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Quarterly Review of Biology.
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THE EVOLUTION OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM
BY ROBERT L. TRIVERS
HarvardUniversity,
BiologicalLaboratories,
Cambridge,Mass. 02138
ABSTRACT
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed recipro-
cally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate -against the
cheater (non-reciprocator)in the system. Three instances of altruistic behavior are
discussed, the evolution of which the model can explain: (1) behavior involved in
cleaning symbioses; (2) warning cries in birds: and (3) human reciprocal altruism.
Regarding human reciprocal altruism, it is shown that the details of the psycho-
logical system that regulates this altruism can be explained by the model. Spe-
cifically,friendship,dislike, moralisticaggression,gratitude,sympathy,trust,suspicion,
trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some forms of dishonestyand hypocrisycan be
explained as important adaptations to regulate the altruisticsystem. Each individual
human is seen as possessing altruistic and cheating tendencies, the expression of
which is sensitive to developmental variables that were selected to set the tendencies
at a balance appropriate to the local social and ecological environment.
A
INTRODUCTION own perpetuation,regardlessof which individ-
ual the genes appear in. The term "kin selec-
LTRUISTIC behavior can be de-
tion" will be used in this paper to cover in-
finedas behavior that benefitsan-
stancesof this type-that is, of organismsbeing
otherorganism,not closelyrelated,
selectedto help theirrelativelyclose kin.
while being apparentlydetrimen-
The model presented here is designed to
tal to the organism performing
show how certain classes of behavior con-
the behavior, benefitand detrimentbeing de-
venientlydenoted as "altruistic" (or "recipro-
fined in termsof contributionto inclusive fit-
cally altruistic")can be selected for even when
ness. One human being leaping into water,at
the recipient is so distantlyrelated to the or-
some danger to himself,to save another dis-
ganism performingthe altruisticact that kin
tantly related human from drowning may be
selection can be ruled out. The model will
said to display altruisticbehavior. If he were
apply, for example, to altruisticbehavior be-
to leap in to save his own child, the behavior
tween membersof differentspecies. It will be
would not necessarilybe an instance of "al-
argued that under certain conditions natural
-truism";he may merelybe contributingto the
selection favors these altruistic behaviors be-
survivalof his own genes investedin the child.
cause in the long run theybenefitthe organism
Models that attemptto explain altruisticbe-
performing them.
havior in termsof natural selectionare models
designed to take the altruismout of altruism.
THE MODEL
For example, Hamilton (1964) has demon-
strated that degree of relationship is an im- One human being savinganother,who is not
portant parameterin predictinghow selection closely related and is about to drown, is an
will operate, and behavior which appears instance of altruism. Assume that the chance
altruistic may, on knowledge of the genetic of the drowningman dying is one-half if no
relationships of the organisms involved, be one leaps in to save him, but that the chance
explicable in termsof natural selection: those thathis potentialrescuerwill drownif he leaps
genes being selectedfor thatcontributeto their in to save him is much smaller, say, one in
35
36 TH E QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
twenty. Assumethat the drowningman always This argumentcan be made precise. Assume
drowns when his rescuer does and that he is there are both altruistsand non-altruistsin a
always saved when the rescuersurvivesthe res- population of size N and that the altruistsare
cue attempt. Also assume that the energycosts characterizedby the fact that each performs
involvedin rescuingare trivialcomparedto the altruisticacts when the cost to the altruist is
survival probabilities. Were this an isolated well below the benefitto the recipient,where
event, it is clear that the rescuer should not cost is defined as the degree to which the be-
bother to save the drowningman. But if the havior retardsthe reproductionof the genes of
drowningman reciprocatesat some futuretime, the altruistand benefitis the degree to which
and if the survival chances are then exactly the behavior increasesthe rate of reproduction
reversed,it will have been to the benefitof each of the genes of the recipient. Assume that the
participantto have riskedhis life forthe other. altruisticbehavior of an altruist is controlled
Each participant will have traded a one-half by an allele (dominant or recessive),a2, at a
chance of dying for about a one-tenthchance. given locus and that (for simplicity)there is
If we assume that the entire population is only one alternativeallele, a1, at thatlocus and
sooner or later exposed to the same risk of that it does not lead to altruistic behavior.
drowning,the two individuals who risk their Consider three possibilities: (1) the altruists
lives to save each other will be selected over dispense their altruism randomly throughout
those who face drowningon their own. Note the population; (2) they dispense it nonran-
that the benefitsof reciprocitydepend on the domly by regarding their degree of genetic
unequal cost/benefitratio of the altruisticact, relationshipwith possible recipients;or (3) they
that is, the benefitof the altruisticact to the dispense it nonrandomlyby regardingthe al-
recipientis greaterthan the cost of the act to truistictendenciesof possible recipients.
the performer,cost and benefitbeing defined
here as the increase or decrease in chances of (1) Random dispensationof altruism
the relevant alleles propagating themselvesin There are three possible genotypes: a1a1,
the population. Note also that,as defined,the a2al, and a2a2' Each allele of the heterozygote
benefitsand costs depend on the age of the will be affectedequally by whatevercosts and
altruist and recipient (see Age-dependent benefitsare associatedwith the altruismof such
changesbelow). (The odds assigned above may individuals (if a2 is dominant)and by whatever
not be unrealistic if the drowning man is benefitsaccrue to such individuals from the
drowningbecause of a cramp or if the rescue altruismof others,so theycan be disregarded.
can be executed by extending a branch from If altruisticacts are being dispensed randomly
shore.) throughouta large population, then the typi-
Why should the rescued individual bother to cal a1ai individual benefitsby (1/N)lb1, where
reciprocate?Selection would seem to favorbe- bi is the benefitof the ith altruisticact per-
ing saved fromdrowningwithoutendangering formedby the altruist. The typical a2a2 indi-
oneself by reciprocating. Why not cheat? vidual has a net benefitof (l/N)Jbi - (I/N)Icj,
("Cheating" is used throughout this paper wherec; is the cost to the a2a2 altruistof his jth
solely for convenience to denote failure to altruisticact. Since -(1 /N)Icj is always less
reciprocate;no conscious intent or moral con-
than zero, allele a1 will everywherereplace
notationis implied.) Selectionwill discriminate
allele a2.
against the cheaterif cheatinghas later adverse
affectson his life which outweighthe benefitof (2) Nonrandom dispensationby reference
not reciprocating.This may happen if the al- to kin
truistrespondsto the cheatingby curtailingall
futurepossible altruisticgesturesto this indi- This case has been treated in detail by
vidual. Assumingthat the benefitsof these lost Hamilton (1964), who concluded that if the
altruisticacts outweigh the costs involved in tendencyto dispense altruism to close kin is
reciprocating, the cheater will be selected great enough, as a function of the disparity
against relative to individuals who, because between the average cost and benefit of an
neither cheats, exchange many altruisticacts. altruistic act, then a2 will replace a1. Tech-
MARCH 1971] RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 37
gets when cheated; and P is the punishment for it means that only under highlyspecialized
that both individuals get when neither is al- circumstancescan the altruist be reasonably
truistic (adapted from Rapoport and Cham- guaranteed that the causal chain he initiates
mah, 1965). Iteratedgames played between the with his altruisticact will eventuallyreturnto
same two individuals mimic real life in that him and confer,directlyor indirectly,its bene-
theypermiteach player to respond to the be- fit. Only under these conditions will the
havior of the other. Rapoport and Chammah cheater be selected against and this type of
(1965) and othershave conducted such experi- altruisticbehavior evolve.
ments using human players,and some of their Althoughthe preconditionsforthe evolution
resultsare reviewedbelow in the discussionof of reciprocal altruism are specialized, many
human altruism. species probably meet them and display this
W. D. Hamilton (pers. commun.) has shown type of altruism. This paper will limit itself,
that the above treatmentof reciprocalaltruism however, to three instances. The first,be-
can be reformulatedconciselyin termsof game havior involvedin cleaning symbioses,is chosen
theoryas follows. Assuming two altruistsare because it permits a clear discriminationbe-
symmetrically exposed to a series of reciprocal tween this model and that based on kin selec-
situations with identical costs and identical tion (Hamilton, 1964). The second, warning
benefits,then after 2n reciprocal situations, calls in birds, has already been elaborately
each has been "paid" nR. Were one of the two analyzed in terms of kin selection; it is dis-
a nonaltruistand the second changed to a non- cussed here to show how the model presented
altruisticpolicy after firstbeing cheated, then above leads to a very differentinterpretation
the initial altruistwould be paid S + (n - I)P of these familiar behaviors. Finally, human
(assuming he had the firstopportunityto be reciprocal altruism is discussed in detail be-
altruistic) and the non-altruistwould receive cause it representsthe best documentedcase of
T + (n - I)P. The important point here is reciprocal altruism known, because there has
that unless T >> R, then even with small n, apparently been strong selection for a very
nR should exceed T + (n - I)P. If this holds, complex systemregulating altruisticbehavior,
the nonaltruistictype,when rare, cannot start and because the above model permitsthe func-
to spread. But there is also a barrier to the tional interpretationof details of the system
spread of altruismwhen altruistsare rare, for that otherwiseremain obscure.
P > S implies nP > S + (n-1)P. As n in-
creases,thesetwo total payoffstend to equality, ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR IN CLEANING SYMBIOSES
so the barrierto the spread of altruismis weak
if n is large. The barrierwill be overcome if The preconditionsfor the evolution of re-
the advantages gained by exchanges between ciprocal altruism are similar to those for the
altruists outweigh the initial losses to non- operation of kin selection: long lifetime,low
altruistictypes. dispersal rate, and mutual dependence, for ex-
Reciprocal altruismcan also be viewed as a ample, tend to increase the chance that one is
symbiosis,each partnerhelping the otherwhile interactingwith one's close kin. This makes it
he helps himself.The symbiosishas a time lag, difficult to discriminatethe two alternativehy-
however;one partnerhelps the otherand must potheses. The case of cleaning symbiosisis
then wait a period of time beforehe is helped importantto analyze in detail because altruistic
in turn. The returnbenefitmay come directly, behavior is displayed that cannot be explained
as in human food-sharing, the partner directly by kin selection,since it is performedby mem-
returningthe benefitaftera time lag. Or the bers of one species for the benefitof members
returnmay come indirectly,as in warningcalls of another. It will be shown instead that the
in birds (discussed below), where the initial behavior can be explained by the model pre-
help to other birds (the warning call) sets up sented above. No elaborate explanation is
a causal chain through the ecological system needed to understand the evolution of the
(the predatorfails to learn useful information) mutually advantageous cleaning symbiosisit-
which redounds aftera time lag to the benefit self; it is several additional behaviorsdisplayed
of the caller. The timelag is the crucial factor, by the host fish to its cleaner that require a
40 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
Randall has made similar observationson a parasites may be sufficientto inhibit hunger.
moray eel (Gymnothoraxjaponicus) that sig- Both possibilitiesare contradictedby Hediger's
nalled with a "sharp lateral jerk of the eel's observation,cited above, and seem unlikelyon
head," afterwhich "the wrasse fairlyflew out functionalgroundsas well.
of the mouth, and the awesome jaws snapped A fishto be cleaned seems to performseveral
shut" (Randall, 1958, 1962). Likewise, Hedi- "altruistic" acts. It desists from eating the
ger's Kasper Hauser grouper shook its body cleaner even when it easily could do so and
when it had enough of being cleaned. when it must go to special pains (sometimes
Why does a large fishnot signal the end to a at danger to itself)to avoid doing so. Further-
cleaning episode by swallowing the cleaner? more,it may performtwo additional behaviors
Natural selection would seem to favor the which seem of no direct benefitto itself (and
double benefitof a good cleaning followed by which consume energyand take time), namely,
a meal of the cleaner. Selection also operates, it signals its cleaner that it is about to depart
of course,on the cleaner and presumablyfavors even when the fishis not in its mouth,and it
mechanismsto avoid being eaten. The distinc- may chase offpossible dangers to the cleaner:
tive behavior and appearance of cleaners has While diving with me in the VirginIslands,
been cited as evidence of such selection. One Robert Schroederwatched a Spanish hogfish
can also cite the distinctivebehaviorof the fish groominga bar jack in its bronze color state.
being cleaned. Feder (1966) has pointed out When a secondjack arrivedin the pale color
that hostsapproachinga cleaner react by "stop- phase,the firstjack immediatelydroveit away.
ping or slowing down, allowing themselvesto But later when anotherjack intrudedon the
assume awkwardpositions,seeminglyin a hyp- sceneand changedits pale color to dark bronze
notic state." Fishes sometimesalter their color it was not chased. The bronzecolorwould seem
dramaticallybefore and while being cleaned, to mean "no harm intended;I need service"
(Randall,1962p. 44).
and Feder (1966) has summarizedinstancesof
this. These forms of behavior suggest that The behavior of the host fishis interpreted
natural selection has operated on cleaners to here to have resulted from natural selection
avoid attemptingto clean fish without these and to be, in fact,beneficialto the hostbecause
behaviors,presumablyto avoid wasting energy the cleaner is worthmore to it alive than dead.
and to minimize the dangers of being eaten. This is because the fishthat is cleaned "plans"
(Alternatively,the behaviors, including color to returnat later dates formore cleanings,and
change, may aid the cleaners in findingecto- it will be benefitedby being able to deal with
parasites. This is certainlypossible but not, the same individual. If it eats the cleaner, it
I believe, adequate to explain the phenomenon may have difficulty findinga second when it
completely. See, for example, Randall, 1962.) needs to be cleaned again. It may lose valuable
Once the fishto be cleaned takes the proper energy and be exposed to unnecessarypreda-
stance,however,the cleaner goes to work with tion in the search for a new cleaner. And it
no apparent concernforits safety: it makes no may in the end be "turned down" by a new
effortto avoid the dangerous mouth and may cleaner or servicedvery poorly. In short,the
even swim inside,which as we have seen, seems host is abundantly repaid for the cost of its
particularlyfoolhardy,since fishbeing cleaned altruism.
may suddenly need to depart. The apparent To support the hypothesisthat the host is
unconcernof the cleaner suggeststhat natural repaid its initial altruism,several pieces of evi-
selection acting on the fishbeing cleaned does dence mustbe presented: that hostssufferfrom
not, in fact, favor eating one's cleaner. No ectoparasites;that findinga new cleaner may
speculation has been advanced as to why this be difficult or dangerous; that if one does not
may be so, although some speculation has ap- eat one's cleaner,the same cleanercan be found
peared about the mechanismsinvolved. Feder and used a second time (e.g., that cleaners are
advances two possibilities, that of Eibl- site-specific);that cleaners live long enough to
Eibesfeldt (1955) that fishcome to be cleaned be used repeatedly by the same host; and if
only aftertheirappetite has been satisfied,and possible, that individual hostsdo, in fact,reuse
one of his own, that the irritationof ecto- the same cleaner.
42 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
(1) The cost of ectoparasites. It seems al- Cleaning fishesand cleaning shrimpshave regular
most axiomatic that the evolution of cleaners stations to which fishes wanting to be cleaned
entirely dependent on ectoparasitesfor food can come (p. 367).
implies the selective disadvantage for the Limbaugh, Pederson, and Chase (1961) have
cleaned of being ectoparasite-ridden.What is reviewed available data on the six species of
perhaps surprisingis the effectthat removing cleaner shrimps, and say:
all cleaners froma coral reef has on the local
"hosts" (Limbaugh, 1961). A, '<eder (1966) said The known cleaner shrimpsmay convenientlybe
in his review: divided into two groups on the basis of behavior,
habitat and color. The five species comprising
Within a few days the numberof fisheswas one group are usually solitary or paired....
drasticallyreduced. Within two weeks almost All five species are territorial and remain for
fisheshad disappeared,and
all exceptterritorial weeks and, in some cases, months or possibly
manyofthesehad developedwhitefuzzyblotches, years within a meter or less of the same spot.
ulceratedsores,and frayedfins(p. 366).
swellings, They are omnivorous to a slight extent but seem
to be highly dependent upon their hosts for
Clearly, once a fish'sprimaryway of dealing food. This group is tropical, and the individuals
with ectoparasites is by being cleaned, it is are brightlymarked. They display themselvesto
quickly vulnerable to the absence of cleaners. their hosts in a conspicuous manner. They prob-
(2) The difficulty and danger of finding a ably rarely serve as prey for fishes. A single
cleaner. There are naturallyveryfew data on species, Hippolysmata californica, comprises the
the difficultyor dangerof findinga new cleaner. second group. . . . This species is a gregarious,
This is partiallybecause, as shown below, fish wandering, omnivorous animal . . . and is not
tend repeatedlyto returnto familiar cleaners. highly dependent upon its host for survival. So
far as is known, it does not display itself to
The only observationof fishbeing disappointed
attractfishes(p. 238).
in their search for cleaners comes from Eibl-
Eibesfeldt (1955): "If the cleaners fail to ap- It is H. californica that is occasionally found in
pear over one coral in about half a minute,the the stomachs of at least one of its hosts. The
large fishes swim to another coral and wait striking correlation of territoriality and soli-
therea while" (translatedfromp. 210). It may tariness with cleaning habits is what theory
be that fish have several alternative cleaning would predict. The same correlation can be
stationsto go to, since any particularcleaning found in cleaner fish. Labroides, with four
station may be occupied or unattended at a species, is the genus most completely dependent
givenmoment. So manyfishtend to be cleaned on cleaning habits. No Labroides has ever been
at coral reefs (Limbaugh, 1961, observed a found in the stomach of a host fish. All species
cleaner service300 fishin a 6-hourperiod), that are highly site-specific and tend to be solitary.
predatorsprobablyfrequentcoral reefsin search Randall (1958) reports that an individual
L. dimidiatus may sometimes swim as much as
of fishbeing cleaned. Limbaugh (1961) suggested
60 feet from its cleaning station, servicing fish
that good human fishingsites are found near
on the way. But he notes,
cleaning stations. One finalreason whycoming
to be cleaned maybe dangerousis thatsome fish This was especially true in an area where the
must leave their element to do so (Randall, highly territorialdamsel fish Pomacentris nigri-
1962): cans (Lepede) was common. As one damsel fish
was being tended, another nearby would assume
Most impressive were the visits of moray eels, a stationarypose with finserect and the Labroides
which do not ordinarilyleave their holes in the
would move oni to the latter with little hesita-
reef during daylight hours, and of the big jacks
tion (p. 333).
which swam up from deeper water to the reef's
edge to be "serviced" before going on their way Clearly, what matters for the evolution of re-
(p. 43). ciprocal altruism is that the same two indi-
(3) Site specificityof cleaners. Feder (1966) viduals interact repeatedly. This will be facili-
has reviewed the strikingevidence for the site tated by the site specificityof either individual.
specificityof cleaners and concludes: Of temperate water cleaners, the species most
MARCH 1971] RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 43
(1) There exist no data showing a decrease zee (Van Lawick-Goodall, 1968) and not of the
in warning tendencies with decrease in more rigidlylinear form characteristicof the
the genetic relationshipof those within baboon (Hall and DeVore, 1965). Aid in intra-
earshot. Indeed, a striking feature of specificcombat,particularlyby kin, almost cer-
warningcalls is thattheyare given in and tainlyreduced the stabilityand linearityof the
out of the breeding season, both before dominance order in early humans. Lee (1969)
and after migrationor dispersal. has shown that in almost all Bushman fights
(2) There do exist data suggestingthat close which are initially between two individuals,
kin in a number of species migrate or othershave joined in. Mortality,for example,
disperse great distances from each other often strikes the secondaries rather than the
(Ashmole, 1962; Perdeck, 1958; Berndt principals. Tool use has also probably had an
and Sternberg,1968; Dhont and Huble, equalizing effecton human dominance rela-
1968). tions, and the Bushmen have a saying that
(3) One can advance the theoretical argu- illustratesthis nicely. As a dispute reaches the
ment that kin selection under some cir- stage where deadly weapons may be employed,
cumstancesshould favor kin dispersal in an individualwill oftendeclare: "We are none
order to avoid competition (Hamilton, of us big, and otherssmall; we are all men and
1964, 1969). This would lead one to we can fight;I'm going to get myarrows,"(Lee,
expect fewercloselyrelated kin near any 1969). It is interestingthatVan Lawick-Goodall
given bird, outside the breeding season. (1968) has recordedan instanceof strongdom-
inance reversalin chimpanzeesas a functionof
The argumentsadvanced in this section may tool use. An individual moved from low in
also apply,of course,to speciesotherthan birds. dominance to the top of the dominance hier-
archywhen he discoveredthe intimidatingef-
HUMAN RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM fects of throwinga metal tin around. It is
likely that a diversityof talentsis usually pres-
Reciprocal altruism in the human species ent in a band of hunter-gatherers such that the
takes place in a numberof contextsand in all best makerof a certaintypeof tool is not often
known cultures (see, for example, Gouldner, the best maker of a differentsort or the best
1960). Any complete list of human altruism user of the tool. This contributesto the sym-
would contain the followingtypesof altruistic metaryof relationships,since altruisticacts can
behavior: be traded with referenceto the special talents
(1) helping in timesof danger (e.g. accidents, of the individuals involved.
predation, intraspecificaggression; To analyze the details of the human recipro-
(2) sharing food; cal-altruisticsystem,several distinctionsare im-
(3) helping the sick, the wounded, or the portant and are discussedhere.
veryyoungand old; (1) Kin selection. The human species also
(4) sharing implements;and met the preconditionsfor the operation of kin
(5) sharingknowledge. selection. Early hominid hunter-gatherer bands
almost certainly(like today's hunter-gatherers)
All these forms of behavior often meet the consistedof many close kin, and kin selection
criterionof small cost to the giver and great mustoftenhave operated to favorthe evolution
benefitto the taker. of some types of altruisticbehavior (Haldane,
During the Pleistocene,and probablybefore, 1955; Hamilton, 1964, 1969). In general, in
a hominid species would have met the precon- attemptingto discriminatebetween the effects
ditionsforthe evolutionof reciprocalaltruism: of kin selection and what might be called re-
long lifespan; low dispersal rate; life in small, selection,one can analyze the
ciprocal-altruistic
mutuallydependent,stable, social groups (Lee formof the altruisticbehaviorsthemselves.For
and DeVore, 1968; Campbell, 1966); and a long example,the existenceof discriminationagainst
period of parental care. It is very likely that non-reciprocalindividuals cannot be explained
dominance relations were of the relaxed, less on the basis of kin selection,in which the ad-
linear formcharacteristic
of the livingchimpan- vantage accruingto close kin is what makes the
46 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
truist,assumingother thingsto be equal, will of this mutual dependence are a positive func-
sufferthe loss of the substandard altruism tion of group size and that altruisticbehaviors
of the subtle cheater. It is the subtletyof the may be selected for because they permit addi-
discriminationnecessaryto detect this formof tional individuals to surviveand therebycon-
cheatingand the awkwardsituationthat ensues fer additional indirect (non-altruistic)benefits.
thatpermitsome subtlecheatingto be adaptive. Such an argumentcan only be advanced seri-
This sets up a dynamic tension in the system ously for slowlyreproducingspecies with little
that has importantrepercussions,as discussed dispersal. Saving an individual's life in a
below. hunter-gatherer group,forexample,maypermit
(5) Number of reciprocalrelationships.It has non-altruisticactions such as cooperativehunt-
so far been assumed that it is to the advantage ing to continue with more individuals. But if
of each individual to formthe maximumnum- there is an optimum group size, one would
ber of reciprocal relationships and that the expect adaptations to stay near that size, with
individual suffersa decrease in fitnessupon the individualsjoining groupswhen the groups are
rupture of any relationshipin which the cost below this size, and groups splittingup when
to him of acts dispensed to the partneris less they are above this size. One would only be
than the benefitof acts dispensed toward him selected to keep an individual alive when the
by the partner. But it is possible that relation- group is below optimum and not when the
ships are partly exclusive, in the sense that group is above optimum. Although an abun-
expanding the number of reciprocalexchanges dant literature on hunter-gatherers (and also
with one of the partnersmay necessarilyde- nonhuman primates)suggeststhat adaptations
crease the number of exchanges with another. exist to regulate group size near an optimum,
For example, if a group of organismswere to there is no evidence that altruisticgesturesare
split into subgroupsfor much of the day (such curtailedwhen groups are above the optimum
as breakingup into huntingpairs), then altru- in size. Instead, the benefitsof human altruism
istic exchanges will be more likely between are to be seen as comingdirectlyfromreciproc-
membersof each subgroup than between mem- ity- not indirectly through non-altruistic
bers of differentsubgroups. In that sense, re- group benefits. This distinctionis important
lationships may be partly exclusive, member- because social scientistsand philosophershave
ship in a given subgroup necessarilydecreasing tended to deal with human altruismin terms
exchanges with others in the group. The im- of the benefitsof living in a group, without
portance of this factor is that it adds further differentiating between non-altruisticbenefits
complexityto the problem of dealing with the and reciprocal benefits (e.g., Rousseau, 1954;
cheater and it increases competitionwithin a Baier, 1958).
group to be membersof a favorablesubgroup.
An individual in a subgroup who feels that THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM UNDERLYING HUMAN
another member is subtly cheating on their RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM
relationship has the option of attemptingto
restorethe relationshipto a completelyrecipro- Anthropologistshave recognized the impor-
cal one or of attemptingto join another sub- tance of reciprocityin human behavior, but
group, therebydecreasing to a minimum the when theyhave ascribed functionsto such be-
possible exchanges between himself and the havior they have done so in terms of group
subtle cheater and replacing these with ex- benefits,reciprocitycementinggroup relations
changesbetweena new partneror partners. In and encouraginggroup survival. The individ-
short,he can switchfriends. There is evidence ual sacrificesso that the group may benefit.
in hunter-gatherers that much movement of Recently psychologistshave studied altruistic
individuals from one band to another occurs behavior in order to show what factorsinduce
in response to such social factorsas have just or inhibit such behavior. No attempthas been
been outlined (Lee and DeVore, 1968). made to show what functionsuch behaviormay
(6) Indirect benefitsor reciprocal altruism? serve,nor to describe and interrelatethe com-
Given mutual dependence in a group it is possi- ponents of the psychologicalsystemaffecting
ble to argue that the benefits(non-altruistic) altruisticbehavior. The purpose of thissection
48 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
is to show that the above model for the natural organizes it differently,much of the material
selectionof reciprocallyaltruisticbehavior can supportingthe assertionsbelow is taken from
readilyexplain the functionof human altruistic his paper. All referencesto Krebs below are to
behavior and the details of the psychological this review. Also, Hartshorneand May (1928-
systemunderlyingsuch behavior. The psycho- 1930) have shownthatchildrenin experimental
logical data can be organized into functional situationsdo not divide bimodallyinto altruists
categories,and it can be shownthat the compo- and "cheaters" but are distributednormally;
nents of the systemcomplementeach other in almostall the childrencheated,but theydiffered
regulatingthe expressionof altruisticand cheat- in how much and under what circumstances.
ing impulsesto the selectiveadvantage of indi- ("Cheating" was defined in their work in a
viduals. No concept of group advantage is slightlydifferentbut analogous way).
necessaryto explain the function of human (2) Friendshipand the emotionsof likingand
altruisticbehavior. disliking. The tendency to like others, not
There is no direct evidence regarding the necessarilyclosely related, to form friendships
degree of reciprocal altruismpracticed during and to act altruisticallytoward friendsand to-
human evolutionnor its geneticbasis today,but ward those one likes will be selected for as the
given the universaland nearlydaily practiceof immediateemotional rewardsmotivatingaltru-
reciprocal altruismamong humans today, it is istic behavior and the formationof altruistic
reasonable to assume thatit has been an impor- partnerships.(Selection may also favorhelping
tant factorin recenthuman evolution and that strangersor disliked individualswhen theyare
the underlyingemotional dispositionsaffecting in particularlydire circumstances). Selection
altruisticbehaviorhave importantgenetic com- will favora systemwherebythesetendenciesare
ponents. To assume as much allows a number sensitive to such parameters as the altruistic
of predictions. tendencies of the liked individual. In other
(1) A complex, regulatingsystem. The hu- words,selectionwill favorliking those who are
man altruisticsystemis a sensitive,unstable themselvesaltruistic.
one. Often it will pay to cheat: namely,when Sawyer(1966) has shownthatall groupsin all
the partnerwill not findout, when he will not experimental situations tested showed more
discontinue his altruismeven if he does find altruisticbehavior toward friendsthan toward
out, or when he is unlikely to survive long neutral indivduals. Likewise,Friedrichs (1960)
enough to reciprocate adequately. And the has shown that attractivenessas a friend was
perception of subtle cheating may be very most highly correlated among undergraduates
difficult.Given this unstable characterof the with altruistic behavior. Krebs has reviewed
system,where a degree of cheatingis adaptive, other studies that suggestthat the relationship
natural selection will rapidly favor a complex betweenaltruismand likingis a two-waystreet:
psychologicalsystemin each individual regulat- one is more altruistictowardthoseone likes and
ing both his own altruistic and cheating one tends to like those who are most altruistic
tendenciesand his responsesto thesetendencies (e.g., Berkowitz and Friedman, 1967; Lerner
in others. As selection favorssubtler formsof and Lichtman, 1968).
cheating, it will favor more acute abilities to Others (Darwin, 1871; Williams, 1966; and
detectcheating. The systemthat resultsshould Hamilton, 1969) have recognized the role
simultaneouslyallow the individual to reap friendshipmightplay in engenderingaltruistic
the benefitsof altruisticexchanges,to protect behavior, but all have viewed friendship(and
himselffromgross and subtle formsof cheat- intelligence)as prerequisitesfor the appearance
ing, and to practicethoseformsof cheatingthat of such altruism. Williams (1966), who cites
local conditions make adaptive. Individuals Darwin (1871) on the matter,speaks of this be-
will differnot in being altruists or cheaters havior as evolving
but in the degree of altruismtheyshow and in in aniimalsthat live in stablesocial groupsand
the conditionsunder which theywill cheat. have the intelligence and othermentalqualities
The best evidencesupportingtheseassertions necessaryto forrna systemof personalfriend-
can be found in Kreb's (1970) review of the ships and animositiesthat transcendthe limits
relevant psychologicalliterature. Although he of familyrelationships (p. 93).
MARCH 19711 RECIPROCAL ALTRUISMW 49
This emphasison friendshipand intelligenceas gen, 1968; Gilula and Daniels, 1969). The
prerequisitesleads Williams to limit his search grounds for expecting,on functionalgrounds,
for altruismto the Mammalia and to a "min- a highlyplastic developmentalsystemaffecting
orityof thisgroup." But accordingto the model moralisticaggressionis discussedbelow.
presented above, emotions of friendship(and (4) Gratitude,sympathy,and the cost/benefit
hatred) are not prerequisites for reciprocal ratio of an altruisticact. If the cost/benefit
altruism but may evolve after a system of ratio is an importantparameterin determining
mutual altruism has appeared, as important the adaptiveness of reciprocal altruism, then
waysof regulatingthe system. humansshould be selectedto be sensitiveto the
(4) Moralistic aggression. Once strong posi- cost and benefitof an altruisticact, both in
tiveemotionshave evolved to motivatealtruistic deciding whetherto performone and in decid-
behavior,the altruistis in a vulnerableposition ing whether,or how much, to reciprocate. I
because cheaterswill be selectedto take advan- suggestthat the emotion of gratitudehas been
tage of the altruist'spositive emotions. This selectedto regulatehuman responseto altruistic
in turn sets up a selection pressurefor a pro- acts and that the emotion is sensitive to the
tective mechanism. Moralistic aggression and cost/benefit ratio of such acts. I suggestfurther
indignationin humanswas selectedforin order that the emotionof sympathyhas been selected
(a) to counteractthe tendencyof the altru- to motivatealtruisticbehavior as a functionof
ist, in the absence of any reciprocity,to con- the plight of the recipient of such behavior;
tinue to performaltruisticacts for his own crudelyput, the greaterthe potentialbenefitto
emotionalrewards; the recipient,the greaterthe sympathyand the
(b) to educate the unreciprocatingindi- more likely the altruistic gesture, even to
vidual by frighteninghim with immediate strange or disliked individuals. If the recipi-
harm or with the futureharm of no more ent's gratitudeis indeed a functionof the cost/
aid; and benefitratio, then a sympatheticresponse to
(c) in extreme cases, perhaps, to select the plight of a disliked individual may result
directlyagainst the unreciprocatingindivid- in considerablereciprocity.
ual by injuring,killing,or exiling him.
There is good evidence supporting the
Much of human aggressionhas moral over- psychological importance of the cost/benefit
tones. Injustice, unfairness,and lack of reci- ratio of altruisticacts. Gouldner (1960) has re-
procityoften motivate human aggressionand viewed the sociologicalliteraturesuggestingthat
indignation. Lee (1969) has shown that verbal the greaterthe need stateof the recipientof an
disputes in Bushmen usually revolve around altruisticact, the greater his tendency to re-
problemsof gift-giving, stinginess,and laziness. ciprocate; and the scarcerthe resourcesof the
DeVore (pers. commun.) reports that a great donor of the act, the greater the tendencyof
deal of aggressionin hunter-gatherers revolves the recipientto reciprocate. Heider (1958) has
around real or imagined injustices-inequities, analyzed lay attitudes on altruism and finds
for example, in food-sharing(see, for example,
that gratitudeis greatestwhen the altruisticact
Thomas, 1958; Balikci, 1964; Marshall, 1961).
does good. Tesser,Gatewood,and Driver (1968)
A common featureof this aggressionis that it
have shown that American undergraduates
oftenseemsout of all proportionto the offenses
thoughtthey would feel more gratitudewhen
committed. Friends are even killed over ap-
parently trivial disputes. But since small in- the altruisticact was valuable and cost thebene-
equities repeated many times over a lifetime factora great deal. Pruitt (1968) has provided
may exact a heavy toll in relative fitness,selec- evidence that humans reciprocatemore when
tion may favor a strong show of aggression the original act was expensive for the bene-
when the cheating tendency is discovered. factor. He shows that under experimentalcon-
Recent discussionsof human and animal aggres- ditions more altruismis induced by a gift of
sion have failed to distinguishbetween moral- 80 per cent of $1.00 than 20 per cent of $4.00.
istic and other formsof aggression(e.g., Scott, Aronfreed(1968) has reviewedthe considerable
1958; Lorenz, 1966; Montague, 1968; Tinber- evidence that sympathymotivatesaltruisticbe-
50 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
havior as a functionof the plight of the indi- is based on the fact that many transgressions
vidual arousingthe sympathy. performed in private are likely to become
(5) Guilt and reparativealtruism. If an orga- public knowledge. It should often be advan-
nism has cheated on a reciprocal relationship tageous to confess sins that are likely to be
and thisfacthas been found out, or has a good discoveredbefore theyactually are, as evidence
chance of being found out, by the partnerand of sincerity(see below on detectionof mimics).
if the partnerrespondsby cuttingoffall future (6) Subtle cheating: the evolution of mimics.
acts of aid, then the cheater will have paid Once friendship,moralistic aggression, guilt,
dearlyforhis misdeed. It will be to thecheater's sympathy,and gratitudehave evolved to regu-
advantage to avoid this,and, providingthat the late the altruisticsystem,selection will favor
cheatermakes up forhis misdeed and does not mimickingthese traitsin order to influencethe
cheat in the future,it will be to his partner's behavior of others to one's own advantage.
benefitto avoid this,since in cuttingofffuture Apparent acts of generosityand friendshipmay
acts of aid he sacrificesthe benefitsof future induce genuine friendshipand altruismin re-
reciprocalhelp. The cheatershould be selected turn. Sham moralisticaggressionwhen no real
to make up for his misdeed and to show con- cheatinghas occurredmay neverthelessinduce
vincing evidence that he does not plan to reparativealtruism. Sham guilt may convincea
continue his cheating sometimein the future. wronged friend that one has reformedone's
In short, he should be selected to make a ways even when the cheating is about to be
reparativegesture. It seems plausible, further- resumed. Likewise, selection will favor the
more, that the emotion of guilt has been se- hypocrisyof pretendingone is in dire circum-
lected forin humanspartlyin orderto motivate stances in order to induce sympathy-motivated
the cheater to compensatehis misdeed and to altruistic behavior. Finally, mimicking sym-
behave reciprocallyin the future,and thus to pathy may give the appearance of helping in
preventthe ruptureof reciprocalrelationships. order to induce reciprocity,and mimicking
Krebs has reviewed the evidence that harm- gratitude may mislead an individual into ex-
ing another individual publicly leads to altru- pecting he will be reciprocated. It is worth
isticbehaviorand concludes: emphasizingthat a mimic need not necessarily
Many studieshave supportedthe notion that be conscious of the deception; selection may
public transgressionwhetherintentionalor un- favorfeelinggenuine moralisticaggressioneven
whetherimmoralor onlysituationally when one has not been wronged if so doing
intentional,
unfortunate,leads to reparativealtruism(p. 267). leads another to reparativealtruism.
Instances of the above formsof subtle cheat-
Wallace and Sadalla (1966), for example,
ing are not difficultto find. For typical in-
showed experimentallythat individuals who
stances fromthe literatureon hunter-gatherers
brokean expensivemachineweremorelikelyto
see Rasmussen (1931), Balikci (1964), and Lee
volunteerfor a painful experimentthan those
and DeVore (1968). The importanceof these
who did not, but only if theirtransgression had
formsof cheating can partlybe inferredfrom
been discovered. Investigatorsdisagree on the
the adaptations to detect such cheating dis-
extent to which guilt feelingsare the motiva-
cussed below and from the importance and
tion behind reparative altruism. Epstein and
prevalence of moralistic aggressiononce such
Hornstein (1969) supply some evidence that
cheatingis detected.
guilt is involved, but on the assumption that
one feels guilt even when one behaves badly (7) Detection of the subtle cheater: trust-
in private,Wallace and Sadalla's (1966) result worthiness, trust, and suspicion. Selection
contradicts the view that guilt is the only should favor the ability to detect and dis-
motivatingfactor. That private transgressions criminate against subtle cheaters. Selection
are not as likely as public ones to lead to will clearlyfavordetectingand counteringsham
reparativealtruismis preciselywhat the model moralistic aggression. The argument for the
would predict,and it is possible that the com- others is more complex. Selection may favor
mon psychologicalassumption that one feels distrustingthose who perform altruistic acts
guilt even when one behaves badly in private without the emotional basis of generosityor
MARCH 1971] RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 51
guilt because the altruistictendenciesof such 1966; Schopler and Thompson, 1968). Krebs
individuals may be less reliable in the future. concludes that, "When the legitimacyof ap-
One can imagine, for example, compensating parent altruismis questioned,reciprocityis less
for a misdeed withoutany emotional basis but likelyto prevail." Lerner and Lichtman (1968)
with a calculating,self-serving motive. Such an have shown experimentallythat those who act
individual should be distrusted because the altruisticallyfor ulterior benefit are rated as
calculating spirit that leads this subtle cheater unattractiveand are treated selfishly,whereas
now to compensate may in the future lead those who apparently are genuinely altruistic
him to cheat when circumstancesseem more are rated as attractiveand are treated altru-
advantageous(because of unlikelihoodof detec- istically. Berscheid and Walster (1967) have
tion, for example, or because the cheated indi- shown thatchurchwomen tend to make repara-
vidual is unlikely to survive). Guilty motiva- tionsforharm theyhave committedby choosing
tion, in so far as it evidences a more enduring thereparationthatapproximatestheharm (that
commitmentto altruism,either because guilt is, is neithertoo slightnor too great), presum-
teaches or because the cheater is unlikely not ably to avoid the appearance of inappropriate-
to feel the same guilt in the future,seemsmore ness.
reliable. A similar argument can be made Rapoport and Dale (1967) have shown that
about the trustworthiness of individuals who when two strangers play iterated games of
initiate altruistic acts out of a calculating Prisoner'sDilemma in which the matrix deter-
rather than a generous-hearteddisposition or mines profitsfromthe games played there is a
who show either false sympathyor false grati- significanttendencyforthe level of cooperation
tude. Detection on the basis of the underlying to drop at the end of the series,reflectingthe
psychological dynamics is only one form of fact that the partnerwill not be able to punish
detection. In many cases, unreliability may for "cheating" responses when the series is
more easily be detected throughexperiencing over. If a long seriesis brokenup into subseries
the cheater's inconsistentbehavior. And in with a pause between subseriesfor totalingup
some cases,thirdpartyinteractions(as discussed gains and losses,then the tendencyto cheat on
below) may make an individual's behavior pre- each otherincreasesat the end of each subseries.
dictable despite underlying cheating motiva- These results,as well as some others reported
tions. by Rapoport and Chammah (1965), are sug-
The anthropologicalliteraturealso abounds gestive of the instabilitythat exists when two
withinstancesof the detectionof subtlecheaters strangersare consciously tryingto maximize
(see above referencesfor hunter-gatherers). Al- gain by tradingaltruisticgestures,an instability
though I know of no psychologicalstudies on thatis presumablyless markedwhen the under-
the detectionof sham moralisticaggressionand lying motivation involves the emotions of
sham guilt, thereis ample evidence to support friendship,of likingothers,and of feelingguilt
the notion that humans respond to altruistic over harminga friend. Deutsch (1958), for ex-
acts accordingto theirperceptionof the motives ample, has shown that two individuals playing
of the altruist. They tend to respond more iterated games of Prisoner's Dilemma will be
altruisticallywhen they perceive 'the other as more cooperative if a third individual, dis-
acting "genuinely"altruistic,thatis, voluntarily liked by both,is present. The perceivedmutual
dispatchingan altruisticact as an end in itself, dislike is presumed to create a bond between
without being directed toward gain (Leeds, the twoplayers.
1963; Heider, 1958). Krebs (1970) has reviewed It is worthmentioningthat a classicproblem
the literatureon thispoint and notes that help in social science and philosophy has been
is more likely to be reciprocated when it is whetherto definealtruismin termsof motives
perceived as voluntary and intentional (e.g., (e.g., real vs. "calculated" altruism)or in terms
Goranson and Berkowitz, 1966; Lerner and of behavior,regardlessof motive (Krebs, 1970).
Lichtman, 1968) and when the help is appro- This problem reflectsthe fact that, wherever
priate, that is, when the intentions of the studied, humans seem to make distinctions
altruistare not in doubt (e.g., Brehmand Cole, about altruismpartly on the basis of motive,
52 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
and this tendency is consistentwith the hy- favorlearningabout the altruisticand cheating
pothesis that such discriminationis relevant to tendencies of others indirectly,both through
protectingoneself fromcheaters. observing interactions of others and, once
(8) Setting up altruisticpartnerships. Selec- linguistic abilities have evolved, by hearing
tion will favor a mechanism for establishing about such interactionsor hearingcharacteriza-
reciprocalrelationships.Since humans respond tions of individuals (e.g., "dirty,hypocritical,
to acts of altruismwith feelingsof friendship dishonest,untrustworthy, cheatinglouse"). One
that lead to reciprocity,one such mechanism important result of this learning is that an
might be the performingof altruistic acts individual may be as concernedabout the atti-
toward strangers,or even enemies,in order to tude of onlookers in an altruisticsituation as
induce friendship.In short,do unto othersas about the attitude of the individual being
you would have them do unto you. dealt with.
The mechanismhypothesizedabove leads to (ii) Help in dealing withcheaters. In dealing
results inconsistentwith the assumption that with cheaters selection may favor individuals
humans always act more altruisticallytoward helping others,kin or non-kin,by direct coer-
friendsthan towardothers. Particularlytoward cion against the cheateror by everyonerefusing
strangers,humans may initiallyact more altru- him reciprocal altruism. One effectof this is
isticallythan towardfriends.Wright(1942) has that an individual, throughhis close kin, may
shown, for example, that third grade children be compensatedfor an altruisticact even after
are more likelyto give a more valuable toyto a his death. An individual who dies saving a
strangerthan to a friend. Later, some of these friend,for example, may have altruisticacts
childrenverballyacknowledgedthat theywere performedby the friend to the benefitof his
tryingto make friends.Floyd (1964) has shown offspring.Selection will discriminate against
that, after receiving many trinkets from a the cheater in this situation, if kin of the
friend,humans tend to decrease their giftsin martyr,or others,are willing to punish lack of
return,but afterreceivingmanytrinketsfroma reciprocity.
neutral or disliked individual, they tend to (iii) Generalized altruism. Given learning
increase their gifts in return. Likewise, after from others and multiparty action against
receiving few trinketsfrom a friend,humans cheaters,selectionmay favora multipartyaltru-
tend to increase their giftsin return,whereas isticsystemin whichaltruisticacts are dispensed
receiving few trinketsfrom a neutral or dis- freelyamong more than two individuals, an
liked individual resultsin a decrease in giving. individual being perceived to cheat if in an
This was interpretedto mean that generous altruisticsituation he dispensesless benefitfor
friendsare taken forgranted(as are stingynon- the same cost than would the others,punish-
friends). Generosityfroma non-friendis taken ment coming not only fromthe other individ-
to be an overtureto friendship,and stinginess ual in that particular exchange but from the
froma friendas evidence of a deterioratingre- othersin the system.
lationship in need of repair. (Epstein and (iv) Rules of exchange. Multipartyaltruistic
Hornstein, 1969, provide new data supporting systemsincrease by several-foldthe cognitive
this interpretationof Floyd, 1964.) difficulties in detectingimbalancesand deciding
(9) Multipartyinteractions.In the close-knit whethertheyare due to cheatingor to random
social groups that humans usually live in, se- factors. One simplifyingpossibility that lan-
lection should favormore complex interactions guage facilitatesis the formulationof rules of
than the two-party interactionsso fardiscussed. conduct, cheating being detected as infraction
Specifically,selection may favor learning from of such a rule. In short,selection may favor
the altruisticand cheatingexperiencesof others, the elaboration of normsof reciprocalconduct.
helping others coerce cheaters,formingmulti- There is abundant evidence for all of the
party exchange systems,and formulatingrules above multipartyinteractions(see the above
for regulated exchanges in such multiparty referenceson hunter-gatherers). Thomas (1958),
systems. forexample,has shownthatdebtsof reciprocity
(i) Learning from others. Selection should do not disappear with the death of the
MARCH 19711 RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 53
"creditor"but are extended to his kin. Krebs nism's sense of guilt to be educated, perhaps
has reviewed the psychological literature on partly by kin, so as to permit those formsof
generalized altruism. Several studies (e.g., cheating that local conditions make adaptive
Darlingtonand Macker, 1966) have shown that and to discourage those with more dangerous
humansmay directtheiraltruismto individuals consequences. One would not expect any sim-
other than those who were hurt and may ple systemregulatingthe developmentof altru-
respond to an altruisticact that benefitsthem- istic behavior. To be adaptive, altruisticbe-
selves by acting altruisticallytoward a third havior must be dispensed with regard to many
individual uninvolvedin the initial interaction. characteristicsof the recipient (including his
Berkowitzand Daniels (1964) have shown ex- degree of relationship,emotional makeup, past
perimentally,for example, that help from a behavior, friendships,and kin relations), of
confederate leads the subject to direct more other membersof the group, of the situation
help to a thirdindividual,a highlydependent in whichthe altruisticbehavior takesplace, and
supervisor. Freedman, Wallington, and Bless of many other parameters,and no simple de-
(1967) have demonstratedthe surprisingresult velopmental system is likely to meet these
that, in two differentexperimentalsituations, requirements.
humans engaged in reparativealtruismonly if Kohlberg(1963), Bandura and Walters(1963),
it could be directedto someone other than the and Krebs have reviewed the developmental
individualharmed,or to the originalindividual literatureon human altruism.All of themcon-
only if theydid not expect to meet again. In clude that none of the proposed developmental
a systemof strongmultipartyinteractionsit is theories (all of which rely on simple mecha-
possible that in some situationsindividuals are nisms) can account for the known diverse de-
selected to demonstrategeneralized altruistic velopmental data. Whiting and Whiting (in
tendenciesand that their main concern when prep.) have studied altruisticbehavior directed
theyhave harmed anotheris to show that they towardskin by childrenin six different cultures
are genuinelyaltruistic,which theybest do by and find consistentdifferencesamong the cul-
acting altruisticwithout any apparent ulterior tures that correlate with differencesin child-
motive, e.g., in the experiments,by acting rearingand other facetsof the cultures. They
altruistic toward an uninvolved third party. argue that the differences adapt the childrento
Alternatively, A. Rapoport (pers. commun.)has differentadult roles available in the cultures.
suggestedthat the reluctance to direct repara- Although the behavior analyzed takes place
tive altruismtowardthe harmedindividualmay between kin and hence Hamilton's model
be due to unwillingness to show thereby a (1964) may apply rather than this model, the
recognitionof the harm done him. The re- Whitings' data provide an instance of the
directionserves to allay guilt feelingswithout adaptive value of developmental plasticityin
triggeringthe greaterreparation that recogni- altruisticbehavior. No careful work has been
tionof theharmmightlead to. done analyzingthe influenceof environmental
(10) Developmentalplasticity.The conditions factors on the development of altruistic be-
under which detection of cheating is possible, havior,but some data exist. Krebs has reviewed
the range of available altruistic trades, the the evidence that altruistictendencies can be
cost/benefitratios of these trades, the relative increased by the effectsof warm, nurturant
stabilityof social groupings,and otherrelevant models, but little is known on how long such
parameters should differfrom one ecological effectsendure. Rosenhan (1967) and Rettig
and social situation to another and should (1956) have shown a correlationbetween altru-
differthroughtime in the same small human ism in parentsand altruismin theircollege-age
population. Under these conditionsone would children, but these studies do not separate
expect selectionto favordevelopmentalplastic- genetic and environmental influences. Class
ity of those traits regulating altruistic and differencesin altruistic behavior (e.g., Berko-
cheating tendencies and responses to these witz, 1968; Ugurel-Semin,1952; Almond and
tendencies in others. For example, develop- Verba, 1963) may primarily reflect environ-
mental plasticitymay allow the growingorga- mental influences.Finally Lutzker (1960) and
54 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY [VOLUME 46
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