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access to African Studies Review
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182 African Studies Review
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Book Reviews 183
ten years on, the good governance agenda has been largely unsuccessful
in promoting stable multi-party democracies on the African continent.
Although most African countries have by now established democratic
structures and procedures, the substance of civil and political rights has
gradually been eroded and these democracies remain highly fragile and
plagued by civil and political instability." (xiv-xv)
Indeed, any attentive and astute observer of the current African politic
scene would be hard-pressed to disagree fundamentally with such an analysis.
In just over 150 pages, Rita Abrahamsen makes a concise, tightly
argued, and compelling argument which, in a nutshell, is that in th
post-Cold War world, the impoverished and disenfranchised African pop
ular masses have been abandoned by their own leaders and sacrificed by
the international community on the altar of globalization. Indeed, the
African people emerge clearly as the laisses-pour-compte (or casualties) of
global prosperity which only benefits northern countries, firms, and org
nizations and the southern elites who work hand-in-glove with them. Mor
specifically, the good governance agenda actively promoted by the Worl
Bank and the IMF is conceptually linked to economic liberalism, and "the
effort to strengthen civil society concentrates primarily on nurturing th
bourgeoisie and creating an enabling environment for business" (61). On
the other hand, "'empowerment of the people' is reduced to cost-sharing
and becomes a tool in the hands of liberal economists." In this way, "the dis-
course legitimizes continued structural adjustment, and gives it a more
democratic face, while simultaneously delegitimizing more interventionis
and socialist strategies" (65).
Abrahamsen further demonstrates that the type of democracy promot-
ed by the good governance discourse and liberal scholarship-procedural
or minimalist approaches concerned with equal legal or formal rights ta
Schumpeter, Dahl, or Huntington-is one that centers on the selection o
leaders (hence the exclusive focus on multiparty elections) and excludes
socioeconomic rights (i.e., a democratic theory committed to the ideals o
participation, equality, tolerance, and liberty it la Rousseau or John Stuar
Mill). Illustrating her argument with case studies of Zambia, Ghana, Keny
and Ctte d'Ivoire, the author shows how popular demand for politic
change in African countries seems to have had as much to do with wid
spread dissatisfaction with deteriorating economic conditions as with a
deep commitment to democracy. Indeed, "mass protests across the cont
nent were first and foremost demands for better standards of living, that is
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184 African Studies Review
Rita Abrahamsen makes her case elegantly and persuasively, and she
offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the paradox of democrac
and development-that is, how is it possible for African countries and lead
ers simultaneously to democratize their political systems and structurally
adjust their economies in a context of decreasing economic and financia
resources? The short answer is that it is indeed impossible for African lead-
ers to satisfy the contradictory demands of two constituencies: externa
donors and creditors, and the African urban and rural masses. Indeed, the
simultaneous promotion of democracy and economic liberalism "has pre-
vented the process of democratization from progressing beyond the elec-
toral stage, as it effectively rules out social reforms towards a more equi-
table distribution of wealth." In this way, "the good governance discourse
presides over the creation of what can be termed "exclusionary democra-
cies," that is, democracies that cannot incorporate the majority of the pop-
ulation and their demands in any meaningful way" (113).
Although Abrahamsen's argument is generally persuasive, her work
may be faulted on a number of counts. First of all, she makes some dis-
putable claims. For example, she declares that "economically, Africa has
always been of limited importance to the industrialized countries" (33), a
claim evidently contradicted by the historical record of European imperi-
alism and colonialism in Africa and the West's continuing need for strate-
gic raw materials from central and southern Africa. Second, Abrahamsen's
African country case studies are superficial and unevenly treated. Although
the author cautions that "these are not case studies of democratization, but
intended more as commentary and reflection on contemporary develop-
ment discourse and practice" (86-87), the strength of her argument rests
essentially on adducing compelling evidence from various African coun-
tries. And while she does this well for Zambia and fairly well for Ghana, her
treatment of Kenya and C6te d'Ivoire are far too superficial and inade-
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Book Reviews 185
quate to be convincing (on the latter country, she cites only one author and
not the best, R. C. Crook). Strangely, Abrahamsen also shies away from eve
referring to the two political and economic giants of Africa, Nigeria a
South Africa. This lacuna is all the more surprising in that her reference t
the "democratic pact" types of transition in Latin America applies perf
ly, pari passu, to South Africa: "Such pacts may serve as a vehicle thro
which elements of the previous authoritarian regime continue to influ
the new democracy" (80). As a result, while Abrahmsen makes a c
pelling argument with regard to Third World countries in general, h
argument vis-ai-vis specific African countries is somewhat less convinc
because of the choice and weaknesses of her case studies.
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