G.R. No.

161414 January 17, 2005

Sultan Osop B. Camid, Petitioner
vs.
The Office of the President, et. al., Respondents

FACTS:

The municipality of Andong in Lanao del Sur was one created

through an Executive Order issued by then President Diosdado
Macapagal. Consequently, the ruling from Palaez v. Auditor General
declared thirty-three (33) municipalities to be void ab initio, and
among them is the municipality of Andong.

The petitioner alleges that Andong has metamorphosed into a

full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to
handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents.
With this, they still believe that the municipality does exist. To
support their claim, a certification from DENR-CENRO was
presented showing the total area of Andong and another cetification
from the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi concerning the
population of Andong. Additionally, petitioner also enumerates a
list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly
recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have
recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly
for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-
establishment of Andong.

The petitioner also assails a certification from DILG

enumerating municipalities certified as “existing”. And he imputes
grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG for not including
Andong as a regular existing municipality. Hence, he prays for the
nullification of the certificate and to immediately release the
internal revenue allotments to Andong and for DILG to recognize
their “Interim Local Officials”.

Moreover, the petitioner cited Section 442(d) of the LGC of

1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned
municipality.
THE CASE:

Petition for Certiorari under the effects of Section 442(d) of

the Local Government Code filed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive

fiat was previously voided by the Supreme Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or re-implementing
statute.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

In the Palaez ruling, the President has no power to create

municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before the Supreme Court.
Thus, the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled
by the order of the Supreme Court.

Section 442(d) of the LGC requires that in order that the

municipality created by executive order may receive recognition,
they must “have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of the LGC”.

Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section

422(d) of the LGC as the petitioner admits that they never elected
municipal officers at all.

Therefore, the Supreme Court asserts the proper purview to

Section 442(d) of the LGC – which it does not serve to affirm or
reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong
which had been previously created by presidential issuances or
executive orders.

PRINCIPLE:

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section
442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with.” Are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.