INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND

PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

FINAL DRAFT

Project Topic:
GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATON

Submitted by
Shreyank Tiwari
Roll No. – 1564
7 Semester, 4th Year, B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)
th

Submitted to
PROF. (DR.) ALI
Faculty of I.S.P.L.

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,

PATNA
September, 2019.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am thankful to my Faculty of I.S.P.L., PROF. (DR.) ALI, Professor of Law, CNLU,

Patna, who allotted me this research topic and guided me with his ideas, that how to
pursue this research topic.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the University Library, from where I had
managed to get the relevant books and web materials, which helped me in the completion
of this research topic.

At the end, I would like to thank my parents and few friends, who rendered their valuable
support for the completion of this research topic.

Shreyank Tiwari
Roll No. 1564
7th Semester
4th Year, B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)

II
 TABLE OF CONTENT

CHAPTER-I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER-II PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION ........................................................ 5

CHAPTER-III GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION .................................................. 8

CHAPTER-IV GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION ................................................... 15

CHAPTER-V CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 21

III
 CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION

The interpretation of laws is confined to courts of law. In course of time, courts have evolved
a large and elaborate body of rules to guide them in construing or interpreting laws. Most of
them have been collected in books on interpretation of statutes and the draftsman would be
well advised to keep these in mind in drafting Acts. Some Interpretation Acts, like the
Canadian one, lay down that every Act shall be deemed remedial and shall accordingly
receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit. The object
of all such rules or principles as aforesaid broadly speaking, is to ascertain the true intent,
meaning and spirit of every statute. A statute is designed to be workable, and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or
clear direction makes that unattainable.1

The term statutory interpretation refers to the action of a court in trying to understand and
explaining the meaning of a piece of legislation. Many cases go to appeal on a point of
interpretation, Indeed, Lord Hailsham, a senior English judge, once said that “probably 9 out
of 10 cases heard by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords turn upon or involve the
meaning of words contained in statute or secondary legislation.”

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is

arrived at by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words,
it regards only the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to
the intention of the legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible
according to the rules settled in this behalf. ‘Proper construction’ is not satisfied by taking the
words as if they were self-contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the
meaning of a statute.2

According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of

speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and
with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in
1
Whitney v. Inland Rivenue Commissioners, 1926 AC 37.
2
Romero v International Terminal Operating Co 358 US 354, 3 L Ed 2d 368, 375.

1
which the statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal
meaning of the words used by the legislature. A statute is the will of the legislature and the
fundamental rule of interpretation , to which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to
be expounded, according to the intent of them that made it. 3 The object of interpretation is to
find out the intention of the legislature.

First, laws must be drafted in general terms and must deal with both present and future
situations. Often, a law which was drafted with one particular situation in mind will
eventually be applied to quite different situations. A classic example is the UK Criminal
Justice Act, part of which was originally designed to curb illegal warehouse parties but which
was later used to crush demonstrations, often involving people from very different
backgrounds to those attending the so-called raves.

Legislation is drawn up by draftsmen, and a draftsman’s capacity to anticipate the future is

limited. He may not foresee some future possibility, or overlook a possible misinterpretation
of the original intentions of the legislation. Another problem is legislation often tries to deal
with problems that involve different and conflicting interests.

Both legal and general English contain many words with more than one meaning. In fact,
some of the terms in TransLegal’s Legal English Dictionary have seven or more distinct
definitions. With this being the case, even the best drafted legislation can include many
ambiguities. This is not the fault of the draftsman, simply a reflection of the fact that where
people look at a text from different points of view they will naturally find different meanings
in the language used.

Judges in England generally apply three basic rules of statutory interpretation, and similar
rules are also used in other common law jurisdictions. The literal rule, the golden rule and the
mischief rule. Although judges are not bound to apply these rules, they generally take one of
the following three approaches, and the approach taken by any one particular judge is often a
reflection of that judge’s own philosophy.

Our law has gradually developed a vast body of authority pertaining to statutory
interpretation.4 Some of the rules in this law are very ancient, others rather recent. Most of
this authority is applicable to statutes in any field; some of it only to one field, such as

3
Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.
4
The leading modern texts on statutory interpretation are SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CoNSTRUCTION (3rd cd., Horack, 1943).

2
criminal law or constitutional law. Nearly all of it is entirely judge made, although a few rules
of interpretation appear in the general statutes of most states.5

Salmond defines “interpretation” as “a process by which the Court seeks the meaning of
Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it expresses”. The purpose of
interpretation is always to find out what the statute stands for, what is the defect it intends to
remove and what is the remedy it seeks to advance.6 Judges are not at liberty to add or take
from or modify the letter of the law, simply because they have reason to believe that the true
sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by the law.7 The duty of the Court is
to discover and act upon the true intention of the legislature.

The Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse8,
while lamenting the scant attention paid by draftsman to the language of statutes, referred to
the British jingle “I am the Parliamentary draftsman. I compose the country’s laws. And of
half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the cause”. Reference was also made to Kirby v.
Leather9, where the Court observed that the provision of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939 was
so obscure “that the draftsman must have been of unsound mind”. Construction of statutes
and interpretation of laws should obviously cover all areas affecting the rights of the citizens.
The art of judicial interpretation, according to Krishna Iyer, J., “Supreme Court, is imbued
with creativity and realism …. Legal Darwinism adapting the rule of law to new societal
developments, so as to survive and serve the social order, is necessary”10

Objective of the study

The researcher is going to research the above topic with some of the objectives which is sited
below:

a) To analyze the extent of applicability of this rule.

b) To know the judicial interpretations of the given rule.

Research methodology

The researcher will be using doctrinal mode of research.

5
KAN. G.S. 1949,77-201. Mo. REV. STAT. c. 1 (1949).
6
Seventilal Maneklal Seth v. Commr. Of Income Tax(Central) Bombay, (1968) 2 SCJ 129.
7
Moss v. Charnock, 1802) 2 East 399.
8
A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 90
9
(1965) 2 All ER 441
10
D.R.Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Officer, AIR1977 SC 842 (847).

3
Source of data

Primary Source: Case Laws.

Secondary Source: Textbooks and Websites.

4
 CHAPTER-II
LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

The primary and important rule of interpretation is called the Literal Rule, laid down in the
Sussex Peerage Case11. This rule stated that:

“The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are
in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case;
best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by
the Legislature, it has always been held a safe mean of collecting the intention to call in aid
the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which,
according to Chief Justice Dyer is “a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the
mischiefs which they intend to redress”.12

The literal rule, in its purest form, has an inflexibility which places particular strain on the
draftsperson, requiring language which expressly covers all eventualities. This extreme
inflexibility can be seen in the words of Lord lisher MR in R. v. The Judge of the City of
London Court13 where he stated that

“if the words of an Act are clear you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest
absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has
committed an absurdity. This means that only the words of the statute count; if they are clear
by themselves then effect must be given to them. This rule also has its drawbacks; it
disregards consequences and the object of the statute may be considered only if there is
doubt. It should be noted, however, that the object of a statute and the circumstances that led
to its enactment are always relevant-not just in cases of doubt. When the words of a statute
are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the
Courts are bounds to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.16 Statutory

11
Sussex Peerage Case [1844] 11 Clark and Finnelly 85, 8 ER 1034 at 1844
12
Alekhya Reddy, LITERALLY INTERPRETING THE LAW- A APPRAISAL OF THE LITERAL RULE OF
INTERPRETATION IN INDIA, Manupatra, available at
www.manupatra.com/roundup/338/Articles/Literally%20interpreting%20the%20Law.pdf, last seen on
22/10/2017.
13
[1892] 1QB273 9CA.

5
enactment must be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added,
altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being
unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the
statute.

There are three fundamental rules suggested in the English Cases:

Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the
result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless
that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the
“mischief rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it
was directed.”

For the application of literal rule a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In Jugal
Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.14The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of
construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their
ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity
and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when
no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
interpretation. In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar,15 the
Apex Court had held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions
used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the
object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two
constructions are feasible, the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress
the mischief as the legislature envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach
keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as
interpretative possibility permits.” In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal,16 the
Supreme Court said: “in order to get true import of the statute, it is necessary to view the
enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it
was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined
by construing all the construing parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section
as to take one word here and another there.”

14
AIR 1955 SC 376
15
1963 SCR Supl. (2) 459
16
[1957] S.C.R. 754.

6
Literal Rule or Plain Meaning Rule is acclaimed as the safest guide to legislative intent, as
the legislature is not to be supposed to use words in a statute, in vain. A Court of law is bound
to proceed upon the assumption that the legislature is an ideal person that does not make
mistake.17 The Courts are warned not to assume ambiguity where there is none.18 Ambiguity
can be inferred if the word or phrase in a statute is capable of more than one meaning in that
particular context.19 A consequence that follows from the doctrine of literal constructions is
that, effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.20

The function of the Court is “not to scan the wisdom and policy, where the language of a
statute is clear, and it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same.21 It is the duty of
the Court to interpret the language actually employed and to determine the intention of the
legislature from such language and where there is no ambiguity about the language actually
employed, neither the recommendation if the Law Commission, nor the aims and objects set
out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons can be brought in aid or can be allowed to
influence the natural grammatical meaning of the statute as enacted by the Parliament.22 The
length and detail of modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal
construction as the safe rule.23 It is always advisable to find out the intention from the plain
meaning as conveyed by the words as used in the Statute.

17
Thakur Madho Singh v. Lieut.Kames, R.R.Skinner, AIR 1942 Lahore 243
18
Mahadeolal Kanodia v.Administrator General W.B. AIR 1960 SC 936 (940)
19
Kirkness v. John Hudson & CO., (1955 2 All ER 345 (HL) 366.
20
State v. Bartlay, 39 Neb 353 (1894)
21
Commissioner of Sales Tax, UP., Lucknow v. M/s. Parsons Tools and plants, kanput, AIR 1975 SC 1039
22
Subhash Ganpat Roy Buty v. maroti, AIR 1975 Bom 244; Indian Chamber of Commerce v. CIT West Bengal
AIR 1976 SC 348
23
Lord Evershed, M.R. – Foreword to Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edition.

7
 CHAPTER-III
GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION

According to Gray,24 the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman,
who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute
book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to
attribute to it, is called ‘interpretation’.

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the
legislature and in England the rules of interpretation, developed there , can be relied on to aid
the discovery because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into language,
fashion their language with those very rules in view. Since framers of statutes couch the
enactments in accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of
those rules in the analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface.
It is at least doubtful whether in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times,
specially of the provincial legislature, the same assumption can always be made.25

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention
of the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be construed so as to
ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words
which it has used. ‘The essence of the Law’, according to Salmond, Lies in its spirit, nor in its
letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that
underlies it. Nevertheless in all ordinary cases the courts must be content to accept the litera
legis as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They must, in general,
take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has
said. Ita scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to
or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that
the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is to say, in all
ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable.

24
Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn, pp 176-78.
25
Badsha Mia v Rajjab Ali, AIR 1946 Cal 348, p 353.

8
Parke B in Becke v Smith26 formulated the following well-known rule for the interpretation of
statutes:

If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to
construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an
absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is
doubtful or obscure, but we assume the function of legislators when we depart from, the
ordinary meaning of the precise words used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an
absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.

Burton J in Warburton v Loveland,27 observed:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the
grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with
any expressed intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any
absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified,
extended, or abridged so far as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson28 and
thereafter it is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of
the golden rule. His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally
adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed
statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency
with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention
of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or

26
(1836) 2 M&W 191.
27
(1929) 1 H&B IR 623, p 648.
28
(1857) 6 HL 61.

9
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the ‘golden rule’ in Matteson v Hart29

We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of
construction, as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the
Legislature their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope and
intention of the statute, injustice and absurdity would result from so construing them.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the language
may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no
further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to
effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. In other words ambiguity, inconsistency,
incompleteness in literal interpretation leads modification of language so as to avoid such
inconvenience. When in construing a word literally, there exist variance with the intention of
the legislature to be gathered from the subject or context of the statute, the language may be
varied or modified in such a case, but no further. Ambiguity here means double meaning, a
word’s expression capable of more than one meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is
incompatible with other words or gives separate meaning when read with other parts of the
statute. The word ‘absurdity’ also means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a
direct conflict or inconsistencies like one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A
situation may be reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the
other.30 In all such cases, the statute becomes equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable,
suspicious or uncertain in nature. Whenever the meaning of the word, phrase, expression or
sentence is uncertain, it may be a case of departing from the plain grammatical meaning, and
there may be need for application of golden rule. It is however reiterated in every concerned
case, that the province of the judge is very different one of construing the language in which
the legislature has finally expressed. If they undertake the other province, which belongs to
the legislature who, have to endeavor to interpret the desire of the country, the courts are in
danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide.
And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what

29
(1854) 23 LJCP 108.
30
T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Regachari, AIR 1969 SC 701.

10
seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical sense of the
words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words have primary
meaning in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be applied first. Words
have a secondary meaning

If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.31 ”We should avoid a construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of
the legislation. We should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that
Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if
the language is capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or
natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads
to reasonably practical results.”

In R. v. Sweden Lord Parker32 construed section 1(1) of the poor Prisoners’ Defense Act,
1930: “Any person committed for trial for an indictable offence shall be entitled to free legal
aid in the preparation and conduct of his defense at the trial and to have solicitor and counsel
assigned to him for that purpose.” The Court of Criminal appeal held that this section gave
the right to an accused person once the certificate is granted to have a solicitor assigned for
the purposes mentioned, but not a right that that solicitor or another should defend him at the
trial. The court observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person a right to
have a solicitor at the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly refuse to have the solicitor
assigned when he got advice which he did not like and go to others, and there would be no
means whatever to prevent that, with the result that there might be added expense to the
country, delays and abuse of the whole procedure.” Such an unreasonable intention of
Parliament cannot be imputed. In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India,33 a restricted
construction was given to rule 11 (VI) of the Central Services (Classification, Appeal and
Control) Rules, 1965. This Rule empowers imposition of “penalty of reduction to a lower
time-scale pay, grade post or service.” The Supreme Court held that a person initially
appointed to a higher post and grade of pay scale cannot be reduced to a lower grade or post.
A wider construction if given to the provision, it may affect the recruitment policy itself for a

31
(1940) AC 1014.
32
(1964) 1 WLR 1454.
33
AIR 1988 SC 1979.

11
person directly recruited to a higher post may not have the requisite qualification for the
lower post.

In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd.,34 held; “Where
possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the
scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging
artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible
constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen. In Gill v. Donald
Humberstone & Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid: ‘Beneficial laws are addressed
to practical people, and ought to be construed in the light of practical consideration, rather
than a meticulous comparison of the language of their various provisions. If the language is
capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it
leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably
practical result.”

INDIAN CASES

In India there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have
applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears
that even for literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of
literal meaning of the provision, and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no
repugnancy, uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning. But when there is
possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the inconvenience by
even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution of words so as to make
meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature.

In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore35, the Supreme Court held that
the expression “landless person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which
made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A
landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court
further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a
city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at
distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman,
though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

34
(1961) 1 WLR 92.
35
AIR 1981 SC 1656.

12
In Lee v. Knapp,36 section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that “a driver
causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in
question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an
accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not
fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to
enable interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot
of accident

In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar37 in construing section 6 of the Probation of

Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of
the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the
sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below
21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years,
he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the
object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders
into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls
of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him
under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.

In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P. 38 Sales

Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under section 3A
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit
manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be
construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said
provision. Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the
wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here
biscuit was not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words
used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense
and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy which has to
decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

36
(1966) 3 AH ER 961.
37
AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745
38
AIR 1981 SC 1656

13
In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh39 the appellant argued that it was obligatory under
Section 99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal to record
names of all persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including parties and non-
parties to the petition and that under the proviso, notice should be given to all persons named
under Section 99(1)(a)(ii) He being a party to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh
notice. Supreme Court said that such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and held that
the proviso along with clause (b) thereto and the setting of the section pointed out that notice
is contemplated only against non- parties to the petition.

39
AIR 1955 SC 850.

14
 CHAPTER-IV
GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION

Grammatical Interpretation doesn’t look beyond the written words. If the words given in the
statute are lucid and explicit, it is not for the judges to go beyond that language or words to
try and establish what the legislative might have meant by using that word. The Courts have
to follow this principle even if it results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to the policy or
intention of legislature.40 It doesn’t look beyond the litera legis which means letter of
legislation. It just looks at what law says. Words and phrases are to be construed by the courts
in their ordinary sense, and the ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation have to be applied.
If, applying this rule, a clear meaning appears, then this must be applied, and the courts will
not inquire whether what the statute says represents the intention of the legislature. In order to
determine the literal meaning of a statute the courts have to ascertain the ordinary meaning of
a word in a statute by referring to a dictionary or scientific or any other technical works
where the words have been used.41

Chief Justice Jervis in Abley v Gale42 has explained the expression ’literal meaning’. He poin
ts out that ”if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment we are bou
nd to construe them in their ordinary sense even though it too leads in our view of the case to
an absurdity or manifest injustice. The words of a statute are to be first understood in their nat
ural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their gra
mmatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the con
text, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.43 The tendency is that by doing so,
the courts give effect to the intention of the Parliament and the presumption is that the words
themselves do, in such a case it is best to declare the intention of the law giver.44

It is a rule of construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the
word is to be adhered to. The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. Where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that

40
Justice G.P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 53(11th ed Wadhwa Nagpur
2008).
41
AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON 1134 (2nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
42
20 L.J.C.P (N.S) 233 (1851).
43
Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179.
44
DEEPAK JAIN, Interpretation of Statutes: A Treatise, available at
http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/interpretation-of-statutes-a-treatise/, last seen on 20/10/2017.

15
construction ought to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary.
In other words the best possible interpretation of a statute would be to give its plain meaning.
When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it is not necessary to look into the
legislative intent or object of the Act.45

But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, evocative or can reasonably
bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure
guide to reach at the real legislative intent.46 In such a case, in order to ascertain the true
meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the court to go beyond the
arid literal confines of the provisions and to call in aid other well recognized rules of
construction, such as legislative history, the basic scheme or framework of the statute as a
whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation the object sought
to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to
the other possible interpretation.47

Courts may even go so far as to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by
doing so absurdity and inconsistency may be avoided.48 Courts should not be astute to defeat
the provisions of an Act whose meaning on the face of it is reasonably plain.49

CASE STUDY

In the Australian case of Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Proprietary Limited v The

Commissioner of Taxation of The Commonwealth of Australia50 the court said, “However, if
the language of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, and is consistent and
harmonious with the other provisions of the enactment, and can be intelligibly applied to the
subject matter with which it deals, it must be given its ordinary and grammatical meaning,
even if this leads to a result that may seem inconvenient or unjust. To say this is not to insist
on too literal an interpretation, or to deny that the court should seek the real intention of the
legislature. The danger that lies in departing from the ordinary meaning of unambiguous
provisions is that ‘it may degrade into mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the acts of
the Legislature’, as Lord Moulton said… it may lead judges to put their own ideas of justice
or social policy in place of the words of the statute. On the other hand, if two constructions

45
N.S BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4 (9th edn Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2002).
46
FITZGERALD, GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, 176(2nd edn.).
47
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L. VA. Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 1.
48
Narayanan v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 4.
49
Sahmrao v. Parulekarw. The District Magistrate, Thana, (1952), SCR 683.
50
(1981) 147 CLR 297.

16
are open, the court will obviously prefer that which will avoid what it considers to be
inconvenience or injustice. Since language, read in its context, very often proves to be
ambiguous, this last mentioned rule is one that not infrequently falls to be applied.”

In Kingston and another v Keprose Pty Ltd,51 under the heading ‘The purposive approach’: A
purposive and not a literal approach is the method of statutory construction which now
prevails… In most cases the grammatical meaning of a provision will give effect to the
purpose of the legislation. A search for the grammatical meaning still constitutes the starting
point. But if the grammatical meaning of a provision does not give effect to the purpose (sic)
of the legislation, the grammatical meaning cannot prevail. It must give way to the
construction which will promote the purpose or object of the Act.

In Nolan v Clifford52 the court said: The first and most important rule in the construction of
Statutes is to give effect to words according to their grammatical meaning. If that meaning is
clear, then, whether an alteration is made in the common or the statute law or not, and,
whether of a serious character or not, is of no moment; (is this a correct phrase? YES)effect
must be given to the words the legislature has used.

In Grey v. Pearson,53 it was held that, “In construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written
instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified
so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.”

In Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Proprietary Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation of

The Commonwealth of Australia54 the court said: But there are cases in which inconvenience
of result or improbability of result assists the court in concluding that an alternative
construction which is reasonable open is to be preferred to the literal meaning because the
alternative interpretation more closely conforms to the legislative intent discernible from
other provisions in the statute… There is a similar problem with the related so-called ‘golden
rule’ of construction. There are statements of the rule which would confine the courts to the
ordinary grammatical sense of the words used unless that produces and absurdity or
inconsistency. It is to be noted that Dixon J. in Broken Hill South Ltd. V Commissioner of

51
(1987) 11 NSWLR 404.
52
(1904) 1 CLR 429.
53
(1857) 6 HLCas. 61.
54
[1981] 147 CLR 297.

17
Taxation (N.S.W) observed that departure from the ordinary grammatical sense is not
legitimate unless there is ‘some obscurity or some inconsistency’, though it may be that
‘obscurity’ was intended to be a reference to ‘absurdity’. For the reason already given in the
discussion of the literal rule, departure from the ordinary grammatical sense cannot be
restricted to cases of absurdity and inconsistency… In some cases in the past these rules of
construction have been applied too rigidly. The fundamental object of statutory construction
in every case is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the
instrument viewed as a whole. But in performing that task the courts look to the operation of
the statute according to its terms and to legitimate aids to construction… The rules, as D.C
Pearce says in Statutory Interpretation, p. 14, are no more than rules of common sense,
designed to achieve this object. They are not rules of law. If the judge applies the literal rule
it is because it gives emphasis to the factor which in the particular case he thinks decisive.
When he considers that the statute admits of no reasonable alternative construction it is
because (a) the language is intractable or (b) although the language is not intractable, the
operation of the statute, read literally, is not such as to indicate that it could not have been
intended by the legislature… On the other hand, when the judge labels the operation of the
statute as ‘absurd’, ‘extraordinary’, ‘capricious’, ‘irrational’ or ‘obscure’ he assigns a ground
for concluding that the legislature could not have intended such an operation and that an
alternative interpretation must be preferred. But the propriety of departing from the literal
interpretation is not confined to situations described by these labels. It extends to any
situation in which for good reason the operation of the statute on a literal reading does not
conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the provisions of the statute, including
the policy which may be discerned from those provisions… Quite obviously questions of
degree arise. If the choice is between two strongly competing interpretations, as we have said,
the advantage may lie with that which produces the fairer and more convenient operation so
long as it conforms to the legislative intention. If, however, one interpretation has a powerful
advantage in ordinary meaning and grammatical sense, it will only be displaced if its
operation is perceived to be unintended.

18
 CHAPTER-V
CONCLUSION

We may conclude by referring to an article written by John Willis way back in 1938 in the
Canadian Bar Review. According to Willis if you are trying to guess what meaning a court
will attach to a section in a statute which has not yet been passed on by a court, you should be
careful how you use Craies’ Statute haw and Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes.
Willis maintains that as armories of arguments for counsel they can be very useful, but you
must know how to choose your weapon. In at least three respects these legal classics are very
defective. Both books assume one great sun of a principle, “the plain meaning rule”, around
which revolve in planetary order a series of minor rules of construction. Both assume that
what courts do is unswervingly determined by that one principle. That is not so. These books
base their rules not on decisions, not on what the courts did in cases before them, but on
dicta, the remarks let fall by a heterogeneous collection of judges in an unrelated series of
situations. This is unsound. Both books treat the “principles” and dicta with which they deal
as if, having once been enunciated by a court, they remained equally valid at all times and in
all places. Once again they are merely misleading. If you are trying to guess what meaning
your court will attach to a section in a statute which has already been passed on by the courts,
when it comes to apply it to the facts of your case, you should beware of putting too implicit
a trust in previously decided cases. According to Willis one should not be misled in reading
of cases by pious judicial references to “the intent of the Legislature”. The expression does
not refer to actual intent - a composite body can hardly have a single intent: it is at most only
a harmless, if bombastic, way of referring to the social policy behind the Act. According to
Willis “Every school boy knows” that our law recognizes three main approaches to all
statutes: their usual names are (1) the “literal (plain meaning) rule”; (2) the “golden rule”; (3)
the “mischief (Heydon’s Case) rule” and any one of these three approaches may legitimately
be adopted by the court in the interpretation of any statute which it does in fact adopt, and the
manner of its application, will, if the case in question is a close one, be decisive of the result.
Ultimately according to Willis a court invokes whichever of the rules produces a result that
satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it. According to him the basic rule of statutory
interpretadon is that it is taken to be the legislator’s intention that the enactment shall be
construed in accordance with the guides laid down by law and that where in a particular case
these do not yield a plain answer but point in different direcdons the problem shall be

19
resolved by a balancing exercise, that is by weighing and balancing the factors they produce.
But Francis Bennion does not agree. Bennion maintains that for at least the past half century
the teaching of this subject has been bedeviled by the false notion that statutory interpretation
is governed by a mere three ‘rules’ and that the court selects which ‘rule’ it prefers and then
applies it in order to reach a result. The error according to him perhaps originated in an article
published in 1938 by Willis. After warning his readers that it is a mistake to suppose that
there is only one rule of statutory interpretation because ‘there are three-the literal, golden
and mischief rules’, Willis went on to say that a court invokes ‘whichever of the rules
produces a result which satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it’. Academics are still
producing textbooks which suggest that the matter is dealt with by these three simple ‘rules’.
However, as demonstrated at length in his 1984 textbook Statutory Interpretation, the truth is
far more complex. Willis, and those who have followed him, are wrong according to Bennion
in two ways. First, there are not just three guides to interpretation but a considerable number.
Second, the court does not ‘select’ one of the guides and then apply it to the exclusion of the
others. The court takes (or should take) an overall view, weighs all the relevant factors, and
arrives at a balanced conclusion. What is here called the basic rule of statutory interpretation
sets out this truth. It is a rule because it is the duty of the interpreter to apply it in every case.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Websites

 http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/interpretation-of-statutes-a-treatise/
 www.manupatra.com/roundup/338/Articles/Literally%20interpreting%20the%20Law.
pdf

Articles

 DEEPAK JAIN, Interpretation of Statutes: A Treatise, ITAT

 Alekhya Reddy, LITERALLY INTERPRETING THE LAW- A APPRAISAL OF
THE LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION IN INDIA, Manupatra.

Books

 FITZGERALD, GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, (2nd edn.).

 Justice G.P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (11th ed
Wadhwa Nagpur 2008).
 AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON (2nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
 N.S BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4 (9th edn Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 2002).
 FITZGERALD, GRAY NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, 176(2nd edn.).
 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION (3rd cd.,
Horack, 1943).
 Lord Evershed, M.R. – Foreword to Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edition.
 Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn

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