1

People v. Collado

Facts:

PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu and
that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City,
for their drug sessions. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. The asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino
as a regular buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from
which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found Apelo,
Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug
paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters,
and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from Ranada.

Issue:

Whether or not irregularities attended the arrest, detention, and the procedure in handling the specimen seized from
them

Held:

The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of
shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.

As for the specimen, the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to
the prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in
this case.

In Rañada’s case, he was actually caught having custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for
smoking, injecting, etc. into one's body. It was also indubitably shown that he failed to present authority to possess the
prohibited articles, much less, an explanation of his possession thereof. However, as regards the other accused who were
seen in the company of Rañ ada, the evidence of conspiracy against them was insufficient. They were in close proximity to
Rañ ada at the time and place of the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. The
prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link these accused to Ranada's possession of the said
contrabands.

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 2

Stonehill v Diokno

Facts:

Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations of which they were
officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.

Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.

Issue:

Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.

Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

Held:

The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.

The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is because
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired, the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties.

As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and
the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.

In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses
committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of probable
cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid search warrant.

The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and void.

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 3

UY KHEYTIN vs VILLAREAL

G.R. No. 16009; September 21, 1920

FACTS:

A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable cause
for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons responsible
therefor. Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books
and other property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had
been so seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend that the search
was illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized.

ISSUE:

May the opium, books, papers, etc. be returned?

RULING: (Opium and its paraphernalia

NO; Books, papers, etc.

YES)

In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not
first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having
been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest,
we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under
said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge
did not comply with the requirements of section98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return
of the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant and much less are they entitled to be
exonerated because of such omission of the judge.2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search
begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not require another search warrant.3. That the seizure of the petitioner's
books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is
not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.

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 4

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano

132 SCRA 152 (1985)

FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG).
Milagros had been wanted as a high-ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At
noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search
warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject
of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically
provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers
of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general.

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 5

Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.,

G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014

FACTS

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry
with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the
accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of “actual malice”
as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required
to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available
where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal
(the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard
of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest
and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense,
the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.

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 6

Lemon vs. Kurtzman

FACTS

Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-
public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and
secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was
passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15%
of teachers’ annual salaries.

The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute
violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in
Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island
case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared
unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in
favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.

ISSUE

Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment?

HELD

Yes. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The
statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor
inhibits religion, and it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.”

The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire
of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did
not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive
government entanglement with religion. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to “an
intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications
of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.

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 7

VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZAALDE ROPE FACTORY

Facts:

Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union was mandatory as provided for under a
collective bargaining agreement: "Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers, by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union
security agreements.

Held:

NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It
was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting
that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being
impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

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 8

ATILANO O. NOLLORA v. PEOPLE

GR No. 191425, 2011-09-07

Facts:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter's workplace in CBW,
FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed... and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends

The defense claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, and he could marry more than one
according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent
of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consen... the
trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.

Issues:

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-
mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating
his criminal intent.

Nollora's two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code
of the Philippines should apply.

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;[14] (2)
Nollora and Pinat's marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted
the... existence of his second marriage to Geraldino;[15] and (4) Nollora and Geraldino's marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.

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 9

ERWIN TULFO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO

G.R. No. 161032; 2008

FACTS:

Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri,
as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel. That private respondent was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having acquired his wealth illegally.

RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, Tulfo appealed and
raised that the said article is a qualified privileged communication and is written without malice.

ISSUE:

Whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with
malice, for which he would be liable.

HELD:

Freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals however, such freedom is not absolute and
unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of
responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod
over the rights of others.

The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned
by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist
abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an
adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory
or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility.

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 10

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008

Facts:

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that
he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of
the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Issues:

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

Held:

(1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by
the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents,
who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear
and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself
to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.

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Gonzales vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their seats (Third
Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act submitting
to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First and Third
Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate the spirit of the Constitution –
NO.

RATIO:

1. YES. The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are sufficient under the
Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
certain conditions.

2. No. People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the provinces of the
Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading
copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter of Third Resolution, the provisions of
Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their
seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

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G.R. No. L-61016 – 121 SCRA 538

FACTS:

In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were
charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant
of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the
right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already
under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same
time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.

HELD:

Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains
suspended “”with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and
offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith,”” the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which
the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.

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 13

People Vs. Dy

G.R. 74517 February 23, 1988

Facts:

Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio
Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe,
tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant
alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the
surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail
which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report
the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla
picked up the gun from the bar at his request.

Issue:

Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case.

Held:

YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar
deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in
the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief
of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's
voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the
reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint."

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PEOPLE VS. BANDULA

232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994

Facts:

Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant was convicted.

Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional
infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and
were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an
independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.

Issue:

Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him.

Held:

No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had
no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused
Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect toappellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused
was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used
against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in
Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:

1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance. Reason for Accused
Sedigo’s "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandula’s fractured rib.
3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.

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