ALUMUNIUM DUST EXPLOSION

An aluminum dust explosion and fire on October 29, 2003 at the Hayes Lemmerz
International−Huntington, Inc. (Hayes) facility, Huntington, Indiana killed one
employee and burned two other employees, one critically. Three other Hayes
employees and one contractor received minor injuries.

The facility manufactures cast aluminum alloy wheels. The U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) determined that the dust that exploded
originated in a scrap re-melting system. The explosion completely destroyed the
dust collection equipment outside the building and damaged equipment inside
the building. The explosion also lifted a portion of the building roof above one
furnace and ignited a fire that burned for several hours.

CSB identified the following root causes of the incident:

• Hayes did not perform a review to address why the chip system was releasing
excess dust. The hazards of aluminum dust were neither identified nor addressed.

• Hayes did not ensure the proper design of the dust collector system.

• Hayes did not ensure that the dust collector design and installation followed the
guidance in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 651.

• Hayes had no formal, documented program to investigate and implement

corrective action for .incidents involving fires in the foundry area, especially those
fueled by aluminum dust.

CSB also determined that the following factors contributed to injuries and
damage:

• Employees did not wear flame-retardant clothing when performing routine work
near the melt

furnace.

• Housekeeping and maintenance in the chip-processing and dust collector areas

were inadequate.
• Facility personnel received no formal training for operating and maintaining the
chip-processing and dust collection systems.

In this report, CSB makes the recommendations to Hayes, a few of which are listed
below:

1. Develop and implement a means of handling and processing aluminum chips

that minimizes the

risk of dust explosions.

2. Implement a program to provide regular training for all facility employees on

the fire and

explosion hazards of aluminum dust.

3. Develop and implement written operating procedures for chip processing and
train all affected

employees. Ensure that procedures address maintenance and housekeeping.

To Premelt Systems, CSB recommends that they communicate the findings and
recommendations of this investigation to owners/operators of facilities to which
Premelt supplies similar aluminum chip-melting systems, including specific
information that the chip drying process liberates small particles of aluminum,
and that such particles may be explosive.

CSB also makes recommendations to the Aluminum Association and the Fire
Protection Research

Foundation to jointly research improved explosion protection for dust collectors in

aluminum dust service.