Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Marikina

Senior high school Department

San Roque Campus

In Partial Fulfillment in the Subject: Discipline and ideas in the Social

Science

Pestaño, Harvey C.

Saguinsin, Rafael

H-109 Guerrero
 2018 GOLDEN BEACON POLITICAL LAW

JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT

KILOSBAYAN VS. EDUARDO ERMITA

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. on the issue of

Kilos Bayan vs Eduardo Ermita solving whether or not Gregory Ong is a natural born citizen.

In this statement, Gregory Ong was a Chinese Citizen as indicated in his birth

certificate. In his defense, Ong said that while his parents were Chinese citizens, his father

was naturalized as a Filipino citizen when Ong was just 11 years old. Ong said he was also

able to secure a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice

that he is a natural-born citizen. Ong was originally appointed by former President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, but his appointment was

rejected by the SC en banc due to questions on his citizenship.

Petitioners invoke the constitution Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any

lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV

defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship." Confirmed that

Ong is definitely not natural born citizen of the Philippines meaning he is nothing to be with in

the Supreme Court.

TERMS LIMIT

FRANCIS ONG VS. JOSEPH ALEGRE

Term of limits is obtained in an issue of Francis Ong Vs. Joseph Alegre about that

whether or not Petitioner Francis assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for

the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of three limit

rule.

The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the

mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the

constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official

cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution

commends itself for concurrence.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to

Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. Docketed as

SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term

rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001

mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for

three 3 consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. That for me the term of being a

mayor are not be abused at the same time.

MERE MISDESCLARATION OF SALN IS NOT DISHONESTY

ATTY. AMADO Q. NAVARRO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Navarro Amado is a CPA Lawyer, Navarro began his employment at the

Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The CA found that Navarro failed to comply with his obligation as

a government employee to truthfully disclose in detail all of his business interests in his SALN. The

CA noted that in his SALNs submitted from 1998-2002, Navarro simply lumped together with the

declared properties based on their location, which went against the legal mandate for a government

employee to submit a true and detailed statement of his assets and liabilities.

Therefore, Navarro argues that the conclusion of the Ombudsman and the

CA that his assets were disproportionate to his lawful income, without considering his other sources

of income before and after he was taken in, was erroneous. He further explained that he could not

have declared other assets as exclusively his because he co-owned those properties with his brother,

Engr. Victor Navarro, and sister, Atty. Epifania Navarro who had assets and sources of income of

their own. The Ombudsman considered such failure as constituting grave misconduct and asserted

that Navarro deliberately concealed his financial and business interests in his SALNs, by intentionally

lumping together all of his real properties, depending on their location and, thus, hiding the true

nature of the properties.

Indeed, the general rule in administrative law is that the courts of Justice

should respect the findings of fact of administrative agencies. The rule, however, is not absolute as

there are recognized exceptions thereto. One is when the precise issue is whether there is substantial

evidence to support the findings of the administrative agency. Substantial evidence has been held as

that which is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might

conceivably opine otherwise.

DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE CANNOT BE VOTED UPON

FR. NARDO B. CAYAT vs COMELEC

Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in

Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy on 5

January 2004. On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before

the COMELEC Regional Election Office in Baguio City. Docketed as SPA (PES) No. C04-001,

Palileng's petition alleged. . COMELEC canceled Cayat's COC but his name still remained on the

COMELEC's list of candidates. Cayat received the highest number of votes and thus, proclaimed as

the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet and he took his oath of office on May 17, 2004

On 29 July 2004, pending the resolution of G.R. No. 163776, Palileng

filed a petition for annulment of proclamation with a prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief,

docketed as SPC No. 04-043, against the MBOC of Buguias and Cayat before the COMELEC

Second Division. On 28 August 2004, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Palileng's petition

pursuant to COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 7257 (Resolution No. 7257). Resolution No. 7257

enumerated the cases which survived from among those filed before the Clerk of the COMELEC in

the 10 May 2004 elections and which required proceedings beyond 30 June 2004.

However, on 4 November 2004, Atty. Armando Velasco, Regional

Director for the CAR, sent a notice that the new MBOC would convene on 12 November 2004 for the

implementation of the COMELEC First Division's 25 October 2004 order. On 10 November 2004,

Cayat filed a petition for certiorari before this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 165736. Cayat

prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin
COMELEC and its agents from enforcing the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice

an order be issued reversing and setting aside the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004

notice; and an order be issued directing the COMELEC to suspend proceedings in SPA Case No. 04-

152 until G.R. No. 163776 is resolved by this Court with finality.

QUALIFICATION OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATE

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD

Constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of

candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of

public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,

among other personalities.

In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,

random, and suspicionless drug testing for... students emanates primarily from the waiver by the

students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily

submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and

public employees, the... constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug

testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. he operative

concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of

persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, mandatory drug testing can never be

random or suspicionless.
 In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)

9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires

mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,

officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s

office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

REMOVAL OF AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS vs MARTINEZ

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the Orders dated 20 October 2005 and 30 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Special Civil Action No. 6727. In its assailed Orders,

the trial court ruled that the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya Sangguniang Bayan,

exceeded its jurisdiction when it imposed upon respondent Severino Martinez the administrative

penalty of removal from office.

On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty

and Graft and Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the

Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials according to Section

61 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed with the

Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for

Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the

authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution, provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

RULES ON SUCCESION OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS

CASAN MAQUILING VS. COMELEC & ROMMEL ARNADO

Local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30,

2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no

longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the

validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal

of this Court’s Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the

Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not

only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of the

renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s

renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The

renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the

renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign

passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO VILLAREAL

Whether or not must always show someone Warrant of arrest to someone you've

been captured. The apprehension of De Leon to Nazareno is illegal. The story of this is that PO3

Renato De Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home when he saw Nazareno from a distance

scrutinizing a sachet of shabu on his hand. As De Leon approached Nazareno, it looks like Nazareno

recognized him and tried to escape. According to De Leon, he recognized Nazareno as previously

arrested suspect because of illegal drug possession.

In this statement, PO3 De Leon doesn't have any warrant of arrest when he captured

Nazareno. it is against the rights of the arrested in individual. but there's a fact that when he arrested

him there some illegal drugs are evident to Nazareno but he's not showing any warrant of arrest. Yes,

it is one of the commands of the President that the officers can arrest someone if they caught that

someone doing something illegal. But then, still, warrant of arrest should be shown first before the

arresting and that is the conflict of this case.

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:

the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and such overt act is done in the presence or within

the view of the arresting officer.

CALLING-OUT POWER

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN VS. HON. RONALDO PUNO

Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state

of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical

violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an

invalid exercise of the President's emergency powers.

On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her

supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego anyway. These

orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend

or replace ARMM officials. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass

killings. Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise

of emergency powers.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the

three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that

authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the

President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

ATTY. ALICIA R. VIDAL VS. COMELEC & JOSEPH ESTRADA

Because of smuggling issue and illegal activity, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada got

removed from his position. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on the other hand as his vice president take his

position and become the president. On September 22, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted the

former president for the crime of plunder and sentenced him to suffer Reclusion Perpetua. But on

October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency by way of

pardon to former President Estrada. And on October 2, 2012, former president Estrada filed his COC

for mayor of Manila.

Wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal

Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Plunder, defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as

amended. On the other hand, for the failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada and Atty. Edward S.

Serapio Not guilty of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their Acquittal.

In accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No.

7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: The total

amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety-One Thousand Pesos

(P545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million

Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

The amount of One Hundred Eighty-Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and

income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account. The real property consisting of a house and

lot dubbed as “Boracay Mansion” located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.