Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty

Author(s): Thomas W. Pogge

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 48-75
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381495 .
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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 57
mediated by empirical regularitiesand correlations.This is so chiefly
because of itsbroadlyconsequentialistcharacter,thatis, itscommitment
to take the engendered consequences of an institutionalscheme as
seriously,morally,as its established consequences. Whetheran insti-
tutionalscheme establishesavoidable deprivationsor inequalities(such
as slavery or male suffrage)can be read off from the (writtenor
unwritten)ground rules characterizingthis scheme. With regard to
engendered deprivationsand inequalities,however,we face far more
complexempiricalquestionsabout how theexistinginstitutional scheme,
compared to feasiblemodifications thereof,tendsto affectthe incidence
of human rightsviolations, such as rates of infant mortality,child
abuse, crime, war, malnutrition,poverty,personal dependence, and
exclusion fromeducation or health care.
The interventionof such empirical matters,and the openness of
the notion of human rights,do not mean that no conclusions can be
drawn about the burning issues, only that what we can conclude is
less precise and less definitethan one mighthave hoped.
THE IDEA OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Before discussing how we should thinkabout sovereigntyin lightof
myinstitutionalcosmopolitanism,let me definethisterm,in a somewhat
unusual way,as a two-place relation: A is sovereignover B if and only
if
1. A is a governmentalbody or officer("agency"), and
2. B are persons, and
3. A has unsupervised and irrevocableauthorityover B
a) to lay down rules constrainingtheirconduct, or
b) to judge theircompliance withrules, or
c) to enforce rules against them through preemption,pre-
vention,or punishments,or
d) to act in theirbehalf vis-a'-visother agencies (ones thatdo
or do not have authorityover them)or persons(ones whom
A is sovereign over, or not).
over B if and only if
A has absolutesovereignty
1. A is sovereign over B, and
2. no other agency has any authorityover A or over B which is
not supervised and revocable by A.
Any A having (absolute) sovereigntyover some B can then be said to
be an (absolute) sovereign (the one-place predicate).'6
Central to contemporarypoliticalthoughtand realityis the idea
of the autonomous territorialstateas the preeminentmode of political
16. It is quite possible,and not withouthistoricaljustification,to definesovereignty
the way I have defined absolute sovereignty.In that case the expression "distribution
of sovereignty"would be an oxymoron.

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58 Ethics October1992
organization. In the verticaldimension, sovereigntyis very heavily
concentratedat a single level; it is states and only states that merit
separate colors on a political map of our world. For nearly every
human being, and foralmost everypiece of territory, thereis exactly
one governmentwith preeminent authorityover, and primaryre-
sponsibilityfor,this person or territory.And each person is thought
to owe primarypoliticalallegiance and loyaltyto thisgovernmentwith
preeminentauthorityover him or her. Nationalgovernmentsdominate
and control the decision making of smaller political units as well as
supranationaldecisions,whichtend to be made throughintergovern-
mental bargaining.'7
From the standpointof a cosmopolitan morality-which centers
around the fundamental needs and interestsof individual human
beings, and of all human beings-this concentrationof sovereignty
at one level is no longer defensible.What I am proposing instead is
notthe idea of a worldstate,whichis reallya variantof thepreeminent-
state idea. Rather, the proposal is that governmentalauthority-or
sovereignty-be widelydispersed in the verticaldimension.What we
need is both centralizationand decentralization,a kind of second-
order decentralizationaway fromthe now dominantlevel of the state.
Thus, persons should be citizensof, and govern themselvesthrough,
a number of politicalunits of various sizes, withoutany one political
unit being dominant and thus occupyingthe traditionalrole of state.
And theirpoliticalallegiance and loyalties'8should be widelydispersed
over these units: neighborhood,town,county,province,state,region,
and worldat large. People should be politicallyat home in all of them,
withoutconverging upon any one of them as the lodestar of their
politicalidentity.'9
Before defending and developing this proposal by referenceto
myinstitutional cosmopolitanism,letme address twotypesofobjection
to any verticaldivisionof sovereignty.
17. One promisingexception to this is the European Parliament.
18. This includes the sentimentsof patriotism,if such there mustbe. Beitz points
out two respects in which patrioticallegiance to political units may be desirable: it
supports a sense of shared loyalty("Cosmopolitan Ideals," p. 599); and it allows one
to see oneself as a significantcontributorto a common culturalproject: "Justas we can
see ourselvesas strivingto realize in our own livesvariousformsof individualperfection,
so we can see our countries as strivingfor various forms of social and communal
perfection"("Cosmopolitan Ideals," p. 600). Neitherof these considerationsentail that,
say, Britainmust be the sole object of your patrioticallegiance ratherthan some com-
bination of Glasgow, Scotland, Britain,Europe, humankind,and perhaps even such
geographicallydispersedunitsas theAnglicanchurch,theWorldTrade Union Movement,
PEN, or AmnestyInternational.
19. Many individualsmight,of course, identifymore withone of theircitizenships
thanwiththe others.But in a multilayeredscheme such prominentidentifications would
be less frequentand, most important,would not converge: even if some residentsof
Glasgow would see themselvesas primarilyBritish,others would identifymore with
Europe, withScotland, withGlasgow, or withhumankindat large.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 59
Objections of type 1 dispute that sovereigntycan be divided at
all. The traditionalform of this objection rests on the belief that a
juridical state (as distinctfroma lawless state of nature) presupposes
an absolute sovereign.This dogma of absolute sovereigntyarises (e.g.,
in Hobbes and Kant) roughlyas follows.Ajuridical state,bydefinition,
involvesa recognized decision mechanismthat uniquely resolves any
dispute.This mechanismrequiressome agencybecause a mere written
or unwrittencode (constitution,holy scripture)cannot settledisputes
about its own interpretation.But so long as this agency is limitedor
divided-whether horizontally(i.e., by territoryor by governmental
function)or vertically(as in my proposal)-a juridical state has not
been achieved because there is no recognized way in which conflicts
over the precise location of the limitor divisioncan be authoritatively
resolved. A genuine state of peace requires then an agency of last
resort-ultimate, supreme, and unconstrained.Such an agency may
stillbe limitedby (codified or unmodified)obligations.But these can
obligate merelyinforointernobecause to authorize subjects,or some
second agency,to determinewhetherthe firstagency is overstepping
its bounds would enable conflictsabout thisquestion forwhich there
would be no legal path of resolution.20
This argument,which-strictlyconstrued-would require an ab-
solute world sovereign,has been overtakenby the historicalfactsof
the last two hundred years or so, which show conclusivelythat what
cannot work in theory works quite well in practice. Law-governed
coexistenceis possible withouta supreme and unconstrainedagency.
There is, it is true,the possibilityof ultimateconflicts:of disputes in
regardto whicheven thelegallycorrectmethodofresolutionis contested.
To see this,one need only imagine how a constitutionaldemocracy's
threebranchesof governmentmightengage in an all-outpowerstruggle,
each going to the verybrinkof what, on its understanding,it is con-
stitutionallyauthorized to do. From a theoreticalpoint of view, this
possibilityshows that we are not insured against, and thus live in
permanent danger of, constitutionalcrises. But this no longer un-
dermines our confidence in a genuine division of powers: we have
learned that such crises need not be frequentor irresolvable.From a
practicalpoint of view,we know that constitutionaldemocracies can
endure and can ensure a robustjuridical state.

20. This dogma-prefigured in Aquinas, Dante, Marsilius,and Bodin-is most

fullystated in chaps. 14, 26, and 29 of Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan(Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1981), who also introducesthe idea of obligationsinforointern. For Kant's
statementsof it, see Reiss, ed., pp. 75, 81, 144-45. The dogma maintained its hold
well into the twentiethcentury,when itdeclined togetherwiththe Austinianconception
ofjurisprudence. See GeoffreyMarshall,Parliamentary and theCommonwealth
Sovereignty
(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1957), pt. 1; S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Social
Principlesand theDemocraticState (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), chaps. 3, 12; and
Herbert L. A. Hart, The ConceptofLaw (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1961).

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60 Ethics October1992
This same point applies in the verticaldimension as well: just as
it is nonsense to suppose that (in a juridical state) sovereigntymust
restwithone of the branchesof government,itis similarlynonsensical
to thinkthatin a multilayered schemesovereignty mustbe concentrated
on one level exclusively.As the historyof federalistregimes clearly
shows,a verticaldivisionof sovereigntycan workquite wellin practice,
even while it leaves some conflictsover the constitutionalallocation
of powers withouta legal path of authoritativeresolution.
Objections of type2 oppose, more specifically, a verticaldispersal
of sovereignty:there are certain verticallyindivisiblegovernmental
functionsthatformthe core of sovereignty. Any politicalunitexercising
these core functionsmustbe dominant-free to determinethe extent
to whichsmallerunitswithinit may engage in theirown local political
decision making, even while its own political process is immune to
regulation and review by more inclusive units. Vertical distributions
of sovereignty,if theyare to exist at all, must thereforebe lopsided
(as in currentfederal regimes).
To be assessable, such a claim standsin need of twoclarifications,
whichare rarelysupplied.First,whenone thinksabout itmorecarefully,
it turnsout to be surprisinglydifficultto come up withexamples of
indivisiblegovernmentalfunctions.Eminentdomain, economic policy,
foreignpolicy,judicial review; the control of raw materials,security
forces,education, health care, and income support; the regulation
and taxation of resource extractionand pollution,of work and con-
sumptioncan all be handled at variouslevelsand indeed are so handled
in existingfederal regimes and confederations.So what are the gov-
ernmentalfunctionsthatsupposedlyare verticallyindivisible?Second,
supposed to be derivedfroma conceptual insight,
is theirindivisibility
fromempiricalexigencies,or frommoraldesiderata?And whichones?
Since I cannot here discuss all possible type 2 objections,let me
concentrateon one paradigm case: Walzer's claim that the authority
to fixmembership,to admitand exclude,is at leastpartof an indivisible
core of sovereignty:"At some level of politicalorganizationsomething
like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authorityto
make its own admissions policy,to controland sometimesto restrain,,
the flowof immigrants.",2'Walzer's"must"does not reflecta conceptual
or empirical necessity,for in those senses the authorityin question
quite obviously can be divided-for example, by allowing political
units on all levels to veto immigration.It is on moral grounds that
Walzer rejectssuch an authorityfor provinces,towns,and neighbor-
hoods: it would "create a thousand pettyfortresses."22 But if smaller
unitsare to be precluded fromcontrollingthe influxof new members,

21. Walzer, "Distribution,"p. 10.

22. Ibid., p. 9.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 61
then immigrationmust be controlledat the state level: "Only if the
statemakes a selectionamong would-be membersand guaranteesthe
loyalty,security,and welfare of the individuals it selects, can local
communitiestake shape as 'indifferent'associations,determinedonly
by personalpreferenceand marketcapacity."23 The assertedconnection
is again a moralone: itis certainly factually
possibleforlocalcommunities
to exist as indifferentassociations even while no controlis exercised
over migrationat all; as Walzer says,"The fortressestoo could be torn
down, of course."24 Walzer's point is, then, that the insistence on
openness (to avoid a thousand pettyfortresses)is asking too much of
neighborhoods,unless the state has controlover immigration:"The
distinctivenessof cultures and groups depends upon closure.... If
thisdistinctiveness is a value, . . . thenclosuremustbe permittedsome-
where."25
But is the conventionalmodel, withthisrationale,reallymorally
necessary?To be sure,Walzeris rightto claimthatthevalue of protecting
cohesiveneighborhoodculturesis betterservedbynationalimmigration
controlthan by no controlat all.26But it would be much betterserved
stillif the state were constrainedto admit only immigrantswho are
planning to move into a neighborhood thatis willingto accept them.
Moreover,sincea neighborhoodculturecan be as effectively destroyed
bytheinfluxof fellownationalsas bythatof immigrants, neighborhoods
would do even better,iftheyhad some authorityto selectfromamong
prospective domestic newcomers or to limit their number. Finally,
neighborhoods may often want to bring in new members from
abroad-persons to whomtheyhave specialethnic,religious,or cultural
ties-and they would thereforebenefitfrom a role in the national
immigrationcontrol process that would allow them to facilitatethe
admission of such persons. Thus there are at least three reasons for
believingthatWalzer'srationale-cohesive neighborhoodculturesought
to be protectedwithoutbecoming pettyfortresses-is actuallybetter
servedby a divisionof the authorityto admit and exclude than by the
conventionalconcentrationof this authorityat the level of the state.
SOME MAIN REASONS FOR A VERTICAL DISPERSAL OF
SOVEREIGNTY
Having dealt withsome preliminaryobstacles,let me now sketchfour
main reasonsfavoring,over the statusquo, a worldin whichsovereignty
is widelydistributedvertically.
1. Peace/security.
-Under the currentregime, interstaterivalries
are settledultimatelythroughmilitarycompetition, includingthe threat
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
26. Ibid., p. 9.

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62 Ethics October1992
and use of military force.Moreover,withintheirown territories, national
governmentsare freeto do virtuallyanythingtheylike. Such govern-
ments thereforehave very powerful incentivesand very broad op-
portunitiesto develop their militarymight.This is bound to lead to
the furtherproliferationof nuclear,biological,chemical,and conven-
tional weapons of mass destruction.And in a world in which dozens
of competingnationalgovernmentscontrolsuch weapons,the outbreak
of devastatingwars is onlya matterof time.It is not feasibleto reduce
and eliminatenationalcontroloverweaponsof massdestruction through
a programthatdepends upon the voluntarycooperation of each and
everynational government.What is needed, therefore,is the centrally
enforcedreductionand eliminationof such weapons-in violationof
the prevalentidea of statesovereignty. Such a program,ifimplemented
soon, is much less dangerous than continuingthe statusquo. It could
gain the support of most peoples and governments,ifit increasesthe
securityof all on fairtermsthatare effectivelyadjudicatedand enforced.
2. Reducingoppression. -Under the currentglobal regime,national
governmentsare effectively freeto control"their"populationsin what-
ever way they see fit.Many make extensive use of this freedom by
torturingand murderingtheirdomesticopponents, censoringinfor-
mation,suppressingand subvertingdemocraticprocedures,prohibiting
emigration,and so forth.This problem could be reduced througha
verticaldispersal of sovereigntyover various layersof political units
that would check and balance one another as well as publicize one
another's abuses.
3. Globaleconomic justice. The magnitude and extentof current
economic deprivations-over 20 millionpersons die everyyear from
poverty-relatedcauses-calls for some modificationin the prevailing
scheme of economic cooperation. One plausible reformwould involve
a global levyon the use of natural resourcesto support the economic
developmentin the poorestareas.27Such a levywould tend to equalize
per capita endowmentsand also encourage conservation.Reformsfor
the sake of economic justice would again involve some centra-
lization-though withoutrequiringanythinglike a global welfarebu-
reaucracy.
Global economicjustice is an end in itsown right,whichrequires,
and thereforesupports,a reallocationof politicalauthority.But it is
also importantas a means toward the firsttwo purposes. War and
oppressionresultfromthe contestforpowerwithinand among political
units, which tends to be the more intense the higher the stakes. In
fightsto govern states,or to redraw their borders, far too much is
now at stake by way of controlof people and resources. We can best
27. For furtherdiscussionof such a reform-backed perhaps by the idea thatthe
world's resources should be owned or controlledby all its inhabitantsas equals-see
Beitz, PoliticalTheory,pp. 136-43; and Pogge, RealizingRawls, pp. 250-52, 263-65.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 63
lower the stakes by dispersing political authorityover several levels
and institutionally securingeconomicjustice at the global level.
This importantpoint suggestswhy my firstthree considerations
-though each supportssome centralization-do noton balance support
a world state. While a world statecould lead to significantprogressin
termsof peace and economic justice, it also poses significantrisksof
oppression. Here the kind of multilayeredscheme I propose has the
great advantages of affordingplentyof checks and balances and of
assuringthat,even when some politicalunits turn tyrannicaland op-
pressive,there will always be other, already fullyorganized political
units (above, below, or on the same level) which can render aid and
protectionto the oppressed, publicize the abuses, and, if necessary,
fightthe oppressors.
There are two furtherimportantreasons against a world state.
Cultural and social diversityare likelyto be much better protected
when the interestsof culturalcommunitiesat all levelsare represented
(externally)and supported (internally)by coordinate political units.
And the scheme I propose could be gradually reached from where
we are now (throughwhat I have called second-orderdecentralization),
while a world state-involving, as it does, the annihilationof existing
states-would seem reachable only throughrevolutionor in the wake
of some global catastrophe.
4. Ecology.-Modern processes of production and consumption
are liable to generate significantnegativeexternalitiesthat,to a large
and increasingextent,transcendnational borders.In a worldof com-
peting autonomous states,the internalizationof such externalitiesis
generallyquite imperfectbecause of familiarisolation,assurance, and
coordination problems. Treaties among a large number of verydif-
ferently situatedactorsrequiredifficultand time-consuming bargaining
and negotiations,whichoftenlead to only veryslightprogress,ifany.
And even when treatiesare achieved,doubtsabout the fullcompliance
of other partiestend to erode each party'sown commitmentto make
good-faitheffortstoward compliance.
Now one might think that this fourthreason goes beyond my
institutionalcosmopolitanismbecause there is no recognized human
rightto a clean environment.Why should people not be free to live
in a degraded natural environmentif they so choose? In response,
perhaps they should be, but for now they won't have had a choice.
The degradationof our naturalenvironmentineluctablyaffectsus all.
And yet,most people are effectively excluded fromany say about this
issue which,in the currentstate-centric model, is regulatedbynational
governmentsunilaterallyor through intergovernmentalbargaining
heavilyinfluencedbyhuge differentials in economicand military might.
This response suggestsreplacingecologywitha deeper and more
general fourthreason, whichmightbe labeled democracy: personshave

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64 Ethics October1992
a rightto an institutionalorder under which those significantly and
legitimately28 affectedby a political decision have a roughly equal
opportunityto influence the making of this decision-directly or
through elected delegates or representatives.29 Such a human right
to politicalparticipationalso supportsgreaterlocal autonomyin matters
of purely local concern than exists in most currentstates or would
existin a world state,howeverdemocratic.In fact,it supportsjust the
kind of multilayeredinstitutionalscheme I have proposed.
Before developing thisidea further,let me consideran objection.
One mightsay, against a human rightto politicalparticipation,that
what mattersabout politicaldecisions is thattheybe correct,not that
they be made democraticallyby those concerned. But this objection
applies, firstof all, only to politicalchoices thatare morallyclosed and
thus can be decided correctlyor incorrectly.I believe that we should
rejecta view on whichalmostall politicalchoices are viewedas morally
closed (withthe correctdecision determined,perhaps, throughutility
differentials),but I have no space here to defend thisbelief. Second,
even when politicalchoicesare morallyclosed,the primaryand ultimate
responsibility fortheirbeing made correctlyshould lie withthe persons
concerned.Of course,some otherdecisionprocedure-such as a group
of experts-may be more reliable for this or that kind of decision,
and such procedures (judges, parliaments,cabinets,etc.) should then
be put in place. This should be done, however,bythe people delegating,
or abstaining from,such decisions. It is ultimatelyup to them, and
not to self-appointedexperts,to recognize the greater reliabilityof,
and to institutionalize,alternativedecision-makingprocedures.

28. The qualification"legitimately"is necessaryto rule out claims such as this: "I
should be allowed a vote on the permissibilityof homosexuality,in all parts of the
world, because the knowledge that homosexual acts are performedanywherecauses
me great distress."I cannot enter a discussion of this proviso here, except to say that
the argumentsrelevantto its specificationare by and large analogous to the standard
argumentsrelevantto the specificationof Mill's no-harm principle.
29. I understand opportunityas being impaired only by (social) disadvantages
not by (natural) handicaps. This is plausible only on a narrowconstrualof "handicap."
Although being black and being female are natural features,they reduce a person's
chances to affectpolitical decisions only in certain social settings(in a racist/sexist
culture). Such reductionsshould thereforecount as disadvantages. By contrast,those
whose lesser abilityto participatein public debate is due to theirlow intelligenceare
not disadvantaged but handicapped. They do not count as having a less-than-equal
opportunity.The postulatedhuman rightis nota group right.Of course,theinhabitants
of a townmayappeal to thisrightto show thatitwas wrongforthe nationalgovernment,
say,to imposesome politicaldecisionthataffects onlythem.In sucha case, thetownspeople
forma group of those havinga grievance.But theydo not have a grievanceas a group.
Rather,each of them has such a grievance of not having been given her due political
weight-just the grievance she would have had, had the decision been made by other
townspeople withher excluded.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 65
Given the postulated human rightto political participation,the
proper verticaldistributionof sovereigntyis determinedby three sets
of considerations. The firstfavor decentralization,the second cen-
tralization,while the thirdmay correctthe resultingbalance in either
direction.
First,decision making should be decentralizedas far as possible.
This is desirable in part,of course, in order to minimizethe decision-
makingburdensupon individuals.But thereare moreimportantreasons
as well. Insofar as decisions are morallyclosed, outsiders are more
likely to lack the knowledge and sensitivitiesto make responsible
judgments-and the only practicableand morallyacceptable way of
delimitingthose who are capable of such judgments is by rough geo-
graphical criteria.Insofaras decisions are morallyopen, the end must
be to maximize each person's opportunityto influencethe social con-
ditions that shape her life-which should not be diluted forthe sake
of enhancing persons' opportunitiesto influencedecisions of merely
local significanceelsewhere. At least persons should be left free to
decide for themselvesto what extent to engage in such exchanges.
The firstconsiderationdoes not then rule out voluntarycreation of
central decision-makingmechanisms (even though theirstructure-
dependent upon unanimous consent-would tend to reflectthe par-
ticipants'bargaining power). Such centralizationmay be rational,for
example,in cases of conflictbetweenlocal and globalrationality(tragedy-
of-the-commonscases: fishing,grazing,pollution) and also in regard
to desired projectsthatrequire manycontributorsbecause theyinvolve
coordinationproblemsor economies of scale, forexample, or because
theyare simplytoo expensive (constructionand maintenanceof trans-
portationand communicationsystems,researchand technology,space
programs,and so forth).
The second considerationfavorscentralizationinsofaras this is
necessary to avoid excluding persons from the making of decisions
that significantly (and legitimately)affectthem. Such decisions are of
two-possibly three-kinds. Inhabitingthe same naturalenvironment
and being significantlyaffectedby what others do to it, we have a
rightto participatein regulatinghow it may be used. And since the
lives each of us can lead are very significantly shaped by prevailing
institutions-suchas marriage,reproductionand birthcontrol,property,
money,markets,and formsof politicalorganization-we have a right
to participatein theirchoice and design. These two kindsof decision
arise directlyfrom Kant's point that human beings cannot avoid in-
fluencingone another:throughdirectcontactand throughtheirimpact
upon the natural world in which theycoexist. A rightto participate
in decisionsof the thirdkindis more controversial.There are contexts,
one might say, in which we act as a species and thus should decide
togetherhow to act. Examples might be our conduct toward other

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66 Ethics October1992
biological species (extinction,genetic engineering,cruelty),ventures
intoouter space, and the preservationof our human heritage(ancient
skeletonsand artifacts,great worksof art and architecture,places of
exceptional natural beauty). In all these cases it would seem wrong
forone person or group to take irremediablesteps unilaterally.
The significance of the second considerationdepends heavilyupon
empirical matters,though it does so in a ratherstraightforward and
accessible way. It is obvious upon minimal reflectionthat the devel-
opmentsof the past fewcenturieshave greatlyincreasedthe significance
of thisconsiderationin favorof centralization.This is so partlybecause
of risingpopulation density,but much more importantlybecause of
our vastlymore powerfultechnologiesand the tremendously increased
levelof global interdependence.Concerningtechnologies,thefactthat
what a population does withinits own national borders-stockpiling
weapons of mass destruction, depletingnonrenewableresources,cutting
down vegetation essential for the reproductionof oxygen, emitting
pollutants that are destroying the ozone layer and cause global
warming-now oftenimposes verysignificantharms and risksupon
outsidersbringsinto play the politicalhuman rightsof theseoutsiders,
therebymorallyunderminingthe conventionalinsistenceon absolute
stateautonomy.Global interdependenceis bestillustratedbytheemer-
gence of trulyglobal capital and commoditymarkets(as dramatically
illustratedby the stock marketcrash of October 1987): a change in
Japanese interestrates,or a speculativefrenzyof short-sellingon the
Chicago Futures Exchange, can literallymake the differencebetween
life and death for large numbers of people half a world away-in
Africa,forexample, where manycountriesdepend upon foreignbor-
rowing and cash crop exports. Such interdependence is not bad as
such (it can hardly be scaled back in any case), but it does require
democraticcentralization of decisionmaking:as moreand more persons
are significantlyaffectedby certaininstitutions,
more and more persons
have a rightto a politicalrole in shaping them.The possibilityof free
bargaining over the design of such institutionsdoes not satisfythe
equal-opportunityprinciple,as is illustratedin the case of commodity
marketsbythe factthatAfricanpopulationssimplylack thebargaining
power thatwould allow them significantly to affecthow such markets
are organized. (This argument withstandsthe communitarianclaim
that we must reject supranational democraticprocesses for the sake
of the value of nationalautonomy.Such rejectiondoes indeed enhance
the national autonomy of the advantaged First World populations.
But theirgain is purchased at the expense of poorer populationswho,
despite fictionalor de jure statesovereignty,have virtuallyno control
over the most basic parameters that shape their lives-a problem
heightenedbythefactthateven theirown,ratherimpotentgovernments
face strongincentivesto cater to foreigninterestsratherthan to those
of theirconstituents.)

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 67
The firsttwo considerationsby themselvesyield the result that
the authorityto make decisions of some particularkind should rest
with the democratic political process of a unit that (i) is as small as
possible but still (ii) includes as equals all persons significantly and
legitimatelyaffectedby decisionsof thiskind.In practice,some trading-
offis required between these two considerationsbecause therecannot
always be an established political process that includes as equals all
and onlythose significantly affected.A matteraffecting the populations
of two provinces,forexample, mightbe referredto the national par-
liament or might be left to bargaining between the two provincial
governments.The formersolution caters to (ii) at the expense of (i):
involvingmany persons who are not legitimatelyaffected.The latter
solutioncatersto (i) at the expense of (ii): givingthe personslegitimately
affectednot an equal opportunityto influencethe matterbut one that
depends on the relativebargaining power of the two provincialgov-
ernments.
The firsttwo considerations would sufficeon the ideal-theory
assumption that any decisions made satisfyall moral constraintswith
regard to both procedure (the equal-opportunityrequirement)and
output(thisand otherhuman rights).This assumption,however,could
hardlybe strictlytrue in practice.And so a thirdconsiderationmust
come into play: what would emerge as the proper verticaldistribution
of sovereigntyfroma balancing of the firsttwo considerationsalone
should be modified-in eitherdirection-if such modificationsignif-
icantlyincreasesthedemocraticnatureofdecisionmakingor itsreliability
(as measured in terms of human rightsfulfillment).Let me briefly
discuss how this thirdconsiderationmightmake a difference.
On the one hand, one must ask whetherit would be a gain for
human rightsfulfillment on balance to transferdecision-makingau-
thority"upward" to largerunits-or (perhaps more plausibly)to make
thepoliticalprocessof smallerunitssubjectto regulationand/orreview
by the politicalprocess of more inclusiveunits.Such authoritywould
allow the larger unit,on human rightsgrounds,30to require revisions
in the structureof the political process of the smaller one and/orto
nullifyitspoliticaldecisionsand perhaps also to enforcesuch revisions
and nullifications.
Even when such interventionsreallydo protecthuman rights,this
regulationand reviewauthorityhas some costsin termsof the political
human rightsof the membersof the smallerunit. But then,of course,
the largerunit's regulationand reviewprocess mayitselfbe unreliable
and thus may produce human rightsviolationseitherby overturning
30. Though not in defense of other proceduralor substantiveconstraintsto which
the smaller unit may have chosen to commititself.Compare here the situationin the
United States,where federalcourts may reviewwhetherlaws and decisions at the state
level accord withsuperordinatefederalrequirements,but not whethertheyaccord with
superordinaterequirementsof that state itself.

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68 Ethics October1992
unobjectionable structuresor decisions (at even greater cost to the
politicalhuman rightsof membersof the smaller unit) or by forcing
the smallerunit to adopt structuresand decisions thatdirectlyviolate
human rights.
On the other hand, there is also the inverse question: whether
the thirdconsiderationmightsupport a move in the directionof de-
centralization.Thus one must ask to what extentthe politicalprocess
of a larger unit is undemocraticor unreliable,and whetherit might
be a gain forhuman rightsfulfillment on balance to transferdecision-
makingauthority"downward"to smallerunits-or to investthepolitical
process of such subunits with review authority.Such an authority
might,for example, allow provincialgovernments,on human rights
grounds, to block the application of national laws in theirprovince.
This authorityis justifiedif and only if its benefits(laws passed in an
undemocraticmanner or violatinghuman rightsare not applied) out-
weigh its costs (unobjectionable laws are blocked in violation of the
politicalrightsof membersof the larger unit).
How such mattersshould be weighedis a highlycomplexquestion,
which I cannot here address with any precision. Let me make two
points nevertheless.First,a good deal of weight should be given to
the actual viewsof thosewho sufferabridgmentsof theirhuman rights
and forwhose benefita regulationand/orreviewauthoritymightthus
be called for.If mostblacks in some statewould rathersufferdiscrim-
ination than see their state governmentconstrainedby the federal
government,then the presumptionagainst such an authorityshould
be much weightierthan if the opposition came only fromthe whites.
This is not to deny that victimsof injusticemay be brainwashed or
may sufferfrom false consciousness of various sorts. It may stillbe
possible to make the case fora regulationand/orreviewauthority.But
it should be significantlymore difficultto do so.
Second, commonalitiesof language, religion,ethnicity, or history
are strictlyirrelevant.Such commonalitiesdo not give people a claim
to be part of one another's political lives, nor does the lack of such
commonalitiesargue against restraints.The presence or absence of
such commonalitiesmay stillbe empiricallysignificant, however.Thus
suppose that the members of some smaller unit share religious or
ethnic characteristicsthat in the larger unit are in the minority(e.g.,
a Muslimprovincewithina predominantlyHindu state).Our historical
experiencewithsuch cases maywell supportthe viewthata regulation
and reviewauthorityby the larger unit would probablybe frequently
abused or that a review authorityby the smaller unit would tend to
enhance human rightsfulfillment overall. The relevance of such in-
formationbrings out that the required weighingsdo not depend on
value judgments alone. They also depend on reasonable expectations
about how alternativearrangementswould actuallywork in one or
another concrete context.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 69
The thirdconsiderationmust also play a centralrole in a special
case: the question of where decisions about the proper allocation of
decisionmakingshouldbe made. For example,shoulda disputebetween
a provincialparliamentand a national legislatureover whichof them
is properlyin chargeof a particulardecisionbe referredto theprovincial
or the nationalsupremecourt?Here again one mustpresentarguments
to the effectthat the preferredlocus of decision making is likelyto
be more reliable than its alternative.
Nothing definitecan be said about the ideal number of levels or
the exact distributionof legislative,executive,and judicial functions
over them. These mattersmightvary in space and time, depending
on the prevailingempirical factsto be accommodated by my second
and thirdconsiderations(externalities, interdependence;unreliabilities)
and on persons' preferencesas shaped by the historical,cultural,lin-
guistic,or religious ties among them. The human rightto political
participationalso leaves roomfora widevariety, hence regionaldiversity,
of decision-making procedures-direct or representative,with or
withoutpoliticalparties,and so on. Democracy may take manyforms.
THE SHAPING AND RESHAPING OF POLITICAL UNITS
One great advantage of the proposed multilayeredscheme is, I have
said, that it can be reached gradually fromwhere we are now. This
requiresmoderatecentralizingand decentralizingmovesinvolvingthe
strengtheningof politicalunitsabove and below the level of the state.
In some cases, such unitswillhave to be created,and so we need some
ideas about how the geographical shape of new politicalunitsis to be
determined.Or, seeing thatthereis considerabledissatisfactionabout
even the geographical shape of existingpoliticalunits,we should ask
more broadly: What principlesought to govern the geographicalsep-
aration of politicalunits on any level?
Guided again by the cosmopolitan ideal of democracy,I suggest
these two procedural principlesas a firstapproximation:
1. The inhabitantsof any contiguousterritory
of reasonableshape
may decide-through some majoritarianor supermajoritarian
procedure-to join an existingpoliticalunit whose territory
is contiguous with theirsand whose population is willing-
as assessed through some majoritarianor supermajoritarian
procedure-to accept themas members.3'This libertyis con-

31. I won'ttryto be preciseabout "reasonable shape." The idea is to rule out areas
with extremelylong borders, or borders that divide towns, integratednetworksof
economic activity,or the like. Perhaps the inhabitantsin question should have to be
minimallynumerous; but I think the threshold could be quite low. If a tinyborder
village wants to belong to the neighboringprovince,why should it not be allowed to
switch?The contiguitycondition needs some relaxing to allow territoriesconsistingof
a small number of internallycontiguous areas whose access to one another is not
controlled by other political units. The United States of America would satisfythis

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70 Ethics October1992
ditional upon the political unit or units that are truncated
throughsuch a move eitherremainingviable(witha contiguous
territoryof reasonable shape and sufficientpopulation) or
being willinglyincorporated,pursuantto the firstclause, into
another politicalunit or other politicalunits.
2. The inhabitantsof anycontiguousterritory ofreasonableshape,
if sufficientlynumerous, may decide-through some major-
itarianor supermajoritarianprocedure-to formthemselves
intoa politicalunitof a level commensuratewiththeirnumber.
This libertyis subject to three constraints:there may be
subgroups whose members,pursuant to their libertyunder
1, are free to reject membershipin the unit to be formed in
favorof membershipin another politicalunit. There may be
subgroups whose members,pursuant to their libertyunder
2, are free to reject membershipin the unit to be formedin
favorof formingtheirown politicalunit on the same level.32
And the politicalunitor unitstruncatedthroughthe requested
move must either remain viable (witha contiguous territory
of reasonable shape and sufficient population) or be willingly
incorporated,pursuant to the firstclause of 1, into another
politicalunit or other politicalunits.
It will be said that acceptance of such principles would triggeran
avalanche of applications. It is surely true that a large number of
existinggroups are unhappy with their currentmembershipstatus;
there is a significantbacklog, so to speak, that mightpose a serious
short-termproblem. Once this backlog will have been worked down,
however,theremaynot be much redrawingactivityas people willthen
be contentwiththeirpoliticalmemberships,and mostborderswillbe
supported by stable majorities.
Moreover, as the advocated verticaldispersal of sovereigntyis
implemented,conflictsover borders will lose much of theirintensity.
In our world,manysuchconflicts are motivatedbymorallyinappropriate
considerations-especially the followingtwo. There is competition
importantterritories
over valuable or strategically and groups because
their possession importantlyaffectsthe distributionof international
bargainingpower (economic and militarypotential)forthe indefinite
future. And there are attemptsby the more affluentto interpose

relaxed condition through secure access among Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii, and the
remainingforty-eight contiguous states.
32. What if minoritysubgroups are geographicallydispersed (like the Serbs in
Croatia)? In such cases, there is no attractiveway of accommodatingthose opposed to
the formationof the new politicalunit. My second principlewould let the preference
of the majoritywithinthe relevantterritoryprevail nevertheless.This is defensible,I
think,so long as we can bracketany concern forhuman rightsviolations.Wherejustice
is not at stake, it seems reasonable, if legitimatepreferencesare opposed and some
must be frustrated,to let the majorityprevail.

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 Pogge Cosmopolitanism 71
bordersbetweenthemselvesand the poor in orderto circumvent widely
recognized duties of distributive justice among compatriots.33Under
the proposed multilayeredscheme-in which the political authority
currentlyexercised by national governmentsis both constrainedand
dispersed over several layers,and in which economicjustice is insti-
tutionalizedat the globalleveland thusinescapable-territorialdisputes
on any level would be only slightlymore intensethan disputes about
provincial or county lines are now. It is quite possible that my two
principles are not suitable for defining a right to secession in our
present world of excessivelysovereign states.34But theirplausibility
willincreaseas theproposed second-orderdecentralization progresses.35
Finally,the incidence of applicationscan be reduced throughtwo
reasonable amendments. First,the burden of proof,in appealing to
eitherof the two principles,should restwiththe advocates of change,
who must map out an appropriate territory, organize its population,
and so forth.This burden would tend to discourage frivolousclaims.
Second, itmaybe bestto require some supermajoritarianprocess (e.g.,
proponentsmust outnumberopponents plus nonvotersin threecon-
secutivereferendaover a two-yearperiod). Some such provisionwould
especiallyhelp preventareas changingback and forthrepeatedly(with
outside supportersmoving in, perhaps, in order to tip the scales).
Let me brieflyillustratehow the two principleswould workin the
case of nested political units. Suppose the Kashmirisagree that they
want to belong togetheras one provincebut are divided on whether
this should be a province of India or of Pakistan.The majorityWest
Kashmiris favor affiliationwith Pakistan, the East Kashmiris favor
affiliationwith India. There are four plausible outcomes: a united
Kashmiriprovinceof Pakistan(P), a united Kashmiriprovinceof India
(I), a separate state of Kashmir (S), and a divided Kashmirbelonging
partlyto Pakistan and partlyto India (D). Since the East Kashmiris
can, by principle 2, unilaterallyinsiston D over P, they enjoy some
protectionagainst the West Kashmirimajority.They can use thispro-
tectionfor bargaining,which may result in outcome S (if this is the
second preferenceon both sides) or even in outcome I (if that is the

33. See Alan Buchanan, Secession(Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1991), pp. 114-25;

and Thomas W. Pogge, "Loopholes in Moralities,"JournalofPhilosophy 89 (1992): 79-
98, pp. 88-90.
34. That topic is extensivelydiscussed by Buchanan. While he takes the current
statessystemfor grantedand adjusts his theoryof secession accordingly,I am arguing
thata more appealing theoryof secessionwould be plausiblein the contextof a somewhat
differentglobal order. I therebyofferone more reason in favorof the latter.
35. For example, as European stateswillincreasinglybecome subjectto global and
regional constraints-regarding militarymight,pollution, exploitation of resources,
treatment ofitscitizens,etc.-the importanceofwhetherthereis one state(Czechoslovakia)
or two states (one Czech, one Slovak) would tend to decline: for the Slovaks, for the
Czechs, and for any thirdparties in the vicinity.

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