1.

Judicial Review

The Doctrine Supremacy of the Constitution

- It is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
- If a law violates any norm of the constitution, that law is null and void; it has no effect. (This is an overstatement,
for a law held unconstitutional is not always wholly a nullity)
- It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it.
- Constitutional supremacy produced judicial review.

FACTS:

1. In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein petitioner) and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision
Mayor (Respondents) were candidates voted to be members of the national assembly (NA) for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas.
2. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.
3. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
4. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election
of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding
the previous confirmation made by the NA.
5. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest (the prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent
was late in filing his protest because he filed the protest after December 3.).
6. Ynsua calims that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA
cannot be contested after confirmationof the NA.. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner then
files a protest to the Supreme Court (SC) questioning EC’s jurisdiction over the case. ( Petitioner argues
that, EC could only regulate proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to pass upon fundamental questions in
the issue since it is an interpretation of the constitution)
7. The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional body which has jurisdiction to try all
contested cases re:elections and said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its
jurisdiction. Since EC acquired jurisdiction over the election protest, the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is
not reviewable by the SC.
ISSUE(S): 1. does the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM and the controversy?

2. If it does, then has ELECOM acted within or without jursidiction

HELD: 1. Yes

2. Within Jursidiction

RATIO:

- The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate
articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there
are conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power
to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This
however is limited to actual cases and controversies.
- that judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
- ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body
which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present
constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said
function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The
confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix
dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM.
 2. Functions of Judicial Review

1. Checking - it allows justice to be served by striking down erroneous decisions by lower courts
- the reading of the constitutional map, as it were, and the allocation of constitutional authority among the major
structures of government.

Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

a) The Orthodox View - The law is void if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validity because it is
patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces no effect, creates no effect, and produces no duty.
- if the law is inconsistent with the Constitution, then the latter shall govern
- if the law has been declared unconstitutional, it is presumed that no law existed at all
- traditional view

- An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. (NORTON vs.
SHELBY COUNT 118 U.S. 425, 442 [1886], ARTICLE 7 NCC)

b) The Modern View - The law is voidable if on its face it enjoys the presumption of unconstitutionality. The
law becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. The declaration produces no
retroactive effect.

- Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights
of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. (CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1991, 32-33, citing
NORTON vs. SHELBY, 118 U.S. 425 and SHEPARD vs. BARREN, 194 U.S. 553) But certain
legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. (PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR
GENERAL 15 SCRA 569)

Serrano de Agbayani v PNB

FACTS:
In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In 1944, the lo a n mat u red b ut P NB c o ul d
no t co l lec t b e ca u se i t wa s a t t h is ti me o f t h e wa r. In 1 9 4 5 , P re s. O s me n a i s s ued t h e Deb t Mo r ato r i u m La w ( EO
# 3 2 ) , s u sp e nd i n g t he p a yme n t o f lo a ns fo r fo ur years due to the ravages of war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt
Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the c a se o f
R ut ter v E steb a n. I n 1 9 5 9 , P NB fi led a s u it fo r p a yme n t o f t h e lo a n.

I SS UE :
W ON t he act io n prescribed?

HELD:
If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of RA 342 as unconstitutional retroacted to 1945
when EO 32 was first issued. Between 1944 when the loan matured and 1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15 years had elapsed. [T he
o r t ho d o x vi e w wa s a n no u nc ed b y M r . J . Fie ld , i n t he c a se o f No rto n vs . S he lb y County where the court held that:

" xx x . An u nco n st it u ti o na l act is no t a la w; it co n fe rs no r i g ht s; it i mp o se s

no d u t i e s ; i t a f f o r d s n o p r o t e c t i o n ; i t c r e a t e s n o o f f i c e ; i t i s , i n l e g a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n , inoperati
ve, as if it had not been passed.

B ut i f we t a ke t h e u no r t ho d o x vi e w, as t he S C d id , t he act io n co u ld s ti ll p ro sp er. T he period from 1945

when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional s ho uld no t b e co u nted fo r t h e p urp o se o f
p r es crip tio n s i nce t h e D eb t Mo r a to r i u m La w wa s operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45,
1953-59). Ind eed , i t wo ul d b e u nj u st to p u n is h t h e cr ed i to r wh o co uld no t co ll ec t p r io r to 1 9 5 3 b eca u se t h e
Deb t Mo ra to ri u m La w wa s e f f ect i ve, o nl y to b e to ld la ter t ha t hi s re s p ect fo r a n apparently valid law made him
lose his right to collect.
A r t . 7 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t , " W h e n t h e c o u r t s d e c l a r e a l a w t o b e inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Facts:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the
“mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that
they are incapable of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between
November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common
provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under
Republic Act No. 9009.

These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
failed to sign them.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Ratio:

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management
Bureau; or
 (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income.

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100
million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Chavez vs. JBC

Facts:

Chavez seeks judicial intervention with regard to JBC composition. Article VIII, Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides that: A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In compliance, Congress, from
the moment of JBC creation, had only 1 representative (the HR and Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC).
Subsequently, in 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an 8th member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.

Issue:

Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: Yes.

The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers of the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly
cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word "Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire
"to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officiomembers of the Council consist
of representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal
branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal
say in the choice of judicial nominees.

To ensure judicial independence, the framers of the Constitution adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the
private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary.

Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution." 53

2. Legitimating - appellate courts monitor the performance of lower courts; lower courts have an incentive to apply the law
correctly if the possibility exists that their decisions may be overturned
- the determination of whether the particular agency or department concerned has stayed within its own sphere of
authority observing the constitutional limitations projected for actions within such sphere, or whether it has
trespassed into the zone of immunity or privacy guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution
3. Symbolic - important controversies regarding the law are examined and resolved for the future guidance of courts and
individuals
- it is this function that the Supreme Court discharges when it acts, as it should, as the "pronouncer and the
guardian" of the more fundamental values that the community seeks
- "sui generis" (of its own kind/genus or unique in its characteristics); whether the Supreme Court be invalidating or
validating a legislative or executive measure, the demand of the community is that the resulting decision shall
embody and implement its basic values

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano G.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18, 1985 Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with other
39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during
the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are
not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salonga;s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.

HELD Yes. The petition is dismissed.

RATIO: The petitioners’ opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the government. In PD 885,
political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to
conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the
case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. Lovely
also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directed against a particular family. Such a statement negates
any politically motivated or subversive assignment.
Romeo Acop Vs Teofisto Guingona
G.R. No. 134855 July 2, 2002
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed
along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and
who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation on the incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was
no shootout and the eleven (11) suspected members of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 Corazon dela
Cruz, also a member of the CIC.

The senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes and
SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the
government’s Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said Program.

Herein petitioners, in their capacity as tax payers, but who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend
that under Sec. 3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officres, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified from
being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers.
Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead – “ a) An injunction be issued enjoining the Department
of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and
SPO2 dela Cruz; b) Order the immediate discharge of respondent SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and for the latter
to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting benefits of the WPP; and c) Order respondent officers to return whatever monetary
benefits they have received from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP”.

Issue: Whether the petition for judicial review should prosper.

Held:
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition lacks merit and that the same has been
rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program was already terminated
on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to OSG,
dated February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agree with OSG. Indeed, prayers
a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the
coverage of the Program.

However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) for future
guidance of both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,
276 SCRA 501 (1997), and Viola vs Alunan III 277 SCRA409 (1997), “courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it
is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
b. Precedents and the principle of Stare decisis under Article 8, Civil Code.

Government and the State as Watchers

1. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

—the government as guardian of the rights of the people may initiate legal actions for and in behalf of particular individual.
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738; Cabañas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94)