1
1. Calalang v. Williams passengers in the places mentioned to the detriment not
Social Justice| December 2, 1940| J. Laurel
DOCTRINE:
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception, may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.
FACTS:
● The National Traffic Commission (NTC) issued a Resolution
recommending to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited in certain areas and certain
hours for a period of 1 year from the date of opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic.
o Passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon
de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 AM to 12:30PM
and from 1:30PM to 5:30PM;
o Along Rizal Ave extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo St. to Echague St. from 7:00AM to 11:00PM.
● The Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved
the recommendation.
● Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila then
enforced the rules and regulations. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles were not allowed to pass and pick up
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
● Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and a
taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for writ of prohibition
against herein respondents.
● Calalang contended that Commonwealth Act No. 548, by which
the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of traffic on national
roads and streets, is unconstitutional because it constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the rules and regulations infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people. - NO
● The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
● Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception, may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
 2

● Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the 3. WON the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or
divers and diverse units of a society and of the trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to locomotion. - NO
all groups as a combined force in our social and ● It aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstruction
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
paramount objective of the state of promoting the public convenience and welfare.
health, comforty, and quiet of all persons, and of
● It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
which is to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
number.”
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
2. WON the act of the Director of Public Works constitutes an
interfere with personal liberty, with property and with
undue delegation of legislative power. - NO
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
● Section 1 of CA No. 548 do not confer legislative power subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
upon the Director of Public Works and Secretary of Public secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
Works and Communications. State.
● The authority conferred upon them and under which they ● This is within the scope of the government’s police power.
promulgated the rules and regulations is not to determine The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
what public policy demand but merely to carry out the
advances. The right to exercise police power is a continuing
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly. The one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination the changed situation, the growth of population or other
of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare,
facts and circumstances upon which the application of said and be required to yield to the public good.
law is to be predicated.
● To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national RULING: Writ of prohibition DENIED.
roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It
must depend on the discretion of some other government
official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of discretion is the making of the
law.

2. Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Constitutional Issues | July 14, 1989 | Cruz, J.
DOCTRINE: Eminent domain is an inherent power of the
State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner.
FACTS:
● The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they
involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above.
G.R. No. 79777:
● The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano,
Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 &
229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full
owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
● Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with
1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit
the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
● Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the
National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000
members). It was granted by the court.
● Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It
was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
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● Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion
of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing
the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer
were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and
cancellation of these certificates.
● Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without
hearing.
● Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which
had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued
which rendered his motion moot.
G.R. No. 78742
● The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted
by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding
seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit
but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such
lands.
● The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue
the said rules.
ISSUE/S & RATIO: (there are a lot of constitutional issues but for
AGRA purposes, i focused on this only, but i’ll probably discuss in class
everything if he ever asks, but i hope he doesn’t lol)
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or
EMINENT DOMAIN.
● There are traditional distinctions between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. Property condemned under the police power is

noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building
on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner.
● The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as
the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation
of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police
power but of the power of eminent domain
● Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that
enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
● Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in
which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by
the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into
play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the
interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield
to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-
honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that
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the welfare of the people is the supreme law
● Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
Eminent Domain are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
● It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure
is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
● There is compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the
entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
● The determination of the just compensation by the DAR is
not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or
any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation. The determination made
by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the
right to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
● Title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright

change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, that the
assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected.
RULING: Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
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3. Caballes vs. DAR
Personal Cultivation | December 5, 1988 | J. Sarmiento
DOCTRINE: Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel
of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production. e essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship are: (1) The parties are the landowner and tenant; (2)
The subject is agricultural land; (3) There is consent; (4) The
purpose is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation;
and (6) There is sharing of harvests.
FACTS:
● The landholding subject of the controversy consists of 60 sqm
was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virtue
of a Deed of Sale executed by Millenes and is situated in Talisay,
Cebu.
● Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Abajon constructed
his house on a portion of land, paying monthly rental to Millenes.
o Abajon was also allowed to plant there and they agreed
that the produce would be shared 50-50
● When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will
put up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to
Abajon’s house. They also persuaded Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite portion of the land.
● Abajon offered to pay rent to the new owners but they refused
and later demanded for Abajon to vacate
● DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner,
Millenes.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON DAR and Hon. Alvarez committed GADALEJ in
holding that Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is
cultivating only a 60sqm portion of a commercial lot - YES,
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a small portion of the
land which cannot be interpreted as an economic-family size farm
under RA 3844.
 6

Sec. 2 of RA 3844 provides that “it is the policy of the State to establish located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial
cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as zone at that.
tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
basis of Philppine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
capital in agriculture to industrial development” The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
● Abajon only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden
bananas, camote, and corn cannot be considered as an economic of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said
family-size farm. portion.
● He also himself that he did not depend on the products of the
land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs RULING: It is clear that private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner
on the side. (Millenes) since agricultural product as the primary purpose was absent from the
arrangement.
2. WON Abajon is a tenant under the new owners - NO
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some
of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops
thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or
patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received.
This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant
especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and
 7

4. Hilario vs. IAC ● Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the
Agricultural Tenancy | March 16, 1987 | J. Gutierrez Jr. true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation, thus, mere cultivation of the land by
DOCTRINE: usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the
the true and lawful landholder thus, tenancy relation does not law. (Tiongson v. CA)
exist where a usurper cultivates the land. ● Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws
FACTS:
● Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract
executed between him and Socorro Balagtas involving a 2- RULING: Since there is no tenancy relationship established, plaintiff is
hectare property. After Socorro's death, the land ownership declared not to be a tenant on the landholding described in the
was transferred to her daughter (Corazon Pengzon). No new complaint and he is ordered ejected therefrom.
contract was executed.
● Subsequently, Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of
the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same,
claiming that they acquired the landholding from PNB after a
foreclosure proceeding.
● Baltazar filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
alleging that he had been in continuous possession as a share
tenant of a parcel of land and insisted that the old contract was
continued between Pengzon and himself.
● On the other hand, Pengzon explained that she did not get
any share from the produce of the land and she would not
have accepted it knowing that she did not own the property
anymore.

ISSUE & RATIO:

Whether there is a landowner-tenant relationship. – NO
● The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are the landholder and
tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is
agricultural production; and (4) There is consideration; have not
been met by the Baltzar as he, firstly, not a tenant because
no consent was given by landowner Pengzon.

5. Lourdes Pena QUA vs. CA, Carmen Carillo et al.
Agricultural Tenancy - Personal Cultivation | 11-June-1991 | Ganyanco
DOCTRINE: Personal cultivation by the tenant is one of the
essential requisite to warrant the existence of tenancy
relationship.
This requisite implies that the tenant’s source of livelihood is
derived from the lots they are tenanting.
FACTS:
● Lourdes Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against the private respondents from a 346sqm parcel of
residential land, bounded by two other agricultural lands, in
Albay. She alleged the following:
o Claimed that she is the owner of all the lots in question,
evidenced by TCTs registered in her name.
o That in the land in question, the respondents have erected
an auto repair shop and three houses.
o That their stay in the land was by mere tolerance and
they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the
land without any agreement between them, nor did they
pay rents or realty taxes.
● To counter Qua’s allegations, Carmen Carillo alleged that the
lot in question was a farm lot because she and her late husband
were tenants of the same.
o Averred that the lot they were occupying is agricultural
being bounded by two other agricultural lands
planted to coconuts, and that all three parcels were
being cultivated by them.
o As tenants, they could not just be ejected without just
cause.
o Admitted that they were not instituted as tenant by Qua,
but rather by the former owner, Leovigildo Pena, who
permitted the constructions.
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MTC: for Qua. Found that the lot was residential not agricultural,
and that the private respondents were mere squatters, not tenants,
and ordered them to vacate and remove the structures in the lot.
RTC: affirmed MTC, with a modification that the case is dismissed as to
Carmen, effectively ruling that she qualified as an agricultural
tenant, declaring that the home and lot where her house was standing
should be respected. The RTC made the following observations:
● The lot in question is adjoined to two other lots, which totaling
11k+ sqm.
● On the lot stood 4 structures, among which was Carmen’s house.
The private respondents almost converted the entire area as
their homelot for personal aggrandizement, believing that
they are tenants thereof.
● Found that standing in the entire 11k lot areas are only 7
coconut trees, the harvest of which was merely alleged to be
shared by Qua and private respondents. However also ruled that
there is no direct evidence to confirm the parties observed a
sharing scheme between them.
● In dismissing the case against Carmen, the RTC blindly adopted
the recommendation of the Regional Director, who simply
defined and explained that Carmen was a tenant.
Case was dismissed on appeal to the CA.
ISSUE: Does Carmen possess the status of agricultural tenants entitled
to, among others, the use and possession of a home lot? NO, the
requisites for the existence of tenancy relationship were not met.
RATIO: The one of the essential requisites set by law for the existence
of a tenancy relationship is that there is personal cultivation of the land
by the tenant.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the source of livelihood of private
respondents IS NOT derived from the lots they are tenanting because of
the following reasons:
 9

● HOW in the world would they get by cultivating merely 7

coconut trees??
● Carmen asserted that her husband was a driver-mechanic of the
auto repair shop, located along the highway
● The finding that there is no direct evidence confirming that the
parties shared the harvest.

Private respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation

of coconuts, having earned, through the auto repair shop, more than
enough not only for their livelihood, but also for the construction of
dwelling houses theron.

[ruling as to other requisites]

The tenant relationship between the parties was not established.
RTC blindly adopted the recommendation of the DAR Regional Director
that Carmen was a tenant, without making an independent conclusion as
to the nature of the relationship between them. RTC erred in this respect
since jurisprudence dictate that, as regards the relations between litigants
in land cases, the findings and conclusions of the Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, being preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding on the
trial courts, which must endeavor to arrive at their own independent
conclusions.

As to the nature of the land, Court did not rule on the matter since the
only a tax declaration was presented to establish the lot as being
residential. But be that as it may, as discussed earlier, the situation
obtaining in this case still lacks requisites, namely: agricultural production,
personal cultivation, and the sharing of harvests.

RULING: Since not all the requisites for the existence of tenancy relationship were
met, Carmen is not entitled to be considered as an agricultural tenant, and therefore
may not be allowed to use a home lot, a privilege granted only to tenants.

6. Guerrero vs. CA
Agricultural Tenancy | May 30,1986 | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
"agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person
of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate
farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both
FACTS:
● In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-
spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60
heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare
coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora,
Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that
purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his
family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made
to clean the already fruit bearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves
and grass and to do such other similar chores. During harvest
time which usually comes every three months, he was also
made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-
hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation. He had to husk
and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in
defendants' copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts,
he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed
and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was
paid P500 a year.
● Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from
gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part
of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt
aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to
the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the
10
President in Malacanang, Manila. This led to an execution of an
agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed,
among others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of
the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be
guided by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
● Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts
from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of
bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant
spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and
Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the
processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused
to be demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his
family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants)
meant business.
● Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere
farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as an employee
from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom
as tenant Stating that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code have been superseded by the
Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between
the parties Manuel Guerrero and Apolinario Benitez- Yes
RULING:
Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously
from 1969 until he was ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding
is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real
tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being one who has the temporary use
and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec. 3,
Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent

Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the
petitioner's copra kiln. A hired laborer would not build his own house at
his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or
termination at any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an
agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the
existence of tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it had been one
Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in
question and planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to
work in the landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing.
The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The
definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or
harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care
of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the
earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural
enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need
harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient
depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface
thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty
to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the
coconut trees are already fruit bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging
or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying
fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact
that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra,
although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the
land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.
11
7. Talavera vs. CA
Right of Security of Tenure | Feb 27, 1990| Gutierrez
DOCTRINE:
1. The very essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the
cardinal rule that an agricultural tenant enjoys security of
tenurial status.
2. Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except
for the strong reasons provided by law which must be
convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's
policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small
farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices
FACTS:
● An Action for Recovery of Possession was instituted by private
respondent Jose Laxama. The complaint alleged that:
o He had been a bonafide tenant of the land since 1958
and had been in continuous possession and
cultivation of the said land.
o However, for unknown reasons and without the
knowledge of respondent, the Talaveras started to plant
palay thereon through force and intimidation.
o Thus, Jose suffered damages in the price equivalent to
65 cavans of palay per agricultural year from the time of
his dispossession until his reinstatement as tenant.
● The Talaveras answered by claiming that their tenancy
relationship with Jose has been terminated pursuant to a
document captioned “Casunduan” whereby Jose sold his
rights and interests over the landholding for P1000 and whatever
tenancy rights over the land were actually voluntarily surrendered
by him upon the execution of the document.
 12

● The RTC ruled in favor of Jose. The CA affirmed and ruled that
the Casunduan even if assumed to be valid did not constitute
"voluntary surrender" as contemplated by law, hence,
respondent Laxamana ought to be reinstated as tenant of the
petitioners' landholding.
First, the agreement was prepared by petitioner Visitacion A.
Talavera. Jose was clearly at a disadvantage during the execution of the
contract and the intention to voluntarily surrender the land must be
gleaned from evidence other that the document signed by an
ignorant peasant in an hour of emotional stress and financial need.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:
Whether the private respondent voluntarily surrendered the
landholding in question – NO.
The Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (Republic Act No.
3844, as amended) specifically enumerates the grounds for the
extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations. Section 8 of the said
Code provides:
Extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation. — The agricultural leasehold
relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the land holding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section rune to succeed to the
lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
Second, it took petitioners more than 10 years to enforce the
Casunduan. The factual findings of the lower courts also found
convincing evidence that it was Jose who was tilling the land from 1973
to 1984, contrary to petitioners’ claim that it was them who was
cultivating the land during the said years. Also, Jose resides in the
barangay where the land is located while the petitioners reside in another
barangay.
Third, it is not shown why Laxamana should voluntarily give up his
sole source of livelihood even if he needed money to pay off his
debts. We are more inclined to believe that Laxamana was forced by
circumstances to sign something he did not fully understand and
then went right back to the farm and continued to work on it until 1984

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations,

does not require any court authorization considering that it involves the
tenant's own volition. To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure,
voluntary surrender, as contemplated by law, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention
to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to
security of tenure becomes an illusory one.

RULING: In this case, the Court gave three factors to consider to rule in favor of
Jose that there was indeed no voluntary surrender.

8. Endaya vs. CA
Right to Security to Tenure | October 23, 1992| Romero, J.
DOCTRINE:
The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over
the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to
oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not
among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the
agricultural leasehold relation.
FACTS:
● The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a
piece of agricultural land consisting of 20,200 square meters
situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted to rice and
corn.
● As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a
fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement.
● On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed between the
Spouses San Diego and one Regino Cassanova for a period of
four years from May 1974 up to May 1978.
● The lease contract obliged Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare
per annum and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of
crops on the land.
● During the entire duration of the lease contract between the
Spouses San Diego and Cassanova, private respondent
continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with Cassanova
the net produce of the harvests.
● On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to
petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00.
● Private respondent continued to farm the land although
petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately
after the sale to vacate the land. In any case, it is undisputed that
private respondent deposited with the Luzon Development Bank
an amount of about P8,000.00 as partial payment of the land-
owner’s share in the harvests for the years 1980 until 1985.
● Due to petitioners’ persistent demand for private respondent to
vacate the land, private respondent filed in April 1985 a
13
complaint with the RTC praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioners
● RTC: decided in favor of petitioners by holding that private
respondent is not an agricultural lessee of the land now owned by
petitioners.
● CA: reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent
to be the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Private Respondent is an agricultural lessee and
thus is entitled to security of tenure – YES
● R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended by R.A. No. 6839 (1971),
which is the relevant law governing the events at hand, abolished
share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and
established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law.
● Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of
tenure by providing the following: “The agricultural leasehold
relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee
the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes
herein provided.”
● The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract
over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to
oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not
among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the
agricultural leasehold relation.
● On the contrary, section 10[1] of the law provides that
transactions involving the agricultural land over which an
agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership,
e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not
terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given
protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against
the transferee or the landowner’s successor in interest.
RULING:

● The execution of a lease agreement between the Spouses San
Diego and Regino Cassanova in 1974 did not terminate private
respondent’s status as an agricultural lessee.
● The fact that private respondent knew of, and consented to, the
said lease contract by signing as witness to the agreement may not
be construed as a waiver of his rights as an agricultural lessee. On
the contrary, it was his right to know about the lease contract
since, as a result of the agreement, he had to deal with a new
person instead of with the owners directly as he used to.
● No provision may be found in the lease contract and the renewal
contract even intimating that private respondent has waived his
rights as an agricultural lessee. Militating against petitioners’
theory that the agricultural leasehold was terminated or waived
upon the execution of the lease agreement between the San
Diegos and Cassanova is the fact that the latter desisted from
personally cultivating the land but left it to private respondent to
undertake the farming, the produce of the land being shared
between Cassanova and private respondent, while the former
paid P400.00 and later P600.00 per hectare per annum to the San
Diegos, as agreed upon in the lease contract.
● In fine, the Court, after a painstaking examination of the entire
records of the case and taking into account the applicable law, as
well as the relevant jurisprudence, rules that private respondent is
the agricultural lessee over the land owned by petitioners. As
such, private respondent’s security of tenure must be respected
by petitioners.
[1] “Sec.10.Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Expiration of Period, etc.—The agricultural leasehold relation under this
code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.”
14
9. Villaviza vs. Panganiban
Prescription of Action | April 30, 1964| J. JBL Reyes
DOCTRINE: A tenant’s right to be respected in his tenure
under RA 1199, as amended, is an obligation of the landholder
created by law, and action for violation thereof prescribes in
TEN YEARS under Art. 1144 (2) of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
● Domingo Fajardo, as the owner of a riceland situated in
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, gave out the land for lease to Quirino
Capalad, starting with the crop year 1955-56.
● In June 1955, Capalad plowed the land by machinery and
installed as his tenant, herein petitioners, so that when the
respondents- tenants went back to their respective
landholdings, they found the land already cultivated.
● Respondent-tenants demanded their reinstatement, but
everytime they did, Capalad promised but never reinstated
them.
● The case was filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) which ordered Capalad to pay the respondents-
tenants and for petitioners to vacate their respective
landholdings. It was also found by the lower court that the
respondents were tenants since 1944.
● Petitioners filed a petition for review.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
WON CAR committed grave abuse of discretion. NO
● The Court believed the evidence for the respondents rather
than those for the petitioner since the decision of the CAR
contains the recitals of the testimonies of the witnesses and
the petitioners did not question its existence and adequacy.
As much, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence
presented.

● A tenant’s right to be respected in his tenure under RA
1199, as amended is an obligation of the landholder
created by law, and an action for violation thereof
prescribes in 10 years under Art. 1144 (2) of the Civil
Code.
● The respondents were ousted from their landholdings in
June 1955, and they filed the present action on March 31,
1960. Therefore, the period of limitation had not expired.
RULING: Decision under review AFFIRMED.
10. Basbas vs. Entena
RA 3844; Right of pre-emption and redemption | June 20, 1969 |
Reyes, J.B.L, J.
DOCTRINE: The timely exercise of the right of legal
redemption requires either tender of the price or valid
consignation thereof.
FACTS:
● Appellee-landholder Rufino Entena sent a letter to appellant-
tenant Pablo Basbas to the effect that the subject landholding
(located in Sta Rosa, Laguna) was being put up for sale at
P13,000.00 per hectare and the tenant being given 90 days within
which to communicate his intention to purchase the said
landholding; otherwise, the land would be offered to other
buyers.
● In his reply, tenant-petitioner Basbas, accepted the offer to sell
the land but disagreed to the quoted price. Basbas also informed
Entena that he was enlisting the aid of the government in
purchasing the land, as allowed by law.
● However, a sworn affidavit of Entena and his wife attest that
Basbas was fully notified of the sale of their land 90 days before
said conveyance, and that the tenant had refused, or failed to
exercise, the right of pre-emption granted him under the
Agricultural Land Reform Code. The submission of this affidavit
15
enabled the registration of the deed of sale in favor of vendees
Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena (son-in-law and daughter of
Rufino Entena, respectively).
● Basbas filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations
against landholders Rufino Entena and Sps Flaviano and
Angelina Tibay.
● The Agrarian Court dismissed the case, reasoning that since
plaintiff Basbas failed to make tender of payment and
consignation of the purchase price, the landowner cannot be
compelled to sell the property to him.
ISSUE/S & RATIO: W/N tender of payment and judicial consignation
of the purchase price are necessary before a tenant-lessee may avail
himself of the right of pre-emption or of redemption provided in
Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
● YES. The SC found that no error was committed by the
Agrarian Court in dismissing the case. First, there is no
showing that the Land Reform Council has proclaimed that
the government machineries and agencies in the region are
already operating, as required by section 4 of Republic Act
3844.
● Second, granting that sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet in
Torres de Conejero, the SC ruled that the timely exercise of
the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the
price or valid consignation thereof.
● The timely exercise of the agricultural lessee's right of
redemption requires: firstly, that the Land Reform Council
has previously proclaimed that the government machineries
and agencies in the region are already operating as required by
Section 4 of Republic Act 3844; and, secondly, there must be
either a tender of the redemption money or valid
consignation thereof within the specified time limit.
● That the legal redemptioner is only required to pay a
reasonable price is no obstacle to the requirement of
tender.

● Both under said law and under Article 1620 of the Civil Code,
the right of legal redemption must be exercised within
specified time limits: and the statutory periods would be
rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the
redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good
faith of what he believed to be reasonable price of the land
sought to be redeemed.
● The existence of the right of redemption operates to
depress the market value of the land until the period
expires, and to render that period indefinite by
permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with
either party unable to foresee when final judgment will
terminate the action, would render nugatory the period
of two years fixed by the statute for making the
redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the
landowner to realize the value of his land.
● No buyer can be expected to acquire it without any certainty
as to the amount for which it may be redeemed, so that he
can recover at least his investment in case of redemption. In
the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations can not
be met. It is doubtful if any such result was intended by the
statute, absent clear wording to that effect.
● It may be added that unless tender or consignation is
made requisite to the valid exercise of the tenant's right
to redeem, everytime a redemption is attempted, a case
must be filed in court to ascertain the reasonable price.
On the other hand, a prior tender by the tenant of the
price that he considers reasonable affords an
opportunity to avoid litigation, for the landowner may
well decide to accept a really reasonable offer,
considering that he would thereby save the attorney's
fees and the expense of protracted litigation.
RULING: In the case at bar, there was neither prior tender nor did
judicial consignation accompany the filing of the suit. Furthermore, in
16
the cases Basbas is relying on for his appeal, the Court took into account
the brevity of the periods (9 days) allowed by the law operating at the
time (Civil Code of 1889); in the case at bar the statute grants the tenant
two years to redeem.
The SC affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court to dismiss the case.
11. Tan vs. Pollescas
Lawful Consideration | November 17, 2005 | J. Carpio
DOCTRINE: If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds
the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot
be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the
landholding.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Tan Heirs are co-owners of a coconut farmland in
Ozamis City.
● Esteban was the original tenant of the land and upon his death,
his son Enrique succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by
the landowner Tan.
● However, respondent Reynalda, Esteban’s surviving 2nd spouse,
demanded that Tan recognize her as Esteban’s successor but he
did not agree.
● Reynalda filed with the DAR Adjudication Board a complaint for
Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy
Relationship and damages.

o DAR declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the land
and apportioned the harvests between the Tan heirs and
Reynalda based on the customary sharing system (⅔ to
the landowner and ⅓ to tenant)
● On the following harvest dates, Reynalda failed to deliver to the
Tan Heirs their ⅔ share thus then demanded her to pay.
● Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against Reynalda with the
MTC and was found guilty.
● DAR and CA affirmed that “the mere failure of a tenant to pay
the landholder’s share does not necessarily give the latter the right
to eject the former when there is a lack of deliberate intent on the
part of the tenant to pay.”
o CA held that Reynalda’s failure to deliver the full amount
could not be considered as a willful and deliberate intent
to deprive the Tan heirs of their share.
o Further, there is nothing in the law that makes failure to
deliver share a group for extinguishment of leasehold
agreement (Sec. 8, RA 3844).
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Reynalda should be ejected from the land on the
ground of non-payment of the lease rental - NO
The Court agrees with the CA that for non-payment of the lease rental to
be a valid ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding,
the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful.
If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law,
non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that "not x x x more
than" 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair
rental for leasehold.
17
● In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3
of the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the
25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the
Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the
landholding for non-payment of rental precisely because the
lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease
rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease rental for being unlawful.
There is no legal basis to demand payment of such unlawful lease rental.
The courts will not enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the
law. There was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the
harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental.
Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental
payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. Until the DAR has
fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in
the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet
determined.
There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental
because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda
is not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason
why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-payment of
rental
RULING: The Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for
non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is
unlawful, therefore Reynalda is not in default

ISSUE & RATIO:
1. Whether with the passage of the Code of Agrarian Reforms
12. Guerrero vs. CA
Share Tenancy, Abolition | May 30, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.
DOCTRINE:
The phasing out of the share tenancy was never intended to
mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired
laborers with no tenurial rights because once a tenancy
relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue
working until such relationship is extinguished according to
Agrarian laws.
FACTS:
● Guerreros had an agreement to let Benitez work on the 16-
hectare portion of the coconut plantation as tenant and that their
relationship will be guided by the provisions of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act.
● However, Benitez was subsequently refrained with threats of
bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Hence, this
case for reinstatement with damages.
● CA ruled that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and
the respondents and reinstating Benitez in the peaceful
possession and cultivation to the coconut holding.
● Guerreros argue that the passage of the Code of Agrarian
Reforms nullified all agricultural share tenancy agreements
over all kinds of lands, including coconut plantation, thus
18
the share tenancy agreements have lost their validity. On the
basis of RA 3844 which abolished and outlawed share
tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold
system, & RA 6389 amending RA 3844 and declared share
tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy –
Guerreros asserts that no cause of action exists in the case
at bar and the lower court's committed grave error in
upholding the respondent's status as share tenant.
has repealed in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act
and the Agricultural Reform Code abrogating or nullifying
therefore all agricultural share tenancy agreements over all
kinds of lands. – NO
● The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to
mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or
hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever. Once a
tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to
continue working until such relationship is extinguished
according to law.
○ The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (RA 1199),
the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (RA
3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (RA 6389)
and P.D. 1038 (Strengthening the Security of
Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn
Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the
security of tenure of agricultural tenants.
● Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law,
to wit:
(1) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the tenancy contract or any
of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
(2) The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver
the landholder’s share unless the tenant’s failure is caused
by fortuitous event or force majeure;
 19

(3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that
specified by the agreement of the parties;
(4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices;
(5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the
tenant;
(6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any
member of his immediate family or farm household of a
crime against the landholder or a member of his
immediate family. (Sec. 50, RA 1199)
● None of the above causes exists in the case at bar, THUS
Benitez has been unlawfully deprived of his right to security
of tenure and his reinstatement as tenant must be upheld.

RULING: Since there exist a tenancy agreement which provided Benitez a security
of tenure as an agricultural tenant, Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering
the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.