FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184058. March 10, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELISSA CHUA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and was
convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. She was also
indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted only for three. The Court of
Appeals, by Decision 1 dated February 27, 2008, affirmed appellant's conviction.

The Information 2 charging appellant, together with one Josie Campos (Josie), with
Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-222596, reads:

The undersigned accuses JOSIE CAMPOS and MELISSA CHUA of violation of Article 38
(a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions of Book I, PD 442, otherwise known as the
New Labor Code of the Philippines, in relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) of said
Code, as further amended by PD Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2019 and as further amended by
Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042 committed in a [sic] large scale as follows:

That sometime during the month of September, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to ERIK DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR.,
HARRY JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas employment abroad without
first having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly from: ACDIcS

ERIK DE GUIA TAN -

P73,000.00
MARILYN D. MACARANAS -
83,000.00
NAPOLEON H. YU, JR. -
23,000.00
HARRY JAMES P. KING -
23,000.00
ROBERTO C. ANGELES -
23,000.00
For purposes of their deployment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than
that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as prescribed by the POEA, and
without valid reasons and without the fault of said complainants, failed to
actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred in connection with
their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.

xxx xxx xxx

The five Informations 3 charging appellant and Josie with Estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 04-222597-601, were similarly worded and varied only with
respect to the names of the five complainants and the amount that each purportedly
gave to the accused. Thus each of the Information reads:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about . . . in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud . . . in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations which they made to the
said . . . to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit the latter
as factory worker to work in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said . . .
to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to the said accused the
amount of . . . on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely
to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of . . . which amount once in
their possession, with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage of said . . . in the aforesaid amount of . . ., Philippine
Currency.

xxx xxx xxx

Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie remained at

large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded only with respect to
appellant.

Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D. Macaranas

(Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King (King). The substance of
their respective testimonies follows:

Marilyn's testimony:

After she was introduced in June 2002 by Josie to appellant as capacitated to

deploy factory workers to Taiwan, she paid appellant P80,000 as placement fee and
P3,750 as medical expenses fee, a receipt 4 for the first amount of which was
issued by appellant.

Appellant had told her that she could leave for Taiwan in the last week of
September 2002 but she did not, and despite appellant's assurance that she would
leave in the first or second week of October, just the same she did not.

She thus asked for the refund of the amount she paid but appellant claimed that she
was not in possession thereof but promised anyway to raise the amount to pay her,
but she never did. EcASIC

She later learned in June 2003 that appellant was not a licensed recruiter,
prompting her to file the complaint against appellant and Josie.

Tan's testimony:

After he was introduced by Josie to appellant at the Golden Gate, Inc., (Golden
Gate) an agency situated in Paragon Tower Hotel in Ermita, Manila, he underwent
medical examination upon appellant's assurance that he could work in Taiwan as a
factory worker with a guaranteed monthly salary of 15,800 in Taiwan currency.

He thus paid appellant, on September 6, 2002, P70,000 5 representing placement fees

for which she issued a receipt. Appellant welched on her promise to deploy him to
Taiwan, however, hence, he demanded the refund of his money but appellant failed
to. He later learned that Golden Gate was not licensed to deploy workers to Taiwan,
hence, he filed the complaint against appellant and Josie.

King's testimony:
His friend and a fellow complainant Napoleon Yu introduced him to Josie who in turn
introduced appellant as one who could deploy him to Taiwan.

On September 24, 2002, 6 he paid appellant P20,000 representing partial payment for
placement fees amounting to P80,000, but when he later inquired when he would be
deployed, Golden Gate's office was already closed. He later learned that Golden
Gate's license had already expired, prompting him to file the complaint.

Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from
January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn
Calueng, 7 she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and
that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent.

Admitting having received P80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she
issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed that she turned over
the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the
money to Marilyn Calueng whose present whereabouts she did not know.

By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC convicted appellant of

Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused Melissa Chua
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused as
principal of a large scale illegal recruitment and estafa three (3) counts and she
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment. HCEISc

The accused is likewise convicted of estafa committed against Harry James P. King
and she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two
(2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Six (6) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum; in Criminal Case No. 04-22598; in Criminal Case No. 04-
222600 committed against Marilyn Macaranas, accused is sentence [sic] to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional
as minimum, to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum;
and in Criminal Case No. 04-222601 committed against Erik de Guia Tan, she is
likewise sentence [sic] to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and
Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Eleven (11) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.

Accused Melissa Chua is also ordered to return the amounts of P20,000.00 to Harry
James P. King, P83,750.00 to Marilyn D. Macaranas, and P70,000.00 to Erik de Guia
Tan.

As regards Criminal Cases Nos. 04-222597 and 04-222599, both are dismissed for lack
of interest of complainants Roberto Angeles and Napoleon Yu, Jr.

In the service of her sentence, the accused is credited with the full period of
preventive imprisonment if she agrees in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules
imposed, otherwise only 4/5 shall be credited.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals, as stated early on, affirmed the trial court's decision by
the challenged Decision of February 27, 2008, it holding that appellant's defense
that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money which was
ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to prove
the existence of an employment relationship between her and Marilyn, as well as the
legitimacy of the operations of Golden Gate and the extent of her involvement
therein.

Citing People v. Sagayaga, 8 the appellate court ruled that an employee of a

company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together
with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of appellant, actively and
consciously participated therein.

Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a person
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of Estafa as
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, held that
the elements thereof were sufficiently established, viz.: that appellant deceived
the complainants by assuring them of employment in Taiwan provided they pay the
required placement fee; that relying on such representation, the complainants paid
appellant the amount demanded; that her representation turned out to be false
because she failed to deploy them as promised; and that the complainants suffered
damages when they failed to be reimbursed the amounts they paid. EcATDH

Hence, the present appeal, appellant reiterating the same arguments she raised in
the appellate court.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The term "recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as follows:

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, under
which appellant was charged, provides:

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. � (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
(emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be

undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts, or as in the present case,
an agency with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. And illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or
as a group.
Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to
prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment
activity under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed
such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group. 9
cCHITA

In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from
January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment
abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden Gate's license only expired on
February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April
2, 2002.

Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the
complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they
would be able to secure for them employment abroad. In the absence of any evidence
that the complainants were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's
assessment of their credibility shall not be interfered with by the Court. 10

Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make
her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as principal by
direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively
and consciously participated in the recruitment process. 11

Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the
recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability either.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or "The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a violation
of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus immaterial. And that
explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such offense.

[I]llegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the

first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the
second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using
fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
12 (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by

Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A. Lanzanas; rollo, pp. 2-
15.

2.Records, pp. 2-3.

3.Id. at 61-76.
4.Vide Cash Voucher dated September 6, 2002, id. at 13.

5.Vide Cash Voucher dated September 6, 2002, id. at 10.

6.Vide Cash Voucher receipt, id. at 19.

7.Spelled as GOLDEN GATE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and as MARILEN L. CALLUENG per

certification dated June 23, 2003 of Atty. Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing
Branch of the POEA, id. at 8.

8.G.R. No. 143726, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 468.

9.People v. Jamilosa, G.R. No. 169076, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 340, 352.

10.People v. Saulo, G.R. No. 125903, November 15, 2000, 344 SCRA 605, 614.

11.People v. Nogra, G.R. No. 170834, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 723, 724.

12.People v. Comila, G.R. No. 171448, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 153, 167.

||| (People v. Chua, G.R. No. 184058, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 135-145)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 187730. June 29, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, accused-

appellant,

FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, accused.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y
Dungo (accused), which affirmed the Decision 2 dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant
Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot ("accused-appellant") of syndicated illegal recruitment in
Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

The Facts

Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo ("Pacardo") and Pilar
Manta ("Manta"), together with Mardeolyn Martir ("Mardeolyn") and nine (9) others,
were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa
committed against eighteen complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza ("Dela
Caza"), Sandy Guantero ("Guantero") and Danilo Sare ("Sare"). The cases were
respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However,
records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against
accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against
accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to
the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases,
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-
206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion
of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants
in said cases to appear and testify during trial.

It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency
of evidence. Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by
Sare. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated
illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively. aSTAcH

Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellant's conviction for

syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant,

together with the others, as follows:

The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA, NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO
MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES
PACARDO y JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and
YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995,
committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between November 2000 and
December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another, representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE
BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO,
RENATO V. HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO S. MORON,
FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN, DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON,
JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept
directly or indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE
BRENDO � P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA � P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA �
P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA � P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO � P35,000.00; RENATO V.
HUFALAR � P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO � P30,000.00; LUPO A. MANALO � P75,000.00; ALMA
V. MENOR � P45,000.00; ROGELIO S. MORON � P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA � P45,000.00;
OSCAR RAMIREZ � P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN � P75,000.00; DANILO SARE �
P100,000.00; MARY BETH SARDON � P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO � P35,000.00; and JOEL
TINIO � P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas employment,
which amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02, Series 1998, and
without valid reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed to
actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said
complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of
their deployment. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:

That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they had the
power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as
factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in
inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and untrue and were made [solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact
they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in their
possession, with intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00,
Philippine currency. IDEScC

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not
guilty to all charges.

On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.

During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines
Roa, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and
private complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense
presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean
national at the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency ("MPM
Agency") located in Malate, Manila.

Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar
Martir was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir,
Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as
the cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agency's employee who was in
charge of the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an
employee who was tasked to deliver documents to the Korean embassy. SIcCTD

Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and

informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together
with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five
Thousand Pesos (PhP45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction.

Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the
processing of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory
worker and their possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about
the business and what to expect from the company and the salary.

With accused-appellant's assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well
as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas
procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money.
Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP45,000) to MPM Agency
through accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and
Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401.

Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agency's office
in Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at
Batangas Street, Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and
found out that the agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development &
Services, Inc. ("New Filipino"). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta,
Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the
transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing
the name of the agency.

Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but
Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his
decision. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge
about the money.

After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the
other applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because
the agency again moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of
Ambassador Se�eres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the
new address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that
it had to move in order to separate those who are applying as entertainers from
those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo
and Manta, were then arrested.

The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was
dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the
existence of the following documents:

1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the

POEA to the effect that "New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc., with
office address at 1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, was a licensed
landbased agency whose license expired on December 10, 2001 and was delisted from
the roster of licensed agencies on December 14, 2001." It further certified that
"Fides J. Pacardo was the agency's Recruitment Officer"; AIcaDC

2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM
International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to recruit
workers for overseas employment;

3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999 regarding
placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.

4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on the
placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and

5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.

Version of the Defense

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of
Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for
deployment to Korea as a factory worker. According to him, he gave his application
directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay
only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to
facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the
agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants, running
errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for
some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agency's
office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised
deployment abroad but it never materialized.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of
syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-
206308;

II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a
syndicate and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to indemnify
EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal
interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 until fully paid.

III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 is likewise found
guilty and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
years of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum. TIaCHA

IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02-206308.

Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all the
criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.

The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is hereby ordered
unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.

SO ORDERED. 5

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-206297, for estafa, appellant is
sentenced to four (4) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision
mayor.

SO ORDERED. 6

The CA held the totality of the prosecution's evidence showed that the accused-
appellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His
actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of
a mere errand boy.

As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage

having been committed by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant
Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal
found guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa. 7 The same
evidence proving accused-appellant's commission of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale also establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh 2 (a) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.

The Issues

Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of

errors:

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove the same beyond reasonable doubt. TCaEAD

II

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of estafa
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Evidence supports conviction of

the crime of Syndicated Illegal
Recruitment

Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal

recruitment because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment
agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the
private complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was not duly
supported by competent evidence. According to him, even assuming that he was an
employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence that he acted
in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.

We disagree.

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1)

the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; 8 and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. 9 When
illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage. 10

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code,"recruitment and placement" refers to "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not".

After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals
that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 ("R.A. 8042"), otherwise known as the Migrants
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, viz.:

Sec. 6. Definition. � For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether committed
by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
EHcaDT

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;

xxx xxx xxx

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department
of Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes
of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of

R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in
consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the
amount of Php45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made
misrepresentations concerning the agency's purported power and authority to recruit
for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the guise of
placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. 11 Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution
witness, Dela Caza, to wit:
PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: How about this Rodolfo Gallo?

A: He was the one who received my money.

Q: Aside from receiving your money, was there any other representations or acts
made by Rodolfo Gallo?

A: He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he even

intimated to me that their agency has sent so many workers abroad. AHSEaD

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application at the
agency. Was there any instance that you were able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo
Gallo and Pilar Manta?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: What was the conversation that transpired among you before you demanded the
return of your money and documents?

A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr. Gallo told me

"I know nothing about your money" while Pilar Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why
should I withdraw my application and my money when I was about to be [deployed] or
I was about to leave.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced you to those
persons whom you just mentioned?

A: The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the placement fee in that
agency is Php150,000.00 and then I should deposit the amount of Php45,000.00. After
I have deposited said amount, I would just wait for few days . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Q: They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php45,000.00 for
deposit only?

A: Yes, ma'am, I was told by them to deposit Php45,000.00 and then I would pay the
remaining balance of Php105,000.00, payment of it would be through salary
deduction.

Q: That is for what Mr. Witness again?

A: For placement fee.

Q: Now did you believe to (sic) them?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Why, why did you believe?

A: Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep on telling me
that they have sent abroad several workers and they even showed visas of the
records that they have already deployed abroad.

Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations which have been made upon
you or make you believe that they can deploy you? EAcIST

A: At first I was adamant but they told me "If you do not want to believe us, then
we could do nothing." But once they showed me the [visas] of the people whom they
have deployed abroad, that was the time I believe them.

Q: So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr. Witness?

A: That was the time that I decided to give the money.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: Do you have proof that you gave the money?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?

A: I have it here.

PROS. MAGABLIN:

Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the amount of
Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your Honor, may I request that the same
be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit "F".

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of this receipt.
Do you know whose signature is this?

A: Yes, ma'am, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.

PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: Why do you say that that is his signature?

A: Rodolfo Gallo's signature Your Honor because he was the one who received the
money and he was the one who filled up this O.R. and while he was doing it, he was
flanked by Fides Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So it was Gallo who received your money?

A: Yes, ma'am.

PROS. MAGABLIN

Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your money? cISDHE
A: They told me ma'am just to call up and make a follow up with our agency.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what happened with
the application, with the promise of employment that he promised?

A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new office in Makati,
Brgy. San Isidro.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?

A: No, ma'am, they were not able to send us abroad. 12

Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying
accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part
with their money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false
misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement
fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were waiting for them and that they would be
deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave
him the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his
payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants' actions constituted illegal
recruitment.

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding
that he was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his
active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he
was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of
innocence.

This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-
appellant and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting
in the commission of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with

Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in
a network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment
scam was directed at one single purpose � to divest complainants with their money
on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that
complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their papers for a
possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo
Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect
from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as
Mardeolyn's relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency
was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers
visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant
signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza.
Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well
as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a
common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present. CIDTcH

In People v. Gamboa,13 this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context
of illegal recruitment, viz.:

Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts
of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the
crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its execution.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-
appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual

proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient
that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. 14

Estafa

The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime

of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
viz.:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). � Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned hereinbelow . . .

xxx xxx xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed

prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a)
by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 15
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that
he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.

All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together
with the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the
agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there
were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the
strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of
the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-
accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing
complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these
representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2 (a), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable. TAaCED

Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail

over Positive Identification

Indubitably, accused-appellant's denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face

of the positive identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of
the perpetrators of the crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v.
Abolidor, 16 "[p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter
prevails over alibi and denial."
The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him.

Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the

one hand, and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must
prevail. 17

Moreover, this Court accords the trial court's findings with the probative weight
it deserves in the absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a
fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not
disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected
the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in convicting the
accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error
in the assailed decision. The Decision dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02764 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in
by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso.

2.Id. at 15-35. Penned by Judge Lucia Pe�a Purugganan.

3.CA rollo, p. 16.

4.Rollo, pp. 5-6.

5.CA rollo, pp. 34-35.

6.Rollo, pp. 18-19.

7.People v. Alona Buli-e, et al., G.R. No. 123146, June 17, 2003; People v. Spouses
Ganaden, et al., G.R. No. 125441, November 27, 1998.

8.People v. Soliven, G.R. No. 125081, October 3, 2001.

9.See Sec. 6, R.A. 8042; See also People v. Buli-e, et al., G.R. No. 123146, June
17, 2003.

10.Sec. 6 (m), R.A. 8042.

11.People v. Ong, G.R. No. 119594, January 18, 2000.

12.TSN, August 12, 2004, pp. 15-23.

13.G.R. No. 135382, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 451.

14.Fortuna v. People, G.R. No. 135784, December 15, 2000.

15.People v. Soliven, G.R. No. 125081, October 3, 2001.

16.G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260.

17.People v. Carizo, G.R. No. 96510, July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 687; People v. Miranda,
235 SCRA 202; People v. Bello, G.R. No. 92597, October 4, 1994, 237 SCRA 347.

||| (People v. Gallo y Gadot, G.R. No. 187730, [June 29, 2010], 636 PHIL 450-472)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179532. May 30, 2011.]

CLAUDIO S. YAP, petitioner, vs. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME
AGENCIES, INC., respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 2 dated February 28, 2007, which affirmed with modification the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) resolution 3 dated April 20, 2005.

The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

[Petitioner] Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT
on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal,
Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt.
Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12
months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as
electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on
06 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with the other
crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and
will be scrapped. They were also informed about the Advisory sent by Capt.
Constatinou, which states, among others:

". . . PLEASE ASK YR OFFICERS AND RATINGS IF THEY WISH TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER
VESSELS AFTER VESSEL S DELIVERY (GREEK VIA ATHENS-PHILIPINOS VIA MANILA. . .

. . . FOR CREW NOT WISH TRANSFER TO DECLARE THEIR PROSPECTED TIME FOR REEMBARKATION
IN ORDER TO SCHEDULE THEM ACCLY. . ."

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the
scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to
accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the
payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed
from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.
ECaTAI

[Respondents], for their part, contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed. They
alleged that following the sale of the M/T SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from the vessel
on 10 November 2001 and was paid his wages corresponding to the months he worked or
until 10 November 2001 plus his seniority bonus, vacation bonus and extra bonus.
They further alleged that Yap's employment contract was validly terminated due to
the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yap's transfer to
Thenamaris' other vessels. 4

Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
Damages and Attorney's Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioner claimed that
he was entitled to the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
contract. Subsequently, he filed an amended complaint, impleading Captain Francisco
Adviento of respondents Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. (Intermare) and
Thenamaris Ship's Management (respondents), together with C.J. Martionos, Interseas
Trading and Financing Corporation, and Vulture Shipping Limited/Stejo Shipping
Limited.

On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision 5 in favor of petitioner, finding the
latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents.
Moreover, the LA found that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured
petitioner of re-embarkation and required him to produce an electrician certificate
during the period of his contract, but actually he was not able to board one
despite of respondents' numerous vessels. Petitioner made several follow-ups for
his re-embarkation but respondents failed to heed his plea; thus, petitioner was
forced to litigate in order to vindicate his rights. Lastly, the LA opined that
since the unexpired portion of petitioner's contract was less than one year,
petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract
for a period of nine months. The LA disposed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby rendered declaring

complainant to have been constructively dismissed. Accordingly, respondents
Intermare Maritime Agency Incorporated, Thenamaris Ship's Mgt., and Vulture
Shipping Limited are ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant Claudio S.
Yap the sum of $12,870.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. In
addition, moral damages of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and exemplary
damages of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) are awarded plus ten percent (10%) of
the total award as attorney's fees.

Other money claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 6

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.

In its decision 7 dated January 14, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the LA's findings that
petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed; that respondents' bad
faith was evident on their wilful failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel;
and that the award of attorney's fees was warranted. However, the NLRC held that
instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only
entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 8 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042, 9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission. 10 Hence, the NLRC ruled in this wise:
cAHDES

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding the
termination of complainant illegal is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION.
Complainant['s] salary for the unexpired portion of his contract should only be
limited to three (3) months basic salary.

Respondents Intermare Maritime Agency, Inc.[,] Vulture Shipping Limited and

Thenamaris Ship Management are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay
complainant, the following:

1. Three (3) months basic salary � US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time
of actual payment.

2. Moral damages � P100,000.00

3. Exemplary damages � P50,000.00

4. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

SO ORDERED. 11

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 12 praying for the reversal
and setting aside of the NLRC decision, and that a new one be rendered dismissing
the complaint. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed his own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, 13 praying that he be paid the nine (9)-month basic salary, as
awarded by the LA.

On April 20, 2005, a resolution 14 was rendered by the NLRC, affirming the findings
of Illegal Dismissal and respondents' failure to transfer petitioner to another
vessel. However, finding merit in petitioner's arguments, the NLRC reversed its
earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3)
months salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of
unexpired term which this can be applied." Hence �

WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is

hereby granted. The award of three (3) months basic salary in the sum of
US$4,290.00 is hereby modified in that complainant is entitled to his salary for
the unexpired portion of employment contract in the sum of US$12,870.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment.

All aspect of our January 14, 2005 Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED. 15

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC denied. SAEHaC

Undaunted, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 16 under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA affirmed the
findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and
illegally dismissed. The CA held that respondents failed to show that the NLRC
acted without statutory authority and that its findings were not supported by law,
jurisprudence, and evidence on record. Likewise, the CA affirmed the lower
agencies' findings that the advisory of Captain Constantinou, taken together with
the other documents and additional requirements imposed on petitioner, only meant
that the latter should have been re-embarked. In the same token, the CA upheld the
lower agencies' unanimous finding of bad faith, warranting the imposition of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC
erred in sustaining the LA's interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this
regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 and held:

In the present case, the employment contract concerned has a term of one year or 12
months which commenced on August 14, 2001. However, it was preterminated without a
valid cause. [Petitioner] was paid his wages for the corresponding months he worked
until the 10th of November. Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 10, [R.A. No.] 8042,
therefore, the option of "three months for every year of the unexpired term" is
applicable. 17

Thus, the CA provided, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 14, 2005, and Resolutions, dated April 20, 2005 and July 29,
2005, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth
Division, Cebu City, in NLRC No. V-000038-04 (RAB VIII (OFW)-04-01-0006) are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months of basic salary computed at US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time
of actual payment.

Costs against Petitioners. 18

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the CA,
however, denied in its Resolution 19 dated August 30, 2007.

Unyielding, petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:

1) Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an
illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of � "salaries for [the]
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" � is constitutional; and

2) Assuming that it is, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9
months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold. 20 AHaDSI

In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as
unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. 21 on March 24,
2009.

Apparently, unaware of our ruling in Serrano, petitioner claims that the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section 1, 22 Article III
and Section 3, 23 Article XIII of the Constitution to the extent that it gives an
erring employer the option to pay an illegally dismissed migrant worker only three
months for every year of the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of
law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers;
and that said provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because, while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor
Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive nine months of their collectible
backwages every time they have a year of unexpired term of contract to reckon with.
Finally, petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of law is constitutional,
the CA gravely abused its discretion when it reduced petitioner's backwages from
nine months to three months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot accommodate the
lesser relief of three months for every year of the unexpired term. 24

On the other hand, respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our
pronouncement of unconstitutionality of the clause "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in Serrano should not apply in this case because
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the rights and
obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is
not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should
be no retroactive application of the law in this case. Moreover, respondents
asseverate that petitioner's tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included
in the computation of the award as petitioner's basic salary, as provided under his
contract, was only US$1,300.00. Respondents submit that the CA erred in its
computation since it included the said tanker allowance. Respondents opine that
petitioner should be entitled only to US$3,900.00 and not to US$4,290.00, as
granted by the CA. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance
should be excluded from the definition of the term "salary." Also, respondents
manifest that the full sum of P878,914.47 in Intermare's bank account was garnished
and subsequently withdrawn and deposited with the NLRC Cashier of Tacloban City on
February 14, 2007. On February 16, 2007, while this case was pending before the CA,
the LA issued an Order releasing the amount of P781,870.03 to petitioner as his
award, together with the sum of P86,744.44 to petitioner's former lawyer as
attorney's fees, and the amount of P3,570.00 as execution and deposit fees. Thus,
respondents pray that the instant petition be denied and that petitioner be
directed to return to Intermare the sum of US$8,970.00 or its peso equivalent. 25
ScTaEA

On this note, petitioner counters that this new issue as to the inclusion of the
tanker allowance in the computation of the award was not raised by respondents
before the LA, the NLRC and the CA, nor was it raised in respondents' pleadings
other than in their Memorandum before this Court, which should not be allowed under
the circumstances. 26

The petition is impressed with merit.

Prefatorily, it bears emphasis that the unanimous finding of the LA, the NLRC and
the CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not
disputed is the tribunals' unanimous finding of bad faith on the part of
respondents, thus, warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. What remains in issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and, necessarily, the proper
computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his
illegal dismissal.

Verily, we have already declared in Serrano that the clause "or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In
an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause,
this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in
that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles
out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. 27

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply
any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 28 Consequently,
petitioner therein was accorded his salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be different from Serrano.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by
Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: HADTEC

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general

rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 29 we held:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an

undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it. 30

Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the
aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he
lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect,
send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may
violate an OFW's security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

In the same vein, we cannot subscribe to respondents' postulation that the tanker
allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the lump-sum
salary to be awarded to petitioner.

First. It is only at this late stage, more particularly in their Memorandum, that
respondents are raising this issue. It was not raised before the LA, the NLRC, and
the CA. They did not even assail the award accorded by the CA, which computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the basic salary of US$1,430.00, and which clearly
included the US$130.00 tanker allowance. Hence, fair play, justice, and due process
dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
They must be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the lower tribunals.
Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties;
consequently, issues not raised before the lower tribunals cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. 31

Second. Respondents' invocation of Serrano is unavailing. Indeed, we made the

following pronouncements in Serrano, to wit:

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime
pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours,
and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days
and holidays. 32 ECDaAc

A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was
not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause,
hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in
their petition for certiorari before the CA averred that petitioner's basic salary,
pursuant to the contract, was "US$1,300.00 + US$130.00 tanker allowance." 33 If
respondents intended it differently, the contract per se should have indicated that
said allowance does not form part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract
should have separated it from the basic salary clause.

A final note.

We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v.

Nayona, 34 this Court held that:

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the
poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums,
trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only
hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate
circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb
mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive.
Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries
below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February
28, 2007 and Resolution dated August 30, 2007 are hereby MODIFIED to the effect
that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months computed at the rate of US$1,430.00
per month. All other awards are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 33-56.

2.Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Pampio

A. Abarintos and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id. at 60-73.

3.Id. at 166-170.

4.Supra note 2, at 63-65.

5.Rollo, pp. 121-129.

6.Id. at 129.

7.Id. at 130-149.

8.The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, provides to
wit:

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. � . . . .

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

9.The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, effective July 15, 1995.

10.371 Phil. 827 (1999).

11.Supra note 7, at 148-149.

12.Rollo, pp. 157-163.

13.Id. at 150-156.

14.Id. at 166-170.

15.Id. at 170.

16.Id. at 171-196.

17.Supra note 2, at 70.

18.Id. at 72-73.

19.Rollo, pp. 96-99.

20.Supra note 1, at 44-45.

21.G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.

22.Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

23.Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution pertinently provides:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

24.Rollo, pp. 312-331.

25.Id. at 290-303.

26.Supra note 24.

27.Supra note 21, at 295.

28.Id. at 303.

29.G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.

30.Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)

31.Ayson v. Vda. De Carpio, 476 Phil. 525, 535 (2004).

32.Supra note 21, at 303. (Emphasis supplied.)

33.Supra note 16, at 173.

34.461 Phil. 429, 431 (2003).

||| (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's Management, G.R. No. 179532, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL
614-629)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-58674-77. July 11, 1986.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO
ABUG, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J p:

The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.
D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:

"(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting,

contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein,
"without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four
separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of
the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would
be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee." 2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of
the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before
us on certiorari. 3

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted
under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b)
is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of
recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in
the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in
Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and

placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two
or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner
argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the
recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body
of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.

Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak
only of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the
requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For
its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are
needed where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment but not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic
rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of
the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule
in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence
that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment
to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words
"shall be deemed" create that presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand
funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed
to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word "shall be
deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or
of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp v. Odin
Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned

provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise
have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be,
and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the
promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their
lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or
not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually
reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino
workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings
or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the
reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and
the four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ. concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 25.

2.Rollo, p. 11.

3.Rollo, p. 1, pp. 20-21, p. 24.

||| (People v. Panis, G.R. No. L-58674-77, [July 11, 1986], 226 PHIL 562-566)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109583. September 5, 1997.]

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA
BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ,
CANDELARIA NONO, NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA
PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR,
NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA,
ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA,
ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO,
respondents.

Romeo Valdecantos & Arreza Law Offices for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's

employees. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00,
but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demand for refund proved unavailing;
thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for
violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. The
Undersecretary of Labor found that the petitioner is liable for 28 counts of
violation of Article 32 and 5 counts of Art. 34(a) and ordered the cancellation of
its license to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers.
The cancellation of petitioner's license was temporarily lifted but the order
revoking its license was reinstated when the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit. The issue presented in the
case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee charging employment
agency. LibLex

The Supreme Court ruled that the power to suspend or cancel any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Authority (POEA) and the Secretary of Labor.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT; POWER TO SUSPEND
OR CANCEL ANY LICENSE OR AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; CONCURRENTLY
VESTED WITH THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA) AND THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR. � The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to
recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended. In the case of Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor, 181 SCRA 110 (1990), we held
that: "The penalties .of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are
prescribed for violations of the abovequoted provisions, among others. And the
Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these
sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to 'restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,' but also to
'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus
granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, 'on its own initiative or upon
filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved
person, . . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension
or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity' for certain
enumerated offenses including � 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or
indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess
of what is prescribed by the Administration, and 2) any other violation of
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations. The Administrator was also given the power to 'order the dismissal of
the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or
contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." This power
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People vs. Diaz,
259 SCRA 441 (1996), viz.: "A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any
person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or
whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or
the Secretary." In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the
power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of
Labor. prLL

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; 1987 POEA REVISED RULES ON THE SCHEDULE OF PENALTIES; DOES NOT
PRESCRIBE ADDITIONAL RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; CASE AT
BAR. � As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987
POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and
hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, this Court agrees with
Secretary Confesor's explanation, to wit: "On the other hand, the POEA Revised
Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor
Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various
violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the
penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains
only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations
governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions
imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts. Under the
circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority
of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA
Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties." cdrep

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J p:

The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-
charging employment agency.

From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a

private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits
for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as
domestic helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur
Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from
P1,000.00 to P14,000.00 but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for
refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints
against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as
amended. liblex

Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents,
and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview
applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the
applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by
respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any
money to unauthorized individuals.

POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was
aware that petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that
they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their
deployment abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of
petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was
leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for
the screening of the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued
that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was
perfectly alright to collect fees.

On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the

assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
following claims:

1. Rosele Castigador
P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon
3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa
3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog
13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira
2,000.00
6. Elma Flores
2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco
2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando
3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma
1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez
1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono
1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante
5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo
1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar
3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton
2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos
2,000.00
17. Sony Jamuat
4,500.00
18. Irma Sobrequil
2,000.00
19. Elsie Penarubia
2,000.00
20. Antonia Navarro
2,000.00
21. Selfa Palma
3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan
13,300.00
23. Paulina Cordero
1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling
2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia
2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida
3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate
1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos
3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo
3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol
1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar
2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero
13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador
14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby
dismissed in view of their desistance.

The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:

1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
5. Virginia Castroverde
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:

1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso

2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32
and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the
aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the
schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the
imposition of the penalty of cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION
OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of
workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED." 2 (Emphasis supplied)

On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of
Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it the authority to engage
in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual
relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and
livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective
assignments. Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure
payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.

Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted

the cancellation of petitioner's license pending resolution of its Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30, 1992, however, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April
5, 1991 order revoking its license was reinstated.

Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.: (1) it is the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the
authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on
the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law
Center.

Under Executive Order No. 797 3 (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O.
No. 247), 4 the POEA was established and mandated to assume the functions of the
Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and
the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES).
Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article
35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.

The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article
35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:

"ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. � The Minister of

Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by
the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National
Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws,
General Orders and Letters of Instructions."

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 5 we held
that:

"The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are

prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the
Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply those
sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to 'restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,' but also to
'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions' governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus
granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, 6 'on its own initiative or upon
filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved
person, . . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension
or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity' for certain
enumerated offenses including �

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money,

goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the
Administration, and

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant
laws, rules and regulations. 7

The Administrator was also given the power to 'order the dismissal of the case or
the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor
or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof.'" 8 (Emphasis supplied)

This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in
People v. Diaz, 9 viz.:

"A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity

which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and
placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary." (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend
or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is
concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.

As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA
Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence,
cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's
explanation, to wit:

"On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued
pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and
particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and
clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned
schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe
additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed
the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated
prohibited acts.

Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the
authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987
POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties." 10

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is
AFFIRMED. No costs. prcd

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1."ART. 32. Fees to be paid by workers. � Any person applying with a private fee-
charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee
until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the appropriate receipt clearly
showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees."

"ART. 34. Prohibited practices. � It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:

(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor,
or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a
loan or advance; . . .

2.Rollo, pp. 43-44.

3.Creating the POEA.

4.Reorganizing the POEA and for other purposes.

5.181 SCRA 110 (1990).

6.Sec. 1, Rule II, Book VI of the New Rules on Overseas Employment.

7.Ibid., Sec. 2 (t).

8.Id., Sec. 12.

9.259 SCRA 441 (1996).

10.Rollo, pp. 27-28.

||| (Trans Action Overseas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 109583, [September
5, 1997], 344 PHIL 125-134)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167639. April 19, 2006.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE

OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), petitioner, vs. PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT
AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Petitioner assails the September 20, 2004 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86170, dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for failure
to attach copies of all relevant pleadings and transcripts of the hearings, as well
as the March 29, 2005 Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration.

This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against Principalia Management and Personnel
Consultants, Incorporated (Principalia) for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations. The first complaint dated July 16, 2003 filed by Ruth Yasmin Concha
(Concha) was docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1497. The second complaint dated
October 14, 2003 filed by Rafael E. Baldoza (Baldoza) was docketed as POEA Case No.
RV 03-07-1453.

In the first complaint, Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied with
Principalia for placement and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the
USA or Canada. Despite paying P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by
Principalia which was not properly receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha
for employment abroad. 3

In its March 15, 2004 Order, 4 the Adjudication Office of the POEA found
Principalia liable for violations of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations,
particularly for collecting a fee from the applicant before employment was
obtained; for non-issuance of official receipt; and for misrepresenting that it was
able to secure employment for Concha. For these infractions, Principalia's license
was ordered suspended for 12 months or in lieu thereof, Pricipalia is ordered to
pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Concha's placement fee of P20,000.00.

Baldoza initiated the second complaint on October 14, 2003 5 alleging that
Principalia assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator with a
monthly salary of $450.00. After paying P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed
for Doha, Qatar on May 31, 2003 but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was made to
work as welder, a job which he had no skills. He insisted that he was hired as
machine operator but the alternative position offered to him was that of helper,
which he refused. Thus, he was repatriated on July 5, 2003. aCIHcD

On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement
with quitclaim and release whereby the latter agreed to redeploy Baldoza for
employment abroad. Principalia, however, failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed hence,
in an Order dated April 29, 2004, 6 the POEA suspended Principalia's documentary
processing.

Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted on June 25, 2004. 7
The latter lifted its order suspending the documentary processing by Principalia
after noting that it exerted efforts to obtain overseas employment for Baldoza
within the period stipulated in the settlement agreement but due to Baldoza's lack
of qualification, his application was declined by its foreign principal.

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, or before the promulgation of POEA's order lifting the
suspension, Principalia filed a Complaint 8 (Complaint) against Rosalinda D. Baldoz
in her capacity as Administrator of POEA and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his
capacity as POEA Conciliator, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City for "Annulment of Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with
Damages and Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction."
Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary processing would ruin
its reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers
and principals. Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory
injunction must be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to it.

On June 14, 2004, 9 Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante of the RTC of Mandaluyong

City, Branch 211, granted a 72-hour restraining order enjoining Administrator
Baldoz and Atty. Abara to refrain from imposing the suspension orders before the
matter can be heard in full. On June 17, 2004, 10 Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali,
RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, held thus:

WHEREFORE, in order to preserve status quo ANTE, the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order is hereby GRANTED enjoining the defendant[s] ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ
and ATTY. JOVENCIO ABARA, other officers of Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, their subordinates, agents, representatives and all other persons
acting for and in their behalf, for (sic) implementing the Orders of Suspension
under VC No. LRD 03-100-95 and POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497.

Let the hearing on Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be

set on June 22, 2004 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED. 11

After the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Administrator Baldoz and Atty.
Abara submitted their Memorandum (Memorandum). 12 In an Order dated July 2, 2004,
13 the trial court held that the issue on the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction has become moot because POEA had already released the renewal of license
of Principalia. However, on the issue against the implementation of the order of
suspension, the trial court resolved, to wit:

Accordingly, the only issue left for the resolution of this Court is whether or not
a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction will lie against the immediate
implementation of the Order of Suspension of License of the Plaintiff dated March
15, 2004 under POEA case No. RV-03-07-1497, issued by the POEA Administrator
Rosalinda D. Baldoz.

In support of its Application for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction,

Plaintiff presented evidence to prove the following:

(1) that it has a license,

(2) that the said license was renewed,

(3) the existence of the two (2) suspension orders subject of this case;

(4) the irreparable damages to the Plaintiff.

The defendants on the other hand did not present evidence to controvert the
evidence of the plaintiff. Instead, defendants submitted a Memorandum.

Upon a careful evaluation and assessment of the evidence by the plaintiff and their
respective memoranda of the parties, this Court finds the need to issue the Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction prayed for by the plaintiff. ISCaTE
It bears stressing that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 is still
pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

It is likewise significant to point out that the said Order dated March 15, 2004
does not categorically state that the suspension of Plaintiff's License is
immediately executory contrary to the contention of the defendants.

Counsel for POEA argued that the basis for the immediate implementation thereof is
Section 5, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, which is quoted
hereunder, as follows:

"Section 5. Stay of Execution. The decision of the Administration shall be stayed

during the pendency of the appeal; Provided that where the penalty imposed carried
the maximum penalty of twelve (12) months suspension o[r] cancellation of license,
the decision shall be immediately executory despite pendency of the appeal."

The Order dated March 15, 2004 decreed Plaintiff as having violated Section 2 (a)
(d) and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations and the Plaintiffs
was imposed the penalty of twelve (12) months suspension of license (or in lieu, to
pay fine of P120,000, it being it[s] first offense).

Violation of Section 2 (a) (d) and (e) Rule I, Part VI of POEA Rules and
Regulations imposes a penalty of two (2) months to six (6) months suspension of
license for the FIRST offender (sic). And in the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the medium range of the imposable penalty which is four
(4) months shall be meted out. Being a first offender, the plaintiff was imposed
suspension of license for four (4) months for each violation or an aggregate period
of suspension for twelve (12) months for the three (3) violations.

It was not however made clear in the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 that
the Plaintiff's case falls under the EXCEPTION under Section 5 Rule V, Part VI of
the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, warranting the immediate implementation
thereof even if an appeal is pending with the POEA.

The Plaintiff had established that even if it has been granted a renewal license,
but if the same is suspended under the March 15, 2004 Order in POEA case No. RV-03-
07-1497, it could not use the license to do business. As earlier mentioned, the
said Order is still pending appeal.

In the meantime that the appeal has not been resolved, Plaintiff's
clients/principals will have to look for other agencies here and abroad, to supply
their needs for employees and workers. The end result would be a tremendous loss
and even closure of its business. More importantly, Plaintiff's reputation would be
tarnished and it would be difficult, if not impossible for it to regain its
existing clientele if the immediate implementation of the suspension of its license
continues.

The defendants and even the POEA, upon the other hand, will not suffer any damage,
if the immediate implementation of the suspension of plaintiff's license as decreed
in the March 15, 2004 Order, is enjoined.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the Plaintiff, the application for the issuance of the
Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction is hereby GRANTED, upon posting of a
bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 500,000.00), enjoining and
restraining the Defendants ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ and Atty. Jovencio Abarra (sic),
other officers of the POEA, their subordinates, agents, representative, and all
other persons acting for and in their behalf, from immediately implementing the
Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 under POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497. DHITCc
The Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction shall be in full force and effect
immediately upon receipt thereof and to be carried out on subsequent days
thereafter pending the termination of this case and/or unless a contrary Order is
issued by this court. 14 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court stressed that it issued the injunctive writ because the order of
suspension dated March 15, 2004 is still pending appeal before the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment; that there is a possibility that Principalia
will suffer tremendous losses and even closure of business pending appeal; that
POEA will not suffer any damage if the immediate implementation of the suspension
of Principalia is enjoined; that the order does not categorically state that the
suspension of the license is immediately executory.

POEA appealed to the Court of Appeals which was dismissed 15 outright for failure
of POEA to attach copies of its Memorandum dated June 30, 2004, as well as the
transcripts of the hearings conducted on June 22, 2004 and June 29, 2004 as
required under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. POEA's motion for
reconsideration was denied 16 hence, this petition on the following grounds:

SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE PETITION
SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE JUDGMENT, ORDER OR RESOLUTION
SUBJECT THEREOF AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELEVANT AND PERTINENT THERETO. PETITIONER
ATTACHED ALL THE DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE PETITION FILED WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS.

II

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENT
PRICIPALIA'S APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF A CLEAR AND CONVINCING RIGHT TO THE RELIEF DEMANDED.

III

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENT PRINCIPALIA'S APPLICATION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE AS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.

IV

THE INJUNCTIVE WRIT ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DOES NOT LIE TO ENJOIN AN
ACCOMPLISHED ACT.

THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS TANTAMOUNT TO THE
REVERSAL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF AN OFFICIAL ACT. 17

The core issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari based on purely technical grounds;
and (2) whether the trial court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction.

POEA avers that the Court of Appeals' Resolution dismissing outright the petition
for certiorari is not valid because the documents attached to the petition
substantially informed the Court of Appeals that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. Thus, the attached documents
were sufficient to render an independent assessment of its improvident issuance.
We disagree. ETDaIC

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari due to POEA's failure to
comply with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:

RULE 46

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with

requirements. � The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of
all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved,
the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief
prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material
dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was
filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of
service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or
ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall
be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized
representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office
involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of
copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all
documents attached to the original.

xxx xxx xxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

RULE 65

SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari. � When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor, any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law a, person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari due
to POEA's failure to attach the following relevant documents: (1) the Memorandum
filed by POEA in the trial court to oppose the Complaint; and (2) the transcripts
of stenographic notes (TSN) of the hearings conducted by the trial court on June
22, 2004 and June 29, 2004. In its motion for reconsideration dated October 13,
2004, 18 POEA only attached the TSN dated June 30, 2004, 19 with the explanation
that the trial court did not furnish it with copies of the other hearings. However,
we note that POEA still failed to attach a copy of the Memorandum which the Court
of Appeals deemed essential in its determination of the propriety of the trial
court's issuance of the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

The allowance of the petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the
Rules is not a novel occurrence in our jurisdiction. 20 Indeed, if we apply the
Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition 21
because the POEA did not demonstrate willingness to comply with the requirements
set by the rules and to submit the necessary documents which the Court of Appeals
need to have a proper perspective of the case. ASTIED

POEA avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction when the requirements to issue the same have
not been met. It asserts that Principalia had no clear and convincing right to the
relief demanded as it had no proof of irreparable damage as required under the
Rules of Court.

We do not agree.

The trial court did not decree that the POEA, as the granting authority of
Principalia's license to recruit, is not allowed to determine Principalia's
compliance with the conditions for the grant, as POEA would have us believe. For
all intents and purposes, POEA can determine whether the licensee has complied with
the requirements. In this instance, the trial court observed that the Order of
Suspension dated March 15, 2004 was pending appeal with the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Thus, until such time that the appeal is
resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia has a clear and convincing right to
operate as a recruitment agency.

Furthermore, irreparable damage was duly proven by Principalia. Suspension of its

license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical
computation, as alleged by POEA. The trial court in its Order stated, thus:

In the meantime that the appeal has not been resolved, Plaintiff's
clients/principals will have to look for other agencies here and abroad, to supply
their needs for employees and workers. The end result would be a tremendous loss
and even closure of its business. More importantly, Plaintiff's reputation would be
tarnished and it would be difficult, if not impossible for it to regain its
existing clientele if the immediate implementation of the suspension of its license
continues. 22

If the injunctive writ was not granted, Principalia would have been labeled as an
untrustworthy recruitment agency before there could be any final adjudication of
its case by the DOLE. It would have lost both its employer-clients and its
prospective Filipino-applicants. Loss of the former due to a tarnished reputation
is not quantifiable. cDTACE

Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory functions over
Principalia because the matter had already been brought to the jurisdiction of the
DOLE. Principalia has been granted the license to recruit and process documents for
Filipinos interested to work abroad. Thus, POEA's action of suspending
Principalia's license before final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and
would amount to a violation of the latter's right to recruit and deploy workers.

Finally, the presumption of regular performance of duty by the POEA under Section 3
(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, finds no application in the case at bar, as it
applies only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain way, and
assumes that the law tells him what his duties are. Therefore the presumption that
an officer will discharge his duties according to law does not apply where his
duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion. 23 The issue
threshed out before the trial court was whether the order of suspension should be
implemented pending appeal. It did not correct a ministerial duty of the POEA. As
such, the presumption on the regularity of performance of duty does not apply.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 43-44. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred
in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a Supreme Court Justice) and
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando.

2.Id. at 45-46. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by

Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.

3.Id. at 105-106.

4.Id. at 110-113.

5.Id. at 107-108.

6.Id. at 131.

7.Id. at 132.

8.Id. at 133-154.

9.Id. at 155.

10.Id. at 156-160.

11.Id. at 159.

12.Id. at 161-177.

13.Id. at 185-188.

14.Id. at 185-187.

15.Id. at 43-44.

16.Id. at 45-46.

17.Id. at 24-25.

18.Id. at 69-73.

19.Id. at 74-104.

20.Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 520, 532 (2003).

21.Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, G.R. No. 146197, June
27, 2005, 461 SCRA 260, 268.

22.Rollo, p. 187.

23.R. Francisco, Basic Evidence, 39 (2nd ed., 1999).

||| (Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc., G.R. No.
167639, [April 19, 2006], 521 PHIL 718-731)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156029. November 14, 2008.]

SANTOSA B. DATUMAN, petitioner, vs. FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION

SERVICES, INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated
August 7, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825, setting aside the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). HCSEIT

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc.
recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms
and conditions:

Site of employment - Bahrain

Employees Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Foreign Employer - Mohammed Sharif
Abbas Ghulam Hussain 2
On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required
placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport when she
arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a
domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to
One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the agreed salary of
US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 3

On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract,

transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the
duration of two (2) years. 4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and
to return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she
continued working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation
from September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued failure and
refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able to finally
return to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration
Department. 5

In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office
against respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay
and refund of her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586. 6
While the case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for
underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of
vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare. EHSITc

When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor
Arbiter, they were required to file their respective position papers, subsequent
pleadings and documentary exhibits.

In its Position Paper, 7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to

work in Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position
available then. However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at
that time, they mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating
petitioner's position as saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually
petitioner herself who violated the terms of their contract when she allegedly
transferred to another employer without respondent's knowledge and approval.
Lastly, respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of action since the
claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right accrued,
reckoned from either 1990 or 1991. 8

On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding
respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering
it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for
fifteen (15) months; and, (b) the amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket, thus:
DAaEIc

From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to resolve in
this case is whether or not complainant is entitled to her monetary claims. AacDHE

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is thus self-
evident that the relationship of the complainant and respondent agency is governed
by the Contract of Employment, the basic terms a covenants of which provided for
the position of saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of
contract for one (1) year. As it is, when the parties � complainant and respondent
Agency � signed and executed the POEA � approved Contract of Employment, this
agreement is the law that governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated from
the terms of the contract by assigning the position of a housemaid to complainant
instead of a saleslady as agreed upon in the POEA-approved Contract of Employment,
respondent Agency committed a breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention
is the fact that respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph 2, Brief
Statement of the Facts and of the Case � admitted that it had entered into an
illegal contract with complainant by proposing the position of a housemaid which
said position was then not allowed by the POEA, by making it appear in the
Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the position of a
saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that the foreign employer had took
advantage to the herein hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same
obviously rendered complainant's continuous employment unreasonable if not
downright impossible. The facts and surrounding circumstances of her ordeal was
convincingly laid down by the complainant in her Position Paper, from which we find
no flaws material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had clearly made out
her case and no amount of persuasion can convince us to tilt the scales of justice
in favor of respondents whose defense was anchored solely on the flimsy allegations
that for a period of more than five (5) years � from 1989 until 1995 � nothing was
heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had no
problem with her employment abroad. We also find that the pleadings and the annexes
filed by the parties reveal a total lapse on the part of respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions � their failure to support with substantial
evidence their contention that complainant transferred from one employer to another
without knowledge and approval of respondent agency in contravention of the terms
of the POEA approved Employment Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its
disquisition on the alleged "contracts" signed by the complainant that she agreed
with the terms of said contracts � one (1) year duration only and as a housemaid �
to support its contention that complainant violated the contract agreement by
transferring from one employer to another on her own volition without the knowledge
and consent of respondent agency. To us, this posture of respondent agency is
unavailing. These "documents" are self-serving. We could not but rule that the same
were fabricated to tailor-fit their defense that complainant was guilty of
violating the terms of the Employment Contract. Consequently, we could not avoid
the inference of a more logical conclusion that complainant was forced against her
will to continue with her employment notwithstanding the fact that it was in
violation of the original Employment Contract including the illegal withholding of
her passport.

With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency failed to discharge
the burden of proving with substantial evidence that complainant violated the terms
of the Employment Contract, thus negating respondent Agency's liability for
complainant's money claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to
show that complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage differentials or
have already received the same from respondent. As such, we are perforce
constrained to grant complainant's prayer for payment of salary differentials
computed as follows:

January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)

US$370.00 agreed salary

US$100.00 actual paid salary

US$270.00 balance

US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00

We are also inclined to grant complainant's entitlement to a refund of her plane

ticket in the amount of BD180 Bahrain Dinar or the equivalent in Philippine
Currency at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment. SHCaDA

Anent complainant's claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay, we cannot,
however, grant the same for failure on the part of complainant to prove with
particularity the months that she was not granted vacation leave and the day
wherein she did render overtime work.

Also, we could not grant complainant's prayer for award of damages and attorney's
fees for lack of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondent

Agency liable for violating the term of Employment Contract and respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions is hereby ordered:

To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND FIFTY (US$4,050.00), or its
equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary
differentials for fifteen (15) months;

To pay complainant the amount of BD180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the
time of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket;

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 9 (emphasis supplied)

On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision 10 affirming with

modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of
salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:

Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than
April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her
complaint on May 31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since
the cause of action for salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due,
it is clear that only the claims for the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have not
yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate of US$370.00 vis-�-vis the amount of
salary received which was $100.00, complainant is entitled to the salary
differential for the said period in the amount of $2,970.00. IHcTDA

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed

Decision by reducing the award of salary differentials to $2,970.00 to the
complainant.

The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 11

On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

On August 2, 2000, 12 the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

On October 20, 2000, 13 however, the CA reinstated the petition upon respondent's
motion for reconsideration. 14

On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision 15 granting the petition and
reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:

Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the
local agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all
claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability
compensation and repatriation.

Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent

"for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed
prescribed." It must be noted that petitioner company is privy only to the first
contract. Granting arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign
principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in the
execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion that the same would,
at the most, extend only up to the expiration of the second contract or until 01
September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995
had prescribed. STIcEA

However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only having abused its
discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all, in declaring private
respondent entitled to salary differentials. After decreeing the money claims
accruing before April 1993 as having prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to
hold petitioner company for salary differentials after that period. To reiterate,
the local agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for
all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of
the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious consideration, we so hold that it is
only in connection with the first contract. The provisions in number 2, Section 10
(a), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f),
Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations were not made to make the
local agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts that may be done by the
foreign principal or the direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the
principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability extend. In Catan v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was held that the
responsibilities of the local agent and the foreign principal towards the
contracted employees under the recruitment agreement extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.

xxx xxx xxx

Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February 2000 and the
Resolution dated 23 June 2000 of respondent Commission in NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are
hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. 16

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 17 thereon was denied in the assailed

Resolution 18 dated November 14, 2002.

Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ABANDONED THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION. IADaSE

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT AGENCY
IS ONLY A [sic] PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE PETITIONER ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is
not liable for the monetary claims of petitioner as the claim had already
prescribed and had no factual basis.

Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not holding respondent
liable for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.

We grant the petition.

On whether respondent is solidarily liable

for petitioner's monetary claims

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. � Every applicant for license to

operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written
application together with the following requirements:

xxx xxx xxx

f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and
liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract;
including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation
and repatriation. (emphasis supplied) ADECcI

The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer. 19 This Court has, time and again,
ruled that private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with
the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment. 20 This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against
recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker
of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. 21 This is in line with the
policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.

In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law
and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter. As the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and
solidarily liable with the latter's principal employer abroad for her
(petitioner's) money claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all
the claims and liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-approved
Contract of Employment.

We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent
extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which
had a term of until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the
foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and
any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term,
against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-
approved contract. To accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even
more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and
local recruiters, since the recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated
solidary liability for breaches of the POEA-approved contract by colluding with
their foreign principals in substituting the approved contract with another upon
the worker's arrival in the country of employment. Such outcome is certainly
contrary to the State's policy of extending protection and support to our overseas
workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or
alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved
and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. 22 ECTHIA

Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract
of Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant
consideration. It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC � which,
significantly, the CA did not disturb � that petitioner was forced to work long
after the term of her original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of
the foreign employer.

In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, 23 we held that the

subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her
foreign employer which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is
void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said
side agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract
approved by the POEA.

Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from
US$370.00 to US$100 (BD40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved
contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment.
Consequently, the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign
employer for petitioner's money claims continues although she was forced to sign
another contract in Bahrain. It is the terms of the original POEA-approved
employment contract that shall govern the relationship of petitioner with the
respondent recruitment agency and the foreign employer. We agree with the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC that the precepts of justice and fairness dictate that
petitioner must be compensated for all months worked regardless of the supposed
termination of the original contract in April 1990. It is undisputed that
petitioner was compelled to render service until April 1993 and for the entire
period that she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally appointed
successor, she should have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in
accordance with her original contract. HTSIEa

Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which
forced petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws and under the most
oppressive conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot
give credence to this claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew
from the outset that the contract submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be
the "real" contract. Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a
contract stating that the position to be filled by petitioner is that of
"Saleslady" although she was to be employed as a domestic helper since the latter
position was not approved for deployment by the POEA at that time. Respondent's
evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the laws and regulations on migrant
workers belie its protestations of innocence and put petitioner in a position where
she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what indeed happened to
her in this case.

We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or

ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign
principals, as if the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the
worker. In the light of the recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several
liability with the foreign employer for all claims in connection with the
implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment agency's responsibility to
ensure that the terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved by the
POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its foreign
client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being haled
to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its
foreign principal. IaEACT

On whether petitioner's claims for

underpaid salaries have prescribed

It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that
petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of
months for which salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand,
held that all of petitioner's monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article
291 of the Labor Code which provides that:

Art. 291. Money Claims. � All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from
the time that cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
(emphasis supplied)

We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had
already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from
September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her
will. As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for
underpayment of salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid
salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due. 24
Thus, petitioner's cause of action to claim salary differential for October 1989
only accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of
October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only
accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until
April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that
the extent of respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original
contract or, at most, to the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the
participation of respondent's foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed
previously the reasons why (a) the CA's theory of limited liability on the part of
respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to be compensated for
all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine for which months
petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count
three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims
accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on May
31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months. 25

We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner
at US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary rate - US$100.00 as salary received =
US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11 months). However, it should be for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as erroneously
stated in the NLRC's Decision.

A final note

This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to
guarantee our overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs
with bona fide employers. Local agencies should never allow themselves to be
instruments of exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of
foreign employers. Indeed, being the ones who profit most from the exodus of
Filipino workers to find greener pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to
ensure the welfare of the very people that keep their industry alive. CAaSHI

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification with respect to the
award of salary differentials, which should be granted for the period May 31, 1992
to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, ** Austria-Martinez, *** Corona and Carpio-Morales, *** JJ., concur.

Puno, C.J., is on official leave.

Footnotes

1.Penned by then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Mario L. Guarina III. HcaDTE

2.Annexes B-B-2, Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo at 79-81.

3.Id.

4.Annex "A", CA Rollo at 77.

5.Petition for Review in the CA, CA Rollo.

6.Rollo at 86.

7.CA Petition-Annex "H", CA Rollo.

8.Id., at 97-98.

9.Rollo at 108-113.

10.Promulgated on February 24, 2000, penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay

and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul Aquino and Commissioner Angelita
Gacutan. cEHSIC

11.Rollo at 161.

12.CA Rollo at 45.

13.Id., at 91.

14.Id., at 91-92.

15.Id., at 37-43.

16.Rollo at 41-42.

17.CA Rollo at 121-133.

18.Id., at 46-47.
19.Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co., S.A.
v. Jerry Maguad and Porferio Ceudadano, G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA
639, 668. SATDHE

20.Hellenic Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, G.R. No. 84082, March 13, 1991, 195
SCRA 179, 186; Empire Insurance Company v. NLRC, G.R. 121879, August 14, 1998, 294
SCRA 263, 271-272.

21.P.I. Manpower Placements, Inc. v. NLRC (Second Division), G.R. No. 97369, July
31, 1997, 276 SCRA 451, 461.

22.Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, June

26, 2006, 492 SCRA 761. EcTCAD

23.Id., citing Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, G.R. No. 109808, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 73.

24.NLRC Decision, Rollo at 160.

25.As an aside, this Court notes that in petitioner's complaint filed with the
Labor Arbiter, she only claims underpayment of salaries and did not include
nonpayment of salaries as one of her causes of action. Subsequently, in her
position paper and other pleadings, petitioner asserts that she was not paid any
salary at all from September 1991 to April 1993. However, under the NLRC Rules of
Procedure, parties are barred from alleging or proving causes of action in the
position paper that are not found/alleged in the complaint. Thus, the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC only granted petitioner salary differentials as she herself prayed for
in her complaint. cEAaIS

**Acting Chairperson of the First Division as per Special Order No. 534.

***Additional Member as per Special Order No. 535. CaESTA

||| (Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, Inc., G.R. No.
156029, [November 14, 2008], 591 PHIL 662-678)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 177498. January 18, 2012.]

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT,

petitioners, vs. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Decision 2 of the
First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91632 dated 31 January
2007, denying the petition for certiorari filed by Stolt-Nielsen Transportation
Group, Inc. and Chung Gai Ship Management (petitioners) and affirming the
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision
promulgated on February 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 27, 2005 are
AFFIRMED. 3

The facts as gathered by this Court follow:

On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the

Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for
failure to deploy under a second contract. In his complaint-affidavit, 4 respondent
alleged that:

1. On 6 November 1991 (First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine

Services, Inc. on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as
Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of
nine (9) months;

2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime pay
of $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment period
commencing on 6 November 1991;

3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV "Stolt Aspiration";

4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while
the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship's master to disembark the
vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation;

5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner's office

where he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV "Stolt Pride"
under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract; aTADcH

6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA;

7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified
the Second Employment Contract on 18 September 1992.

8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners

failed to deploy him with the vessel MV "Stolt Pride";

9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with the
Second Employment Contract.

10. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seaman's book and other
employment documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in
exchange of his signing a document;

11. He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without these
documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.

He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees for
his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners' bad faith in not complying
with the Second Contract.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

The parties were required to submit their respective position papers before the
Labor Arbiter. However, petitioners failed to submit their respective pleadings
despite the opportunity given to them. 5

On 21 July 2000, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a judgment 6 finding

that the respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the

respondents guilty of constructively dismissing the complainant by not honoring the
employment contract. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered jointly and
solidarily to pay complainant the following:

1. $12,537.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. 7

The Labor Arbiter found the first contract entered into by and between the
complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the execution of the second
contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract
but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second contract. 8
However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for
moral and exemplary damages. 9

The petitioners appealed the adverse decision before the National Labor Relations
Commission assailing that they were denied due process, that the respondent cannot
be considered as dismissed from employment because he was not even deployed yet and
the monetary award in favor of the respondent was exorbitant and not in accordance
with law. 10

On 28 February 2003, the NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby, MODIFIED BY

DELETING the award of overtime pay in the total amount of Three Thousand Six
Hundred Thirty Six US Dollars (US $3,636.00).

In all other respects, the assailed decision so stands as, AFFIRMED. 11

Before the NLRC, the petitioners assailed that they were not properly notified of
the hearings that were conducted before the Labor Arbiter. They further alleged
that after the suspension of proceedings before the POEA, the only notice they
received was a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 12

The NLRC ruled that records showed that attempts to serve the various notices of
hearing were made on petitioners' counsel on record but these failed on account of
their failure to furnish the Office of the Labor Arbiter a copy of any notice of
change of address. There was also no evidence that a service of notice of change of
address was served on the POEA. 13 aTcIEH

The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure on
the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their non-
deployment of the respondent. 14 It denied the claim of the petitioners that the
monetary award should be limited only to three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term of the contract. It ruled that the factual incidents material to the
case transpired within 1991-1992 or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8042
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 which provides for such
limitation. 15

However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award with respect to the
deletion of the overtime pay due to the non-deployment of the respondent. 16

The Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated 27 July 2005. 17

The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when it affirmed with
modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. They prayed that the Decision and
Resolution promulgated by the NLRC be vacated and another one be issued dismissing
the complaint of the respondent.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the Decision of
the labor tribunal.

The Court's Ruling

The following are the assignment of errors presented before this Court:

I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SECOND CONTRACT NOVATED THE FIRST
CONTRACT.

1. THERE WAS NO NOVATION OF THE FIRST CONTRACT BY THE SECOND CONTRACT; THE
ALLEGATION OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST CONTRACT MUST BE RESOLVED
SEPARATELY FROM THE ALLEGATION OF FAILURE TO DEPLOY UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT.

2. THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST CONTRACT TRANSPIRED MORE THAN
THREE (3) YEARS AFTER THE CASE WAS FILED AND THEREFORE HIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED FOR BEING BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL UNDER THE
SECOND CONTRACT.

1. IT IS LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL WHEN THE EMPLOYMENT HAS

NOT YET COMMENCED.

2. ASSUMING THERE WAS OMISSION UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT, PETITIONERS CAN ONLY BE
FOUND AS HAVING FAILED IN DEPLOYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT BUT WITH VALID REASON.

III.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT EVEN ASSUMING THERE WAS BASIS FOR
HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR "FAILURE TO DEPLOY" RESPONDENT, THE POEA RULES
PENALIZES SUCH OMISSION WITH A MERE "REPRIMAND." 18

The petitioners contend that the first employment contract between them and the
private respondent is different from and independent of the second contract
subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila.

We do not agree.

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of

the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either
by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in
place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the
creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following
requisites is indispensable: HSTaEC

1. There must be a previous valid obligation,

2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,

3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and

4. There must be the validity of the new contract. 19

In its ruling, the Labor Arbiter clarified that novation had set in between the
first and second contract. To quote:

. . . [T]his office would like to make it clear that the first contract entered
into by and between the complainant and the respondents is deemed to have been
novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot
be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the
breach of the second contract. 20

This ruling was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision ruling that:

Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, it is evident that novation took place in
this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished the first contract by
agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who was
unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The second contract would not
have been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and conditions of
Madequillo, Jr.'s employment under the first contract. The records also reveal that
the 2nd contract extinguished the first contract by changing its object or
principal. These contracts were for overseas employment aboard different vessels.
The first contract was for employment aboard the MV "Stolt Aspiration" while the
second contract involved working in another vessel, the MV "Stolt Pride."
Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr. accepted the terms and conditions of the second
contract. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the first contract was a "previous
valid contract" since it had not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo,
Jr.'s repatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been
resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract
when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As such, the NLRC
correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second
contract. 21

We concur with the finding that there was a novation of the first employment
contract.

We reiterate once more and emphasize the ruling in Reyes v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 22 to wit:

. . . [F]indings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of
facts.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which

have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought
not to be altered, modified or reversed.(Emphasis supplied) 23

With the finding that respondent "was still employed under the first contract when
he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract", 24 novation became an
unavoidable conclusion.
Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported
by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 25 But these findings are
not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. 26 In this
case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in
their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.

We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by the Court of
Appeals with its ruling that recovery of damages under the first contract was
already time-barred. Thus:

Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr.
may initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his
repatriation. . . . The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must
therefore be reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo Jr.'s own admission was
the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at this point in time that
Medequillo Jr.'s cause of action already accrued under the first contract. He had
until February 1995 to pursue a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from
the 1st contract. With the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995,
which was clearly beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st
contract was already time-barred. 27 ATHCDa

The issue that proceeds from the fact of novation is the consequence of the non-
deployment of respondent.

The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the
seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. 28 We
agree with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the
perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners.

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. 29 The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. 30

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence "upon
the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of
hire." 31 We adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the
valid prior stipulations of the parties before the controversy started. Else, the
obligatory force of every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law. 32

Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only "upon actual
departure of the seafarer", this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in
case of non-deployment without any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of
the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of respondent while on board the
first ship MV "Stolt Aspiration" cannot be sustained to justify the non-deployment,
for no evidence to prove the same was presented. 33

We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection
of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof,
occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well
as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-
employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner
been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the
employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of
which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the
reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as
agreed upon, he would be liable for damages. 34

Further, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the penalty is
a mere reprimand.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment 35 dated 31 May 1991
provides for the consequence and penalty against in case of non-deployment of the
seafarer without any valid reason. It reads:

Section 4. Worker's Deployment. � An agency shall deploy its recruits within the
deployment period as indicated below:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Thirty (30) calendar days from the date of processing by the administration of
the employment contracts of seafarers.

Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid
reasons shall be a cause for suspension or cancellation of license or fine. In
addition, the agency shall return all documents at no cost to the worker. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty of reprimand 36 provided under
Rule IV, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers is not applicable in this case. The
breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time
was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty
for non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated by
reason of the unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners? DSTCIa

The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do not provide
for the award of damages to be given in favor of the employees. The claim provided
by the same law refers to a valid contractual claim for compensation or benefits
arising from employer-employee relationship or for any personal injury, illness or
death at levels provided for within the terms and conditions of employment of
seafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of
damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from
claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the
suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no
cost to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not forfend a seafarer from
instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed
to deploy him. 37

We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment. The law provides:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. � Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar
days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages. . . . (Underscoring supplied)

Following the law, the claim is still cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC
under the second phrase of the provision.

Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides
that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner
actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months' worth of salary as
provided in the contract. 38 This is but proper because of the non-deployment of
respondent without just cause. STHAaD

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 31 January 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 91632 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Petitioners are hereby
ordered to pay Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr., the award of actual damages equivalent to
his salary for nine (9) months as provided by the Second Employment Contract.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, * JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 1174 dated 9 January 2012.

1.Rule 45, Rule on Civil Procedure.

2.Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a Member of this Court)
with Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (former Member of this Court) and Associate
Justice Arcangelita Romilla Lontok, concurring. Rollo, pp. 38-54.

3.Id. at 53.

4.Id. at 134-139.

5.Id. at 61.

6.Id. at 59-62.

7.Id. at 62.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 64.

11.Id. at 68.

12.Id. at 64-65.

13.Id. at 65.

14.Id. at 66.
15.Id. at 67.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 72.

18.Id. at 20-21.

19.Philippine Savings Bank v. Sps. Ma�alac, Jr., 496 Phil. 671, 686-687 (2005);
Azolla Farms v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 745, 754-755.

20.Rollo, p. 61.

21.Id. at 45-46.

22.G.R. No. 160233, 8 August 2007, 529 SCRA 487.

23.Id. at 494 and 499.

24.Rollo, p. 46.

25.Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, 12 January 2011, 639 SCRA
312, 324 citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 188882, 30 March 2010, 617 SCRA 204.

26.Id. at 324-325 citing Faeldonia v. Tong Yak Groceries, G.R. No. 182499, 2
October 2009, 602 SCRA 677, 684.

27.Rollo, pp. 47-48.

28.Id. at 48.

29.Article 1305, New Civil Code.

30.Article 1306, New Civil Code.

31.Rollo, p. 48.

32.Article 1315, New Civil Code.

33.Rollo, p. 50.

34.Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., G.R. No. 162419, 10 July 2007, 527
SCRA 165, 176.

35.Section 4, par.(b), Rule II, Book III.

36.Section 1 (C) 4. Failure to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without
valid reason:

1st Offense � Reprimand.

37.Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., Supra note 33 at 176-177.

38.In Legahi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 557, 566 (1999), we
held: Petitioner's dismissal without a valid cause constitute a breach of contract.
Consequently, he should only be paid the unexpired portion of his employment
contract.
||| (Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. v. Medequillo, Jr., G.R. No. 177498,
[January 18, 2012], 679 PHIL 297-313)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,

accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Daryll A. Amante for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Erlie Ramos, an attorney of the POEA, received a call from an unidentified woman
inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos conferred with the CIS to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. The group planned the entrapment the next day with Eileen Fermindoza to
pose as an applicant. The plan materialized the next day, which caused the CIS team
to bring Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and three women applicants to the
office for investigation. In the course of the investigation, it turned out that
Figueroa had many aliases, among them Carol Llena and Carol de la Piedra. A check
by Ramos with the POEA revealed that she was not licensed nor authorized to conduct
recruitment. Figueroa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of illegal
recruitment in Large Scale. Denial comprised the accuseds' defense. The trial court
convicted the accused and sentenced her to life imprisonment. Accused-appellant
questioned her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assailed the
constitutionality of the law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of
the accused, but reduced the penalty imposed upon her. According to the Court,
considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the
undertaking of the activity constituting recruitment and placement are present,
appellant, at the very least, was liable for simple illegal recruitment. A
conviction for large-scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each
case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a
group. In this case, only two persons were proven to have been recruited by the
appellant. Hence, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was modified. Appellant
was found guilty of illegal recruitment on two counts and was sentenced to 4 years
to 6 years imprisonment on each count.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; VOID FOR VAGUENESS. � Due
process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or
indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 13(b) OF LABOR CODE NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS. � While
the Court, in People vs. Panis, bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed
light on the meaning of the proviso in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code."whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee,
the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by
applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the
law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly vague act" whose
obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched
in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for
vagueness. CTSAaH

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OVERBREADTH; CASE AT BAR. � A statute may be said to be
overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or
religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot
be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it
fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. . .
. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of "recruitment
and placement" that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.

4. ID.; ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; A STATUTE NONDISCRIMINATORY ON ITS FACE BUT
GROSSLY DISCRIMINATORY IN ITS OPERATION; PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF LAW MAY BE
CONSIDERED A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION ONLY WHEN THE ELEMENT OF INTENTIONAL AND
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION BE PRESENT; ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. � At the
outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the
statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory
effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in
its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. The prosecution
of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is
not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous
or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute,
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal
application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with
respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic
evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the
action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a
showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed to show
that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional
discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL

DUTIES; CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY BY PROOF TO THE CONTRARY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
� The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment
whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has
committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly
performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the
contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence
to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was
charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangue�a, the guilty party in
appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the
prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT; ELEMENTS. �

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13
(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.In
case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the
accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. � In this case, the first element is
present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that
appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement. The
second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and
placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes
Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their
testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing conducted by
appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown
that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The
absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of
the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that
their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL, NON-RECEIPT OF PAYMENTS AND FRAME-UP; NOT AVAILING
AS DEFENSES; RATIONALE. � Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony. That
appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of
no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of recruitment may be "for
profit or not"; it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee
employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. . . The claim of
"frameup," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove. Apart from her
self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed
framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law
enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DONE IN LARGE SCALE; CONVICTION THEREOF MUST BE BASED ON THE
FINDINGS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN EACH CASE OF THE THREE OR MORE PERSONS
RECRUITED; ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. � A conviction for large scale illegal
recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three
or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only two persons,
Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third
person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee,
Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify. It is true that law does not
require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence. proving that the offense was committed
against three or more persons. In this case, evidence that appellant likewise
promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove
this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends,
Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she and her "friends")
filled up application forms. The affidavit Baez executed jointly with Araneta
cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its
contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant
recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible. In any case,
hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has little probative value. Neither
can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the
other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of
recruiting only the three persons named in the information � Araneta, Modesto and
Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in
the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to
have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Courts may consider
a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered, and the purpose
of the offer of their testimonies did not include the proving of the purported
recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J p:

Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal

recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.

The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the
accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.

The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an
information alleging:

That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a
fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto
[y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to
apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of
P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which
did not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the
said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic
sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale. 1

Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty 2 to these charges.

At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos,
SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The
succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:

On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an
unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a
certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of
suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz,
Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon
arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house
and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement,
from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos
even heard a woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible
employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants
have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-
data form in hand.

On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo
Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a
certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day
by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant. 3

On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2
Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National Police who was assigned as
an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the
report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza,
immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house where the
recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two people
who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their
office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team
to conduct the raid.

The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a
certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that
morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded
to enter the house while the rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure
the area Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form,
which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house. 4

Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently

the owners of the house, and went inside. There, she saw another woman, later
identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza
earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was applying for a
position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her that she would just
get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked Fermindoza what position she was
applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a baby-sitter or any
other work so long as she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application
form.

A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that
Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements were and
whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a
passport, she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza replied that she had
no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the
passport for her. While filling up the application form, three women who appeared
to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and
to give their advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put them on top of a
small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding
party by raising her hand. HaDEIc

Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to
enter the same. The owners granted permission after the raiding party introduced
themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some
supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were in the hands of one
Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit.
Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza
nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was
holding as the raiding party seized the other papers 5 on the table. 6

The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three
women suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation. 7

In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had
many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra The accused was not
able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators. 8 A check
by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the accused was not licensed or authorized to
conduct recruitment. 9 A certification 10 dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was
executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.

The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy
Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, who executed their respective written statements. 11

At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's
house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino,
also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job
applicants for Singapore.

Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's
house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit down. They
listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people. The
recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her
friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a
transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be
salary deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same
afternoon, but did not give any money because she was "not yet sure."

On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro
residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at the
house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at
the porch when it happened. 12

Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30,
1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was someone recruiting in
Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by
Jasmine.

Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she
arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like a "good opportunity" since a
hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for
the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the
processing of papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by
salary deduction.

Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the
interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes
that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes
went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave back the money to
Lourdes after the raid. 13

Denial comprised the accused's defense.

Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a
businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grolier
International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging
to the students.

The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first
traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the
Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore
on December 10, 1993.

On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas
party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that occasion, she met a
certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in
Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of
Carol.

According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then
seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father received the money
so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She
informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro.
Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone number, address and a sketch of how to
get there.

The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the
accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents to her
friends.

On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's
cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At around noon that
day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house
where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of
her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the
accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.

The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had
sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked Carol to tell
Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her
that she would send something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore.
The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City,
and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused
went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen
(15) minutes.

On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in
the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then proceeded to
Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 am.

Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?"
The accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for her. The woman
inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative,
explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further
asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore.
Carol replied that she would need a passport.

Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The
woman Carol was talking with then stood up and went out. A minute after, three (3)
members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a
member of the CIS and informed her that they received a call that she was
recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied
this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the house, and
to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them
her ticket for Cebu City.

Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The
accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to
give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted
to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was
to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their
office.

The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in
recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom
she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied
she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement.
She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as
processing fee. 14

The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.

The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first
time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen
Malicay's message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a
certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol
came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning
to "get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.

Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the
accused conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-
data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding
the P2,000 application fee. 15

The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the
accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4)
days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he
did not notice that she conducted any recruitment. 16

On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the
accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.

Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the
period of her detention during the pendency of this case under the condition set
forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED. 17

The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,]
AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM
COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION
2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE
III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N
FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME
COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;

[IV]

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N
FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;

VI

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO
WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;

VII

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED
IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2,
1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic]
COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;

VIII

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY
SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;

IX

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic]
SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED
BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID
NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE
BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 18

In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment
and placement" violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth
assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws. EHSADc

We shall address the issues jointly.

Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and
placement" is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. 19

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties. 20 A criminal statute that "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and
erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. 21 The constitutional vice
in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on
trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. 22

We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario: 23

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

We added, however, that:

. . . the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it
illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some
people but does not annoy others.'"

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose
obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise language � but which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrased � in which case, it may be "saved" by proper
construction.

Here, the provision in question reads:

ARTICLE 13. Definitions. � (a) . . . .

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

xxx xxx xxx

When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment

activities are punishable as follows:

ARTICLE 38. Illegal Recruitment. � (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

xxx xxx xxx

ARTICLE 39. Penalties. � (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:

(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to

violate any provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations,
shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title
found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations
shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more
than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

xxx xxx xxx

In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant
invokes People vs. Panis, 24 where this Court, to use appellant's term,
"criticized" the definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows:

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned

provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise
have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without
previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own
counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.

If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned

provision," appellant asks, what more "the ordinary citizen" who does not possess
the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"

Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement"
suffer from overbreadth since by merely "referring" a person for employment, a
person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

These contentions cannot be sustained.

Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was
whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment
could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee." The Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic
rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of
the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule
in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence
that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment
to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words
"shall be deemed" create that presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand
funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed
to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word "shall be
deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or
of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned

provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise
have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without
previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own
counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino
workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings
or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the
reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt
quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of
records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of
such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing
from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a
"perfectly vague act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the
proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper
construction. It is not void for vagueness.

An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and
uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable
to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature
intended. . . . . In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that
"legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible
of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will
not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense
and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith." 25

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary

and harmless acts such as "labor or employment referral" ("referring" an applicant,
according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render
the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of

individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the
freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish
conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to
the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of
the statute. 26

In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, 27 for instance, we struck down as
void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in
any place � including private vehicles � other than in the common poster areas
sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived
the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of
his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was
so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void
for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of "recruitment
and placement" that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.

Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause 28 in her defense. She points
out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out
application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the
only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From
this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds
of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangue�a, and
the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

The argument has no merit.

At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of
the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. 29 Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 30

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. 31 Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. 32 The unlawful administration by officers of a statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to
be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be
present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may
appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or
person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory
design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional
discrimination." 33 Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in
court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the
prosecuting officials.

The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment

whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has
committed an offense. 34 The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly
performed their duties, 35 and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to
the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any
evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a
Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangue�a, the
guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion
that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.

While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before
the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of
crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal
enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the
guilty at the expense of society . . . . Protection of the law will be extended to
all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has
the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. 36

Likewise,

[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons
should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result would
be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in
the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law
would suffer a complete breakdown. 37

We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve
the finding of guilt by the trial court.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of '"recruitment and placement" defined under Article
13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added:
that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or
as a group. 39

In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-
Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage in
recruitment and placement. TSEcAD

The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment

and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes
Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their
testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing conducted by
appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown
that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The
absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of
the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that
their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 40

Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact
asserted easily overrides negative testimony. 41

That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment
is of no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of recruitment may be
"for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee
employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses,
meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed
recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into the
second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and
the seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the
effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so seized are
rendered inadmissible in evidence. 42 Here, even if the documents seized were
deemed inadmissible, her conviction would stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's
testimonies.

Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth
assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly "planted" the application
forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a
lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.

The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed
by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove.
43 Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence
that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at any motive for
Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 44

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the
undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present,
appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is
she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not.

A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each
case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a
group. 45 In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have
been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been
promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to
testify.

It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the
trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that
the offense was committed against three or more persons. 46 In this case, evidence
that appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only
evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said
that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that
they (she and her "friends") filled up application forms.

The affidavit 47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Araneta's
testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed, by
Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the
affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible. 48 In any case, hearsay evidence, such as
the said affidavit, has little probative value. 49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or
even the other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is
accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information � Araneta,
Modesto and Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons
present in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To
convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those
alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. 50

In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and
Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows:

FISCAL BELDUA:

Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of
those recruited by the accused, and also to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify the accused. 51

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL BELDUA:

We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the
fact about her recruitment by the accused and immediately before the recruitment,
as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in
this case, Your Honor. 52

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL BELDUA:

This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was
connected with the CIS, that she was instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to
be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well
as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution. 53

xxx xxx xxx

Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was
offered, 54 and the purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not include the
proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.

Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally
defective since it charges her with committing illegal recruitment in large scale
on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she
committed the crime on February 2, 1994.

We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission
of the crime does not vary from that charged in the information. Both Nancy Araneta
and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro
residence, appellant offered them employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was
effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime had already been committed three (3)
days earlier on January 30, 1994.

The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well as the constitutionality of the law
prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being
unduly harsh. 55

The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because
the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed recruitment and
placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment
in large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more
persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of "simple" illegal
recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for
that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to
suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that
the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is

hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced,
for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment
and to pay a fine P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Records, p. 1.

2.Id., at 28.

3.TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 3-13, 26-39.

4.TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 7-14, 35-36, 82-88, 102-110.

5.The documents seized include: Exhibit "C," the application form of one Josilyn
Villa, consisting of four (4) pages; Exhibit "D," the application form of one
Shirley Estrada, consisting of nine (9) pages; Exhibit "E," the application form of
one Cora Iglesia, with an annex of nine (9) pages; Exhibit "F," the application
form of Jocelyn Santos. Exhibit "G," the application form of Jennifer Alejandro;
Exhibit "H," the application form of one Geraldine Reyes; Exhibit "I," the
application form of Lilibeth Estrada, consisting of six (6) pages; Exhibit "J," is
the application form of Geraldine Sunga; Exhibit "K," is the diploma of Shirley
Estrada, together with a photocopy of her passport; Exhibit "L," a certification
that Jasmine Alejandro rendered services as Staff Nurse with the Camp Navarro
General Hospital.

6.TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 88-101, 110-124.

7.TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 28-34.

8.TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 18-19; TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 18.

9.TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 21-22.

10.Exhibit "A."

11.Exhibits "M" and "N." Araneta and Baez executed a "Joint Affidavit."

12.TSN, August 15, 1994, pp. 4-18.

13.Id., at 21-35.

14.TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 5-39.

15.TSN, September 28, 1994, pp. 4-8.

16.TSN, October 13, 1994, pp. 2-7.

17.Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 24.

18.Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 1-4.

19.CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 1.

20.Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 70 L Ed 322 46 S Ct 126

(1926).

21.Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US 379, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675 (1979).

22.American Communications Asso. v. Douds, 339 US 382, 94 L Ed 925, 70 S Ct 674

(1950).

23.165 SCRA 186 (1988).

24.142 SCRA 664 (1986).

25.People vs. Rosenthal and Osme�a, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).

26.Wright vs. Georgia, 373 US 284,10 L Ed 2d 349,83 S Ct 1240 (1963).

27.207 SCRA 712 (1992).

28.CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 1.

29.American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 US 637,48 L Ed 2d 263,96 S Ct 1800

(1976).

30.Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356,30 L Ed 1012, 18 S Ct 583 (1886), cited in Genaro

Reyes Construction, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 16 (1994).

31.Application of Finn, 356 P.2d 685 (1960).

32.Snowden v. Hughes, 321 US 1, 88 L Ed 497, 64 S Ct 397 (1943).

33.Ibid.

34.Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 292 SCRA 452 (1998).

35.RULES OF COURT, RULE 131, SEC. 5 (m).

36.People v. Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).

37.State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 (1958).

38.Abaca vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 657 (1998); Darvin vs. Court of Appeals,
292 SCRA 534 (1998); People vs. Juego, 298 SCRA 22 (1998).

39.People vs. Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319 (1998); People vs. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 92
(1998); People vs. Sanchez, 291 SCRA 333 (1998); People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715
(1998); People vs. Ganaden, 299 SCRA 433 (1998).

40.People vs. Badozo, 215 SCRA 33 (1992).

41.People vs. Santos, 276 SCRA 329 (1997).

42.E.g, Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)

43.Espano vs. Court of Appeals, supra; People vs. Alegro, 275 SCRA 216 (1997).

44.Marco vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 276 (1997).

45.People vs. Reyes, 242 SCRA 264 (1995).

46.People vs. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180 (1997).

47.Exhibit "N".

48.See People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257 (1998); and People vs. Quidato, Jr.,
297 SCRA 1 (1998).

49.Salonga vs. Pa�o, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).

50.CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 (1); RULES OF COURT, RULE 115, SECTION 1
(b).

51.TSN, August 15, 1994, p. 3.

52.Id., at 20.

53.TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 79-80.

54.People vs. Lapay, 298 SCRA 62 (1998).

55.Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. . . . . "

||| (People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, [January 24, 2001], 403 PHIL 31-61)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172642. June 13, 2012.]

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY,

petitioner, vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, * J :

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 dated
July 11, 2005 and April 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
76489.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:

Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was employed by [herein respondent] General
Charterers, Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner [herein co-respondent]
Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman
and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19,
2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners' vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

On August 13, 2000, or 25 days after the completion of his employment contract,
Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his
death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's
Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI's collective bargaining agent. Nelson's
widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance
procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI.
However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as
petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits
and damages. aIEDAC

On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson's brother, received P20,000.00 from

[respondents] pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification"
acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability.
Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand
Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to [A]rticle 20 (A)1 of the CBA . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000.00 already received by Joven Mar should be
considered advance payment of the total claim of US$90,000.[00].

[Herein respondents], on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between
GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter's death. Nelson also had no claims against
petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of
his contract with GCI. They further alleged that private respondent is not entitled
to death benefits because petitioners are only liable for such "in case of death of
the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract" and the
cause of his death is not work-related. Petitioners admitted liability only with
respect to article 20(A)2 [of the CBA]. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

However, as petitioners stressed, the same was already discharged.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. It took cognizance of the
case by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence
of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and
the claim asserted. It ordered the petitioner to pay P4,621,300.00, the equivalent
of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the proximate cause of Nelson's death was not
work-related.

On appeal, [the NLRC] affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision as to the grant of
death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latter's ruling as to the proximate
cause of Nelson's death. 3

Herein respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
jurisdiction of the NLRC over the case; in ruling that a different provision of the
CBA covers the death claim; in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the
cause of death is not work-related; and, in setting aside the release and quitclaim
executed by the attorney-in-fact and not considering the P20,000.00 already
received by Merridy Jane through her attorney-in-fact.

On July 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows: AICDSa

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the case is
REFERRED to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for the designation of
the Voluntary Arbitrator or the constitution of a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the applicable CBA
provision.

SO ORDERED. 4

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same
basically involves the interpretation and application of the provisions in the
subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the
labor arbiter.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its

Resolution of April 18, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the CA
committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the
appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino
workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217 (c)
of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators
over interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

The pertinent provisions of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provide as follows:

SEC. 10. Money Claims. � Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar
days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages.

Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, states that:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring the
same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in
said agreements. cCSHET

On their part, respondents insist that in the present case, Article 217, paragraph
(c) as well as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be the governing provisions
of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Under these provisions of law,
jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators.

Article 261 of the Labor Code reads, thus:

ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators. � The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and
shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the
Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

The petition is without merit.

It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers.
However, a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no
specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or
unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA.
Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general,
of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." On the other hand, Articles
217 (c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant
case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject
in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular. 5 In the
present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with
the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits
due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding
that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said
CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. ACcaET

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law
or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered into by and
between respondent GCI and AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides
as follows:

The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the
interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or
enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation,
conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The Company and the Union further agree that
they will use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed,
resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90) days from
the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure to settle
thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action. 6
(Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really
intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict
in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled
that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances
and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be
strictly observed. 7

It may not be amiss to point out that the abovequoted provisions of the CBA are in
consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10022, which states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance
with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus
Rules and Regulations were promulgated by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that these departments were
mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and the House
of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs.

In the same manner, Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels,
promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provides
as follows:

Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. � In cases of claims and disputes

arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining
agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the parties
are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their
option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the
voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall be appointed
from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment. DHSEcI

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original

and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which
are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of
recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving employers, principals,
contracting partners and Filipino seafarers. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation
with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes
involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the
jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the
dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules
and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. 8
Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. 9 In the instant case,
the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule.

The above interpretation of the DOLE, DFA and POEA is also in consonance with the
policy of the state to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor
disputes. 10

No less than the Philippine Constitution provides, under the third paragraph,
Section 3, Article XIII, thereof that "[t]he State shall promote the principle of
shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace."

Consistent with this constitutional provision, Article 211 of the Labor Code
provides the declared policy of the State "[t]o promote and emphasize the primacy
of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration,
mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes."

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA
that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76489 dated July 11, 2005 and April 18, 2006,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. aDHCAE

Abad, Villarama, Jr., ** Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012.

**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,

per Special Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.

1.Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Arturo
G. Tayag and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 14-26.

2.Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Romulo
V. Borja and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; id. at 109-111.

3.Rollo, pp. 15-19.

4.Id. at 25.

5.See Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007,
525 SCRA 11, 22-23.

6.Records, p. 73.
7.Vivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268, 281.

8.ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA
251, 288-289.

9.Id.; Landbank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903,
February 29, 2012.

10.Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 260, 264.

||| (Estate of Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 172642, [June 13,
2012], 687 PHIL 153-163)