Gul)
5
(Congress)
quell real threats to both America and Pakistan. By looking critically at how this
bill is different from past aid packages we can possibly come away with a slightly
more optimistic view of a rapidly failing country.

One of the most important parts of the bill is in Section 205. This section states
that funds can only be given to a civilian government in Pakistan.6 This is a
radical departure from traditional U.S. policy as the U.S. has normally funded
almost exclusively the military and has had no problem supporting and working
with military regimes.7 This bill makes the military accountable in that there are
massive repercussions if there is a military coup of the civilian government.8 The
U.S. is also held accountable. In the past the U.S. has opted for the stability, with
only half-hearted calls for democracy.9 This bill firmly states that for America,
democracy is the name of the game in Pakistan. This is something that past
American actions have contradicted.

Another reason this bill is a change for the better is that contrary to any
assumptions, most aid to Pakistan prior to this bill were primarily for non-
development purposes. Approximately 15% went to security assistance (which
have been spent on large-scale weapons not useful for counter-insurgency
operations), 60% for people displaced by terrorism, 15% direct payments to
Pakistan (which clearly has been ineffective in providing basic services to its
people or economic stability) and 10% humanitarian purposes. As can be seen
there is almost no money for long-term development in regards to either the
building of institutions, infrastructure or human capital.10

By far the most important part of the bill however is the “performance clause” or
Part D of Section 102. In this clause it states that if there is an improving political
and economic climate, Congress can continue the bill for an additional five
years.11 Combining this with credible oversight and consistent political rhetoric
should create a situation where Pakistani leadership should feel pressure to
properly use this money for the Pakistani people. U.S. officials now believe that
good performance has a tangible reward.12 This allows Pakistani leaders to throw
off their “rentier state” mentality, in that they assume because they are in a
favorable strategic position they will get aid.13 This gives Pakistan the opportunity
to be rewarded for meaningful development in institutions, infrastructure and
human capital instead of just being given money for no reason or with no
incentive to properly govern and help its people.

6
Ibid
7
(Adamski)
8
(Congress)
9
(Robert B. Oakley)
10
(Adamski)
11
(Congress)
12
(Robert B. Oakley)
13
(Zakaria)
The other positive aspect of this clause is it is an important gesture to the
Pakistani people that the United States is committed to Pakistan’s long term not
simply because it is geopolitically relevant at the moment. Many in Pakistan feel
as the U.S. presence and aid will shrivel when they leave Afghanistan. By
constantly reminding both the Pakistani leaders and its people that this is a not a
quick fix but a plan for long term development, this partnership can serve as
hope for Pakistanis and can be a reason to demand accountability from their
leaders.14

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 has some interesting parts
that make it a dynamic piece of legislation. It asks for the money to be spent on
many different projects representing the full range of development -practices
such as microfinance, education and infrastructure development.15 While if
implemented successfully all these projects would help the Pakistani people;
successful implementation will be extremely difficult due to deteriorating or non-
existent rule of law in many areas of Pakistan. The successful implantation of this
aid package will ultimately depend on the people and government of Pakistan. If
former civilian governments are any sign of things to come, (which they should
be saying it is essentially the same people in power) leaders will be corrupt and
personalize power.16 This will continue to hurt the development of democratic
institutions and weaken the rule of law, two major cornerstones of this Act.
Another reason that it might fail is the military.

While the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act looks to rely on civilian
organizations, the military will undoubtedly be a major player in implementing
much of the legislation actually on the ground. The military as well has to realize
that enriching themselves as they have sometimes been primed to do is also not
in their best interest as they have been under attack from non-state actors.17
Instead the military and the civilian government both need to realize that
establishing the rule of law will be fundamental for this aid and eventually the
country to really take off. The final reason this effort might fail is even if the
government and the military actually do a good job it just might not be enough
money to make a tangible difference. To put things into perspective Kerry-Lugar
initiative is giving approximately 7.5 billion in aid for five years. The Marshall
Plan, the most successful U.S. aid package ever given gave 13 billion dollars in
1945 (this comes out to approximately 100 billion today)18. This was done at a
time when America enjoyed extremely high prestige and people were very
receptive to American values and practices.19 The situation in Pakistan is actually
far worse. First, simply from a numbers perspective compared to the Marshall
Plan (inflation adjusted) per capita development aid comes to $42 compared to in

14
(Robert B. Oakley)
15
(Congress)
16
(Diamond)
17
(Siddiqa-Agha)
18
(Kohen)
19
(Ellwood)
post war Europe where they received approximately $450 a person.20 While the
Marshall plan was to prevent the spread of communism into the minds of
Europeans by rebuilding the economy, the situation in Pakistan is that violent
Islamist ideology (that America had a hand in creating) has already corrupted the
minds of many Pakistanis. This radicalism preaches against America, India and
the West and serves to destabilize Pakistan.21 If America is not able to
significantly alter the minds of Pakistanis through a combination of propaganda,
actual development progress and political decisions, the Kerry-Lugar initiative
will prove to be another failed aid package.

As can be seen through a critical reading of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, America

is actually well intentioned in their attempts to help the Pakistani people. This aid
package tries to rectify negative aspects of American foreign policy in Pakistan in
the past. However, anyone that thinks it will be easy to build good governance, a
functioning economy and the rule of law in five years with limited funds is sadly
mistaken. For the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act to be successful all
parties involved need to realize that hard work, good faith and a lot of luck will be
needed and even that might not be enough to completely right the ship with
Pakistan. But if all sides realize that this is a first step in what needs to be a long
relationship of working partners and that America is there for the right reasons
this can go a long way in giving hope to Pakistanis. However, if the bill is not
successfully implemented that will surely continue Pakistan along a scary path of
instability, poverty and radicalism.

Works Cited

1. Adamski, Michael J. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEOBAND MARDRASA NETWORK AND

U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT MILITANT IDEOLOGY. Masters Thesis. Washington D.C.:

George Washington University, 2009.

2. Congress. Text of the Final Version of the Kerry-Lugar Bill: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

Act of 2009. 2009 October 7. 16 July 2010 <http://pakistaniat.com/2009/10/07/full-text-kerry-

lugar-bill/>.

3. Diamond, Larry. "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?" Plattner, Larry Diamond and

Marc F. The Global Divergence of Democracy. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,

2001. 356-359.

20
(Farmer) and (Pakistan 2010)
21
(Adamski)
4. Ellwood, David. "The Marshall Plan: A Strategy that Worked." 3 April 2008. america.gov. 17

July 2010 <http://www.america.gov/st/educ-

english/2008/April/20080423213601eaifas0.2363535.html>.

5. Farmer, Tim. "Marshall Plan Data Analysis." 2010. learningtogive.org. 16 July 2010

<http://learningtogive.org/lessons/unit231/lesson3_attachments/1.html>.

6. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier New America Foundation.

Washington D.C., 6 16 2010.

7. Kohen, Lawrence Korb and Arnold. "A Marshall Plan for the Third World." November 15 2005.

Bostonglobe.com. 16 July 2010

<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/11/15/a_marshall_plan

_for_the_third_world/>.

8. Nelson, Matthew J. "Pakistan in 2009: Tackling the Taliban?" Asian Survey 50 (2010): 112-126.

9. Pakistan. 24 June 2010. 16 July 2010 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/pk.html>.

10. Robert B. Oakley, T.X. Hammes. "Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia." June 2010.

ndu.edu. 15 July 2010 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF%20256%20(2).pdf>.

11. Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha. Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. London: Pluto Press,

2007.

12. Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.