Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the importance of

Cromwell’s military role in the Civil War has been exaggerated.

Although the debate over Cromwell’s military importance in the Civil War is a popular one amongst
historians, there is very little in terms of evidence in these sources to suggest that any of the authors
support the given view. Indeed only sources C and D seem to give any implication that they support
the view at all and even then the overriding theme in both is that they disagree with the
interpretation. It is hardly surprising that all four passages seem to come to the same conclusion as
all of them fail to mention Cromwell’s relative insignificance during the start of the Civil War, before
the battle of Marston Moor. Instead they come to the same conclusion that Cromwell’s importance
has not been exaggerated, but give different reasons for thinking so. Sources A,C and D mention his
contribution both in specific battle and military campaigns in general as well as going on state, at
least by implication if nothing more, that his unusual style of command is also possible evidence of
his military importance. B differs from all three of the others in that although it does agree with
them in suggesting he was militarily skilful and he had an important military role, it states that his
later political success is all the evidence needed to suggest his importance has not been
exaggerated.

It is source D that seems to imply most heavily that it has any agreement whatsoever with the view
given, saying that “atypical Cromwellian aggression” made him occasionally “hasty” and “unsubtle”
on the battlefield, and that he “never reached the heights of a master of the strategic manoeuvre”,
an idea that is contrasted with source A which says that Cromwell’s contribution to Marston Moor
had a hall-mark of genius upon it” and source B which says that some of Cromwell’s most “sublime
moments were reached” on the battlefield. Indeed we know that Cromwell was not most tactically
astute commander, instead preferring to fight with an incredible confidence seemingly inspired by
his belief in the divine, as shown by source D saying that he was “instinctively aware that, in war,
moral forces can far outweigh the physical” and also that he was dependent on his own “self-
assurance and religious certainty” to carry him through the chaos of conflict. A final way in which D
seems to support the view is by saying that Cromwell himself acknowledged himself guilty of
“oversights as they can rarely be avoided in military matters.” Although all of this does seem to take
away from his ability as a commander, it is not to say that this means his role was not important in
the civil war, as although he may have started out as an unsubtle amateur source D itself goes on to
state that in time Cromwell “did become a sound capable tactician” and that his successes were
“based on sound planning, intelligence and sharp manoeuvres”, an idea which is seemingly
supported by the source B which says that there was “decisive quickness” and “brilliant rapid
concentration” in his mind in battle.

Source C is the only other passage to give some evidence of supporting the view given, as it says that
the importance of Cromwell’s role may be questioned as his main strength during the “Civil War was
as a cavalry commander, rather than as a general in overall command of the movement of armies on
and off the battlefield.” It can be said that this may have been correct in the early part of his military
career, as whenever he tried to take part in wider strategies in which he took general command,
which included combining with other Parliamentary forces, he experienced only failure, such as the
failure to stop Henrietta Maria from leading a convoy to Oxford. However when using the other
sources and our own knowledge the assumption that Cromwell was limited in his success as a
General in command of a large force seems to come under scrutiny; the content of source A directly
contrasts this view, as it states that Cromwell was himself entirely responsible for the victory at
Marston Moor, saying that Cromwell, an “extraordinary character”, won the battle for the
parliamentarians “when all three of his commanding generals had given it up for lost.” Source D also
backs up the idea that Cromwell was actually an accomplished general during the Civil War,
mentioning the Preston campaign of 1648, in which Cromwell successfully commanded a force
which defeated the invading Scots, killing five thousand in the process.

Even if sources A and D disagree with C about Cromwell’s role on the battlefield, all three agree, at
least by implication, that the importance of his role in a wider context came from his unusual
military approach and characteristics. Interpretation D says that Cromwell was “different” from his
“contemporary generals”, who although “trained to be heroic soldiers” “were also habitually locked
into fruitless wars of manoeuvre” because of his “uncompromising and aggressive nature”. Indeed it
can be said that it was his “hasty” and “unsubtle” approach stemming from his confidence in the
moral superiority of him and his men that made him as effective as he was in command. The idea
that Cromwell’s skill as a commander came from his confidence that he was supported by God can
be seen both in source D, which says he “became the moral commander par excellence”, and our
own knowledge, as we know that Cromwell attributed every victory won to God’s influence. This
idea that Cromwell’s importance in the Civil War came from his confidence inspired by his faith is
also backed up in C, which says that “he raised such men as had the fear of God before them, and
made some conscience of what they did.” Indeed we do know that Cromwell was extremely
selective in who he took under his command, much preferring those he considered to be “Godly”, or
morally sound, thinking that good faith was the key to success in battle, as is reflected in his high
levels of confidence throughout. Another example of Cromwell’s unusual characteristics as a general
mentioned by source C is the uniquely high amount of discipline he encouraged within the troops
under his command. C says he exercised this level of discipline “on, as well as off, the battlefield”
and did not allow “his men to chase those in flight for plunder, but instead regrouped his forces into
a tight formation to attack” the remaining enemy from behind. Indeed C also agrees with A in saying
that it was “Cromwell’s disciplined cavalry was decisive” at Marston Moor and A likewise saying that
Cromwell “rallied” his “highly trained cavalry” “after his own victory” “and led them across the
battlefield to the aid of his right wing.” This high level of discipline combined with the fact that,
according to C, “Cromwell had a very close relationship with the men under his command” and
made “frequent displays of concern for their well-being”, as well as the fact that Cromwell was
always extremely confident that he had moral superiority over his opponents meant that his unusual
characteristics as a general did contribute to him having an extremely important military role in the
Civil War.

Sources A, C and D also give evidence that Cromwell’s role was not exaggerated by mentioning his
various military successes, with particular detail given in A. Source A concentrates solely on
Cromwell’s contribution to Marston Moor, saying that in the “dramatic struggle” although the
Parliamentarian force had all the advantages, including 10,000 more men, “it lacked a coordinated
command” the Royalists looked to have won the battle as they “had only one commander in Prince
Rupert and had the advantage of being attacked in their prepared positions behind a ditch defended
by cannon.” Indeed when the battle looked to have been won by the Royalists as the “Scottish
infantry had suffered considerable losses” and the “Yorkshire cavalry had been repulsed” Cromwell,
when he “overthrew the opposing Royalists” “went tirelessly to the help of the infantry, inflicting
crippling losses upon Newcastle’s stubborn foot soldiers” and thus the battle was “won largely by a
comparatively small group” of troops under Cromwell and “from that moment Cromwell himself was
recognised as an outstanding soldier.” Source C agrees that it was Cromwell and his cavalry that
were decisive at Marston Moor and it can be safely said that the importance of Cromwell’s military
role in the Parliamentary cause can be argued for simply for his role in this crucial battle. Source C
also mentions the “crushing victory over Rupert at Naseby” and the “equally decisive victory at
Langport” in both of which the “role of Cromwell’s disciplined cavalry was decisive.” D also mentions
Cromwell’s importance in the Preston campaign, in which he was crucial as main commander of the
force in defeating the invading Scottish army. By giving attention to Cromwell’s decisive
contributions to several crucial battles in the Civil War both as a general and as a cavalry
commander, the sources help to refute the given view, showing that Cromwell certainly did have an
important military role in the Civil War, as he often proved single-handedly to make the crucial
difference between victory and defeat for the Parliamentarian cause.

A final idea given in the sources that seems to refute the view can be found in B, which unlike the
other three sources says the importance of his role is shown by his rise to political power. In the
source it states proof that his role was not exaggerated comes in the fact his military successes as a
“man of action” prompted his “well-deserved rise to fame” “which in turn enhanced his position in
the political world.” Indeed although it can be argued that this rise to fame may have at first been
the result of the desperate Parliamentarian propaganda machine using him as a ploy to jinx people
into thinking their war effort was going as planned, once Cromwell had played such a crucial role in
the battle of Marston Moor, it can be said that his rise to fame was indeed “well-deserved”, as
people started realise that Cromwell was “an outstanding soldier, an amateur who had made good.”

Although Cromwell’s military role in the Civil War was not exaggerated it is hardly surprising that this
is the picture one builds when taking the sources together as one body of evidence, as none of them
mention his relative insignificance in the early stages of the war and it cannot be stressed enough
that his input was relatively limited before Marston Moor. Cromwell had no distinctive military role
until January 1643 and although Cromwell did contribute to the Parliamentarian war effort, his
contribution must be considered as limited to a political, rather than military, contribution, as he
managed to secure more funds and support from the people for the Eastern Association. In terms of
military contribution his successes in battle came in minor skirmishes and were limited to within the
Eastern Association areas and were never important in the context of the war. Indeed the myth that
Cromwell had always been Parliament’s military “saviour” was an image created in a desperate
propaganda bid by London newspapers amidst fears of Royalist supremacy, who failed to mention
that Cromwell not only had his own military failures, but also that his efforts in the skirmishes only
succeeded in slowing down, not halting, Newcastle’s march south.

Although it can be said that the importance of his role was slightly exaggerated, as parliamentarian
propaganda did exaggerate up his early successes and played down his failures, Cromwell more than
made up for it afterwards with his decisive contributions to several key battles as shown in sources
A, C and D, all of which were allowed by his unusual characteristics as a commander as mentioned
again in sources A, C and D, including his desire for good discipline, his unusually close relationship
with his men and his confidence in himself and his formidable cavalry force, which itself stemmed
from his obsession with being morally superior and confident that he had God’s backing, and led to
Cromwell’s “well-deserved rise to fame”, as source B mentions; Final proof that his military
contribution has not been exaggerated.