Slameto Wiryolukito

Material Engineering Department

Bandung Institute of Technology
slameto@material.itb.ac.id
swmetallurgist@yahoo.com
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Managing Risk for Asset Integrity
AIMS
Company
HSE &
ECONOMY
Management system
(Corporate Policy)

Asset Integrity
Management System

• Corrosion/Failure Management Guidelines

•Asset Repair Guidelines
•Emergency Response Manual
•Risk Based (RBI, RBM, RCM etc) Guidelines
•Leak Detection Manual
•Asset Modification Management

COMPANY’s
•Assets
•Available Data
AIMS:
- Deterministic Approaches: FA, FFS, RLA,
- Probabilistic Approaches: RBI

AIMS
FAILURE CONTROL Equipment & Pipeline
Integrity Management
BY MANAGING RISK
Systems

FAILURE

RISK AIMS
Outcomes From FA
 Determine most probable Root Cause of Failures
 Prevent similar occurrence in the future services
 Physical evidences for RCA
 Physical evidence for Insurance Purposes
 Support the AIMS programs

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 Introduction – Failure Analysis
 Failure:
How ? Load Uncertainty
Why ?
What Next ? Materials Degradation

 Failure Analysis Answering questions:

 What happened?
 How it happened?
 Why it happened ?
 How to prevent the future failure ?
 What is the remedial action?

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Introduction – failure definition

CAPACITY
• Materials
• Structures

SAFE FAIL

• Mechanical
LOAD

• Electrochemical
•Thermal

TIME
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Introduction - Failure analysis cont’d
MATERIALS Degradation
& cyclic load
STRUCTURES temperature
In-service Performance electrochemistry
FAILURE
materials
FAILURE
& discrepancy failure
component ANALYSIS
MATERIALS
&
STRUCTURES
Properties & Behavior

MATERIALS
Selection
&
Design
ENG. LIFE
ASSESSMENT
MATERIALS MECHANICS
Behavior Stress & Strength of Solid
& Fracture Mechanics
Characterization FEM for Stress & Strain Analysis
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Introduction - Failure analysis Procedure
Collection of background data
(review documentation and interview with appropriate individuals)

Selection of failed and unfailed samples for examination

Preliminary examination of the failed part

Determination of failure mode

• Nondestructive evaluation • Chemical analysis
• Mechanical testing • Fracture mechanics considerations
• Macroscopic examination and analysis • Full scale testing under service
• Microscopic examination and analysis conditions

Analysis of the evidence

Formulation of conclusions

Recommendations to prevent reoccurrence

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CORROSION FAILURE

 Duplex SS Tube Corrosion

 Selective Leaching
 Sea Water Exposure

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 EDS #13

SRB Corrosion
 SEM & EDS Examination on Location #5
(Pit Initiation Site)
 Evidence existence of SRB

Inner Surface of Tube

EDS #14

#13 (%wt) #14 (%wt)

Element
Select Area Select Area
C 60.06 36.05
O 10.42 24.63
Cl 0.56 --
Fe 28.96 39.32
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SRB Corrosion cont’d
 Another evidence of SRB

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  SS 316 Corrosion
CORROSION  Intergranular Corrosion

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RUPTURE FAILURE
 Reheater Tube
 Flue Gas Environment

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FOD Failure Analysis
 Choke Valve
 Tungsten Carbide Material
 Crack & Chipping at Critical Area

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FAILURE ANALYSIS - FTA
 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
A technique for systematically analyzing the logical structure
of the possible causes and contributory factors leading to a
defined unwanted event or accident, to facilitate

understanding of the possible causes,

estimation of the likelihood of occurrence,
identification of the options for risk treatment.

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FAILURE ANALYSIS – FTA CONT’D
 Ex. Failure of Pressure Vessel

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FAILURE ANALYSIS – ETA
 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
 A Technique for systematically analyzing the range of possible outcomes of
an unwanted event or accident, to facilitate understanding of the possible
impacts and quantification of the relative likelihood of those impacts.

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FAILURE ANALYSIS - FMEA
 FAILURE MODE & EFFECT ANALYSIS technique for
identifying the possible modes of failure of equipment and
machinery, and the possible outcomes of those various
impacts.

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FAILURE ANALYSIS – FMEA cont’d

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Equipments & Piping Systems

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Modes of Failure
1. Thinning
a. General Thinning
b. Localized Thinning: Pitting; Erosion-Corrosion

2. Stress Corrosion Cracking

a. Caustic Cracking
b. Amine Cracking
c. Sulfide Stress Cracking (SSC)
d. Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC)
e. Stress-Oriented Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (SOHIC)
f. Carbonate Cracking
g. Polythionic Acid Cracking (PTA)
h. Chloride Cracking (ClSCC)

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Thinning Mechanisms

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Inspection Effectiveness – General Thinning

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Inspection Effectiveness – Localized
Thinning

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TMSF - Thinning

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Effect of Online Monitoring (Division)

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Stress Corrosion Cracking
1. Caustic Cracking
2. Amine Cracking
3. Sulfide Stress Cracking (SSC)
4. Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC)
5. Stress-Oriented Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (SOHIC)
6. Carbonate Cracking
7. Polythionic Acid Cracking (PTA)
8. Chloride Cracking (ClSCC)

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Caustic Cracking
 Cracking of metal under the combined actions of
tensile stress and corrosion in the presence of NaOH at
elevated temperature
 Intergranular; typically occurs as a network of fine
cracks
 Occur in a few days or a few years
 Key parameters: caustic concentration, metal temp,
level of tensile stress

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Amine Cracking
 Cracking of metal under the combined actions of tensile stress and
corrosion in the presence of Alkanolamine at elevated temperature
 Intergranular; typically occurs as a network of fine cracks. Corrosion
product filled the cracks
 Typical in amine treating unit for removal H2S and CO2 from Oil & Gas
Processing Unit.
 Occurs at Lean-amine stream, whilst Rich Amine stream will
experience SCC, HIC, SOHIC
 NACE data: more prevalent in Monoethanolamin (MEA) &
Disopropanolamine (DIPA); less prevalent in Diethanolamine (DEA),
Methyldiethanolamine (MDEA), Sulfinol, Diglycolamine (DGA)
 Key parameters: amine concentration, metal temp, level of tensile
stress

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Sulfide Stress Cracking (SCC)
 Cracking of metal under the combined actions of
tensile stress and corrosion in the presence of Water
and H2S.
 H atoms produced by the sulfide corrosion absorbed
on the metal surface
 More susceptible on High Hardness mat’l, Weld Joint
(HAZ, WM), low pH, H2S content in water, pH2S in
Gas
 Corrosion at low pH due to H2S, at high pH due to
bisulfide ions
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HIC-SOHIC in H2S
 HIC is defined as stepwise internal cracks that connect
adjacent hydrogen blisters
 No external load needed. High stress at circumference
hydrogen blisters cause cracks
 Water must presence
 Source of H2 is corrosion reaction of metal with H2S
 More susceptible on High Hardness mat’l, Weld Joint
(HAZ, WM), low pH, H2S content in water (50 ppm), pH2S
in Gas, number-size-shape of inclusions
 Corrosion at low pH due to H2S, at high pH due to
bisulfide ions
 SOHIC: special form of HIC due to joining of small H2
blister in TT-direction of metal
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Technical Modules (API 581)
• Thinning—Appendix G

• Stress Corrosion Cracking—Appendix H

• High Temperature Hydrogen Attack—Appendix I

• Furnace Tubes—Appendix J

• Mechanical Fatigue (Piping Only)—Appendix K

• Brittle Fracture—Appendix L

• Equipment Linings—Appendix M

• External Damage—Appendix N
Damage Mechanism

• Thinning Mechanisms (General /

Localized)
• Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Corrosion
• High Temperature Sulfidic/Napthenic Acid
Corrosion
• High Temperature H2S/H2 Corrosion
• Sulfuric Acid (H2SO4) Corrosion
• Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) Corrosion
• Sour Water Corrosion
• Amine Corrosion
• High Temperature Oxidation
Damage Mechanism (cont’d)
• SCC Mechanisms
• Caustic Cracking
• Amine Cracking
• SSC/HIC/SOHIC
• Carbonate Cracking
• Polythionic Acid Cracking (PTA)
• Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking
(ClSCC)
• Hydrogen Stress Cracking (HSC-HF,
HIC/SOHIC-HF)
Damage Mechanism (cont’d)
• Equipment Linings
• Furnace tube mechanisms
• Mechanical fatigue failures of piping
systems
• Brittle fracture
• Low Temperature / Low Toughness Failure
• Temper Embrittlement
• 885°F Embrittlement
• Sigma Phase Embrittlement
Damage Mechanism (cont’d)

• High Temperature Hydrogen Attack

(HTHA

• External damage
• External Corrosion of Carbon and Low
Alloy Steels
• Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) for
Carbon and Low Alloy Steels
• External SCC of Austenitic Stainless Steels
• External CUI SCC for Austenitic Stainless
Steels
Effectiveness of Inspection Programs
in Confirming Damage Levels
Inspection Effectiveness for
General Thinning
Inspection Effectiveness for
Localized Thinning
TMSF Thinning
Inspection Effectiveness for Amine
& Carbonate Cracking
Inspection Effectiveness for
SSC/HSC
TMSF for SCC
TMSF Calculation

TMSF Final = TMSF Thinning + TMSF

SCC + TMSF HTHA + TMSF Fatigue +
TMSF BF + TMSF Lining + TMSF
External
 Slameto Wiryolukito
Material Engineering Department
Bandung Institute of Technology
slameto@material.itb.ac.id
swmetallurgist@yahoo.com

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 FFS Introductions
 FFS assessments are
 quantitative engineering evaluation
 to demonstrate the structural integrity of in service components containing
flaws or damages.
 To make decision whether the components
 To be run: normally or required derating
 To be repaired
 To be replaced
 Coverage:
 Present integrity of the Equipment containing flaws
 Projected Remaining Life

 FFS does not addressed:

 In service degradations: Why ? , How ?
 Deficiencies due to gradation or fabrication

 The analysis is based on:

 Allowable Stress methods & Plastic Collapse Loads for non-Crack Like Flaws
 FAD-Base Strategies for Crack-Like Flaws

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Codes
 API 579; API 510; API 570; API 653; API 650; API 620
 ASME B&PV Code, Section VIII, Div 1 & 2
 ASME B&PV Code, Section 1
 ASME B31.3 & B31.1 Piping Code

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Three
 Level 1 –
Levels of Analysis in FFS
 provide conservative screening criteria
 utilized with a minimum amount of inspection
 may be performed by either plant inspection or engineering
Personnel
 Level 2 –
 provide a more detailed evaluation
 more precise than those from a Level 1 assessment
 inspection information similar to that required for a Level 1
 more detailed calculations are used in the evaluation
 typically be conducted by plant engineers, or engineering
specialists experienced and knowledgeable in FFS.
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Three Levels of Analysis in FFS cont’d
 Level 3 –
 to provide the most detailed evaluation
 produces results that are more precise than those from a Level
2 assessment.
 The most detailed inspection and component information is
typically required,
 the recommended analysis is based on numerical techniques
such as the FEM
 Conducted by engineering specialists experienced and
knowledgeable in performing FFS

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Type of Flaws Considers (API 579)
 General & Localized Corrosion
 Widespread and Localized Pitting
 Blister and Laminations
 Weld Misalignment and Shell Distortions
 Crack like Flaws
 Brittle Failure
 Long time Creep
 Fire Damage

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Data Required
 Material Data; Fabrication Practices, Operating
Conditions; Fluid containment
 Design Rules
 Inspection Data: actual thickness, pitting size and
depth, Crack dimensions, Bulging and Distortion
Geometry
 FCA (Future Corr. Allowance)

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FFS Procedures
 Step 1: Flaw and Damage Mechanism Identifications
 Step 2: Applicability and Limitations of the FFS
Assessment Procedures
 Step 3: Data Requirements
 Step 4: Assessment Techniques and Acceptance Criteria
 Step 5: Remaining Life Evaluation
 Step 6: Remediation
 Step 7: In-Service Monitoring
 Step 8: Documentation

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Acceptance
 Allowable Stress
Criteria
 For the evaluation of non crack-like flaws in components

 Remaining Strength Factor (RSF)

 For the evaluation of non crack-like flaws in components

 Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD)

 For the evaluation of crack-like flaws in components.

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FFS Outcomes
 To make decision whether the components
 To be run: normally or required rerating
 To be repaired
 To be replaced

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Remaining Life (RL)
 Determine the life time to reach a specified operating
condition such as the MAWP (MFH) or
 To reach a reduced operating condition MAWPr, (
MFHr)

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Three Categories to determine
Remaining Life (RL)
 The Remaining Life Can be Calculated With
Reasonable Certainty
 Case: general uniform corrosion, where a FCA can be
calculated and the RL is the future CA/CR
 Case : long term creep damage where a future damage rate can
be estimated.
 RL estimation is conservative to account for uncertainties in
material properties, stress assumptions, and variability in
future damage rate

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Three Categories to determine
Remaining Life (RL)
 The Remaining Life Cannot be Established with
Reasonable Certainty –
 Examples: a stress corrosion cracking mechanism where there
is no reliable crack growth rate data available
 or hydrogen blistering where a future damage rate can not be
estimated.
 In this case remediation methods should be employed, such
as application of a lining or coating to isolate the
environment, drilling of blisters, or monitoring.
 inspection would then be limited to assuring remediation
method acceptability, such as lining or coating integrity.

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Three Categories to determine
Remaining Life (RL)
 There is Little or No Remaining Life
 In this case remediation, such as repair of the damaged
component, application of a lining or coating to isolate the
environment, and/or frequent monitoring is necessary for
future operation.

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Remediation
 Remediation is called for
 where a flaw is not acceptable in its current condition; the
estimated remaining life is minimal or difficult to estimate; or
the state-of-the-art analysis/knowledge is insufficient to
provide an adequate assessment.
 Periodic checks to ensure that the remediation steps
have prevented additional damage from occurring, and
condition that they can be expected to continue to
provide protection in the future.
 Refer to other documents for applicable remediation
procedures
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Thank You

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