LEIDEN FERNANDEZ, et. al., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al.

,
respondents.

G.R. No. 105892

January 28, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioners, who are employees of private respondent Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier and/or
Margueritte Lhuillier, filed a complaint before Dept. of Labor for illegal dismissal and payment of
backwages when the latter denied them their demand to increase their salaries and subsequently
terminated their employment.

In her opinion, SG recommended that the labor arbiter’s decision be reinstated substantially, that
the award of service incentive leave be limited to three years. This is based on Article 291 of the
Labor Code which provides:

“ART. 291. Money Claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

ISSUE:

WON the claim for service incentive leaves may be limited to a certain number of

years.

Law Applicable:

Case History:

On August 30, 1991, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. On appeal,
Respondent NLRC vacated the labor arbiters order and remanded the case for further proceedings. It
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration. SC ruled that the petitioners, except Lim and
Canonigo,were illegally dismissed so it had to rule now on the money claims.
Ruling:

No.

Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that “every employee
who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of
five days with pay.”

To limit the award to three years is to unduly restrict such right. The law does not prohibit its
commutation.

SG’s recommendation is contrary to the ruling of the Court in Bustamante et al. vs. NLRC et al. lifting
the three-year restriction on the amount of backwages and other allowances that may be awarded
an illegally dismissed employee, thus: “Therefore, in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are
entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement.”

Opinion:

Notes:

*** Implementing Rules clearly state that entitlement to “benefit provided under this Rule shall start
December 16, 1975, the date the amendatory provision of the [Labor] Code took effect.”Hence,
petitioners, except Lim and Canonigo, should be entitled to service incentive leave pay from
December 16, 1975 up to their actual reinstatement.

***Full backwages, including the accrued thirteenth month pay, are also awarded to the nine
petitioners from the date of their illegal dismissal to the time of their actual reinstatement.

G.R. No. 135547, Jan 23, 2002

RIVERA v. ESPIRITU
FACTS:

AL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was
forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL
Employees Association) went on a four-day strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998.
PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the suspension
of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members
accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on
Oct 7, 1998.

Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement
entered into between PAL and PALEA.

ISSUE:

W/N CBA negotiations may be suspended for ten years

Law Applicable:

Case History:

In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners charge public respondents with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for acts taken in regard to the
enforcement of the agreement dated September 27, 1998, between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and its
union, the PAL Employees Association (PALEA)

HELD:

YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for ten years.

- The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the
peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the
latter's closure.

- There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article
253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as
the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement
satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein
negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253A, prohibits the
parties from waiving or suspecting the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to
enforce the same.

- It was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL 's ground employees, that voluntarily
entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension
of the CBA. Either case was the union's exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free
collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.

- The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA
did not contravene the “protection to labor” policy of the Constitution. The agreement afforded full
protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and they
exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace.

G.R. No. 168120 : January 25, 2012

MANSION PRINTING CENTER and CLEMENT CHENG, Petitioners, v. DIOSDADO BITARA, JR.,
Respondent.

PEREZ,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners engaged the services of respondent as a helper (kargador). Respondent was later
promoted as the companys sole driver tasked to pick-up raw materials for the printing business,
collect account receivables and deliver the products to the clients within the delivery schedules.

Petitioners aver that the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of the foremost
considerations material to the operation of the business.It being so, they closely monitored the
attendance of respondent. They noted his habitual tardiness and absenteeism.

Thus, petitioners issued a Memorandumrequiring respondent to submit a written explanation why

no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for his habitual tardiness.

Despite respondents undertaking to report on time, however, he continued to disregard attendance

policies.

Consequently, Davis Cheng, General Manager of the company and son of petitioner Cheng, issued
another Memorandum(Notice to Explain) requiring respondent to explain why his services should
not be terminated. He personally handed the Notice to Explain to respondent but the latter, after
reading the directive, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.He did not submit any explanation
and, thereafter, never reported for work.

Davis Cheng personally served another Memorandum(Notice of Termination) upon him informing
him that the company found him grossly negligent of his duties, for which reason, his services were
terminated.

On even date, respondent met with the management requesting for reconsideration of his
termination from the service. However, after hearing his position, the management decided to
implement the Memorandum. Nevertheless, the management, out of generosity, offered
respondent financial assistance in the amount ofP6,110.00 equivalent to his one month salary.
Respondent demanded that he be given the amount equivalent to two (2) months salary but the
management declined as it believed it would, in effect, reward respondent for being negligent of his
duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is illegally dismissed?

Case History:

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the findings of the Labor Arbiter was
AFFIRMED en toto.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondent sought the annulment of the Commissions Resolution on
the ground that they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals found for the respondent and reversed the findings of the Commission.

HELD: NLRC's decision is reinstated.

LABOR LAW
In order to validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to observe both substantive and
procedural aspects the termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized cause of
dismissal and the dismissal must be effected after due notice and hearing.

We, therefore, agree with the Labor Arbiters findings, to wit:

The imputed absence and tardiness of the complainant are documented. He faltered on his
attendance 38 times of the 66 working days. His last absences on 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 March 2000
were undertaken without even notice/permission from management. These attendance
delinquencies may be characterized as habitual and are sufficient justifications to terminate the
complainants employment.

On this score,Valiao v. Court of Appealsis instructive:

xxx It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but
manifested a pattern of habituality. xxx The totality of infractions or the number of violations
committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and
separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into
tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each
other.

InValiao,we definedgross negligenceas want of care in the performance of ones dutiesandhabitual

neglectas repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.51 These are not overly technical terms, which, in the first place, are expressly
sanctioned by the Labor Code of the Philippines, to wit:

ART. 282.Termination by employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) xxx

(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

xxx

Clearly, even in the absence of a written company rule defining gross and habitual neglect of duties,
respondents omissions qualify as such warranting his dismissal from the service.

We cannot simply tolerate injustice to employers if only to protect the welfare of undeserving
employees. As aptly put by then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing:
Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the
workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative xxx to terminate his employment. Even as
the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those
rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be
upheld.

Procedural due process entails compliance with the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee, to
wit: (1) the employer must inform the employee of the specific acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) after the employee has been given the opportunity to be heard, the
employer must inform him of the decision to terminate his employment.