Introduction:

Art. VIII, Secs. 1 and 5, Philippine Constitution

Case Title: Marbury v. Madison

Facts: Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before
Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of
1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over
appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to
frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new
justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not
be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.
William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but
his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by
three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling
the delivery of the commissions.

Issue/s: 1. Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?

2. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their
commissions?

Ruling:
The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal, but did not
order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of mandamus. Instead, the
Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his
claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.

Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but
concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789
conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution
through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the
laws.

In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare
a law unconstitutional.

Doctrine Doctrine of judicial review

Case Title: Angara v. Electoral Commission

Facts: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly in the first district of Tayabas.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The

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 following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution
providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before
December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought
the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy.
2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or within jurisdiction in
assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.

Ruling: 1. Yes. The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by
Consti (through separate articles for each branch) but check and balances
maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between the
boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power
to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as
Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases and controversies.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
2. Acted within jurisdiction. ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is
recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal,
or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised
by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the
regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA
of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix
dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of
the ELECOM.

- Court denied the petition. The Electoral Commission did not act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.

Case Title: People v. Vera

Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime
he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.

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 The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing
the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law,
like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal
of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

Issue/s: 1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

Ruling: 1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized
representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie
against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the Probation Law violates section 1, subsection 1, Article III, of
the Constitution of the Philippines and section 2, Art. VIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is
violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the
option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province
decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will
be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law. (Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause)
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only
apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a
probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient
standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to
apply the probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission
which will act arbitrarily according to its whims. (Undue Delegation of Legislative
Power)
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of
Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the
power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties. (Encroachment of Executive Power)
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted.

Doctrine Judicial review | All laws and statutes must uphold the constitution.

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Case Title: Ynot v. IAC

Facts: In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no
carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation
shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.

Petitioner had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo which were
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the above measure. He
issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of his bond. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The trial court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court where the petitioner claimed that the penalty of confiscation is
invalid as the same was imposed without taccording the owner the right to be heard before
a competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the lower court (like the MTC, RTC, and CA) may declare a law
unconstitutional?
2. Whether the executive order is valid.

Ruling: 1. Yes. While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional question, they are not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the supreme court. This is so because under Section
5,[2(a)], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the power
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" or certiorari as the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that lower courts may declare
whether or not a law is constitutional.

2. No. The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of
carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can be confiscated.

The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities
of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

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 There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.

Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Doctrine Resolution on the issue of the constitutionality of a law may be made in the first instance
by the lower courts.
Expanded definition of judicial power - judiciary may review the acts and decisions of the
executive and legislative and declare it invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

Case Title: Salonga v. Cruz Pano

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant
the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit
and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after
he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings
in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons (1) because his house was used as a contact point; and (2)
because of his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined
about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted
immediately by then President Marcos.

When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither
was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an
order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of
detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against
him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but
the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering
the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established
against the forty persons accused.

Hence, this petition questioning the resolution of the judge.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss being interlocutory in

character may be questioned by certiorari.
2. Whether the prima facie case has been established by the prosecution.

Ruling: 1. Yes. While there is a general rule that the denial of motion to quash or dismiss
cannot be questioned by certiorari, there are certain exceptions when a petition for
certiorari is clearly warranted as enunciated in Mead v Angel, under certain
situations, extraordinary legal remedies like certiorari, prohibition, mandamus to
question the denial of motion to quash is proper in the interest of “more enlightened

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 and substantial justice”. In the case at bar, the initial disregard of the petitioner’s
constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made
against him, justifies the favorable consideration of such petition by the Court.
2. No. Not only does the witnesses for the prosecution used hearsay as pieces of
evidence but also Victor Lovely’s testimony before the court contained
inconsistencies. Even if the prosecution cites the house of the petitioner as a
contact point for subversive movements the conclusion that the petitioner is the
leader of a subversive organization is still not established. The same is true on the
petitioner’s thoughts regarding violent struggles for reforms because it merely
shows the petitioner's exercise of freedom of thought and expression. Moreover,
the picture where the petitioner and Lovely appeared do not say anything about
the petitioner's involvement in the bombings. Thus, without credible evidence of
the petitioner’s role in the bombings, the prosecution failed to establish a prima
facie case against the petitioner.

Case Title: Javier v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several followers
of the petitioner were ambushed and killed allegedly by the respondent’s men. It was in
this heightened atmosphere when the voting was held. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, petitioner went to the
COMELEC to question the canvass of election returns. His complaints were dismissed
and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner brought this upon the Court arguing that said proclamation was
invalid since it was made only by a division and not by the COMELEC en banc as required
by the Constitution. The case was still being considered by the Court when the petitioner
was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight on February 1986 and a year later
the Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents then moved for the dismissal of the petition contending that it is moot and
academic.

Issue/s: Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Ruling: No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the
legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this
case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only

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 for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future.

Doctrine Courts will decide cases otherwise moot and academic if (1) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution (2) exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

Case Title: David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.

Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On
the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded
on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His
supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO
5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist.

David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.

Issue/s: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

Ruling: Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that
PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.’

The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP
1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’

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 To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take
care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Case Title: Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, et al. v. Ermita, et al

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration
of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States
negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16,
1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US
military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by
US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the
Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On
October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA;

(2) And whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have
not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the
act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.

(2) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of
the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with
such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution
no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which
each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively
and essentially conferred to it by law.

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Case Title: Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC

Facts: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed
Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners
and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among
others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling
law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
people’s initiative;
(2) Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Ruling: (1) No. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve,
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause
"proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

(2) No. While the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for
Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitles are provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Case Title: Lim v. Executive Secretary

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Facts: ● Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
attacking the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”.
● The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States.
● Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in
case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US.
● Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize
American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue/s: WON the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper?

Ruling: No. The court is not a trier of facts. Balikatan 02-1 in accordance with the VFA is valid.
The present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. The sole
object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase
"grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion
"too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.

Doctrine Under the expanded concept of judicial power under the Constitution, courts are charged
with the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government."From the facts obtaining, the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military
exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for
correction on the part of the court. In other words, respondents in the case at bar have
not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Case Title: Lambino, et al. V. COMELEC

Facts: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.

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 On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Issue/s: Whether or not Lambino’s group’s petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through people’s initiative.

Ruling: No. 2 elements must be present:

● First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
● Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition, Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition” only if the people sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach their present petition with the Court that people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this court a copy of a signature
sheet only after the oral arguments when they filed their memorandum.

Case Title: Oposa v. Factoran

Facts: ● Minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al filed a taxpayer’s class lawsuit representing
their generation and generations of the unborn, and represented by their parents
against Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of DENR.
● They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, and
representatives to:
○ Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country
○ Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs
● Oposa, et al. alleged that that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae.
● The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.

Issue/s: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue

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 on behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Doctrine In relation to Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack
or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

Case Title: Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts: GSIS held an auction pursuant to the privatization program of the government under
proclamation no. 50. The public auction was selling 31-51% of MHC where the winning
bidder shall provide management expertise, international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the latter’s profitability.

There were 2 bidders for MHC, petitioner Filipino hotel, Manila Prince Hotel (MPH), and
a Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. Renong Berhad outbid MPH by 2.42 pesos per share.
Pending the declaration of the highest bidder, MPH matched the bid, and sent a
manager’s check as bid security to GSIS, the latter refused to accept this hence the MPH
filing for prohibition and mandamus.

MPH invokes their preferential right to national economy and patrimony par 2 of Section
10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. MPH contends that Manila Hotel Corporation has
built a cultural heritage having hosted prominent guests in Filipino history which should
not be sold to a stranger in the presence of a qualified Filipino who had matched the bid
to purchase the same.

GSIS argues that Section 10 of Article XII of the Constitution requires legislation for its
enforcement, and stresses that par 2 of the same section is directed to the state and not
to them who has a distinct personality from the Philippines as state.

Issue/s: Whether MPH should have preferential right over MHC.

Ruling: Petition Granted, the Court orders respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51%
of shares to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of MPH.

The Court explains in three respects;

1. The GSIS is under the Constitutional command. The Court explains this by
defining Constitutional Supremacy and also what ‘State’ means.

Constitutional supremacy makes the Constitution implied in the rules of the GSIS
on conducting public auctions the same in all other statutes, hence the GSIS is
subject to the Constitution’s command.

12
 The Court defines that ‘the State’ pertains to both people and the government.
GSIS is an instrumentality of the executive department hence is directed to in par.
2 Section 10 of Art. XII in the 1987 Constitution.

The Court further stresses so by enumerating the 3 types of state action where 2
of 3 describes the latter’s transaction in selling MHC. This clarifies that the GSIS
is in fact referred to when it orders ‘the State’ to give the preferential right
concerned.

2. Section 10 of Art. XII in the 1987 Constitution is self executory.

As a general rule, the constitution is self-executory unless otherwise stated, par. 2
of section 10 is clear in conferring the preferential right to qualified Filipinos, which
makes it independent from further legislation.

3. 51% of MHC is reserved for Filipinos/ par 2. Of Sec 10 of Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution applies in the case.
The Court explains that MHC has become part of the country’s national economy
and patrimony because of its 8-decade existence, and prominence in hosting
Government events since the Commonwealth era. This guarantees that MHC
being part of the national economy and patrimony must be reserved for Filipinos,
and shall be should MPH acquire its controlling stock. 51% makes the controlling
stock.

Doctrine 1. The Court defines the constitution as “a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.”

2. 3 types of State Action

a. When the activity it engages is a “public function,”
b. When the government is so-significantly involved with the private sector
as to make the government responsible for its action
c. When the government has approved or authorized the action.

3. As a general rule, the constitution is self-executory unless otherwise stated.

Case Title: Kilosbayan v. Morato

Facts: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the
net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own
personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may

13
 purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA
invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was
same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the
law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

Ruling: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply.
Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan
vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case.
The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in
the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST

Doctrine Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, Rule on conclusiveness, Locus standi

Case Title: People v. Ferrer (in his capacity as judge of the CFI of Tarlac)

Facts: Respondent Judge is questioned in his decision declaring the Anti-Subversion Act void
and unconstitutional. Respondent Judge declared the said act upon motion to quash of
respondent accused Co, and Tayag in a separate case invoking their right against bill of
attainder.

Co was charged to have violated the said act for being a leader of the Communist Party
of the Philippines. Tayag on the other hand for being a member of KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, which is identified as a subversive organization as defined by the Anti-
Subversion Act.

Issue/s: Whether the Anti-Subversive Act is unconstitutional.

Ruling: No, question set-aside, 2 cases remanded.

14
 The court explains that a statute only becomes a bill of attainder if it punishes named
individuals or singles out prominent groups by easily identifying them as a way to inflict
punishment without trial.

The Act does not specify names or members of particular groups punishable, it simply
declares that the Communist Party is subversive for its contradicting views with subjecting
the Philippines to alien domination and control, but does not say that it's being subversive
is the purpose of the punishment. The Act even expresses that it applies to other
parties/groups and their successors of similar purpose.

Doctrine 1. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. The
right to protection against bill of attainder applies only to a statute that singles out
“a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.”

Case Title: PACU v. Secretary

Facts: Petitioner Philippine Assoc of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended and RA 139. Act No. 2706 provides that
before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the
Sec. of Education, which they aver restrains the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school. Said Act also confers on the Sec. of Education the duty to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools xxx. PACU contends this confers unlimited
power constituting unlawful delegation of legislative power. On the other hand, RA 139
confers upon the Board of Textbooks power to review all textbooks to be used in private
schools and prohibit the use of those deemed, in sum, unsuitable. PACU avers this is
censorship in “its baldest form”.

Issue/s: May PACU validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing statutes?

Ruling: No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitioners have
suffered no wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief may be had in striking down
the assailed statutes.202 Petitioner private schools are operating under the permits
issued to them pursuant to the assailed Act, and there is no threat, as they do not assert,
that the Sec. of Education will revoke their permits. Mere apprehension that the Secretary
might, under the law, withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Petitioners also do not show how the “general standard of efficiency” set by the Secretary
has injured any of them or interfered with their operation. It has not been shown that the
Board of Textbooks has prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are averse and are
thereby in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights.

Doctrine Issues premised on contingent events are hypothetical. They have yet to ripen to actual
controversies, and cannot be the basis for raising questions of constitutionality.

Case Title: KILOSBAYAN v. Guingona

15
Facts: Petitioners as tax-payers and concerned citizens of the Philippines challenge a contract
entered into by Philippine Charity and Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) with a lessor, Berjaya
Group Berhad through Philipipne Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) who shall
build the equipment for the former’s on-line lottery system.

Petitioners pray for prohibition and injunction with prayers of temporary restraining order,
and preliminary injunction contending that PCSO is prohibited by Blg. 42 to hold/conduct
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture.

The Lease Contract obliges the lessor to furnish the machines, and partial development
plan of the on-line lottery system as well as to construct a telecommunications network
for the efficient communication of cities and municipalities to each other. The petitioners
also aver that the PGMC is not authorized by its charter to operate a telecommunications
network, nor an online lotto. The petitioners add that pursuant to RA No. 3846
telecommunication networks need a franchise from Congress in order to be constructed.

Upon request of the Court the respondents comment in the following respects;
1. They are independent lessors for a piece of work and hence are not in
collaboration with PCSO in establishing an on-line lotto.
2. The telecommunications network is not for commercial use but for own use of the
on-line lotto, and that it falls within the exception prescribed by RA No. 3846 for
the establishment of radio stations without congressional franchise.
3. The charter of PMGC warrants the contract concerned
4. The petitioners do not have locus standi
The Court considered the foregoing in the oral arguments, and thus issued a temporary
restraining order to PCSO and PGMC. and ordered the same to cease and desist from
implementing the challenged contract.

Issue/s: 1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether PCSO’s employment of a lessor/contractor is considered as a joint
venture or association

Ruling: Petition granted, challenged lease-contract declared contrary to law and invalid. TRO
made permanent.

1. Petitioners have locus standi

The Court declares the case a matter of transcendental importance hence the
petitioners must be given way to challenge such contract, and the technicalities of
procedures be brushed aside. The Court explains that the ramifications of the
issue posed affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even
in the remotest barangays of the country. The counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise.

The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and

conversely without a well ordered state there could be no enforcement of private
rights. The private rights of lay-men with respect to the services of PCSO would
be impaired in effect of any issue it would have within the latter’s instrumentality.

16
 The court clarifies that the tax-payers suit doctrine applies in the case and
reiterates its not only applicable to statutes. The Court cited previous decisions
challenging executive orders, charters decisions, rulings orders of various
government agencies giving way for transcendental import.

Hence the contract here-in concerned may also be assailed by concerned

citizens.

2. Yes
The Contract show that the PGMC is the actual online lotto operator and not PCSO
despite the PGMC being mainly responsible for the machines to be leased, the
latter have liabilities in profit, and access to managerial, as well as developmental
aspect of the on-line lotto.

The Court construed the legislative intent of the prohibition of collaboration in

conducting lottery systems and ascertained that PCSO must not employ a lessor
in conducting the same. The Court cited committee reports, on the parliamentary
enactment of BP blg. 42.

Doctrine The liberal policy on locus standi is set aside in the presence of a case involving
transcendental import.

Case Title: Francisco v. House of Representative

Facts: On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J.
Davide, Jr., among others.2 The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to
that effect has not been sent to the House in plenary. The following day and just nearly 5
months since the filing of the first complaint, a second impeachment complaint3 was filed
by respondents house representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents House of Representatives, et. al.,
(the House) most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which provides: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.” The House argues: the one year bar could not have been
violated as the first impeachment complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same
is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which has “the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean "to file" because filing
can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members
of the House.4 Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first
impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”. House
Speaker De Vencia said SC does not have the jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit HR
from initiating impeachment.

17
 Issue/s: 1. Will the second complaint for impeachment will prosper?
2. Is the HS Speaker correct in saying that SC does not have jurisdiction over them?

Ruling: 1. Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the
framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint.5 The vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings,]
no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice foraction [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment
complaint].
2. No. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November
28, 2001 are unconstitutional. This Court's power of judicial review is conferred
on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution. . .In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, ". . . Judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of separation of powers and the balancing of power among three
great departments of the government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them." To him,"judicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention
— of the judiciary in that balancing operation." To ensure the potency of the power
of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by " any branch or
instrumentalities of the government ." the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time in its history, into block letter law the so-
called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this court.

Art. III, Sec. 1, Philippine Constitution

Due Process:

Case Title: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila

Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative
of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege
the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.

18
 Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests
of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests. "Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

Issue/s: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Ruling: No.

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely
on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does "to all the great public needs."

It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the
state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police
power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is
hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people.

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guarantees however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injunction on the
Ordinance in question.

19
 *** Liberty is a blessing, without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery

Case Title: Tañada v. Tuvera (1985)

Facts:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

Issue/s:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

Ruling:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

20
Case Title: Tañada v. Tuvera (1986)

Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

Ruling: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Doctrine ADDITIONAL: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.

Case Title: Serrano v. NLRC

21
Facts: Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker
to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase
out its security section engage the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner
was then terminated prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC ordered
petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-out of the security section
was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent was denied the right to be given
written notice before termination of his employment.

Issue/s: What is the effect of violation of the notice requirement when termination is based on an
authorized cause?

Ruling: The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an
employee if, although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied.
The remedy was to order the payment to the employees of full backwages from the time
of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his
dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because the dismissal
is ineffectual. In termination of employment under Art. 283, the violation of notice
requirements is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to afford the employee
an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him for there is none. The purpose is
to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE to determine
whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. With
respect to Art. 283, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not
constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely
ineffectual.

If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he
should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he
should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days
in advance. With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just
causes in 282, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from
the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination is for a
just cause because the failure to hear him renders the termination of his employment
without legal effect.

Case Title: Ang Tibay v. CIR

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number
of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity
of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while
no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU
claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground

22
 of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

Ruling: Yes. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al, the Supreme Court had
occasion to point out that although the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. In this
case the records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at
the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further,
the attached documents and exhibits are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by

23
 Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing), hence, the NLU
should be granted new trial to comply with due process.

Doctrine Due process in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

Case Title: PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine

Case Title: Non v. Dames

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-
enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is
not, however, made clear in the pleadings. The trial court dismissed the petition,
respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in
view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school.

The court also denied their MR stating that, due to the ruling in Alcuaz v. PSBA, the contract
between the student and the school is terminated when the preceding semester ends.
Furthermore, the students waived their right for readmission when they continued to rally
against the school having known that the form they signed for enrollment contains the
condition that the school has the right to deny admission to students whose conduct
discredits the institution.

The court also said that there must be a clear legal right. Since Mabini College enjoys
academic freedom, it has the freedom of admitting or denying admission of a student.
Hence, being readmitted is not a right but a privilege.

The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred
failing grades. In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating.
(b) Their academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct
attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly. (d) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for

24
 disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of
residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.

Issue/s:
Whether the termination of contract doctrine is applicable to the case at bar.

Ruling: No. The case focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-
à-vis the right of school officials to discipline them. The student does not shed his
constitutionally protected rights at
the school gate – the rights of speech and assembly which is constitutionally protected is
similarly available to students (Malabanan v. Ramento and Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District). Malabanan case involved students which were given a
preventive suspension due to illegal assembly for conducting rallies outside the allowed
school grounds and over the time period allowed.

Permissible Limitations of Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school:

● (Guzman v. NU). In Guzman , the students are allowed to be readmitted without
prejudice to the imposition of disciplinary measure. However, disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process: (1) the students must
be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance
of counsel; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by an investigating committee. Furthermore, sanctions imposed
must be proportional to the offense committed.
● The Nature of Contract between the school and the student – despite the ruling in
alcuaz, there is a presumption that once admitted for a course and have been
enrolled for a semester, the student is expected to finish the course. The school
cannot deny the readmission of a student. Hence, the contract of the student with
the school is not an ordinary contract.
● Academic Freedom not a ground for denying student rights - the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights of speech and
assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right of equal protection.

The Supreme Court held that the students who were not given failing marks but denied re
enrollment were refused re enrollment without just cause. The denial for readmission of
students with failing marks was also found to be a mere afterthought not relevant to the
actual cause which was their participation in mass actions.

Disciplinary sanctions should still be imposed provided that these were proportionate to
the offenses incurred by each student and that procedural due process was conducted
before such sanctions
were imposed.

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Doctrine The court held that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers
over all educational institutions. It provides that every student has the right to enroll in any
school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable
regulations,

Case Title: Lumiqued v. Exevea

Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Lumiqued was dismissed from his position as the Regional Director of
the Department of Agrarian Reform-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR). The
dismissal was the aftermath of 3 affidavit-complaints filed by private respondent and DAR-
CAR cashier Jeannette Obar-Zamudio. The affidavit-complaints charged Lumiqued with
malversation due to falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements, violation of COA’s rules
and regulations on concealing unliquidated cash advance, and oppression and
harassment for unjustly terminating Zamudio’s services as cashier. Committee hearings
on the complaints were conducted, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. The
committee granted Lumiqued’s request for resetting the second hearing to enable him to
employ the services of counsel. However, neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared, so
the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Adopting the recommendation of
the Investigating Committee, President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed Lumiqued from his
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52. Lumiqued filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the
hearing. In view of Lumiqued's death, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning such order.

Petitioner’s fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right
to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the
committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time
within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee
should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.

Issue/s: Whether the due process clause encompasses the right to be assisted by counsel during
an administrative inquiry.

Ruling:
No.In the case at bar, the investigation conducted was for the purpose of determining if
Lumiqued could be held administratively liable under the law. As such, the hearing
conducted was not part of a criminal prosecution. Under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.In Nera v.Auditor General, the Court said:

26
 . . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not
be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that
without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

Doctrine The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications.

Case Title: PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (2 Bernas 8)

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.

Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent
Jose Alcuaz, Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546
which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice
and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue/s: Whether or not the Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued
without prior notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the Petitioner.

27
Ruling: Yes. The respondent violated procedural due process. If the authorities where the
function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due
process of law, Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved.
In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential
to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise
of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate
rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
an order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.

Case Title: Ateneo v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 106

Facts: Juan Ramon Guanzon was a student-boarder at Cervini hall who hurled abuses and laid
hand to the cafeteria server, Carmelita Mateo. This was witnessed by several boarders.
The university investigated the slapping incident and on the basis of the investigation
results, decided to expel Guanzon. He opted instead to apply for honourable dismissal
which was granted. Upon learning of the incident, his parents lodged a complaint for
damages with CFI on the ground of unfair trial. The university denied this and justified
that such behaviour of the student is subject to be sanctioned by the school and that the
university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a
student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and
discipline. Lower court decided in favour of the Guanzon. CA initially reversed the LC
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration of the Guanzons, CA reversed its own decision.
Ateneo was compelled to ask for review of the said decision.

Issue/s: Whether or not Guanzon was denied of due process on the ground of unfair trial.

Ruling: No. He was not denied of due process. Besides the administrative body undertaking a
fair and objective investigation of the incident, due process in administrative proceedings
also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to
support the decision. Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision penned by Justice
Gancayco, showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive,
and adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the
reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper
or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University.

Juan Ramon was given notice of the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his
side. The investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative
due process were met. It cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon
were not given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years

28
 of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his
responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he
asked if he could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December
1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance
from his guardian and or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not
inform them about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his
Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University.

Case Title: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)

Facts: This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under
the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or
under New York State’s Home Relief Program. Their complaint alleged that City officials
administering these programs terminated such aid without prior notice and hearing,
denying them due process of law. After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for
notice and hearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then challenged as constitutionally
inadequate. The procedure allowed the recipient to challenge the proposed termination
of benefits within seven days and submit a written statement for the reviewing official to
make a final determination. Appellees’ challenged the procedures’ lack of an opportunity
to personally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-examination
of adverse witnesses. The procedure did allow for a post-termination “fair hearing,”
however. The District Court held that only a pre-termination hearing would satisfy the
constitutional due process requirement.

Issue/s: Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without
affording him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the
recipient due process of law?

Ruling: Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing
provides the recipient with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare
provides the only means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care. The
crucial factor is that the termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy might
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.

Doctrine The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the
State’s interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the State’s
competing interest to prevent administrative and fiscal burdens. The pre-termination hearing need
not take the form of a judicial or quasi- judicial trial, as the “fair hearing” will afford full
administrative review later on. It need only produce an initial determination that the welfare’s
grounds for termination of benefits are valid.

Case Title: U.P. v. Hon. Ligot-Telan

Facts: Note: Nadal was a College of Law Student in the University of the Philippines.

29
 THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year,
non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as
long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest
per annum and non issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial
obligations with the university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a
guilty verdict on Nadal’s alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his
application for scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and
maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of
his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process when, after the
Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY”
in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner,
called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for
Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal
was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.

Issue/s: WON Nadal was denied due process.

Ruling: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice
of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in
BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the
Board. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of
the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not
be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of professionals who would uphold
truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated
his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the
STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis
for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings, only substantial evidence
is required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as
adequate to support a conclusion.

Case Title: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558,
finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the
Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended
that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses
with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus
violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from
vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:‘combination’,‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’.

Issue/s: WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due process.

Ruling: NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the

30
 State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal
act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.

Case Title: People v. Nazario

Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a
fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The
years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay
because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus
this petition.

Issue/s: Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended, is null and void for being
ambiguous and uncertain, and thus violates due process

Ruling: As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It
is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As
the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not
deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into
the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is
the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits
they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under
the said ordinances.

Case Title: Agustin v. Edu

Facts: Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires
an early warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and
highways, including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The
hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna

31
 Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the
said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

Issue/s: Whether or not the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due
process.

Ruling: NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was
no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified,
police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of
police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate
a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our
own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No.
207 .
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is,
moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.

Doctrine The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactments of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.'

Case Title: Olmstead v. U.S

Facts: The petitioners led by Olmstead were convicted in the District Court of a conspiracy for
violating the National Prohibition Act for unlawfully possessing, transporting, importing,
and selling intoxicating liquors. The information which led to the discovery of the crime
was obtained through the interception on the telephones of the conspirators by 4 federal
officers. Small wires were inserted in the ordinary telephone wires of the residences of
the petitioners.

Issue/s: 1. Is the obtainment of evidence violative of the Fourth Amendment (right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, etc. against unreasonable searches
and seizure shall not be violated)?

2. Is the procedure in acquiring evidence violative of the Fifth Amendment (No

person…shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself)?

Ruling: 1. NO, following the ruling in Boyd v. US which held that Acts 1863, 1867, and 1874
are free from constitutional objection, the production of a man’s private papers to
establish criminal charge does not equate to search and seizure that the Fourth
amendment prohibits. There was no searching nor seizure and the interceptors

32
 were not at the house of the defendants nor were they a party of the conversation.
Moreover, due to lack of legislation, the common law rule is applied to the case.

2. NO, because there was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to

talk over their telephones.

Brandeis dissent: Wiretapping constituted an unreasonable search and seizure violating

the Fourth Amendment and compelled the defendants to be a witness against themselves
which then violated the Fifth Amendment. Protection against such invasion of "the
sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life" was provided in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments by specific language. Espionage will not stop with wiretapping.

Doctrine Common Law Rule (US v. Reid) – Admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality
of the means which it was obtained

Case Title: Griswold v. Connecticut

Facts: Griswold, an Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
Buxton, a license physician and professor of Yale Medical School were arrested for giving
information, instruction, and medical advice for married persons to prevent conception.
They prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for the fee and usually charge
couples for the service.

This practice is against 52-32 (Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument and shall be fined…) and 54-196 (Any person who assists…may be
prosecuted and punished) of the General Statutes of Connecticut. They were found guilty
for violating the Fourteenth Amendment and fined $100 each.

Issue/s: Can the State intrude upon a married couple’s privacy?

Ruling: NO, as supported by jurisprudence, the First Amendment has a penumbra of rights (not
confined in the specific terms of the Bill of Rights) where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion and this includes the right of association. Marriage is an
association that promotes a way of life and should not be intruded upon.

Moreover, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects the
fundamental personal rights and liberties of people from impairment of the States.

Concepts Due Process

Liberty – Right to marry, establish a home and bring up children

Case Title: Roe v. Wade

Facts: The law in Texas permitted abortion only in cases involving rape or incest. When Dallas
citizen, Norma McCorvey found that she was pregnant with her third child, McCorvey
falsely claimed to have been raped to obtain an abortion. To which she failed to achieve.

33
 McCorvey sought the assistance of Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington (who were
advocates of abortion). They filed a claim using the alias Jane Roe for McCorvey.
Appellant sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional and an
injunction to prevent Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Jane Roe
sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statues
were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue/s: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate
her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people
by the Ninth Amendment?

Ruling: The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
 The abortion
laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from
statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law
abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in
utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly
established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws.
The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit
sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore
the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques
have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first
trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However,
this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for
the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not
be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s
interest in promoting the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion,
except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s
interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

Case Title: Ople v. Torres

Facts: The then President Ramos enacted Administrative Order no. 308 on December 12, 1996
to serve as the groundwork for the implementation of a National ID system.
The administrative order mandates that the major government agencies should pool their
existing resources to implement a centralized data bank of all citizens. The existence of

34
 a data bank shall be used to efficiently manage day-to-day government transactions, in
the hopes of minimizing red taping and corruption amongst government employees.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople filed a case, questioning A.O. no. 308 on three (3) grounds:
- A.O. 308 demonstrates usurpation of legislative functions as the implementation
of a national ID system would require a legislative act
- A.O. 308 has the tendency to infringe on the citizen’s privacy
- Appropriation of funds for the implementation of the said A.O. is an exclusive
legislative function

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.

2. Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the President in establishing a national
computerized identification reference system is an unconstitutional usurpation of
the legislative powers of the Congress.

Ruling: 1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the President’s Executive power,
the Court provided the following:
1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
legislature’s exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby
compliance therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy as
it allows the government to pool various data regarding an individual
without any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping,
safeguards against improper use, and any definite answer as to what type
of information may or may not be used.
· But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the
would be infringement. To streamline government transactions and to
remove red taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to
counter act the strict protection of the individual’s right to privacy.

2. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws.As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive.Corollary to the power of control, the President has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices
under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.

As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power
of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. From these precepts,
the Supreme Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by an administrative order. The dissenting opinions of the Justices
unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erode the
plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". .
. Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative

35
 legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the
form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws."
Thus, Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" was declared null and void for being unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.

Case Title: People v. Fajardo

Facts: In criminal case No. 9730 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Pascual Fajardo was
convicted of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence and sentenced
to pay a fine of P270.10 and the costs.
When the judgment was to be executed, it was found that the accused was insolvent, for
which reason the sheriff returned the writ unsatisfied. The clerk of court informed the
provincial fiscal to this effect and the latter replied that the accused should suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment although he was not so sentenced in the judgment.
The clerk of court reported the case to the court which, by order of March 13, 1935, held
that the accused could not be compelled to suffer subsidiary imprisonment because he
was not so sentenced in the judgment, and ordered his release, which was carried out.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused may be compelled to undergo subsidiary imprisonment

Ruling: It is a fundamental principle that no person may be deprived of liberty without due process
of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in Article 78 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be executed, except by virtue of a
final judgment. As the facts show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed upon him,
because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding him guilty,
it is clear that the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary
imprisonment.

Case Title: Ynot v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659 (2 Bernas 21)

Facts: On October 25, 1980, Executive Order No. 626-A took effect ordering the an absolute
ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of
carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry
(AI) may also see fit.
Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued
for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k.

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 RTC: It sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be
produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the
constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed
validity.
IAC (CA): On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-
A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty
suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

Issue/s: Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

Ruling: YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that
the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626
complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the
order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought
to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except
those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately
works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of
their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to
observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial
transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to
another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable
relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright
confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no
trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain
occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary
abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In
the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the
confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since
the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are
granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said
officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they
are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality
and abuse, and even corruption.

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Doctrine Police Power is defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare.
Requisites:
(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference, and;
(b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

Due Process is defined as “the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”

Case Title: Bel-Air Association v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719

Facts:
Ayala Corporation (original owner owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel
Air Village) executed Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets to Bel-Air
Village Association (BAVA). Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of
Makati, opening the streets in Bel-Air Village could alleviate traffic congestion along the
adjacent public streets to Bel-Air Village. This leads to the Municiality of Makati to open
the streets to the public.

Issue/s: Whether the Mayor could have validly open the streets.

Ruling: Yes. Police power is a power inherent to the State to regulate property and liberty for the
promotion of general welfare. Here, there was sufficient evidence that it would benefit the
whole public if the streets are open to the public. It is within the power of the Mayor to
regulate a rule that will cater the common good of the people. It is incumbent upon the
petitioners to prove that such action was arbitrary and capricious.

Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (2 Bernas 655)

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under
PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market
value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were
denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then
filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.

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Issue/s: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: YES, it is unconstitutional, Court has the power to determine just compensation and to
appoint commissioners for the purpose.The method of ascertaining just compensation under
the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have
the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees,
its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by
the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as
the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. "

Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just
compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling
that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair
and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the province,
plus consequential damages—including attorney's fees—from which the consequential benefits, if
any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from
and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7
SCRA 60).

Doctrine Just Compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever
gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.

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Case Title: De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (2 Bernas 666)

Facts: The petitioner alleges that than ten (10) years ago, the government through the
Department of Public Workmen’s and Communication (now MPH) prepared a to Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Blvd; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of
building program, the Manila — Cavite Coastal Read Project, would pass through Cuneta
Ave. up to Roxas Blvd that this route would be a straight one taking into account the
direction of EDSA but later decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets which petitioner being one of them residents, that President
Marcos referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission (HSC) for investigation
and recommendation which recommended the original plan; notwithstanding the said
recommendation, the MPH insisted on implementing the revised plan; In February 1979,
the government filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, presided by the
respondent Judge, a complaint for expropriation against the petitioner. respondent judge
issued a writ of possession dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be
condemned. The petitioner contends that “Respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter
upon the possession of the properties sought to be expropriated-petitioner having raised
a constitutional question which respondent court must resolve before it can issue an order
to take or enter upon the possession of properties sought to be expropriated.

Issue/s: Is the government entitled to just take any property it wants?

Ruling: No, The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason. The
condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature has delegated a
power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the
intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject however to
review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The choice
of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness and due
process determination as to whether or not the proposed location was proper in terms of
the public interests.

Doctrine The right of the government to expropriate property upon payment of just compensation
is not a right that should be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily.

Case Title: Manotok v. NHA, 150 SCRA 89 (2 Bernas 674)

Facts: Pursuant to LOI No. 555 instituting nationwide slum improvement and resettlement
program (SIR) and LOI No. 557 adopting slum improvement as a national housing policy,
the City of Manila and NHA declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in
its priority list for a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which they described as blighted
areas. With this, the President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos. 1669 and
1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area
expropriated. The decrees gave the City Assessor the authority to determine the market

40
 value of the lands involved and stated that "no improvement has been undertaken on the
land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably
depress the expropriation cost".

Petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of
the properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal
protection of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their properties
were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to
contest the just compensation to which they are entitled. The petitioners argue that the
government must first have filed a complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court in order to fulfill the requirements of due process.

Issue/s: Whether or not the decrees in question deprived the petitioners of their properties without
due process of law

Ruling: Petitions are GRANTED. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670 which respectively
proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Due process
•The areas are summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the
decree.
•Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead
their side, or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the decisions, rulings,
orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial
review.
•In City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges (85 Phil. 663), we reiterated that a necessity
must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes but
accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. ---- In the instant
petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled
out for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or
selections

Case Title: Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (2 Bernas 650)

Facts: Parcels of land covering approximately twenty-five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an
area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the
market value.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The
NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing
the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree

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 No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized
housing upon payment of just compensation."

On January 17, 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of possession when the
NHA deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P158, 980.00. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law, which was however denied.
Hence, the resort to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing''
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not really for a public purpose.

Ruling: No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing''
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is really for a public purpose.
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the
statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be valid must
be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.

Case Title: Luz Farms v. Secretary, 192 SCRA 51 (2 Bernas 1011)

Facts: Luz Farm, petitioner is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business. Allegedly,
they are adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16, 17, and 32 of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Said sections provide, among others,
production and profit sharing. Thus, Luz Farm assails the constitutionality of said
provisions.

Luz Farm contended that livestock or poultry is not similar to farming. Land is not a primary
resource in commercial livestock and only represents not more than five percent (5%) of
the total investments. Further, land is only incidental but not the principal factor or
consideration in poultry raising. Thus, poultry, livestock shall not be included in the
coverage of “agricultural lands” defined in R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.

Issue/s: Whether said provisions are unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes, the provisions are unconstitutional. Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the

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 definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is
simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32
of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to
execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their
gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due
process.

Case Title: Cariday v. CA (Gutierrez J., dissenting), 176 SCRA 31

Facts: Cariday, petitioner owns a residential lot in Forbes Park Subdivision. The residential lot is
only restricted to one family even if it can occupy two families. Cariday, lease a portion of
his lot to an Englishman. However, the association in the Village cuts his utilities to enforce
the “one residential lot-one family rule”. Thus, Cariday prays for the modification on the
restriction.

Issue/s: Whether the restriction of one residential lot for one family shall continue to be reinforced
in Forbes Park Subdivision?

Ruling: The court finds no merit on the petition. The deed of restrictions clearly states the “one
residential lot for one family”. Further, the court is persuaded that the restriction was made
to avoid overcrowding both in the houses and in the subdivision which would result in
pressure upon the common facilities such as water, power and telephone connections,
accelerate the deterioration of the roads, and create problems of sanitation and security
in the subdivision.

Dissenting Justice Gutierrez does not agree. He said that the disputed single family restriction is
intended to insure that Forbes Park real estate values remain higher much, much higher
than the values in any other residential area in the whole country.

(1) That the Court is not protecting sanitation, peace and order, comfort, or aesthetic
surroundings which would not in the least bit be affected by two families sharing
one big house in Forbes Park, but inflated land values and an elitist life style. The
decision of the court does not help to meet the constitutional objectives of social
justice and reduction of inequalities.
(2) That there is denial of due process:

“the police power as an attribute to promote the common weal would be diluted
considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that the liberty to contract
would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized as a denial of due
process. The right to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme”

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