On July 17, 1975, Milagros Matuguina and petitioner
MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer 5 transferring all of
MATAGUINA v. CA
FACTS:
Provisional Timber License (PTL) No. 30 – was issued
by the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development on June 28, 1973, covering an area of 5,400
hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who was then doing
business under the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship
venture. A portion, covering 1,900 hectares, of the said
area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov.
Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the
timber concession of Davao Enterprises Corporation
(DAVENCOR), the private respondent in this case.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI),
- was incorporated, having an authorized capital stock of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on July 10, 1974.
Milagros Matuguina – became the majority stockholder
of MIWPI on September 24, 1974, when the latter's Board
of Directors approved by Resolution the transfer of
1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina,
thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of
MIWPI.
Ms. Mataguina requested the Director of Forest
Development (BFD) for a change of name and transfer of
management of PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship
under her name, to that of MIWPI.
This request was favorably endorsed on December 2,
1974 3 by the BFD's Acting Director, Jose Viado to
respondent Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved
the same on September 5, 1975.
the former's rights, interests, ownership and participation
in Provincial Timber License No. 30 to the latter for and
in consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI.
A copy of said deed was submitted to the Director of
Forest Development and petitioner MIWPI had since been
acting as holder and licensee of PTL No. 30.
On July 28, 1975, pending approval of the request to
transfer the PTL to MIWPI, DAVENCOR, through its
Assistant General Manager, complained to the District
Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros
Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting
logging operations in DAVENCOR's timber concession.
After investigation of DAVENCOR's complaint, the
Investigating Committee which looked into
DAVENCOR's complaint submitted its report to the
Director, finding that MLE had encroached on the
concession area of DAVENCOR. In line with this, the
Director of Forest Development issued an Order 6 on July
15, 1981, finding and declaring MLE to have encroached
upon, and conducted illegal logging operationswithin the
licensed or concession area of DAVENCOR
On October 1, 1986, The Minister of Natural Resources,
Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his Decision, 8
affirming the aforesaid order of the Director of Forest
Development,
Director of Forest Development - finding and declaring
MLE to have encroached upon, and conducted illegal
logging operations within the license or concession are of
DAVAO ENTERPRISES CORPORATION.
ISSUE: WON a transferee of a forest concession is liable
for obligations arising from the transferor's illegal
encroachment into another forest concessionaire
committed before the transfer.
HELD:
No, the transferee is not liable for the illegal
encroachment caused by the tranferor. Sec. 61 (2) of P.D
705, which provides that “the transferee shall assume all
the obligations of the transferor,” refer to those
obligations incurred in the ordinary course of business,
not those incurred as a result of transgressions of the law,
as these are personal obligations of the tranferor. In
construing statues, the terms used are generally to be
given ordinary meaning or common usage, to the end that
absurdity in the law must be avoided.
4. Words with commercial or trade meaning
GR: Trade terms are presumed to have used in their trade
sense.
XPN: Should be given such trade or commercial meaning
as has been generally understood among merchants or in
their trade sense.
SMC v. MUN. COUNCIL OF MANDAUE
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 23, series of 1966, as amended by
Ordinance No. 25, series of 1967, of the Municipality
of Mandaue, Cebu – imposing "a graduated quarterly
fixed tax based on the gross value of money or actual
market value at the time of removal of the manufactured
articles from their factories or other manufacturing or
processing establishments."
In enacting the said ordinances, the municipal council of
Mandaue invoked as basis of its authority Republic Act
No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act).
The relevant portion of Section 1, Ordinance No. 23
(1966), as amended by Ordinance No. 25 (1967), provides
as follows:
"SECTION 1.Municipal License Tax On Proprietors Or
Operators Of . . . Breweries, . . . Proprietors or operators
of . . . breweries, . . . within the territorial limits of this
municipality shall pay a graduated quarterly fixed tax
based on the gross value in money or actual market value
at the time of removal, of the manufactured articles from
their factories . . .”
The basic Ordinance was No. 88, which took effect on
September 25, 1962, but this was amended by Ordinance
No. 23 (January 1, 1967), and by Ordinance No. 25
(January 1, 1968).
San Miguel Corporation - a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing beer and other
products with a subsidiary manufacturing plant in
Mandaue, Cebu, since December, 1967, paid the taxes
prescribed in the aforesaid ordinance. They claiming that
it is adversely affected by the ordinance, which in its view
was beyond the power and authority of the municipality to
enact, petitioner brought and action in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, for the annulment of said
ordinance.
Petitioner contends that (1) the phrase "gross value in
money or actual market value" employed in the
questioned ordinance clearly referred to "sales or market
price" of the articles or commodities manufactured
thereby indicating a manifest intent to impose a tax based
on sales, and (2) that to impose a tax upon the privilege of
manufacturing beer, when the amount of the tax is
measured by the gross receipts from its sales of beer, is
the same as imposing a tax upon the product itself.
Respondents insist that the tax imposed in the questioned
ordinance (1) is not a percentage tax or a tax on the sales
of beer but is a tax on the privilege to engage in the
business of manufacturing beer, and the phrase "actual
market value" was merely employed as a basis for the
classification and graduation of the tax sought to be
imposed; (2) that it is not a specific tax because it is not a
tax on the beer itself, but on the privilege of
manufacturing beer; and (3) that with the conversion of
Mandaue into a city on June 21, 1969, the appeal has
become moot, because the prohibition against the
imposition of any privilege tax on sales or other taxes in
any form based thereon, is applicable only to
municipalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 88, as amended
violated Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264
HELD:
Yes. Ordinance No. 88 imposed tax based on sales and
therefore issued in violation of Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264, which
provides “that municipalities and municipal districts shall,
in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other
taxes in any form based thereon, etc.” The phrase “gross
value in money,” as defined in trade or commerce, means
“gross selling price” or the total amount of money or its
equivalent which the purchaser pays to the vendor to
receive goods, and it should be taken in this sense when
used in the statute. It is a settled rule that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, trade or commercial
terms, when used in a statute, are presumed to have been
used in their trade or commercial sense.
5. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish
GR: General words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance
XPN: There should be no distinction in the application of
a law where none is indicated.
GUERRERO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Guillermo Ruiz – filed a petition to disqualify respondent
Rodolfo C. Fariñas as a candidate for the elective office of
Congressman in the first district of Ilocos Norte during the
May 11, 1998 elections. It also assails the Resolution
dated May 16, 1998, of the COMELEC En Banc, denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Ruiz
and dismissing the petition-in-intervention filed by herein
petitioner Arnold V. Guerrero.

Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent Fariñas
as a candidate for the position of Congressman. 1 Ruiz
alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a candidate
for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his
failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office.
Ruiz averred that Fariñas' failure to file said Certificate
violated Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code 2 in
relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated
January 15, 1998. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to declare
Fariñas as a "nuisance candidate" pursuant to Section 69
of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and to disqualify him
from running in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as in
all future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate
Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
COMELEC – dismissed the petition and stated "[T]here
is none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an
official candidate to speak of without the filing of said
certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to
be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be
disqualified."
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as
scheduled.
Rodolfo C. Fariñas was elected Congressman in the May
11, 1998 elections.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that Fariñas could not validly substitute for
Chevylle V. Fariñas, since the latter was not the official
candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP), but was an independent candidate. Another
person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.
Thus, Fariñas' certificate of candidacy claiming to be the
official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V.
Fariñas was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
Fariñas took his oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives on June 3, 1998.
Arnold Guerrero - filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in
COMELEC. Petitioner averred that he was the official
candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for
Congressman. Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having
failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or before the
last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998,
Fariñas illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution
provided for under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code and thus, Fariñas' disqualification was in order.
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of
the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and
special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy
of Fariñas.
And when the COMELEC ruled that the determination of
the validity of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas is
already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), this petition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed.
While the COMELEC is vested with power to declare
valid or invalid a Certificate of Candidacy, its refusal to
exercise that power following the proclamation and
assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of
the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC
and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Should the validity of filing the Certificate of
Candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code be
considered as a qualification within the jurisdiction of the
HRET?
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the candidacy of a proclaimed
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and
assumed his post as Congressman is best addressed to the
HRET that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives. The term
“qualification” cannot be read as qualified by the term
“constitution.” As a rule, where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. In making
no qualification in the use of the general word, the
lawmakers must have intended no distinction at all. The
courts could only distinguish where the facts and
circumstances show that the lawmaker intended a
distinction or qualification.
6. Disjunctive and conjunctive words
GR: “OR” signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from each of the other things in the enumeration
XPN: Use of “or” may sometimes mean “and” depending
on the warrant of the spirit or context of the law.
PEOPLE v. MARTIN
FACTS:
Maximo Martin, Candido Martin and Rodolfo Higashi
- were accused of violation of Sec. 46 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613 otherwise known as Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act No. 827.
They are conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another and in active aid with
Filipino nationals to unlawfully and feloniously bring in
and carry into the Philippines thirty nine (39) Chinese
aliens who traveled by the Chinese vessel 'Chungking'
from the port of Hongkong and who are not duly admitted
by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to
enter the Philippines, and from the Chinese vessel
'Chungking,' accused took delivery, loaded, and ferried
the Chinese aliens in the vessel 'MARU XI' owned,
operated, under the charge and piloted by them from
outside into the Philippines, surreptitiously landing the
said aliens at Barrio Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union,
Philippines, which place of landing is not a duly
authorized port of entry in the Philippines.
Petitioners - filed a "motion to dismiss" [quash] on the
ground that the CFI of La Union has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged in the said indictment as the court had
been pre-empted from taking cognizance of the case by
the pendency in the CFI of Bulacan of criminal case 6258-
M. This motion was opposed by the prosecution.
ISSUE: Should criminal case A-392 be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction under Sec. 46 of C.A. 613?
HELD:
No. The court a quo erred in refusing to take cognizance
of criminal case A-392. The word “or” in Sec. 40 of C.A.
613, as amended, which punishes “any individual who
shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceals or
harbors any alien not duly admitted by any immigration
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the
Philippines” does not justify giving the word a non-
disjunctive meaning, the words “bring into,” “land,”
“conceals,” and “harbors” being four separate acts each
possessing its distinctive, different and disparate meaning.
The accused in criminal case A-392 are charged only with
bringing in and landing on Philippine soil the 39 aliens,
while the accused in criminal case 6258-M are charged
only with concealing and harboring the said aliens. It is
absurd to draw a conclusion of conspiracy among the
accused in both criminal cases.
7. Word and phrase in relation to other provisions
GR: A word, phrase or provision should not be construed
in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other
provisions of the law.
XPN: The word or provision should not be given a
meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should instead be
construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an
enacting law.
CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Jovito O. Claudio - was the duly elected mayor of Pasay
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on
July 1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the
chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to
discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against
Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed
of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan
chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999,
entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL
OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY
CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito
O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles,
alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition,
to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were
actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2)
most of the signatories were only representatives of the
parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe
the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place
within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case,
2 filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as
mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall
proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the
recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the
members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually
double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of
the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had
withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction.
COMELEC- granted the petition for recall and dismissed
the oppositions against it. The COMELEC ruled that the
petition for recall did not violated the bar on recall within
one year from the elective official's assumption of office,
and that recall is a process which starts with the filing of
the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July
2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner
Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the
petition was filed on time.
ISSUE: Whether the one-year prohibited period in Sec. 74
of the Local Government Code embraces the entire recall
proceedings
HELD:
No. The limited period for recall refers only to the recall
election, excluding proceedings prior thereto. The word
“recall” in Sec. 74 was construed in relation to Sec. 69 of
the Code to the effect that “the power of recall… shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government
unit to which the local elective official belongs.” Since the
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate
recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into
office, the limitation in Sec. 74 must not apply to the
entire recall proceedings.
 enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
8. Meaning of term dictated by context their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
GR: The context may give broad sense a word or it may
limit the meaning. "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
XPN: (1) The context in which the word is used employees and household helpers acting within the scope
oftentimes determines it meaning. of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
(2) A word is to be understood in the context in which iit engaged in any business or industry.
is used. xxx xxx xxx
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v. PHIL. AMERICAN when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
FORWARDERS, INC. observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)"
As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint for damages
based on culpa-aquitiana was filed against the Phil- ISSUE: Whether or not Balingit is covered under Article
American Forwarders, Inc., Fernando Pineda, and Balingit 2180, and therefore liable for culpa aquiliana
as manager of the company. The trial court dismissed the
complaint against Balingit on the ground that he is not the
HELD:
manager of an establishment contemplated in Article 2180
No. The terms “employers” and “owners and managers of
of the Civil Code making owners and managers of an
an establishment or enterprise” under Article 2180 do not
establishment responsible for damages caused by their
include manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from
employees, since Balingit himself may be regarded as an
the context of the said provision that the term “manager”
employee of the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. On
is used in the sense of “employer.” The context may also
appeal, plaintiffs urged that the veil of corporate fiction
limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad
should be pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc.
signification. Hence, under the allegations of the
being merely a business conduit of Balingit, since he and
complaint, Balingit is not liable for torts or quasi-delict as
his wife are the controlling stockholders. The Supreme
manager, in connection with the vehicular accident
Court held that this issue cannot be entertained on appeal,
because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
because it was not raised in the lower court.
dependent of his employer, Phil-Am Forwarders.
FACTS:
9. General words construed generally
Fernando Pineda - drove recklessly a freight truck,
GR: Words of general significance is to be taken in its
owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
ordinary sense. A general statement is understood in a
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
general sense.
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned
XPN: Where a word used in a statue has both a restricted
by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the
and a general meaning, the general must prevail unless the
bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
nature of the subject muster indicates that the limited
damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days,
sense is intended.
thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51.
GATCHALIAN v. COMELEC
Archimedes Balingit- was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
FACTS:
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their
Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian - alleges that he is a candidate
answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the first
district of Rizal, having filed his certificate of candidacy
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be
with the Commission on Elections on September 8, 1970.
dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus
driver had no cause of action against him. As already
Comelec Resolution No. RR-707 – was promulgated by
stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit.
Commission on Elections pursuant to the request of the
The bus company and its driver appealed.
advertising firms and associations of the Philippines,
holding that "donations of billboards to the Commission
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of the Revised
xxx xxx xxx
Election Code."
"The owners and managers of an establishment or
Resolution No. RR-731 – was promulgated by the
Commission on Election pursuant to the request of the
Advertising Council of the Philippines, to the effect that
the ban in Sec. 46 of the Revised Election Code, as
amended, does not cover the projected campaign for funds
and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the
Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120
days immediately preceding a regular or special election;
and "that in line with the ruling in its resolution numbered
RR-707, donations and contributions for the above
campaign may be received from foreigners, companies or
corporations owned and/or controlled wholly or partially
by foreigners.
Petitioner - filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections impugning the validity of said Resolutions Nos.
RR-707 and 731 as violative of Sec. 56 of the Revised
Election Code.
Commission on Elections - denied the petitioner's
petition on the ground "that contributions by foreigners to
the Comelec Billboards Committee for the purpose of
financing costs of Comelec billboards are not made in aid
or support of any particular candidate in a particular
district and that the allocation of space for its candidate is
allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the
result of the election, . . ."
ISSUE: Does the term “foreigner” include both natural
and juridical persons, with or without legal personality?
HELD:
Yes. The word “person” comprehends private juridical
corporation, unless it appears that it is used in a more
limited sense; and the word “person” under a penal statute
which is intended to inhibit an act, must be “a person in
law,” that is, an artificial as well as a natural person. There
is nothing in the Revised Election Code or in Sec. 56 itself,
indicating that the term "foreigner" is limited only to
natural persons. Neither is there any provision in the said
Code expressly or impliedly suggesting that the
circumstances of an artificial person in law are not
identical to those of natural persons covered by the
prohibition. On the contrary, there is greater reason to
believe that the law-maker feared more the assistance and
influence of artificial persons in the elections than the aid
of natural persons. Hence, the law utilizes the more
generic term “foreigner.”
10. Words with technical or legal meaning
GR: Technical and legal meaning of word should be
adopted.
XPN: The presumption is that the language used in a
statute, which has a technical or well-known legal
meaning is used in that sense by the legislature.
RURA v. LOPENA
This case involves the application of the Probation Law
(P.D. No. 968, as amended), more specifically Section 9
thereof which disqualifies from probation those persons:
"(c) who have previously been convicted by
final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and
one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos."
FACTS:
Teodulo Rura - (Petitioner) was accused, tried and
convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on
different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol.
The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was
rendered on August 18, 1983. Rura was sentenced to a
total prison term of seventeen (17) months and twenty-
five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was
three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
Regional Trial Court of Bohol - affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
When the case was remanded to the court of origin for
execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol
on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under
Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation Law quoted above.
The court denied the application for probation. A motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for
probation
HELD:
No. The words “previously convicted” in Sec. 9 (c) of the
Probation Law refer to the date of conviction, not to the
date of commission of the crime. Hence, a person
convicted on the same date of several offenses committed
on different dates but jointly tried is not thereby
disqualified under said provision.
11. Identical words in statute
GR: A word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will
bear the the same meaning throughout the statute.
XPN: A word or phrase is one part of a statute is to
receive the same interpretation when used in every other
part, unles it clearly appears from the context or otherwise
that a different meaning is intended.
LOZADA v. COMELEC
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Jose Mari Eulalio
C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot as a representative suit for\
and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the
election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the
respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up
existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim
Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2),
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
"(2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a
regular election, the Commission on Election
shall call a special election to be held within
sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the unexpired term."
FACTS:

Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada - claims that he is a

taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a
transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires
to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa.

Romeo B. Igot - alleges that, as a tax payer, he has

standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special
election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution.
As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are
". . . deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and
desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of
law . . ."; that they have filed the instant petition "on their
own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject
matters are of profound and general interest."

COMELEC - opposes the petition alleging, substantially,

that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition
for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2)
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and
3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does
not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. And that the
petition must be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973

Constitution applies to interim Batasan Pambansa

HELD:

No. Sec. 5 (2), Article VIII, which calls for special

elections to fill up vacancies, applies only to the regular
Batasan Pambansa. This is evident from the language
thereof which speaks of a vacancy in the Batasan
Pambansa, which means the regular Batasan Pambansa as
the same words “Batasan Pambansa” found in all the
many other sections of Article VIII, undoubtedly refer to
the regular Batasan, not the interim one. A word or phrase
used in one part of a Constitution is to receive the same
interpretation when used in every other part, unless it
clearly appears, from the context or otherwise, that a
different meaning should be applied.