CUENCO VS.
CA
Rule 73
Afable
DOCTRINE: The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was
survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon
City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in
Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in
CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss
were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
 Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition.
 Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission
to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Regarding the issue on venue and jurisdiction, it is
provided under Rule 73 that the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. Otherwise, it would affect the prompt
administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also
first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to
exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

PORTUGAL VS PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
FACTS:
• Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo.
Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta
and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-
petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal.
• Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In
the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor.
• Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate.
Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit
of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person”
adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds
then issued the title in her name.
• Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against
Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-
Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her
name.
HELD:
NO. When the adverse parties are putative heirs
to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings
for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to
have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and
he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil
action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring
about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate
of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication. It is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
 CALMA VS. TANEDO
Rule 73
Afable
DOCTRINE: Debts chargeable against the conjugal
property should be filed in the testamentary proceeding of the
deceased wife.
FACTS:
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were
owners of the subject property, being their conjugal property.
They were indebted to respondent Esperanza Tanedo,
chargeable against the conjugal property. Fausta died leaving a
will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma as
administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings,
Maria was appointed as judicial administratrix of the properties
of the deceased.
While probate proceedings were pending, respondent
Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery
of the debt. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
In the execution of the judgment, the subject property was sold
by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta,
filed the present action to annul the sale of the property and
prays that the estate of the deceased be declared as the absolute
owner. The probate proceedings of the deceased were instituted
in accordance with Act No. 3176.
ISSUE:
• Whether the debts may be recovered against the
husband of the deceased.
RULING: No.
Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for
the liquidation of conjugal property:
1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse
2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of
the property of a conjugal partnership.
These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.
In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was
already instituted for the partition of the conjugal property. It
follows then that when respondent filed a suit, the power of
Eulalio Calma as legal administrator of the conjugal property
while Fausta was living had ceased and passed to Maria Calma
as administratrix appointed in the testamentary proceedings.
Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable
against the conjugal property should have been filed in the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased and not against the
husband of the deceased who had already ceased as
administrator of the conjugal property.
The court also annulled the sale of the subject property.
The property should be demed subject to the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta.
 OCAMPO VS POTENCIANO by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of
its view are now obsolete.

FACTS:
 Edilberto Ocampo executed a deed purporting to convey
to his relative, Conrado Potenciano and the latter’s wife,
Rufina, a town lot with a house. On that same day,
Ocampo signed another document, making it appear
that, for an annual rental of P300, the Potenciano’s were
leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the
redemption period.
Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband
must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has
been changed by Act No. 3176, now section 2, Rule 75, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership
affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse.

 In 1939, with Edilberto and Rufina already dead,

Conrado gave Paz an option to repurchase the property
for P2,500 within 5 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the surviving spouse has authority to

consolidate titles of properties of the deceased spouse into his
name.

HELD:

NO. The appellants now contend that Potenciano had

no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of his
wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals
erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority
as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out