June 2011 • TA N K S T O R A G E
Aboveground storage tank fires are not common, but they do occur.
One expert looks at the major causes of tank fires and assesses how
some incidents may have been avoided
Cause and effect
L
ightning may be the most
common source of tank
fires, and is more likely to
cause a fire in external floating
roof (EFR) tanks than internal
floating roof (IFR) tanks.
Fires caused by lightning
in EFRs typically occur due to
arcing between the floating
roof and shell structure,
particularly in the vicinity
of perimeter seals. Arcing
occurs when lightning-induced
currents encounter a path
of high resistance due to
imperfect bonding of metallic
shoe seals and shunts.
The latest editions of API
RP Recommended Practice
545 ‘Recommended Practice
for Lightning Protection of
Aboveground Storage Tanks for
Flammable and Combustible
Liquids’ and NFPA 780
‘Standard for the Installation of
Lightning Protection Systems’
present conclusions drawn from
lightning simulation testing
commissioned by the API and
the Energy Institute London.
API 545 replaces the
lightning protection
requirements of API
Recommended Practice 2003
‘Protection Against Ignitions
Arising Out of Static, Lightning
and Stray Currents’.
New requirements:
1) Applicable to new
construction
2) Floating roof shunts (at the
perimeter seals) must be
located at least one foot
below the liquid level
3) Bypass conductors (away
from perimeter seals) are
required in addition to shunts
4) Perimeter seal assemblies
above the liquid level must
be electrically insulated from
the rest of the floating roof
5) Retrofit is acceptable if
existing shunts above the
liquid level are removed
6) Gauge poles must be
electrically insulated
from the floating roof.
2009 Bayamon, Puerto Rico: Multiple tank fires caused by
overfilling one tank
Incorporation of these
requirements into API
Standards 650 and 653 is
currently being balloted
in the API Subcommittee
on Aboveground Storage
Tanks (SCAST).
The results of the lightning
simulation testing assume
the floating roof is floating.
It is not clear whether the
new requirements increase
or decrease the risk of a
landed floating roof with
flammable vapours beneath
it. This scenario is most
significant for tanks in ‘drain-
dry’ operation and the issue
is being worked through
the API balloting process.
EFR tanks
The likelihood of lightning fires
in EFR’s can be reduced by:
1) Following API 545 and
NFPA 780 guidelines
2) Ensuring that the floating
roof, seals and shunts are
properly maintained
3) Avoiding refloating of
landed roofs during weather
where lighting is possible
4) Avoiding tank cleaning
operations during weather
where lighting is possible
5) Ensuring that roof drains
are open during heavy
precipitation (to avoid
sinking the roof)
6) Consideration of
supplementary lightning
protection systems such
strike termination devices
7) Installing a metallic fixed
roof over the EFR.
iFR tanks
Fires caused by lightning in
IFR’s typically occur when
flammable vapours exist at
the top of the tank around
vents. IFR’s handling low
vapour pressure products or
in-service tanks with properly
maintained floating roofs with
tight-fitting seals are not likely
to have flammable vapours
at atmospheric vents unless
being refilled from empty.
The fixed roof shields the
tank internal space from
lightning-induced currents.
These currents will travel near
the outside surface of the
fixed roof and shell to ground.
The arcing at perimeter
seals that can occur in EFRs
is not a concern for IFRs.
The likelihood of
lightning fires in IFR’s
can be reduced by:
1) Ensuring that the floating
FIRE SAFEtY
roof, seals and shunts are
properly maintained
2) Avoiding refloating of
landed roofs during weather
where lighting is possible
3) Avoiding tank cleaning
operations during weather
where lighting is possible.
Static electricity
Tank operations tend to change
over time and it is advisable
to periodically review practices
to ensure compliance with API
Recommended Practice 2003
and NFPA 77 ‘Recommended
Practice on Static Electricity’.
Static electricity is also a
concern during maintenance
and measurement activities but
the focus is on tank operations.
Sparks from static electricity
can cause ignition of flammable
vapours. For static electricity
to be a source of ignition, the
following conditions must be
present:
1) A means of generating
a charge
2) A means of accumulating
a charge
3) A spark gap
4) An ignitable vapour-air
mixture in the spark gap.
Risk of ignition can be
mitigated by eliminating one
or more of these conditions.
Switch loading
Switch loading is the most
frequently cited cause of
static incidents when handling
bulk hydrocarbons.
Switch loading can be
defined as loading a low
conductivity, low vapour
pressure product (such as
diesel or jet fuel) into a tank
which previously contained
a high (such as petrol) or
intermediate vapour pressure
product (such as toluene). The
introduction of lower sulphur
products such as low- and
ultra-low sulphur diesel has
57
FIRE SAFEtY
resulted in significantly lower
conductivity of these products.
When switch loading,
charge accumulation can
be significant because of
low product conductivity
and the high probability of
flammable vapours being
present. If sufficient charge is
generated and a spark gap is
present, ignition is possible.
Loading an intermediate
vapour pressure product with
low conductivity can also be
viewed as switch loading for
the purposes of this discussion.
These products often produce
flammable vapours at ambient
temperatures and many
have low conductivity.
2003 Glenpool, Oklahoma incident
This incident involved an
80,000 barrel tank that
exploded and burned for 21
hours, causing significant
damage to adjacent tanks and
facilities. The tank was being
filled with low sulphur diesel
(LSD) following removal of
petrol. The probable cause
was ignition of a flammable
fuel-air mixture within the tank
by static electricity discharge.
The tank had an aluminum
IFR that was landed in petrol
service. The tank was partially
emptied, the floating roof re-
floated with petrol and then
drained dry. The tank was then
re-filled with LSD at rates up
to 9ft/s in the fill line. Just
prior to re-floating the roof, an
explosion occurred in the tank.
An investigation concluded
that the following issues
may have contributed to the
incident and its severity:
1) Fill velocity exceeded
industry standards
2) Floating roof drain tubes
may have extended
below the pontoons
3) Partial emptying/filling of
2003 Glenpool, oklahoma: Remains of the tank after the incident
58
petrol filled the entire tank
with flammable vapours,
which magnified the incident.
Other conclusions and
issues identified by the
investigation as significant:
1) Flow rates had changed
over time without
adequate review
2) The strapping table
was not accurate
3) Multiple low leg settings
were found in a floating
roof leg recovered after the
incident
4) The splash plate over
the drain-dry sump (also
used for filling) did not
completely cover the sump
5) Credit may not be
taken for diffusers in
determining flow velocity
6) IFR bonding cables are
important for dissipation
of static electricity,
especially when non-
conductive seals are used.
The detailed report of the NTSB
investigation can be found at
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/
par0402.pdf
Control of charge generation
When flammable vapours
could be present, the
following protective measures
may be taken to control
charge generation:
1) Avoiding splash filling
and upward spraying
2) Limit flow velocity in the
inlet pipe to 3ft/s (1m/s)
until the floating roof is
completely floated or, in
the case of a tank without
a floating roof, until the
inlet pipe is submerged by
two pipe diameters or 2ft
(61cm), whichever is less.
Flow rate restriction should
apply to all piping segments
within 30 seconds upstream
of the tank fill opening –
credit may not be taken for
TA N K S T O R A G E • June 2011
2005 Cushing, oklahoma: Aftermath of an external floating roof fire
diffusers used to slow the
inlet velocity into the tank
3) Provide a minimum
30 second residence
time downstream of
micro-pore filters
4) Check for ungrounded loose
or floating objects in the
tank (such as loose gauge
floats and sample cans)
5) Avoid pumping substantial
amounts of air or
other gas into the tank
though the liquid
6) Consider limiting maximum
fill rate after the initial
fill rate is complete
to 33ft/s or less.
Risk mitigation and control of
other factors:
1) Minimise or eliminate
switch loading
2) Consider using inert gas
if switch loading cannot
be avoided (including
intermediate vapour
pressure products)
3) Review filling operations
to ensure flow rates are
appropriate and line fill
is properly handled when
switching products in a tank
(to avoid mixing of products)
4) Consider purging flammable
vapours before introducing
a low conductivity, low
vapour pressure product
5) Minimise or eliminate
landing of floating roofs
during normal operations
6) Ensure floating roofs are
in metallic contact with
the shell by bonding
cables or other method
7) Consider using full contact
floating roofs when
handling intermediate
vapour pressure products
8) Ensure mixers are not
operated such that
jets cannot break the
surface of the liquid
9) Check for spark promoters
(metallic structures pointed
downward in the tank) such
as floating roof drain tubes
that extend below pontoons
10) Consider strapping table
updates and avoid multiple
low leg settings on
floating roof legs.
Overfill
Much has been written recently
about tank overfills, particularly
about the incidents at
Buncefield, UK and Bayamon,
Puerto Rico. API 2350 ‘Overfill
Protection for Storage Tanks
in Petroleum Facilities’ is being
revised and significant changes
can be expected, partially as
the result of the Buncefield
incident. Buncefield incident
reports are available at www.
buncefieldinvestigation.
gov.uk. A report on the
Bayamon incident by the US
Chemical Safety Board will
be issued in the near future.
Other causes
Other causes of tank fires
include but are not limited
to hot work, tank cleaning
and adjacent fires. Consult
ANSI/API Standard 2015
‘Requirements for Safe Entry
and Cleaning of Petroleum
Storage Tanks’ and ANSI/
API Recommended Practice
2016 ‘Guidelines and
Procedures for Entering and
Cleaning Petroleum Storage
Tanks’ for guidance on tank
cleaning operations. Both
documents are scheduled for
major revisions beginning
later in 2011. n
For more information:
This article was written by Craig B. Meier,
Baker Consulting Group,
craig.meier@bakercgi.com,
www.bakercgi.com