It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA

CITIZENSHIP 9225 is to do away with the provision in CA No. 63 which

takes away Philippine Citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
AASJS vs DATUMANONG
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
FACTS:
foreign country. It does not recognize dual allegiance and
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, the
by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
tasks to implement laws governing citizenship. Petitioner
prays the writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent
from implementing Republic Act No. 9225 entitled “An
JACOT vs. DAL
Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, amending for the
FACTS:
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and
Petitioner, Nestor Jacot, is running for the position of
for Other Purposes.”
Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin. He was a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who became a natural
ISSUE:
citizen of the United States in 1989. Petitioner sought to
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
Section IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, “Dual
entitles “The Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
Act”. He files a request for the administration of his Oath
and shall be dealt with by law.”
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
RULING/DOCTRINE:
California.
NO.
A person is required to take an oath and the last he utters
ISSUE:
is one of allegiance to the country. The problem of dual
Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified from running
allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but
as a candidate in the May 14, 2007 local elections for his
of the other foreign country.
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his
US Citizenship.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
The petitioner’s oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PGC and his
Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with
the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements
to be complied with for different purposes.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective
public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquire it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Oath of allegiance is different from renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
Hence, Section 5(2) of RA 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquire or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of RA 9225, and (2) fore those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.
DAVID vs. AGBAY
FACTS:
The petitioner migrated to Canada in 1974, where he
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, the petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a 600-square meter lot along
the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where
they constructed a residential house. In 2004, they came to
know that the land where they built their house is a public
land and part of the salvage zone. The petitioner then files
a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) and thus, he
indicated that he was a Filipino citizen. The respondent
then opposed the application and said that the petitioner
was a Canadian citizen thus, he is disqualified to own
land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may be indicted for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of the RA 9225, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers
those natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign
citizens after RA 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippines citizenship upon taking the same oath.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship
after the effectivity of this act are considered to have
retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who
lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this
act are considered to have reacquired their citizenship.
The REACQUISITION will apply to those who lost their
Philippine citizenship by virtue of CA No. 63.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian
citizen prior to the effectivity of RA 9225, he belongs to
the first category of natural-born Filipino under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country.
TAN vs. CRISOLOGO
FACTS:
The petitioner was born to Filipino parents and became a
naturalized citizen of the USA. She applied to be a
registered voter in Quezon City and indicated that she was
a Filipino citizen by birth and her application was
approved by the Election Registration Board (ERB). On
November 30, 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in
Makati and the following day, she filed a petition before
the Bureau of Immigration for the reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship and stated that she lost her
citizenship when she became a naturalized American
citizen. She then filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
2010 National Election to run as congresswoman for the
First District of QC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should have been excluded
from the list of registered voters for failure to meet the
citizenship and residency requirement to be registered as a
voter. / Whether or not the petitioner can be considered as
a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
NO.
Given the distinction between citizens who have
“reacquired” from those who “retained” Philippine
citizenship, coupled with the legal effects of renunciation
of citizenship, Section 2 of RA 9225 cannot be used as a
basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. RA
No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be
applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who
became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to
the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections
2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only those
falling under the second paragraph of RA No. 9225 i.e.
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a
foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall
be considered to not have lost their Philippine Citizenship.
In the case at bar, the time that Tan lost here Philippine
Citizenship, RA No. 9225 was not yet enacted and the
applicable law was still CA No. 63. Under this law, both
the renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the
acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign country
through naturalization are grounds to lose Philippine
citizenship. Since the foregoing law was still effective
when Tan became and American citizen, the loss of her
Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As
the applicable law at that time, Tan was presumed to know
the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized US
citizen. The loss of Tan’s Philippine citizenship is
reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her
Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire US
citizenship.

s
 Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
POLICE POWER Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
FACTS:
such roads and streets…” The above provisions of law do
Maximo Calalang, the petitioner, in his capacity as a
not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public
private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila brought before
Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
respondents. It is alleged that the National Traffic
them and under which they promulgated the rules and
Commission, in it resolution, resolved to recommend to
regulations now complained of is not to determine what
the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
public policy demands but merely to carry out tue
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
legislative policy. The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
vehicle be prohibited from passing along Plaza Calderon
is not the etermination of what the law sdhall be, but
de la Barca to Dasmarinas and along Rizal Avenue at
merely the ascertainment of the facts and cicumstances
specific time period.
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
ISSUE:
roads and to determine when and how long a national road
Whether or not the CA No. 548, by which the Director of
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
convenience and interest.
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the
Social justice is “neither communism, nor depotism, nor
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
atomism, nor anarchy” but the humanization of laws and
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
of legislative power.
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception mat at lease be approximated.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
NO.
necessiry of interdependence among divers and diverse
Section 1 of CA No. 548 reads: “To promote safe transit
units of a society and of the protection that should be
upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
designated as national roads by acts of the National
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promiting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and
of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number”
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
RA No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business” nationalizes the retail trade business.
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon
the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and dare-reaching in significance.
The enactment poses questions of due process, police
power, and equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Act is constitutional.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
Police Power – The scope of police power. The
Constitution do not define the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitation thereof. The most important of these are due
proves and the equal protection clause. The basic
limitation of due process and equal protection is found on
Article III, Section 1(1) which states: “No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
low, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Equal Protection meaning – The equal protection of the
law clause is against the undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it
is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Due Process meaning – The due process clause has to do
with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power.
*Due process test: (1) Is there public interest, a
public purpose; is public welfare involved? (2) Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive? (3) Is there sufficient foundation or reason
inconnection with the matter involved; or has there not
been a capricious use of the legislative power? (4) Can the
aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
The petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 12, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Iloilo
for violation of the Executive Order No. 626-A.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the executive order is unconstitutional.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so ir
would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions
of the fundamental law, an “iron rule
laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every
situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.
Due process is defined as nothing more and nothing less
than “the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play”
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare.
Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas.
In conclusion, there is an invalid exercise of police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process in violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. There is also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or draws and issues
any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
It is contended that the statute runs counter to the
inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states “No person
shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax.”
It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act
not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.
The police power of the state has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers” which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating
from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the
state, plenary, “suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing
the state and imposing upon the government limitations
tgo safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order
and welfare.”
DEPED, CULTURE AND SPORTS vs. SAN DIEGO
FACTS:
Private respondent is a student from the University of the
East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology.
ISSUE:
RULING/DOCTRINE:
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the
State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validity
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction
exists between medical students and other students who
are not subjected to the NMAR and the three-flunk rule.
The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
people unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not
require more vigilant regulation.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who
have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
MMDA vs. GARIN
FACTS:
Respondent, Dante Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license was
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila. He then requested the return of his
driver’s license but received no immediate reply and so he
filed a complaint contending that, in the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations, Section 5(f) of RA
No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a
judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5(f) of RA 7924 is valid.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
The petitioner pointed out that a license to operate a motor
vehicle is not a property right but a privilege granted by
the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state
in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the
public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due
process requirements.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the
Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a
“political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF
MANILA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
Test for the validity of an ordinance: (1) It must not
contravene the Constitution; (2) Must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) Must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
Must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has
been purposely veiled in general term to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. It is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people and has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The goal of the Ordinance, in this case, is to minimize if
not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State.
Procedural vs Substantive due process – Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property; it convers itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause; it inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.
Liberty – as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The
term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by the Creator,
subject only to the restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare.”
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL vs. MAYOR OF MANILA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
is violative of the due process clause.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
YES.
Police power is “that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”
The exercise of police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote health, morals, peace, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty, property, in each appropriate
case, be valid.
Due process has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play. It exacts fealty “to those striving for justice” and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch “in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect democratic traditions of legal and political
thought.”
CRAIG vs. BOREN
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not such a gender-based differential
constitutes a denial to male 18-20 year of age of the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING/DOCTRINE: