Supreme Court rules on Malversation case

Today is Thursday, August 01, 2019
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
nal Case No. 28326, convicting petitioner Violeta Bahilidad and co-accused Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta of the complex crime of
mbudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and
cial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conduc
egally made thus local development projects do not exist resulting in the loss of ₱16,106,613.00 on the part of the government.
mostly government personnel or relative of the officials of Sarangani Province resulting to wastage and misuse of government f
to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) wa
ough falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Thus, the following Information was filed:
hin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public officer, being the Vice-Gov
officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with V
oniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
nts, making it appear that financial assistance had been sought by Women in Progress, Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its P
a C. Zoleta and her association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned publ
n the name of Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and despite
amanay and Diaz did not appear and remain at large to date. Thereafter, during the pendency of the case, Constantino died. Con
ecial Audit Team (SAT) of Sarangani Province. Cailing testified that the SAT, composed of herself and three (3) members, in th
d the monitoring, inspection and evaluation of the project by the provincial engineer if an infra-project and by the provincial agr
usly an Executive Assistant III in the latter’s office.
tified on the certification3 she issued that WIP and Women in Development (WID) were not registered cooperatives. Tutoh furth
eived an inquiry from the Office of the Ombudsman on whether WIP and/or WID were cooperatives registered with the CDA; a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani from July 1993 to August 2002, who acted as state witness, admitted in open court tha
hat she saw accused Constantino, Camanay, Diaz, and Zoleta sign the documents, and she merely followed Zoleta’s directive and
der to make the letter appear authentic.
2002, who also acted as state witness, admitted in open court that, upon orders of Zoleta, she helped prepare and process the req
of Melanie Remulta, the purported secretary of WIP. Tangan then recounted that she accompanied petitioner Bahilidad to claim
ad was merely a dummy for that disbursement. Tangan gave the money to Zoleta who told her that she would take care of Bahal
d the prosecution’s charge of malversation. The witnesses testified that WIP and WID were registered cooperatives. To support h
s. Bahilidad insisted that the amount of ₱20,000.00 that she received from the Office of the Vice-Governor was, in turn, properly
of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, and disposed, as follows:
nd guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 o
s and 11 days of reclusion temporal. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to pa
y of this case, his personal and pecuniary penalties and liabilities were totally extinguished upon his death. This Court has alread
d Maria Camanay, the case as it pertains to them is in the meantime archived. It shall be revived when the Court acquires jurisdi
s a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings of the t
ngs and conclusions of the trial court, leading to an accused’s conviction, must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable d
the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial court relied o
nt association and a co-terminus employee at the office of her father, [accused Constantino,] initiated the request for obligation o
e signatures of accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad, the amount could not have been disbursed on that particular day. Whe
f proper documentation and non-compliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the check, Bahilidad, and received
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the a
racy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the
P, that the other accused likewise signified their approval to the disbursement and allowed payment, and that payee received and
ahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by using a dummy organization as a payee.5
a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements
e commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal
ution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the c
e mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same,
ertainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the comp
g that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursemen
en in Progress; that the check was encashed when it should have been for deposit only; and that there was also failure of the pro
, being the payee of the check, because without her signature, the check would not have been encashed, and the funds would not
ffense proved. There was no showing that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the requirements submitted for the disburse
Why the check was issued in her name and not in the name of WIP is beyond cavil, but this was not incumbent upon her to quest
ioner went to the provincial capitol to claim the check, because the check was issued in her name as the Treasurer of WIP. She l
e, in varying amounts of ₱3,000.00, ₱2,000.00 and ₱500.00, all of which prove that the amount of ₱20,000.00 was disbursed for
have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioner’s name and, as
ial assistance from grants and donations for Winds Malugon, Sarangani as per supporting papers hereto attached." Petitioner’s ac
hat the COA Rules required that the check had to be deposited in the bank first, or that an evaluation report from the provincial a
s a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility.13
d must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certain
vernment. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However, this objective can be accomplished on
our Constitution to the accused.15
UITTED on reasonable doubt.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
as assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CERTIFICATION
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
d Roland B. Jurado, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-60.

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Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
MICHAEL SAN JUAN y CRUZ, G.R. No. 177191

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. May 30, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated December 21, 2006, which affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, dated July 8, 2004, finding petitioner Michael San
Juan y Cruz (petitioner), together with Rolando Pineda y Robledo (Pineda), Cynthia
Coderes y Habla (Coderes), guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
5,[4] Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.[5]
The Facts
Petitioner, together with Pineda and Coderes (accused), was charged with the
crime of Transporting Illegal Drugs in an Information[6] dated December 16, 2003,
which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of December 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport a total of 978.7 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu) a dangerous drug[s].
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on February 17, 2004, the three accused entered separate
pleas of not guilty to the offense charged.[7] During the pre-trial, the three accused
did not enter into any stipulation or admission of facts with the
prosecution.[8] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two
varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On December 15, 2003, at about 10:00 a.m., elements of the Intelligence Unit
of the Pasay City Police, namely: Police Inspector Grant Golod (P/Insp. Golod),
Police Officer (PO)3 Zoilo Manalo (PO3 Manalo), and PO2 Roberto Jovenir (PO2
Jovenir), together with Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Sorio Aure (SPO2 Aure), PO2
Froilan Dayawon (PO2 Dayawon), PO2 Carlito Bintulan, and PO1 Angel dela Cruz,
who were all in civilian attire, conducted surveillance, monitoring, and intelligence
gathering to arrest violators of the law along Senator Gil Puyat (formerly Buendia)
Avenue in Pasay City due to numerous reports of rampant snatching, robbery, and
holdup in the area. P/Insp. Golod and PO3 Manalo boarded a vehicle driven by PO2
Jovenir, while SPO2 Aure and the rest of the officers occupied another.[9]
While cruising along Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, the police officers noticed a
blue Toyota Corolla 4-door sedan car (car), which had no license plate at its rear,
parked in front of a liquor store. Thus, P/Insp. Golod called the other group using
his cellphone, and informed them that they should check the said car.[10]
SPO2 Aure and PO2 Dayawon approached the driver side of the car, whereas
PO3 Manalo and PO2 Jovenir approached the passenger side thereof. SPO2 Aure
knocked on the cars window. When the driver, later identified as petitioner, opened
the cars windows, SPO2 Aure asked for the Official Receipt (OR) and the Certificate
of Registration (CR) of the car but none was produced. SPO2 Aure was about to
accost petitioner, when a commotion ensued at the passenger side[11] of the car
because PO2 Jovenir noticed that the passenger, later identified as Pineda, was trying
to hide a plastic bag under his seat, the contents of which accidentally came out
(lumawit). PO2 Jovenir opened the door, held Pineda's right hand and asked
him, Ano yan? The contents were discovered to be plastic containers containing
white crystalline substance which the police officers suspected to be shabu[12] so
much so that PO2 Jovenir uttered, Pare, may dala to, shabu, positive.[13] At this
juncture, Pineda said, Sir, baka pwede nating ayusin ito.[14]
SPO2 Aure instructed petitioner to alight. When he was frisked, SPO2 Aure
recovered two small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. SPO2
Aure turned over these sachets to PO2 Jovenir. At the back seat of the car was
another passenger who was later identified as Coderes. Upon questioning, Coderes
replied that the owner of the shabu was a certain Mike who was waiting for the
accused at her condominium unit at Unit 1225, 12 th Floor of the Cityland
Condominium on Dela Rosa Street, Makati City (Cityland Condominium).[15]
Immediately thereafter, the police officers, with the accused, went to Cityland
Condominium for a follow-up operation. Upon arrival, P/Insp. Golod coordinated
with the Security Officer of the said condominium, while SPO2 Aure, PO3 Manalo,
and PO2 Jovenir were led by Coderes to Unit 1225. SPO2 Aure, PO3 Manalo, PO2
Jovenir allowed Coderes to walk ahead of them. Upon reaching Unit 1225, Coderes
pretended to knock on the door but the police officers did not notice that she had a
key with her. Coderes immediately opened the door, went inside the unit and locked
herself in. The police officers forcibly opened the door by kicking it and rearrested
Coderes. They then searched the unit for Mike, but they discovered that Coderes
was the only one inside. From Cityland Condominium, the police officers brought
all the accused to the Pasay City Police Headquarters for investigation.[16]
Subsequently, upon examination, the two plastic containers and the two
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were positively identified as
shabu.[17] The supposed testimony of Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, Forensic
Chemical Officer, before the RTC, was the subject of stipulation by the parties.[18]
Version of the Defense
Pineda and Coderes denied that they were arrested while on board the car and
that they possessed the illegal drugs. They claimed that, on December 15, 2003,
between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., they were inside Unit 1225 and were preparing to go
out shopping; that somebody knocked on the door; and Pineda asked who that person
was, but there was no reply; that the door was forcibly opened and armed men gained
entry and ordered them to lie down on the bed face down; that the men searched the
unit and took their personal belongings and money; that they later recognized the
said armed men as Pasay City police officers; that they presented no warrant of arrest
and/or search warrant; that they were brought to separate rooms in Sinta Court Motel
(Sinta Motel) at the corner of F.B. Harrison and EDSA Extension in Pasay City; that
the police officers demanded money from them in the amount of P500,000.00 in
exchange for their release; and that they were brought to the Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) of the Pasay City Police Headquarters at around 7:00 or 8:00
p.m.[19] On that day, Coderes only saw petitioner at the CID.[20]
On June 2, 2004, petitioner testified that he knew Pineda because he is the
godfather of one of Pinedas children; that he also knew Coderes because she is the
live-in partner of Pineda; that around 10:00 a.m. on December 15, 2003, he was at
the lobby of the Cityland Condominium and was waiting for an elevator in order to
see Pineda and Coderes; that upon riding the elevator, three (3) male persons joined
him who were all in civilian attire and whom he later came to know to be Pasay City
police officers, namely: PO2 Jovenir and P/Insp. Golod and another one whom he
failed to identify; that one of them pressed the number four (4) button of the elevator;
and that at the time, petitioner was calling Pineda through his cellular phone, but,
there was no signal.[21]
Petitioner also related that P/Insp. Golod suddenly held petitioner's hand
which was holding the cellular phone, and PO2 Jovenir punched him in the stomach
and was told to peacefully go with them so that he would not be hurt; that they did
not introduce themselves to him; that the elevator opened on the fourth floor, and
the person who pressed the number four (4) button went out and the elevator went
down; that when the elevator reached the ground floor, P/Insp. Golod pulled him
towards the lobby, while PO2 Jovenir remained by the door of the elevator; that there
was another man who held him and he was pulled out of the Cityland Condominium;
that he was brought to a parked white car, handcuffed at his back, and made to board
the backseat of the said white car with his face down, and thereafter the car left; that
he did not know what kind of car it was because he was ordered to bow down and
not to look out, and they were always holding his head; that he was with P/Insp.
Golod and the other policemen inside the white car; that he was brought to Sinta
Motel; that he was brought inside a room, and frisked, and the police officers took
from him his watch, his wallet and the money inside his wallet, the car key, and the
parking ticket; that he was asked if he knew Pineda and Coderes to which he
assented; that when he was asked who was the owner of the car key, he said that the
car did not belong to him as it was just being offered for sale; that in going to the
Cityland Condominium, he used the car; that when he was brought out of the
Cityland Condominium, the car was left at the parking area of the Cityland
Condominium; that, as a car sales agent, he made sure that the OR, CR, and plate
number of the car were complete; that the car had a rear plate number; that P/Insp.
Golod demanded that petitioner pay P200,000.00 in exchange for his release; that he
stayed at the Sinta Motel for five (5) hours before he was brought to the CID; that
he stayed at the CID for two (2) hours and he was made to sit on a chair; that after
two (2) hours he was brought inside a room of the same building where he stayed
until the following day; that on the following day, the accused were brought to Fort
Bonifacio for drug testing; and that they were brought back to the CID and, in the
afternoon, petitioner was brought to the Pasay City Jail. While inside the CID,
petitioner saw the car parked at the back of the Pasay City Hall.[22]
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC gave greater weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution,
and found the testimonies of the arresting officers more credible and worthy of
belief. Thus, in its decision dated July 8, 2004, the RTC convicted petitioner, Pineda,
and Coderes of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations,

this Court hereby renders judgment finding the three accused Rolando
Pineda y Robledo, Cynthia Coderes y Habla and Michael San Juan y Cruz all
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Php 500,000.00 each, plus costs.
The 978.7 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) involved
in this case is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to
be turned-over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its appropriate
disposition in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Law.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Aggrieved, the accused, through their respective counsels, appealed their

[24]
case.
The CA's Ruling
On December 21, 2006, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA
opined that the inconsistencies pointed out by the defense were unimportant matters
which do not delve into the material elements of the crime. The CA also relied on
the presumption that the aforementioned police officers regularly performed their
official functions. Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 8, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116 of Pasay City convicting accused-appellants
Rolando R. Pineda, Cynthia H. Coderes and Michael C. San Juan of violation of
Section 5, Rule II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
in Criminal Case No. 03-2804CFM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Undaunted, petitioner alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] which the

CA, however, denied in its Resolution[27] dated March 21, 2007.
Of the three accused, only petitioner sought recourse with this Court through
this Petition based on the following grounds:
1. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE DESPITE THE GLARING VIOLATIONS OF PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND R.A. 9165 MAKING SUCH
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF CONVICTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE ADMITTED CONFLICTING AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF ALL THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY PUTS THE CONVICTION IN DOUBT.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DESPITE THE LATTER'S CLEAR VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED
PROCEDURAL RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON DUE
PROCESS BY NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO PRESENT A
MATERIAL WITNESS.[28]
Petitioner avers that the police officers initially apprehended the accused for
a mere traffic violation; hence, there was no justifiable reason for them to search the
car in the absence of any search warrant and/or the fact that the accused were not
caught in flagrante delicto. The police officers also failed to appraise the accused of
their rights. Petitioner points out that the follow-up operation conducted in Unit 1225
was unlawful as the police officers were not armed with any search warrant, and
they simply relied on the alleged information given by Coderes. In view of the
numerous, conflicting, and material inconsistencies in the respective testimonies of
PO2 Jovenir, SPO2 Aure and P/Insp. Golod, petitioner submits that such would lend
credence to the unanimous claim of all the accused that they were arrested in
Cityland Condominium in Makati City and not on board the car parked in Pasay
City. Moreover, petitioner, invoking R.A. No. 9165, asseverates that the police
officers did not follow the procedure prescribed by law. He questions the identity of
the illegal drugs alleged to have been seized from the accused and those presented
before the RTC because instead of proceeding immediately to the Pasay City Police
Headquarters, the police officers went to the Cityland Condominium, making
planting of evidence highly probable.[29] The police officers also failed to make any
inventory of the alleged prohibited drugs in clear violation of the law.[30]
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), argues that only questions of law may be entertained
by this Court. The issue of whether petitioner was apprehended in the act of violating
R.A. No. 9165 is factual in nature. The OSG claims that petitioner was lawfully
caught in flagrante delicto, thus, any evidence seized from him may be used against
him. Citing the CA's ruling, the OSG avers that the police officers were clear,
positive, and categorical in their testimonies against the accused. Lastly, the OSG
invokes the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are
accorded not only respect, but also finality by this Court.[31]
Our Ruling
The instant Petition is impressed with merit.
It is the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case that the appeal throws
the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct,
cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[32] We find the Petition meritorious on the basis of such review.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 5, Article

II of R.A. No. 9165. Said provision of law reads, as follows:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. ― The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any such transactions.[33]
Petitioner was charged specifically with the transport of methylamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu. However, upon review of the facts of the case, no such
transport was proven to have taken place.
The RTC found that petitioner and accused were seen in a parked Toyota
Corolla car, which had no rear license plate, by a team from the Pasay City Police
Force. When the police approached the driver and asked for the vehicles papers,
none were presented, prompting the police to ask the vehicles occupants to
disembark for verification purposes. The driver, petitioner, did so, while the man on
the passenger side, Pineda, was seen attempting to hide a paper bag under his
seat. The paper bag dropped on the floor, partially revealing its contents, namely,
one of two plastic containers with a white crystalline substance inside. This
prompted the police to search petitioner as well, and they recovered two small plastic
sachets containing a white crystalline substance from him. An examination of the
substance by the Southern Police District Crime Laboratory revealed the contents to
be positive for shabu.
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that a conviction for transportation of

dangerous drugs cannot stand.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: to carry
or convey from one place to another.[34] The essential element of the charge is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. In the present case,
although petitioner and his co-accused were arrested inside a car, the car was not in
transit when they were accosted. From the facts found by the RTC, that car was
parked and stationary. The prosecution failed to show that any distance was travelled
by petitioner with the drugs in his possession. The conclusion that petitioner
transported the drugs merely because he was in a motor vehicle when he was
accosted with the drugs has no basis and is mere speculation. The rule is clear that
the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. All doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove
the element of transport of dangerous drugs, namely, that transportation had taken
place, or that the accused had moved the drugs some distance.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great
respect. But when there is a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings of the trial
court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of an accused, considering
that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The Court must be
satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court leading to an
accuseds conviction has satisfied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[35]
Having charged that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Pineda and Coderes,
it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that all the accused had come to an
agreement concerning the transport of shabu and had decided to execute the
agreement.[36]
In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v. People[37] is instructive:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not
presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together,
however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal
design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design
to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the
cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a
direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction.[38]
In this case, the prosecution, other than its bare assertions that petitioner and
accused conspired in transporting the shabu, failed to establish that there was indeed
a conscious criminal design existing between and among petitioner and accused to
commit the said offense. True, petitioner was in the drivers seat of the parked car on
that fateful day of December 15, 2003, but it could not be deduced that he was even
aware that Pineda had with him two plastic containers containing shabu, nor did he
accord any form of assistance to Pineda. According to PO2 Jovenir, these plastic
containers were placed inside a bag and Pineda tried to conceal these under his
seat.[39] These facts, standing alone, cannot give rise to a presumption of
conspiracy. Certainly, conspiracy must be proven through clear and convincing
evidence. Indeed, it is possible that petitioner was telling the truth when he said that
he merely met with accused in order to offer the car for sale, as that was his part-
time business.[40]
It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required
to establish the crime proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.[41] In
fine, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove and establish conspiracy.
Necessarily, petitioner should be held accountable only for his alleged respective
participation in the commission of the offense.[42]
However, we find that the prosecution also failed to adequately prove petitioners
participation in the offense charged with moral certainty.
Crucial are the following facts. SPO2 Aure allegedly found the two sachets in the
possession of petitioner.[43] However, it should be noted that SPO2 Aure did not
mark the sachets himself. Instead, he turned over these sachets to PO2 Jovenir.[44]
Thus, on Direct Examination, PO2 Jovenir testified:
PROSECUTOR PUTI:
Q - Contained in this bag are also two (2) small transparent plastic sachets with
granules and with markings RJ-4 and RJ-5 and the date. These two (2), why
is it that the same are included in that bag?
A - SPO2 Aure confiscated those two (2) small transparent plastic sachets from the
possession of [petitioner], sir.
Q - The driver?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How do you know that these are the two (2) plastic sachets that were
confiscated by SPO2 Aure from [petitioner]?
A - Sir, I also put markings RJ-4 and RJ-5 on those plastic sachets.
Q - Why do you say that these were the two (2) plastic sachets that were
confiscated by SPO2 Aure from the driver [petitioner]?
A - Because SPO2 Aure handed to me those plastic sachets and according to him,
he confiscated those two (2) plastic sachets in front of [petitioner], sir.
PROSECUTOR PUTI:
Q - When was the handing made?
A - Right at the scene, sir.[45]
The answers elicited from PO2 Jovenir raise numerous questions and
ultimately cast doubts on the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the two
sachets containing illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner. The prosecution, in
its quest to establish its claim that these two sachets were actually recovered from
petitioner, even had to propound similar questions to PO2 Jovenir twice only to
reveal that the latter merely relied on SPO2 Aures claim. PO2 Jovenir did not
actually witness that SPO2 Aure seized these two sachets from petitioner. Neither
was it established that the two sachets were actually marked in the presence of
petitioner by SPO2 Aure himself.
Apropos is our ruling in People v. Coreche:[46]
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that
failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable
doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties,the doctrinal fallback of every
drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v. Casimiro, we held
that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the
accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on
reasonable doubt. These rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v.
Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen
occasioned by the prosecution's failure to prove that the evidence submitted for
chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant
acquittal on reasonable doubt.[47]
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Decision dated December 21,

2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00180,
and ACQUITS petitioner Michael San Juan y Cruz on reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another
lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 29-48.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo, concurring; id. at 51-68.
[3]
Id. at 74-90.
[4]
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
[5]
AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Also known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." Approved on June 7, 2002.
[6]
Records, p. 2.
[7]
Id. at 39.
[8]
Id. at 44.
[9]
TSN, March 3, 2004, pp. 7-11.
[10]
Id.
[11]
TSN, March 11, 2004, pp. 9-14.
[12]
TSN, March 3, 2004, pp. 16-17.
[13]
TSN, March 11, 2004, p. 37.
[14]
TSN, March 3, 2004, p. 17.
[15]
TSN, March 11, 2004, pp. 15-21.
[16]
Id. at 21-30.
[17]
Records, p. 12.
[18]
TSN, March 11, 2004, pp. 59-65.
[19]
TSN, April 14, 2004, pp. 11-43. Please also see TSN, May 6, 2004, pp. 3-22.
[20]
TSN, May 6, 2004, p. 19.
[21]
TSN, June 22, 2004, pp. 7-11.
[22]
Id. at 11-63.
[23]
Supra note 3, at 89-90.
[24]
Records, pp. 237-238, 241-242.
[25]
Supra note 2, at 67.
[26]
CA rollo, pp. 247-266.
[27]
Id. at 273-274.
[28]
Rollo, p. 35.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Reply; id. at 911-916.
[31]
Comment; id. at 899-907.
[32]
People v. Balagat, G.R. No. 177163, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 640, 644-645.
[33]
Emphasis supplied.
[34]
People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 471, 485.
[35]
Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 597, 604.
[36]
People v. Lago, 411 Phil. 52, 59 (2001).
[37]
Supra note 35.
[38]
Id. at 606. (Citations omitted.)
[39]
Supra note 12.
[40]
TSN, June 2, 2004, pp. 4, 9.
[41]
People v. De Chavez, G.R. No. 188105, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 464, 476-477.
[42]
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 420 Phil. 25, 36 (2001).
[43]
TSN, March 11, 2004, p. 15.
[44]
Id.
[45]
TSN, March 9, 2004, pp. 6-7. (Emphasis supplied.)
[46]
G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350.
[47]
Id. at 357-358. (Citations omitted.)
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PHILIPPINE DRUG G.R. No. 196390

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), Present:
Petitioner,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ActingChairperson,
BERSAMIN,
-versus- DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,*and
MENDOZA,**JJ.
RICHARD BRODETT AND Promulgated:

JORGE JOSEPH,
Respondents. September 28, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are
the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is
not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects
pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of
Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 9165[1]in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the
accusatory portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60)
pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-
sealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.[2]
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging only Brodett with a violation
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the
information alleging:
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules
containing white powdery substance contained in one self-sealing
transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHYLENE DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA),
commonly known as Ecstasy, a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery

substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence
of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery

substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper, with total recorded net
weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination
yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves

with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams, which when subjected
to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.[3]
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed
a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects
from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and
that PDEArefused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their
return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned
to himupon verification.[4]
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and
Objection,[5]proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal
effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would
be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary
value. The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous
drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or

custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord,
before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return
should be fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this
Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for
safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied
on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated November 4, 2009
is upheld.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by
petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,[8]dismissing the petition
for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard
Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S.
Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the
dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord
may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioners submission that the subject car, being an
instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain
in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there
is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial
construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here.
More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, PDEA appeals.

Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with
applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.[10]It
contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car,
registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from
accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released
from the custody of the law;that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not
intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car
had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso
facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC
that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,[11]Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any

question of law that warranted a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No.
9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds
or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done
by PDEA, unless such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not
liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third
person must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the commission
of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition
for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the
release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction
over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of
(a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other
effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the
ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification
for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property
or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.[12]As justification for
thesecond, to return to the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way
or another,is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of
the law for possessing the contraband again.[13]Indeed, the court having jurisdiction
over the offense has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the
crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused,
unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was
used as the instrument to commit.[14]
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict
are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government.[15] But it is required that
the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be
said to be within its jurisdiction.[16]
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with
a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal
property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that
which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
orthat which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.[17] If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of
dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in
the commission of an offense.[18] Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in
which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from
whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter
of course,[19]except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the
return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably
delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.[20]The order for the disposition of such
property can be made only when the case is finally terminated.[21]
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of
disposing of property claimed as evidence,[22] and this discretion extends even to the
manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was wrongfully
taken from him.[23]In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held
as evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized
by the Government.[24] Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal
proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture
or other proceedings.[25]
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett,
who was not charged either in connection with the illegal possession and sale of
illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal
proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and
forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to all the proceeds and properties
derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular
unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a third person not
liable for the unlawful act. Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of
confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who
is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition
is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said
Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject
cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to
the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the same according to its
clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the
first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express
terms, interpretation being called only when such literal application is impossible.
No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision
of law peremptorily calls for application.
More so that the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.[26] (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds derived from
illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals,is
Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the

Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal
Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Every
penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture
of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful
act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless
they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those
which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay
pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case
filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and
forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the
accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the
same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:
Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be
auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or
income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be
disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and no
bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or

forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the
proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs.
The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used
in its campaign against illegal drugs.[27]
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section
20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of

theCrime. Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it
the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which
it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in

favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable
for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall
be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People
v. Jose,[28]concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four
accused when they committed theforcible abduction with rape, although the car did
not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture
of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such be the property
of a third person not liable for the offense, it is the sense of this Court that the order
of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and
that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as
decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case.
xxx[29]
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture
of the tools and instruments belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an
indictment charging such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice.
Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to
the third person, for a mere suspicion of that persons participation is not sufficient
ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.[30]
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and

Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC[31]that the delivery to the RTC
of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration
of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their
possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the
return of the car because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the
sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with
applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165,[32]and
contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law because it
had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It
argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that
the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release,
because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge
of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a property
in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodettsMotion To Return Non-Drug

Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were still going on,
and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that pointof
the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section
20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property,
or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be
admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised

Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be
prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be
made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is
also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas
being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure
its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the
trial court and the parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that photographs
were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not
fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTCs assailed
orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or
reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC
promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal
Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return
to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine
money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain
of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the
glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The
presumption of regularity should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the
accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y
SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non-drug evidence
except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine
money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated in favor of the
government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper
disposition. (emphasis supplied)[33]
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for
review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the
opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not
liable for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.[34]This the Court must now do in view of the
question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible
of repetition in the future.[35]
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with
the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles,
whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of
the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision

to all trial courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had beenreached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
**
Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special order No. 1093 dated September 21, 2011.
[1]
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
[2]
Rollo, p. 51.
[3]
Id., pp. 54-55.
[4]
Id., pp. 58-61.
[5]
Id., pp. 63-64.
[6]
Id., p. 107.
[7]
Id., p. 110.
[8]
Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and
Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
[9]
Id., pp. 44-46.
[10]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[11]
Id., pp. 158-177.
[12]
24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733.
[13]
Villaruz v. Court of First Instance,71 Phil. 72 (1940).
[14]
United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
[15]
United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).
[16]
United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).
[17]
Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
[18]
[19]
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 704, 711.
[20]
24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733, c., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
[21]
Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351
[22]
24 CJS, Criminal Law, 1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66 N.W. 2d 830, 159 Neb. 314.
[23]
Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24 Misc. 2d 949.
[24]
Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d 1060.
[25]
Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A.
Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[27]
Emphasis supplied.
[28]
No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.
[29]
Id., p. 482.
[30]
I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638-639.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[32]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[33]
Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209.
[34]
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438, 463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R.
No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.
[35]
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215;Albaa v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002,
383 SCRA 577;Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186131

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
- versus -
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
December 14, 2011

BENJAMIN AMANSEC y DONA,
Accused-Appellant.
x----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the April 15, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02557, which affirmed the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) August 30, 2006
Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187,[3] wherein accused-appellant
Benjamin Amansec y Dona (Amansec) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
On June 18, 2003, Amansec was charged before the Quezon City RTC, Branch
95 of violation of Sections 11 and 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The pertinent portions of the
Informations[4] are as follows:
Crim. Case No. Q-03-118186
The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA of violation of Section
11, Art. II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control zero point zero
nine (0.09) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine
Hydroc[h]loride otherwise known as SHABU a dangerous drug.[5]
Crim. Case No. Q-03-118187

The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA a.k.a. Benjie for
violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero nine (0.09)
gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydroc[h]loride
otherwise known as SHABU a dangerous drug.[6]
Amansec pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment[7] on

August 7, 2003. After the termination of the pre-trial conference[8] held on October
2, 2003, trial on the merits followed.
The prosecutions first witness was Engineer Bernardino M. Banac, Jr., a
forensic chemist from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory. However, upon agreement by the prosecution and the defense, his
testimony was dispensed with, and in lieu thereof, the following stipulations and
admissions were made by the parties:
1. That on June 16, 2003, a request for laboratory examination was prepared and
sent by La Loma Police Station 1 to the Central Police District Crime
Laboratory together with the specimens which were received by the said office
on June 16, 2003, as shown in the stamp marked received attached to the said
request for laboratory examination;
2. That upon receipt of the said request, a qualitative examination was conducted
by the Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office, examined by Engr.
Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. and that the specimens were found to be positive to
the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug which
findings conducted contained in Chemistry Report No. D-472-03 dated June
16, 2003;
3. That attached to said Chemistry Report is a small brown envelope which when
opened by the Court Interpreter yielded three heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance with markings : A (JR-BA)=
0.09 gram; B (RP-BA)= 0.09 gram; C (RV-JM)= 0.09 gram; [and]
4. That the forensic chemical officer has no personal knowledge leading to the
arrest of the accused as well as the source of specimens.[9]
On July 15, 2004, the RTC granted the prosecutions motion[10] to try the two
cases jointly.
The prosecutions version, which was primarily lifted from the testimonies of
two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, is summarized below:
Police Officer (PO) 1 Alfredo Mabutol, Jr. and PO2 Ronald Pascua, members
of the PNP assigned at Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the La Loma Police
Station, testified that on June 15, 2003, at around 11:00 p.m., while they, along
with PO1 Roderick Valencia and their Officer-in Charge (OIC), Police Inspector
Oliver Villanueva were on duty, an informant, whose identity remained
confidential, arrived at the station to talk to Villanueva. After talking to the
informant, Villanueva formed a team for a buy-bust operation against Amansec, at
Santos St., Barangay Damayan, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. The team
consisted of Mabutol as the poseur-buyer and Pascua and Valencia as his back-up
members. Villanueva then gave Mabutol a one hundred peso (₱100.00) bill to be
used as his buy-bust money. Mabutol marked this with his initials JR on the lower
left side portion and listed its serial number in his dispatch book. The team, with
their informant, then proceeded to the target area using a white marked vehicle
with red plate. As soon as they reached the place, Mabutol and the informant
moved ahead to the house of Amansec at Santos St., corner Caragay St., while the
rest of the team positioned themselves at a strategic location, keeping Amansec
within viewing distance. The informant then introduced Mabutol to Amansec as a
drug addict, in dire need of drugs. Mabutol had just told Amansec that he was going
to purchase one hundred pesos worth of shabu when another buyer, later
identified as Jerome Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy shabu. Amansec then
showed both Pintis and Mabutol three plastic sachets containing crystalline
substance. Pintis gave a one hundred peso bill to Amansec who in return, let him
pick one of the three plastic sachets. After Pintis left, Amansec continued his
transaction with Mabutol, and gave Mabutol another of the remaining two plastic
sachets after receiving the buy-bust money. Mabutol thereafter examined the
plastic sachet he obtained from Amansec, and suspecting it to be shabu, scratched
the right side of his head with his right hand to signal his team to approach the
target. Valencia immediately arrested Pintis and recovered from the latter one
plastic sachet, while Pascua went after Amansec, who, upon seeing Pintis arrest,
tried to run away. Pascua thereafter frisked Amansec and retrieved the buy-bust
money that Mabutol had given Amansec, and another plastic sachet. The team
then brought Pintis and Amansec to the Station Investigator. The team also marked
with their initials the plastic sachets that they had recovered and turned them over
to their Investigator. They later brought the plastic sachets to the Crime Laboratory
to have their contents examined for the presence of shabu.[11]
The examination made by Engr. Banac on June 16, 2003, yielded the
following results, as stated in his Chemistry Report No. D-472-03[12]:
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1200H 16 JUNE 2003
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: OIC, SDEU
PS-1 CPD
Laloma QC
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
having the following markings and recorded net weights:
A(JR-BA) = 0.09 gram C(RV-JM) = 0.09 gram
B(RP-BA) = 0.09 gram
xxxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of dangerous drugs. xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE results

to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A, B, and C contain Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x

x.
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1400H 16 JUNE 2003
This report, along with the three plastic sachets with white crystalline
substance, and the ₱100.00 bill[13] recovered from Amansec, were presented in
court, and, except for the plastic sachets, were submitted to the court as evidence.
The defense presented Amansec who vehemently denied, on the witness

stand, the charges against him. He testified that on June 15, 2003, he was in his
residence when two police officers, whom he later came to know as Mabutol and
a certain PO1 Lozada, entered his room and thoroughly searched it. He was then
brought to the precinct where he was instructed to call somebody who could help
him settle his case. As he knew no one who could help him, Mabutol asked him to
give a name of a big-time drug seller/pusher who could take his place, or pamalit-
ulo.[14] Since Amansec did not know any big-time drug pusher, reasoning that he
had been in his residence for only six months then, the police officers proceeded
with the case and he was brought to the Inquest Prosecutor.Amansec averred that
he did not file a case against the police officers because he did not know how to go
about it.[15] On cross-examination, he said that he was denying the allegations as
the police officers had no proof [of] what they [were] saying.[16] Amansec also
stated that the first time he saw Mabutol and Pascua was when he was arrested,
and he did not know of any grudge or ill motive that they might have against him.[17]
On August 30, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y
DONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187 for
violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drugs) and he is
hereby sentenced him (sic) to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos.
However, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118186 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY
because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The pieces of evidence [that is the] subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government and to be disposed of as provided by law.[18]
In convicting Amansec of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.

9165, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish and satisfy the
elements in the sale of illegal drugs. The RTC averred that Amansec failed to prove
any ill motive on the part of the police officers whom he admitted to have met only
after his arrest. Moreover, the RTC found the testimonies of Mabutol and Pascua
to be consistent, clear, direct, positive, and corroborative of the material and
significant aspects of what actually transpired.[19]
However, the RTC acquitted Amansec of the illegal possession of dangerous

drugs charge, ratiocinating in this wise:
Anent the second offense, the public prosecutor was able to prove that indeed the
accused was caught in possession of illegal drugs known as shabu after the
entrapment. After the arrest of the accused for selling illegal drugs, PO2 Ronald Pascua
was able to recover another plastic sachet containing shabu from the accused. However,
the Court is convinced that the second plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhibit E-2) was
intended by the accused to be sold to the buyer at the time of the buy-bust operation. In
People vs. Hindoy [357 SCRA 692], possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof,
except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case at bar, it is clear from the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the second plastic sachet of shabu was
shown and offered by the accused during the transaction in the buy-bust operation.[20]
On September 11, 2006, Amansec filed his Notice of Appeal with the RTC. In
his Brief, [21] Amansec cited irregularities, which allegedly create a reasonable doubt
that a buy-bust operation was conducted. He also questioned the admissibility of
the evidence against him.
However, the Court of Appeals was not convinced by Amansecs

arguments. The Court of Appeals found the prosecutions evidence to be sufficient
to uphold the conviction of Amansec.[22] The Court of Appeals held that [n]on-
compliance by the apprehending officer with Section 21 of [Republic Act] No. 9165
is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items, are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[23]
On April 15, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, with the
following fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 30,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case No. Q-
03-118187 convicting accused-appellant BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA for violation of
Section 5, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php500,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED.[24]
Aggrieved, Amansec appealed[25] the above ruling to this Court, assigning the
same errors he assigned before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE ITS APPARENT UNREALITY AS
TO HOW THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

SELLING ILLEGAL DRUGS DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM
FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SPECIMENS.[26]
The Ruling of this Court
Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine

hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
which provides:

Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or

transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as

runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual,

or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical
involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed
upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the
illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this
Section.
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

and conduct of the buy-bust operation
Amansec argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as they failed to pass the test in
determining the value of a witnesss testimony that such must be in conformity with
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.[27]
Amasec claims that the charges against him were merely planted and
enumerates the following as evidence, which supposedly creates reasonable doubt
as to the allegation of the prosecution that a buy-bust operation was conducted[28]:
1. Only Amansec was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, and not
Pintis, whom the police officers alleged to have bought shabu from him,
while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.
2. The prosecution failed to produce and present in court the ₱100.00 bill
Pintis allegedly used to buy shabu from Amansec.
3. The informant was not presented in court, and no explanation was given
by the prosecution for their failure to do so.
4. There was no surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation conducted by

the police officers.
5. The buy-bust money used by Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet
powder.
Amansecs arguments are untenable. As we have held before, [i]t is for the
party to plan its own strategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what
evidence to submit to support its own cause.[29]
Non-inclusion of Pintis in this case and

Non-presentation of Pintis ₱100.00 bill
Recovered from Amansec
It is not within the province of this Court to speculate or make presumptions as to
what happened to Pintis after he was arrested. Suffice it to say that he was
apprehended for not only a different, but also, a separate illegal act. He was
caught in flagrante delicto of purchasing shabu from Amansec, and when he was
caught, a plastic sachet, similar to the ones sold to Mabutol and recovered from
Amansec, was found in his possession. Since this had nothing to do with Amansecs
own acts, this Court sees no reason why they should have been tried jointly.
Anent the ₱100.00 bill Pintis used to buy shabu from Amansec, this Court also sees
no need for its presentation before the RTC because Amansec was charged with
violation of Section 5, or the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, for selling shabu to
Mabutol, and not to Pintis. Thus, even if Pintis ₱100.00 peso bill were presented in
court, it would serve very little purpose for the prosecution, and even for the RTC,
as, to reiterate, Amansec was on trial for his act of selling dangerous drugs to
Mabutol, who was then a poseur-buyer, and not to Pintis, who just happened to
buy from him while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.
Non-Presentation of Informant
This point need not be belabored as this Court, has time and again, held that the
presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative.[30] If Amansec felt that the
prosecution did not present the informant because he would testify against it, then
Amansec himself should have called him to the stand to testify for the
defense.[31] The informants testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug
has been adequately proven by the prosecution.[32] In People v. Ho Chua,[33] we
said:
The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug

cases. In People v. Nicolas, the Court ruled that [p]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove
the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers
since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Moreover,
drug dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants. It is understandable why,
as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the
informant would be merely corroborative.[34]
No prior surveillance conducted
This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by
this Court. We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not
required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is
accompanied to the target area by their informant.[35] In People v. Eugenio,[36] we
held:
There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-

bust operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are
accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no
fixed or textbook method for conducting one. We have held that when time is of [the]
essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[37]
Buy-bust money was not

dusted with ultraviolet powder
The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust
money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials
to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this
Court.[38] In People v. Rivera,[39] we declared:
It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the
money to be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with
fluorescent powder did not render the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of
initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this
Court in numerous cases.[40]
Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence
Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence
against him was obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in Republic Act No.
9165. He claims that Section 21 of the aforesaid act was violated when the police
officers who arrested him did not take his picture with the shabu they confiscated
from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in his presence,
or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or
any elected public official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence
prevails over the presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a
regular manner.[41]
He also avers that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the
evidence obtained from him as the station investigator, to whom the specimens
were turned over, was not presented in court. Moreover, Amansec claims, there
was no evidence to show that the forensic chemist examined the same articles
allegedly confiscated from him. Amansec says that the stipulations made as regards
the testimony of the forensic chemist mentioned nothing about the chemists actual
receipt of the specimens from the Investigator or from any other person. Amansec
argues that the prosecutions failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is
fatal and leads to the unavoidable suspicion on its integrity.[42]
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which

shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within
twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when
the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two
(72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which
shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as
determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate
purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and
recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of
destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative
sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having
jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept
to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be

allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence
shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused
refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused
or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a
member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;
(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the
representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall
inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the
court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper
disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same;
and
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the

effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in
possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or
destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of
Health (DOH) and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the
organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of
seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be
implemented by the DOH.
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
(b) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,

plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted
to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(c) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be

done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four
(24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, that a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(d) After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, and through the PDEA shall, within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter,
proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society
groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the
manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the
offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board,
shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, that a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(e) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction
or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the
custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In
cases of seizures where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA
may order the immediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all
instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as
determined by the Board;
(f) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to
personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute
an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a
representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within
seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in
question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorneys office to
represent the former;
(g) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the
representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall
inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court
for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition
and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and
(h) Transitory Provision:
h.1) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous
drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall,
with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the
court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel; and
h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning
or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall
be implemented by the DOH.
In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence
rooms, as well as the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the
existing National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP)
forensic laboratories shall continue to examine or conduct screening and confirmatory
test on the seized/surrendered evidence whether these be dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments,
paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall continue to
have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or destroyed
in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation
of the full complement of the representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public
official, the inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting
NBI and PNP operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in
writing by the DOH or PDEA, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and

unbroken. However a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.[43] Thus, even though
the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph
of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will
not render Amansecs arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in
evidence.[44] This Court has consistently held that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.[45]
The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized had been preserved. Both the prosecution witnesses
were categorical and consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets
containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis. These were later recovered from
Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself. As soon as the police officers, together with
Amansec and Pintis, reached the La Loma Police Station, the seized sachets were
marked with the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet
he personally retrieved from the suspects. This was done before the specimens
were turned over to the station investigator for the preparation of the request for
laboratory examination. Thereafter, the specimens were forwarded to the crime
lab by the police officers themselves.[46] The Chemistry Report prepared by the
forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the police
officers, and which were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as
the plastic sachets they marked with their initials.
Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been
preserved will remain unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tampering of the evidence. Amansec bears the burden of showing the foregoing to
overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with
regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties.[47] This, Amansec failed
to do.
Furthermore, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing

rules, which requires each and everyone who came into contact with the seized
drugs to testify in court. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was
clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness
stand.[48] This Court, in People v. Hernandez,[49] citing People v. Zeng Hua
Dian,[50] ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the chain of
custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of other
persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty,
is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to
how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as
witnesses.[51]
It is worthy to note, and we agree with the Court of Appeals observation,

that Amansec questioned the chain of custody of the evidence only when he
appealed his conviction. Not once did he raise this defense or mention these
procedural gaps before the trial court. Thus, whatever justifiable ground the
prosecution has will remain a mystery in light of Amansecs failure to raise this issue
before the trial court, viz:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever

justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in
this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police
officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised
before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance
did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.[52]
Amansecs theory, from the very beginning, were that he did not do it, and
that he was being framed for his failure to give the police officers either money or
some big-time pusher to take his place. In other words, his defense tactic was one
of denial and frame-up.However, those defenses have always been frowned upon
by the Court, to wit:
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy
in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases
before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside
from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his
allegations.[53]
Equally important is the fact that Amansec has not ascribed any improper motive
on the part of the police officers as to why they would hand-pick him, and falsely
incriminate him in such a serious crime. No evidence has been offered to show that
Mabutol and Pascua, were motivated by reasons other than their duty to curb the
sale of prohibited drugs.[54] Amansec himself admitted that he only came to know
his arresting officers after his arrest. He also testified that he knew of no grudge
that they might have against him. Hence, until Amansec can show clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the entrapment operation team were
stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit. [55]
Elements of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs established
The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on

the satisfaction of the following elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [56]
To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that [i]n
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence.[57]
It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the
said elements.[58]
Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the

person who sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. He had been caught red-handed in the entrapment operation
conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police. Such positive identification must
prevail over Amansecs uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and
unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.[59]
The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and
conclusiveness. Amansec gave one of the two remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol
after receiving the ₱100.00 buy-bust money.[60] In People v. Legaspi,[61] we said:
The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction between the
entrapping officers and Legaspi.
This Court therefore finds no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals in convicting Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 15,
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-14; penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Sesinando E.Villon, concurring.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 71-78; penned by Judge Henri Jean-Paul B. Inting.
[3]
This case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. Q-03-118186. However, this was no longer appealed by
Benjamin Amansec as he was acquitted therein by the RTC.
[4]
Records, pp. 2-3, 3-4.
[5]
Id. at 2.
[6]
Id. at 4.
[7]
Id. at 20.
[8]
Id. at 24-25.
[9]
Id. at 34-35.
[10]
TSN, July 15, 2004, p. 2.
[11]
Id. at 3-15; TSN, August 12, 2005, pp. 4-16.
[12]
Folder of Evidence for the Prosecution; records, p. 114.
[13]
Id. at 117.
[14]
TSN, July 5, 2005, p. 12.
[15]
Id. at 5-14.
[16]
TSN, September 27, 2005, p. 2.
[17]
Id. at 2-3.
[18]
CA rollo, p. 78.
[19]
Id. at 76-78.
[20]
Id. at 77.
[21]
Id. at 51-70.
[22]
Rollo, p. 9.
[23]
Id. at 10.
[24]
Id. at 13.
[25]
[26]
Id. at 53-54.
[27]
Id. at 58.
[28]
Id. at 63.
[29]
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 98123, October 1, 1993, 227 SCRA 35, 40.
[30]
People v. Khor, 366 Phil. 762, 792 (1999).
[31]
People v. Rivera, supra note 29 at 40.
[32]
People v. Cercado, 434 Phil. 492, 500 (2002).
[33]
364 Phil. 497 (1999)
[34]
Id. at 513-514.
[35]
People v. Lacbanes, 336 Phil. 933, 941 (1997).
[36]
443 Phil. 411 (2003).
[37]
Id. at 422-423.
[38]
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 135 (2000).
[39]
Supra note 29.
[40]
Id. at 40.
[41]
[42]
Id. at 67-68.
[43]
Asiatico v. People, G.R No. 195005, September 12, 2011.
[44]
People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436.
[45]
People v. Campomanes, G.R. No. 187741, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 494, 507.
[46]
TSN, July 15, 2004, p. 13.
[47]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 647.
[48]
Id.
[49]
Id.
[50]
G.R. No. 145348, June 14, 2004, 432 SCRA 25.
[51]
People v. Hernandez, supra note 47 at 647-648.
[52]
People v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.
[53]
People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.
[54]
People v. Lee, 407 Phil. 250, 260 (2001).
[55]
People v. Valencia, 439 Phil. 561, 568 (2002).
[56]
People v. Tiu, 469 Phil. 163, 173 (2004).
[57]
People v. Lazaro, Jr., supra note 53 at 264.
[58]
Id.
[59]
People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 173485, November 23, 2011.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,

- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
DEL CASTILLO,* JJ.
SPO3 SANGKI ARA y MIRASOL,
MIKE TALIB y MAMA, and JORDAN
Promulgated:
MUSA y BAYAN,
December 23, 2009
Accused-Appellants.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara
y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan, which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accused-
appellants of violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
Three Informations charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan
Musa, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized
by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, which is a dangerous drug, with the
aggravating circumstance of trading, transporting and delivering said 26.6563 grams of
shabu within 100 meters from [the] school St. Peters College of Toril, Davao City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized
by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control one (1)
plastic sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, weighing 0.3559 gram,
which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa
That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, without being
authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control
five (5) big plastic sachet[s] of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu weighing
14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a not guilty plea.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Forensic Chemist
Noemi Austero, PO2 Ronald Lao, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr.,
SPO4 Rodrigo Mallorca, and PO2 Jacy Jay Francia.
In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI) came to the
Heinous Crime Investigation Section (HCIS) of the Davao City Police Department
and reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had contacted him for a deal
involving six (6) plastic sachets of shabu. He was instructed to go that same
morning to St. Peters College at Toril, Davao City and look for an orange Nissan
Sentra car.[4]
Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-bust team
composed of SPO3 Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario Galendez, SPO3 Antonio
Balolong, SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1 Rizalino Aquino, SPO1
Bienvenido Furog, PO2 Vivencio Jumawan, Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique
Ayao, Jr., who would act as poseur-buyer.[5]
The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate.
At around 8:45 a.m., an orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR 510
stopped in front of them. The two men approached the vehicle and the CI talked
briefly with an old man in the front seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back
seat as accused-appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old man, later identified
as accused-appellant SPO3 Ara, asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and the latter
replied in the positive. Ara took out several sachets with crystalline granules from
his pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged
signal of opening the car door. The driver of the car, later identified as accused-
appellant Jordan Musa, tried to drive away but PO1 Ayao was able to switch off the
car engine in time. The back-up team appeared and SPO1 Furog held on to Musa
while PO2 Lao restrained Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to get out of the vehicle.[6]
Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six
(6) big sachets, weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets,
weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing
0.3559 gram, from Talib by PO2 Lao.[7]
The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items indorsed to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic
Chemist Austero, who conducted the examination, found that the confiscated
sachets all tested positive for shabu.[8]
The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had been a
member of the PNP for 32 years, with a spotless record. On December 20, 2002,
SPO3 Ara was in Cotabato City, at the house of his daughter Marilyn, wife of his co-
accused Musa. He was set to go that day to the Ombudsmans Davao City office for
some paperwork in preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He recounted
expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in retirement benefits.[9] Early that morning, past
three oclock, he and Musa headed for DavaoCity on board the latters car. As he
was feeling weak, Ara slept in the back seat.
Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike Talib,
in the front seat of the car when he woke up. Musa explained that Talib had hitched
a ride on a bridge they had passed.[10]
When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they
stopped. Ara did not know that they were near St. Peters College since he was not
familiar with the area. Talib alighted from the car and Ara transferred to the front
seat. While Talib was getting into the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere,
pointed his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered
him to get off the vehicle. He saw that guns were also pointed at his companions.
As the group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao that he was also a police
officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu taken
from him was planted. He asserted that the only time he saw shabu was on
television.[11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged. In its

Decision dated March 1, 2003, the trial court held that the prosecution was able to
establish the quantum of proof showing the guilt of accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. It further ruled that the intercept operation conducted by the
buy-bust team was valid.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing the Court finds the following:
In Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002, the accused herein SANGKI ARA Y MASOL, Filipino, 55
years old, widower, a resident of Kabuntalan, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, and is CONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, 1st
paragraph of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed the DEATH PENALTY and FINE of
TEN MILLION PESOS (PhP 10,000,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding
thereto, including absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, in view of
the provision of section 28 of RA 9165 quoted above.
Since the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in
the area which is only five (5) to six (6) meters away from the school, the provision of
section 5 paragraph 3 Article II of RA 9165 was applied in the imposition of the maximum
penalty against the herein accused.
In Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002, the accused herein MIKE TALIB y MAMA, Filipino, of
legal age, single and a resident of Parang, Cotabato, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, and is CONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 11, 3rd paragraph, Article II of
Republic Act 9165. He is hereby imposed a penalty of Imprisonment of SIXTEEN (16)
YEARS and a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 300,000) with all the
accessory penalties corresponding thereto.
In Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 the accused herein JORDAN MUSA Y BAYAN, Filipino,
30 years old, married and a resident of Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt and is CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Sec. 11, 1st paragraph,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and FINE of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 400,000) with all
the accessory penalties corresponding thereto.
SO ORDERED.[12]
As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went on automatic review
before this Court. Conformably with People v. Mateo,[13] we, however, ordered the
transfer of the case to the CA.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
Contesting the RTC Decision, accused-appellants filed separate appeals before the
CA. Talib claimed that it was erroneous for the trial court to have used the
complaining witnesses affidavits as basis for ruling that their arrest was valid. He
also cited as erroneous the trial courts refusal to rule that the prosecutions
evidence was inadmissible. Lastly, he questioned the failure of the buy-bust team
to follow the requirements of RA 9165 on proper inventory of seized drugs.
Ara and Musa filed a joint brief, alleging the following: (1) the trial court erred in
denying the Motion to Suppress and/or exclude illegally obtained evidence; (2) the
trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence; (3) the trial court failed to
consider that the criminal informations did not allege conspiracy among the
accused; and (4) the trial court erred in ruling that the intercept operation was
valid.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision with some modifications on the penalty
imposed. It ruled that a majority of the errors raised in the appeal referred to
technicalities in the conduct of buy-bust operations that did not invalidate the
police officers actions. On the issue of the evidence presented, the CA held that the
presumption that police officers performed their duties in a regular manner was
not overturned.
The appellate court resolved the issue of the validity of the buy-bust operation by
stating that the law requires no specific method of conducting such an operation.
It ruled that to require a warrant of arrest would not accomplish the goal of
apprehending drug pushers in flagrante delicto. The CAs Decision emphasized that
all the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs were
established.
The fallo of the December 13, 2007 CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
March 1, 2003 Decision is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification insofar as the
death penalty imposed upon accused SPO3 Sangki Ara is concerned. Accordingly, his
penalty is hereby reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On December 17, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental
briefs if they so desired. The parties, save for Musa, manifested their willingness to
forego the filing of additional briefs.
The Issues
Reiterating the matters raised before the CA, accused-appellants alleged the
following:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arrest of the accused-appellants
was valid based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses
II
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the apparent defects and
inconsistencies in the affidavits of the complaining witnesses
III
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the suppression or exclusion
of evidence
IV
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the prosecution miserably failed
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
Talib also raises the following grounds for his acquittal:
Whether the arrest of Talib was illegal and the evidence confiscated from him illegally
obtained
II
Whether the police officers who conducted the illegal search and arrest also deliberately
failed and/or violated the provisions of RA 9165
III
Whether the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses and their respective affidavits
were gravely inconsistent
Ara and Musa additionally raise the following issues:
I
Whether the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence
II
Whether the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did not allege
conspiracy among the accused
III
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the intercept operation was valid
Accused-appellant Musa also avers that the CA erred in convicting him since the
prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged.
What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1) whether the buy-bust conducted was
valid; (2) whether the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were
sufficiently established; and (3) whether the chain of custody over the shabu was
unbroken.
Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable
cause and the violation of their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust
team had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust
operation has long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a
form of entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in
the act of commission of an offense.[15] We have ruled that a buy-bust operation
can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such
operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such
operation.[16] It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a
warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation was to apprehend the
accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations covered by a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when
a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-
appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for
determining probable cause, for its determination varies according to the facts of
each case.[17] Probable cause was provided by information gathered from the CI and
from accused-appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their
vehicle and begin the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accused-
appellants vehicle was afterwards clearly established. Thus, as we have previously
held, the arresting officers were justified in making the arrests as accused-
appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao.[18] Talib
and Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they
were also part of Aras drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further
strengthened by Musas attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.
Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or Exclude
Evidence. We need not reiterate that the evidence was not excluded since the buy-
bust operation was shown to be a legitimate form of entrapment. The pieces of
evidence thus seized therein were admissible. As the appellate court noted, it was
within legal bounds and no anomaly was found in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation. There is, therefore, no basis for the assertion that the trial courts order
denying said motion was biased and committed with grave abuse of discretion.
Prosecution Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt

For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements
must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.[19] All these requisites were met by the prosecution.
In contrast, Ara, the sole defense witness, could only proffer the weak defenses of
denial and alibi. He expressed surprise at having Talib in his car and claimed he was
framed and that the shabu confiscated from him was planted. According to the trial
court, however, Aras lying on the witness stand was so intense as he tried very hard
in vain to win the Courts sympathy.[20]
Given the prosecutions evidence, we rule that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties has not been overturned. The presumption remains
because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
improper motive.[21] Ara could not explain why his fellow police officers, who did
not know him prior to his arrest, would frame him for such a serious offense.
Validity of Buy-Bust Operation
Likewise questioned by the defense in the affidavits of the police officers was
the allegation that there was a legitimate buy-bust operation. No marked money
was presented to back up the police officers claims. This argument lacks basis,
however. There are requirements that must be complied with in proving the
legitimacy of drug buy-bust operations. Nevertheless, this Court has ruled that
presentation of the marked money used is not such a requirement. In the
prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does
not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of
dangerous drugs is adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court.[22] In the instant case, the police officers testimonies
adequately established the illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then presented
before the trial court. The non-presentation of the marked money may, thus, be
overlooked as a peripheral matter.
Talib further contends that it is incredible that a shabu transaction would be
carried out in a very open and public place. Contrary to Talibs claim, however,
judicial experience has shown that drug transactions have been conducted without
much care for an inconspicuous location.
Thus, we observed in People v. Roldan:
Drug pushing when done on a small level x x x belongs to that class of crimes that
may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the
exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the
parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always
discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade these factors may even serve to
camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers
caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front of a store, along a street at 1:45 p.m.,
and in front of a house.[23]
It is also argued as impossible to believe that even if there was already a deal
between the informant and accused-appellants, it was the apprehending police
officer who acted as the buyer and that he requested to see the shabu first before
showing the money. These claims by Talib are similarly undeserving of
consideration. First, there is no uniform method by which drug pushers and their
buyers operate. Second, the choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is
within the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the expertise to
determine which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment
operations.[24] Third, as long as they enjoy credibility as witnesses, the police
officers account of how the buy-bust operation transpired is entitled to full faith
and credit. [25] Lastly, these arguments are merely incidental and do not affect the
elements of the crime which have been, in the instant case, sufficiently established.
Talib also alleges that during his testimony, SPO1 Furog was not certain as to the
reason he was apprehending Musa. Another claim is that SPO1 Furog, when
examined by the prosecutor and two different defense lawyers, allegedly made
relevant inconsistencies in his testimony. The pertinent exchange reads:
Direct Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Prosecutor Weis:
Q What was your basis for stopping [Musa] from letting the car go?
A I made him [stop] the car[.] [W]e [had] to check them first because I think Ayao saw
[that] Ara [had] the suspected shabu.
Cross-Examination of SPO1 Furog:
Atty. Estrada
Q When you arrested Musa as you said, it was because he attempted to drive the car
away, that was it?
A The most, when SPO3 Sangki Ara told us that he was a PNP member and when we saw
the substances from the two of them first.
xxxx
Q You are referring to Musa and Ara?

A Yes sir.[26]
xxxx
Atty. Javines
Q Ayao did not arrest [Ara] inside the vehicle?
A Only I rushed to the vehicle. I dont know if he directly arrested him when he saw the
substance and [got] out of the vehicle but I saw him get out from the vehicle.[27]
The alleged inconsistencies in SPO1 Furogs reason for apprehending Musa are,
however, insignificant and do not merit much consideration as well. The
questioned parts in the testimony of SPO1 Furog do not dent the totality of
evidence against accused-appellants. To repeat, the elements of the crime of illegal
sale of drugs and illegal possession of drugs were both sufficiently established.
Although SPO1 Furog was not categorical in explaining his basis for apprehending
Musa, the arrest of the latter must be considered as part of a legitimate buy-bust
operation which was consummated. Musas arrest came after the pre-arranged
signal was given to the back-up team and this served as basis for the police officers
to apprehend all those in the vehicle, including Musa.
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa, no reason was given in the
appeal as to why the trial court erred in denying their Demurrer to Evidence.
Whatever their basis may be, an action on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss
rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion.[28] In Gutib v. CA,[29] we explained
that:
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt.
Here, the trial court found competent and sufficient evidence to support a
conviction of all three accused-appellants. We see no reason to overturn the trial
courts finding.
Allegation of Conspiracy in Information Not Necessary
We find no merit in accused-appellants insistence that conspiracy should have been

alleged in the separate Informations indicting them. We agree with the appellate
court, which succinctly stated that conspiracy was not alleged precisely because
they were charged with different offenses for the distinct acts that each of them
committed. Ones possession of an illegal drug does not need to be conspired by
another who, on his part, also possessed an illegal drug.[30] The three separate
indictments against Ara, Musa, and Talib do not need to allege conspiracy, for the
act of conspiring and all the elements of the crime must be set forth in the
complaint or information only when conspiracy is charged as a crime.[31]
Requirements of RA 9165 on Proper Inventory
Musa contends that since the markings on the seized items were only made at the
police station, there is a great possibility that these were replaced. The result, he
argues, would be a lack of guarantee that what were inventoried and photographed
at the crime laboratory were the same specimens confiscated from the accused.
As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez[32] and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,[33] RA 9165
and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict
compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be
invalidated and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole
ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. We have emphasized
that what is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA

9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the
apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and
custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.[34]
The chain of custody in the instant case did not suffer from serious flaws as
accused-appellants argue. The recovery and handling of the seized drugs showed
that, as to Ara, first, PO1 Ayao recovered six plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance from Ara and marked them with both his and Aras initials. Second, the
sachets were likewise signed by property custodian PO3 Pelenio. Third, PO1 Ayao
signed a Request for Laboratory Examination then personally delivered the sachets
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Fourth, SPO4 Mallorca then received
the sachets at the crime laboratory.
As to Musa, first, SPO1 Furog seized the sachets from Musa and marked each with
his own initials. Second, an Inventory of Property Seized was then made by SPO4
Galendez. Lastly, SPO1 Furog later submitted a Request for Laboratory Examination
of the five (5) sachets weighing a total of 14.2936 grams to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
As to Talib, first, PO2 Lao seized a small sachet from Talib during the buy-bust
operation. Second, PO2 Lao delivered a Request for Laboratory Examination of one
(1) sachet of suspected shabu weighing 0.3559 gram. Third, SPO4 Mallorca also
received the items at the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Forensic Chemist Noemi Austeros examination of the sachets confiscated from all
accused-appellants showed that these were positive for shabu. During trial, the
seized items were identified in court. The five (5) sachets taken from Musa were
marked Exhibits A-1 to A-5, while the sachet seized from Talib was marked Exhibit
B. The six (6) sachets taken from Ara were marked Exhibits B1-B6.
We are, thus, satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the shabu in all three criminal cases against accused-
appellants.
The rest of the arguments interposed are evidently without merit and do not
warrant discussion.
Penalties Imposed
Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

The crime of illegal possession of drugs is punishable by Sec. 11 of RA 9165,
as follows:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. x x x
xxxx
3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5)
grams of x x x methamphetamine hydrochloride x x x.
Talib was sentenced to imprisonment of sixteen (16) years and a fine of PhP
300,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa

The provision Musa was charged of violating provides the following penalty:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty
(50) grams;
Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.
Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara
The crime of illegal sale of shabu is penalized by Sec. 5, Art. 11 of RA 9165:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The same section contains the following provision:
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation

of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires
within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed
in every case.
Since the sale of shabu was within five (5) to six (6) meters from St. Peters College,
the maximum penalty of death should be imposed on Ara. Pursuant to RA 9346 or
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, however, only
life imprisonment and a fine shall be meted on him.
Ara was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000,000. He, however,
is no longer eligible for parole.
What distinguishes this case from others is that one of the accused-appellants was
a police officer himself who should have known better than to break the law he
was duty-bound to enforce. What is more, he is charged with the crime of selling
illegal drugs, an offense so horrendous for destroying the lives of its victims and
their families that the penalty of death used to be imposed on its perpetrators. No
one could have been more deserving of such a punishment than someone who
should be enforcing the law but caught pushing drugs instead. As it was, the death
penalty was indeed originally imposed on SPO3 Ara, who had been in the service
for more than 30 years.
The ill effects of the use of illegal drugs are too repulsive and shocking to
enumerate. Thus, once the charges of sale and possession of said drugs are
established in cases such as this, any errors or technicalities raised by the suspects
should not be allowed to invalidate the actions of those involved in curtailing their
illegal activities. The punishments given to drug pushers should serve as deterrent
for others not to commit the same offense. No price seems high enough for drug
dealers to pay; it is just unfortunate that the penalty of death can no longer be
imposed because it has been abolished.
As the penalties meted out to all three accused-appellants are within the range
provided by RA 9165, we affirm the CAs sentence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B
entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama,
Jordan Musa y Bayan is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant
Sangki Ara is not eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Additional member per Special Order No. 805 dated December 4, 2009.
[1]
CA rollo, p. 34.
[2]
Id. at 34-35.
[3]
Id. at 35.
[4]
Rollo, p. 7.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id. at 8-9.
[7]
Id. at 9.
[8]
Id. at 9-10.
[9]
Id. at 11.
[10]
Id. at 12.
[11]
Id. at 13.
[12]
[13]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[14]
Rollo, p. 32. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
[15]
People v. Encila, G.R. No. 182419, February 10, 2009.
[16]
Quinicot v. People, G. R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009.
[17]
Epie, Jr. v. Ulat-Marredo, G.R. No. 148117, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 641, 647.
[18]
People v. Lopez, G.R No. 181441, November 14, 2008.
[19]
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, February 6, 2009.
[20]
CA rollo, p.43.
[21]
People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008.
[22]
Cruz v. People, supra note 19.
[23]
G.R. No. 98398, July 6, 1993, 224 SCRA 536, 548; citing People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, February 27,
1989, 170 SCRA 681 (other citations omitted).
[24]
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 187503, September 11, 2009.
[25]
Unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were impelled by
any improper motive, or were not properly performing their duties, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith
and credit. Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065, March 14, 2008.
[26]
TSN, February 5, 2003, p. 18.
[27]
Id. at 28.
[28]
Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008.
[29]
G.R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365.
[30]
Rollo, p. 30.
[31]
Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009.
[32]
G.R. No. 183819, July 23, 2009.
[33]
G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009.
[34]
People v. Daria, G.R. No. 186138, September 11, 2009.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Appellee,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and
SITTI DOMADO, 
ABAD, JJ.
Appellant.
Promulgated:
June 16, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the February 28, 2006 decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00432. The CA affirmed the July 28,
2004 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, finding
appellant Sitti Domado y Sarangani (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), imposing on her the penalty of life imprisonment.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant and Jehan Sarangani y Calaw (Jehan) before
the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information
that states:
That on or about the 31st day of December 2003, in the Municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly deliver or transport twelve
(12) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), more or less, without any lawful
authority or permission to deliver or transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The appellant and Jehan pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] The prosecution
presented Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo L. Lizardo (PSI Lizardo) and Police
Inspector Valeriano P. Laya II (PI Laya) at the trial. The appellant and Jehan took the
witness stand for the defense.
PSI Lizardo testified that at around 2:30 p.m. of December 31, 2003, a group
from the Second Ranger Company based in Tagudin, Ilocos Sur came to his office
at Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, and referred to Augustus DVince
Castro (Augustus) for the filing of a case; Augustus was arrested earlier that day at
a checkpoint in Tagudin for violation of R.A. No. 9165.[5]
In the course of the investigation that followed, Augustus disclosed that he

could order shabu from his source in Dagupan City. PSI Lizardo responded by asking
him to contact his source. Augustus obliged and contacted his source by cell
phone. He reported to PSI Lizardo that his source agreed to meet him at Damortis,
Sto. Tomas, La Union, for the delivery of shabu. On the basis of this information,
PSI Lizardo conducted a briefing and ordered his officers to undertake an
entrapment operation.[6]
The entrapment team went to Damortis in two vehicles. PSI Lizardo and
Augustus were on board a Besta van, while the back-up team (composed of the
Second Ranger Company members) used a Toyota Revo. The team reached
Damortis at 7:30 p.m. of December 31, 2003. PSI Lizardo and Augustus parked the
van at a Petron station, while the back-up vehicle strategically parked
nearby.[7] Augustus received word by cell phone from his source that they were
already at Damortis. Augustus relayed this information to PSI Lizardo and that three
(3) persons would deliver the shabu. At a little past 8:00 p.m., three women
alighted from a mini-bus, and went to the parked van. Augustus waived at the three
women and bidded them to board the van, which they did; the appellant sat in
front, while Jehan and Violeta Fernandez (Violeta) occupied the row immediately
behind.[8]
Augustus asked the women if they brought the shabu he had ordered.[9] The
appellant (who was seated in front beside Augustus) ordered one of the two
women seated behind them to show the items. One of the women (later identified
as Jehan) responded by showing and handing over an envelope containing three
plastic sachets to Augustus.[10] Augustus, in turn, gave these items to PSI Lizardo
who was seated at the vans third row and who locked the vans door after
confirming that the plastic sachets contained shabu.[11]PSI Lizardo then announced
that he was a PDEA agent and that he was placing them under arrest for delivery
of dangerous drugs, and apprised them of their constitutional rights. PSI Lizardo
then directed their return, together with the back-up team, to Camp Diego
Silang.[12] They arrived at the camp approximately 9:00 p.m.[13]
At the police station, PSI Lizardo conducted an investigation and prepared an
affidavit of arrest (Exhibit C),[14] marked each plastic sachet with his initial RLL, and
made the corresponding marking sheet report.[15] He likewise conducted an
inventory of the seized items and made a certificate of inventory signed by
a barangay kagawad and by two media representatives (Exhibit G).[16] PSI Lizardo
also prepared a written request for laboratory examination (Exhibit F)[17] and a
request for the medical and physical examination of the three accused (Exhibit
E).[18] The seized items were turned over the next day to the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union.[19] The request for laboratory
examination and turn over were documented through Exhibit F[20] dated December
31, 2003, Control NR 001-04, signed by Reynaldo L. Lizardo, under a stamped proof
of delivery dated 01 0050H 04 which he initialed, and received and initialed for the
laboratory by PO1 Avelino.[21]
During all this time, the accused were all at the police station, under custody,
as they had claimed, with the assistance of counsel, their right to a preliminary
investigation and voluntarily waived their right under the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.[22] Their continued custody after their arrest was shown
by Exhibit H, dated January 1, 2004, addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor and
signed by Reynaldo L. Lizardo which noted that Suspects are under arrest.[23]
On cross-examination, PSI Lizardo stated that the plastic sachets were in an

envelope when they were handed to Augustus.[24] He confirmed that it was Jehan
who handed the shabu to Augustus,[25] and explained that Violeta had been
excluded from the complaint on the recommendation of the regional state
prosecutor.[26]
PI Laya, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Florendo, La

Union, testified that on January 1, 2004, he conducted a chemical and confirmatory
test on the three heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted to him for examination. He
found the seized items positive for shabu, and reflected his findings in Chemistry
Report No. D-001-2004.[27] On cross -xamination, PI Laya stated that PO1 Avelino
received the items at the PNP Crime Laboratory; he did not know where these items
came from.[28]
The defense presented a different picture of the events. The appellants

testimony was aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
SITTI, nineteen (19) years old, admitted having brought an envelope to Augustus
De Castro in their meeting place at Damortis, Dagupan City but denied knowing its
contents. She testified that on 26 December 2003, she was at home playing at the billiard
store owned by her sister when Augustus alias Guts, her former husbands friend and
whom she did not know very well, arrived to attend the fiesta of Dagupan. Augustus slept
in their house for the first time and went home the following day, 27 December 2003, to
Ilocos Sur [TSN, July 12, 2004, pp. 2-5]. She saw a scotch tape-sealed long brown mailing
envelope left on the place where Augustus slept, and hid the same without informing him
about it. On 31 December 2003, Augustus, who called her up through the cellular phone,
requested her to bring to him the envelope which he left. They were to meet at
Damortis, Dagupan City. She was in the company of her sister JEHAN and Violeta [TSN,
July 12, 2004, pp. 6-7]. As they approached a van, she saw Augustus alight
therefrom. Augustus opened the door and instructed them to board the same [TSN, July
12, 2004, pp. 8-9]. Later, Augustus asked for the envelope and immediately after Violeta
handed the same to him, he raised it up. After which, a man came out from the back
where her sister, JEHAN, was seated and shouted Freeze, do not move. This is PDEA [TSN,
July 12, 2004, pp. 10-11].[29]
Jehan narrated that she was at her home in Fernandez Street, Dagupan City on the
evening of December 31, 2003 when the appellant came and asked to be
accompanied to Damortis to deliver an envelope.[30] Jehan and Violeta (her
neighbor) accompanied the appellant to Damortis. They rode a mini-bus and
immediately proceeded towards a parked van when they arrived.[31] They all
boarded the van at Augustus bidding; Augustus asked about the envelope as soon
as they were inside the van. A conflict of claims exists on who had the envelope
and who handed it to Augustus,[32] but it is not disputed that it was the appellant
who gave the instruction to hand the envelope over to Augustus. Immediately
after, PSI Lizardo appeared from the back of the van and arrested them.[33]
On cross-examination, Jehan maintained that it was Violeta who gave the
envelope to Augustus. She likewise denied having executed a sworn statement
where she allegedly stated that she handed the envelope to Augustus.[34]
The RTC, in its decision of July 28, 2004, convicted the appellant of
transporting shabu (12 grams)[35] and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).[36]
The appellant appealed to the CA,[37] which affirmed the RTC decision in toto in its
decision of February 28, 2006.[38]
The CA found no reason to depart from the doctrine that the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of
their probative weight, as well as the conclusions based on these findings,
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.
The CA ruled that the alleged failure of the apprehending officers to comply with
the requirements under R.A. No. 9165 is a matter strictly between the PDEA and
the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal
case.[39] The CA reasoned out that the commission of the crime of illegal transport
or delivery of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once proof of transport
or delivery is established.
The CA further added that there appears no reason why the police officers should
not be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty.
In her brief on appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court gravely
erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to
establish the identity of the prohibited drugs. The appellant alleges that PSI Lizardo
did not place his initials immediately after seizure. Moreover, there is no showing
that the police inventoried the seized items in the presence of the appellant and
her counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and
any elected official. She further adds that it was not clear who received the seized
items at the police station.[40]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument
that there was no showing of any irregularity in the handling of the seized items.
The OSG argues that R.A. No. 9165 allows the inventory of the confiscated drugs to
be conducted at the nearest police station. It further adds that the inventory of the
seized items was witnessed by representatives from the barangay and the
media.[41]
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we agree with the conclusions and the penalty
imposed by the appealed CA decision, and resolve to deny the appeal for lack of
merit.
The Prosecutions Case and the Objections

The appellant in the present case is charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving
away, dispatching in transit, and transporting dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. This section punishes not only the sale but also the mere
act of delivering or distributing prohibited drugs.[42] In prosecutions for illegal sale
or delivery of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In
the present case, we confirm the lower court findings that the prosecution clearly
showed that the delivery of the illicit drugs (shabu) actually took place; and that
the authorities seized the shabu which thereafter passed through the proper
investigatory/custodial chain until it was identified and submitted to the court as
evidence.
We note that the appellant does not deny the delivery of an envelope to
Augustus at a van in a Petron station in Damortis, but alleges that she was not
aware of the contents of the envelope delivered. The prosecution, however,
adduced ample evidence of the events that led to the entrapment and the actual
transaction; of how arrest of the suspects and seizure of the shabu were made in
an entrapment operation; and of the chain of custody, i.e., how the shabu was
seized, marked, delivered for examination, examined, and subsequently brought to
court. Significantly, the present appeal questions only the identity of
the shabu offered as evidence in court. The appellant alleges breaches in this chain
of custody, specifically, the failure to mark the evidence upon arrest, the failure to
identify who received the seized shabu at the police station, and the failure to
inventory the shabu in the presence of the accused and her counsel.
We find the appellants objections totally without merit.
A notable feature of this case is the careful handling the authorities

undertook in ensuring that the rights of the accused were protected, from the
moment of their warrantless arrest after they were caught in flagrante delicto in
an entrapment operation, all the way up to the handling of the evidence at the trial
level. This is evident from the exhibits that were all properly marked and offered as
evidence without any objection from the accused.
We point out the defenses failure to contest the admissibility of the seized
items as evidence during trial as this was the initial point in objecting to illegally
seized evidence. At the trial, the seized shabu was duly marked, made the subject
of examination and cross-examination, and eventually offered as evidence, yet
at no instance did the appellant manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their admissibility, integrity and
evidentiary value. In People v. Hernandez,[43] we held that objection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time
on appeal.
Beyond the question of admissibility are the issues of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the drugs seized. To ensure these qualities in the evidence
seized, R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of seized dangerous drugs under its Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II. This
is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis ours.]
and stresses that the overriding concern in the rules on the chain of custody of
seized and confiscated drugs is the maintenance of their integrity and evidentiary
value. In other words, mere lapses in procedures need not invalidate a seizure if
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown to have been
preserved.[44]
In the present case, after PSI Lizardo confirmed that the three plastic sachets
given by either Jehan or Violeta to Augustus contained shabu, he immediately
locked the vans door; introduced himself as a member of the PDEA; arrested the
appellant and her two companions; and then brought them (and the seized items)
to the police station. At the police station, he marked each plastic sachet with his
initials RLL, and made the corresponding marking sheet report. He also conducted
an inventory of the seized items; the corresponding certificate of inventory was
signed by PSI Lizardo, Barangay Kagawad Luis Ordoa, Jr., and two representatives
from the media. Afterwards, he prepared a written request for laboratory
examination, and a request for the medical and physical examination of the three
accused. During all this time, the accused were all at the police station, under
custody, as they had waived their right under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, while not specifically mentioned in the testimonies,
evidence shows that the accused were all at the very same place where the
markings and inventory of the seized items took place.
The records further clearly bear out that confiscated items were forwarded
to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by PO1 Avelino. The
turnover of the confiscated item was documented through the request for
laboratory examination, Exhibit F, dated December 31, 2003, with date of receipt
by PO1 Avelino on 01 0050H 04, or on January 1, 2004 at 12:50 a.m. PSI Lizardo
made the delivery, as shown by his initials on the portion of the Exhibit indicating
receipt by the PNP Crime Laboratory.[45]
PO1 Avelino, in turn, gave these items to PI Laya for examination to

determine the presence of dangerous drugs. PI Laya testified to this
turnover.[46] After the qualitative examination was conducted on the submitted
specimens, PI Laya concluded that Exhibits A-1, A-2, and A-3 tested positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride. When the prosecution presented
these marked specimens in court, PSI Lizardo positively identified them to be
the same items he seized from the appellant and which he later marked at the
police station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for
examination based on a duly prepared request. We quote the pertinent portions of
the records:
APP TADE:
Q: Earlier[,] you mentioned that you recovered three (3) plastic sachets from the
possession of the persons that was subject of the Police operation and
you likewise mentioned that you would be able to identify these items if
again shown to you. Im now showing to you three (3) plastic sachets
earlier marked for the Prosecution as EXHIBIT A, will you go over the same
and tell the Honorable Court what relation[,] if any[,] does [these] plastic
sachets have with the ones that you recovered from the accused?
PSI LIZARDO:
A: These three (3) plastic sachets were the ones which we recovered from the
three suspects.
xxxx
Q: And why do you say that these were the very same items that were handed
to you?
A: I put markings on the three (3) plastic sachet[s].
Q: Will you please point to the Court that markings that you identifying mark
[sic] on the items that you recovered?
A: The markings are my initials[,] RLL means Reynaldo L. Lizardo.
Q: That is on one of the sachets, how about the other sachets?
A: The same markings with the RLL means Reynaldo L. Lizardo.[47]
PI Laya identified the three plastic sachets offered in evidence as the very
same items he examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory, thus:
Q: When you received that request[,] what else was turned over to you?
A: Three (3) heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Q: Where are these three sachets that were handed to you for examination?
A: (Witness bringing out certain items.)
APP TADE:
Witness handing over to this representation PDEA marking plastic bag containing
three plastic sachet with yellow piece of paper containing white
crystalline substance.
Q: And upon receipt of these items and the request for laboratory examination
as an officer, what did you do next?
A: I conducted my laboratory examination.
xxxx
Q: And the three (3) tests that you conducted in this case[,] what was the result
of your examination?
A: Positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: And do you have any document to that effect?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Who prepared this Laboratory Examination Report?
A: I prepared the report.
Q: Personally?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You handed over to this representation three (3) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances which you claim to be the same items that were
examined by you, why do you say that these are the same items that were
examined by you?
A: I have my markings placed in the items.
Q: Again, will you point to the Court the items which you identifying markings [sic]
which you said you placed in the three plastic sachets?
A: (Witness pointing to the yellow paper attached to the plastic as A2=D-001-

04, A1=D-001-04 and the other plastic A3=D-001-04.)[48]
Clearly apparent from all these is that the whole operation, all the way up to the
submission of the seized shabu to the laboratory for testing, were overseen and
under the immediate charge of PSI Lizardo who himself was brought to court to
testify. The prosecution thus duly established the crucial links in the chain of
custody of the seized items from the time they were confiscated until they were
brought for examination. The totality of the testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence adequately supports not only the findings that a delivery of the illicit drugs
took place but accounted for an unbroken chain of custody of the seized evidence
as well.
We note in this regard that at no time during the trial did the defense question the
integrity of the evidence, by questioning either the chain of custody or the evidence
of bad faith or ill will on the part of the police and the prosecution in the handling
of evidence, or by proof that the evidence had been tampered with. Under the
circumstances, the presumption of regularity in the handling of the exhibits by the
public officers concerned and the presumption that they properly discharged their
duties should already apply.[49] As the foregoing discussion shows, the integrity of
the adduced evidence has never been tainted, so that it should retain its full
evidentiary value.
An obvious flaw in the prosecutions case was the failure of the apprehending
team to photograph the seized items. Nevertheless, PSI Lizardo immediately
conducted an inventory of the items at the police station where the accused were
then held in custody. Even without considering the presence of the accused at the
inventory, however, we find it undisputed that a barangay kagawad and two
representatives from the media witnessed the inventory and signed the
corresponding certificate of inventory. To our mind, the presence of an elected
official and two media representatives sufficiently safeguarded the seized evidence
from possible alteration, substitution or tampering. The presence of these third
parties (as required by law) during the inventory, as well as the clear lack of any
irregularity affecting the identity of the evidence, more than made up for the
prosecutions failure to photograph the confiscated specimens. In other words, we
hold that there has been substantial compliance by the police authorities with the
required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated drugs even
without the required photographs.
The marking of the seized shabu at the police station rather than at the exact scene
of the warrantless arrest of the accused and the seizure of evidence, to our mind,
should be appreciated under the unique attendant circumstances of the case.
We note that the entrapment undisputably took place and the sachets
of shabu were seized inside a vehicle where all the actors the accused, the
informant, and the police were riding together. They were effectively on the road
at that time and the records do not indicate that the van went to any other place
after the arrest and seizure. Only PSI Lizardo also appeared to have handled the
seized items while the van was on its way to the police station. Thus, there
appeared no possibility for the planting, switching, and tampering of evidence
during the whole travel time from the place of seizure to the police station. In fact,
the case of the defense did not even suggest these possibilities as its defense was
one of avoidance, i.e., the accused did not know that what the delivered envelope
contained was shabu.
All these indicators tell us that the main concern of the authorities at that
time was simply to bring the accused in for investigation and appropriate
proceedings. Thus, they cannot be faulted if they opted, after the warrantless
arrest, to prioritize the delivery of the accused to their station and to undertake the
required marking and inventory of the seized items there. With the continued
presence of all the accused in the vehicle while the seized items remained
unmarked, and the immediate marking and inventory of these items upon reaching
the police station, the laws feared planting, tampering, and switching of evidence
were substantially negated. The fact that the accused were all at the police station
when the marking and inventory took place immeasurably strengthens the validity
of our conclusion.
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path by
holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and immediate
marking of seized items may be excused by the unique circumstances of a
case. In People v. Resurreccion,[50] we already stated that marking upon immediate
confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police
station or office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v.
Rusiana,[51] People v. Hernandez,[52] and People v. Gum-Oyen,[53]the apprehending
team marked the confiscated items at the police station and not at the place of
seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the evidence showed
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To
reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict
step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to
ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte[54] when we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly
the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law
or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the
courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance
with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value
to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends
on the circumstances obtaining in each case.[55]
The Proper Penalties
The appellant was caught delivering a total of 12 grams of

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The illegal delivery, dispensation,
distribution and transportation of drugs are punished under Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, which provides:
Sec. 5. x x x The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Pursuant to the enactment of RA No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the

Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, only life imprisonment and fine,
instead of death, shall be imposed.
Accordingly, we find the penalty imposed to be within the range provided by

law and was thus correctly imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the February

28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00432. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional Member of the Third Division vice Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order
No. 845, dated June 8, 2010.

Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, per Special Order No. 843, dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, and concurred in by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
(now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam; rollo, pp. 2-14.
[2]
Penned by Executive Judge Clifton U. Ganay; CA rollo, pp. 7-24.
[3]
Id. at 6.
[4]
Records, pp. 35-36.
[5]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 3-4.
[6]
Id. at 4-5. See also Affidavit of Arrest, Exh. C, Records, p. 3.
[7]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 5-7.
[8]
Id. at 8-11.
[9]
Id. at 11.
[10]
Id. at 12; Records, p. 3.
[11]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 12-13; TSN, July 8, 2004, p. 21.
[12]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 14-15.
[13]
Id. at 16.
[14]
Records, p. 3.
[15]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 16-17.
[16]
Records, p. 11.
[17]
Id. at 9.
[18]
Id. at 8.
[19]
TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 17-20; TSN, July 8, 2004, pp. 22-23.
[20]
Records, p. 9.
[21]
Id. See also TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 20; TSN, July 8, 2004, p. 8.
[22]
Records, p. 1. The appellant, Jehan and Violeta were assisted by Atty. Roberto S. Ferrer.
[23]
Id. at 2; TSN July 5, 2004, p. 20.
[24]
TSN, July 8, 2004, pp. 16-17.
[25]
Id. at 19.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Id. at 3-7; Records, p. 10.
[28]
TSN, July 8, 2004, p. 9.
[29]
[30]
TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 3-4.
[31]
Id. at 5-7.
[32]
Id. at 9-10.
[33]
Id. at 7-9.
[34]
Id. at 9-10.
[35]
CA rollo, p. 23.
[36]
Id. at 23-24.
[37]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00432.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 2-14.
[39]
Id. at 11-12.
[40]
[41]
Id. at 84-106.
[42]
See People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 442.
[43]
G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009.
[44]
See People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430; People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July
28, 2008, 560 SCRA 375; People v. del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627; People v. Pringas,
G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
[45]
Records, p. 9; TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 20; TSN, July 8, 2004, p. 22.
[46]
TSN, July 8, 2004, p. 8.
[47]
Id. at 11-13.
[48]
Id. at 3-7.
[49]
People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 174773, October 2, 2007, 534 SCRA, 552, 568.
[50]
G.R. No. 186380, October 12, 2009.
[51]
G.R. No. 186139, October 5, 2009.
[52]
G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009.
[53]
G.R. No. 182231, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 668.
[54]
G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627.
[55]
Id. at 637.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
DONATO CAPCO y SABADLAB, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.
September 17, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed before the Court is the Decision dated December 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02213 affirming the February 1, 2006 Decision
in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3233 and 03-3561 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant Donato Capco liable for
violation of certain provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The records show that, in two separate informations filed before the RTC of Makati
City, Capco was charged with violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165 (illegal sale of
dangerous drugs) and Sec. 15, Art. II of the same law (use of dangerous drugs),
respectively, allegedly committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 03-3233
That on or about the 21st day of August 2003, in the city of Makati, Philippines
and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously without being authorized by law, sell,
distribute and transport zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug in consideration of one hundred
(P100.00) pesos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Criminal Case No. 03-3561
That on or about the 21st day of August 2003, in the City of Makati Philippines and a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to use, administer and take any dangerous drugs, after confirmatory
test was found to be positive for the use of Methylamphetamine which is [a] dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned on September 10, 2003 for violation of Sec. 5,[3] Art. II of RA 9165,
Capco, assisted by counsel, entered a not guilty plea. He pleaded guilty, however,
when later arraigned for the other charge of violation of Sec. 15[4] of RA 9165 and
was, accordingly, sentenced to undergo a six-month rehabilitation, the execution
of which, however, was deferred due to the pendency of Criminal Case No. 03-
3233.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Vicente

Barrameda and PO1 Randy Santos. The defense lined up Capco and Ace Bernal as
witnesses.
The CAs decision under review summarizes the Peoples version of the events, as
follows:
At about 8:30 in the evening of August 21, 2003, operatives from the Makati
City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (AID-SOTF), acting on a
confidential informants tip, conducted a buy-bust operation in the vicinity
of Dapitan St., Brgy. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City. The operation had for its
subject, Capco. Acting as poseur-buyer, PO2 Barrameda, accompanied by the
informant, was able to purchase one plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance with the use of PhP 100 in marked money.After the completion of the
sale, PO2 Barrameda gave the operations pre-arranged signal by ringing back-up
PO1 Santos mobile phone. The rest of the team then helped in arresting Capco who
was then brought to the Makati AID-SOTF station. From there, appellant and the
item subject matter of the sale were then brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for drug test and qualitative
examination, respectively. As the chemistry report would later indicate, the urine
taken from Capco and the specimen submitted were both found positive for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[5]
On the other hand, the defense is grounded mainly on denial. To show his
innocence, Capco claimed that when he alighted from a tricycle in front of his house
coming from Guadalupe Market on August 23, 2003, he observed a commotion and
saw four men chasing some people in the basketball court on Dapitan
Street, Makati City. Suddenly he was dragged by unidentified persons inside a
vehicle parked at Kalayaan Avenue and asked about a certain Gary whom he does
not know. When they could not obtain any information from Capco, they brought
him to the Office of the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU). There the DEU Chief asked
PhP 10,000 for his release.
Capcos story was collaborated by witness Bernal.[6] While Bernal was playing
basketball with his cousins on Dapitan Street, Makati City, several men
disembarked from a taxi and inquired on the whereabouts of Gary. Then they
suddenly chased somebody who was able to escape in an alley. After that, they saw
two men went inside the house of Capco, who was later brought out and taken to
a parked vehicle at Kalayaan Ave., Makati City.
In its decision of February 1, 2006, the RTC found Capco guilty beyond
reasonable of the crime (illegal sale of shabu) charged in Criminal Case No. 03-3233.
The fallo of the RTCs decision, which also included a portion to implement its ruling
in Criminal Case 03-3561, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered against the accused DONATO
CAPCO y SABADLAD finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5,
Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.
As regards the implementation of the judgment which this Court renders in Criminal Case
No. 03-3561 for violation of Sec. 15, Art. II, RA 9165 and considering the aforestated
sentence for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, the accused is sentenced to undergo rehabilitation
for at least six (6) months in a drug rehabilitation program under the auspices of the
Bureau of Correction.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) the one (1) piece of plastic sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram subject
matter of these cases, for said agencys appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, Capco questioned the RTCs decision on the ground that it

convicted him in spite of the inadmissibility of the evidence against him and
notwithstanding the prosecutions failure to present the alleged confidential
informant. He, too, raised, as issues, the prosecutions failure to establish the
prohibited nature, and the chain of custody, of the seized item.
Unconvinced, the CA, by decision dated December 28, 2007, affirmed that of
the trial court, noting, among other things, that the informant was not an
indispensable witness. Apropos the custodial chain, the CA held that the non-
presentation of the police investigator and the PNP Crime Laboratory personnel
who received the shabu did not affect the Peoples case, as the prosecution
witnesses presented sufficiently proved that the chain of custody of the
seized shabu was never broken.
The decretal portion of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated February 1, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64 in Crim. Cases Nos. 03-3233 and 03-3561 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Capco subsequently filed, and the CA gave due course to, his notice of appeal from
the decision of December 28, 2007.
On August 6, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if
they so desired. They manifested, however, their amenability to submit the case
on the basis of the records already on file.
As it was in the CA, Capco now asks the Court to overturn his conviction on
the following issues which may be formulated, as follows:
1. The CA erred in affirming the appellants conviction despite failure of the

prosecution to present the alleged informant;
2. The evidence against appellant is inadmissible for having been obtained in

violation of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165; and
3. The prosecution failed to establish: (1) the item allegedly confiscated was
indeed a prohibited drug and (2) the chain of custody of the specimen.
The Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling of the CA.
Non-Presentation of Informant
Capco argues that the prosecution should have presented the informant or at least
explained to the courts satisfaction why he was not made to testify. The informants
non-presentation, so he claims, is equivalent to suppression of evidence.
There is a logical and critical rationale behind the accepted practice of leaving out
a confidential informant from the prosecutions roster of witnesses. As held
in People v. Peaflorida, Jr.,[9] the presentation of an informant is not essential for
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would merely be corroborative and cumulative. More importantly, as Peaflorida,
Jr. and other similar drug cases teach, informants are by and large not presented
as witnesses in court as there is a need to conceal their identity and protect their
important service to law enforcement. Living in the fringes of the underworld,
these police assets may well be unwilling to expose themselves to possible
liquidation by drug syndicates and their allies should their identities be revealed.
Violation of Sec. 21 of RA 9165
Capco next alleges that the buy-bust team violated Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165,
quoted below, on the matter of handling the contraband after a buy-bust
operation:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, x x x as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Capco asserts that, in breach of what the aforequoted provision mandates, the
apprehending police operatives did not, upon his arrest, take his photograph
together with the alleged shabu sold. There was likewise no physical inventory of
the seized item conducted in his presence or before his representative or counsel,
and before representatives from the media and the Department of Justice as well
as an elected public official.
Generally, non-compliance with Sec. 21 will not render an accuseds arrest
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from the accused inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as they would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[10] As we shall later discuss, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drugs were preserved. We, thus, cannot sustain Capcos claim of
inadmissibility of the drug.
Hiatus in Chain of Custody
Capcos last argument dwells on the prosecutions non-presentation of the

personnel who touched or had physical possession of the suspected illegal item
from the time it was seized up to the moment it was presented in court, or at least
until it was examined by the forensic chemist. He claims that this non-presentation
casts doubt on the accuracy of the chain of custody of the object evidence.
We agree with the appellate courts conclusion that the prosecution was able
to show that the chain of custody was never broken. A careful review of the records
supports this finding.
Following the successful drug transaction with Capco, PO2 Barrameda

marked the plastic sachet of suspected shabu with DSC.[11] A letter-request, signed
by Police Superintendent Jose Ramon Q. Salido, was then sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for an examination of the seized drugs.[12] Forensic Chemist Grace M.
Eustaquio later filed Chemistry Report No. D-1049-03,[13] finding the white
crystalline substance in the plastic sachet marked DSC positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. During trial, PO2
Barrameda[14] identified the same specimen as the shabu their team had seized
from Capco and he had later marked with DSC. PO1 Santos corroborated PO2
Barramedas testimony by testifying that the specimen marked DSC was indeed the
product of their buy-bust operation against Capco.[15]
In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the traded substancethe object evidence which is the core of the corpus
delicti.[16] These requirements have been sufficiently established in the instant
case. What is more, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with. Capco has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits
by public officers.[17] Capco failed in this respect.
Another presumption Capco failed to overcome relates to the prosecutions

witnesses. Decisive in a prosecution for drug pushing or possession is the testimony
of the police officers on what transpired before, during, and after the accused was
caught and how the evidence was preserved. Their testimonies in open court are
considered in line with the presumption that law enforcement officers have
performed their duties in a regular manner, absent evidence to the contrary. In the
absence of proof of motive to falsely impute a crime as serious as drug pushing
against Capco, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as
well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail
over Capcos self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[18] This presumption holds
true for the police officers in this case, as Capco could not provide a credible and
believable account on why he was being falsely accused.
In sum, proof beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed
by the CA, was established against Capco. Finding no showing that certain facts of
relevance and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied,[19] we affirm these courts judgments.
Penalty Imposed
Capco was charged with violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165. For clarity we quote said
provision again, which states:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from x x x
(P500,000.00) to x x x (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, x x x or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions. x x x
We find the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 500,000 in accordance
with the penal provisions of RA 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02213
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
CA rollo, p. 100.
[2]
Id. at 101.
[3]
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from [P500,000.00] to [P10,000,000.00] shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, x x x or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a
broker in such transactions.
xxxx
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes,
manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who acts as a protector/coddler of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
[4]
Sec. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use
of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment x x x:
Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession
such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated
therein shall apply.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 17.
[6]
Id. at 17-18.
[7]
Id. at 104-105. Penned by Judge Delia H. Panganiban.
[8]
Rollo, p. 15. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Lucenito N. Tagle and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
[9]
G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 121.
[10]
People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 185164, June 22, 2009.
[11]
TSN, June 15, 2004, p. 11.
[12]
Records, p. 9.
[13]
Id. at 10.
[14]
TSN, January 25, 2005, p. 68.
[15]
TSN, June 15, 2004, p. 11.
[16]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578, 593.
[17]
People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009.
[18]
People v. Llamado, G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009.
[19]
People v. Darisan, G.R. No. 176151, January 30, 2009.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y Promulgated:
TRESBALLES,
Accused-Appellant. January 12, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
This is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 12,
2007[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant Francisco
Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-sale and drug-use penalized by Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully and
feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point zero four (0.04) gram
of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug.[3]
On December 11, 2003, another information was filed against Manlangit for
breach of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:
That sometime on or before or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the
City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drugs, and
having been arrested and found positive for use of Methylamphetamine, after a
confirmatory test, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
Methylamphetamine, a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.[4]
During the arraignment for both cases, Manlangit pleaded not

guilty. Afterwards, the cases were tried jointly.
At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence as follows:

On November 24, 2003, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)
Cluster 4 office received information from an informant that a certain Negro was
selling prohibited drugs along Col. Santos Street at Brgy. South
Cembo, Makati City. The MADAC thereafter coordinated with the Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSTOF) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency to conduct a joint MADAC-police buy-bust operation. A team
was assembled composed of several members of the different offices, among which
Police Officer 2 Virginio Costa was designated as the team leader, with MADAC
operative Wilfredo Serrano as the poseur-buyer and Roberto Bayona as his back-
up. The team prepared buy-bust money for the operation, marking two (2) one
hundred peso (PhP 100) bills with the initials AAM.
Upon arrival on Col. Santos Street, Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, the team
spotted Manlangit standing in front of his house. The informant approached
Manlangit and convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to purchase shabu from
him. Manlangit asked Serrano how much shabu he wanted, to which Serrano replied
that he wanted two hundred pesos (PhP 200) worth of shabu. Manlangit went inside
his house and later reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in turn, gave
Manlangit the marked money. Then Serrano gave the pre-arranged signal of lighting
a cigarette to indicate to the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been
consummated. Thus, the rest of the team approached Manlangit and proceeded to
arrest him while informing him of constitutional rights and the reason for his
arrest. The marked money was recovered from Manlangits pocket. The plastic
sachet was then marked with the initials FTM and sent to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for analysis. The PNP
crime laboratory identified the white crystalline substance as Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride in Chemistry Report No. D-1190-03. Manlangit was also brought to
the PNP crime laboratory for a drug test, which yielded a positive result for use of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.[5]
Manlangit denied that such buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed
that the recovered shabu was not from him. He claimed that he was pointed out by
a certain Eli Ballesteros to Serrano and Bayona. Thereafter, he was allegedly
detained at the Barangay Hall of Brgy. Pitogo. There, he was allegedly interrogated
by Serrano as to the location of the shabu and its proceeds, as well as the identity of
the drug pushers in the area. He also claimed that whenever he answered that he did
not know what Serrano was talking about, he was boxed in the chest. Later on, he
said that he was brought to Camp Crame for drug testing.[6]
On July 12, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735, finding accused Francisco

Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of Violation of Section 5, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-sale) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. Said accused shall be given
credit for the period of his preventive detention.
2) In Criminal Case No. 03-4735,[7] finding accused Francisco

Manlangit y Tresballes GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of Violation of Section 15, Art II, RA 9165 (drug-use), and
sentencing him to undergo rehabilitation for at least six (6) months
in a government rehabilitation Center under the auspices of the
Bureau of Correction subject to the provisions of Article VIII, RA
9165.
It is further ordered that the plastic sachet containing shabu, subject of

Criminal Case No. 03-4735, be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the latters appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[8]
From such Decision, Manlangit interposed an appeal with the CA.
In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit claimed that the prosecution failed

to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support such contention, accused-
appellant claimed that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. He pointed out
that he was not in the list of suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the
AIDSTOF. He further emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted
without first conducting a surveillance or test buy to determine the veracity of the
report made by the informant. He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of his
identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to secure even a search warrant.
Accused-appellant also raised the issue that the buy-bust team failed to
comply with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs
under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He argued that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official function was overturned by the officers failure to follow the
required procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust operation, as well as the procedure
in the proper disposition, custody, and control of the subject specimen.
On August 28, 2009, the CA rendered the decision which affirmed the RTCs
Decision dated July 12, 2007. It ruled that contrary to accused-appellants contention,
prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust operation. The
case was a valid example of a warrantless arrest, accused-appellant having been
caught in flagrante delicto. The CA further stated that accused-appellants
unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, in this case the members of the buy-
bust team; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. After examining
the testimonies of the witnesses, the CA found them credible and found no reason to
disturb the RTCs findings. Finally, the CA found that chain of evidence was not
broken.
Hence, the instant appeal.
In a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated February 22, 2010,

accused-appellant expressed his desire not to file a supplemental brief and reiterated
the same arguments already presented before the trial and appellate courts.
The Issues
The issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated September 29,
2008, are:
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecutions failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt.[9]
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody and
control of prohibited drugs was complied with.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Accused-appellants guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous
drugs. It provides:

Precursors and Essential Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
While Sec. 15, RA 9165 states:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.A person apprehended or arrested,
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory
test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation
in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article
VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time,
he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this
Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in
his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section
11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (Emphasis
supplied.)
People v. Macatingag[11] prescribed the requirements for the successful prosecution
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as follows.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.
The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the elements
of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses testimonies, which established the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The testimoniesparticularly those
of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credibleare
now beyond question. As the Court ruled in Aparis v. People:[12]
As to the question of credibility of the police officers who served as

principal witnesses for the prosecution, settled is the rule that prosecutions
involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded
respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility
of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in the
present case.
Moreover, accused-appellants defense of denial, without substantial evidence to

support it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of the police officers
performance of official functions. Thus, the Court ruled in People v. Llamado:[13]
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be

given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when
they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of
proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to accused-appellants challenge to the validity of the buy-bust

operation, the Court categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior
surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as long as the
operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus:
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior
surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is
a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the
police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case,
having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling
the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior
surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation.[14] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Furthermore, accused-appellants contention that the buy-bust team should

have procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is
misplaced. The Court had the occasion to address this issue in People v. Doria:[15]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not

unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section
5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a

penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a

warrant if he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an
accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:[16]

Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of
shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellants
claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an
entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid
warrantless arrest, in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been

accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
Second Issue:
The chain of custody of the seized drug was unbroken
Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the
requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec.
21(1) of RA 9165:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(Emphasis supplied.)
In particular, accused-appellant argues that:
While the marking of the specimen was done in the place of incident by MADAC
operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was done at Cluster 4. There was no
photograph made of the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused, media, any
elected local official, or the DOJ representatives, in clear violation of Section 21,
R.A. No. 9165.[17]
Based on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural
requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits that he should, therefore,
be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.
In People v. Rosialda,[18] the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of

dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a violation
of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the alleged
dangerous drugs seized by the apprehending officers be photographed in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel. Rosialda argues that such failure
to comply with the provision of the law is fatal to his conviction.
This contention is untenable.
The Court made the following enlightening disquisition on this matter

in People v. Rivera:
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized

dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers

conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does
not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing
rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items. The same provision clearly states as well,
that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if
any, since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it
may, this Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of
the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the
function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity
of the evidence are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or

testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it
was offered in evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only
contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the specimen
on site and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However,
as ruled by the Court in Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken,
even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was
not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not broken
as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:
Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the police officers failed to comply with the
provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in
the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that
Serrano marked the confiscated sachet of shabu in the presence of appellant at the
place of incident and was turned over properly to the investigating officer together
with the marked buy-bust money. Afterwards, the confiscated plastic sachet
suspected to be containing shabu was brought to the forensic chemist for
examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed
their Pinagsanib na Salaysay sa Pag-aresto immediately after the arrest and at the
trial, Serrano positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution
evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from
the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus,
there is no doubt that the prohibited drug presented before the court a quo was the
one seized from appellant and that indeed, he committed the crimes imputed against
him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CAs August 28, 2009 Decision
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Francisco P. Acosta.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 17-24. Penned by Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.
[3]
Id. at 15.
[4]
Id. at 16.
[5]
Id. at 100-102.
[6]
Id. at 102.
[7]
Should be Criminal Case No. 03-4961.
[8]
[9]
Id. at 40.
[10]
Id. at 46.
[11]
G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354, 361-362.
[12]
G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010.
[13]
G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 544, 552; citing Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705,
February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513.
[14]
G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470.
[15]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 704.
[16]
G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 593-594.
[17]
[18]
G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 879.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
ADRIANO PASCUA y Promulgated:

CONCEPCION,
Accused-Appellant. August 31, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the July 16, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03563, which affirmed the August 21, 2008 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No.
3936-M-2003. The RTC found accused Adriano Pascua guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art.
II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
An Information charged the accused with the following:

That on or about the 13th day of October, 2003, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and
transport [a] dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.084 gram.[3]
During his arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
The parties stipulated on the following facts during the trial:
(1) That there was a request for laboratory examination (Exhibit A) covering
two (2) sachets of regulated drugs (Exhibits C and C-1);
(2) That pursuant to the request, an examination was conducted on the
specimens seized; and
(3) That the examination conducted by Forensic Chemical Officer Nelson Sta.
Maria found the subject specimens positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu (Chemistry Report No. D-768-2003, Exhibit B).[4]
The CA summarized the facts from the records as follows:
On 13 October 2003, PO1 Tadeo of the PNP Station, Meycauayan, Bulacan, received a
phone call from a concerned citizen saying that there was rampant selling of illegal drugs
in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan. When the information was relayed to the Chief of Police,
the latter instructed the police officers to form a team which would conduct a buy-bust
operation. The team was composed of PO1 Tadeo, who would act as the poseur-buyer in
the said operation, and his back-up officers PO1 Michael Sarangaya, PO1 Frederick Viesca
and PO1 Philip Santos.
After the pre-operational report was made, the buy-bust team, together with the asset,
proceeded to the target area which was a club located at Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
PO1 Tadeo was given two pieces of P100-bills, and he marked the same with his initials
WCT. Thereafter, the back-up officers positioned themselves at the other side of the
street, while PO1 Tadeo and his asset went inside the club. Upon entering the same, PO1
Tadeo noticed that there was somebody transacting with their suspect. Afterwards, PO1
Tadeo was introduced by the asset to their suspect, alias Joel, as the next buyer of shabu.
PO1 Tadeo then asked alias Joel if he had P200.00 worth of shabu, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. PO1 Tadeo thus handed alias Joel the marked P100-bills, while
the latter in turn gave PO1 Tadeo a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
PO1 Tadeo, thereafter, dialed the number of one of his back-up officers and made a
missed call from his cellphone, which was the pre-arranged signal for his back-up team.
Consequently, the other members of the entrapment team entered the premises and
arrested the person whom they first saw buying suspected drugs from alias Joel, who they
identified later on as Robert Carmelo, and likewise obtained from him a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter, they arrested alias Joel, who was later
on identified as accused-appellant Adriano Pascua.
After placing the necessary markings, the two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance recovered from the accused-appellant Pascua and Robert Carmelo
were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis. Consequently, Forensic Chemist
Nelson Sta. Maria issued Chemistry Report No. D-768-2003 which stated that the seized
specimen yielded positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.[5]
As synthesized by the CA, the defense offered the following version of what
transpired:
On 13 October, 2003, at around 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant was resting in his home.
Suddenly, he heard a noise and saw two uniformed men holding short guns while
destroying the door of his house. He instantly felt afraid because just recently, two of his
brothers were killed in an ambush, hence this prompted him to run away and pass
through the back door of his house. While running, he fell into the river, but he managed
to swim and climb up the cliff. He continued running until he noticed two men in a
motorcycle chasing him. When the men caught up with him, they grabbed him by the
hand and told him that he was being arrested. The accused-appellant asked them for what
offense he was being arrested, but he was instead told by the men that he better take a
bath since he fell into a river and he [did] not smell good, after which they would bring
him to the police headquarters. The armed men thus forcibly brought him inside their
vehicle, where he saw another person handcuffed. The men subsequently brought both
of them at the police headquarters in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the police station, the
accused-appellant [begged] the police officers not to charge him with violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, since said offense was not bailable. One of the police
officers then told him that he would be charged with violation of Section 11 instead, but
he should bring five (5) grams of shabu with him. The accused-appellant, however, replied
that he did not have any shabu. The police officers thereafter locked him up in the
Municipal Hall and, the next day, charged him at the fiscals office with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. 9165. Subsequently, the police officers brought him back to his house
and told him to give them money and shabu. Accused-appellant again replied that he did
not have any money and shabu in his possession. The police officers then entered his
house and searched it thoroughly, without showing him any search warrant. After
conducting the search, the accused-appellant was brought back to the police station.
On the other hand, Robert Carmelo narrated that, on 13 October 2003, at around 11:00
a.m., he was at his house at Bangcal Extension, Meycauayan, Bulacan, when somebody
forcibly entered it and hit him in the stomach with a 45-caliber gun. He was then forcefully
taken outside and was made to ride in an ambulance. They passed by a bridge and
stopped as the men riding with him alighted from the vehicle and entered another house.
Thereafter, a chase ensued as the occupant of the house ran away. Subsequently, the
men were able to arrest the person they were chasing and likewise was able to lead him
inside the vehicle. Carmelo and the other person arrested were brought to the Municipal
Hall, where they were immediately charged with Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
9165 and Section 5 of the same law, respectively. Carmelo only found out that the other
person arrested with him was accused-appellant Pascua when they were already inside
the jail.
Teresita Bheng de Belen, an assistant at the videoke bar located in front of accused-
appellants house who claimed to have witnessed the incident, corroborated the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Carmelo.[6]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found the accused guilty of the offense charged. It found that the evidence
of the prosecution established the elements of illegal sale of drugs as the accused
was caught in flagrante delicto via a buy-bust operation. On the other hand, the
RTC noted that the defense merely offered denial as its defense while failing to
overturn the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
accorded to the buy-bust team.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that the
prosecution was able to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused
Adriano Pascua y Concepcion of the crime charged. Consequently, he is hereby
sentenced, there being no attending circumstances, to serve the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[7]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, accused averred that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite the prosecutions non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA
9165 on the chain of custody of seized drugs. He alleged that the prosecution failed
to prove the integrity of the seized drug. He also raised as error his conviction
based solely on the testimony of Police Officer 1 Willie Tadeo (PO1 Tadeo).
The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered
that the integrity and chain of custody of the seized item was duly established
during the trial. It was further argued that not all those who came into possession
of the seized drugs have to be presented as a witness as long as the chain of custody
was not broken and the seized drugs were properly identified.
Moreover, the OSG argued that the failure of the prosecution to comply with Sec.
21 of RA 9165 did not overcome the application of the presumption of regularity in
the performance of regular duty accorded to the police officers involved in the buy-
bust operation. The OSG furthermore argued that the defense of bare denial
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive declarations of the
complainant. It added that no evidence was shown that the police officers in the
buy-bust operation had any ill motive to make false charges against the accused.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.[8]
On January 19, 2011, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs
if they so desired. The parties manifested that they were adopting their respective
briefs filed before the CA.
The Issues
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt despite the prosecutions non-compliance with RA 9165 on chain of
custody of seized drugs
II
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding accused-appellant guilty despite the
prosecutions failure to prove the integrity of the seized drug
III
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding accused-appellant guilty based solely on
the testimony of PO1 Tadeo.

In every case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution is obliged to
establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.[9]
On the first issue, the CA did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. As the records show, the identities of the buyer, PO1 Tadeo, and
the seller, accused-appellant, were established. The object of the sale, 0.084 gram
of shabu, and the consideration, PhP 200, were likewise adequately shown by the
prosecution. There is also no question as to the delivery of the shabu sold and the
payment for it.
As to the second issue on the integrity of the seized drug, the CA correctly affirmed
the findings of the RTC. Apart from establishing the elements in the illegal sale of
drugs, it must further be shown by the prosecution that the drugs seized and tested
are the same as the corpus delicti presented in court. Sec. 21(a), Art. II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 lays down the procedure in
the custody and control of drugs:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
In People v. Rosialda,[10] We reiterated jurisprudence to the effect that leeway is

given to the prosecution as regards compliance with the chain of custody
requirement. We have previously underscored that RA 9165s IRR provides that
non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officers.[11] What is significant in the requirement is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Indeed, non-
compliance with the provisions of RA 9165 on the custody and disposition of
dangerous drugs is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case. Neither will it
render the arrest of an accused illegal nor the items seized from her inadmissible.[12]
In the instant case, the chain of custody over the seized drugs was testified on by
PO1 Tadeo. After the buy-bust was completed, PO1 Tadeo marked the plastic
sachet sold by accused-appellant with the initials WCT. PO1 Michael Sarangaya,
who arrested accused-appellants co-accused Carmelo, marked the plastic sachet
from Carmelo with MCS. A request for laboratory examination of the seized items
was made (Exhibit A). Afterwards, PO1 Tadeo personally brought the request and
the seized items to the PNP crime laboratory. The same specimens tested positive
for shabu as evidenced in Chemistry Report No. D-768-2003 (Exhibit B) and were
subsequently presented during trial (Exhibits C and C-1).
Reiterating his earlier argument, accused-appellant maintains that there was a

broken chain of custody over the seized drugs in the instant case. However, as aptly
shown by the prosecution, the chain of custody was shown to have been unbroken
in accordance with RA 9165 and its IRR.
On the third issue, We affirm the CA as well. On the matter of presenting only one
witness against accused-appellant, We had occasion to rule that not all people who
came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is
nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that
imposes such requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was
clearly established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.[13]
What is more, PO1 Tadeo enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to those
performing their official duties. To overturn the presumption, there must be clear
and convincing evidence that the police officer was inspired by an improper
motive.[14] No evidence was shown by accused-appellant that PO1 Tadeo had any
ill motive to frame him.
Penalty Imposed
As there were no attending circumstances in the commission of the offense, the

RTC imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos (PhP 500,000).
A violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 carries with it a penalty of life imprisonment and a

fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000) to ten million pesos
(PhP 10,000,000) for the sale of any dangerous drug regardless of the quantity or
purity involved.
We find the penalty and fine imposed on accused-appellant conform to RA 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03563
is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE C. MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a
member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.
[2]
Penned by Judge Jaime V. Samonte.
[3]
Rollo, p. 3.
[4]
[5]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[6]
Id. at 6-8.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 18.
[8]
Rollo, p. 25.
[9]
People v. Midenilla, G.R. No. 186470, September 27, 2010, 631 SCRA 350, 364; citing People v. Guiara, G.R. No.
186497, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 310, 322-323.
[10]
G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 507, 521; citing People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17,
2008, 569 SCRA 879, 897-899.
[11]
People v. Padua, G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010, 625 SCRA 220, 233.
[12]
People v. Marcelino, G.R. No. 189278, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 632, 641; citing People v. Alberto, G.R. No.
179717, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA 706, 718.
[13]
People v. Padua, supra note 11.
[14]
People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 202, 219.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), Present:
Petitioner,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ActingChairperson,
BERSAMIN,
PEREZ,*and
MENDOZA,**JJ.

JORGE JOSEPH,
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Antecedents



drugs.

SO ORDERED.[6]
is upheld.
SO ORDERED.[7]

xxxx
xxxx
process of law.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Issues

for review.
Ruling
I
II



Code, which states:

it was committed.

be destroyed.
xxx[29]
applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165,[32]and


R.A. No. 9165.
money,because:

accused.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
**
[1]
[2]
Rollo, p. 51.
[3]
Id., pp. 54-55.
[4]
Id., pp. 58-61.
[5]
Id., pp. 63-64.
[6]
Id., p. 107.
[7]
Id., p. 110.
[8]
[9]
Id., pp. 44-46.
[10]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[11]
Id., pp. 158-177.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[27]
Emphasis supplied.
[28]
[29]
Id., p. 482.
[30]
[31]
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[32]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[33]
[34]
No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.
[35]

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), Present:
Petitioner,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ActingChairperson,
BERSAMIN,
PEREZ,*and
MENDOZA,**JJ.

JORGE JOSEPH,
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Antecedents



drugs.

SO ORDERED.[6]
is upheld.
SO ORDERED.[7]

xxxx
xxxx
process of law.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Issues

for review.
Ruling
I
II



Code, which states:

it was committed.

be destroyed.
xxx[29]

applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165, [32]and

R.A. No. 9165.
money,because:

accused.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
**
[1]
[2]
Rollo, p. 51.
[3]
Id., pp. 54-55.
[4]
Id., pp. 58-61.
[5]
Id., pp. 63-64.
[6]
Id., p. 107.
[7]
Id., p. 110.
[8]
[9]
Id., pp. 44-46.
[10]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[11]
Id., pp. 158-177.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[27]
Emphasis supplied.
[28]
[29]
Id., p. 482.
[30]
[31]
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[32]
Id., pp. 2-32.
[33]
[34]
No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 215.
[35]
SECOND DIVISION
Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
BELEN MARIACOS, Promulgated:

Appellant.
June 16, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144,
finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November
7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality

of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport,
deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without
the necessary permit or authority from the proper government
agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the

information as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just
alighted from a passenger jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the

accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for
examination to the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug

submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence
of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained

(sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit

executed by the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the

accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and
Magdalena Carino.
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel,
La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to
intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San
Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B.
Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the
checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed
PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance
operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a
baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to
leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic
bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While
the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and
peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the
owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and
three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away
by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got
away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station,
the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the
bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were
opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round
bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in
a newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated

marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together

with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While
the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang
(Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded
on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded
later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they
reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later,
PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were
brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio
disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the
true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was
not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the
bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as

charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court
personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in
considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She
claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by
Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers,
without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2
Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying
was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended
that there was no probable cause for her arrest.[6]
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No.
2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited
and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation
directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who
shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this
directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items
allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to
establish the chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of
marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred
that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed
the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their
agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the
distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now
estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a
plea of not guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her
evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of
marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her
counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team,
whichever was practicable.[11]
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully
proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when
inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that contained the
illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate
court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the
bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a
specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for
himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying
the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents
of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers
atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no
violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police
has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to
no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as
promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a
search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the
contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise,
a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already
left the locality.[13]
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents
to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules
on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining
which are proper and which are not.
Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of

the evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would
have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless
search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12

[now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in

which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further

search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that
the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted

exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause.[15]
In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions

to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the
arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The
essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search
and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles seized
cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.[18]
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of
such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law
are in the place to be searched.[19]
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place,
things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving
vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. [21]
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be

obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted
on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[22]
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case
is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to
leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under
the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had
no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle
before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants
arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported from
Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the
suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the
Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was
loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc
had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid
arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of
Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous

with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.[25]
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also
valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong
to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention,
however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of

prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense.

Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession and/or
delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are
rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of
society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining
crimes mala prohibitacondemn behavior directed not against particular individuals,
but against public order.[29]
Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to

another.[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited
drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and
the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of
the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a
finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or
not the place of destination is reached.[32]
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave

rise to the disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their
contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of
lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-
ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to
first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if,
as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney,
appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had
left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they
were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow
the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of
all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the
very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her
to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the
opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the
bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles
of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. [36] PO2 Pallayoc identified
the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items
were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant
was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the
DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-
compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal,
or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.[37]
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was
immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the
Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs,
which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following
day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain
of custody from the time of
appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable
ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that
appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable
ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and
disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even assuming that the
police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue
before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the
first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection
on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules
on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of
police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly,
absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]
In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her
conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated February 22, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member
of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-13.
[2]
[3]
Rollo, pp. 2-5.
[4]
CA rollo, p. 29.
[5]
Id. at 45.
[6]
Id. at 48.
[7]
Id. at 50.
[8]
Id. at 108.
[9]
Id. at 112.
[10]
Id. at 113.
[11]
Id. at 114-115.
[12]
Rollo, p. 13.
[13]
Id. at 8-9.
[14]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998). (Citations omitted.)
[15]
Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 118, 126 (1999), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 430 (1996); and People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).
[16]
G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 68-69. (Citations omitted.)
[17]
People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880.
[18]
Except when the prohibited items are in plain view.
[19]
People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880, citing People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301 (1997).
[20]
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[21]
People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15, at 128-129, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); People
v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740 (2001).
[22]
Salvador v. People, 502 Phil. 60, 72 (2005).
[23]
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126.
[24]
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113.
[25]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752
(2003).
[26]
People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21, at 751. (Citations omitted.)
[27]
Id., citing People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38 (1999).
[28]
People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229, 239 (2001).
[29]
People v. Doria, supra note 20, at 618. (Citations omitted.)
[30]
People v. Peaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 125.
[31]
People v. Jones, 343 Phil. 865, 877 (1997).
[32]
People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679, 700.
[33]
Section 3 (j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him.
[34]
See People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21.
[35]
People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 909 (2004), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120 (1994).
[36]
CA rollo, p. 16.
[37]
People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436-437, citing People v. Del Monte, 552
SCRA 627 (2008).
[38]
See People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828; People v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No.
171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633.
[39]
People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 198, 223.

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,
Appellant. August 3, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Joint
Decision[3] dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of
member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the
appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed
him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime
of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that
would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out
his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[5]
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the
same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero
one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as Shabu, a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities
to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler,
Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without
any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to
visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the
charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van,
blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze
Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for
investigation.[9]
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting appellant of

Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision.[11]
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately
after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the
legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He
questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the
fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings
when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.[13]
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure
of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is
noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by
the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence
against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon
by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not
raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the
case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in
keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed
innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his
arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case,
we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal. [15]
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.[16]
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure

is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he
was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime
in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing
with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless search was considered
valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the

arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.[21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether
the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.[22]
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates

a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of
the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00
a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he
was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants
pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant,
was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question:
whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.[24] We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v.
Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas.[27]
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large
volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed
themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two
females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the
woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her
bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found
to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a
certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for
the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence
Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned
that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset
informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that
day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers
approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which
yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male
person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper
right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of
marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal
drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag.
The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers.
Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape
charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery
of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo
Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as
police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the
contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.[30]
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because
there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act
indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or
about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from
the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers
to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have
been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the
sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v.
Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would
indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except
in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches.[38]
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them
to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio
Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the tipped information
on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants
physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be
there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply
for a warrant.[39]
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2)
of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on

the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of
appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his
active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A
waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.[40]
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right

to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection
of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over
an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence
of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of
attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society,
we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means.[42]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated

May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate

release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to
inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within
ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim
S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.
[2]
Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.
[3]
Penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren; records, pp. 152-157.
[4]
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, July 31, 2003, pp. 4-6.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[6]
Id. at 5-6.
[7]
Records (Criminal Case No. 3054), p. 1
[8]
Records (Criminal Case No. 3038), p. 1.
[9]
Rollo, p. 6.
[10]
Supra note 3.
[11]
Supra note 1.
[12]
[13]
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611; People v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003, 396 SCRA 657, 664.
[14]
People v. Chua, supra.
[15]
Valdez v. People, supra at 622.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Section 2 and 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[18]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 475-476 citing People v. Tudtud, 458
Phil. 752, 771 (2003).
[19]
People v. Nuevas, id. at 476.
[20]
Records, p. 156.
[21]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 477; People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003).
[22]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
[23]
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[24]
People v. Nuevas, supra; People v. Tudtud, supra.
[25]
Supra note 22.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
Supra.
[28]
People v. Aruta, supra at 875.
[29]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 765-766.
[30]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 468-469.
[31]
G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751.
[32]
G.R. No. 86218, September 12, 1992, 214 SCRA 63.
[33]
311 Phil. 290 (1995).
[34]
341 Phil. 801 (1997).
[35]
349 Phil. 640 (1998).
[36]
363 Phil. 481 (1999).
[37]
417 Phil. 342 (2001).
[38]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 776.
[39]
People v. Tudtud, supra at 782; People v. Aruta, supra at 894.
[40]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 483-484; People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003).
[41]
Supra.
[42]
People v. Nuevas, supra at 484-485.
3t\epulllic o( tiJe ~~IJilippines ~uprPmr Q[ourt .it lam! (1 SECOND DIVISION PEOPLE OF TilE
PHILIPPINES, P!ainriff~Appe!lee. - versusG.R. No. 184606 Present: CARPIO, Chairperson. BRION,
DELCASTILLO, PEREZ, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.. CALEXTO DUQUE FUN DALES, JR., Promulgated: Accused-
Appellant. SEP 0 5 Z91~~J~J;.o \ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~X ~- DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: On appeal is the April 18, 2008 Decision 1 of the Cmn1 of Appeals (CA)
in CA-C.R. CR-H.C. No. 02274, which affirmed the March 18, 2006 Decision2 or the Regional ·rrial Court
(RTC) of Parafiaque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 03-1425. Said RTC Decision declared appellant
Calexto Duque Fundales, Jr. (
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: to carry
or convey from one place to another.[34] The essential element of the charge is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. In the present case,
although petitioner and his co-accused were arrested inside a car, the car was not in
transit when they were accosted. From the facts found by the RTC, that car was
parked and stationary. The prosecution failed to show that any distance was travelled
by petitioner with the drugs in his possession. The conclusion that petitioner
transported the drugs merely because he was in a motor vehicle when he was
accosted with the drugs has no basis and is mere speculation. The rule is clear that
the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. All doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove
the element of transport of dangerous drugs, namely, that transportation had taken
place, or that the accused had moved the drugs some distance.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great
respect. But when there is a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings of the trial
court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of an accused, considering
that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The Court must be
satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court leading to an
accuseds conviction has satisfied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[35]

Supreme Court rules on Malversation case

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Supreme Court rules on Malversation case

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Today is Thursday, August 01, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

UITTED on reasonable doubt.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

as assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

d Roland B. Jurado, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-60.

Republic of the Philippines

MICHAEL SAN JUAN y CRUZ, G.R. No. 177191

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The RTC's Ruling

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations,

Aggrieved, the accused, through their respective counsels, appealed their

Undaunted, petitioner alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] which the

1. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

The instant Petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 5, Article

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Petitioner was charged specifically with the transport of methylamphetamine

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that a conviction for transportation of

In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v. People[37] is instructive:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement

Thus, on Direct Examination, PO2 Jovenir testified:

Apropos is our ruling in People v. Coreche:[46]

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Decision dated December 21,

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

PHILIPPINE DRUG G.R. No. 196390

RICHARD BRODETT AND Promulgated:

Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of

b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery

c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery

d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves

On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently

Hence, PDEA appeals.

In hisComment,[11]Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any

The petition is meritorious.

In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or

Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in

However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and

We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodettsMotion To Return Non-Drug

Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186131

December 14, 2011

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Crim. Case No. Q-03-118187

Amansec pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment[7] on